ENS 50519: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 10/08/2014 10:35 CDT | | event date = 10/08/2014 10:35 CDT | ||
| last update date = 10/08/2014 | | last update date = 10/08/2014 | ||
| title = Potential Fire Induced Cable Failure | | title = Potential Fire Induced Cable Failure in Multiple Fire Zones | ||
| event text = INPO-IER-L4-14-33 (Direct Current Circuits Challenge Appendix R Fire Analysis) was reviewed to determine applicability to ANO Unit 1 & 2. It was determined that 2P-21, Turbine Generator Emergency Seal Oil Pump, control cables are not fused and are routed through multiple fire zones containing safe shutdown equipment. A potential fire induced cable failure in any of these fire zones could result in a secondary fire or damage adjacent cables along the path of the unprotected cable. The concern is that under fire safe shutdown conditions, it is postulated that a fire in one zone can cause short circuits potentially resulting in secondary fires or cable failures in other fire zones where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. | | event text = INPO-IER-L4-14-33 (Direct Current Circuits Challenge Appendix R Fire Analysis) was reviewed to determine applicability to ANO Unit 1 & 2. It was determined that 2P-21, Turbine Generator Emergency Seal Oil Pump, control cables are not fused and are routed through multiple fire zones containing safe shutdown equipment. A potential fire induced cable failure in any of these fire zones could result in a secondary fire or damage adjacent cables along the path of the unprotected cable. The concern is that under fire safe shutdown conditions, it is postulated that a fire in one zone can cause short circuits potentially resulting in secondary fires or cable failures in other fire zones where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. | ||
This condition is reportable as an 8-hour ENS report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected zones of the plant. | This condition is reportable as an 8-hour ENS report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected zones of the plant. |
Latest revision as of 21:49, 1 March 2018
Where | |
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Arkansas Nuclear ![]() Arkansas (NRC Region 4) | |
Reporting | |
Emergency class: | |
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+0.07 h0.00292 days <br />4.166667e-4 weeks <br />9.5886e-5 months <br />) | |
Opened: | Rex Knight 15:39 Oct 8, 2014 |
NRC Officer: | Dan Livermore |
Last Updated: | Oct 8, 2014 |
50519 - NRC Website
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