ML20245J558

Forwards SSOMI Rept 50-339/89-200 on 890213-17 & 0227-0303. Four Safety Significant Matters Identified.Concerns Raised Re Improperly Sized motor-operated Valve Actuators

ML20245J558
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	06/26/1989
From:	Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Cartwright W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
Shared Package
ML20245J560	List: IR 05000339/1989200 ML20245J558
References
NUDOCS 8907030092
Download: ML20245J558 (8)

See also: IR 05000339/1989200

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' June 26, 1989

Docket Hos. 50-338

and 50-339

Mr. W. R. Cartwright'

Vice President-Nuclear

Virginia Electric anc Power Company

5000 Dominion Boulevard

Glen. Allen, Virginia .23060

Dear Mr. Cartwright:.

SUBJECT:

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 2 - SAFETY SYSTEM OUTAGE

>

' MODIFICATION INSPECTION (DESIGN) - 50-339/89-200

This letter conveys the results and conclusions of the design portion of the

safety system outage modification inspection (SSOM1) of the North Anna Power

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Station Unit 2 conducted by. the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

The . inspection teani consisted of NRC personnel and consultants. The inspection

was conducted primarily at your engineering offices in Richmond, Virginia

during the periods February 13-17 and February 27 - March 3,1989 and was

augmented with a 1-day site visit.

The purpose of the design portion of the 550MI was to examine, on a. sampling

basis, the detailed design and engineering that were required to support

modifications implemented during the outage.

In addition to the design portion

of the SSOMI, %is office has also conducted an inspection of installation and

test activities for Unit I during its outage. A separate report will be

published detailing that phase of the SSOMI.

.The report is organized to present the findings in three formats.

Section 1.3'

provides an overview of the team's activities and summarizes major findings by

discipline. Sections 2 and 3 summarize the effectiveness of your design' effort

in terms of weaknesses and strengths, respectively. The items of concern

identified by the team during the inspection have been classified as finoings

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and are referenced throughout the report ano presented in detail in Appendix C.

Ey separate correspondence' dated March 17, 1989 you were advised of four

11ndings characterized as " safety-significant matters" which needed to be

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addressed in an expeditious s.anner. Your response of March 31, 1969 resulted

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in a Region 11 confirmatory inspection during the week of April 3,1989.

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Also your letters of April 13, 1989 and April 28, 1989 provided supplemental

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information with regard to your actions and comitments for these four

findings. A current status of these four " safety-significant matters" is

provided in the enclosed Executive Summary.

Of particular concern to the team were findings related to improperly si:ed

motor operated valve actuators and improper isolation between a nontlass IE

instrument that was powered from a Class IE bus. The motor-operated valve

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Mr. W. R. Cartwright

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June 26, 1989

actuator issue has resulted.in the resetting of torque switches as well as the

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need for new torque switch spring packs for certain valves in the service water

system. The improper isolation has resulted in the replacement of the associated

fuses with' ones qualified as Class IE.

Additionally, VEPC0 needs to assess the

-pervasiveness of improper isolation of nonClass' 1E components powered from

. Class 1E buses at the North Anna facility.

NRR is planning to reinspect the findings addressed herein. Once your response

to this inspection report is received a schedule will be established.

Some of

the identified items may be potential enforcement findings. Any enforcement

actions will be identified by Region II in separate correspondence.

A safeguards finding is being transmitted to you under separate cover.

~

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure will

be placed in the NRC' Public Document Room.

- You are requested to respond to this office within 60 days regarding the

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unresolved items in Appendix C and weaknesses in Section 2 identified in the .

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enclosed inspection report. Should you have any questions concerning this

inspection, please contact the NRR Project Manager, Leon Engle or Ron Parkhill of

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the NRC staff. Messrs. Engle and Parkhill can be reached at (301) 492-1484 and

(301)492-0963, respectively.

Sincerely ,

Steven A. Varga, Director

Division of Reactor Projects - 1/II

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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Enclosures:

'1.

Executiye Summary

2.

Inspection Report

50-339/89-E00

cc w/ enclosures:

See next page

[ COVER LTR NA]

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

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Mr. W. R. Cartwright

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actuator issue has resulted in the resetting of torque switches a well as the

need for new torque switch spring packs for certain valves in t e service water

system. The improper isolation has resulted in the replaceme

of the associated

fuses with ones qualified as Class 1E. Additionally, VEPC0 eeds to assess the

pervasiveness of improper isolation of nonClass 1E compon ts powered from

Class 1E buses at the North Anna facility.

NRR is planning to reinspect the findings addressed

rein. Once your response

to this inspection report is received a schedule wi

be established.

Some of

the identified items may be potential enforcement indings. Any enforcement

actions will be identified by Region II in separ te correspondence.

A safeguards finding is being transmitted to ou under separate cover.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a cop of this letter and the enclosure will

be placed in the NRC Public Docurrent Ro i.

You are requested to respond to this office within 60 days regarding the

unresolved items in Appendix C and eaknesses in Section 2 identified in the

enclosed inspection report.

Shou d you have any questions concerning this

inspection, please contact NRR

oject Manager, Leon Engle or Ron Parkhill of

l

the NRC staff. Messrs. Engle nd Parkhill can be reached at (301) 492-1484 and

(301) 492 0963, respectively

Sincerely,

Steven A. Varga, Director

Division of Reactor Projects - I/II

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Enc'osures:

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Execut e Summary

2.

Inspe tion Report 50-339/89-200

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Regional Administrators:

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Inspection . Team

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June 26, 1989

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Mr. W. R. Cartwright

Virginia Electric and Power Company

Surry Power Station

cc:

Michael W. Maupin, Esq.

Attorney General

Hunton and Williams

. Supreme Court Building

Post Office Box.1535

101 North 8th Street

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Richnend, Virginia 23212

Richmond, Virginia 23219

Mr. Michael Kansler, Manager

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-Surry Power Station

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INPO

Post Office Box 315

1100 Circle 75 Parkway

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Surry, Virginia 23883

Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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Resident inspector

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Surry Power Station

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission

. Post Of fice Box 166, Route 1

Surry, Virginia _23883

Mr. Sherlock Holnes, Chairman

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Board of Supervisors of Surry County

Surry County Courthouse

Surry, Virginia 23683

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Mr. W. T. Lough.

Virginia Corporation Comission

Division of Energy Regulation

Post Office Box 1197

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Richmond, Virginia. 23209

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Regional Administrator,. Region 11

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900

Atlanta, Georgia 30323

C. N. G. Buttery, M.D., M.P.H.

Department of Health

109 Governor Street

4

Richmond, Virginia 23219

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EXECUTIVE SUMARY

INSPECTION REPORT 50-339/89-200

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - Unit 2

The NRC conducted the-design portion of a safety system outage modification

inspection (SSOMI) for North Anna Unit 2 during the weeks of February 13 and

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February 27, 1989.

The inspection was conducted at the Virginia Electric and

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Power Company (VEPCO) corporate offices in Richmond, Virginia, where the

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associated exit meeting was held on March 3, 1989.

The purpose of this design

SSOMI was to review planned plant changes and ascertain if the as-modified

plant remained in accordance with its licensing basis. The inspection focused

on an in-depth review of sampled modifications for the disciplines of instru-

mentation and controls, mechanical systems, electrical power, mechanical

components and civil / structural. Sungnarized below are the more significant

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findings.

In a letter from Mr. G. C. Lainas to Mr. W. R. Cartwright dated March 17, 1989,

the NRC identified four findings characterized as safety significant and

requested VEPCO to respond within 15 days. VEPC0 responded in a letter dated

March 31, 1989 and Region 11 performed an inspection the week of April 3,1989

to evaluate the response. This inspection will be sumarized in a future

inspection report covering an assessment of the corrective actions to the

findings in this report.

In letters dated April 13, 1989 and April 29, 1989,

VEPCO provided supplemental information for the. safety significant findings. A

brief sumary of these issues is provided below addressing the commitments and

actions required.

(1) VEPCO-designed and procured service water valve operators were identified

to be undersized based on the worst-case differential pressure. VEPC0

reanalyzed the sizing criteria and concluded that two spray array valves

had to have their torque switch settings readjusted and the bypass spray

valves had to have their torque switch spring packs replaced.

Until the

spring packs can be replaced, VEPCO committed to implementing administra-

tive controls when operating in Modes 1 through 4 to ensure proper system

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response under design-basis accidents. Also, VEPCO had been requested

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with the NRR project manager)g on April 7, 1989 and during a discussionto p

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(at the Region 11 exit meetin

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problems were not pervasive at North Anna by reviewing the design basis of

other VEPCO designed and procured safety-related motor-operated valves

(MOVs).

VEPCO's response of April 28, 1989 indicated that their review of

E0Vs replaced or modified confirned that the associated design pressure

and torque requirements were adequate (See Appendix C Fincing IC-1).

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(2) The inspection team identified unjustified assumptions and omissions in

setpoint calculations.

VEPC0 was requested to sample 10 setpoint calcula-

tions to verify that these identified errors had no adverse impcct on the

safety system setting limits and report any reductions in safety margin.

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Additionally, VEPCO was requested to issue guidance for performing setpoint

calculations.

VEPCO's letter dated March 31, 1989 committed to these

aforementioned requests.

In a letter dated April 28, 1989. VEPC0 stated

that the calculational review was complete and where safety limits were

established'the margin of safety was confirmed (See Appendix C Finding IC-2).

(3) The inspection team identified improper isolation between nonclass 1E

pressure transmitters for the service water system and a Class IE vital

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power source.

Consideration of VEPCO's March 31, 1989 response in addi-

tion to discussions within the NRC and review of VEPCO's response dated

April 28, 1989 has resulted in the following comitments and issues (See

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Appendix C Finding IC-3):

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(a) VEPCO comitted to replace the subject isolation devices with Class

IE fuses prior to restart.

(b) .VEPCO comitted to review all modifications installed during this

outage for.similar isolation errors and make the appropriate changes

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prior to restart.

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(c) VEPCO comitted to review all modifications implemented after April

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1987 by Novenber 1,1989 and the NRC understands that any associated

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change would be made prior to the end of the next refueling outage.

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Procedure changes and personnel training would be completed by

September 15, 1989, to preclude future occurrence of similar isolation

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issues.

(d) The NRC staff disagrees with VEPCO's position for modifications

rior to April 1987. The staff position is that all similar

made.p'ations of improper isolation at the North Anna facility need

applit

to be identified 6nd corrected prior to the end of the next refueling

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outage. VEPCO has verbally requested a meeting with the staff to

discuss this ratter.

(4) The inspection team noted that the design change packages did not specify

the testing required to demonstrate functionality of the system and

affected components following the change. Additionally, in regard to the

anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) modification, the team found

that one periodic test procedure (i.e., two tests) was being performed

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before the installation of the modification. As a consequence VEPC0 was

requested to explicitly identify the functional test requirements in the

design change packages and engineering work requests to be installed thi,s

outage, to ensure th6t all necessary testing would be perfonned (See

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Appendix C Finding 10-8).

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The following is a brief sumary of other significant items addressed in the

' enclosed inspection report.

(1) A potentially vital system did r.ot have two protective barriers as required

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by.10 CFR 73.55.

(See finding MS-1 which was tr6nsmitted under separate

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coverletter.)

(2)

A change was made to a pipe support baseplate to enlarge the holes,)

without proper design justification.

(See Appendix C finding MC-1.

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(3) A quality' control inspection report had an inadequate design evaluation

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and inadequate' safety evaluation in that riaither recognized the_inappro-

priateness of losing one battery channel due to interaction with

non-seismic hardware.

(See Appendix C Finding EP-2.)

(4) VEPC0 did not comply with its comitment in regard to a previous violation

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concerning the omission of leakage current effects in instrument loop

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securacy calculations.

(See Appendix C Finding IC-7.)

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