| NineNilePointUnit2FSAR1.2GENERALPLANTDESCRIPTION1.F1PrincipalDesignCriteriaTheprincipalarchitecturalandengineeringcriteriaforthedesign,construction,andoperationofUnit2aresummarizedinthisSection.Therearetwowaysofconsideringprincipaldesigncriteria:onaclassification-by-classificationbasis,oronasystem-by-system(systemgroup)basis.Safetyanalysesgenerallyutilizetheinformationformattedintheclassification-by-classificationapproachbut/systemdescriptionsaremoreeasilyunderstoodthroughthesystem-by-systemmethod.Thissectionusesbothmethodsforsummarizingtheprincipaldesigncriteria.1.2.1.1GeneralCriteriaSomeofthecriteriaaregenerallyapplicabletomorethanoneclassificationormorethanonesystemgroup.Thesegeneralcriteriaareasfollows:Unit2isdesigned,fabricated,anderectedtoproduceelectricpowerinasafeand.reliablemanner.Unitdesigngenerallyconformswithapplicablecodesandregulations.Exceptionsareevaluatedandjustified.TheGeneralDesignCriteriaof10CFR50AppendixAhavebeensatisfiedintheUnit2design.2.3.Unit2isdesigned,fabricated,anderectedtooperateinsuchawaythatthereleaseofradioactivematerialstotheenvironmentislimitedtolessthanthelimitandguidelinevaluesofapplicablefederalregulationspertainingtothereleaseofradioactivematerialsfornormaloperationsandabnormalevents.Unit2isdesignedtosupportaGEboilingwaterreactor(BWR)andnuclearsteamsupplysystem(NSSS)toproducesteamfordirectuseinaturbinegeneratorunit.Thisdesignincorporates,featurestypicalofmanyotherBWRplants.4.Certainportionsoftheplantaredesignedtowithstandextremenaturalphenomenasuchasearthquakes,flooding,ortornadoes,andunnaturalphenomenasuchasfige,floodingfromin-plantleakage,internallyorexternallygeneratedmissiles,andothers.1.2-1 NineMilePointUnit2FSARThereactorcoreandreactivitycontrolsystemsaredesignedsothatcontrolrodactioniscapableofbringingthecoretosubcriticalconditionandmaintainingit,evenwiththerodofhighestreactivityworthfullywithdrawnandunavailableforinsertion.Designmarginsforthenuclearsafetysystemsandengineeredsafeguardsareconservative.Nuclearabnormaldamage.environsmaterialAppendixsafetysystemsaredesignedtorespondtooperationtransientstoprecludefuel'nyfissionproductsreleasedtothevianormaldischargepathsforradioactivewillnotexceedthelimitsof10CFR50I.Nuclearsafetysystemsandengineeredsafeguardsaredesignedtoassurethatnodamagetothereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)resultsfrominternalpressurescausedbyabnormaloperationaltransientsoraccidents.Wherepositive,preciseactionisimmediatelyrequiredinresponsetoaccidents,suchactionisautomaticandrequiresnodecisionormanipulationofcontrolsbystationoperationspersonnel.Essentialsafetyactionsarecarriedoutbysafety-relatedequipmentofsufficientredundancyandindependencesothatnosinglefailureofactivecomponentscanpreventrequiredactions.Anysinglefailurewithinthesafety-relatedprotectionsystemshalln'otpreventproperprotectiveactionatthesystemlevelwhenrequired.Provisionshavebeenmadeforcontrolofthecomponentsofnuclearsafetysystemsandengineeredsafeguardsfromthecontrolroom.CNuclearsafetysystemsandengineeredsafeguardsaredesignedtopermitdemonstrationoftheirfunctionalperformancerequirements.Unit2featuresessentialtothemitigationofaccidentconsequencesaredesigned,fabricated,anderectedtoqualitystandardsthatreflecttheimportanceofthesafetyfunctiontobeperformed.1.2-2 NineMilePointUnit2FSARI1.2'~2PowerGenerationDesignCriteriaPrincipalpowergenerationdesigncriteriaareasfollows:1.Fuelcladding'designedtoretainintegrityasaradioactivematerialbarrierthroughoutthefulloperationalrangeoftheplantandanyabnormaloperationtransient.Thefuelcladdingisdesignedtoaccommodate,withoutlossofintegrity,pressuresgeneratedbyfissiongasesreleasedfromfuelmaterialthroughoutthedesignlifeofthefuel.2.Heatremovalsystemsareprovidedinsufficientcapacityandredundancytoremoveheatgeneratedinthereactorcoreforthefullrangeofnormaloperatingconditionsfromplantshutdowntodesignpower,andalsoforanyabnormaloperational"transient.Thecapacity'fsuchsystemsisadequatetopreventfuelcladdingdamage.3.Backupheatremovalsystemsareprovidedtoremovedecayheatgeneratedinthecoreundercircumstanceswherenormaloperationalheatremovalsystemshavebecomeinoperative.Thecapacityofsuchsystemsisadequatetopreventfuelcladdingdamage.4Controlequipmentisprovidedtoallowthereactortorespondautomaticallytomajororminorloadchangesandotherabnormaloperationaltransients,includingbringingthereactortoahotshutdowncondition.5.Reactorpowerlevelismanuallycontrolled.6.ControloftheNSSS,includingthereactor,is'ossiblefromasinglelocation.NSSSandreactorcontrols,includingalarms,arearrangedtoallowtheoperatortorapidlyassesstheconditionofthenuclearsystemandlocateprocesssystemmalfunctions.8.Fuelhandlingandstoragefacilitiesaredesignedtomaintainadequateshielding,cooling,andwaterqualityforspentfuelandtopreventinadvertentcriticality.Amendment211.2-3September1985 NineMilePointUnit2FSARInterlocksorotherautomaticequipmentareprovidedasbackuptoproceduralcontrolstoavoidconditionsrequiringthefunctioningofnuclearsafetysystemsorengineeredsafeguards.SafetyDesignCriteriaThe.unitisdesigned,fabricated,anderectedtooperatesothatthereleaseofradioactivematerialstotheenvironmentissignificantlylessthantherequirementsof10CFR20or10CFR100.ThoseportionsofthenuclearsystemthatformpartoftheRCPBaredesignedtoretainintegrityasaradioactivebarrierfollowingabnormaloperationaltransientsoranaccidentevent.Thereactorcoreisdesignedsoitsnuclearcharacteristicsdo,notcontributetoadivergentpowertransient.TheNSSSandsupportingsystemsaredesignedsothatthereisnotendencyfordivergentoscillationofanyoperatingcharacteristic,consideringtheinteractionofthenuclearsystemwithotherappropriateunitsystems'aseous,liquid,andsolidwastedisposalfaci'litiesaredesignedsothedischargeofradioactiveeffluentsandoffsiteshipmentofradioactivematerialscanbemadeinaccordancewithapplicableregulations'esignoftheradwastesystemprovidesmeansbywhichUnit2operatorscanbealertedwhenlimitsonthereleaseofradioactivematerialareapproached.Sufficientindicationsareprovidedtodeterminethatthereactorisoperatingwithinthelimitsofapplicableregulationsinanymodeofunitoperations.Adequateradiationshieldingisprovidedandaccesscontrolpatternsareestablishedtoallowaproperlytrainedoperatingstafftocontrolradiationdosesto-alevelthatisaslowasreasonablyachievableduringnormaloperation.1.2-4 NineMilePointUnit2FSAREssentialsafetyactionsaredesignedtobecarriedoutbyequipmentofsufficientredundanceandindependencethatnosinglefailurecanpreventtherequiredactions.Anysinglefailurewithintheprotectionsystemshallnotpreventproperactionatthesystemlevelwhenrequired.Provisionsaremadeforcontrolofthecomponentsofnuclearsafetysystemsfromthecontrolroom.Nuclearsafetysystemsaredesignedtodemonstratefunctionalperformancerequirements.1Thedesignofnuclearsafetysystemsincludesdesignallowancesforenvironmentaldisturbancesatthesitesuchasearthquakes,floods,highwinds,stormsandotherdisturbancessuchasfireandfloodingfromleakageoffluidsystems,internallyandexternallygeneratedmissiles,andothers.Standbyelectricalpowersourcesareofsufficientcapacitytopowerall-necessarynuclearsafetysystemsrequiringelectricalpower.Standbyacanddcpowersourcesareprovidedtoremovedecayheatwhentheoffsitepowersupplyisnotavailable.EngineeredsafeguardsaredesignedtoassurethatnodamagetotheRCPBresultsfrominternalpressurescausedbyanaccidentorabnormaltransient.Aprimarycontainmentisprovidedthatcompletelyenclosesthereactorvessel.Theprimarycontainmentusesthepressuresuppressionconcept.Theprimarycontainmentisdesignedtoretainintegrityasaradioactivematerialbarrierduringandfollowingaccidentsthatreleaseradioactivematerialintotheprimarycontainmentvolume.Itispossibletotestprimary.containmentintegrityandleaktightnessatperiodicintervals.Areactorbuildingisprovidedthatcompletelyenclosesboththeprimarycontainmentandthefuelstorageareas.Thesecondarycontainmentincludesamethodforcontrollingreleaseofradioactivematerialsfromthebarrierandincludesacapabilityforfilteringradioactivematerialswithinthebarrier.1.2-5 NineMilePointUnit2FSAR18.Thereactorbuildingisdesignedtoactasaradioactivematerialbarrier,ifrequired,whentheprimarycontainmentisopenforexpectedoperationalpurposes.19.Theprimarycontainmentandreactorbuilding,inconjunctionwithotherengineeredsafeguards,limitsradiologicaleffectsofaccidentsresultinginthereleaseofradioactivematerialtotheprimarycontainmentvolumetosignificantlylessthantherequirementsof10CFR100.20.Provisionsaremadeforremovingenergyfromwithintheprimarycontainmenttomaintaintheintegrityoftheprimarycontainmentsystemfollowingaccidentsthatreleaseenergytotheprimarycontainment.21.Pipingthatpenetratestheprimarycontainmentstructureandservesasapathfortheuncontrolledreleaseofradioactivematerialtotheenvironsisautomaticallyisolatedwheneversuchpotentialforradioactivematerialreleaseexists.Suchisolationiseffectedintimetolimitradiologicaleffectstosignificantlylessthantherequirementsof10CFR100.22.Theemergencycorecoolingsystem(ECCS)isprovidedtolimitfuelcladdingtemperatureto2,200Fasaresultofaloss-of-coolantaccident(IOCA).23.TheECCSprovidesforcontinuityofcorecoolingoverthecompleterangeofpostulatedbreaksizesintheRCPB.24.TheECCSisdiverse,reliable,andredundant.25.-OperationoftheECCSisinitiatedautomaticallywhenrequired,'regardlessoftheavailabilityofoffsitepower.26.Themaincontrolroomisshieldedagainstradiationtopermitcontinuedoccupancyunderaccidentconditions.27.Intheeventthatthemaincontrolroombecomesuninhabitable,itispossibletobringthereactorfrompowerrangeoperationtoacoldshutdown1.2-6 NineMilePointUnit2FSARconditionbymanipulatinglocalcontrolsandequipmentavailableoutsidethemaincontrolroom.28.Backupreactorshutdowncapabilityisprovidedindependentofnormalreactivitycontrolprovisions.Thisbackupsystemshutsdownthereactorfromanynormaloperatingconditionandmaintainstheshutdowncondition.I1.2.1.3System-by-SystemApproachTheprincipalarchitecturalandengineeringcriteriafordesignaresummarizedbelowonasystem-by-systemorsystem-groupbasis.Thesystem-by-systempresentationfacilitatesunderstandingoftheactualdesignofanyonesystem.Onlythemostrestrictiveofanyrelatedcriteriaarestatedforasystem.Wherethemostrestrictivecriterionisclassifiedasapowergenerationconsideration,lessrestrictivesafetycriteriamaynotbestatedinthesystem-by-systempresentation.However,theactualdesignofasystemmustreflectallcriteriathatpertaintoit.1.2.1.3.1NuclearSystemCriteriaPrincipaldesigncriteriaforthereactor,ECCS,RCPB,andreactivitycontrolsystemsareasfollows:ThenuclearsystemisdesignedtosupportaGEBWRratedat3,323MWt.2.Fuelcladdingisdesignedtoretainintegrityasaradioactivematerialbarrierthroughoutthedesignpowerrange.Fuelcladdingisdesignedtoaccommodate,without.lossofintegrity,thepressuresgeneratedbythefissiongasesreleasedfromfuelmaterialthroughoutthedesignlifeofthefuel.3.Fuelcladding,inconjunctionwithotherunitsystems,isdesignedtoretainintegritythroughoutanyabnormaloperationaltransient.ThoseportionsofthenuclearsystemthatformpartoftheRCPBaredesignedtoretainintegrityasaradioactivematerialbarrierfollowingabnormaloperationaltransientsandaccidents.5.HeatremovalsystemsincludingtheECCSandmakeupwatersuppliesareprovidedinsufficientcapacity,redundancy,andoperationaladequacytoremoveheat1%27 NineMilePointUnit2FSARgeneratedinthereactorcoreforthefullrangeofnormaloperationalconditionsfromunitshutdowntodesignpowerandforanyabnormaloperationaltransientoraccident.Thecapacityofsuchsystemsisadequatetopreventfuelcladdingdamage.6.Thereactorcoreandreactivitycontrolsystemisdesignedto-ensurethatcontrolrodactioniscapableofbringingthecoresubcriticalandmaintainingitthus,evenwiththerodofhighestreactivityworthfullywithdrawnandunavailableforinsertion.Analternatereactivitycontrolsystemisprovidedshouldthecontrolrodsordrivesystembecomeinoperable.Thealternatesystemiscapableofshuttingdownthereactorandmaintainingitsubcritical.7.Thereactorcoreis'designedsothat,itsnuclearcharacteristicsdonotcontributeto'divergentpowertransient.8.Thenuclearsystemisdesignedsothereisnotendencyfordivergentoscillationofanyoperatingcharacteristic,consideringtheinteractionofthenuclearsystemwith'otherappropriateunitsystems.1.2.1.3.2PowerConversionSystems.CriteriaComponentsofthepowerconversionsystemsaredesignedtoperformthesebasicobjectives:Reliablyproduceelectricalpowerfromthesteamsuppliedbythereactor,condensethesteamintowater,andreturnthewatertothereactorasheatedfeedwater,withamajorportionofitsgaseousandparticulateimpuritiesremoved.2.Assurethatanyfissionproductsorradioactivityassociatedwiththesteamandcondensateduringnormaloperationoraccidentconditionsaresafelycontainedwithinthesystemorarereleasedundercontrolledconditionsinaccordancewithwastedisposalregulations.1.2-8 NineMilePointUnit2FSAR1.2.1.3.3ElectricalPowerSystemsDesignCriteriaSufficientpreferredandstandbyacanddcpowersourcesareprovidedtoattainpromptshutdownandcontinuedmaintenanceoftheunitinasafeconditionunderallcrediblecircumstances.Powersourcesareadequatetoaccomplishallrequiredengineeredsafeguardfunctionsunderpostulateddesignbasisaccidentconditions.1.2.1.3.4RadwasteSystemDesignCriteriaRadwastesystemsaredesignedtolimitreleaseofradioactivematerialsfromtheunitduringnormaloperationtosignificantlylessthantherequirementsof10CFR20,andwithintheguidelinesofAppendixIto10CFRSO.Gaseous,liquid,,andsolidwastedisposalsystemsaredesignedsothatoffsiteshipmentswillbeinaccordancewithapplicableregulations,including10CFR20,10CFR71,and49CFR171through179,asappropriate.3.Thedesignprovidesmeansbywhichunitoperationspersonnelcanbealertedwheneveroperationallimitsonthereleaseofradioactivematerialareapproached.1.2.1.3.5AuxiliarySystemsDesignCriteriaAuxiliarysystemsareprovidedtosupporttheNSSSandpowergenerationsystemtoprovideformaintenanceoftheplantenvironment,in-plantradiationandairbornecontaminationcontrol,compressedairsupplies,sealingsteam,etc.2.Essentialauxiliarysystemsaredesignedtofunctionduringaccidentconditions.1.2.1.3.6ShieldingandAccessControlDesignCriteriaRadiationshieldingisprovidedandaccesscontrolpatternsareestablishedtoallowaproperlytrainedoperatingstafftocontrolradiationdoseswithinthelimitsofpublishedregulationsduringnormaloperation.Shieldingdesign,equipmentlayout,andzoninghavebeenperformedtoensureradiationdosesaremaintainedaslowasreasonablyachievable.1.2-9 NineNilePointUnit2FSAR2.Themaincontrolroomisshieldedagainst,radiationsothatinconjunctionwiththecontrolroomairconditioningsystemoccupancyisallowedunderaccidentconditions.1.2.1.3.7NuclearSafetySystemsandEngineeredSafeguardsDesignCriteriaPrincipaldesigncriteriafornuclearsafetysystemsandengineeredsafeguardsareasfollows:1.Thesecriteriacorrespondto10CFR50GeneralDesignCriteria1through64asdescribedinSection3.1.2~2.Standbyacanddcpowersourcesare,designedtohavesufficientcapacitytopowerallnecessarynuclearsafetysystemsandengineeredsafeguardsrequiringelectricalpower.3.Standbyacpowersources-areprovidedtoallowreactorshutdownandremovalofdecayheatwhenoffsitepowerisnotavailable.lntheeventthatthemaincontrolroomisuninhabitable,itispossibletobringthereactorfrompowerrangeoperationtoacoldshutdownconditionbyuseoftheshutdownroomormanipulatinglocalcontrolsandequipmentthatareavailableoutsidethecontrolroom.5.Backupreactorshutdowncapabilityisprovidedindependentlyofnormalreactivitycontrolprovisions.Thisbackupsystemhasthecapabilitytoshutdownthereactorfromanynormalorupsetoperatingconditionandsubsequentlytomaintaintheshutdowncondition.1.2.1.3.8ProcessControlSyst:emDesignCriteriaPrincipaldesigncriteriaforprocesscontrolsystemsarelistedasfollows:NSSSProcessControlDesinCriteria1.Controlequipmentisprovidedtoallowthereactortorespondautomaticallytoloadchangeswithindesignlimits.1.2-10 NineMilePointUnit2FSAR2.Controlsareprovidedtomanuallycontrolreactorpowerlevel.3.Controlofthenuclearsystemispossiblefrom-a--single"location.Nuclearsystemsprocesscontrolsandalarmsarearrangedtoallowtheoperatortorapidlyassesstheconditionofthenuclearsystemandtolocateprocesssystemmalfunctions.5.Interlocksorotherautomaticequipmentareprovidedasabackuptoproceduralcontrolstoavoidconditionsr'equiringactuationofnuclearsafetysystemsorengineeredsafeguards.PowerConversionSstemsProcessControlDesinCriteriaControlequipmentisprovidedtocontrolreactorpressurethroughoutitsoperatingrange.2.Theturbineiscapableofrespondingautomaticallytominorchangesinload.3.,Thefeedwatersystemiscontrolledtomaintainthewaterlevelinthereactorvesselattheoptimumlevelrange.4Controlofthepowerconversionequipmentispossiblefromonelocation.5.Interlocksorother,automaticequipmentareprovidedasabackuptoproceduralcontrolstoavoidconditionsrequiringtheactuationofnuclearsafetysystemsorengineeredsafeguards.ElectricalPowerSstemProcessControlDesinCriteriaThesafety-related(Class1E)electricalpowersystemisdesignedasathree-divisionsystem,anytwooutofthreedivisionsbeingadequatetosafelyshutdowntheunit.2.Theprotectionsystemisdesignedtodetectandisolatefaultedequipmentfromthesystemwithaminimumofdisturbanceintheeventofanyfaultinthesystem.Amendment211.2-11September1985 NineMilePointUnit2FSAR3.Intheeventofalossofoffsitepowertheprotectionsystemisolatestheemergencybusesfromtheoffsitesystemandinitiatesthestartingofthestandbyacpowersources.4.IntheeventoflossofoffsitepowerandLOCAtheprotectionsystemisolatesthe:emergencybusesfromtheoffsitesystemandthenormalelectricalsystem,andthestandbydieselgeneratorsarestartedandsequentiallyloadedbyaprogrammedcontrolsystemtoenergizeallsafety-relatedloads.5.Allelectrically-operatedbreakersarecontrollablefromthecontrolroom.6'.Meteringforgenerators,transformers,andotheressentialcircuitsisavailableinthecontrolroom.1.2.2SiteDescription1.2.2.1SiteCharacteristics:SiteLocationandSizeTheprojectsitecomprisesapproximately364ha(900acres)andislocatedonthesouthshoreofLakeOntariointhetownofScriba,OswegoCounty,NY,onlandownedbytheNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation(NMPC).TheNineMilePointNuclearStation-Unit2(Unit2)sharesthesitewithexistingUnit1;Unit2andsupportfacilitiesoccupyabout18.2ha(45acres)ofthetotalsiteacreage.TheJamesA.FitzPatrickplant,ownedbytheNYPA,islocatedeastoftheprojectsite.Thecenterline-to-centerlinedistancebetweenUnit2andtheFitzPatrickplantreactorsisabout716m(2,350ft).ThedistancebetweentheNineMilePointUnit1andUnit2reactorcenterlinesisabout274m(900ft).ThesiteplanisshownonFigure1.2-1.AllactivitiesatthesiteareunderthedirectcontrolofNMPC"'.1.2.2.2AccesstotheSiteTheprotectedareaofthesiteisisolatedfromthesurroundingareabyfencing.Accesstothesiteiscontrolledatthegateofthemainentrancetotheplantbysecuritypersonnel.Allothergatesarekeptlocked"'.USARRevision41.2-12October1992 NineMilePointUnit2FSAR1~2.2.3DescriptionoftheSiteandEnvironsMostofthelandimmediatelytothesouthandwestofthesiteispastureorinactivefarmland.Fortheregionwest,south,andeastofthesite,thecountryischaracterizedbyrollingterrainrisinggentlyupfromLakeOntariowhichliesimmediatelytothenorthofthesite.Withinanapproximate8-km(5-mi)radiusofUnit2,the1980populationwas3,468.Thepopulationforthissameareaisprojectedtobe5,301in1990and7,213in2010.ThenearestdwellingsareonLakeviewRoadapproximately1.6km(1mi)fromthestation.TheOntarioBibleConferenceoperatesasummercamponthelakefrontadjacenttothewesternboundaryofthesite'swego,whichisthenearestcity,islocatedabout10km(6.2mi)southwestofthesiteandhada1980populationof19,793.Thenearestpopulationcenterwithapopulationinexcessof25,000isthecityofSyracuse,approximately53km(32.8mi)southeastofthesite.Buffaloisapproximately217km(135mi)westofthesite.Figure2.1-1showsthelocationofthesiterelativetothelargercitiesinNewYorkStatewhicharewithinthe80-km(50-mi)radiusofthesite.1.2.3StructuresandEquipmentThebuildingsandstructuresessentialtothesafeoperationandshutdownoftheplantaredesignedtowithstandextremeenvironmentalandabnormalloadingconditions.Thestructuresand/orportionsthereofsodesignatedaredesignedtoprovidetheprotectionasrequiredfromtornadoes,missiles,earthquakes,pipewhip,andinternalorexternalflooding.AdditionaldiscussionsofdesignconsiderationsarefoundinChapter3.LocationsandorientationofthestructuresareshownonFigures1.2-1and1.2-2.ThegeneralarrangementofpersonnelaccessbetweenstructuresisshownonFigures1.2-3through1.2-5.ThegeneralarrangementofthemajorstructuresandequipmentisshownonFigures1.2-6through1.2-40.Theprincipalstructureslocatedatthesitearelistedbelowalongwiththebriefdescriptionofthemajorequipment,withineachstructure.Theprimarycontainmentstructure(Figures1.2-6'through1.2-12)housesthereactorpressurevessel,reactor1.2-13 NineMilePointUnit,2FSARrecirculationpumpsandmotors,drywellcoolingsystemunit,coolers,safetyreliefvalves,accumulators,andotherequipment.Thereactorbuildingandauxiliarybays(Figures-1.2-6throughl.2-12)enclosetheprimarycontainmentstructure.ThesestructureshousetheremainingportionsoftheNSSS,refuelingandfuelstorageequipment,controlroddrive(CRD)hydraulicunits,equipmentforthereactorwatercleanupsystem(RWCU),equipmentforthestandbyliquidcontrolsystem(SLCS),equipmentforthereactorbuildingclosedloopcoolingwatersystem,andotherequipment.Theradwastebuilding(Figures1.2-13and1.2-14)housesprimarilythetanksandequipmentassociatedwiththeliquidandsolidradwastesystems.Thecontrolbuilding(Figures1.2-15and1.2-16)housesthemaincontrolroom,standbyswitchgear,batteriesandassociatedinstrumentation,cables,andequipment.Thedieselgeneratorbuilding(Figures1.2-17and1.2-18)housesthreestandbydieselgenerators,dieseloilstoragetanks,andassociatedcontrolsandinstrumentation.Theturbinebuildingincludingheaterbay(Figures1'-19through1.2-25)housestheturbinegenerator,condensers,moistureseparatorreheater,condensatedemineralizersystem,feedwaterheaters,steamjetairejectors,reactorfeedpumps,turbinebuildingclosedloopcoolingwatersystem,andmiscellaneoustanksandequipmenttosupportthepowerconversionsystemandotherrelatedsystems.Thescreenwellbuilding(Figures1.2-26through1.2-28)housesthecirculatingwaterpumpsandtheservicewaterpumpswithassociatedequipmentandinstrumentation.Theintakeanddischargetunnelsandintakestructures(Figures1.2-29'and1.2-30)areusedfortransportingservicewatertoandfromthelake.Theintaketunnelsalsosupplymakeupwaterforthecirculatingwatersystem.Themainstack(Figure1.2-31)isusedtoprovideelevatedreleaseofgasesfromtheoff-gas,standbygastreatment,andothersystems.Theoff-gasregenerationandcondensatedemineralizerrooms(Figures1.2-19through1.2-25)housethecatalyticrecombiners,off-gasfilter,condensatedemineralizer,andrelatedequipment.1.2-14 NineMilePointUnit2FSARThenormalswitchgearbuilding(Figures1.2-32and1.2-33)housesthenormalswitchgearandassociatedequipment.Theauxiliaryboilerbuilding(Figure1.2-34),locatednorthofthescreenwellbuilding,housestheelectricboilersandaccessoriestosupplysteamtotheplantduringshutdown.Thestandbygastreatmentbuildingandrailroadaccessarea(Figures1~2-35and1.2-36)housethestandbygastreatment,filtersandassociatedequipmentandallowaccessforspentfuelshipping.IThecondensatestoragetankbuilding(Figure1.2-37)housesthecondensatestoragetanksandassociatedequipment.Thenatural-draftcoolingtower(Figures1.2-38and1.2-39)providesthenormalheat,sinkforheattransferredtothecirculatingwatersystemfromthemaincondensers.Theauxiliaryservicebuilding(Figures1.2-7and1.2-8),adjacenttothereactorbuilding,housestheHVACroomanddecontaminationandshowerfacilitiesforpersonnel.Thedecontaminationarea(Figures1.2-19through1.2-21,1.2-23,and1.2-24),immediatelysouthoftheradwastebuilding,providesthefacilityfordecontaminationoflargetoolsandequipment,andasampleroom.Italsohousescleansteamreboilersandrelatedequipment.Thehydrogenstoragearea(forhydrogencoolingoftheturbinegenerator,Figure1.2-40)islocatedwestoftheoff-gasarea.Thehydrogenstoragebottlesaremountedonconcrete.padsandareinafencedarea.1.2.4NuclearSteamSupplySystemThenuclearsystemincludesadirect.-cycle,forcedcirculation,GEBWRthatproducessteamfordirectuseinthesteamturbine.AheatbalanceshowingthemajorparametersofthenuclearsystemforthewarrantedpowerconditionisshownonFigure1.1-1.ThenuclearsteamsupplysystemisfurtherdiscussedinChapters4and5.1.2.4.1ReactorCoreandControlRodsThereactorfuelandcoredesignaredescribedinSe'ction2ofReference5andSection1ofReference6.Amendment211.2-15September1985 NineMilePointUnit2FSARExperiencehasshownthatthecontrolrodsare.notsusceptibletodistortionandhaveanaveragelifeexpectancymanytimestheresidencetimeofafuelloading.1.2.4.2ReactorVesselandInternalsThereactorvesselcontainsthecoreandsupportingstructures;thesteamseparatorsanddryers;thejetpumps;thecontrolrodguidetubes;thedistributionlinesforthefeedwater,coresprays,andstandbyliquidcontrol;theincoreinstrumentation;andothercomponents.Themainconnectionstothevesselincludethesteamlines,coolantrecirculationlines,feedwaterlines,CRDandincorenuclearinstrumenthousings,corespraylines,residualheatremovallines,standbyliquidcontrolline,coredifferentialpressureline,jetpumppressuresensinglines,andwaterlevelinstrumentation.Thereactorvesselisdesignedandfabricatedinaccordancewithapplicablecodesforapressureof1,250psig.Thenominaloperatingpressureinthesteamspaceabovetheseparatorsis1,020psia.Thevesselisfabricatedoflow-alloysteelandiscladinternallywithstainlesssteel(exceptforthetopheadnozzlesandnozzleweldzoneswhichareunclad).Thereactorcoreiscooledbydemineralizedwaterthatentersthelowerportionofthecoreandboilsasitflowsupwardaroundthefuelrods.Thesteamleavingthecoreisdriedbysteamseparatorsanddryerslocatedintheupperportionofthe.reactorpressurevessel(RPV).Thesteamisthendirectedtotheturbinethroughthemainsteamline'.Eachsteamlinehastwoisolationvalvesinseries,oneoneithersideoftheprimarycontainmentbarrier.Amendment211.2-16September1985 NineMilePointUnit2FSAR1.2.4.3ReactorRecirculationSystemThereactorrecirculationsystemconsistsoftworecirculationpumploopsexternaltotheRPV.These,loopsprovidethepipingpathforthedrivingflowofwatertotheRPV~jetpumps.Eachexternalloopcontainsonehighcapacitymotor-drivenrecirculationpump,twomotor-operatedmaintenancevalves,andonehydraulicallyoperatedflowcontrolvalve.Thevariablepositionhydraulicflowcontrolvalveoperatesinconjunctionwithalow.frequencymotorgeneratorsettocontrolreactorpowerlevelthroughtheeffectsof'coolantflowrateonmoderatorvoid.content.ThejetpumpsareRPVinternals.Theyprovideacontinuousinternalcirculationpathforthemajorportionofthecorecoolantflow.Thejetpumpsarelocatedintheannularregionbetweenthecoreshroudandthevesselinnerwall.Anyrecirculationlinebreakstillallowscorefloodingtoapproximatelytwo-thirdsofthecoreheight,theleveloftheinletofthejetpumps.1.2.4.4ResidualHeatRemovalSystemTheresidual,heatremoval(RHR)systemisasystemofpumps,heatexchangers,andpipingthatfulfillsthefollowingfunctions:1~Remove'sdecayandsensibleheatduringandafterplantshutdown.2.InjectswaterintotheRPVfollowingaLOCAtorefloodthe,coreindependentlyofothercore.coolingsystems.3.RemovesheatfromtheprimarycontainmentfollowingaLOCA,tolimittheincreaseinprimarycontainmentpressure.Thisisaccomplishedbycoolingandrecirculating"thesuppres'sionpoolwater.andbysprayingthedrywellandsuppressionpoolairspaceswithsuppressionpoolwater.1.2.4.5ReactorWaterCleanupSystemTheRWCUsystemrecirculatesaportionofreactorcoolantthroughafilter-demineralizertoremoveparticulateanddissolved.impuritiesfromthe.reactorcoolant.Italsoremovesexcesscoolantfromthereactorsystemundercontrolledconditions.1.2-17 NineMilePointUnit2FSAR1.2.4.6NuclearLeakDetectionSystemThenuclearleakdetectionandmonitoringsystemconsistsoftemperature,pressure,flow,andfission-productsensorswithassociatedinstrumentationandalarms.Thissystemdetectsandannunciatesleakageinthefollowing.systems:1~Mainsteamlines.2.Reactorwatercleanupsystem.3.Residualheatremovalsystem.4.Reactorcoreisolationcooling(RClC)system.5.Feedwatersystem.6.Emergencycorecoolingsystems~7.Miscellaneoussystems.Smallleaksgenerallyaredetectedbymonitoringareatemperatures,radiationlevels,anddcainsumpfillupandpumpoutrates.Largeleaksarealsodetectedbychangesinreactorwaterlevel,primarycontainmentpressureandchangesinflowratesinprocesslines.1.2.5Electrical,Instrumentation,andControlSystems1.2.5.1ElectricalPowerSystemTheplantelectricalpowersystemconsistsoftheunitgenerator,theswitchyard,andtheunitauxiliarypowerdistributionsystem.'ITheunitgeneratorisconnecteddirectlytothegeneratorstep-up.transformersandthenormalstationservicetransformerthroughisolatedphasebusduct.Thegeneratorstep-uptransformersstepuptheoutputoftheunitgeneratorfrom25kVtoanominal345-kVtransmissionsystemvoltage.Thenormalstationservicetransformerstepsdowntheunitgeneratorvoltagefrom25to13.8kVandprovidesanonsite(ac)powersourcetotheunitauxiliarypower~distributionsystem.Theswitchyardhastwoseparateandindependentsections:the345-kVswitchyardandthe115-kVswitchyard.Theoutputofthegeneratorstep-up.transformersisconnectedtothe345-kVswitchyardwhichconnectstheunitAmendment181.2-18March1985 NineMilePointUnit2FSARgeneratortotheoutgoingtransmissionsystem.-The115-kVswitchyardreceivespowerfromtwoseparateoffsitepowersourcesthrough'wophysicallyandelectricallyindependentincomingcircuits.'hetwocircuitsfeed'twoseparatereservestationservicetransformersandanauxiliaryboilertransformer.Thereser'vestationservicetransformersstepdowntheoffsitepowerfrom115to13.8and4.16kV,andprovidetwoindependent"offsitepowersourcesfortheunitauxiliary-powerdistributionsystem.Theauxiliaryboilertransformerstepsdowntheoffsitepowerfrom115to13.8and4.16kV.Its'3.8-kVwindingsuppliespowertotheauxiliaryboilerandassociatedequipment;the4.16-kVtertiarywindingprovidesabackupsource'ortheemergency4.16-kVbuses.Theunitauxiliarypowerdistributionsystemfeedsallunitauxiliaryloadsthrough13.8-kVswitchgear,4.16-kVswitchgear,600-Vloadcenters,600-Vmotorcontrolcenters,andvariousacanddcdistributionpanels.Thesystemisdivided'into'nuclearnonsafety-relatedandnuclearsafety-relatedsystems.Thenuclearnonsafety-relatedauxiliarypower'distributionsystemfeedsallnon-Class1Eunitauxiliaryloads.'ndernormalplantoperatingconditions,itisenergizedfromthenormalstationservicetransformer..''During'-startupandnormalshutdownconditions,it.isenergizedfromoffsitepowersourcesthroughreservestationservicetransformers'normal125-Vdcsystem,consistingofbatteries,batterychargers,anddistributionpanels,providesareliablesourceofpowerforprotection,control,andinstrumentationloadsanddcmotorsundernormalandemergencyconditionsoftheplant.Ai24-Vdcsystemprovides'areliablesourcefortheneutronmonitoringsystem.Thenuclearsafety-relatedauxiliarypowerdistributionsystemsuppliesallClass1Eunitauxiliaryloads.Thissystemis,dividedintothreeindependentdivisions.DivisionIandDivisionIIareindependentredundantdivisionsandsupplyallnuclearsafety-relatedauxiliaryloadsexceptthehighpressurecorespray(HPCS)system.TheHPCSsystem,andrelatedequipmentaresuppliedbyDivision.III..Allthreedivisionsarenormallyenergizedfromtheoffsitepowersourcesthroughreservestationservicetransformers.TheauxiliaryboilertransformercanbeconnectedmanuallytoactasabackupsourceforeithertheDivisionIorDivisionIIsupply.Eachofthethreedivisionsofthenuclearsafety-relatedauxiliarypowerdistributionsystemshasitsownindependentstandbydieselgenerator.IntheeventofaLOCAand/or1.2-19 NineMilePointUnit2FSAR.lossofoffsitepower,eachdivisionisenergizedfromits,,ownstandbydieselgenerator.A125-Vemergency.dcpower;systemfeedsallsafety-relateddc,protection,control,andinstrumentationloadsandsafety-relateddcmotorsundernormal.operationoftheplantaswellasduringemergency.conditions.,Thesystemisdividedintothree,independentdivisionseachconsistingofitsownbattery,primaryandbackupbatterychargers,switchgear,motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionpanels.Eachdivisionfeedsthedc.loadsassociatedwiththe.correspondingdivisionsofthenuclearsafety-relatedauxiliarypowerdistributionsystem.tChapter8describestheelectrical,powersystemindetail.1.2.5.2NuclearSystemProcessControlandInstrumentationReactorManualControlSstemThereactormanualcontrolsystem(RMCS)providesthemeansbywhichcontrolrodsarepositionedfromthecontrolroomforpowercontrol.Thesystemoperatesvalvesineachhydrauliccontrolunittochangecontrolrodposition.Onecontrolrodcanbemanipulatedatatime.TheRMCSincludesthelogicthatrestrictsabnormalcontrolrodmovement(rodblock)undercertainconditionsasabackuptoproceduralcontrols.RecirculationFlowControlSstemPfDuringnormalpoweroperation,avariablepositiondischargevalveisused'tocontrolflow.Adjustingthisvalvechangesthecoolantflowratethroughthecoreandtherebychangesthecorepowerlevel.NeutronMonitorinSstem!'heneutronmonitoringsystem(NMS)isasystemofincoreneutrondetectorsandout-of-coreelectronicmonitoringequipment.Thesystemprovidesindicationofneutronflux,which'anbecorrelatedtothermalpowerlevelfortheentirerangeoffluxconditionsthatcanexistinthecore.Thesourcerangemonitors(SRMs)andthe"intermediaterangemonitors(IRMs)providefluxlevelindicationsduringreactorstartupandlow-poweroperation.Thelocalpowerrangemonitors(LPRMs)andaveragepowerrangemonitors(APRMs)allowassessmentoflocalandoverallfluxconditionsduringpowerrangeoperation.Thetraversingincoreprobe(TIP)'systemprovidesa'eanstocalibratetheUSARRevision01.2-20April1989 NineMilePointUnit2FSARindividualLPRM.sensors.TheNMSprovidesinputstotheRMCStoinitiaterodblocksifpresetfluxlimitsareexceeded,andinputstothereactorprotectionsystemtoinitiateascramifotherlimitsareexceeded.RefuelinInterlocksAsystemofinterlocksthatrestrictmovementofrefuelingequipmentandcontrolrodswhenthereactorisintherefuelingandstartupmodesisprovidedtopreventaninadvertentcriticalityduringrefuelingoperations.Theinterlocksbackupproceduralcontrolsthathavethesameobjective.Theinterlocksaffecttherefuelingplatform,refuelingplatformhoists,fuelgrapple,andcontrolrods.ReactorVesselInstrumentationreactorvesselheadannProcessComuterSstemInadditiontoinstrumentationforthenuclearsafetysystemsandengineeredsafetyfeatures,instrumentationisprovidedtomonitorandtransmitinformationthatcanbeusedtoassessconditionsexistinginsidethereactorvesselandthephysicalconditionofthevesselitself.Thisinstrumentationmonitorsreactorvesselpressure,waterlevel,coolanttemperature,reactorcoredifferentialpressure,coolantflowrates,andersealringleakage.Anonlineprocesscomputerisprovidedtomonitorandlogprocessvariablesandtomakecertainanalyticalcomputations.Thenuclearmeasurementanalysisandcontrolrodworthminimizer(NUMACRNM)preventsrodwithdrawalunderlow-powerconditionsiftherodtobewithdrawnisnotinaccordancewithapreplannedpattern.Theeffectoftherodblockistolimitthereactivityworthofthecontrolrodsbyenforcingadherencetothepreplannedrodpattern.Chapter7describesthesesystemsindetail.1.2.5.3PowerConversionSystemsProcessControlandInstrumentationPressureRelatorandTurbineGeneratorControlThepressureregulatormaintainscontroloftheturbinecontrolandturbinebypassvalvestoallowpropergeneratorandreactorresponsetosystemload-demandchangeswhilemaintainingthenuclearsystempressureessentiallyconstant.USARRevision31.2-21October1991 NineMilePointUnit2FSARTheturbinegeneratorspeed-loadcontrolscaninitiaterapidclosureoftheturbinecontrolvalves(rapidopeningoftheturbinebypassvalves)topreventturbineoverspeedonlossofthegeneratorelectricload.FeedwaterControlSstemThefeedwatercontrolsystemautomaticallycontrolstheflowoffeedwaterintothereactorpressure.vesseltomaintainthewaterwithinthevesselatpredeterminedlevels.Athree-elementcontrolsystem(mainsteamflowrate,feedwaterflowrate,andreactorvesselwaterlevel)isusedtoaccomplishthisfunction.Chapter10describesthesystemingreaterdetail.1.2.6RadioactiveWasteSystemThedisposalofradioactivewastesfromthesiteismanagedbywastesystemsdesignedtomeetallapplicableregulatory>9[requirements,including10CFR20,10CFR60,10CFR61,GeneralDesignCriterion60,andRegulatoryGuide1.21.Therearethreeinterrelatedradioactivewastetreatmentsystems:radioactiveliquidwaste,radioactivegaseouswaste,andradioactivesolidwaste.ThesesystemsaredescribedinChapter11.Theradioactiveliquidwaste(LWS)systemcollectsandprocessesradioactivewasteliquidsgeneratedduringplantoperationandrefueling,eitherforrecyclewithintheplantorfordischargeoffsite.Theprocessoperationsavailabletotreattheliquidwastesarefiltration,evaporation,demineralization,anddecantation.Processdescriptionsandflowchartsillustratethenumberandsequenceof.processingstepstobeappliedtoeachtypeofliquidwaste.Gaseousradwastefromthemaincondenserisprocessedthrougharecombinertoremovehydrogen,afterwhichthegasiscooled,thendried.Wastegasisthenpassedthroughacharcoalbedandfiltersystem,whichholdsupradioactivecomponentsandremovesparticulatematterbeforerelease.Contaminateddrywellandbuildingventilationexhaustsareprocessedbythestandbygastreatmentandventilationsystems.Theradioactivesolidwastesystemprovidesholdup,packaging,andstoragefacilitiesforeventualoffsiteshipmentandultimatedisposalofsolidradioactivewastematerial.TheprocessoperationsconsistofvolumeAmendment191.2-22May1985 NineMilePointUnit2FSARreductionandsolidificationwithasphaltofradioactivewastessuchasLWSevaporatorconcentrates,spentresins,andfiltersludges.Dryradioactivewastessuchascontaminatedpaper,clothing,andtoolsarecompactedandpackaged.Afterprocessing,thesolidwastematerialsarestoredforadditionaldecayandthen'shippedoffsiteforappropriatedisposal.Shielding,asrequiredduringtheprocessingandshipmentofthesolidwastes,isincludedintheplannedoperationofthesolidwastesystem.AdescriptionandflowdiagramoftheprocessingandhandlingsequencesforthesolidwastesgeneratedonsiteisprovidedinChapter11.1.2'FuelHandlingandStorageSystems1.2.7'NewFuelStorageThenewfuelfacilityisdesignedtopreventinadvertentcriticalityandloadbucklingofthenewfuelassemblies.BoththenewfuelstoragevaultandstorageracksaredesignedtocomplywithCategoryIrequirements.Thenewfuelstoragevaultisdesignedwithsufficientdrainagetoprecludeflooding.Thevaultisalsoequippedwithamonitoringsystemtowarnofradiationlevelincreasesabovenormaloperatingconditions.tThedesignofthenewfuelstoragerackslimitskeff50.90inthedryconditionandkeff60.95inafloodedcondition.1.2.7.2SpentFuelStorageThespentfuelstorageracksaredesignedtomaintainspentfuelinaspacegeometrythatpreventscriticalityinnormalandabnormalconditions.Theracksarecapableofwithstandingmaximumupliftforcesgeneratedwithouteffectonthesubcriticalarray.Thedesignofthespentfuelrackswilllimitkeff50.95innormalandabnormalstorageconditions.Thereissufficientshielding,acoolingsystem,andradiationmonitoringtopreventoverheatingandexcessivepersonnelexposure.Thespentfuelstoragepoolandracksarecorrosionresistant,andadheretoCategoryIrequirements.1.2-23 NineMilePointUnit2FSAR1.2.7.3FuelHandlingSystemThefuelhandlingequipmentincludesthefollowing:1.Fuelinspectionstand.2~Fuelpreparationmachine.3.125-toncrane.4.Refuelingplatform.5~Generalpurposegrapple.6;Jibcranes.7.Otherrelatedtoolsforfuelandreactorservicing.Allequipmentconformstoapplicablecodesandstandards.1.2.7.4SpentFuelPoolCoolingandCleanupSystemThespentfuelcoolingandcleanup(SFC)systemprovidesremovalofdecayheatfromthestoredspentfuelandmaintainsspecifiedwatertemperature,purity,clarity,andlevel.Thisprocesspreventsthespentfuelfromoverheating'ndthebuildupofexcessiveradioactivematerialsinthecoolingwater,therebyminimizingradiationlevels.Thesystemincludes.twoheatexchangers,eachofwhichiscapableofremovingthefulldecayheatfromanormalrefuelingoffloadofspentfuelsAcrossconnectiontotheRHRsystemprovidesadditionalemergencybackupcoolingandcoolingduringafullcoreoffload.Chapter'givesfurtherdetailsofthefuelhandlingandstoragesystem.1.2.8PowerConversionSystemChapter10providesadetaileddiscussionofthefollowingequipmentsystems.1.2.8.1TurbineGeneratorTheturbineisan1,800-rpmtandem-compound,six-flow,single-stagereheatunitwithanelectrohydraulicgovernorcontrol.Theturbinegeneratorhasanemergencytripsystemforturbineoverspeed.TheoutputoftheturbinegeneratorAmendment211.2-24September1985 NineMilePointUnit2FSARis1,165,663kWeatturbineguaranteeconditionswith2.0inHgabsbackpressureand0percentmakeup.Thegeneratorisadirectdriven,three-phase,60-Hzt25)000Vf1,800-rpmhydrogeninner-cooled,synchronousgeneratorratedat1,348,400kVAat0.90powerfactor,0.58short-circuitratioatmaximumhydrogenpressureof75psig.1.2.8.2MainSteamSystemThemainsteamsystemdeliverssteamfromthenuclearboilersystemthroughfour26-/28-inODsteamlinestotheturbinegenerator,turbinebypassvalves,steamjetairejectors,off-gaspreheaters,steamsealevaporator,andradwastesteamreboiler.1.2.8.3MainCondenserThemaincondensermaintains2.0inHgabswhenoperatingatturbineguaranteeconditionswith67.97Fcirculatingwaterinlettemperature.Thecondenserincludesprovisionsforacceptingsteambypassedaroundtheturbinegenerator.Deaerationofcondensateisaccomplishedinthecondenser.1.2.8.4MainCondenserAirRemovalSystemThemaincondenserairremovalsystem,usingairejectorsfornormaloperationandvacuumhoggingpumpsforstartup,evacuatesgasesfromthemainturbineandcondenserduringplantstartupandmaintainsthecondenseressentiallyfreeofgasesduringoperation.Thissystemhandlesallinleakageofnoncondensablegasesthroughtheturbineseals,condensate,feedwater,andsteamsystems,andnoncondensablesthataregeneratedinthereactorbydisassociationofwater.1.2.8.5TurbineGlandSealingSystemTheturbineglandsealingsystemprovidesmildlyradioactivesteamtothesealsoftheturbinethrottlevalvestemglandsandtheturbineshaftglands.Thesealingsteamissuppliedbyacleansteamreboilerusingcondensate.Theunitauxiliaryboilerprovidesanauxiliarysteamsupplyforstartupandwhenreactorheatingsteamisnotavailable.Thesteampackingexhaustercollectsandcondensestheairandsteammixtureanddischargestheairandothernoncondensablestotheplantexhaustducttotheatmosphere,usingamotor-drivenexhauster.USARRevision31.2-25October1991 NineMilePointUnit2FSAR1.2.8.6SteamBypassSystemandPressureControlSystemAturbinebypasssystemisprovidedwhichpassessteamdirectlytothemaincondenserundercontrolofthepressureregulator.Steamisbypassedtothecondenserwheneverthereactorsteamingrateexceedstheloadpassedtotheturbinegenerator.Thecapacityoftheturbinebypasssystemis25percentoftheturbineratedsteamflow.Thepressureregulationsystemprovidesmainturbinecontrolvalveandbypassvalveflowdemandstomaintainanearlyconstantreactorpressureduringnormalplantoperation.Italsoprovidesdemandstotherecirculationsystemtoadjustpowerlevelsbychangingreactorrecirculationflowrates.l.2.8.7CirculatingWaterSystemThecirculatingwatersystemprovidesthecondenserwithacontinuoussupplyofcoolingwater.Thecirculatingwatersystemisapumpedclosedloopsystemutilizinganair-coolednatural-draftcoolingtowerasaheatsink.Sixone-sixthcapacitycirculatingwaterpumpsareprovidedtopumpcoolingwaterfromthecoolingtowerbasinthroughthemaincondenserandbacktothetopofthecoolingtower.Makeupwaterisprovidedfrom?akeOntariobytheservicewatersystem.1.2.8.8CondensateandFeedwaterSystemsThecondensateandfeedwatersystemssupplycondensatefromthecondenserhotwelltotheRPV~Thecondensateispumpedbytwoofthethreecondensatepumpsthroughthefullflowcondensatedemineralizersystem,theintercooleroftheairejectors,andthesteampackingexhaustertothecondensateboosterpumps.Thecondensateboosterpumpspumptheflowthroughthreestringsconsistingoftwodraincoolersandfivestagesoflowpressureheaterseach.Inaddition,threeheaterdrainpumpsprovideapproximatelyone-thirdofthefeedwaterflowrequirements.Thelastlowpressureheatersdischargetothesuctionofthreeparallelmotor-drivenreactorfeedwaterpumps.Thedischargeofthereactorfeedwaterpumpspassesthroughthreeone-thirdcapacityparallelheatersandintotheRPV.Thefeedwaterflowiscontrolledbyvaryingthefeedwaterflowcontrolvalveposition.1.2.8.9CondensateDemineralizerSystemAfullflow,deepbedcondensatedemineralizersystemcompletewithregenerationfacilities,instrumentation,and1.2-26 NineMilePointUnit2FSARsemiautomaticcontrolsisdesignedtoensureaconstantsupplyofhighqualitywatertothereactor.1.2.9NuclearSafetySystemsandEngineeredSafetyFeaturesChapters3,4,5,6,=7,9,and10givefurtherdetailsfor)iethefollowingequipmentandsystems.1.2.9.1ReactorProtectionSystemThereactorprotectionsystem(RPS)initiatesarapid,automaticshutdown(scram)ofthereactor.Itactsintimetopreventfuelcladdingdamageandanynuclearsystemprocessbarrierdamagefollowingabnormaloperationaltransients.TheRPSoverridesalloperatoractionsandprocesscontrolsandisbasedonafail-safedesignphilosophythatallowsappropriateprotectiveactionevenifasinglefailureoccurs.11.2.9.2NeutronMonitoringSystemTheneut"onmonitoringsystemisasystemofincoreneutrondetectorsandoat-of-coreelectronicmonitoringequipment.Thesystemprovidesindicationofneutronflux,whichcanbecorrelatedtothermal-powerlevelfortheentirerangeofflu".conditionsthatcanexistinthecore.TheSRMsandtneIRMsprovidefluxlev'el'indicationsduringreactorste.tupandlowpoweroperation.TheLPRMsand~'iPRMsallowassessmentoflocalandoverallfluxconditionsduringpowerrangeoperation.TheTIPsystemprovides=ameanstocalibratetheindividualLPRMsensors.TheNMSprovidesinputstotheRMCStoinitiaterodblocksifpresetfluxlimitsareexceeded,andinputstotheRPStoinitiateascramifotherlimitsareexceeded.1.2.9'ControlRodDriveSystemWhenascramisinitiatedbytheRPS,theCRDsysteminsertsnegativereactivitynecessarytoshutdownthereactor.Eachcontrolrodisindividuallycontrolledby'ahydrauliccontrolunit(HCU).Whenascramsignalisreceived,highpressu'rewaterstoredinanaccumulatorintheHCUorreactorpressureforcesthecontrol"rodintothecore.1.2.9.4ControlRodDriveHousingSupportsCRDhousingsupportsarelocatedunderneaththereactorvesselnearthecontrolrodhousings.Thesupportslimitthetravelof'controlrodintheeventthatacontrolrodhousingisruptured.ThesupportspreventanuclearAmendment181.2<<27March1985 NineMilePointUnit2FSARexcursionasaresultofahousingfailureandthusprotectthefuelbarrier.1.2.9.5ControlRodVelocityLimiterAcontrolrodvelocitylimiterisattachedtoeachcontrolrodtolimitthevelocityatwhichacontrolrodcanfalloutofthecoreshoulditbecomedetachedfromtheCRD.Thisactionlimitstherateofreactivityinsertionresultingfromaroddropaccident.Thelimiterscontainnomovingparts.1.2.9'NuclearSystemPressureReliefSystemApressurereliefsyst:emconsistingofsafety/reliefvalves(SRV),mountedonthemainsteamlinesisprovidedtopreventexcessivepressureinsidethenuclear.systemfromoperationaltransientsoraccidents.TheSRVdischargesteamisdirectedtothesuppressionpoolwithintheprimarycontainment.1.2.9.7ReactorCoreIsolationCoolingSystemTheRCICsystemprovidesmakeupwatertotheRPVwhenthevesselisisolated.TheRCICsystemusesasteam-driventurbine-pumpunitandautomaticallyoperatestomaintainadequatewaterlevelintheRPVforeventsdefinedinSection5.4.6.1.1.2.9.8EmergencyCoreCoolingSystemsFourECCSsareprovidedtomaintainfuelcladdingbelowthetemperature.limitin10CFR50.46intheeventofabreachintheRCPBthatresultsinalossofreactorcoolant.Thesystemsareasfollows.HihPressureCoreSraHPCSTheHPCSsystemprovidesandmaintainsanadequatecoolantinventoryinsidetheRPVtolimitfuelcladdingtemperaturesintheeventofbreaksintheRCPB.Thesystemisinitiatedbyeitherhighpressureinthedrywellorlowwaterlevelinthevessel.Itoperatesindependentlyofallothersystemsovertheentirerangeofpressuredifferencesfromgreaterthannormaloperatingpressuretozero.TheHPCScoolingdecreasesvesselpressuretoenablethelowpressurecoolingsystemstofunction.TheHPCSsystempumpmotorispoweredbyanonsitedieselgeneratorif.offsitepowerisnotavailable.ThesystemmayalsobeusedasabackupfortheRCICsystem.1.2-28 NineMilePointUnit2FSARAutomaticDeressurizationSstemADSTheADSrapidlyreducesRPVpressureinaLOCAsituationinwhichtheHPCSsystemfailstomaintaintheRPVwaterlevel.ThedepressurizationprovidedbythesystemenablesthelowpressureECCStodelivercoolingwatertotheRPV.TheADSusessomeofthereliefvalvesthatarepartofthenuclearsystempressurereliefsystem.TheautomaticreliefvalvesarearrangedtoopenonconditionsindicatingboththatabreakintheRCPBhasoccurredandthattheHPCSsystemisnotdeliveringsufficientcoolingwatertotheRPVtomaintainthewaterlevelaboveapreselectedvalue.SetpointsarediscussedinSection5.2.2.TheADSisnotactivatedunlesseitherthelowpressurecorespray(LPCS)orlowpressurecoolantinjection(LPCI)pumpsareoperating.Thisistoensurethatadequatecoolantisavailabletomaintainreactorwaterlevelafterthedepressurization.LowPressureCoreSraTheLPCSsystemconsistsofoneindependentpumpandvalvesandpipingtodelivercoolingwatertoasprayspargeroverthecore.Thesystemisactuatedbyeitherlowwaterlevelinthereactorvesselorhighpressureinthedrywell,but,waterisdeliveredtothecoreonlyafterRPVpressure'isreduced.Thissystemprovidesthecapabilitytocoolthefuelbyspraying.waterintoeachfuelchannel.TheLPCSloopfunctioninginconjunctionwiththeADSorHPCScanprovidesufficientfuelcladdingcoolingfollowingaLOCA.LowPressureCoolantInectionLPCIisanoperatingmodeoftheRHRsystem,butisdiscussedherebecausetheLPCImodeactsasanengineeredsafetyfeatureinconjunctionwiththeotherECCSs.LPCIusesthepumploopsoftheRHRtoinjectcoolingwaterintotheRPV.LPCIisactuatedbyeitherlowwaterlevelinthereactorvessel'orhighpressureinthedrywell,butwaterisdeliveredtothecoreonlyafterRPVpressureisreduced.LPCIoperationprovidesthecapabilityofcorereflooding,followingaLOCA,intimetomaintainthefuelcladdingbelowtheprescribedtemperaturelimit.1.2.9.9ContainmentSystemsPrimarContainmentTheprimarycontainmentisaMarkIIdesignthatincor-poratesadrywellpressuresuppressionsystemandutilizesa1.2-29 NineNilePointUnit2FSARlargereservoirofwatertofunctionasaheatsinktoabsorbenergy.1.FunctionalDesinTheprimarycontainmentisasteellinedreinforcedconcretestructure.Itconsistsofaconicaldrywellchamberaboveacylindricalsuppressionpoolchamberseparatedbyadrywellfloor.ThisfloorcontainsapipingsystemwhichwoulddirectdrywellsteamintothesuppressionchamberreservoirintheeventofaLOCA.2.HeatRemovalThecontainmentheatremovalsystemissummarizedinSection1.2.9.14.3.ContainmentSraThecontainmentspraysystemconsistsoftworedundantsubsystems,eachwithitsownfull-capacitysprayheader.EachsubsystemissuppliedfromaseparateredundantRHRsubsystem.4.CombustibleGasControlThecontainmentcombusti-blegascontrolsystemissummarizedinSection6.2.5.1.2.9.10ContainmentandReactorVesselIsolationControlSystemTheprimarycontainmentandRPVisolationcontrolsystemautomaticallyinitiatesclosureofisolationvalvestocloseoffallprocesslinesthatarepotentialleakagepathsforradioactivematerialtotheenvirons.ThisactionistakenuponindicationofabreachintheRCPB.1.2.9.11NainSteamIsolationValves28Althoughallpipelinesthatbothpenetratetheprimarycontainmentandofferapotentialreleasepathforradioactivematerialhaveredundantisolationcapabilities,themainsteamlines,becauseoftheirlargesizeandlargemassflowrates,aregivenspecialisolationconsideration.Automaticisolationvalvesareprovidedineachmainsteamline(MSIVs).Eachisclosedbyspringforceandpneumaticforceandopenedbypneumaticforce.Thesevalvesfulfillthefollowingobjectives:PreventexcessivedamagetothefuelbarrierbylimitingthelossofreactorcoolantfromtheRPVresultingfromeitheramajorleakfromthesteampipingoutsidetheprimarycontainmentoraAmendment,281.2-30Nay1987 NineMilePointUnit2FSARmalfunctionofthepressurecontrolsystemresultinginexcessivesteamflowfromtheRPV.2.Limit,thereleaseofradioactivematerialsbyisolatingtheRCPBincaseofagrossreleaseofradioactivematerialsfromthefueltothereactorcoolingwaterandsteam.3.Limitthereleaseofradioactivematerialsbyclosingthecontainmentbarrierincaseofamajorleakfromthenuclearsysteminsidethecontainment.1.2.9.12MainSteamFlowRestrictorsAventuri-typeflowrestrictorisinstalledineachsteamline.ThesedeviceslimitthelossofcoolantfromtheRPVbeforetheMSIVsareclosedincaseofamainsteamlinebreakoutsidethepr'imarycontainment.1~2.9.13MainSteamRadiationMonitoringSystemThemainsteamradiationmonitoringsystemconsistsoffourgammaradiationmonitorslocatedexternallytothemainsteamlinesjust.outsidetheprimarycontainmentinthemainsteamtunnel.Themonitorsaredesignedtodetectagrossreleaseoffissionproductsfromthefuel.Ondetectionofhighradiation,thetripsignalsgeneratedbythemonitorsareusedbytheRPStoinitiateareactorscramandtoclosetheMSIVs.1.2.9.14ResidualHeatRemovalSystemTheRHRsystemisplacedinoperationtolimitthetemperatureofthewaterinthesuppression'oolandoftheatmospheresinthedrywellandsuppressionch'amberfollowingadesignbasisLOCA,tocontrolthepooltemp'eratureduringnormaloperationoftheSRVsandtheRCICsystem,andtoreducethepooltemperaturefollowinganisolationtransient.Inthecontainmentcoolingmodeofoperation,theRHRmainsystempumpstakesuctionfromthesuppressionpoolandpumpthewaterthroughtheRHR.heat.'e'xchangersAmendment281.2-31May1987 NineMilePointUnit2FSARwherecoolingtakesplacebytransferringheattotheservicewater.Thecoolantisthendischargedbacktothesuppressionpool,thedrywellsprayheader,thesuppressionchambersprayheader,ortheRPV.1.2.9.15VentilationExhaustRadiationMonitoringSystemPermanentlyinstalledprocessandarearadiationmonitorsprovideindicationsandalarmsonairborneradiationinthereactorbuildingventilationsystem,drywellatmosphere,fuelstorageandrefuelingareas,andcontrolroomatmosphere.Additionally,connectionsareprovidedinthereactorbuildingventilationsystemductworkforcontinuousairbornemonitors(CAMs).1,.2.9.16StandbyGasTreatmentSystemThestandbygastreatmentsystem(SGTS)processesexhaust.airfromvariousplantsystemstolimitthereleaseofairborneradioactivity,maintainingoffsitedoseratesbelowthespecifiedlimits.DuringadesignbasisaccidenttheSGTSsystemisautomaticallyactuated.WhenhighradiationlevelsaresensedinanyexhaustsystemconnectedtotheSGTSsystemitisautomaticallyplacedinoperation.TheSGTSconsistsoftwoidentical,parallelbutphysicallyseparatedairfiltertrainassemblies.Each'ssemblyiscapableofhandlingthemaximumdesignairflowrate.1.2'.17Safety-RelatedElectricalPowerSystemsAstandbypowersupplysystemisprovidedfortheoperationofemergencysystemsandengineeredsafetyfeaturesduringandfollowingtheshutdownofthereactorwhenthepreferredpowersupplyisnotavailable.Thestandbypowersupplysystemconsistsofthreestandbydieselgenerators.Onegeneratorisdedicatedtoeachofthethreedivisionsofthesafety-relatedelectricpowerdistributionsystemfeedingeach'lass1Eloadgroup.Anytwoofthethreestandbydieselgeneratorshavesufficient,capacitytostartandsupplyallneededengineeredsafetyfeaturesandemergencyshutdownloadsincaseofaLOCAand/orlossofoffsitepower.Thestandbydieselgeneratorfueloilstoragetanksaresizedtoholda7-daysupplyoffueloilbasedontheenginerunningcontinuouslyatfullload.ALOCAand/orlossofoffsitepowersignalinitiatesstartofthestandbydieselgeneratorsandthegeneratorspickuptheloadsinaprogrammedsequence.Standbydieselgeneratorsareindependent,andfeedseparateloadgroupsthroughseparate,physicallyandelectricallyisolateddistributionsystems'.2-32 NineMilePointUnit2FSARFailureofanyoneunitwillnotjeopardizethecapabilityoftheremainingstandby'ieselgeneratorstostartandruntherequiredshutdownsystemandengineeredsafetyfeatureloads.A125-Vemergencydcpowersystemfeedsallsafety-relateddcprotection,controlandinstrumentationloads,andsafety-relateddcmotorsundernormaloperationoftheplantaswellasduringemergencyconditions.Thesystemisdividedintothreeredundantdivisionseachconsistingofitsownbattery,primaryandbackupbatterychargers,switchgears/motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionpanels.Eachdivisionfeedsdcloadsassociatedwithcorrespondingdivisionsofthesafety-relatedelectricpowerdistributionsystem.Batteriesandbatterychargersareredundantandfeedseparateloadgroupsthroughseparateandisolateddistributionsystems,andfailureofanyoneunitwillnotjeopardizethecapabilityofremainingunitstofeedassociatedloads.1.2.9'8StandbyLiquidControlSystemAlthoughnotintendedtoprovidepromptreactorshutdown,asthecontrolrodsare,theSLCSprovidesaredundant,independent,andalternatewaytobringthenuclearfissionreactiontosubcriticalityandtomaintainsubcriticalityasthereactorcools.Thesystemmakespossibleanorderlyandsafeshutdownintheeventthatnotenoughcontrolrodscanbeinsertedintothereactorcoretoaccomplishshutdowninth'enormalmanner.Thesystemissizedtocounteractthepositivereactivityeffectfromratedpowertothecoldshutdowncondition.1.2.9.19SafeShutdownfromOutsidetheControlRoomIntheeventthatthecontrolroombecomesinaccessible,thereactorcanbebroughtfrompowerrangeoperationtocoldshutdownconditionsbyuseofneccessarycontrolslocatedintheremoteshutdownroom.1.2.9.20MainControlRoomHeating,VentilatingandAirConditioningSystemThemaincontrolroomHVACsystemprovidesandmaintainsanenvironmentnecessaryforthesafetyandcomfortofcontrolroompersonnelduringshutdownoftheplantandintheeventofaLOCA.1.2.9.21RedundantReactivityControlSystemTheredundantreactivitycontrolsystem(RRCS)determinesifthereisanexistingtransientthatexceedscertainRPVAmendment231.2-33December1985 NineMilePointUnit2FSARpressureandwate'rlevelparametersandimmediatelyactivatesATWSpreventionequipment.,Ifthelogichasdetermined,thatacontrolledshutdownisnotoccurring,theRRCSactivatesATWSmitigationequipment..Amendment181.2-33aMarch1985 NineMilePointUnit2FSARTHISPAGEINTENTiONALLYBLANKAmendment181.2-33bMarch1985 NineMilePointUnit2FSAR1.2.10CoolingWaterandAuxiliarySystemsChapter9providesadetaileddiscussionofthesesystems.1.2.10.1ReactorBuildingClosedLoopCoolingWaterSystemTheRBCLCWsystemisademineralizedwater,closed-circuitheattransfersystemthatconsistsofthree50-percentcapacitypumpsandheatexchangers,alongwithappropriatecontrolsandinstrumentationtoensureadequatecoolingcapacityforreactorplantauxiliarysystemsandcomponentsduringnormalplantoperations'eatremovedfromcomponentsbytheRBCLCWsystemistransferred,totheservicewatersystem.1.2.10'TurbineBuildingClosedLoopCoolingWaterSystemTheTBCLCWsystemisademineralizedwater,closed-circuitheattransfersystemthatconsistsofthree50-percentcapacitypumpsandheatexchangers,alongwithappropriatecontrolsandinstrumentationtoensureadequatecoolingcapacityfortheturbinebuildingandradwastebuildingauxiliarysystemsandcomponents,duringnormalplantoperation.HeatremovedfromcomponentsbytheTBCLCWwatersystemistransferredtotheservicewatersystem.1.2.10.3ServiceWaterSystemTheservicewatersyst:emprovidescoolingwatertovariousessentialandnonessentialcomponentsthroughouttheplant.Essentialcomponentsareservicedbytwo100-percentredundantsubsystems.T2;enonessentialcomponentswillbeautomaticallyisolateduponreceiptofaLOCAsignalcoincidentwithalossofoffsitepower.TheservicewaterpumpstaketheirsuctionfromLakeOntarioviathescreenwellcomplexandintaketunnels.Afterpassingthrough'hesystem,thedischargeisreturnedtothelakeandtothecirculatingwatersystemasmakeup.1.2.10.4UltimateHeat,SinkTheultimateheatsinkisLakeOntario,whichprovideswatertotheintake/dischargetunnelsandisavailableatthescreenwellbuildingforplantuse.1.2.10.5PlantChilledWaterSystemTheplantchilledwatersystemconsistsoftwosubsystems,oneservingtheturbine,normalswitchgear,andradwastebuildings,andoneservingthecontrolbuilding.The1.2-34 NineMilePointUnit2FSARsubsystemsprovidespacecoolingbydistributingchilledwaterthroughcoolingcoilslocatedinairmovingunits.Thecontrolbuildingsubsystemisanessentialsystemdesignedtoprovidechilledwaterforcoolingduringallmodesofplantoperation.Eachsubsystemcontainsmechanicalrefrigerationwaterchillers,circulationpumps,pipingvalves,coolingcoils,accessories,instrumentation,andcontrols.1.2.10.6Heating,Ventilating,andAirConditioningSystemsIndividualheating,ventilating,andairconditioningsystemsareprovidedthroughouttheplanttomaintainindoortemperatureandhumiditydesignconditionsasrequiredforoptimumperformanceofplantequipmentand,whereapplicable,forhumancomfort.1.2.10.7ProcessSamplingTheprocesssamplingsystemconsistsofthereactorplant,turbineplant,andradwastesamplingsubsystems.Thesesubsystemsarecomposedofthenecessarypiping,valves,coolers,instrumentation,andanalyzerstodrawandanalyzesamplesofvariousplantprocessstreams.Representativesamplesaretakenautomaticallyand/ormanuallyforonlineandlaboratoryanalysesofpH,conductivity,turbidity,oxygen,hydrogen,gaseousactivity,fissionproductactivity,dissolvedgasconcentration,andvariousmetallicconcentrations(suchascopper,iron,andsilica).'1.2.10.8CondensateMakeupandDrawoffSystemThecondensatemakeupanddrawoffsystemconsistsoftwostoragetanks,piping,andinstrumentation.Itreceivesdrawoffwaterfromandsuppliesmakeupwatertothemaincondenserandfuelpool,andprovidesmakeupofreactorcoolantinventoryfortheRCICandHPCSsystems.Waterinthecondensatestoragetanksisreplenishedfromthemakeupwatertreatmentsystem.1.2.10.9WaterTreatmentandMakeupWaterSystemsThewatertreatmentsystemiscomposedofawaterfilter,anactivatedcarbonfilter,an'acidexchangerunit,a'orced-draftdegasifier,abaseanionexchanger,andamixed-bedionexchangedemineralizer.Thesystem'purifieslakewatersuppliedfromtheservicewatersystemanddeliversittothedemineralizedwaterstoragetanks.1.2-35 NineMilePointUnit2FSARThemakeupwatersystemprovidesdemineralizedmakeupwaterfromthestoragetanksforthepowerconversionsystemandtheTBCLCWandRBCLCWsystems.Inaddition,themakeupwatersystemsatisfiesvariousmiscellaneousplantrequirementsfordemineralizedwater,includingthesuppressionpoolandthespentfuelpool.1.2'0.10DomesticWaterandSanitaryDrainsandDisposalSystemsDomesticWaterSstemDomesticwaterfordrinkingandtosatisfytheflowandpressurerequirementsofallinstalledplumbingfixturesissuppliedfromanexistingcitymain.WaterqualityisinaccordancewithapplicablestandardspromulgatedbytheStateofNewYork.SanitarDrainsandDisosalSstemRawsanitarywastefromUnit2isdirectedtotheNineMilePointUnit1sanitarywastetreatmentplant.Thisplantconformstoallapplicablelocal,state,andfederaldischargelimitations.1.2.10.11CompressedAirSystemsThecompressedairsystemsarecomposedofaserviceandinstrumentairsystemandabreathingairsystem.ServiceandInstrumentAirSstemThreeaircompressors,eachdischargingthroughanaftercooler,afilter,andanairreceiverintoacommonheader,supplyalltheserviceandinstrument.airrequiredbytheplant.Theserviceairistakendirectlyfromthecommonheader.Theinstrumentairispassedthroughoneoftwo100-percentcapacityairdryersandthenthroughoneoftwo100-percentcapacityairfiltersbeforedeliverytothevariousplantinstruments.BreathinAirSstemAsingleaircompressordischargesthroughanaftercoolertoareceiver.AirfromthisreceiverisfilteredtocomplywithOSHArequirementsforbreathingair.1.2-36 NineNilePointUnit2FSAR1.2.10.12AuxiliarySteamSystemAnauxiliarysteamsystemfurnishesaseparateandindependentsteamsupply.Processsteam.isgeneratedinhighvoltage,electrodeboilersanddistributdthroughouttheplantbyanauxiliarysteamheader.Auxiliarysteamisrequiredformainturbineshaftsealingsteamduringstartupandfortheradwastebuildingduringplantshutdown.1.2.10.13StandbyDieselGeneratorFuelOilStorageandTransferSystemThestandbydieselgeneratorfueloilstorageandtransfersystemsuppliesfueloilforoperationofthestandbydieselgenerators.Thissystemisanessentialsystemandiscapableofsupplyingfueloilduringallmodesofplantoperation,includinglossofoffsitepowercoincidentwithaLOCA.1.2..10.14FireProtectionSystemThefireprotectionsystemconsistsoffirehydrants,hosestations,andautomaticsprinkleranddelugesystems.Whererequired,automaticormanuallyactuatedcarbondioxide,foam,orHalonfiresuppressionsystemsareprovided.Automaticfiredetectorsareprovidedinselectedareas.Portablefireextinguishersandfirehosereelsarelocatedthroughouttheplant.1.2.10.15CommunicationSystemsThestationcommunicationsystemsaredesignedtoprovidereliablecommunicationbetweenallessentialareasofthestationandtolocationsremotefromthestationduringnormalandemergencyconditionsandundermaximumpotentialnoiselevels.Thisisachievedthroughfivedifferentcommunicationsystemsasfollows:1.Adialtelephonesystemforvoicecommunicationbetweenselected-officeareasandselectedlocationsinsideandoutsidethestation.Thedialtelephonesystemisconnectedtothetelephonetiesystemforoffsitecommunicationincludingcommunicationwithlocallawenforcementauthoritiesandthelocalfiredepartment.2.AportableradiocommunicationsystemforcommunicationbetweenstationpersonnelandNNPCpersonnellocatedoutsidethestationincasethedialtelephonesystembetweenthestationandthe1.2-37 NineMilePointUnit2FSARpointsoutsidethestationbecomesinoperable.Theradiosarepoweredbyrechargeablebatteriesandareindependentofanyelectricalsystemoftheplant.3.Apageparty/publicaddress(PP/PA)communicationsystemwithfivepartychannelsandonepagechannelforcommunicationbetweenallbuildingsandlocationswithintheplant,evenunderextremelynoisyconditions.Thisisalso-usedfortheemergencyalarmandevacuationsystemandispoweredfromanuninterruptiblepowersupply(UPS).Aseparate.maintenanceandcalibrationcommunication(M/CC)systemforuseinareasrequiringcommunicationfortesting,instrumentcalibration,maintenance,andforuseduringconstructionandstartup.5.OneofthechannelsoftheM/CCsystemiscapableofbeingoperatedasasound-poweredcommunication(SPC)system.ThissystemcanbeusedincaseofatotallossofelectricpowertothePP/PAandM/CCsystems.ThissystemrequiresnoplantelectricpowerandworksthroughM/CCsystemwiring.Thedesignofthecommunicationsystemspermitsroutinesurveillanceandtestingwithoutdisruptingnormalcommunicationfacilities.Thepagingsystemiselectrically.supervised,permittingimmediatecorrectiveactiontobetakenifthelinebecomesinoperative.1.2.10.16TightingSystemsThestationlightingsystemsaredesignedto-provideadequatelightinginallnecessaryareasofthestationduringbothemergencyandnormaloperatingconditions.Thisisachievedthroughthefollowinglightingsubsystems:1.Normalstationlightingsystem.2~Emergencylightingsystem.3.Essentiallightingsystem.4.Egresslightingsystem.Thenormalstationlightingsystemprovidesadequatelightinginallareasofthestationundernormaloperatingconditions.Thisisfedfromthestationnormal600-Vload1.2-38 NineMilePointUnit2FSARcentersthroughthemainlightingdry-typedistributiontransformers,panels.distributionpanels,andsubdistributionTheemergencylightingsystemprovidesadequatelightingrequiredforoperatingthesafety-relatedequipmentduringemergencyconditionsinthecontrolroom,dieselgeneratorrooms,emergency'switchgearareas,andrelayandcomputerroom.ThisistreatedasaClass1Esystemexceptforthelightingfixtures.Thelightingfixturesareseismicallysupported.Theemergencylightingsystemisdividedinto'threeseparatedivisionscorrespondingtoDivisionsI,II,andIIIoftheplantemergencyacdistributionsystemandisfedfromthecorrespondingClass1Eloadcenters/motorcontrolcentersthroughthemainlightingdistributionpanels,.dry-typedistributiontransformers,andsubdistributionpanels.Incaseofalossofoffsitepower,theemergencylightingsystemisfedfromthestandbydieselgeneratorsthroughmanuallyoperatedcircuitbreakers.Theemergencylightingsystemfixturesareconstantlyenergized.Theessentiallightingsystemprovidespartiallightingforcertaincri'ticalareasofthestationrequiringcontinuouslightingsuchasthecontrolroom,relayandcomputerroom,standbydieselgeneratorrooms,andemergencyswitchgearrooms'heessentiallightingsystemreceivespowerfromthestationnormalUPSsystemandisfedthroughdry-typedistributiontransformersandsubdistributionpanels.TheessentiallightingfixturespoweredbytheUPSsystemareconstantlyenergized.Theegresslightingsystemprovidesadequatelightingforallegresssignsinsidetheplant.ThisisdesignedasaseparatesystemspecificallyfortheinsidebuildingegressemergencyconditionsinaccordancewithOSHArequirements.TheegresslightingsystemreceivespowerfromthestationnormalUPSsystemaspartoftheessentiallightingdistributionsystem.Theegresslightingfixturesareconstantlyenergized.The8-hrbatterypacklightingprovidesilluminationinallareasrequiredforoperationofanysafeshutdownequipmentandinaccessandegressroutestheretoincaseofafire.23Fluorescent,incandescent,andhighpressuresodiumlampsareusedforstationlighting.Fluorescentlampsareusedforallofficesandformostoftheoperatingareassuchasthecontrolroom,relayandcomputerroom,andemergencyandnormalswitchgearrooms.Incandescentlampsareusedintheprimarycontainment,primarycontainmentaccesshatches,mainsteamtunnel,newfuelstoragevault,spentfuelpoolfilterroom,andinallotherareaswherelightingisinfrequentlyrequired.HighpressuresodiumlampsareusedAmendment231.2-39December198S NineMilePoint.Unit2FSARforallhighbaylightingsuchasintheturbinebuildingandreactorbuildinggeneralareas.1.2-40 NineMilePointUnit2FSAR1.2.llReferencesNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation.PreliminarySafetyAnalysisReport,VolumeI,NineMilePointNuclearStation-Unit2,June1972.2.3.NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation.(ConstructionPermitStage),NineStation-Unit2,June1972.IOswegoCountyPlanningBoard.Plan,August1976.EnvironmentalReportMilePointNuclearPreliminaryLandUseGulf6WesternTopicalReport.GGW-FSD2538,NuclearMainSteamIsolationValveSystems,January1979.5.GeneralElectricLicensingTopicalReport.GeneralElectricStandardApplicationforReactorFuel.NEDE-24011-P-A(latestapprovedrevision)~6~GeneralElectricLicensingTopicalReport.GeneralElectricStandardApplicationforReactorFuel(U.STSupplement),NEDE-24011-P-A-US(latestapprovedr'evision).Amendment211.2-41September1985}}
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