ML20203D458: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000361/1997024]]
| number = ML20203D458
| issue date = 02/18/1998
| title = Discusses Enforcement Conference Conducted on 980120 Re Routine Insp Repts 50-361/97-24 & 50-362/97-24 on 971117- 1205 & Forwards Notice of Violation
| author name = Merschoff E
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| addressee name = Ray H
| addressee affiliation = SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
| docket = 05000361, 05000362
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-361-97-24, 50-362-97-24, EA-97-585, NUDOCS 9802260065
| package number = ML20203D462
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 6
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000361/1997024]]
 
=Text=
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        .
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          .T g              A                NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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                                                                  February 18, 1998                                      i
                                                                                                                          l
                    EA 97 585
                    Harold D. Ray, Executive Vice President
                    Southern California Edison Company
                    San Onofro Nuclear Generating Station
                    P.O. Box 128
                    San Clemente, California 92674 0128
                    SUBJECT:        NOTICE OF VIOt.ATION
                                    (NRC Inspection Report No. 50 361/97 24; 50 362/97 24)
                                                                                                                          [
                  Dear Mr. Ray:
                                                                                                                          ,
                  This refers to the predecisional enforcement conference conducted in the NRC's Region IV
                  office in Arlington, Texas on January 20,1998, and to the supplementalinformation Southern
                  California Edison Company (Edison) provided in its letter dated February 3,1998. The
                  conference was held to discuss the results of a routine inspection conducted on November 17          .
                  through December 5,1997, at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. The findings from
                  the inspection were discussed with your staff during a telephonic exit briefing on December 18,
                  1997, and documented in the subject inspection report dated December 24,1997.
                  Based on the information developed during the incpection and the information that Edison
                  provided during the conference and in its February 3 letter, the NRC has determined that
                  violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of
                                                                                                                        ,
                  Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detailin the subject
                  inspection report. The most significant violation involves a failure to protect safeguards
                  information. Specifically, a Safeguards Contingency Plan was lost and has not been recovered.
                  During the conference, Edison's position was that there is sufficient justification to believe the
i
i
                  loss of the Safeguards Contingency Plan was an inadvertent act, and not a deliberate attempt by
                  an unauthorized person to gather information about the Edison security contingency plans.
                  Edison noted that although the plan contains much information about how the security
                organization would respond to various events, the plan does not contain every key detail.
j
                Edison also stated that its program for the control of safeguards information substantially
                exceeds regulatory requirements and that the loss of the plan was an anomaly As a result,
                Edison concluded that the violation should be classified at Severity Level IV because it was an
t
                isniated personnel error, aggressive corrective action was taken, the loss was not indicative of a
                programmatic breakdown or a loss of safety function, and it was not willful.
I
                No' withstanding Edison's position, the circumstances involving the location, duration (until
                idemification), and the importance of the information are significant. The plan was lost from a
                building located outside the protected area, up to one month had passed before Edison
                discovered that the plan was missing, the plan has not yet been recovered, and the plan
                contains significant safeguards information. These factors create the potential for security to be
            90022
            ? *60065      *      *                                                                                f
                                          90 &0
                                          1
                                                l 18                                        ;\\\l\\\;\\\fff)$        .
  -      --            _ _ _ _                    . _ _ _                  _        _    _    _        _ - _
 
    .,
  .
                                                            2-
        compromised; and a violation of this type is considered significant. Therefore, this violation has
        been categorized at Severity Level lll in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and
        Procedure for NRC Enforcement Ac6ons"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG 1600.
        In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a civil penalty with a base value of $55,000 is
        considered for a Severity Level lll violation. Because your facility has not been the subject of
        escalated enforcement action within the last 2 years, the NRC considered whether credit was
        warranted for Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in
        Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Edison's corrective actions included immediately
        initiating a significant inyc&tigation, taking aggressive measures to find the plan, immediately
        implementing securny compenuatory measures, notifying the NRC, enhancing requirements for
        controlling safeguards information, soliciting the assistance of the entire site population, revising
        the plan, and relocating some key security contingency equipment. The NRC has concluded
        that Edison's corrective actions were sufficiently prompt and comprehensive, and that Edison is
l
        deserving of corrective action credit.
        Therefore, to encourage prompt and comprehensive correction of violations, and in recognition
        of the absence of previous escalated enforcement action, I have been authorized not to propose
        a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil
        penalty.
        The attached Notice contains three additional violations involving failures to: (1) secure -
        contingency weapons in two instances, (2) report to the NRC the discovery of weapons that
        were out of the control or physical custody of security personnel, and (3) provide emergency
        power supply to a small portion of the intrusion detection system. In accordance with the
        enforcement policy, each of these four violations has been classified at Soverity Level IV.
        During the conference, Edison stated that these remaining violations were either not violations
        or, for those issues which Edison agreed were violations, satisfied the enforcement policy
        criteria for non cited violations (NCV). Edison's arguments are addressed below.
          Regarding the failure to secure contingency weapons, Edison agreed that a severity level IV
        violation occurred but that it met the enforcement policy criteria for NCV. However, the NRC has
        determined that the corrective' actions for the first instance of this violation (July 30,1997) cculd
          reasonably be expected to have prevented the second instance (November 7,1997).
          Therefore, this does not meet the criteria for treatment as an NCV.
          Regarding the failure to report the loss of the security computers, Edison's position was that its
          compensatory measures takeil were adequate, and therefore the failure of the security comput0r
          did not have to be reported consistent with Edison's reporting procedurei While the NRC still
          has questions about the adequacy of the compensatory measures, Section IV.D of the
                                                                                        _
          Enforcement Policy states that a licensee will not normally be cited for a failure to report a
          condition or event unless the licensee was actually aware of the condition or event that it failed
          to report. As such, no violation is being cited for this issue.
                                                                                                              I
          Regarding the failure to report the discovery of the unlocked and unattended contingency
          weapons, Edison argued that insufficient guidance exists for what constitutes the " loss" of a
      _                          _
                                                                                                              ;
 
    _ __        __-          .        _  _ _ .  _ __ . ___                        __          _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  ,
                                                                3-
            weapon. The NRC's position is that the weapons were out of the control and physical custody of
            security personnel inside the protected area on July 30,1997, and thersfore, in accordance with
            Edison's reporting procedure, required a 1 hour report.
            Regarding the failure to provide emergency power supply to one portion of the intrusion
            detection system, Edison's position was that this violation satisfied the enforcement policy
'
            criteria for and should be characterized as an NCV. The NRC's position is that, although
            Edison's long term corrective action (a permanent engineered fix) was appropriate, the
            immediate corrective actions were inadequate in that no interim measures were taken to
            immediately return to compliance (i.e., to provide backup power supply or uninterruptible power,
            or implement compensatory measures) until the permanent engineered fix could be
            implemented. As a result, the violation continued to exist for several weeks after discovery.
            Therefore, this violation does not meet the enforcement policy criteria for an NCV.
            Regarding the imprcper implementation of compensatory measures during times when the
            security computers were not functioning, Edison's position was that no regulatory violation
            occurred because compensatory measures were properly implorr.ented. However, during the
            inspection, the NRC inspector requested that security personnel demonstrate satisfactory
            performance of three different patrol routes for a simulated computer outage, Edison secunty
            personnel did not properly complete two of the threa patrol routes within the allotted time.
            During the conference, Edison did not adequately show that these failures were isolated and the
            NRC requested further information regarding the control of the security procedures and
            guidance that ensure compensatory measures are adequately implemented in its February 3,
            1998, letter, Edison provided further information regarding the adaquacy of its procedures and
            the adequacy of the compensatory measures taken duiing the computer outages. However, the
            NRC does not have sufficient information to determinc whether a violation occurred, and this
            issue will be tracked as an Unresolved item pending further review.
            Edison's February 3 letter also provided comments to the inspection report. The comments
            reasserted Edison's perspective on the issues discussed during the predecisional enforcement
            conference. We acknowledge Edison's position, and we provided the NRC's position in the
            inspection report and, where appropriate, we are responding to Edison's positions in this
            enforcement action. We have determined that there were no factual errors in the inspection
            report; therefore, a revision to the report will not be issued.
            You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the
            enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to
            determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory
            requirements.
.
        --:          s- e  -    -- - ,  -                                                                          - ,
 
    .
  ,
                                                    -4-
                                                                                                      1
      In accordance with 10 CPR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
      enclosure, and your response will be placed + 'he NPC Public Document Room.
                                                                                                      1
                                                  Sincerely,
                                                    if    OV
                                            [y Ellis W. Merschoff
                                                  Regional Administrator
      Docket Nos.: 50-361; 50-362
      License Nos.: NPF 10; NPF 15
      Enclosure: Notice of Violation
t
      Chairman, Board of Supervisors
'
      County of San Diego
      1600 Pacific Highway, Room 335
      San Diego, California 92101
      Alan R. Watts, Esq.
      Woodruff, Spradlin & Smart
      701 S. Parker St. Suite 7000
      Orange, California 92868-4720
      Sherwin Harris, Resource Project Manager
      Public Utilities Department
      City of Riverside
      3900 Main Street
      Riverside, California 92522
      R. W. Krieger, Vice President
      Southern California Edison Company
      San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
      P.O. Box 128
      San Clemente, California 92674 0128
      Stephen A. Woods, Senior Health Physicist
      Division of Drinking Water and
        Environmental Management
      Nuclear Emergency Response Program
      California Department of Health Services
      P.O. Box 942732, M/S 390
      Sacramento, Ca!'fornia 94334 7320
                                                                                      ,            _
 
    4
  .
                                            5-
      Mr. Gary D. Cotton, Sr. Vice President
      Energy Supply
      San Diego Gas & Electric Company
      P. O. Box 1831
      San Diego, California 92112-4150
      Mr. Steve Hsu
      Radiological Health Branch
      State Department of Health Services
l    P.O. Box 942732
l    Sacramento, California 94234
      Mayor
      City of San Clemente
      100 Avenida Presidio
      San Clemente, California 92672
      Mr. Truman Burns \Mr. Robert Kinosian
      California Public Utilities Commission
      505 Van Ness, Rm. 4102
      San Francisco, California 94102
                                                ._j
 
      .
  .
                                                                          6
              bec w/ Enclosure:
              PDR                                                    lE 14
              LPDR                                                    NUDOCS--
              SECY                                                    EC's: Rl, Rll, Rill
              CA                                                      PA (0 2G4)
              EDO (017G21)                                            OlG (T 5D28)
              DEDO (017G21)                                          OE (0 7HS)
              OE:EAFile (0 7H5)                                      01 (0 3E4)
i            OGC (015B18)                                            OGC (015B18)
l            NRR (012G18)                                            NRR/ADP (012G18)
              NRR PROJECT MANAGER                                    OC/DAF (T 9E10)
              OC/LFDCB (T 9E10)                                      AEOD (T-4D18)
              RA Reading File                                        GSanborn EAFile
              RIV Files                                              MIS Coordinator
              E MAIL DISTRIBUTION:
              OEMAll
              JDyer (JED2)
                                                                      EMerschoff(Eh A)
              TPGwynn (TPG)
                                                                      WBrown (WLB)
;
              GSanborn (GFS)                                          GMVasquez (GMV)
              BHenderson (BWH)                                        BEarnest (ABE)
              CHackney (CAH)--                                        DKunihiro (DMK1)
              Art Howell(ATH)                                        DChamberlain (DDC)
              KPerkins (KEP)                                          Dacker . 3A)
              DKirsch (DFK)                                          KBrockman (KEB)
              BMurray (BXM)
              DOCUMENT NAME: G:\EA\ DRAFT \EA97585.DFT
              To receive copy of document, indicate in box: "C" = Copy without enclosurea "E" a Copy with enclosures ''N" = No copy
                ES MM                      E9(,4ra      , f      DRS:PSB mh C:PSB                          DRP              h/
                MVasquez                  GhtInTidrnk'            8 Earnest 'f69 BMurray D                  TPGwynn 6
              01/tV98                    01M'98                  2/    /98      -
                                                                                                              2//h98
                                                                  RC          ;      DRA
                RRosano Qiff              AHoMF                  WLBroW "              JDyer 3//7 f EMerschoff
                2/5/98                      2/Q/98                2/1 /98              2///V98              2//f/98
                                                        OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
        _ - _          __
    4
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