ENS 48209: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 08/20/2012 11:00 CDT | | event date = 08/20/2012 11:00 CDT | ||
| last update date = 08/20/2012 | | last update date = 08/20/2012 | ||
| title = Minor Thru-Wall Leak | | title = Minor Thru-Wall Leak at Weld in Safety Injection Suction Piping | ||
| event text = While working In the vicinity of valve SI-3, the isolation valve between the Boric Acid Storage Tanks and the common Safety Injection (SI) pump suction piping header, plant staff discovered a thru-wall leak at the weld between the SI-3 valve body and the piping upstream of SI-3. Minor leakage (less than 1 drop per minute) was observed at the flaw location. Upon being informed of this condition, plant operators closed SI-3 at 1109 [CDT] to isolate the affected portion of the piping from the SI suction piping. The time period from when the leak was discovered until it was isolated from the SI piping was less than 10 minutes. | | event text = While working In the vicinity of valve SI-3, the isolation valve between the Boric Acid Storage Tanks and the common Safety Injection (SI) pump suction piping header, plant staff discovered a thru-wall leak at the weld between the SI-3 valve body and the piping upstream of SI-3. Minor leakage (less than 1 drop per minute) was observed at the flaw location. Upon being informed of this condition, plant operators closed SI-3 at 1109 [CDT] to isolate the affected portion of the piping from the SI suction piping. The time period from when the leak was discovered until it was isolated from the SI piping was less than 10 minutes. | ||
As part of the immediate operability determination, plant staff attempted to characterize the flaw to determine the degradation mechanism. Because the flaw could not be readily characterized, the common SI suction piping exposed to the leakage was considered to have been inoperable from the time of discovery until valve SI-3 was closed. | As part of the immediate operability determination, plant staff attempted to characterize the flaw to determine the degradation mechanism. Because the flaw could not be readily characterized, the common SI suction piping exposed to the leakage was considered to have been inoperable from the time of discovery until valve SI-3 was closed. | ||
Latest revision as of 21:03, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Kewaunee  Wisconsin (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
| LER: | 05000305/LER-2012-007 |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+0.43 h0.0179 days <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.89014e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Mike Terry 16:26 Aug 20, 2012 |
| NRC Officer: | John Knoke |
| Last Updated: | Aug 20, 2012 |
| 48209 - NRC Website
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