ML17265A625

Special Rept:On 990309,halon Systems Were Removed from Svc & Fire Door F502 Was Blocked Open.Caused by Mods Being Made to CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys.Continuous Fire Watch Was Established with Backup Fire Suppression Equipment

ML17265A625
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	04/15/1999
From:	Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	Vissing G NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9904230283
Download: ML17265A625 (6)

Text

CATEGORY REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9904230283 DOC.DATE: 99/04/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET,O FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit,l, Rochester G

05000244 AUTH.NAME

-AUTHOR AFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester Gas S Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME 'ECIPIENT AFFILIATION VISSING,G.S.

SUBJECT:

Special rept:on 990309,halon systems were removed from svc 5

fire door F502 was blocked open. Caused by mods being made to CR emergency airgt treatment sys.Continuous fire watch was established with backup fire suppression equipment.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

1E22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72) 05000244 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME LPD1-1 PD INTERNAL: AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DIPM/IOLB NRR/DRIP/REXB RES/DET/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.

NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME VISSING,G.

NRR DIPM/IQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RGN1 FILE 01 LMITCO MARSHALL NOAC QUEENER,DS NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 1l.

0 D

0 N

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECZPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DZSTRZBUTION LZSTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)

ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 16 ENCL

0

AND

i'OCHES7ERGASAVDElEC7RIC" ~P RA CN r

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+ S9 EA$7 AVENUE, ROCHE$ 7ER, hl. Y, 74649 0001 ~'REA CODE 776 5'-2700 ROBERT C. viCRiDY I ce ~'escc1l

+vc ec QQclfcl of'f April 15, 1999 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn:

Guy S. Vissing Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.

20555

Subject:

Thirty (30)

Day Special Report Halon Systems Xnoperable for More Than 14 Days Fire Barrier Penetration Seal (Fire Door)

Znoperable for More Than 7 Days R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Vissing:

Xn accordance with the Ginna Station Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), Required Actions TR 3.7.3.B.1 and TR 3.7.5.B.1, this thirty (30) day special report is being submitted, outlining the cause of halon system inoperability and fire barrier penetration seal (fire door) inoperability and plans for restoration to operable status.

On March 9, 1999, activities affecting fire system components were performed to support the"first phase of modifications to the Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (CREATS).

Based on the scope of the modification, it was anticipated during installation planning that the fire system components would be inoperable longer than specified in the TRM.

The halon systems listed in TRM Table TR 3.7.3-1 were removed from service.

These systems would discharge into the Computer Room and Relay Room in the event of a detected fire.

Detection and electric solenoid valve release features were disconnected for these halon systems to eliminate the potential for false suppression system initiation during the modifications to the CREATS.

Fire Door

F502, between the Relay Room and the Back Stairwell (to the Contxol Room),

was blocked open at this time, making this'ire barrier component inoperable.

These system impairments were required to establish temporary cooling capability for the Control Room while modifications were performed to the existing CREATS after all fuel was removed from the reactor.

9904230283 9'7043.5 PDR ADQCK 05000244 S

PDR v

The halon systems and fire door were declared inoperable at approximately 0922 EST on March 9, 1999.

Compensatory, actions were immediately taken as per TRM Required Action TR 3.7.3.A.1 for the inoperable halon systems.

A continuous fire watch was established with backup fire suppression equipment (additional fire extinguishers) at 0922 EST on March 9, 1999.

These actions also ensured compliance with TRM Required Action 3.7.5.A.1.1 for the blocked open fire door.

Per TRM Required Action 3.7.5.A.2, Fire Door F502 is to be restored to operable status within 7 days.

This Required Action and associated Completion Time was not met, as anticipated before the start of the work on March 9, 1999, requiring entry into TRM Required Action 3.7.5.B.1 on March 16, 1999.

Fire Door F502 was restored to operable status on April g,

1999, when this phase of modifications to the CREATS was completed and the temporary cooling features were no longer required.

Per TRM Required Action 3.7.3.A.2, the halon systems are to be restored to operable status within 14 days.

This Required Action and associated Completion Time was not met, as anticipated before the start of the work on March 9, 1999, requiring entry into TRM Required Action 3.7.3.B.1 on March 23, 1999.

The halon systems were restored to operable status on April 5,

1999, when the next phase of modifications to the CREATS was completed.

The halon

'systems now operate upon detection of fire conditions in either the Computer Room or Relay Room.

All required compensatory actions remained in effect until these fire system components were restored to operable status'ery truly yours, Robert C.

Me ed XC:

Mr. Guy S. Vissing (Mail Stop 8C2)

Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects

- I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Regional Administrator, Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna Senior Resident Inspector

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