ML18177A448: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
Line 2: Line 2:
| number = ML18177A448
| number = ML18177A448
| issue date = 06/26/2018
| issue date = 06/26/2018
| title = Licensee Japan Industry Workshop for Understanding Nrc'S Reactor Oversight Process June 2018
| title = Licensee Japan Industry Workshop for Understanding NRCs Reactor Oversight Process June 2018
| author name = Gibbs R
| author name = Gibbs R
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DIRS/IRAB
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DIRS/IRAB
Line 17: Line 17:
{{#Wiki_filter:Licensee Workshop for Understanding NRCs Reactor Oversight Process Perspectives on the SDP, PRA and PI&R Presented by Russell Gibbs - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8 June, 2018 Tokyo, Japan
{{#Wiki_filter:Licensee Workshop for Understanding NRCs Reactor Oversight Process Perspectives on the SDP, PRA and PI&R Presented by Russell Gibbs - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8 June, 2018 Tokyo, Japan


Oversight Framework NRCs Overall                                 Protect Public Health and Safety Safety Mission                                      as a Result of Civilian Nuclear Power Operation Strategic Performance                      Reactor Safety         Radiation Safety           Safeguards Areas Occupational  Public Initiating Mitigating  Barrier    Emergency                                Physical Radiation  Radiation Events    Systems    Integrity  Preparedness                              Protection Safety    Safety 2
Oversight Framework Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection NRCs Overall Safety Mission Strategic Performance Areas Protect Public Health and Safety as a Result of Civilian Nuclear Power Operation Reactor Safety Radiation Safety Safeguards 2


Reactor Oversight Process 3
Reactor Oversight Process 3


ROP Simplified Cornerstone Baseline Inspection                         Performance Indicator Results                                      Results Significance                     Significance Threshold                        Threshold Action Matrix Regulatory Response 4
ROP Simplified Cornerstone Baseline Inspection Results Significance Threshold Action Matrix Significance Threshold Performance Indicator Results Regulatory Response 4


ROP Goals
ROP Goals
Line 29: Line 29:
* Reduce unnecessary regulatory burden 5
* Reduce unnecessary regulatory burden 5


SDP Objectives (1)
SDP Objectives (1) 6
* Characterize significance of inspection findings, using best available information
* Characterize significance of inspection findings, using best available information
* Provide stakeholders an objective and common framework for communicating the potential safety significance of inspection findings.
* Provide stakeholders an objective and common framework for communicating the potential safety significance of inspection findings.
6


SDP Objectives (2)
SDP Objectives (2) 7
* Provide basis for timely assessment and/or enforcement actions
* Provide basis for timely assessment and/or enforcement actions
* Provide inspectors with plant-specific risk information for use in risk-informing the inspection program 7
* Provide inspectors with plant-specific risk information for use in risk-informing the inspection program


The Reactor Oversight Process is designed to be risk-informed and performance based.
8 The Reactor Oversight Process is designed to be risk-informed and performance based.
8


Risk-informed = using both relevant quantitative and qualitative information for decisions Risk-informed PRA 9
Risk-informed = using both relevant quantitative and qualitative information for decisions Risk-informed PRA 9


What is a risk-based decision?
What is a risk-based decision?
Line 53: Line 51:
(Regulatory Guide 1.174) 12 12
(Regulatory Guide 1.174) 12 12


Inappropriate Inputs to Decision Media interest Personal prejudices Political implications Financial impacts on licensees Gut feel (i.e., judgement with no technical basis) 13
Inappropriate Inputs to Decision 13 Media interest Personal prejudices Political implications Financial impacts on licensees Gut feel (i.e., judgement with no technical basis)


When PRA not available or not productive for decision-making consider such factors as
When PRA not available or not productive for decision-making consider such factors as
Line 67: Line 65:
* SPAR models are used to verify licensee results.
* SPAR models are used to verify licensee results.
* PRA models have been peer reviewed
* PRA models have been peer reviewed
* NRC trains staff on PRA and its applications.                           15
* NRC trains staff on PRA and its applications.
15


Balancing Qualitative and Quantitative Information
Balancing Qualitative and Quantitative Information
Line 90: Line 89:
Specific SDP Documents
Specific SDP Documents
* Numerous cornerstone/inspection finding specific SDP procedures developed (i.e., IMC 0609 Apps A - O and their basis documents)
* Numerous cornerstone/inspection finding specific SDP procedures developed (i.e., IMC 0609 Apps A - O and their basis documents)
  - promotes objectivity, reliability and efficiency!
- promotes objectivity, reliability and efficiency!
* Deterministic SDP procedures used for EP, RP and Security
* Deterministic SDP procedures used for EP, RP and Security
* Probabilistic SDP procedure used for IE, MS and BI cornerstones 20
* Probabilistic SDP procedure used for IE, MS and BI cornerstones 20


SDP Program management mainly includes annual assessment and associated metrics and stakeholder feedback for continuous improvement 21
21 SDP Program management mainly includes annual assessment and associated metrics and stakeholder feedback for continuous improvement


Interactions with Stakeholders Main reason for ROP success is intensive and frequent engagement with industry and other external stakeholders 22
Interactions with Stakeholders Main reason for ROP success is intensive and frequent engagement with industry and other external stakeholders 22
Line 104: Line 103:
* Routine meetings conducted on PRA modelling/data issues 23
* Routine meetings conducted on PRA modelling/data issues 23


Communications with Licensees (2)
Communications with Licensees (2) 24
* For significant inspection findings there is significant dialogue with Senior Reactor Analysts, NRC managers and licensees
* For significant inspection findings there is significant dialogue with Senior Reactor Analysts, NRC managers and licensees
* New process developed to further improve communications
* New process developed to further improve communications
* Publicly available RASP Handbook is helpful 24
* Publicly available RASP Handbook is helpful


Problem Identification & Resolution 25
Problem Identification & Resolution 25


Perspectives on PI&R Oversight (1)
Perspectives on PI&R Oversight (1) 26
* Identifying and correcting plant problems is a foundation of the Reactor Oversight Process
* Identifying and correcting plant problems is a foundation of the Reactor Oversight Process
* Baseline inspections performed on a routine basis and as needed for significant inspection findings 26
* Baseline inspections performed on a routine basis and as needed for significant inspection findings


Perspectives on PI&R Oversight (2)
Perspectives on PI&R Oversight (2) 27
* NRC offers oversight credit for good licensee performance
* NRC offers oversight credit for good licensee performance
* More significant problems = more PI&R inspection Viewpoint - NRA and industry reaching a common understanding on licensee Corrective Action Programs is a significant challenge for NRAs revised oversight program.
* More significant problems = more PI&R inspection Viewpoint - NRA and industry reaching a common understanding on licensee Corrective Action Programs is a significant challenge for NRAs revised oversight program.
27


PI&R Methods (1)
PI&R Methods (1) 28
* Are plant issues being appropriately added to the licensees Corrective Action Program?
* Are plant issues being appropriately added to the licensees Corrective Action Program?
* Are the cause(s) of problems being evaluated in an acceptable manner?
* Are the cause(s) of problems being evaluated in an acceptable manner?
* Are problems evaluated and corrected to prevent recurrence in a timely manner?
* Are problems evaluated and corrected to prevent recurrence in a timely manner?
28


PI&R Methods (2)
PI&R Methods (2) 29
* Is operating experience being properly evaluated?
* Is operating experience being properly evaluated?
* Are self-assessments effective?
* Are self-assessments effective?
* Are effective trending analyses being conducted?
* Are effective trending analyses being conducted?
* Is there a healthy safety conscious work environment?
* Is there a healthy safety conscious work environment?  
29


Final Thoughts Will Japans nuclear industry be ready for NRAs pilot of its revised oversight program beginning in October 2018?
Final Thoughts 30 Will Japans nuclear industry be ready for NRAs pilot of its revised oversight program beginning in October 2018?
What are the key areas of needed attention and focus?
What are the key areas of needed attention and focus?
Suggest intensive and frequent dialogue with NRA going forward on key revised oversight program elements!
Suggest intensive and frequent dialogue with NRA going forward on key revised oversight program elements!
30


Questions and Answers 31}}
Questions and Answers 31}}

Latest revision as of 18:07, 5 January 2025

Licensee Japan Industry Workshop for Understanding NRCs Reactor Oversight Process June 2018
ML18177A448
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/26/2018
From: Russell Gibbs
NRC/NRR/DIRS/IRAB
To:
Gibbs R, NRR/DIRS, 415-8578
References
Download: ML18177A448 (31)


Text

Licensee Workshop for Understanding NRCs Reactor Oversight Process Perspectives on the SDP, PRA and PI&R Presented by Russell Gibbs - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8 June, 2018 Tokyo, Japan

Oversight Framework Initiating Events Mitigating Systems Barrier Integrity Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection NRCs Overall Safety Mission Strategic Performance Areas Protect Public Health and Safety as a Result of Civilian Nuclear Power Operation Reactor Safety Radiation Safety Safeguards 2

Reactor Oversight Process 3

ROP Simplified Cornerstone Baseline Inspection Results Significance Threshold Action Matrix Significance Threshold Performance Indicator Results Regulatory Response 4

ROP Goals

  • Maintain safety
  • Improve efficiency and effectiveness
  • Increase public confidence
  • Reduce unnecessary regulatory burden 5

SDP Objectives (1) 6

  • Characterize significance of inspection findings, using best available information
  • Provide stakeholders an objective and common framework for communicating the potential safety significance of inspection findings.

SDP Objectives (2) 7

  • Provide basis for timely assessment and/or enforcement actions
  • Provide inspectors with plant-specific risk information for use in risk-informing the inspection program

8 The Reactor Oversight Process is designed to be risk-informed and performance based.

Risk-informed = using both relevant quantitative and qualitative information for decisions Risk-informed PRA 9

What is a risk-based decision?

Possible Answer - when the decision-maker overly relies upon risk information that may not be relevant and/or involves high levels of uncertainty.

10

How can a risk-informed decision be made for reactor power oversight?

11

What are appropriate and relevant risk-informed decision-making inputs?

(Regulatory Guide 1.174) 12 12

Inappropriate Inputs to Decision 13 Media interest Personal prejudices Political implications Financial impacts on licensees Gut feel (i.e., judgement with no technical basis)

When PRA not available or not productive for decision-making consider such factors as

  • Extent of degraded condition
  • Exposure time
  • Recovery actions
  • Defense-in-depth
  • Safety Margin 14

NRC Confidence in PRA

  • PRA is an essential tool for evaluating risk increase in licensee performance deficiencies.
  • PRA has matured since 1980s
  • SPAR models are used to verify licensee results.
  • PRA models have been peer reviewed
  • NRC trains staff on PRA and its applications.

15

Balancing Qualitative and Quantitative Information

  • NRC uses risk-informed qualitative information to screen inspection findings.
  • Detailed risk evaluations require use of influential assumptions.
  • Limitations of PRA must be considered Biasing inputs and integrating results objectively is main challenge.

16

Use caution on over reliance on PRA point estimates for the SDP and possible misapplication of PRA 17 17

Key SDP Program Documents (1)

  • Significance and Enforcement Review Panel Process (IMC 0609 Att. 1)

Key SDP Program Documents (2)

  • Initial Characterization Procedure (IMC 0609 Att. 4)
  • Risk Assessment Standardization Project (RASP) Handbook 19

Specific SDP Documents

  • Numerous cornerstone/inspection finding specific SDP procedures developed (i.e., IMC 0609 Apps A - O and their basis documents)

- promotes objectivity, reliability and efficiency!

  • Deterministic SDP procedures used for EP, RP and Security
  • Probabilistic SDP procedure used for IE, MS and BI cornerstones 20

21 SDP Program management mainly includes annual assessment and associated metrics and stakeholder feedback for continuous improvement

Interactions with Stakeholders Main reason for ROP success is intensive and frequent engagement with industry and other external stakeholders 22

Communications with Licensees (1)

  • An open and transparent dialogue is essential
  • Access to licensee models is preferred
  • Must consider licensee perspectives
  • Routine meetings conducted on PRA modelling/data issues 23

Communications with Licensees (2) 24

  • For significant inspection findings there is significant dialogue with Senior Reactor Analysts, NRC managers and licensees
  • New process developed to further improve communications
  • Publicly available RASP Handbook is helpful

Problem Identification & Resolution 25

Perspectives on PI&R Oversight (1) 26

  • Identifying and correcting plant problems is a foundation of the Reactor Oversight Process
  • Baseline inspections performed on a routine basis and as needed for significant inspection findings

Perspectives on PI&R Oversight (2) 27

  • NRC offers oversight credit for good licensee performance
  • More significant problems = more PI&R inspection Viewpoint - NRA and industry reaching a common understanding on licensee Corrective Action Programs is a significant challenge for NRAs revised oversight program.

PI&R Methods (1) 28

  • Are plant issues being appropriately added to the licensees Corrective Action Program?
  • Are the cause(s) of problems being evaluated in an acceptable manner?
  • Are problems evaluated and corrected to prevent recurrence in a timely manner?

PI&R Methods (2) 29

  • Is operating experience being properly evaluated?
  • Are self-assessments effective?
  • Are effective trending analyses being conducted?
  • Is there a healthy safety conscious work environment?

Final Thoughts 30 Will Japans nuclear industry be ready for NRAs pilot of its revised oversight program beginning in October 2018?

What are the key areas of needed attention and focus?

Suggest intensive and frequent dialogue with NRA going forward on key revised oversight program elements!

Questions and Answers 31