ENS 46054: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 04/30/2010 16:48 CDT | | event date = 04/30/2010 16:48 CDT | ||
| last update date = 06/29/2010 | | last update date = 06/29/2010 | ||
| title = Invalid Primary Containment Isolation System (Pcis) Actuation | | title = Invalid Primary Containment Isolation System (Pcis) Actuation from a Loss-Of-Power to Reactor Protection System (Rps) 1A | ||
| event text = This 60-day telephone notification is being made in lieu of a written report, under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system. | | event text = This 60-day telephone notification is being made in lieu of a written report, under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system. | ||
On April 30, 2010, at 1648 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT) with Unit 1 at 100 percent thermal power, while attempting to change a light bulb, the light socket shorted causing a loss of 1A RPS. The loss resulted in Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 primary containment isolations, and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. BFN's review of the event found that the bulb caused a direct short and caused the loss of RPS 1A. Plant conditions which require PCIS actuations and system initiations (e.g., low reactor water level, high drywall pressure, abnormal area radiation level, high area temperature) did not exist, therefore the actuation was invalid. | On April 30, 2010, at 1648 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT) with Unit 1 at 100 percent thermal power, while attempting to change a light bulb, the light socket shorted causing a loss of 1A RPS. The loss resulted in Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 primary containment isolations, and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. BFN's review of the event found that the bulb caused a direct short and caused the loss of RPS 1A. Plant conditions which require PCIS actuations and system initiations (e.g., low reactor water level, high drywall pressure, abnormal area radiation level, high area temperature) did not exist, therefore the actuation was invalid. | ||
Latest revision as of 22:09, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Browns Ferry  Alabama (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER, Invalid Actuation | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1433.62 h59.734 days <br />8.533 weeks <br />1.964 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Ray Swafford 15:25 Jun 29, 2010 |
| NRC Officer: | Eric Simpson |
| Last Updated: | Jun 29, 2010 |
| 46054 - NRC Website
| |
| 60-Day Optional Telephonic Notification of an Invalid Actuation of a General Containment Isolation Signal Affecting More than One System | 60-Day Optional Telephonic Notification of an Invalid Specified System Actuation [Table view] | ||