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{{#Wiki_filter:FNP-FSAR-9 9.0 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS TABLE OF CONTENTS 9.1 FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING ......................................................................... 9.1-1 9.1.1    New Fuel Storage ................................................................................ 9.1-1 9.1.1.1  Design Bases....................................................................................... 9.1-1 9.1.1.2  Facilities Description ............................................................................ 9.1-2 9.1.1.3  Safety Evaluation ................................................................................. 9.1-2 9.1.2    Wet Spent-Fuel Storage ...................................................................... 9.1-2 9.1.2.1  Design Bases....................................................................................... 9.1-2 9.1.2.2  Facilities Description ............................................................................ 9.1-3 9.1.2.3  Safety Evaluation ................................................................................. 9.1-3 9.1.3    Spent-Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System ................................... 9.1-4 9.1.3.1  Design Bases....................................................................................... 9.1-4 9.1.3.2  System Description .............................................................................. 9.1-6 9.1.3.3  Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.1-10 9.1.3.4  Tests and Inspections ........................................................................ 9.1-11 9.1.4    Fuel Handling System........................................................................ 9.1-11 9.1.4.1  Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.1-11 9.1.4.2  System Description ............................................................................ 9.1-12 9.1.4.3  Design Evaluation .............................................................................. 9.1-24 9.1.4.4  Tests and Inspections ........................................................................ 9.1-39 9.1.5    Spent-Fuel Leak Detection ................................................................ 9.1-40 9.1.5.1  Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.1-41 9.1.5.2  System Description ............................................................................ 9.1-42 9.1.5.3  Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.1-43 9.1.6    Dry Spent-Fuel Storage ..................................................................... 9.1-44 9.1.6.1  Spent-Fuel Cask ................................................................................ 9.1-44 9.1.6.2  Spent-Fuel Cask Lift Yoke ................................................................. 9.1-46 9-i                                                    REV 30 10/21
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FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS 9.1.7    Heavy Loads ...................................................................................... 9.1-47 9.1.7.1  Heavy Loads Safe Loads Path .......................................................... 9.1-48 9.1.7.2  Load Handling Procedures ................................................................ 9.1-49 9.1.7.3  Implementation of Standards ............................................................. 9.1-50 9.1.7.4  Load Drop Analysis............................................................................ 9.1-52 9.2 WATER SYSTEMS .................................................................................................. 9.2-1 9.2.1    Station Cooling Water System (River Water, Service Water, and Circulating Water Systems) ................................................................. 9.2-1 9.2.1.1  Design Bases....................................................................................... 9.2-1 9.2.1.2  System Description .............................................................................. 9.2-2 9.2.1.3  Safety Evaluation ................................................................................. 9.2-8 9.2.1.4  Tests and Inspections ........................................................................ 9.2-13 9.2.1.5  Instrumentation Applications.............................................................. 9.2-13 9.2.1.6  Service Water Treatment Systems .................................................... 9.2-13 9.2.2    Cooling System for Reactor Auxiliaries ............................................. 9.2-14 9.2.2.1  Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.2-14 9.2.2.2  System Description ............................................................................ 9.2-14 9.2.2.3  Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.2-17 9.2.2.4  Tests and Inspection.......................................................................... 9.2-19 9.2.2.5  Instrumentation Applications.............................................................. 9.2-19 9.2.3    Demineralized Water Makeup System .............................................. 9.2-20 9.2.3.1  Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.2-20 9.2.3.2  System Description ............................................................................ 9.2-20 9.2.3.3  Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.2-21 9.2.3.4  Tests and Inspections ........................................................................ 9.2-22 9.2.3.5  Instrumentation Applications.............................................................. 9.2-22 9.2.4    Potable and Sanitary Water System .................................................. 9.2-22 9.2.4.1  Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.2-22 9.2.4.2  System Description ............................................................................ 9.2-22 9.2.4.3  Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.2-22 9.2.4.4  Tests and Inspections ........................................................................ 9.2-23 9.2.4.5  Instrumentation Applications.............................................................. 9.2-23 9-ii                                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS 9.2.5  Ultimate Heat Sink ............................................................................. 9.2-23 9.2.5.1 Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.2-23 9.2.5.2 System Description ............................................................................ 9.2-24 9.2.5.3 Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.2-24 9.2.5.4 Description of Analysis Method and Summary of Results ................. 9.2-29 9.2.5.5 Tests and Inspections ........................................................................ 9.2-31 9.2.5.6 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................. 9.2-31 9.2.6  Condensate Storage Facilities ........................................................... 9.2-31 9.2.6.1 Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.2-31 9.2.6.2 System Description ............................................................................ 9.2-32 9.2.6.3 Safety Considerations........................................................................ 9.2-32 9.2.6.4 Tests and Inspections ........................................................................ 9.2-32 9.2.6.5 Storage Tank Fill................................................................................ 9.2-33 9.2.6.6 Flooding Due to Storage Tank Rupture ............................................. 9.2-33 9.2.7  Reactor Makeup Water System ......................................................... 9.2-34 9.2.7.1 Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.2-34 9.2.7.2 System Description ............................................................................ 9.2-34 9.2.7.3 Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.2-35 9.2.7.4 Tests and Inspections ........................................................................ 9.2-36 9.2.7.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................. 9.2-36 9.2.8  Plant Water Treatment System.......................................................... 9.2-36 9.2.8.1 Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.2-36 9.2.8.2 System Description ............................................................................ 9.2-36 9.2.8.3 Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.2-37 9.2.8.4 Tests and Inspections ........................................................................ 9.2-38 9.2.8.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................. 9.2-38 9.2.9  Well Water System ............................................................................ 9.2-38 9.2.9.1 Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.2-38 9.2.9.2 System Description ............................................................................ 9.2-38 9.2.9.3 Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.2-39 9.2.9.4 Tests and Inspections ........................................................................ 9.2-39 9.2.9.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................. 9.2-39 9-iii                                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS 9.3 PROCESS AUXILIARIES......................................................................................... 9.3-1 9.3.1    Compressed Air System ...................................................................... 9.3-1 9.3.1.1  Design Bases....................................................................................... 9.3-1 9.3.1.2  System Description .............................................................................. 9.3-1 9.3.1.3  Safety Evaluation ................................................................................. 9.3-2 9.3.1.4  Tests and Inspections .......................................................................... 9.3-3 9.3.1.5  Instrumentation Applications................................................................ 9.3-3 9.3.2    Process Sampling Systems ................................................................. 9.3-4 9.3.2.1  Design Bases....................................................................................... 9.3-4 9.3.2.2  System Description .............................................................................. 9.3-4 9.3.3    Equipment and Floor Drainage System ............................................... 9.3-7 9.3.3.1  Design Bases....................................................................................... 9.3-7 9.3.3.2  System Description .............................................................................. 9.3-7 9.3.3.3  Design Evaluation ................................................................................ 9.3-8 9.3.3.4  Tests and Inspections .......................................................................... 9.3-9 9.3.3.5  Instrumentation and Control ................................................................ 9.3-9 9.3.3.6  Nonradioactive Auxiliary Building Sump Transfer................................ 9.3-9 9.3.4    Chemical and Volume Control System and Liquid Poison System ... 9.3-09 9.3.4.1  Chemical and Volume Control System .............................................. 9.3-09 9.3.4.2  Boron Thermal Regeneration System ............................................... 9.3-38 9.3.5    Failed Fuel Detection System ............................................................ 9.3-43 9.3.5.1  Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.3-43 9.3.5.2  System Description ............................................................................ 9.3-44 9.3.5.3  Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.3-44 9.3.5.4  Tests and Inspections ........................................................................ 9.3-44 9.3.5.5  Instrumentation Applications.............................................................. 9.3-44 9.4 AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING, COOLING, AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS ....... 9.4-1 9.4.1    Control Room....................................................................................... 9.4-1 9.4.1.1  Design Bases....................................................................................... 9.4-1 9.4.1.2  System Description .............................................................................. 9.4-2 9.4.1.3  Safety Evaluation ................................................................................. 9.4-3 9-iv                                                    REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS 9.4.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements ................................................. 9.4-6 9.4.1.5 Instrumentation .................................................................................... 9.4-7 9.4.1.6 Analysis of Site Boundary, Low Population Zone (LPZ) Boundary, and Control Room Operator Dose Following a LOCA ......................... 9.4-8 9.4.2  Auxiliary Building ................................................................................. 9.4-8 9.4.2.1 Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.4-09 9.4.2.2 System Description ............................................................................ 9.4-12 9.4.2.3 Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.4-21 9.4.2.4 Tests and Inspections ........................................................................ 9.4-24 9.4.2.5 Instrumentation Application ............................................................... 9.4-26 9.4.2.6 Materials ............................................................................................ 9.4-28 9.4.3  Radwaste Area .................................................................................. 9.4-28 9.4.3.1 Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.4-29 9.4.3.2 System Description ............................................................................ 9.4-29 9.4.3.3 Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.4-31 9.4.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements ............................................... 9.4-31 9.4.3.5 Instrumentation Application ............................................................... 9.4-33 9.4.4  Turbine Building ................................................................................. 9.4-33 9.4.4.1 Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.4-33 9.4.4.2 System Description ............................................................................ 9.4-34 9.4.4.3 Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.4-37 9.4.4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements ............................................... 9.4-37 9.4.4.5 Instrumentation Application ............................................................... 9.4-38 9.4.5  Service Water Intake Structure .......................................................... 9.4-38 9.4.5.1 Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.4-39 9.4.5.2 System Description ............................................................................ 9.4-40 9.4.5.3 Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.4-42 9.4.5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements ............................................... 9.4-43 9.4.6  River Water Intake Structure ............................................................. 9.4-43 9.4.6.1 Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.4-43 9.4.6.2 System Description ............................................................................ 9.4-44 9.4.6.3 Inspection and Testing Requirements ............................................... 9.4-46 9-v                                                    REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS 9.4.7    Diesel Generator Building .................................................................. 9.4-46 9.4.7.1  Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.4-47 9.4.7.2  System Description ............................................................................ 9.4-48 9.4.7.3  Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.4-51 9.4.7.4  Testing and Inspection Requirements ............................................... 9.4-56 9.5 OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS ............................................................................... 9.5-1 9.5.1    Fire Protection .................................................................................... 9.5-1 9.5.1.1  Design Basis Summary ....................................................................... 9.5-2 9.5.1.2  System Description .............................................................................. 9.5-4 9.5.1.3  Safety Evaluation ................................................................................. 9.5-5 9.5.1.4  Fire Protection Program Documentation ............................................. 9.5-5 9.5.2    Communication Systems ..................................................................... 9.5-6 9.5.2.1  Design Bases....................................................................................... 9.5-6 9.5.2.2  Description ........................................................................................... 9.5-6 9.5.2.3  Inspection and Tests............................................................................ 9.5-8 9.5.2.4  Safety Evaluation ................................................................................. 9.5-8 9.5.3    Lighting Systems ................................................................................. 9.5-8 9.5.3.1  Normal Lighting.................................................................................... 9.5-9 9.5.3.2  Essential Lighting................................................................................. 9.5-9 9.5.3.3  Emergency Lighting ............................................................................. 9.5-9 9.5.4    Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System ..................................................... 9.5-10 9.5.4.1  Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.5-10 9.5.4.2  Description ......................................................................................... 9.5-11 9.5.4.3  Evaluation .......................................................................................... 9.5-12 9.5.4.4  Tests and Inspections ........................................................................ 9.5-13 9.5.4.5  Instrumentation Application ............................................................... 9.5-13 9.5.5    Diesel Generator Cooling Water System ........................................... 9.5-14 9.5.5.1  Design Bases..................................................................................... 9.5-14 9.5.5.2  Description ......................................................................................... 9.5-14 9.5.5.3  Evaluation .......................................................................................... 9.5-14 9-vi                                                    REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS 9.5.6  Diesel Generator Starting System ..................................................... 9.5-15 9.5.6.1 Design Basis ...................................................................................... 9.5-15 9.5.6.2 Description ......................................................................................... 9.5-15 9.5.6.3 Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.5-16 9.5.7  Diesel Generator Lubrication System ................................................ 9.5-16 9.5.7.1 Design Basis ...................................................................................... 9.5-16 9.5.7.2 Description of External Oil System .................................................... 9.5-17 9.5.7.3 Description of Internal Oil System 38TD8-1/8 Engines 1C and 2C ... 9.5-17 9.5.7.4 Description of Internal Oil System PC-2 Engines 1-2A, 1B, and 2B .. 9.5-18 9.5.7.5 Safety Evaluation ............................................................................... 9.5-18 APPENDIX 9A  ULTIMATE HEAT SINK EVALUATION - RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT .. 9A-1 APPENDIX 9B  FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM ........................................................ 9B-1 9-vii                                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 LIST OF TABLES 9.1-1  Spent-Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Design Parameters 9.1-2  Spent-Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Design and Operating Parameters 9.1-3  Spent Fuel Cask Crane Data 9.2-1  River Water System Component Data 9.2-2  Number of Pumps Required per Unit to Provide Adequate Cooling 9.2-3  Service Water System Design Flowrates 9.2-4  Deleted 9.2-5  Single Failure Analysis Service Water System 9.2-6  Component Cooling Water System Design Flowrates 9.2-7  Component Cooling Water System Heat Loads 9.2-8  Component Cooling Water/Service Water Temperatures 9.2-9  Component Cooling System Component Data 9.2-10 Component Cooling System Code Requirements 9.2-11 Component Cooling System Failure Analysis 9.2-12 Service Water System Heat Load: One Unit LOCA with Maximum ESF, One Unit Shutdown/Cooldown 9.2-13 Service Water System Heat Load: LOCA With Maximum ESF 9.2-14 Service Water System Heat Load: Normal Shutdown With 50°F/h Cooldown 9.2-15 Service Water System Heat Load: Normal Shutdown With 16-h Cooldown 9.3-1  Safety-Related Air-Operated Valves 9.3-2  Primary Sample System Sample Point Design Data 9.3-3  Local Grab Samples 9.3-4  Turbine Plant Analyzer Sampling Section Sample Point Design Data 9-viii                        REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 LIST OF TABLES 9.3-5  Chemical and Volume Control System Design Parameters 9.3-6  Principal Component Data Summary 9.3-7  Boron Thermal Regeneration System Component Data 9.3-8  Valve Positions for Operating Modes of Boron Thermal Regeneration System 9.4-1  Control Room Air Conditioning and Filtration System - Component Description 9.4-2  Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 0, Applicability for the Control Room Filtration System 9.4-3  Control Room Air Conditioning and Filtration System - Single Failure Analysis 9.4-4  Time Calculations for Various Chlorine Concentrations 9.4-5  (Deleted) 9.4-6  Auxiliary Building Ventilation, Air Conditioning, and Filtration System Design Parameters 9.4-6A Auxiliary Building Room Temperatures for Post-Accident Heat Loads 9.4-7  Battery Room Exhaust, Battery Charger Room, Motor Control Centers, and 600-V Load Centers and Engineered Safety Features Pump Room Cooling Systems -
Single Failure Analysis 9.4-8  Unit 1 Radwaste Area Heating, Ventilating, and Filtration Systems Design Parameters 9.4-9  Unit 2 Radwaste Area Heating, Ventilating, and Filtration Systems Design Parameters 9.4-10 Radwaste Heating, Ventilation, and Filtration System Failure Analysis 9.4-11 Turbine Building Heating, Cooling, and Steam Jet Air Ejector Filtration Systems Component Design Parameters 9.4-12 Description of Cases Evaluated in Safety Evaluation of the Diesel Generator Building 9.4-13 Recirculation of Exhaust Gas to Intakes - Assumptions 9.4-14 Concentration of Carbon Dioxide at Diesel Air Intake from Ventilators 9-ix                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 LIST OF TABLES 9.4-15 Conformance to ASME N510-1989 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) Filtration Filter Units 9.4-16 Conformance to ASME N510-1989 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) Pressurization Filter Units 9.4-17 Conformance to ASME N510-1989 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) Recirculation Filter Units 9.4-18 Conformance to ASME N510-1989 Penetration Room Filtration (PRF) System Filter Units 9.4-19 (Deleted) 9.4-20 Conformance to ASME N510-1989 Post-Accident Purge Filtration System 9.5-1  Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System 9.5-2  Single Failure Analysis Diesel Generator Cooling Water 9.5-3  (Deleted) 9-x                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 LIST OF FIGURES 9.1-1      New Fuel Storage Racks 9.1-2      Spent Fuel Rack Module 9.1-3      Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Return Line Piping Arrangement 9.1-4      Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Return Line Piping Arrangement 9.1-5      Manipulator Crane 9.1-6      Spent Fuel Pool Bridge 9.1-7      Spent Fuel Cask Crane Front Elevation 9.1-8      Spent Fuel Cask Crane End Elevation 9.1-9      Spent Fuel Cask Crane Trolley Plan View 9.1-10      Spent Fuel Cask Crane Trolley End Elevation 9.1-11      Spent Fuel Cask Crane Main Hoist 16-Part, 2-Rope Reeving Sketch 9.1-12      Rod Cluster Control Changing Fixture 9.1-13      Reactor Vessel Head Lifting Device 9.1-14      Reactor Internals Lifting Device 9.1-15      Typical Stud Tensioner 9.1-16      Spent Fuel Cask Handling Procedure 9.1-17      Spent Fuel Cask Crane Fleet Angles 9.1-18      Heavy Load Restrictions for Auxiliary Hook - Auxiliary Building Roof, Hatch A Only 9.1-19      Heavy Load Restrictions for Auxiliary Hook - Auxiliary Building Roof Area and Hatch B
9.1-20      Heavy Load Restrictions for Auxiliary Hook - Auxiliary Building Roof Hatch C 9.2-1(sh 1) Service Water System 9.2-1(sh 2) Major Service Water Supply and Discharge Piping 9-xi                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 LIST OF FIGURES 9.2-1(sh 3) Major Service Water Supply and Discharge Piping 9.2-2      Emergency Cooling Pond Estimated Area and Volume Following 40 Years of Service 9.2-3      Ultimate Heat Sink, Heat Input vs. Time, LOCA With Maximum ESF and Normal Shutdown With 50°F/h Cooldown 9.2-4      Ultimate Heat Sink, Heat Input vs. Time, LOCA With Maximum ESF and Normal Shutdown With 16-h Cooldown 9.2-5      Ultimate Heat Sink, Integrated Heat Load, LOCA With Maximum ESF and Normal Shutdown With 50°F/h Cooldown 9.2-6      Ultimate Heat Sink, Integrated Heat Load, LOCA With Maximum ESF and Normal Shutdown With 16-h Cooldown 9.2-7      Ultimate Heat Sink, Service Water Inlet Temperature vs. Time 9.2-8      Ultimate Heat Sink, Pond Configuration as Modeled in the UHS Evaluation 9.2-9      Round Jet from a 20-ft2 Ruptured Hole 9.2-10      Plan View of the Condensate Storage Tank and Its Surrounding Facilities 9.2-11      Plant Water Treatment System 9.3-1      Reactor Coolant Sampling System 9.3-2      Gross Failed Fuel Detector Flow Diagram 9.3-3      Gross Failed Fuel Detector Electronics Diagram 9.4-1      Concentration of Chlorine in Control Room after Onsite Chlorine Release - Case A (Small Scale), Case A (Large Scale), Case B (Small Scale), Case B (Large Scale);
Halon 1301 Concentration in Control Room 9.4-2      Units 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Building Equipment Location on Roof 9.4-3      Chlorine Concentration versus Time Diesel Generator 9.5-1      Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System Physical Layout 9-xii                            REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.0 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.1      FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING Special nuclear material (SNM) in the form of fuel is stored in three locations at FNP. These are the new fuel storage area, the spent-fuel pool, and the independent spent-fuel storage installation (ISFSI). Storage of new fuel is described in FSAR subsection 9.1.1. Wet spent-fuel storage in the spent-fuel pool is described in FSAR subsection 9.1.2. Dry spent-fuel storage in the ISFSI is described in FSAR subsection 9.1.6.
9.1.1    NEW FUEL STORAGE 9.1.1.1        Design Bases New fuel is stored in racks (figure 9.1-1). Each rack is composed of individual vertical cells which can be fastened together in any number to form a module that can be firmly bolted to anchors in the floor of the new fuel storage area. The new fuel storage racks are designed to include storage for approximately 1/2 core (62 fuel assemblies in the west new fuel pit and 14 fuel assemblies in the east new fuel pit) at a center-to-center spacing of 21 in. This spacing provides a minimum separation between adjacent fuel assemblies of 12 in., which is sufficient to maintain a subcritical array even in the event that the building is flooded with unborated water.
All surfaces that come into contact with the fuel assemblies are made of austenitic steel, whereas the supporting structure may be painted carbon steel.
The west new fuel pit racks are designed to withstand nominal operating loads as well as safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) and one-half SSE seismic loads meeting American Nuclear Society (ANS) Safety Class 3 and American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) requirements.
The east new fuel pit racks are designed to withstand nominal operating loads as well as SSE and one-half SSE seismic loads meeting ANS Safety Class 3 and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Subsection NF, requirements.
In addition, an exemption from 10 CFR 70.24, relative to the authorization to possess special nuclear material at Farley Nuclear Plant, has been granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission(2) that provides relief from the requirement to install criticality monitors. These monitors are not needed because inadvertent or accidental criticality will be precluded through compliance with the plant Technical Specifications, geometric spacing of fuel assemblies in the new fuel storage area and spent-fuel storage pool, administrative controls imposed on fuel handling procedures, and the use of nuclear instrumentation that monitors the behavior of nuclear fuel in the reactor vessel.
9.1-1                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.1.1.2          Facilities Description The new fuel storage area is shown on figure 1.2-1. The racks are shown on figure 9.1-1.
9.1.1.3          Safety Evaluation The design basis for preventing criticality outside the reactor is that, including uncertainties, there is a 95-percent probability at a 95-percent confidence level (95/95 probability/confidence) that the effective multiplication factor (keff) of the fuel assembly array will be no greater than 0.95. The keff limit of 0.95 applies to the new (fresh) fuel racks under all conditions, except under low water density (optimum moderation) conditions where the keff limit is 0.98. The new fuel racks are maintained in a dry environment under normal conditions. Therefore, the introduction of full density and low density (optimum moderation) water are the bounding reactivity events. For both cases, keff remains below the NRC acceptance criteria of 0.95 and 0.98, respectively.
The new fuel assemblies are stored dry, the 21-in. x 21-in. spacing ensuring an ever-safe geometric array. Under these conditions, a criticality accident during refueling and storage is not considered credible.
Design of the facility in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.13 ensures adequate safety under normal and postulated accident conditions. Consideration of criticality safety analyses is discussed in paragraph 4.3.2.7.
The new fuel storage racks are designed to withstand a pullup force equal to the load rating of the new fuel monorail hoist (2500 lb).
9.1.2  WET SPENT-FUEL STORAGE 9.1.2.1          Design Bases Spent fuel is stored in the spent-fuel pool in 10.75 in. center-to-center spent-fuel racks. The spent-fuel storage capacity is about 9 cores (1407 fuel assemblies). Spent fuel is stored in racks (figure 9.1-2) which are composed of individual austenitic stainless steel cans that are assembled together in any reasonable number to form a module. The spent-fuel rack modules are freestanding and free to move on the pool liner floor during a seismic event. The racks maintain a center-to-center spacing of 10.75 in. between spent-fuel assemblies, which is sufficient to maintain a subcritical array. Mechanical design criteria for these racks are given below.
Additionally, loose fuel pellets and fuel rod debris from fuel rod failures may be stored in a pellet canister trap inside a transport container in the spent-fuel storage racks. The criticality safety analyses for the spent-fuel pool racks are discussed in paragraph 4.3.2.7.2.
9.1-2                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 Individual fuel rods removed during the fuel reconstitution process can be stored in the fuel rod storage canister (FRSC), which is located in a spent-fuel rack. Criticality and thermal/hydraulic analyses for the FRSC have confirmed that all design criteria for spent-fuel storage continue to be met.
Spent-fuel racks are designed to withstand shipping, handling, and normal operating loads (impact and dead loads of fuel assemblies) as well as SSE and one-half SSE seismic loads meeting ANS Safety Class 3 and AISC requirements. The spent-fuel racks are also designed to meet Category 1 seismic requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.13.
9.1.2.2          Facilities Description The wet spent-fuel storage area is shown in figure 1.2-3. The racks are shown in figure 9.1-2.
9.1.2.3          Safety Evaluation Design of this storage facility, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.13, ensures a safe condition under normal and postulated accident conditions. Consideration of criticality safety analyses is discussed in paragraph 4.3.2.7.
The design basis for preventing criticality outside the reactor is that, including uncertainties, there is a 95-percent probability at a 95-percent confidence level (95/95 probability/confidence) that the effective multiplication factor (keff) of the fuel assembly array will be less than 1.00 when flooded with unborated water.
The keff for the Farley spent-fuel storage racks when flooded with borated water was less than 0.95, with 410 ppm of soluble boron and included all appropriate biases and uncertainties at a 95/95 probability/confidence level(10). This meets the NRC acceptance criteria of 0.95.
The keff for the Farley spent-fuel storage racks under the most limiting postulated accident condition and the Technical Specification soluble boron concentration of 2000 ppm was less than 0.95 and included all appropriate biases and uncertainties at a 95/95 probability/confidence level(10). This also meets the NRC acceptance criteria of 0.95.
Spent-fuel pool cooling is discussed in subsection 9.1.3.
The storage racks are designed to withstand a pullup force equal to the load rating of the spent-fuel pool bridge hoist (4000 lb).
The spent-fuel storage racks are designed to withstand a fuel bundle drop from 42 in. above the rack impacting on the middle of the top grid, the corner of the top grid, or free falling through an empty cavity and impacting the bottom grid. They are also designed to withstand the drop of an inclined fuel bundle on top of the rack or a gate drop from 9 inches above the rack impacting on the top of the rack.
9.1-3                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 An analysis was performed for a fuel assembly drop assuming a load of 3000 lb at a height of 42 in. This analysis conservatively bounds the drop of a standard 17-x-17 fuel assembly, which weighs approximately 2000 lb with a control rod and handling fixture at the maximum lift height of 39.5 in. The analyzed fuel assembly drop load of 3000 lb at 42 in. represents the worst fuel rack impact load condition, i.e., highest kinetic energy, of all loads that could be moved over the spent fuel. The results of the analysis showed that the fuel can deform in compression and shorten in length, but the fuel assemblies would not be damaged and the accident would not result in an unsafe geometric spacing of the fuel assemblies (Keff remains  0.95, as described in paragraph 4.3.2.7).
The only heavy load handled by the spent-fuel pool bridge crane is the spent-fuel pool transfer slot gate, which weighs approximately 3600 lb. Administrative controls prevent the transfer slot gate from being carried over the fuel assemblies in the spent-fuel pool. At the beginning of fuel transfer operations, the transfer slot gate is moved from its normal position directly to its stored position, which is located immediately adjacent to its normal position. This procedure is reversed at the end of fuel transfer operations. However, the racks are designed to withstand a gate drop from 10 1/4 in. The drop height is limited by a physical limitation in lifting capability.
Additionally, administrative controls prevent handling equipment capable of carrying loads with a higher impact energy from transporting these loads over the fuel storage area.
9.1.3    SPENT-FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP SYSTEM The spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system is designed to remove decay heat generated by stored spent-fuel assemblies from the spent-fuel pool water.
A second function of the system is to maintain clarity (visual) and purity of the spent-fuel pool water, the transfer canal water, and the refueling water.
9.1.3.1        Design Bases The spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system design parameters are given in table 9.1-1.
9.1.3.1.1      Spent-Fuel Pool Cooling The spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system is designed to remove an amount of decay heat in excess of that produced by the number of spent-fuel assemblies that are stored in the pool following a normal refueling plus any fuel assemblies that may remain in the pool from previous refuelings. The system design incorporates two trains of equipment, either train being capable of removing 100 percent of the design heat load. When the spent-fuel assemblies resulting from a partial core offload refueling are in the spent-fuel pool, either cooling train can maintain the spent-fuel pool water temperature at or below 150°F when the heat exchanger is supplied with component cooling water at the design flow and temperature. The flow through the pools provides sufficient mixing to maintain uniform water conditions. For a full core offload refueling with the spent-fuel assemblies from previous refuelings in the pool, either cooling train can maintain the spent-fuel pool water at or below 180°F. It should be noted that the heat load 9.1-4                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 calculations are based on an 18-month fuel cycle discharge schedule with high-density racks installed with uncertainty factors applied.
In addition to the cases discussed above, the heat load from a third "best-estimate" case is also presented in table 9.1-1. This case represents start/completion of a normal full-core offload 150 h after shutdown. No uncertainty factors were applied to the decay heat results for this case.
The design basis analyses for the refueling cases assume that the complete batch of spent fuel is instantaneously offloaded from the reactor vessel to the pool at the assumed time with the pool at equilibrium conditions.
An operational sensitivity evaluation for transient fuel movement operations has been performed for a refueling outage full core offload. This evaluation is conservative for less than a full core offload. This evaluation assumed an initial spent-fuel pool temperature of 111 °F, CCW inlet temperature to the spent-fuel pool HX maintained  105 °F, and a core offload rate of 8 assemblies per hour starting at 100 h after reactor shutdown. The pool operational temperature limit of 130°F provides for personnel safety and limits room air temperature for habitability. The evaluation demonstrated suspending movement into the spent-fuel pool at 130°F ensures pool design temperature limits will not be reached. The operational evaluation is provided for outage planning purposes and is bounded by the design basis analyses discussed above.
9.1.3.1.2        Spent-Fuel Pool Dewatering Protection System piping is arranged so that failure of any pipeline cannot drain the spent-fuel pool below the water level required for radiation shielding. A depth of approximately 12 ft of water over the top of the stored spent-fuel assemblies will reduce direct radiation to 2.5 mrem/h, which is a factor of two below the threshold level for a radiation area as defined in 10 CFR 20.1003.
In order to perform inspection and/or maintenance of equipment located in the transfer canal, the water in the transfer canal may be transferred to the spent-fuel pool or cask wash area by means of a submersible pump. When pumping to the spent-fuel pool, as the water level is increased, the water is transferred to the refueling water storage tank or to the recycle holdup tanks. The level in the spent-fuel pool is also monitored to ensure that the level in the spent-fuel pool does not decrease below that required for radiation shielding. When pumping to the cask wash area, which drains to the floor drain tank, the water level in the floor drain tank is monitored to ensure that the tank does not overflow.
9.1.3.1.3        Water Purification The system's demineralizers and filters are designed to provide adequate purification to permit unrestricted access for plant personnel to the spent-fuel storage area and maintain optical clarity of the spent-fuel pool water. The optical clarity of the spent-fuel pool water surface is maintained by use of the system's skimmers, strainer, and skimmer filter. To assist in maintaining optical clarity, a temporary in-pool filter can be used. A permanent power feed is 9.1-5                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 installed at the Unit 1 and Unit 2 spent-fuel pools to allow for use of a portable submersible filter unit to improve water clarity.
9.1.3.2          System Description The spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system piping and instrumentation diagram shown in drawing D-205043 consists of two cooling trains, a purification loop, and a surface skimmer loop. The spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system removes decay heat from fuel stored in the spent-fuel pool. Spent fuel is placed in the pool during the refueling sequence and stored there until it is relocated to an onsite or offsite storage facility, or relocated for reprocessing. The system normally handles the heat loading from typical core discharges from the reactor as described in table 9.1-1, plus the heat loading from any stored assemblies from previous refuelings. Heat is transferred from the spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system through the heat exchanger to the component cooling system.
When either cooling train is in operation, water flows from the spent-fuel pool to the spent-fuel pool pump suction, is pumped through the tube side of the heat exchanger, and is returned to the pool. The suction line, which is protected by a strainer, is located at an elevation 4 ft below the normal spent-fuel pool water level, while the return line terminates in the pool at an elevation 6 ft above the top of the fuel assemblies and contains an antisiphon hole near the surface of the water to prevent gravity drainage of the pool.
Figures 9.1-3 and 9.1-4 show the layout of the spent-fuel heat exchangers, the arrangement of the return piping from the heat exchangers to the spent-fuel pool, and the dimensions of the cask wash and storage areas.
While the heat removal operation is in process, a portion of the spent-fuel pool water may be diverted through a demineralizer and a filter to maintain spent-fuel pool water clarity and purity.
Transfer canal water may also be circulated through the same demineralizer and filter by removing the gate between the canal and the spent-fuel pool. This purification loop is sufficient for removing fission products and other contaminants which may be introduced if a fuel assembly with defective cladding is transferred to the spent-fuel pool.
The spent-fuel pool demineralizer and filter may be isolated from the heat removal portion of the spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system. By so doing, the isolated equipment may be used in conjunction with the refueling water purification pump to clean and purify the refueling water while spent-fuel pool heat removal operations proceed. Connections are provided so that the refueling water may be pumped from either the refueling water storage tank or the refueling cavity through the filter and demineralizer and discharged to either the refueling cavity or refueling water storage tank. Connections in the suction and discharge piping of the refueling water purification pump allow a reverse osmosis filter skid to be connected for silica removal from the refueling water storage tank contents.
To assist further in maintaining spent fuel water clarity, the water surface is cleaned by a skimmer loop. Water is removed from the surface by the skimmers, pumped through a strainer and filter, and returned to the pool surface at three locations remote from the skimmers. A 9.1-6                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 permanent power feed on both Unit 1 and Unit 2 is available to power a portable submersible filter when increased clarity is needed in the spent-fuel pool.
The spent-fuel pool is initially filled with water that is at the same boron concentration as that in the refueling water storage tank. Borated water may be supplied from the refueling water storage tank via the refueling water purification pump connection or by running a temporary line from the boric acid blender located in the chemical and volume control system directly into the pool. Demineralized water can also be added for makeup purposes (i.e., to replace evaporative losses) through a connection in the recirculation return line. An assured Seismic Category I water makeup source is provided by a reactor makeup water system hose station, which is located at the el 155 ft operating area adjacent to the spent-fuel pool. In the unlikely event of the failure of both trains of the spent-fuel pool cooling system and the demineralized water system, reactor makeup water can be added to the spent-fuel pool by the use of a temporary hose connection.
The spent-fuel pool water may be separated from the water in the transfer canal by a gate. The gate is installed so that the transfer canal may be drained to allow maintenance of the fuel transfer equipment. The water in the transfer canal is first pumped, via a portable pump, into the spent-fuel pool or the cask wash area. If the water is pumped to the spent-fuel pool, it may be transferred to the recycle holdup tanks or the refueling water storage tank to maintain the spent-fuel pool level. When maintenance on the fuel transfer equipment is completed, water is returned to the transfer canal from either the spent-fuel pool or the cask wash area using a portable pump. Proceduralized administrative requirements are utilized to maintain control when transferring water from the spent-fuel pool. Water may also be transferred to the transfer canal directly from the recycle holdup tanks using the evaporator feed pumps.
9.1.3.2.1      Component Description Spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system codes and classifications are given in section 3.2.
Equipment design parameters are given in table 9.1-2.
A. Spent-Fuel Pool Pumps The pumps are horizontal, centrifugal units, with all wetted surfaces being stainless steel. The pumps are controlled manually from a local station.
B. Spent-Fuel Pool Skimmer Pump This horizontal, centrifugal pump circulates surface water through a strainer and a filter and returns it to the pool. The pump is controlled manually from a local station.
C. Refueling Water Purification Pump The refueling water purification pump is used to circulate water from the refueling water storage tank through the spent-fuel pool demineralizer and filter. The pump is operated manually from a local station. The pump can be started only 9.1-7                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 when both upstream automatic isolation valves are open and will trip if either valve closes.
D. Spent-Fuel Pool Heat Exchangers The heat exchangers are the shell and U-tube type. Spent-fuel pool water circulates through the tubes while component cooling water circulates through the shell.
E. Spent-Fuel Pool Demineralizer This flushable, mixed-bed demineralizer is designed to provide adequate fuel pool water purity for unrestricted access of plant personnel to the pool working area. A specialty resin, such as a coated weak acid cation resin, may be added in a layer on top of the mixed-bed resin to facilitate removal of particulate material to improve clarity of spent-fuel pool water or reactor cavity water.
F. Spent-Fuel Pool Filter The spent-fuel pool filter is designed to improve the pool water clarity by removing particles which obscure visibility.
G. Spent-Fuel Pool Skimmer Filter The spent-fuel pool skimmer filter is used to remove particles which are not removed by the strainer.
H. Spent-Fuel Pool Strainers A strainer is located in each spent-fuel pool pump suction line to prevent introduction of relatively large particles which might otherwise clog the spent-fuel pool demineralizer or damage the spent-fuel pool pumps.
I. Spent-Fuel Pool Skimmer Strainer The spent-fuel pool skimmer strainer is designed to remove debris from the skimmer process flow.
J. Spent-Fuel Pool Skimmers Two spent-fuel pool skimmers are provided to remove water from the spent-fuel pool water surface in order to remove floating debris.
K. Valves Manual and automatic stop valves are used to isolate equipment, and manual throttle valves provide flow control. Valves in contact with spent-fuel pool water are austenitic stainless steel or equivalent corrosion resistant material.
9.1-8                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 L. Piping All piping in contact with spent-fuel pool water is austenitic stainless steel. The piping is welded except where flanged connections are used to facilitate maintenance.
M. Portable Submersible Filter Usage In order to maintain desired optical clarity in the spent-fuel pool, a permanent power feed is installed at both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 spent-fuel pool to allow for use of a portable submersible filter unit. This supplements existing equipment used to maintain water clarity in the spent-fuel pool. The portable submersible filter may be stored in place on the spent fuel racks.
9.1.3.2.2      Instrumentation Description The instrumentation provided for the spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system is discussed below. Alarms and indications are provided as noted. The spent-fuel pool area radiation monitor is discussed in subsection 12.1.4, and the spent-fuel pool exhaust flow gas monitors are discussed in paragraph 11.4.2.2.
A. Temperature Instrumentation is provided to measure the temperature of water in the spent-fuel pool and give local indication as well as annunciation in the control room when normal temperatures are exceeded.
Instrumentation is also provided to give local indication of the temperature of the spent-fuel pool water as it leaves either heat exchanger.
B. Pressure Instrumentation is provided to measure and give local indication of the pressures in the spent-fuel pool pump suction and discharge lines and in the refueling water purification pump discharge line.
Instrumentation is also provided at locations upstream and downstream of the spent-fuel pool filter and the spent-fuel pool skimmer filter so that the pressure differential across these filters can be determined.
C. Flow Instrumentation is provided to measure and give local indication of the flow in the outlet line of the spent-fuel pool filter.
9.1-9                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 D.      Level A float type level instrument is provided to give an alarm in the control room when the water level in the spent-fuel pool reaches either the high or low level setpoints (within 6 in. above or below the normal water level in the pool).
Local visual indication of the spent-fuel pool level is provided.
9.1.3.3          Safety Evaluation 9.1.3.3.1        Availability and Reliability The spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system has no emergency function during an accident.
This manually controlled system may be shut down for limited periods of time for maintenance or replacement of malfunctioning components. In the event of a failure of a spent-fuel pool pump or loss of cooling to a spent-fuel pool heat exchanger, the second cooling train provides 100-percent backup capability, thus ensuring continued cooling of the spent-fuel pool.
9.1.3.3.2        Spent-Fuel Pool Dewatering The most serious failure of this system would be complete loss of water in the storage pool. To protect against the possibility, the spent-fuel pool cooling suction connections enter near the normal water level so that the pool cannot be siphoned. The cooling water return line contains an antisiphon hole to prevent the possibility of draining the pool. These design features ensure that, for breaks of < 150 gal/min, the spent-fuel pool will not drain below el 149 ft 8 in. For larger breaks, the spent-fuel pool will not drain down below 140 ft 6 in.
The spent-fuel pool is designed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.13 and ensures adequate safety under normal and accident conditions. Pool water losses resulting from normal evaporation and the rupture of suction and discharge piping have been considered. The possibility of cracking the spent-fuel pool liner plate and the surrounding concrete structure is highly unlikely, since it is not possible to bring a sufficiently heavy load, such as a spent-fuel cask, into the spent-fuel pool area.
The spent-fuel cask crane, discussed in subsection 9.1.4, is prevented by design from moving above or into the vicinity of the spent-fuel pool.
The spent-fuel pool is a Seismic Category I structure located entirely within the auxiliary building and is not affected by cyclonic winds or tornado-generated missiles.
Makeup water to compensate for spent-fuel pool losses is provided by the demineralized water system, discussed in subsection 9.2.3. The reactor makeup water system discussed in subsection 9.2.7 is also available as a Seismic Category I water source in the event that the demineralized water system is unavailable.
9.1-10                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.1.3.3.3      Water Quality Only a very small amount of water is interchanged between the refueling canal and the spent-fuel pool as fuel assemblies are transferred in the refueling process. Whenever a fuel assembly with defective cladding is transferred to the spent-fuel pool, a small quantity of fission products may enter the spent-fuel cooling water. The purification loop provided removes fission products and other contaminants from the water, by maintaining radioactivity concentrations in the spent-fuel pool water at 5 x 10-3 Ci/cm3 ( and ) or less and thus allowing unrestricted access for plant personnel. Portable submersible filter units are used as required to further improve water clarity in both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 spent-fuel pools.
9.1.3.4        Tests and Inspections Active components of the spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system are either in continuous or intermittent use during normal system operation. Periodic visual inspection and preventive maintenance are conducted using normal industry practice.
9.1.4  FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM 9.1.4.1        Design Bases The fuel handling system consists of equipment and structures utilized for the refueling operation in a safe manner.
The following design bases apply to the fuel handling system:
A.      Fuel handling devices have provisions to avoid dropping or jamming of fuel assemblies during transfer operation.
B.      Fuel lifting and handling devices are capable of supporting maximum loads under SSE conditions.
C.      The fuel transfer system, where it penetrates the containment, has provisions to preserve the integrity of the containment pressure boundary.
D.      Cranes and hoists used to lift spent fuel have a limited maximum lift height so that the minimum required depth of water shielding is maintained.
In addition, an exemption from 10 CFR 70.24, relative to the authorization to possess special nuclear material at Farley Nuclear Plant, has been granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission(2) that provides relief from the requirement to install criticality monitors. These monitors are not needed because inadvertent or accidental criticality will be precluded through compliance with the plant Technical Specifications, geometric spacing of fuel assemblies in the new fuel storage area and spent-fuel storage pool, administrative controls imposed on 9.1-11                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 fuel handling procedures, and the use of nuclear instrumentation that monitors the behavior of nuclear fuel in the reactor vessel.
9.1.4.2          System Description The fuel handling system consists of the equipment needed for the refueling operation on the reactor core. Basically this equipment is comprised of cranes, handling equipment, and a fuel transfer system. The structures associated with the fuel handling equipment are the refueling cavity, the refueling canal, the spent-fuel storage pool, and the new fuel storage area.
New fuel assemblies received are removed one at a time from the shipping cask and stored in the new fuel storage racks located in the new fuel storage area. New fuel assemblies are transferred from the new fuel storage area and are lowered into the new fuel elevator by the new fuel monorail hoist. New fuel is delivered to the reactor by placing a fuel assembly into the new fuel elevator, lowering it into the spent-fuel pool, and taking it through the fuel transfer system.
The fuel handling equipment is designed to handle the fuel under water from the time it leaves the reactor vessel until it is placed in a cask for temporary onsite storage in the independent spent-fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or shipment from the site. Underwater transfer of spent fuel provides an effective, economical, and transparent radiation shield as well as a reliable cooling medium for removal of decay heat. The boric acid concentration in the water is sufficient to preclude criticality.
The associated fuel handling structures may be generally divided into three areas: the refueling cavity and refueling canal, which are flooded only during plant shutdown for refueling; the spent-fuel pool, which is kept full of water and is always accessible to operating personnel; and the new fuel storage area, which is separate and protected for dry storage. The refueling canal and the spent-fuel pool are connected by a fuel transfer tube. This tube is fitted with a blind flange on the canal end and a gate valve on the spent-fuel pool end. The blind flange is in place except during refueling to ensure containment integrity. Fuel is carried through the tube on an underwater transfer car.
Fuel is moved between the reactor vessel and the refueling canal by the manipulator crane. A rod cluster control changing fixture is located on the refueling canal wall for transferring control elements from one fuel assembly to another.
The upender at either end of the fuel transfer tube is used to pivot a fuel assembly. Before entering the transfer tube, the upender pivots a fuel assembly to the horizontal position for passage through the transfer tube. After the transfer car transports the fuel assembly through the transfer tube, the upender at that end of the tube pivots the assembly to a vertical position so that it can be lifted out of the fuel container.
In the spent-fuel pool, fuel assemblies are moved about by the spent-fuel bridge hoist. When lifting spent-fuel assemblies, the hoist uses a long-handled tool to ensure that sufficient radiation shielding is maintained. A shorter tool is used to handle new fuel, but the new fuel elevator 9.1-12                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 must be used to lower the assembly to a depth at which the hoist, using the long-handled tool, can place the new assembly into the fuel transfer container in the upending device.
The spent-fuel pool bridge is the only structure capable of transporting heavy objects over the spent-fuel pool area. The spent-fuel pool bridge and spent-fuel hoist will not be used to handle loads of more than 3000 lb. over the spent-fuel pool. See paragraph 9.1.2.3 regarding lifting of the transfer slot gate. The spent-fuel handling tool is designed to preclude its accidental decoupling from the hoist. Fuel assemblies are gripped by four cam-actuated latching fingers, and a pin is inserted in the tool handle to preclude fingers from being accidentally unlatched during fuel handling operations.
Decay heat from the spent-fuel assemblies in the spent-fuel pool is removed by the spent-fuel pool cooling system. After a sufficient decay period, the fuel is removed from the racks and loaded into casks for temporary onsite storage in the ISFSI or removal from the site.
9.1.4.2.1      Refueling Procedure The refueling operation follows a detailed procedure that provides a safe, efficient refueling operation. The following significant points are ensured by the refueling procedure:
A.      The boron concentration of the refueling water and the reactor coolant, together with the negative reactivity of control rods, is sufficient to keep the core approximately 5 percent k/k subcritical during the refueling operations. It is also sufficient to maintain the core subcritical in the unlikely event that all of the rod cluster control assemblies were removed from the core.
B.      The water level in the refueling cavity is high enough to keep the radiation levels within acceptable limits when the fuel assemblies are being removed from the core.
The refueling operation is divided into four major phases: preparation, reactor disassembly, fuel handling, and reactor assembly. A general description of a typical refueling operation through the four phases is given below:
A.      Phase I - Preparation The reactor is shut down and cooled to cold shutdown conditions with a final keff
                < 0.95 (all rods in). Following a radiation survey, the containment vessel is entered.
At this time, the coolant level in the reactor vessel is lowered to a point slightly below the vessel flange. Then the fuel transfer equipment and manipulator crane are checked for proper operation.
B.      Phase II - Reactor Disassembly All cables are disconnected and the insulation is removed from the vessel head.
The refueling cavity is then prepared for flooding by sealing off the reactor cavity; 9.1-13                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 checking of the underwater lights, tools, and fuel transfer system; closing the refueling canal drain holes; and removing the blind flange from the fuel transfer tube.
With the refueling cavity prepared for flooding, the vessel head is unseated and raised approximately 1 ft above the vessel flange. The vessel is then inspected to ensure that no binding has occurred on vessel internals or bolts. It is then raised and placed on the storage stand.
Once the head is placed on the storage stand, the water from the refueling water storage tank is pumped into the reactor coolant system by the residual heat removal pumps, causing the water to overflow into the refueling cavity. The water level in the refueling cavity is raised to a level sufficient to unlatch control rod drive shafts. The control rod drive shafts are disconnected and, with the upper internals, are removed from the vessel. The fuel assemblies and rod cluster control assemblies are now free from obstructions, and the core is ready for refueling.
C. Phase III - Fuel Handling The refueling sequence is specified in the refueling procedure which is developed for each reload. Typically, the entire core is unloaded with all assemblies being transferred to the spent-fuel pool. Change out of fuel inserts (RCCAs, discrete burnable absorbers, etc.) is normally performed in the spent-fuel pool. During reload, fresh fuel assemblies along with partially spent-fuel assemblies are transferred from the spent-fuel pool room into the reactor core.
The typical general fuel handling sequence is:
: 1.      The manipulator crane is positioned over a fuel assembly in the core.
: 2.      The fuel assembly is lifted by the manipulator crane to a predetermined height sufficient to clear the reactor vessel and still leave sufficient water covering the fuel assembly, to eliminate any radiation hazard to the operating personnel. For Unit 1 and Unit 2, an in-mast sipping test may be performed at this time to determine whether the fuel assembly contains leaking fuel rods.
: 3.      The fuel container is moved through the fuel transfer tube to containment by the transfer car.
: 4.      The fuel assembly container is pivoted to the vertical position by the upender.
: 5.      The manipulator crane is moved to line up the fuel assembly with the fuel transfer system.
: 6.      The manipulator crane loads a fuel assembly into the fuel assembly container of the transfer car.
: 7.      The container is pivoted to the horizontal position by the upender.
9.1-14                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9
: 8. The fuel container is moved through the fuel transfer tube to the spent-fuel pool by the transfer car.
: 9. The fuel assembly container is pivoted to the vertical position. The fuel assembly is unloaded by the spent-fuel handling tool attached to the spent-fuel pool bridge hoist.
: 10. The fuel assembly is placed in the spent-fuel storage rack location designated by the refueling procedure.
: 11. Steps 1 through 10 are repeated until the entire core is unloaded.
: 12. The fuel inserts are shuffled in the spent-fuel pool using tools in the spent-fuel pool. Any fuel assembly that is to be placed in a control position will have a RCCA inserted into it. This RCCA transfer is normally accomplished by use of a portable change tool or tools in the spent-fuel pool. Alternatively, this transfer can be accomplished by use of the RCCA change fixture in containment.
: 13. For the reload, fresh fuel assemblies are brought to the upender fuel assembly container by the spent-fuel pool crane either from spent-fuel pool storage locations or from the new fuel elevator. Partially spent-fuel assemblies are brought to the upender fuel assembly container by the spent-fuel pool crane from spent-fuel pool storage locations.
: 14. The fuel assembly is loaded into the fuel assembly container of the transfer car.
: 15. The container is pivoted to the horizontal position by the upender.
: 16. The fuel container is moved through the fuel transfer tube to containment by the transfer car.
: 17. The fuel assembly container is pivoted to the vertical position. The fuel assembly is unloaded by the manipulator crane.
: 18. The fuel assembly is placed in the reactor core location designated by the refueling procedure.
: 19. Steps 13 through 18 are repeated until refueling is completed.
D. Phase IV - Reactor Assembly Reactor assembly, following refueling, is essentially achieved by reversing the operations given in Phase II.
9.1-15                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.1.4.2.2        Component Description 9.1.4.2.2.1      Manipulator Crane. The manipulator crane (figure 9.1-5) is a rectilinear bridge and trolley crane with a vertical mast extending down into the refueling water. The bridge spans the refueling cavity and runs on rails set into the edge of the refueling cavity. The bridge and trolley motions are used to position the vertical mast over a fuel assembly in the core. A long tube with a pneumatic gripper on the end is lowered down out of the mast to grip the fuel assembly. The gripper tube is long enough so that the upper end is still contained in the mast when the gripper end contacts the fuel. A winch mounted on the trolley raises the gripper tube and fuel assembly up into the mast tube. The fuel is transported while inside the mast tube to its new position.
For Unit 1 and Unit 2, fuel may be checked for leaking rods using the in-mast sipping system.
After the fuel assembly is raised into the mast, a small amount of air is introduced through a manifold at the bottom of the mast. The air will rise to the top where it is captured and analyzed for radiological content.
All controls for the manipulator crane are mounted on a console on the trolley. The bridge is positioned on a coordinate system laid out on one rail. Unit 2 uses a video camera to view the bridge rail demarcations via a video monitor on the console to indicate the position of the bridge, whereas in Unit 1 the bridge position is indicated on the original electrical readout system on the console. The trolley is positioned with the aid of a scale on the bridge structure. The scale is read directly by the operator at the console. The drives for the bridge, trolley, and winch are variable speed and controlled by console-mounted switches for each drive for continuous operation at a variable speed. Unit 2 has an additional switch for each drive motor to facilitate jogging its associated motor. A recorder is provided to archive the loads applied to any particular fuel assembly. Electrical interlocks and limit switches on the bridge and trolley drives prevent damage to the fuel assemblies. The winch is also provided with limit switches and a mechanical stop to prevent a fuel assembly from being raised above a safe shielding depth, should the limit switch fail. In an emergency, the bridge, trolley, and winch can be operated manually using a handwheel on the motor shaft.
The manipulator crane is designed in accordance with Electric Overhead Industrial Crane specification No. 61 and meets the requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and of 29 CFR 1910.179, Subpart N, Materials Handling and Storage.
9.1.4.2.2.2      Spent-Fuel Pool Bridge. The spent-fuel pool bridge (figure 9.1-6) is a wheel-mounted walkway, spanning the spent-fuel pool, which carries an electric monorail hoist on an overhead structure. The fuel assemblies are moved within the spent-fuel pool by means of a long-handled tool suspended from the hoist. The hoist travel and tool length are designed to limit the maximum lift of a fuel assembly to a safe shielding depth.
9.1.4.2.2.3      New Fuel Elevator. The new fuel elevator consists of a box-shaped elevator assembly with its top end open and sized to house one fuel assembly.
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FNP-FSAR-9 The new fuel elevator is used to lower a new fuel assembly to the bottom of the spent-fuel pool where it is transported to the fuel transfer system by the spent-fuel pool bridge hoist.
The new fuel elevator (NFE) recon basket replaces or interchanges with the site spent-fuel pool new fuel elevator basket. The NFE recon basket is designed to rigidly support the repair fuel assembly and accept removable top nozzle (RTN) tooling required for fuel reconstitution.
9.1.4.2.2.4    Spent-Fuel Cask Crane. The spent-fuel cask crane (figures 9.1-7 through 9.1-11) is a Crane Manufacturers Association of America (CMAA) specification No. 70, Class A1 outdoor electric overhead traveling, unequal leg gantry crane, complete with a single trolley and all the necessary motors, controls, brakes, and accessories. The main hoist is rated at 125 tons and the auxiliary hoist is rated at 15 tons. The crane has been designed for outdoor service and will be used to handle spent-fuel casks. The crane will transfer the spent-fuel cask between the east alleyway to the cask wash and cask storage areas as shown in figure 1.2-1.
The spent-fuel cask crane complies with the requirements of OSHA and of 29 CFR 1910.179, Subpart N, Materials Handling and Storage, insofar as applicable to outdoor powerhouse cranes. The spent-fuel cask crane was designed, fabricated, installed, and tested in accordance with applicable sections of the following codes and standards:
A. American Gear Manufacturers Association (AGMA), for defining and calculating gear durability and strength horsepower requirements.
B. AISC, for specification for rails and structural methods.
C. American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), for specifying materials.
D. American National Standards Institute (ANSI), safety code B30.2 for electric overhead cranes.
E. American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), for determining wind loading factors.
F. American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM), for material testing procedures and for specifying material types.
G. American Welding Society (AWS), AWS D2.0, for welding procedures.
H. Association of Iron and Steel Engineers (AISE), for design of structural members.
I. CMAA, specification No. 70, for structural, mechanical, and electrical design parameters.
J. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), for industrial controls and recommended practices.
K. National Electrical Code (NEC), for specifying wiring, insulation, and fastenings.
9.1-17                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 L.      National Electric Manufacturers Association (NEMA), for specifying electrical equipment such as controls and panels.
M.      Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), for safety requirements and for maintenance and operation checkout and testing procedures.
N.      Steel Structures Painting Council (SSPC), for cleaning, surface preparation, and painting specifications.
O.      Local and state codes, such as the Alabama State Code and the Southern Standard Building Code.
The new fuel bridge crane and the new fuel monorail hoist were designed, fabricated, installed, and tested in accordance with applicable sections of the AISC, ANSI, ASTM, ANS, CMAA, IEEE, NEC, NEMA, OSHA, SSPC, and state and local codes as outlined above.
9.1.4.2.2.5    Spent-Fuel Cask Lifting Hardware. The special lift devices which are used to attach the spent-fuel cask to the spent-fuel cask crane will comply with the design, fabrication, testing, maintenance, and quality assurance requirements of ANSI N14.6, as clarified by NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, without exception. This requirement will be reflected in procurement documents for spent-fuel cask crane special lift devices.
9.1.4.2.2.6    New Fuel Bridge Crane. The new fuel bridge crane is a top running single I beam crane spanning the new fuel storage area. Underhung from the I beam is an electric monorail hoist. The new fuel assemblies are moved within the new fuel storage area by the use of a new fuel assembly handling fixture suspended from the hoist.
9.1.4.2.2.7    New Fuel Monorail Hoist. The new fuel monorail hoist is an electric hoist which removes a new fuel assembly from the new fuel storage rack, moves laterally to a position over the new fuel elevator, and then lowers the new fuel assembly into the new fuel elevator. The new fuel assemblies are handled by a new fuel assembly handling fixture suspended from the hoist.
9.1.4.2.2.8    Fuel Transfer System. The fuel transfer system includes a cable-driven transfer car that runs on tracks extending from the refueling canal through the transfer tube and into the spent-fuel pool and an operator lifting frame at each end of the transfer tube. The upender in the refueling canal receives a fuel assembly in the vertical position from the manipulator crane.
The fuel assembly is then lowered to a horizontal position for passage through the transfer tube and is raised to a vertical position by the upender in the spent-fuel pool. The spent-fuel pool bridge hoist takes the fuel assembly up to a position in the spent-fuel storage racks.
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FNP-FSAR-9 Positive means for control of the fuel assemblies within the fuel transfer canal are provided in the following manner.
The conveyor car is a horizontal wheel-supported structure which is driven by an above-water cable-driven system. The function of the conveyor car is to support and position the fuel assembly container.
The fuel assembly container is a box structure mounted at one end on a pivot support on the conveyor car. The fuel assembly container goes through the transfer tube in a horizontal position and is raised to the vertical position by the lifting frames for loading or unloading fuel assemblies.
The lifting frames are structures, pivot-mounted at the lower end, that straddle the support structure at the loading and unloading points. A winch on the operating deck raises and lowers the frame. When resting on stops in the horizontal position, the frame is positioned so that the conveyor car passes under the frame until it reaches the travel limit stop. As the conveyor car moves under the lifting frame, the fuel container engages the frame so that both components can be lifted to the vertical together.
The transfer tube connects the refueling canal to the spent-fuel pool through the plant containment. The tube is sealed to the plant containment and the steel liners in both the refueling canal and spent-fuel pool. A gate valve is mounted permanently on one end and guides for the conveyor car are mounted in the tube. The blind flange is considered part of the plant containment; it is, therefore, equipped with a double gasket seal serving as a continuously monitored test channel.
Electric winches are used to drive the refueling canal lifting frame and the spent-fuel pool lifting frame. The winches are mounted on the operating deck and are connected to the components through stainless steel wire rope guided by underwater sheaves. Conveyor car position is provided by a rotary resolver on the pit side winch and a programmable limit switch assembly.
Electric winches mounted above water in the fuel storage building are used to drive the carriage. The winches are interlocked together such that when one winch is energized, the countertorque of the other energized winch maintains cable tension at all times. The winches operate at two speeds and are faster when transiting the center of the tube once past designated slow zones at each end of the tube. The winches are connected to the carriage components through a stainless steel cable guided by underwater sheaves to move the carriage between the reactor and pit side upenders.
Two control panels are required, one inside the plant containment and one in the spent-fuel pool area. Each panel contains controls for the adjacent lifting frame. In addition, the panel adjacent to the conveyor car drive provides for its control. The two panels are interlocked to prevent hazardous operation.
A stuck fuel assembly does not cause a problem since the fuel container sides have a minimum of 30-percent open area for water circulation and since the stuck fuel assembly is retrievable.
9.1-19                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The Unit 1 conveyor car can be moved back to the spent-fuel pool by means of hand cranking the winches on the cable drive system. Hand cranking serves as the emergency removal method that allows the car to be retrieved in the event the motorized cable drive system will not move the car. Depending on which cable or winch assembly is postulated to fail, the cart can be moved by use of the other winch. One winch would allow the cart to be moved to the pool end while the other would allow it to be moved to the containment side. Once in either of these locations the fuel assembly can be retrieved. Therefore, the emergency removal cable is no longer required.
During reactor operation, the transfer car is stored in the spent-fuel pool. A blind flange is bolted on the refueling canal end of the transfer tube to seal the reactor containment. The terminus of the tube outside the containment is closed by a gate valve.
9.1.4.2.2.9      Rod Cluster Control Changing Fixture. Rod cluster control elements are transferred from one fuel assembly to another by means of the rod cluster control changing fixture (figure 9.1-12). Five major subassemblies comprise the changing fixture, including frame and track structure, carriage, guide tube, gripper, and drive mechanism. The carriage is a movable container supported by the frame and track structure. The tracks provide a guide for the four flanged carriage wheels and allow horizontal movement of the carriage during changing operations. Positioning stops on both the carriage and frame locate each of the three carriage compartments directly below the guide tube. Two of these compartments are designed to hold individual fuel assemblies, while the third is made to support a single rod cluster control element. Situated above the carriage and mounted on the refueling canal wall is the guide tube.
This assembly provides for the guidance and proper orientation of the gripper and rod cluster control element as they are being raised or lowered. The gripper is a pneumatically actuated mechanism responsible for engaging the rod cluster control element. It has two flexure fingers which can be inserted into the top of the rod cluster control element when air pressure is applied to the gripper piston. Normally, the fingers are locked in a radially extended position. Mounted on the operating deck is the drive mechanism assembly. Its components include a manual carriage drive mechanism, a revolving stop operating handle, a pneumatic selector valve for actuating the gripper piston, and an electric hoist for elevation control of the gripper.
9.1.4.2.2.10 Spent-Fuel Handling Tool. This tool is used to handle new and spent fuel in the spent-fuel pool. It is a manually actuated tool on the end of a long pole suspended from the spent-fuel pool bridge hoist. An operator on the spent-fuel pool bridge guides and operates the tool.
9.1.4.2.2.11 New Fuel Assembly Handling Fixture. This short-handled tool is used to handle new fuel on the operating deck of the new fuel storage area, to remove the new fuel from the shipping container, and to facilitate inspection and storage of the new fuel and loading of fuel into the fuel elevator.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.1.4.2.2.12 Reactor Vessel Head Lifting Device. The reactor vessel head lifting device (figure 9.1-13) consists of a welded and bolted structural steel frame, with suitable rigging to enable the crane operator to lift the head and store it during refueling operations. The head lifting device has been integrated into the head assembly upgrade package that integrates the CRDM missile shield, a permanent radiation shield, and the CRDM cooling system into the existing head assembly structure. The modification eliminates the concrete and steel missile shield, CRDM cooling system mounted on the missile shield, and the associated ductwork that was part of the original configuration. Two CRDM cooling fans are included in the modified head assembly and, with the addition of an upper plenum structure and internal ducting, supply the cooling air flow to the CRDM coils. The lifting device, the CRDM cooling system, the radiation shield, and the missile shield are permanently attached to the reactor vessel head.
Attached to the head lifting device are the monorail and hoists for the reactor vessel stud tensioners.
9.1.4.2.2.13 Reactor Internals Lifting Device. The reactor internals lifting device (figure 9.1-14) is a structural frame suspended from the overhead crane. The frame is lowered onto the guide tube support plate of the upper and lower internals and is affixed to the support plate at three equally spaced locations using roto-lock inserts that engage into mating devices in the guide tube support plate. Bushings on the frame engage guide studs in the vessel flange to provide guidance during removal and replacement of the internals package.
9.1.4.2.2.14 Reactor Vessel Stud Tensioner. Stud tensioners (figure 9.1-15) are employed to secure the head closure joint at every refueling. The stud tensioner is a hydraulically operated device that uses oil as the working fluid. The device permits preloading and unloading of the reactor vessel closure studs at cold shutdown conditions. Stud tensioners minimize the time required for the tensioning or unloading operations. Three tensioners are provided and are applied simultaneously to three studs located 120&deg; apart. A single hydraulic pumping unit operates the tensioners, which are connected in series. The studs are tensioned to their operational load in predetermined optimal steps to prevent high stresses in the flange region and unequal loadings in the studs. Relief valves on each tensioner prevent overtensioning of the studs due to excessive pressure.
9.1.4.2.2.15 Temporary Reactor Vessel Cover. The temporary reactor vessel cover is a stainless steel structure frame consisting of an elliptical dome and flange. The cover is lifted and placed on the reactor vessel mating surface following core off load using the 3-legged reactor vessel internals lifting rig. The cover seals at the top of the reactor vessel and allows for the reactor vessel to be drained without the need to drain the entire refueling cavity. The cover is used when scheduling flexibility is desired for work performed in a full or partially flooded cavity.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.1.4.2.3      Spent-Fuel Cask Handling Procedure The following discussion is typical of the spent-fuel cask handling to be used at FNP.
As described in subsection 9.1.6, the spent-fuel cask system consists of a multipurpose canister (MPC), transfer overpack, and storage overpack. The MPC is a stainless steel container which contains a basket designed specifically for PWR fuel assemblies. The transfer and storage overpacks provide missile protection and shielding for the loaded MPC during various phases of the loading and storage operations.
The transfer overpack is used during spent-fuel loading operations inside the auxiliary building and removal of the MPC from the auxiliary building. The MPC and transfer overpack may be delivered to the site by rail car or truck. Upon arrival, the MPC and transfer overpack are cleaned and inspected in accordance with the requirements of the applicable cask final safety analysis report (FSAR). Following completion of cleaning and inspection activities, the transfer overpack is moved using the cask transporter to the transfer pad located in the east alley way behind the auxiliary building. The spent-fuel cask crane is fitted with a special lift device (i.e., lift yoke) specifically designed to interface with the spent-fuel cask crane and the transfer overpack trunnions. The spent-fuel cask crane lifts the transfer overpack from the transfer pad; lifts it over the auxiliary building roof; and lowers it through the roof hatch into the spent-fuel cask wash area (figure 9.1-16).
The MPC is typically transported inside the storage overpack by the transporter to the transfer pad where the storage overpack is set on a specially designed seismic isolation device. The spent-fuel cask crane lifts the MPC from the storage overpack; lifts it over the auxiliary building roof; and lowers it through the roof hatch into the transfer overpack located in the spent-fuel cask wash area. Loading preparations for the MPC and transfer overpack are performed in the spent-fuel cask wash area. Upon completion of loading preparations, the transfer overpack containing the MPC is lifted by the spent-fuel cask crane and moved from the spent-fuel cask wash area to the spent-fuel cask storage area. A lift yoke extension is used whenever a spent-fuel cask is moved in or out of the spent-fuel cask storage area in order to prevent submerging the crane hook to facilitate decontamination. Provisions are made for storage of the lift yoke extension in the spent-fuel cask wash area when not in use.
When the water level in the cask storage area has been equalized with the spent-fuel pool water level, the spent-fuel bridge crane removes the transfer slot gate (figure 1.2-7) which isolates the spent-fuel pool from the cask storage area. The spent-fuel assemblies are removed from the storage racks and are placed in the MPC by the spent-fuel bridge crane. When MPC loading is completed, the isolation gate is installed over the transfer slot by the spent-fuel bridge crane.
The MPC lid is placed on the MPC, and the transfer overpack containing the loaded MPC is removed from the cask storage area and placed in the cask wash area. A special lift yoke extension is used to avoid submergence of the crane hook.
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FNP-FSAR-9 MPC closure operations are performed in the spent-fuel cask wash area. These typically include:
* MPC and transfer overpack decontamination.
* MPC lid welding operations.
* MPC blowdown to remove the water from the MPC.
* MPC drying operations.
* Helium backfill operations.
* Final radiological surveys.
Prior to removal of the transfer overpack and MPC from the auxiliary building, the storage overpack located in the east alley way will be fitted with a mating device which is bolted to the storage overpack. The mating device facilitates the removal of the transfer overpack bottom lid to allow MPC transfer from the transfer overpack to the storage overpack.
Following completion of MPC closure activities, the transfer overpack containing the loaded MPC is lifted from the cask wash area through the roof hatch, moved over the auxiliary building roof, and lowered onto the storage overpack in the east alley way using the spent-fuel cask crane and lift yoke. The mating device will be secured to both the transfer overpack and the storage overpack to provide stability for the stacked configuration during MPC transfer operations. The lift yoke arms will be disconnected from the transfer overpack trunnions and the MPC lifted slightly by slings attached to the special lift device to allow the transfer door to be opened. The MPC will be lowered into the storage overpack. Upon completion of the MPC transfer, the slings will be disconnected and the lift yoke arms reconnected to the transfer overpack. The transfer overpack will be returned to the spent-fuel cask wash area using the spent-fuel cask crane and the lift yoke.
Following completion of MPC transfer operations, the HI-STORM 100 overpack lid and lift brackets are installed. The lift brackets provide the interface between the loaded HI-STORM 100 and the spent-fuel cask transporter. The HI-STORM 100 cask is lifted by the cask transporter and moved from the transfer pad to its assigned storage location in the ISFSI following the heavy load path defined on drawing D-506467.
Spent-fuel cask handling for unloading operations involves similar cask movements and equipment with the exception that a helium cooldown system and MPC lid removal system may be required for unloading operations. The helium cooldown system and lid removal systems utilize skid mounted equipment that may be remotely located in the new fuel storage area.
The spent-fuel cask crane is prevented from moving above or into the vicinity of the spent-fuel pool by rail stops and mechanical bumpers which are permanently attached to the rails in positions as shown in figure 1.2-9. These stops limit the main hook approach to the wall, which separates the cask wash and storage areas from the transfer canal, to 6 ft 4 in. as shown on figure 1.2-1.
The spent-fuel cask crane is shared between Units 1 and 2. When the spent-fuel cask crane conveys the spent-fuel cask from the east alley way to the Unit 1 cask wash area and then returns over the route shown in figure 9.1-16, the spent-fuel cask will traverse over 9.1-23                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 safety-related equipment separated by intervening floors. A similar, but opposite hand, path exists for Unit 2.
9.1.4.3        Design Evaluation 9.1.4.3.1      Safe Handling The manipulator crane design includes the following provisions to ensure safe handling of fuel assemblies:
A.      Bridge, trolley, and winch drives are mutually interlocked, using redundant interlocks, to prevent simultaneous operation of any two drives.
B.      Bridge and trolley drive operation is prevented except when both gripper tube up-position switches are actuated.
C.      An interlock is supplied which prevents the opening of a solenoid valve in the airline to the gripper except when zero suspended weight is indicated by a force gauge. As backup protection for this interlock, the mechanical weight actuated lock in the gripper prevents operation of the gripper under load even if air pressure is applied to the operating cylinder.
D.      Two redundant excessive suspended weight switches open the hoist drive circuit in the up direction when the loading is in excess of 110 percent of a fuel assembly weight.
E.      An interlock of the hoist drive circuit in the up direction permits the hoist to be operated only when either the open or closed indicating switch on the gripper is actuated.
The hoist gripper position interlock consists of two separate circuits that work in parallel so that one circuit must be closed for the hoist to operate. If one or both interlocking circuits fail in the closed position, an audible and visual alarm on the console is actuated.
F.      An interlock of the bridge and trolley drives prevents the bridge drive from traveling beyond the edge of the core, unless the trolley is aligned with the refueling canal centerline. The trolley drive is locked out when the bridge is beyond the edge of the core.
G.      Suitable restraints are provided between the bridge and trolley structures and their respective rails to prevent derailing due to the SSE. The manipulator crane is designed to prevent disengagement of a fuel assembly from the gripper under the SSE.
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FNP-FSAR-9 H.      The main and auxiliary hoists are equipped with two independent braking systems. A solenoid release spring set electric brake is mounted on the motor shaft. This brake operates in the normal manner to release upon application of current to the motor and to set when current is interrupted. The second brake is a mechanically actuated load brake internal to the hoist gear box, which sets if the load starts to overload the hoist. It is necessary to apply torque from the motor to raise or lower the load. In raising, the motor cams the brake open; in lowering, the motor slips the brake allowing the load to lower. This brake actuates upon loss of torque from the motor for any reason and is not dependent on any electrical circuits. On the main hoist the motor brake is rated at 350-percent operating load and the mechanical brake at 300 percent.
The main hoist system is supplied with redundant paths of load support so that failure of any one component will not result in free fall of the fuel assembly. Two wire ropes are anchored to the winch drum and carried over independent sheaves to a load equalizing mechanism on the top of the gripper tube. In addition, supports for the sheaves and equalizing mechanism are backed up by passive restraints to pick up the load in the event of failure of this primary support. Each cable system is designed to support 13,750 lb or 27,500 lb acting together.
The design load is specified at 5400 lb; the working load of fuel assembly plus gripper is approximately 2500 lb.
The gripper itself has four fingers gripping the fuel, any two of which will support the fuel assembly weight.
The gripper and hoist system are routinely load tested to 3250 lb.
The following safety features are provided for in the fuel transfer system control circuit:
A.      Transfer car operation is possible only when both upenders are in the down position as indicated by the limit switches.
B.      The remote control panels have a permissive switch in the transfer car control circuit that prevents operation of the transfer car in either direction when either switch is open; i.e., with two remote control panels, one in the refueling canal and one in the spent-fuel pool, the transfer car cannot be moved until both "go" switches on the panels are closed.
C.      Two redundant interlocks allow upender operation only when the transfer car is at either end of its travel.
D.      Transfer car operation is possible only when the transfer tube valve position switch indicates the valve is fully open.
E.      The refueling canal upender is interlocked with the manipulator crane. The upender cannot be operated unless the manipulator crane gripper tube is in the fully retracted position or the crane is over the core.
9.1-25                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9
: 1.      The fuel transfer system upender operation is interlocked with the spent-fuel pool bridge to prohibit the lowering if the bridge is positioned over the upender area. The raising operation is not interlocked with the bridge operation.
The fuel storage crane interlock bypass switch is provided to permit upender operation in either direction when the bridge is over the upender. The switch must be placed in the bypass position for this emergency operation.
The bridge and hoist controls are interlocked to prevent simultaneous operation of bridge drive and hoist.
The design load on the hoist is the weight of one fuel assembly (1500 lb) plus the weight of the tool, which gives it a total weight of approximately 2000 lb. The crane is erected in the shop and given a complete functional test that includes a load test at 125 percent of rated load. The electrical wiring meets the applicable requirements of the National Fire Code, Electrical Volume 5, Article 610.
Restraining bars are provided on each truck to prevent the bridge from overturning.
: 2.      The new fuel elevator has an upper limit switch which enables the elevator to accept a new fuel assembly from the new fuel handling tool and a lower limit stop switch.
: 3.      Spent-fuel handling tool. When the fingers are latched, a pin is inserted into the operating handle and prevents inadvertent actuation. The tool weighs approximately 385 lb and is shop-tested at 2500 lb.
: 4.      New fuel assembly handling tool. When the fingers are latched, a safety screw is screwed in, preventing inadvertent actuations. The tool weighs approximately 100 lb and is shop-tested at 2500 lb.
F. All fuel handling tools and equipment handled over an open reactor vessel are designed to prevent inadvertent decoupling from crane hooks (i.e., lifting rigs are pinned to the crane hook and safety latches are provided on hooks supporting tools).
Tools required for handling internal reactor components are designed with fail-safe features that prevent disengagement of the component in the event of operating mechanism malfunction. These safety features apply to the following tools.
: 1.      Air-operated control rod drive shaft unlatching tool. The air cylinders actuating the gripper mechanism are equipped with backup springs that 9.1-26                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 close the gripper in the event of loss of air to the cylinder. Air valves are equipped with safety locking rings to prevent inadvertent actuation.
: 2.      Electrically operated control rod drive shaft unlatching tool. The drive shaft latch mechanism is manually engaged by rotating the outer mast assembly of the tool and positively maintained in latch position by a mechanical device. The three latch toes will stay engaged with the CRDS until manually disengaged by the operator.
: 3.      Guide tube cover handling tool. The mechanical gripper latching mechanism is equipped with an operating handle requiring a vertical lift, horizontal rotation, and vertical lift, in this sequence, for operation.
The following safety features are provided for the new fuel bridge crane and new fuel monorail hoist:
A.      Limit switches are provided for all crane and hoist motions.
B.      For hook travel, two independent limit switches are provided, one geared upper-lower limit switch and one upper block actuated limit switch.
C.      All hoist motors are provided with two independent braking systems, an automatic electric brake which stops hoist motion whenever power to the hoist motor is interrupted, and a multiple disc mechanical load brake which holds the load when the motor is at rest and prevents excessive speed when lowering.
9.1.4.3.2        Spent-Fuel Cask Crane Design Evaluation As discussed in paragraph 9.1.4.2.2, the spent-fuel cask crane is rated at 125 tons. Table 9.1-3 contains spent-fuel cask crane design data.
All mechanical and structural components of the spent-fuel cask crane are designed to have a minimum safety factor of 5, based on the ultimate strength of the materials when handling the full rated load.
The spent-fuel cask crane is Seismic Category I and is designed to withstand, without loss of load carrying function, the forces resulting from an SSE when the crane is handling the full-rated load. The crane bridge and trolley are provided with seismic upkick legs to ensure that the bridge and trolley will not derail under seismic motion. The computer program used to perform the seismic analysis assumes that the full-rated load, at both high- and low-hook elevations, is suspended from the main hook for different trolley positions across the bridge span. The results of this analysis show that the highest seismically induced vertical displacements of the load occur when the trolley is fully loaded and is located at the center of the bridge. For the trolley at the center of the bridge with full-rated load at the high-hook position (el 209.5 ft), the calculated seismically induced vertical displacement is less than 0.1 in. The calculated seismically induced vertical displacement for the load at the low hook position (el 114.5 ft) is less than 0.35 in. It must be noted that all loads supported by the spent-fuel cask crane with the trolley at the center of the span must be above the el 175 ft roof (reference figure 9.1-16). Although the figures for 9.1-27                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 trolley at center and load at low hook position are a physical impossibility, they have been included here for comparison. The maximum rope force created by the above loadings gives a calculated rope safety factor of 7.36 based on 16 parts rope holding the load or 5.55 based on lead line pull.
The main hoist is provided with a dual load path through the hoist gear trains, the reeving system, and the load block. Two separate ropes (figure 9.1-11) are used to provide redundancy for the main hoist. Each 1 1/8-in. diameter, 6 x 37 carbon steel IWRC rope is anchored to the drum and the equalizer assembly and is received through the block and upper sheave assemblies, so that each rope has active parts in each quadrant of the load block about the vertical axis of the hook. If one rope loses its effectiveness, the load will be supported by the remaining rope. With all 16 parts of the main hoist rope sharing the full-rated load and based on the ultimate rope strength and the static rated load as defined by CMAA specification No. 70, the minimum static safety factor is 9.43. In the unlikely event that one cable fails and the full rated load is supported by the remaining cable, then the static safety factor as defined above is 4.72. Based on lead line pull with both cables effective, the calculated safety factor in the lead line is 7.08. Rigid inspection and checking of the cable will ensure dependable service and reliability.
A failure of one of the main hoist ropes allows the load, which was previously shared between the two ropes, to be entirely supported by the remaining redundant main hoist rope. For this sudden load transfer, both the impact force on the remaining rope and the maximum load displacement have been calculated. The highest impact force on the single remaining unbroken main hoist rope is generated when the trolley is fully loaded and is located at either end of the bridge, the main hoist is at its highest position (el 209.5 ft), and one rope fails. For the impact loading generated by a load transfer under these conditions, the safety factor in the remaining rope is 3.15 based on eight parts of rope equally sharing the load or 2.79 based on lead line pull. Under these conditions, the vertical load displacement due to dynamic cable stretch is 0.52 in. For the same trolley position but with the full rated load considered to be suspended from the main hook at the low hook position (el 114.5 ft), the vertical load displacement due to dynamic cable stretch is 2.61 in.
The equalizer assembly consists of an equalizer bar, hydraulic dampers, mechanical stops, and special retainers which ensure continued retention of the load in the event of a pivot pin failure.
The main functions of the equalizer assembly are to continually adjust the hook load, so that any load under normal operation will be shared equally by the redundant reeving system and to transfer the shock of a cable break in an acceptable, safe, dynamic fashion to the remaining cable. If there is an exaggerated displacement of the equalizer assembly, such as that caused by a cable break, a limit switch system is activated and automatically terminates hoisting motion. From the time the limit switches are activated, the hoisting motion will be stopped within a maximum of 3 in. of vertical travel. The 3 in. of vertical travel includes the movement of the equalizer bar necessary to activate the limit switch system. Prior to making a lift, a visual inspection of the equalizer assembly will be made so that unnecessary power shutoffs do not occur. Rope readjustment should not be required until a new rope is installed on the crane.
However, if the equalizer assembly needs adjustment during a lift, the load will be lowered and the adjustment would be made on the adjusting nut provided in the rope socket assembly on either end of the equalizing bar. If the equalizing bar reaches the limits of its travel, which 9.1-28                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 should occur only in the event of a cable failure, the load can be safely lowered with the remaining cable after any debris has been cleared away.
In conformance with CMAA specification No. 70, the upper and lower block sheaves are a minimum of 24 rope diameters in size and, as shown in figure 9.1-11, are so arranged that active parts of each rope are located in each quadrant of the load block. The reeving system design is such that, with either or both parts of the rope retaining the load, the total holding force of all effective parts of rope will remain nearly coaxial and concentric with the vertical axis of the hooks. Each sheave in both the upper and lower load blocks is provided with retainers in both the vertical and horizontal planes. These retainers will capture and retain the sheave in the event of a sheave pin, bearing, or sheave failure. Failure of any of these items will not result in loss of load, and the load can be safely lowered and repairs effected.
The main load block is provided with redundant load carrying devices, a lifting eye and a sister hook. Each of these load carrying devices is designed to handle the full-rated load and to transmit it into the load block and sheaves while providing the normal load rotational capabilities found in standard crane designs. The lifting eye and sister hook may be rotated to all degrees with respect to each other, thus allowing redundant connections to the cask lifting apparatus.
The vertical position of the lifting eye can be adjusted approximately 1/4 in. relative to the sister hook. This vertical adjustment can be used to tighten the fit between a special lifting device as described in paragraph 9.1.4.2.2.5 and the lifting eye and sister hook, thus minimizing any vertical displacement of the load in the event of a load transfer from one lifting element to the other. The lifting eye and each side of the sister hook are designed for the full-rated load. Each lifting device can safely support a static load of 4W, where W is the design rated load. Both lifting elements have been tested to 200 percent of design rated capacity and were given a magnetic particle inspection in accordance with ASTM-A275. The block is a safety housing type and is provided with retainers to capture the sheaves in the event of a sheave, swivel, or bearing failure. As an added conservatism in the design, the swivel has a safety factor in excess of 7.5 on ultimate strength. The loss of any of the above components will not result in the loss of load, and the load may be safely lowered to effect repairs.
If a redundant cask lifting device is used, a failure of one half of the redundant cask lifting device, or yoke, could allow the cask to free fall downward for a small distance prior to engagement of the full load carrying capacity of the intact half of the redundant lifting device.
The impact force generated in the main hoist reeving system and the total cask vertical displacement have been calculated assuming a 1/2 in. cask free fall. The highest rope impact force occurs when the trolley is at either end of the bridge and is supporting the main hoist's full-rated load at the high-hook position (el 209.5 ft). For an initial cask free fall height of 1/2 in.
and the crane loading conditions outlined above, the rope safety factors for the impact load are 3.18 based on 16 parts rope equally sharing the load or 2.40 based on lead line pull. The total calculated downward cask movement, including free fall due to yoke failure, is 1.1 in. For the same trolley position but with the full-rated load suspended at the low hook position (el 114.5 ft),
total calculated downward cask movement is 1.64 in.
As shown on figure 9.1-16, the highest object which lies in the path of the spent-fuel cask, as it is transported from the rail car to the spent-fuel area, is the parapet at el 188 ft. Actual as-built field measurements of the parapet show that the top of the parapet ranges between a high point of el 187 ft 11 3/4 in. and a low point of el 187 ft 11 1/2 in. The design elevations of the crane 9.1-29                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 runways were el 177 ft 1 1/2 in and el 154 ft 6 in. As-built field measurements have shown that the runways are essentially straight and true and are installed at el 177 ft 1 13/16 in. and el 154 ft 6 1/4 in. The actual as-built parapet and runway dimensions are such that, for a specified high-hook elevation, the actual clearance between the bottom of the load and the top of the parapet is 1/2 in. greater than design.
A review of the various failure analyses shows that the largest vertical displacement of the cask, due to a failure when the load is in the high-hook position over the parapet, is the 1.1-in.
displacement due to a yoke failure. The guaranteed maximum static bridge deflection caused by the full-rated load at the center of the bridge is 1.365 in. As the trolley moves toward the end of the bridge (toward the parapet), this static deflection will decrease. Conservatively assuming the 1.365-in. maximum static deflection can occur over the parapet and adding the 1.1-in.
clearance required for a yoke failure, a minimum clearance of 2.465 in. is required between the parapet and the bottom of the lifted load.
Preoperational testing at FNP will establish the actual as-built high-hook position for the spent-fuel cask crane. Using that data, all spent-fuel cask designs used at FNP will be reviewed to establish that a conservative minimum clearance of 3 in. is provided between the bottom of the cask and the top of the parapet.
The reeving system outlined above will remain essentially plumb throughout its length of travel for both normal operation and after a cable break. Based on the ultimate strength of the rope material, either rope of the redundant reeving system can safely support a load of 3W, where W is the crane's design rated load. The redundant reeving system provides the capability for careful, continued operation after the failure of any single element. This allows the cask to be set down in the cask wash area, the cask storage area, on a specified roof location, on the ground, or on the transport vehicle.
Figure 9.1-17 shows one-half of the dual-path reeving system and is marked to show the associated fleet angles. The 3.57&deg; fleet angle occurring at the drum when the block is in the upper position will diminish rapidly as the block is lowered. It will go to 0&deg; within the first few drum revolutions and will increase to 2.92&deg; when the block is in the low position. The remaining fleet angles are at their maximum when the hook is in its highest position and will diminish rapidly as the main load block is lowered. For a total 2-rope reeving system, there are 26 possible sheave fleet angles.
Of these, 16 (61.5 percent) are less than 1 1/2&deg;, 2 are allowed at 3 1/2&deg;, and 8 (30.8 percent) exceed 1 1/2&deg;. Of the eight fleet angles that exceed 1 1/2&deg;, two are at 1.8&deg;, two at 2.18&deg;, two at 3.0&deg;, and two at 3.72&deg;. For many years, Whiting Corporation had an unwritten standard used in crane design which limited fleet angles to a maximum of 1 in. in 12 in. or 4&deg; 45'. In 1955, this standard was formally published as part of the Whiting Crane Handbook and has been used as formal design criteria since that date. Whiting's history encompasses more than 10,000 cranes, and no particular problems have been reported due to the use of the 1 in. in 12 in. fleet angle standard. The cask crane fleet angles, as shown in figure 9.1-17, are well within the maximum limits allowed by the 1 in. in 12 in. criteria.
The influence of the fleet angles on rope life is measured by the amount of rope abrasion or rope wear. Abrasion occurs from rope to rope on the drum or at the point of rope entry into a 9.1-30                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 sheave. Abrasive wear could occur fairly rapidly on a high speed, cyclic duty crane operating under severe loading and environmental conditions; however, on a slow speed, low cyclic duty crane, such as the spent-fuel cask crane, abrasive wear develops over a long period of time.
This relatively long time period provides ample time for the planned crane inspection program to detect rope wear and to replace the rope.
Excessively large fleet angles could theoretically have an influence on the rope's ability to spool properly onto the drum or to remain seated in the sheave throat. Whiting's experience with the 1 in. in 12 in. maximum fleet angle criteria demonstrates that improper spooling due to large fleet angles has not been a problem. This experience is further enhanced by the fact that the dual-path reeving is less severe than that which can be found in conventionally reeved cranes.
In the unlikely event that improper spooling did occur, the rotating equalizing bar would move, tripping the equalizing bar movement limit switch system, and deactivate the crane.
When the redundant reeving system is examined to determine whether reverse bends occur which can cause rope stress reversals, it is found that reverse bends occur only in the section of rope between the drum and the first sheave and that all other rope bends do not constitute stress reversals. This comment also applies to conventional reeving systems and points out that, in essence, there is no difference between conventional reeving and the redundant reeving when one is considering reverse bends.
There has been some concern that the location of the upper sheaves in a plane that is rotated 90&deg; from the plane that contains the lower load block sheaves does, in fact, create reverse bends in the rope. Although cranes have been built and operated in this country with this type of sheave arrangement, the CMAA specification No. 70 and other American crane codes do not directly address the question of sheave orientation. The European crane code, Federation Europeenne de la Manutention, Rules for the Design of Hoisting Appliances, does directly address the 90&deg; sheave orientation and clearly states that such an orientation does not constitute a reverse bend. An example of an operating crane built by Whiting and which has 90&deg; sheave orientation is the 350-ton capacity crane owned and operated by General Electric Company in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. This crane was put in service in 1968 and since that time has been making approximately 280 lifts of 250 tons or more per year. As of February 1975, the original sheaves, drums, blocks, and wire rope were still in service and were in excellent condition with no unusual signs of wear or degradation. Because of the European crane code and the operating experience accumulated to date on both conventionally and redundantly reeved cranes built by Whiting with 90&deg; sheave orientations, it is apparent that the 90&deg; sheave orientation does not create reverse bends which could degrade rope strength.
Wire rope is unique in the consideration of stress reversals in that reversals will not occur if the distance between the points of tangency exceeds one or two lays of rope. Since the spent-fuel cask crane's point of tangency exceeds nine lays of rope, it can be concluded that reverse bends do not occur.
The main hoist drum, shaft, and bearings are designed to accept the forces and bending moments produced by the full-rated load. Safety hub assemblies have been provided which will prevent loss of pinion mesh and loss of load supporting capability due to failure of the main hoist drum shafts or supporting bearings. Failure of a drum shaft will result in 1/8-in. movement (drop) of the affected end of the drum; however, this 1/8-in. movement will not cause binding in 9.1-31                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 the gear train which drives the other end of the drum. The main hoist drum is a single element in the lifting machinery, but a review of the drum geometry shows that its depth-to-length configuration falls far short of the requirements, as shown in "Formulas for Stress and Strain" by Roark, to consider it as a beam in bending. The stresses in the drum are generally of a localized nature and primarily are compressive. These stress conditions reduce the probability of crack propagation and resultant drum failure.
Redundancy of main hoist lifting machinery is provided by two complete gear trains located between the main hoist motor and the hoist drum. Each gear train drives a separate end of the drum and is designed to handle the most conservative of either full-rated load with a safety factor of 5, or 90 percent of yield strength, with 300-percent motor torque. Bearings have been selected in accordance with CMAA specification No. 70. A fatigue analysis was not performed on the cask crane mechanical gear trains. However, the redundant gear train design inherently has a longer fatigue life than a single-gear train design. The gear trains used in the hoisting machinery are a time proven design used on many crane applications. Each gear train contains a load brake rated in excess of 200 percent of motor torque. The load brakes of the automatic safety type set (if power should fail) and are released only during hoist operation when the system is energized. An eddy current brake is provided to prevent overspeed of the main hoist motor and to regulate lowering speed. The eddy current brakes are wired so that, if brake excitation is interrupted during hoisting motion, the hoisting motion will be automatically terminated. There are no friction devices used to transmit power through the gear train.
The design calculations show that a 92.8-hp motor was required for the main hoist service, and a 100-hp motor was provided. A means of continuously monitoring main hoist motor temperature has not been provided, but the motor is protected for thermal and current overload.
All crane controls are located in the operator's cab which is mounted on the trolley. Provisions have been made in the crane design for the possible future installation of radio control. Crane controls are Whiting full magnetic, reversing, variable speed type with spring return to center, and floating points have been provided on the first step of the bridge and trolley. Crane controls are of a fail-safe design, and all failure modes result in the termination of crane motion.
Separate slow speed inching motors and controls have been provided for main hoist and trolley motion.
Limit switches, spring bumpers, and wheel stops have been provided for bridge and trolley motions. Centrifugal overspeed switches are provided to automatically terminate crane motion if the normal main hoist inching speed, main hoist normal high speed, trolley inching speed, trolley high speed, or bridge high speed are exceeded. A slack line lower limit switch, a geared type upper limit switch, and a weight type upper limit switch are provided for main hoist motion.
A limit switch system is provided to sense gross movement of the equalizing bar and, in the unlikely event of a main hoist cable failure, to automatically terminate main hoist motion within 3 in. of vertical travel.
The main hoist is provided with a load sensing device which measures the load on the hook and provides digital readout in the cab. The load sensing system will automatically terminate hoisting motion in the event of main hoist overload or slack line conditions.
9.1-32                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The main hoist drive is Whiting eddy current dynamic braking with 5-step hoisting and lowering through a 100-hp high-speed motor plus a single-speed regenerative lowering slow-speed motor with an electric clutch. In the high-speed mode, there are four points of eddy current braking in the lowering direction, and the fifth point is full-speed regenerative lowering. The first two points of high-speed hoisting use eddy current braking to provide speed control for light loads. The eddy current brake is interlocked with the hoist by a series relay, and current must be flowing in the eddy current brake circuit before power can be applied to the hoist motors and before the shoe brakes can be released. If excitation of the eddy current brake is lost on a control point which requires eddy current braking, then hoisting motors will automatically be terminated and the shoe brakes will set. There are two dc shoe brakes, and each brake has a separate rectifier panel. The dc brakes are connected to all three power phases which supply the main hoist motor in such a manner that a single phasing of the power supply will set at least one brake. The eddy current brake is energized, when the master switch is in the off position, to assist the holding brakes in stopping the load.
The main hoist slow-speed motor is energized from the same power reverser and master switch as the high-speed motor. The crane operator selects his mode of operation, either high speed or slow speed, by using a selector switch in the cab. An electric clutch is used to connect or disconnect the slow-speed motor from the hoist drive train. A series relay is used to sense that the clutch and slow-speed contactor are energized, thus ensuring that power is supplied to the slow-speed motor, before the holding brakes are released. It should be noted that the position of the holding brakes within the drive train is such that the same holding brakes are used for the slow-speed and high-speed motors. Two slow-speed overspeed switches are provided to sense overspeeding of the slow-speed motor and, in the event of overspeed, will lock out the slow-speed motor and set the holding brakes. Two high-speed overspeed switches are provided to sense overspeeding of the high-speed motor and, in the event of overspeeding, will lock out both high- and low-speed motors and set the load brakes.
The main hoist redundant reeving system is provided with a limit switch system which will, if the load is transferred excessively to one set of ropes, activate a red rotating light and automatically terminate all hoisting or lowering of the main hook.
Control circuit types of limit switches are provided to stop main hoist motion when the hook reaches a preset high-hook or low-hook condition. A power circuit type of high-hook limit switch is provided to terminate all hoisting motion, if the normal high-hook limit, as set by the control circuit switch mentioned above, is exceeded.
Overload protection for high- and low-speed main hoist motors is provided by individual thermal overload units on each power phase to provide running protection, and individual circuit breakers are provided for short-circuit protection. Operation of any of these overcurrent protection devices will open all three phases to the motor. Undervoltage protection is provided by undervoltage relays. A local cell type of weight sensing system is provided for the main hook. This weight sensing system has a digital readout provided in the cab for the crane operator. In the event that the load on the hook exceeds a preset maximum value, the hoisting motion will automatically be terminated. If the load on the hook becomes less than a preset minimum, the lowering will automatically be terminated.
9.1-33                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The bridge is powered by two 10-hp wound rotor motors, one mounted on each end of the gantry, connected in a semisynchronized tie circuit. The rotors are tied together through a semisynchronized tie circuit. A common accelerating resistor is used with the master to provide four accelerating steps plus a shift point. Individual ac self-adjusting solenoid holding brakes are connected across each motor primary. A timer is provided which delays the starting motion of the bridge until the bridge motors have locked into synchronism. An overspeed switch is provided for bridge motion and, in the event of overspeed, shuts off power to the motors and sets the brakes. The manual rail clamps are interlocked with the bridge drive to prevent bridge motion unless the rail clamps are released. The bridge storage pins are also interlocked with the bridge drive circuitry to prevent bridge motion, unless the pins are released. A warning bell is provided on each end of the gantry to warn personnel of bridge motion whenever the bridge motors are energized. Extremes of bridge travel are prevented by control circuit limit switches.
Motor overload protection is provided by thermal overloads on each phase plus a thermal magnetic circuit breaker for short-circuit protection. Undervoltage protection is provided by undervoltage relays. Timing relays are provided to prevent excessive motor torques during acceleration, and a plugging relay is provided to limit slugging torque when the drive is reversed.
The trolley drive is a Whiting five-step, magnetic type with a 5-hp, high-speed motor plus a single-speed, 1/4-hp, slow-speed motor with electric clutch. In the high-speed mode, there are four accelerating points, manually controlled, plus a shift point. A self-adjusting ac solenoid brake is controlled by a brake contactor. The slow-speed motor is energized from the same power reverser and master as the high-speed motor. The crane operator selects the mode of operation, either high speed or slow speed, by using a selector switch in the cab. A series relay is used to detect that the clutch, which connects the slow-speed motor to the trolley drive, is energized and that the slow-speed contactor is closed, thus ensuring that power is provided to the slow motor before the brake is released. An overspeed switch is provided to lock out the slow-speed motor and to set the holding brake if the low-speed motor overspeeds.
An overspeed switch is provided to shut off both the high-speed and low-speed motors and to set the holding brake if the high-speed motor overspeeds. The trolley storage lock is interconnected with the control circuitry to prevent trolley motion unless the lock is released.
Extremes of trolley travel are prevented by control circuit limit switches. Thermal overloads and individual circuit breakers are provided for each bridge motor. Undervoltage protection is provided by undervoltage relays. Timing relays prevent excessive motor torques during acceleration, and plugging relays limit slugging torque when the trolley drive is reversed.
The spent-fuel cask crane was not designed to allow two-blocking. If a two-blocking test were required, block approach to the trolley underframe could result in cable and trolley frame damage. In actual operation, two-blocking is extremely unlikely due to the facts that redundant upper limit switches have been provided and that the crane operator in the trolley-mounted cab can easily verify whether the block has gone beyond its safe high-hook position.
The structural members of the spent-fuel cask crane have been fabricated in accordance with CMAA specification No. 70, and all welding was done in accordance with AWS D2.0 welding procedures. All weldments were given a visual inspection, and weld gauge sizes were checked on various welds throughout the structure.
9.1-34                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 During consideration of the necessity of performing notch toughness testing of the structural steel members of the crane, the following factors were taken into account:
A.      Material types and thicknesses.
B.      Loading and stress conditions of the structural members.
C.      Temperature conditions during crane operation.
D.      Past experience of failure of structural members of cranes attributed to brittle fracture.
The principal material used for the structural members of the crane was ASTM-A36 steel; however, ASTM-A242, a higher yield strength structural steel, was used in portions of the structure. Material thicknesses vary from 1/4 to 2 1/2 in. thick. The design conditions of the crane are based on the use of a factor of one-fifth the tensile strength or one-third the yield strength of the materials. Reference to the Pellini Fracture Analysis Diagram indicates that even below the nil ductility temperature (NDT) of the type of steels used, a preexisting defect 12 to 24 in. long is required to initiate a brittle crack when the stresses are in the range of 1/4 to 1/3 of the yield strength of the material. The lowest ambient temperature envisaged during operation of the crane is 30&deg;F. While this temperature may be at or near the NDT of the thicker steels used, it is believed that the likelihood of having linear defects 12 to 24 in. long in the welds in the structural members is negligible. This reasoning is reinforced by the absence of failure of the brittle fracture mechanism of structural members of cranes made from these types of steels, which have been operating under temperature conditions far lower than 30&deg;F.
In view of the considerations described above, it was decided that notch toughness testing of the structural members of the crane was not necessary.
Nondestructive examination using the visual method was performed on all welds and adjacent weld metal. Additional examinations for lamellar tearing were not performed, since lamellar tearing is a problem only on heavier weldments in joints where the principal loading is across the thickness of the base materials. None of the welds in the structural members of the crane falls into this category.
Preheat and postweld heat treatment was specified in the welding procedures used to fabricate the structural members of the crane; however, none of the welds was of sufficient size or thickness to necessitate the application of postweld heat treatment.
As outlined above, the spent-fuel cask crane has been designed with redundant load carrying devices, redundant main hoist ropes, redundant main hoist gear trains and load brakes between the main hoist motor and main drum, safety guards on the upper sheaves, safety housing main load block, and safety hub assemblies on the main hoist drum. A single failure of any element in the spent-fuel cask crane load carrying path will not cause a loss of load carrying ability.
9.1-35                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.1.4.3.3        Spent-Fuel Cask Crane Component Failure Evaluation All members in the load carrying path of the spent-fuel cask crane have been designed with a minimum safety factor of 5 based on the 125-ton design rated load. In many instances, the calculated safety factors exceed the design safety value of 5.
Within the load carrying path, redundant protection is provided or a means is provided to capture and retain a failed component, thus preventing an uncontrolled descent of the load.
In the event of a failure of any load path component, plant personnel will make a careful investigation to determine the exact nature and extent of the malfunction. After inspection of the malfunction and the clearing away of any debris, careful continued operation may progress, at least in the lowering mode. If the failed component cannot be cleared or if it has jammed the load carrying path, four 35-ton come-alongs would be used to support the load from the bridge girders to allow clearing of the load carrying path. When the load carrying path is unjammed, it may be used to lower the load.
Beginning with the load block, the sister hook and lifting eye are redundant components, and the loss of either element will not result in loss of load carrying ability or render the crane inoperable. The load path continues upward through the hooks, hook nuts, and hook bearings and into the swivel, which is the next possible failure point. Although the swivel is a single element, it has been designed with a safety factor in excess of 7.5, which decreases the probability of a failure. In the event of a swivel failure, a loss of load would not occur since the block is provided with retainers to capture and hold the swivel. A swivel failure would require that raising motion be suspended, but the load could be safely lowered to a laydown area.
From the swivel, the load path continues into the block sheaves. The load block has been provided with retainers which will capture and retain a sheave in the event of a bearing or sheave failure. The failure of any given sheave will not result in a loss of load, and the system could continue to operate on the remaining reeving path.
The load path continues upward into the two cables of the redundant reeving system. The failure of either of the two cables will not result in loss of load or crane operability. In the event of a cable break, the displacement of the equalizing bar will trip the limit switch system and terminate hoisting motion. The broken cable should be cleared from the remaining reeving system prior to restoration of operation.
The next elements in the load path are the upper sheave nest, equalizer system, and load cells.
A failure of the sheaves or sheave pins will not result in loss of load, in that retainers have been provided to capture the sheaves. In any event, operation could continue on the remaining rope and reeving system.
Failure of a load cell will not result in loss of load, and retainers have been provided to capture the affected parts. Failure of an equalizing bar pin will not result in loss of load, and crane operation could continue on the remaining reeving system.
The load carrying path continues upward to the drum, which is a single element within the design. A complete failure in the center of the drum would render the crane inoperable and 9.1-36                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 would result in loss of load. A review of the drum dimensions show that the drum depth-to-length ratio falls far short of that necessary to consider it as a beam in bending. The loading on the drum is generally localized in nature and is compressive. As an added design conservatism, the drum has been designed with a safety factor in excess of 8.
Attached to and supporting either end of the drum are the other single elements of the design, the drum shafts. Retainers have been provided to hold the drum in the event of a drum shaft or bearing failure. The design of the retention system is such that operation could continue at least in the lowering direction.
The load path continues through the two gear trains, holding brakes, and input shafts to the main hoist motor. Each gear train is designed to handle safely the entire 125-ton load, and a failure in either gear train will not render the system inoperable. The two holding brakes provided are of a fail-safe design and automatically set upon a loss of power supply. Should the main hoist motor fail, the separate inching motor and drive could be used as an emergency means of operation. In the event that a mechanical or electrical failure renders the main hoist inoperable, the load could be lowered by manual operation of the load brakes. The lowering speed would be measured by a tachometer mounted on the motor shaft.
If an electrical or mechanical failure has rendered the trolley inoperable, the trolley could be moved by first releasing the brake and then pulling the trolley across the bridge with a come-along. The bridge could be moved in a similar manner. For short movements, the bridge or trolley could be moved by means of a hand- or air-operated wrench on the motor shaft. If a wheel bearing or axle has failed, it may be necessary to grease the rail in order to slide the broken wheel.
The crane controls and protective devices have been designed so that the load is left in a safe position in the event of a power failure or an electrical failure on the crane.
A loss of power supply to, or the failure of, the main hoist motor will result in termination of hoisting motion and setting of the holding brakes. If the main hoist motor has failed, the separate main hoist inching motor may be used to move the load. The two main hoist holding brakes are designed to set on a loss of power supply and are so wired that one phasing of the power supply to the main hoist motor will set at least one holding brake. If excitation to the eddy current brake is lost on a control point which requires the eddy current brake, the power supply to the main hoist motor will be automatically blocked and further hoisting using the main hoist motor will be prevented. However, if the eddy current brake is inoperative, the main hoist inching drive may be used to position the load, since eddy current braking is not required for the inching drive.
Redundant main hoist upper limit switches, one power type and one control type, have been provided. If the control type of limit switch, which is the first limit switch seen by the load block, fails, the second, or power type of limit switch, will stop main hoist motion. If both limit switches were to fail, continued upward motion of the load block will result in overloading, which will cause the load sensing system automatically to terminate the hoisting motion. It should be noted that with the crane's operator located in the cab, any violation of the upper limit switch setpoints is very unlikely. The main hoist is provided with a control type of lower limit switch to prevent slack line conditions. If this switch fails to function properly and lowering is continued, 9.1-37                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 the weight sensing system will automatically stop hoist motion when the load on the hook becomes less than a preset minimum.
All motors have been provided with overspeed protection so that the overspeed will automatically cause the power supply to the motor to be terminated. All motors have undervoltage protection and both thermal and current overload protection, so that abnormalities will be sensed and motor operation automatically prevented.
The trolley drive has both a normal (or high-speed) motor and an inching (or slow-speed) motor.
If the normal drive motor fails, the inching motor may be used to permit safe positioning of the load. Both bridge and trolley brakes are of a fail-safe design and will set on loss of power.
Excesses of both bridge and trolley travel are prevented by redundant limit switches which are wired into separate portions of the control circuitry. Bumpers and wheel stops have been provided as an additional method of stopping bridge or trolley travel, if both redundant limit switches were to fail.
In the event that a contactor welds shut or a master switch becomes inoperative, the crane operator can activate the emergency stop button, which is on the control panel in the cab, and stop all crane motion. Opening the main disconnector will interrupt all power to the crane, stop all motions, and set all brakes.
9.1.4.3.4      Seismic Considerations The fuel handling equipment is designed to withstand the forces of an operating basis earthquake (OBE) and an SSE. For normal conditions plus OBE loadings, the resulting stresses are limited to allowable working stresses as defined in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendix XVII, for normal and upset conditions. For normal conditions plus SSE loadings, the stresses are limited to within the allowable values given by Subsection NA 2110 for critical parts of the equipment which are required to maintain the capability of the equipment to perform its safety function. Permanent deformation is allowed for the loading combination, which includes the SSE to the extent that there is no loss of safety function.
The seismic design categories for all fuel handling system components are in table 3.2-1.
9.1.4.3.5      Containment Pressure Boundary Integrity The fuel transfer tube that connects the refueling canal (inside the reactor containment) and the spent-fuel pool (outside the containment) is closed on the refueling canal side by a blind flange at all times, except during refueling operations. Two seals are located around the periphery of the blind flange with leak-check provisions between them.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.1.4.3.6      Radiation Shielding During all phases of spent-fuel transfer, the gamma dose rate from the spent-fuel assembly is a small fraction of 2.5 mR/h at the surface of the water. This is accomplished by maintaining at least 9 ft of water above the active fuel in the assembly during all handling operations.
The two cranes used to lift spent-fuel assemblies are the refueling machine and the spent-fuel pool bridge hoist. The refueling machine contains positive stops that assure that the above shielding depth is maintained. The hoist on the spent-fuel pool bridge moves spent-fuel assemblies with a long-handled tool. Hoist travel and tool length likewise assure that the above shielding depth is maintained.
9.1.4.4        Tests and Inspections As part of normal plant operations, the fuel handling equipment is inspected for operating conditions prior to each refueling operation. During the operational testing of this equipment, procedures are followed that will affirm the correct performance of the fuel handling system interlocks. Inspections credited for license renewal are summarized in the Overhead and Refueling Crane Inspection Program description in chapter 18, subsection 18.2.6.
The spent-fuel cask crane's redundant main hoist ropes shall be inspected and, if required, replaced to ensure compliance with ANSI B30.2.0 and with Whiting Corporation's recommendations. The inspection requirements of ANSI B30.2.0 and of Whiting are as follows:
A.      ANSI B30.2.0 All running ropes which are in continuous service should be visually inspected once each working day. For continuous long term periods of operation, a thorough inspection of all ropes shall be made at least once a month and a full written, dated, and signed report outlining rope condition should be kept on file.
Any signs of rope deterioration which could cause a loss of rope strength, such as those outlined below, shall be noted in the report and a determination made as to whether further use of the rope would create a safety hazard.
: 1.      Reduction of rope diameter below the nominal diameter due to loss of core support, internal or external corrosion, or wear of outside wires.
: 2.      A number of broken outside wires and the distribution of the broken wires.
: 3.      Excessive wear of outside wires.
: 4.      Corroded or broken wires at the rope end connections.
: 5.      Corroded, cracked, bent, worn, or improper rope end connections.
: 6.      Severe rope kinking, crushing, cutting, or unstranding.
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FNP-FSAR-9 B.      Whiting Corporation Replacement of the rope should be considered when any of the following conditions are present:
: 1.      Twelve randomly distributed broken wires in one lay or four broken wires in one strand of one rope lay.
: 2.      Wear of one-third the original diameter of outside individual wire.
: 3.      Kinking, crushing, or any other damage resulting in distortion of the rope.
: 4.      Evidence of any type of heat damage.
: 5.      Reductions from nominal diameter of more than 1/16 in. for a rope diameter from 7/8 to 1 1/8 in., inclusive.
A cold-proof test or material testing will be performed to demonstrate that the spent-fuel cask crane can safely and adequately handle 125-ton full-rated capacity loads at minimum environmental temperatures. The cold-proof test shall be a 125-percent load test, conducted in accordance with ANSI B30.2.0 requirements, and performed at the available minimum site environmental temperature. After satisfactorily passing the cold-proof test, the environmental temperature at which the test was performed shall be the minimum temperature at which full capacity (125 tons) loads may be handled. If the environmental temperature drops below the previously established cold-proof temperature and if crane operation is required during such a period, then a new cold-proof test may be performed to establish a new cold-proof temperature.
The crane structure has been thoroughly examined to determine the calculated stress levels which exist in critical weldments when the crane is handling the full-rated load. For full-load operation, no critical load carrying welds are stressed in excess of two-thirds of their AWS allowable stress values. These weld stress values, which are well within AWS allowable values and far below yield, in conjunction with the successful performance of a cold-proof test, are sufficient to demonstrate the structural adequacy of the crane.
If material testing is performed in lieu of the cold-proof test, it should meet the requirements of NUREG 0554.
9.1.5  SPENT-FUEL LEAK DETECTION Spent-fuel leak detection may be utilized either in the reactor containment building or fuel storage area when deemed necessary to provide an additional means of fuel performance evaluation.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.1.5.1        Design Bases The spent-fuel leak detection equipment is designed to provide for safe handling of spent-fuel assemblies while the equipment is being utilized.
One method of leak detection is ultrasonic testing (UT). In this case, an inspection device is temporarily mounted on top of a spent-fuel rack above empty cells. Then, the assembly to be tested is moved by the fuel handling equipment into the inspection device where individual rods are examined using a UT probe. The control and monitoring equipment associated with the inspection device is temporarily located on the spent-fuel pool deck for analyzing test results.
The following design bases apply:
A.      Movement of UT test equipment over the spent-fuel pool for temporary installation is bounded by the analysis of a dropped fuel assembly. Engineering analysis also verified that a drop of a typical UT inspection device weighing as much as 1470 lb (dry weight) from a height of up to 27 ft above the spent-fuel racks would not result in fuel rack damage which could lead to a spent-fuel pool criticality event. Use of spent-fuel handling tool restricts the height to which a fuel assembly may be lifted within the analyzed limit.
B.      Structural analysis of the spent-fuel racks has shown that the temporary mounting of UT inspection equipment above the empty spent-fuel cells will not affect the structural integrity of the racks, even during a postulated seismic event.
C.      Adherence to test procedure instructions assures no damage to either the test equipment or the fuel assembly during movement of fuel into the test equipment.
D.      UT equipment does not enclose the fuel assembly and, therefore, does not affect assembly cooling.
Another method of leak detection involves placing the fuel assembly to be tested into an underwater inspection container. The following design bases apply to this leak detection method:
A.      Leak detection equipment is designed to prevent damage to fuel assemblies during testing.
B.      Fuel assembly overheating during leak testing while in underwater containers is prevented by 1) maintaining the water level at least 6 in. above the top of the fuel, and 2) inspection container overtemperature monitor.
C.      Fuel assemblies may be removed from the underwater containers upon loss of system air or power supply.
Another method of leak detection involves the use of the in-mast sipping system. The refueling machine in Farley Unit 1 and Unit 2 has been equipped with in-mast sipping system hardware for detection of leaking fuel assemblies during normal core off-load operations. The in-mast sipping system injects air at the bottom of the mast, samples the fission gasses at the top of the mast, and directs the sample to a radiation monitoring system.
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FNP-FSAR-9 The following design bases apply to the use of the in-mast sipping system.
A. During fuel sipping, fuel assemblies are raised from the lower core plate to the refueling elevation above the core outlet but remain immersed in borated water.
The minimum separation distance specified in the fuel handling guidelines will be maintained during fuel handling. The addition of air into the fuel assembly increases the void fraction in the water. An increase in void fraction will decrease the reactivity of the fuel assembly. The refueling water contains sufficient boron to provide a large amount of negative reactivity. The boron concentration during refueling is maintained within the limit specified in Farley Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications.
B. The modifications to the refueling machine mast assembly are designed such that the safe fuel handling design function of the mast is not adversely affected.
The modifications do not interfere with existing plant structures such as the reactor flange, reactor internals, cavity seal ring, or any fuel assemblies or components. The air nozzle manifold at the base of the fixed mast does not intrude into the envelope required for safe handling of the fuel assemblies. Use of the in-mast sipping system does not require any change to the fuel, reactor internals, or reactor vessel.
C. The process of in-mast sipping requires that air be delivered to the bottom of the fuel assembly by means of a stainless steel tube mounted to the side of the refueling machine mast. During this process, the supply tube is filled with air.
Radiation shielding from the fuel assemblies is provided by a minimum of 10 ft of water cover above the fuel assembly. When sipping is not taking place, the tube fills with water because it is immersed in the refueling cavity water. During the sipping operation, radiation streaming through the air-filled tube was found to be negligible.
D. A seismic evaluation has been performed to demonstrate that with the addition of the in-mast sipping system, the refueling machine remains structurally adequate to withstand the seismic and dead weight loads. The seismic evaluation accounts for the weight of permanently installed hardware as well as the weight of temporary analysis equipment used during in-mast sipping.
E. An analysis of the thermal hydraulic effects on the fuel assemblies being leak-tested shows that there is no boiling in the fuel assembly as it is suspended in the enclosed refueling mast during the test. The sparging of air on the fuel assembly will not have an adverse effect during the leak test sequence.
9.1.5.2        System Description The UT method of spent-fuel leak detection utilizes an inspection device containing a UT probe and visual monitor. The device with seismic supports is temporarily mounted on top of a 9.1-42                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 spent-fuel rack above empty cells. The UT control and monitoring equipment is temporarily located on the spent-fuel pool deck.
Once the fuel assembly to be inspected is positioned in the inspection device, the probe begins scanning the rows of rods within the assembly, sending a signal to the monitoring equipment where it is recorded and displayed. The amplitude of this signal will indicate if any rods in the assembly are leaking. Operation of all leak detection equipment is consistent with the ALARA practices of Regulatory Guide 8.8.
The other spent-fuel leak detection method utilizes one or more systems, each having an underwater sipping container with associated controls and necessary utility connections, piping, and cabling for supply of required demineralized water, compressed air, electrical power, etc.
The inspection container(s) is placed in a self supporting rack which may be placed in the refueling canal or the cask storage pit. A typical inspection cycle for a fuel assembly consists of assembly insertion into the underwater container, closing and sealing the container lid, flushing the container, sampling the radioactivity, opening the container lid, and removing the assembly.
The equipment may utilize a radiation detector as an integral part of the system or depend on water samples being taken from the container and analyzed for radioactivity to monitor radiation levels while the equipment is being utilized.
Fuel sipping is the process of identifying leaking fuel assemblies by detecting gaseous or solid fission products that have escaped from breached irradiated fuel rods. The in-mast sipping system provides a means of performing online, qualitative leak testing of fuel assemblies in the refueling mast during normal fuel handling operations. In-mast sipping system hardware is permanently installed on the refueling machine mast and includes an air collection manifold at the top of the mast, an air supply manifold at the bottom of the mast, an air supply tube and supports connected to the supply manifold, and covers installed on the mast to prevent crossflow and loss of air. Temporary equipment used to measure the quantity and type of gas and particulate material leaking from a fuel assembly is installed on the trolley of the refueling machine for the duration of the offload/leak detection activity, and is removed prior to resuming plant operation.
During fuel sipping, fuel assemblies are raised from the lower core plate to the refueling elevation but remain immersed in borated water. Air is delivered to the bottom of the fuel assembly by means of a stainless steel tube mounted to the side of the refueling machine mast. After the air rises through the fuel assembly, it is collected by the manifold at the top of the mast, where air samples are directed to a radiation monitoring system.
9.1.5.3        Safety Evaluation The UT leak testing method does not create a criticality event because all the fuel assemblies are in spent-fuel racks except for the assembly being tested. These racks are already analyzed to ensure proper spacing to maintain Keff  0.95. The movement of the test assembly into the test device is conducted by a detailed procedure which assures that fuel assemblies will not be damaged.
9.1-43                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The movement and setup of UT test equipment does not involve any unique plant configurations which could place the plant in an unanalyzed condition. The only potential accidents associated with the setup and movement of the fuel testing equipment involve physical damage to the spent-fuel racks, a scenario which has been previously considered.
The UT inspection device is seismically supported to prevent uncontrolled movement on top of the spent-fuel rack during a safe shutdown earthquake.
Pertaining to the alternate detection method, a criticality evaluation was performed. Operation of this equipment with fuel in the self supporting rack will not create the possibility of an accidental criticality. Since a 12-in. separation distance between the fuel assemblies is maintained and the separating material(s) is not air (i.e., steel and water), there are no criticality safety issues. Provided that the procedure takes place in refueling water, which typically contains greater than 1800-ppm soluble boron and the fuel enrichments are  5.0 w/o U-235, the 0.95 Keff limit will not be exceeded.
The underwater inspection container(s) is designed to withstand overtemperature or overpressure events such that no fuel assembly damage will occur.
The in-mast sipping system is mounted on the refueling machine mast, which is designated Non-Nuclear Safety (NNS). The design of NNS equipment must resist failure that could prevent Safety Class equipment from performing its design function. In the case of the refueling machine, the potential adverse condition would be improper movement and handling of fuel.
During fuel sipping, fuel assemblies are raised from the lower core plate to the refueling elevation but remain immersed in borated water. The minimum separation distance specified in the fuel handling guidelines will be maintained during fuel handling. The addition of air into the fuel assembly increases the void fraction in the water. An increase in void fraction will decrease the reactivity of the fuel assembly. The refueling water contains sufficient boron to provide a large amount of negative reactivity. The boron concentration is maintained within the limit specified in Farley Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications.
The modifications to the refueling machine mast assembly are designed such that the safe fuel handling design function of the mast is not adversely affected. The refueling machines are structurally adequate to withstand seismic and dead weight loads, including the permanent in-mast sipping hardware and temporary equipment used during fuel sipping.
Analysis shows that there is no boiling in the fuel assembly as it is suspended in the enclosed refueling mast during the test. The sparging of air on the fuel assembly will not have an adverse effect.
9.1.6    DRY SPENT-FUEL STORAGE In order to provide additional temporary spent-fuel storage capacity, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) elected to utilize the general license issued for storage of spent fuel in an ISFSI in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 72, subpart K. The general license is limited to storage of spent fuel which SNC is authorized to possess at the site under the 9.1-44                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 specific license for the site and is restricted to use of spent-fuel casks that are approved by the NRC.
The ISFSI is located south of the diesel generator building inside the protected area as described in paragraph 1.2.10.4. The ISFSI consists of 5 concrete storage pads, each designed to accommodate 12 spent-fuel casks and support equipment. A list of acceptable spent-fuel casks for use at FNP and an evaluation for each is provided in the FNP ISFSI 10 CFR 72.212 Report.
9.1.6.1          Spent-Fuel Cask SNC selected the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system for storage of spent fuel in the FNP ISFSI. The NRC reviewed and approved the HI-STORM 100 design and issued Certificate of Compliance (CoC) 1014 for the HI-STORM 100 cask system in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.
The HI-STORM 100 spent-fuel cask system is part of the Holtec family of MPC-based spent-fuel cask designs and utilizes the same MPC as the HI-STAR 100 storage and transport cask system. As such, the MPC for the HI-STORM 100 cask system is certified for both storage and transportation of spent fuel in accordance with 10 CFR 72 and 10 CFR 71, respectively.
Each MPC is designed for storage of up to 32 spent-fuel assemblies. The HI-STORM 100 overpack is a steel and concrete cylindrical vessel that is certified for storage only in accordance with 10 CFR 72. The HI-STORM 100 overpack provides missile protection and shielding for the MPC during storage operations. MPCs used in conjunction with the HI-STORM 100 cask system will be transferred to HI-STAR 100 overpacks prior to shipment.
The HI-STORM 100 overpack is not designed to be placed in the spent-fuel pool during MPC loading operations but, instead, utilizes the HI-TRAC 125 transfer overpack for movement of the MPC to and from the spent-fuel pool. The HI-TRAC 125 transfer overpack is equipped with a removable bottom lid to facilitate MPC transfer from the HI-TRAC 125 transfer overpack to the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack.
The HI-TRAC 125 transfer overpack is equipped with two single-load path lifting trunnions which are rated for a combined maximum load of 125 tons. The lifting trunnions for the HI-TRAC 125 transfer overpack are designed, fabricated, tested, and inspected in accordance with ANSI N14.6 and NUREG-0612 and have a minimum safety factor of:
* Six times the weight of the cask to the yield strength of the materials of construction; and
* Ten times the weight of the cask to the ultimate strength of the materials of construction.
During MPC transfer operation, MPC lift cleats will be attached to the MPC lid for use with slings attached to the spent-fuel cask crane. The MPC lift cleats are designed, fabricated, tested, and 9.1-45                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 inspected in accordance with ANSI N14.6(3) and NUREG-0612(6) and have a minimum safety factor of:
* Six times the weight of the cask to the yield strength of the materials of construction; and
* Ten times the weight of the cask to the ultimate strength of the materials of construction.
A detailed description of the HI-STORM 100 cask system is provided in Holtec Report HI-2002444, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Holtec HI-STORM 100 Cask System.(7) 9.1.6.2          Spent-Fuel Cask Lift Yoke The spent-fuel cask lift yoke is a single-load path special lift device designed in accordance with ANSI N14.6(3) and NUREG-0612(4), and is rated for a maximum load of 125 tons. The spent-fuel cask lift yoke is used for:
* Vertical lifting of the HI-TRAC 125 transfer overpack.
* Remote underwater installation of the MPC lid.
* MPC transfer between the HI-TRAC 125 transfer overpack and the HI-STORM 100 storage overpack.
The spent-fuel cask lift yoke consists of two parallel strongbacks that sandwich the crane hook and connect to the spent-fuel cask crane sister hook and lifting eye. The spent-fuel cask lift yoke has two closed-loop arms that fit over the HI-TRAC 125 overpack trunnions located near the top of the HI-TRAC 125. Each lift yoke arm transmits the load to the strongbacks via a pair of actuation plates that allow the lift yoke arms to open and close. The actuation plates are attached to the strongbacks via solid steel via a slotted keyway. The spent-fuel cask lift yoke is designed such that it does not contain any load bearing welds. The weight of the HI-TRAC 125 overpack is transferred from the trunnions to the sister hook and lifting eye of the FNP cask crane as follows:
* Lift yoke arms.
* Actuation plates.
* Actuation plate pins.
* Strongbacks.
* Main lift yoke pins.
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FNP-FSAR-9 In addition to use for movement of the HI-TRAC 125 overpack, the spent-fuel cask lift yoke is equipped with four clevises which provide load attachment points designed in accordance with NUREG-0612 to support the weight of a loaded MPC during transfer operations. The weight of MPC is transferred from the MPC lift cleats to the sister hook and lifting eye of the spent-fuel cask crane as follows:
* MPC slings.
* Lift yoke clevises.
* Strongback.
* Main lift yoke pins.
Two spacers are used to position each pair of actuation plates. Four strongback spacers are provided to position the strongbacks.
The load bearing members of the spent-fuel cask lift yoke are designed to lift six times the rated load of the lift yoke which is 125 tons without generating a shear stress or maximum tensile stress at any point in the device in excess of the corresponding minimum yield strength of their materials of construction. Additionally, the spent-fuel cask lift yoke load bearing members are designed to lift ten times the rated load of the lift yoke without exceeding the ultimate strength of the materials of construction.
Structural fabrication of the spent-fuel cask lift yoke is performed to standards consistent with the service intended. All material is certified as to chemical and physical properties. In addition, all stressed members are inspected for internal defects.
Prior to first use, the spent-fuel cask lift yoke was subjected to a load test equal to 300% of the maximum load to which the device will be subjected. Following the load test, critical areas of the lift yoke were subjected to nondestructive testing in accordance with section 5.5 of ANSI N14.6.
For continued qualification of the spent-fuel cask lift yoke, the yoke is tested annually by one of the following methods:
A.      After sustaining the test load equal to 300% of the maximum load to which the device is to be subjected for a period 10 min., critical areas are visually inspected for defects, and all components are inspected for permanent deformation.
B.      If surface cleanliness and conditions permit, dimensional testing, visual inspection, and nondestructive testing are performed in accordance with section 5.5 of ANSI N14.6.
In addition, nonload bearing parts are tested annually according to written procedures to verify that they perform their design function. If the spent-fuel cask lift yoke has not been used for a 9.1-47                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 period greater than 1 year, the above testing is not required. However, testing of the lift yoke as described above is required prior to subsequent use.
The HI-TRAC 125 overpack is equipped with lifting trunnions that are designed to mate with the elliptical loops of the lift arms of the spent-fuel cask lift yoke. Design of the HI-TRAC 125 overpack lift trunnions and the spent-fuel cask lift yoke with increased factors of safety described above in conjunction with use of the single-failure proof spent-fuel cask crane, precludes the accidental drop of a spent-fuel cask.
9.1.7    HEAVY LOADS As per NUREG-0612, a heavy load is defined as any load, carried in a given area after a plant becomes operational, that weighs more than the combined weight of a single spent-fuel assembly and its associated handling tool for the specific plant in question.
9.1.7.1          Heavy Loads Safe Loads Path A load path is a predetermined path and height above the floor a load must follow while suspended. A safe load path is a load path, including height above the floor, which has been identified by procedure or evaluated and determined that the load may travel near or over spent fuel, reactor core, or safe shutdown systems or components without affecting the ability to bring the plant to cold shutdown conditions and/or provide continued decay heat removal following the dropping of a heavy load. This includes the effect on equipment on floors below but does not consider single failure.
Safe load paths for heavy loads inside containment have been developed and incorporated into appropriate plant procedures. The safe load paths are documented in the following drawings; Unit 1: D-175511, D-175512, D-175513, D-175515, Sheet 1 and 2; Unit 2: D-205512, D-205513, D-205514, D-205516 Sheet 1 and 2. The safe loads paths are controlled by procedures. In the auxiliary building, only the demineralizer hatch monorail hoist is capable of carrying a heavy load over safe shutdown equipment. However, safe load paths are not considered necessary in this instance since the load pathway is restricted by the monorail track and safe shutdown functions will not be lost. For the spent-fuel bridge crane, the only heavy load handled is the spent-fuel pool transfer slot gate. Movement of this heavy load is directed by use of administrative controls which prevent movement of the transfer slot gate into a position where it may cause damage to spent fuel. Note that the spent-fuel cask crane is prevented from traveling over the spent-fuel pool by mechanical stops; therefore, it cannot carry heavy loads over spent fuel.
Safe load paths inside containment are clearly marked on drawings contained in procedures.
Development of safe load paths in the containment and, as defined by procedure, over the spent pool area are consistent with NUREG-0612. In lieu of permanent floor markings, these procedures were modified to require the use of a signalman to direct movements of the polar crane. Use of a signalman is consistent with NUREG-0612 by providing the crane operator with suitable visual aids to ensure that load paths are followed. Also, deviations from safe load paths must be reviewed and approved.
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FNP-FSAR-9 The diesel generator building contains several hoists systems which are used to assist in lifting and rigging. However, these hoists are used for maintenance only when the diesel is not on standby. In addition, the diesels are separated by concrete walls, making it physically impossible for a hoist to drop a load on an adjacent diesel generator. The equipment separation in the diesel building assures that no heavy load can damage two trains of safety-related equipment. The Franklin Research Institute stated in its diesel generator hoist evaluation that suitable precautions should be added to any existing procedures identifying the heavy loads and their respective handling systems or the Licensee should physically mark the component with a suitable warning. The Farley Nuclear Plant diesel generator hoists are mounted upon a monorail system. The placement of the fixed rails precludes the lifting of a heavy load over more than one train of safety-related equipment. Since the monorails are limited to only one path, identification of heavy loads is unnecessary.
A heavy load drop from the new fuel monorail hoist, new fuel bridge crane, spent-fuel cask crane, tendon surveillance areas, or the various maintenance monorail hoists would have no consequence to safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment due to physical separation.
External portable maintenance cranes could drop loads onto the river water intake structure, service water intake structure, and outside buried service water piping. However, due to system redundancy, a heavy load drop on these structures or piping will not preclude a safe shutdown.
There are numerous cranes that were excluded from satisfying the criteria of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612. These handling systems included the diesel generator building hoists and external portable maintenance cranes, which are used for outside areas.
9.1.7.2        Load Handling Procedures Load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment are controlled by written procedures. As a minimum, procedures will be used for handling loads listed in table 3.1-1 of NUREG-0612, with the exception of the polar crane main hoist load block. ASME NML-1 (Reference 9) states, "the running rope and lower block of an overhead crane are considered part of the overhead crane".
Therefore, the polar crane main hoist load block is not considered a load or heavy load.
The slings used for rigging loads at FNP are installed and used per ANSI B30.9-1971. The ANSI standard was developed for lifting loads under dynamic conditions. Load limits for slings under ANSI B30.9-1971 are mass handling limits, not dead weight stress limits. The dynamic component is included in the standard through the application of significant safety factors. It is, therefore, inappropriate to apply additional dynamic stress criteria in the sling selection progress. The slings are developed for the load, not for a specific crane; therefore, the markings on slings contain load limits rather than a designation of the specific cranes for which they are used.
Safe load paths for the polar crane inside containment are defined in drawings and are contained in procedures. Components shall not go outside the designated boundaries as 9.1-49                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 shown in the drawings. Deviations from defined safe load paths must be reviewed and approved.
9.1.7.3          Implementation of Standards 9.1.7.3.1        Training of Crane Operators Crane operators involved in the lifting of heavy loads at FNP have been trained in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976. The crane operators training includes specific instructions concerning the handling of loads within the defined safe load pathways inside containment. The requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-3 have been incorporated into the crane operator training, qualification, and conduct procedures.
9.1.7.3.2        Special Lifting Devices There are three special lifting devices which carry heavy loads: reactor vessel head lifting device, core upper internals lifting device, and the spent-fuel cask lifting device. For Unit 2, a design review was performed which determined that both the reactor vessel head and core upper internals lifting devices were designed with safety factors of 5 for lifting loads under dynamic conditions. This factor provides confidence that the heavy load will not be dropped on the core. For Unit 1, the reactor vessel head lifting device was also designed with a safety factor of 5 for lifting loads under dynamic conditions. This factor provides confidence that the heavy load will not be dropped on the core. The replacement reactor internals lifting device for Unit 1 is designed to the allowable stress limits of ANSI N14.6 for non-single failure proof conditions (6*S<yield, 10*S<ultimate) for the upper internals lift. For the lower internals lift for Unit 1, the allowable stress limits of ANSI N14.6 without non-single failure proof penalty (3*S<yield, 5*S<ultimate) are met. The spent-fuel cask lift yoke is a single-load path special device designed in accordance with ANSI N14.6 and NUREG-0612, and is rated for a maximum load of 125 tons (the spent-fuel cask crane is discussed in FSAR subsection 9.1.6 and paragraphs 9.1.4.2.2.5, 9.1.7.4.3, and 9.1.7.4.4).
Following design and fabrication, a 125% load test was performed for each of the Unit 2 reactor vessel head and internals lifting devices. The devices were then visually inspected and found free of faults or distortion, and critical weld areas were nondestructively examined with satisfactory results. The Unit 1 reactor vessel head lifting device has been load tested to 113%
of rated load. Load testing of the assembled Unit 1 internals lifting device was conducted in the factory before shipment. The Unit 1 internals lifting device was load tested to 150% of the dry weight required for the upper internals lifting arrangement and 125% of the dry weight required for the lower internals lifting arrangement. Proof of workmanship for Unit 1 devices is also provided based on welding which was performed in accordance with ASME Section XI, followed by appropriate nondestructive examination (NDE), dimensional tolerances, materials and heat treatment records, and radiography and ultrasonic test results which were also reviewed and verified to be in accordance with design specifications.
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FNP-FSAR-9 To establish continuing reliability of these devices, a program in which critical load bearing welds of these devices are nondestructively examined on a systematic basis are consistent with the Inservice Inspection Program (i.e., all welds examined over a 10-year period).
The cask lifting device will meet the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 as clarified by NUREG-0612.
9.1.7.3.3        Lifting Devices (Not Specifically Designed)
The slings used for rigging loads at FNP are based on the criteria established by NUREG-0612 and ANSI B30.9-1971 with the clarification that the dynamic loadings associated with the acceleration and deceleration of the load (based on maximum hoisting speeds) are a small fraction of the static load and that revising the selection criteria stated in ANSI B30.9-1971 to accommodate them would not have a substantial effect on the load handling reliability. The slings will be marked in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971 requirements. Load handling procedures will specify the slings and other devices used with the slings to make a complete lifting device that is required for handling the load.
9.1.7.3.4        Slings The slings used for rigging loads at FNP are installed and used per ANSI B30.9-1971. The ANSI standard was developed for lifting loads under dynamic conditions. Load limits for slings under ANSI B30.9-1971 are mass handling limits, not dead weight stress limits. The dynamic component is included in the standard through the application of significant safety factors. It is, therefore, inappropriate to apply additional dynamic stress criteria in the sling selection progress. The slings are developed for the load, not for a specific crane; therefore, the markings on slings contain load limits rather than a designation of the specific cranes for which they are used.
The hook speed for the load hook of the polar crane is 5 ft/min maximum. The cask crane's maximum load hook speed is 8 ft/min. These speeds are very slow and will not impart major dynamic loads on the rigging. The cask crane, which is a single-leg gantry running on one ground level track and one track on the auxiliary building roof, is not used to handle heavy loads over the spent-fuel area. The maximum hook speed for the spent-fuel bridge crane, which services the spent-fuel area, is 7 ft/min. This also constitutes a very slow hook speed.
Specific consideration of dynamic effects of loads is included in the slings design safety factors and further consideration is not necessary. It is noted, however, that actual dynamic conditions experienced by these slings are not expected to be a consequence due to the relatively slow speeds of the cranes of concern. Therefore, no slings are marked for use on specific cranes.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.1.7.3.5      Design, Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Cranes Crane design, inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements have been revised to incorporate the requirements of Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, except for certain test frequencies which cannot be met due to inaccessibility as noted in NUREG-0612.
9.1.7.4        Load Drop Analysis For reactor vessel head lifts and spent-fuel cask lifts over the spent-fuel pool, a load drop analysis is provided that bounds the planned lifts with respect to load weight, load height, and medium present under the load, and is implemented into procedures for moving the load that reflect the applicable safety basis.
The following are the cranes at FNP which handle heavy loads in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment and are, therefore, subject to NUREG-0612 criteria:
* Containment polar crane (bridge and jib).
* Demineralizer hatch monorail hoist.
* Spent-fuel pool bridge crane.
* Spent-fuel cask crane.
The following cranes were excluded from satisfying the guidelines of NUREG-0612 because no safety-related equipment is located at any elevation beneath the cranes:
* Drumming station bridge crane.
* Auxiliary building equipment hatch monorail hoist.
* Decontamination room monorail hoist.
* Liquid Radwaste Processing Facility bridge crane The following cranes were excluded from satisfying the guidelines of NUREG-0612 because these hoists are used solely for maintenance performed on the nonstandby diesel. In addition, the diesels are physically separated by concrete walls, precluding a load drop on an adjacent diesel generator:
* Diesel generator building hoists.
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FNP-FSAR-9 The following cranes were excluded from satisfying the guidelines of NUREG-0612 on the basis that load drops from these cranes onto the river water or service water structures or the outside buried service water piping would not preclude safe shutdown due to system redundancy:
* External portable maintenance cranes.
The following cranes were excluded from satisfying the guidelines of NUREG-0612 because sufficient physical separation exists between load impact points and safety-related components so that a load drop would be of no consequence to safe shutdown:
* New fuel monorail hoist.
* New fuel bridge crane.
* Tendon surveillance area hoists.
* Hot machine shop bridge crane.
* Filter hatch monorail hoist.
* Various maintenance monorail hoists.
9.1.7.4.1        Containment Polar Crane and Jib Cranes The Unit 1 and 2 polar crane and jib cranes are the only cranes capable of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel or the rod cluster control (RCC) change fixture. The jib cranes have been administratively prevented from lifting heavy loads over the reactor vessel while the vessel head is removed. The polar crane is administratively prevented from lifting heavy loads over the reactor vessel except during removal or installation of the vessel head or upper internals. Since these cranes cannot lift heavy loads when the vessel head is removed with fuel in the reactor vessel, a signalman is not needed for these cranes. The provision for a signalman in accordance with the NRC guidance obviates the need for marking safe load paths on the floor.
This approach is consistent with the guidelines provided by the NRC.
The prevention of heavy load drop onto the RCC change fixture is accomplished by administrative controls. The upper internals and the reactor vessel head will have been placed in the storage area before the fixture is put in use. The RCP motor and upper internals will be prevented from traveling over the RCC changing fixture during refueling since the fixture is an exclusion area and, as such, is not part of the safe load path for the polar crane.
In the event a new fuel assembly in the RCC changing fixture is crushed, Keff will remain < 0.95 since the refueling canal will be filled with 2000-ppm borated water during refueling. For FNP, it has been determined that for a new core in 2000-ppm borated water with control rods fully inserted, the Keff is  0.9. Per NUREG-0612 section 4.2.2, the maximum reactivity insertion due to crushing is 0.05. Therefore, the maximum achievable Keff would be < 0.95.
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FNP-FSAR-9 The reactor vessel is also protected by administrative controls. When the reactor vessel missile shield/head is in place, the vessel is protected from potential heavy loads (reactor coolant pump (RCP) motor or crane load block) by the shield. The reactor vessel head and internals will only be removed from the reactor vessel during refueling. Prior to removal of the internals, however, the reactor vessel missile shield/head must be removed and placed in the laydown area.
When the main hoist load block is traveling over the exposed core, administrative controls prohibit the hoist from functioning; except during removal or installation of the vessel head or upper internals. This essentially eliminates the risk of the load block dropping onto the core.
In the containment building only the polar crane can carry heavy loads over safety-related equipment. The safety-related equipment in the containment which could be impacted by a heavy load drop is the pressurizer, steam generators, and the RCP. During modes 5 and 6, the pressurizer and steam generators are not required to maintain a safe shutdown condition.
Therefore, no heavy load drops onto the pressurizer or steam generators during modes 5 and 6 have been considered. However, the RCP motor could be dropped onto the RCP while performing maintenance.
An analysis was performed for handling of heavy loads in containment. This analysis demonstrated that the moving of reactor head, reactor upper internals, reactor vessel missile shield (removed with the reactor head in 2003), RCPs, RCP motor, reactor vessel missile shield, RCP hatch covers, and polar crane load block within the established safe load paths was acceptable and would neither impact any safety function of safety-related equipment and components nor the structural integrity of affected structures. It has also been verified that the buckling load on affected fuel assemblies would not exceed design limits and that there will be no consequential damage to the structural integrity of the reactor vessel, reactor vessel nozzles, or RCS loop piping. Therefore, core cooling capability and the integrity of the fuel cladding will be maintained. Thus, the inadvertent drop of the reactor vessel head assembly at FNP would have no impact on the health or safety of the public.
In 2003, the reactor head was replaced on each unit with a new head package that included the missile shield. This increased the weight of the head, and the analysis was revised to show that the effects of dropping the heavier reactor head in the area defined as a safe load path were acceptable.
In 2008, a reactor vessel head drop evaluation was performed for Farley Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Nuclear Energy guidelines of NEI 08-05, Industry Initiative on Control of Heavy Loads. The reactor vessel head drop analysis was performed using the methodology and assumptions of WCAP-9198, Revision 1, Reactor Vessel Head Drop Analyses. The conservative analysis assumed a drop height of 40 ft through air with a reactor head assembly weight of 270,000 lb. This evaluation was performed for the purpose of increasing the conservatism relative to the effect of the impact loads on the reactor vessel nozzles. The analysis concluded that the Farley Units 1 and 2 reactor vessel and reactor vessel nozzles are acceptable for the postulated 40-ft closure head assembly drop in air. The fuel assemblies will retain their structural integrity. In addition, a global assessment of the loop piping and the RV support structures below the nozzles confirmed that the structures are not susceptible to collapse or catastrophic failure and will retain the ability to cool the core.
9.1-54                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 An analysis was performed for the polar crane lifting the 9000-lb polar crane load block over the pressurizer and steam generators. A missile grating covers the pressurizer cavity to protect other equipment from possible pressurizer missiles. It has been shown by analysis that the missile shield will also withstand a free-fall drop of the polar crane load block. Therefore, the pressurizer is protected from a polar crane main hoist load block drop during modes 1 through 4. A polar crane load block drop on one steam generator would not prevent the plant from coming to a safe shutdown condition since the system could still perform the safety function.
An analysis was performed for a polar crane main hoist load block drop onto the operating deck with the following assumptions and results:
: 1. Weight of block and hook is 9,000 lb.
: 2. Drop onto concrete is acceptable from up to 60 ft.
: 3. Drop onto grating may not be acceptable from 60 ft. Grating may be perforated but slab below is acceptable. Grating would be acceptable from 10ft 9.75 in.
An analysis was performed for the polar crane lifting the 77,300-lb RCP motors over the RCPs.
It has been determined that a drop of the RCP motor block onto the RCP will compromise the integrity of the RCS loop pressure boundary.
During refueling operations a postulated heavy load drop over the open reactor coolant pump (RCP) hatches would compromise RCS integrity. In MODES 5 and 6, with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, this would result in a LOCA. While the containment and core responses to this LOCA would be bounded by the analyses in subsections 6.2.1, 15.3.1, and 15.4.1, recovery and repairs would be greatly complicated by the presence of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel. In MODE 6 this LOCA could uncover in-transit fuel in the refueling cavity or in the spent fuel pool (SFP) via the open transfer tube and SFP weir gate.
To preclude this occurrence, the following restrictions shall be placed on crane operations above the open RCP hatches in MODES 5 and 6 when there is irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel AND in MODE 6 while irradiated fuel is being moved inside containment or in the spent fuel pool with the transfer tube isolation valve and SFP weir gate open:
* If traversing the unloaded polar crane main hoist load block over an open RCP hatch, administrative controls shall be in place to prevent the hoist from functioning.
* Temporary maintenance hoist operations shall be permissible, subject to administrative controls that will prevent RCS, CVCS, or RHR piping damage resulting from a load drop.
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FNP-FSAR-9 An analysis was performed for heavy load drops on the containment operating deck. The following assumptions were used in this calculation:
A. RCP motor drop onto the containment operating deck.
: 1. Weight of motor used was 80,000 lb.
: 2. Drop heights used were 5 ft onto the operating deck concrete, 38 ft into the transfer canal, and 60 ft onto the base slab (if dropped over grating, the motor would penetrate and go to the base slab).
: 3. These drops were determined to be acceptable B. Reactor head drop onto the operating deck.
: 1. Weight of the reactor head is 265,000 lb (HAUP).
: 2. Safe load path is from reactor to head stand.
: 3. Drop height considered was 103 in. from el 155 ft or 72.5 in. from the top of the head stand.
: 4. Results of a drop from this height are structurally acceptable.
C. Upper internals.
: 1. Upper internals weight is 140,000 lb.
: 2. Drop height of 3 ft 6 in. is assumed onto the operating deck.
: 3. Drop height of 26 ft 0 in. (additional) is assumed into the reactor cavity.
: 4. Cavity is assumed filled with water.
: 5. Drop is acceptable but will perforate cavity liner.
D. Reactor missile shield.
: 1. Missile shield is now part of the reactor head package.
E. Summary.
: 1. Load paths provided have been evaluated.
: 2. None of the objects will perforate the operating deck, although cracking and deflection may occur.
: 3. Any items dropped into the reactor cavity or transfer canal will perforate the liner but none will perforate the slab.
: 4. If the RCP motor is dropped onto the grating, the grating may not stop the object; however, the object will not perforate the slab below the grating.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.1.7.4.2        Auxiliary Building An analysis was completed for heavy load drops inside the auxiliary building onto the floor slabs. Section 2.0 describes the cranes subject to the NUREG-0612 criteria; therefore, some of the cranes listed in the analysis are not considered in the scope of NUREG-0612. The following assumptions are used in the calculation:
* Areas serviced by the following cranes/hoists are reviewed and evaluated.
                -  New fuel bridge crane.
                -  Drumming station bridge crane.
                -  Auxiliary building equipment hatch bridge crane.
                -  Decon room monorail hoist.
                -  Hot machine shop bridge crane.
                -  Demineralizer hatch monorail hoist.
                -  Filter hatch monorail hoist.
                -  Liquid Radwaste Processing Facility bridge crane.
* All areas were reviewed for maximum drop height.
* Maximum drop heights for various loads are as follows:
                -  20,000 lb          2 ft 1 in.
                -  16,000 lb          2 ft 8 in.
                -  12,000 lb          3 ft 10 in.
                -  8,000 lb            6 ft 5 in.
                -  4,000 lb            21 ft 2 in.
* All drop heights prevent penetration through the floor.
For the auxiliary building, the demineralizer hatch monorail hoist could drop the demineralizer hatch onto portions of the boric acid transfer system. This is the only crane/load combination in the auxiliary building which could impact safety-related equipment.
An analysis was performed for the demineralizer hatch monorail hoist lifting the 18,250-lb demineralizer hatch over the boric acid transfer pump. Dropping the demineralizer hatch onto 9.1-57                            REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 the boric acid transfer pump and its associated piping could at most disable one train of the system, thereby leaving one train to perform the required safety function.
The Liquid Radwaste Processing Facility (LRWPF) 5-ton bridge crane and the Auxiliary Building equipment hatch 10-ton monorail hoist (within the square floor hatch area, only) service the LRWPF. The facility is located on El. 130'-0" of the building. A load drop from either of these cranes could impact the El.130'-0" concrete floor slab. However, the El.130'-0" slab is on a compacted grade; hence, load drops would not penetrate. Therefore, the maximum load/drop heights, shown above, do not apply to lifts by the crane or hoist when using them to carry loads that could drop and impact the LRWPF slab. Other than the crane/hoist ratings, there are no height/load restrictions for the crane or hoist in that service.
9.1.7.4.3        Spent-Fuel Pool Bridge Crane The only heavy load handled by the spent-fuel pool bridge crane is the spent-fuel pool transfer slot gate, which weighs approximately 3600 lb. Administrative controls prevent the transfer slot gate from being carried over the fuel assemblies in the spent-fuel pool. At the beginning of fuel transfer operations, the transfer slot gate is moved from its normal position directly to its stored position, which is located immediately adjacent to its normal position. This procedure is reversed at the end of fuel transfer operations. However, the racks are designed to withstand a gate drop from 10 1/4 in. The drop height is limited by a physical limitation in lifting capability.
Additionally, administrative controls prevent handling equipment capable of carrying loads with a higher impact energy from transporting these loads over the fuel storage area.
9.1.7.4.4        Spent-Fuel Cask Crane The cask crane is a single-leg gantry running on one ground level track and one track on the auxiliary building roof. The cask crane is not used to handle heavy loads over the spent fuel.
The lifting device for a cask is special lifting device and meets the requirements of ANSI N14.6 as clarified by NUREG-0612. This provides assurance that a drop will not occur and, therefore, a drop analysis has not been performed.
To load a dry storage cask, the multipurpose canister (MPC) is placed in the cask loading pit next to the spent-fuel pool. During the process of loading the spent-fuel cask, after the fuel is in the MPC, the lid for the MPC is placed on the MPC using the cask crane. This is the only time that the spent-fuel cask crane can lift a heavy load over spent fuel. Movement of a heavy load over the MPC is acceptable based on the following:
* The single-failure proof spent-fuel cask crane being used in accordance with NUREG-0612.
* The special lift devices being designed in accordance with ANSI N14.6-1978.
* Slings meeting the requirements of ANSI B30.9-1971.
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FNP-FSAR-9 For general loads which the spent-fuel cask crane may move, an analysis was performed. A safety evaluation was performed to determine the consequences of a dropped load when using the spent-fuel cask crane main hoist without a single-failure proof lifting device (i.e., using slings) or the auxiliary hoist in order to ensure compliance with NUREG-0612. Curves of object weight verses drop height (figures 9.1-18 and 9.1-19) were developed and safe load path exclusion areas were identified for the auxiliary building roof. No heavy loads should be transferred over hatch C of the auxiliary building roof (figure 9.1-20).
* Roof hatch A is at column lines U to R and 11 to 14.
* Roof hatch B is at column lines N to R and 7 to 9.5.
* Roof hatch C is at column line P to U and 5 to 6.
A cask drop or tip into the spent-fuel pool is also prevented by permanently installed rail stops and mechanical bumpers which prohibit cask crane travel over or into the vicinity of the spent-fuel pool.
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FNP-FSAR-9 REFERENCES
: 1.  (Deleted)
: 2. Letter from B. L. Siegel (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to D. N. Morey (Southern Nuclear Operating Company), dated July 31, 1996, regarding exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24, Criticality Accident Requirements, for the Joseph M.
Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.
: 3. ANSI-N14.6, American National Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Material, February 15, 1978.
: 4. ANSI-B30.2, Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder),
January 1, 1976.
: 5. ANSI-B30.9, Safety Standards for Cranes, Derricks, Hoists, Hooks, Jacks, and Slings, January 1, 1971.
: 6. NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-36, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1980.
: 7. HI-2002444, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Holtec International Storage and Transfer Operation Reinforced Module Cask System (HI-STORM 100 Cask System), NRC Docket 72-1014.
: 8. NEI 08-05, Industry Initiative on Control of Heavy Loads, July 2008.
: 9. ASME NML-1-2019, Rules for the Movement of Loads Using Overhead Handling Equipment in Nuclear Facilities.
: 10. Wenner, M. T., J.M. Farley Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Safety Analysis, WCAP-18414, September 2019.
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FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.1-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
SPENT-FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS Spent-fuel pool storage capacity Number of cores                                              8.96 Number of assemblies                                        1407 Nominal boron concentration of the                            2300 spent-fuel pool water (ppm)
Cooling characteristics Partial-core offload refueling case                          50% of core plus 8.90 previous cores Time after reactor shutdown                              150 to start core offload (h)
Number of cooling trains operable                        1 Heat exchanger tube plugging level (%)                  10 Decay heat production (Btu/h)                            22.1 x 106 Spent-fuel pool water temperature                        150 with one cooling train in operation
(&deg;F)
Beginning of Cycle (BOC) Emergency full-core                100% of offload case                                                core plus 8.40 previous cores Time after reactor shutdown                              150 to start core offload (h)
Number of cooling trains operable                        1 Heat exchanger tube plugging level (%)                  10 Decay heat production (Btu/h)                            37.0 x 106 REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.1-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Spent-fuel pool water temperature                        180 with one cooling train in operation
(&deg;F)
End of cycle (EOC) full-core offload case                    100% of core plus 8.40 previous cores                                                      cores Time after reactor shutdown                              150 to start core offload (h)
Decay heat production (Btu/h)                            36.5 x 106 Spent-fuel pool water temperatures with                  180 one cooling train in operation (&deg;F)
Best Estimate full-core offload case                        100% of core plus 8.40 previous cores Time after reactor shutdown                            150 to start core offload (h)
Decay heat production (Btu/h)                          30.3 x 106 Spent-fuel pool water temperature                        180(a) with one cooling train in operation (&deg;F)
: a. Bounded by the emergency full-core offload case.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.1-2 (SHEET 1 OF 3)
SPENT-FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP SYSTEM DESIGN AND OPERATING PARAMETERS Spent-fuel pool pump Number                                                2 Design pressure (psig)                                150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                                200 Design flow (gal/min)                                  2300 Total developed head (ft)                              125 Material                                              Stainless steel Spent-fuel skimmer pump Number                                                1 Design pressure (psig)                                50 Design temperature (&deg;F)                                200 Design flow (gal/min)                                  100 Total developed head (ft)                              50 Material                                              Stainless steel Refueling water purification pump Number                                                1 Design pressure (psig)                                200 Design temperature (&deg;F)                                200 Design flow (gal/min)                                  110 Total developed head (ft)                              250 Material                                              Stainless steel REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.1-2 (SHEET 2 OF 3)
Spent-fuel heat exchanger Number                                    2 Design heat transfer (Btu/h)              9.12 x 106(a)
Shell                          Tube Design pressure (psig)                    150                            150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                    200                            200 Design flow (lb/h)                        1.49 x 106                    1.14 x 106 Inlet temperature (&deg;F)                    105                            120 Outlet temperature (&deg;F)                    111.1                          112 Fluid circulated                          Component                      Spent fuel cooling                        pool water water Material                                  Carbon steel                  Stainless steel Spent-fuel pool demineralizer Number                                    1 Design pressure (psig)                    150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                    200 Design flow (gal/min)
Unit 1                              109 max (27 min)
Unit 2                              120 max (27 min)
Resin volume (ft3)                        30 Material                                  Austenitic stainless steel Spent-fuel pool filter Number                                    1 Design pressure (psig)                    150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                    200 Design flow (gal/min)                      150 Filtration requirement                    Greater than or equal to 98-percent retention of particles above 5  when the Cuno filter is used and Greater than or equal to 98-percent retention of particles above 6  when using the ultipor GF Plus filter Material for vessel                          Austenitic stainless steel REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.1-2 (SHEET 3 OF 3)
Spent-fuel pool skimmer filter Number                                              1 Design pressure (psig)                              250 Design temperature (&deg;F)                            200 Design flow (gal/min)                              150 Filtration requirement                              98-percent retention of particles above 5 when the Cuno filter is used and 98-percent retention of particles above 6 when using the ultipor GF Plus filter Material for vessel                                Austenitic stainless steel Spent-fuel pool strainer Number                                              2 Rated flow (gal/min)                                2300 Perforation (in.)                                  1/8 Material                                            Austenitic stainless steel Spent-fuel pool skimmers Number                                              2 Design flow (gal/min)                              50 Piping and valves Design pressure (psig)                              150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                            200 Material                                            Stainless steel Portable/submersible filter (Unit 1 and Unit 2)
Number                                              1 Rated flow (gal/min)                                1000 Material                                            Stainless steel & PVC hose
: a. Design value. Operational values are given in table 9.2-7.
REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.1-3 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
SPENT-FUEL CASK CRANE DATA Bridge Runway length of Units 1 and 2 (ft)                      280 Bridge weight (lb)                                      330,000 Bridge span (ft-in.)                                    91-0 Bridge motor                                            2 at 10 hp Number of wheels                                        8 (30-in.)
Maximum speed (ft/min)                                  30 Minimum incremental distance (in.)                      0.10 Type of controls                                        Rev. plugging Type of brake                                            1 (8-in. ac)
Type of bumper                                          Spring Trolley Length of trolley travel (ft)                            76 Trolley weight (lb)                                      140,000 Trolley gauge (ft-in.)                                  19-6 Trolley drive motor                                      5 hp Number of wheels                                        4 (24-in.)
Maximum speed (ft/min)                                  25 Inching speed (in./min)                                  10 Type of controls                                        Rev. plugging Type of brake                                            1 (6-in. ac)
Type of bumper                                          Spring REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.1-3 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Hoists Main        Auxiliary Lifting capacity (tons)                                125        15 Drum diameter (in.)                                    49.25      17 Rope type                                              6 x 37      6 x 37 IWRC        IWRC Rope size diameter (in.)                                1 1/8      1/2 Sheave diameter or pitch circle                        27,30,33    12 diameter (in.)
Hook material                                          ASTM-235    AISI-4130 Hook test load (tons)                                  250        30 Maximum hook travel (ft-in.)                            96-6        102-0 Maximum hoist speed (ft/min)                            8          30 Line speed (ft/min)                                    64          -
Inching speed (in./min)                                6          -
Minimum incremental distance                            0.03        0.1 (in.)
Number parts rope                                      16          8 Block clearance in highest position                    7-6        11-5 (ft-in.)
Type load brake                                        Eddy        Eddy current    current Type holding brake                                      2 (16-in.)  2 (13-in.)
Type controls                                          Magnetic    Magnetic REV 21 5/08
 
REV 21 5/08 JOSEPH M. FARLEY              NEW FUEL STORAGE RACKS NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-1
 
REV 21 5/08 JOSEPH M. FARLEY              SPENT FUEL RACK MODULE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-2 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
 
REV 21 5/08 JOSEPH M. FARLEY              SPENT FUEL RACK MODULE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-2 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
 
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT              RETURN LINE PIPING ARRANGEMENT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-3
 
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT              RETURN LINE PIPING ARRANGEMENT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-4
 
REV 21 5/08 JOSEPH M. FARLEY              MANIPULATOR CRANE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-5
 
REV 21 5/08 JOSEPH M. FARLEY              SPENT FUEL POOL BRIDGE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-6
 
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                  FRONT ELEVATION UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-7
 
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                    END ELEVATION UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-8
 
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                  TROLLEY PLAN VIEW UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-9
 
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE TROLLEY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                      END ELEVATION UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-10
 
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE MAIN HOIST JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT              16-PART, 2-ROPE REEVING SKETCH UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-11
 
REV 21 5/08 ROD CLUSTER CONTROL JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                  CHANGING FIXTURE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-12
 
REV 21 5/08 REACTOR VESSEL HEAD JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                  LIFTING DEVICE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-13
 
REV 21 5/08 REACTOR INTERNALS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                  LIFTING DEVICE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-14
 
REV 21 5/08 JOSEPH M. FARLEY              TYPICAL STUD TENSIONER NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-15
 
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL CASK JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                HANDLING PROCEDURE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-16
 
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                    FLEET ANGLES UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-17
 
FOR HATCH A ONLY NOTE: HATCH A is documented in drawing D-176007 for Unit 1 and D-206007 for Unit 2.
REV 22 8/09 HEAVY LOAD RESTRICTIONS FOR AUXILIARY HOOK -
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT          AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOF, HATCH A ONLY UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-18
* For irregularly shaped objects, use equivalent diameter for a circle with the same contact or circumscribed contact area.
NOTE:      HATCH B is documented in drawing D-176007 for Unit 1 and D-206007 for Unit 2.
REV 22 8/09 HEAVY LOAD RESTRICTIONS FOR AUXILIARY HOOK -
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT        AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOF AREA AND HATCH B UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-19
 
NOTE: HATCH C is documented in drawing D-176007 for Unit 1 and D-206007 for Unit 2.
REV 22 8/09 HEAVY LOAD RESTRICTIONS FOR AUXILIARY HOOK -
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT              AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOF HATCH C UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-20
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.2      WATER SYSTEMS 9.2.1    STATION COOLING WATER SYSTEMS (RIVER WATER, SERVICE WATER, AND CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEMS) 9.2.1.1          Design Bases The station cooling water systems provide cooling water for plant components during both normal and accident conditions. Component data for the river water and service water systems are listed in table 9.2-1.
The service water system is capable of delivering cooling water during all modes of plant operation to all equipment required to function under accident conditions. Safety-related portions of the system are designed to the following criteria:
A.      Seismic Category I.
B.      Safety Class 3.
C.      Meets single-failure criteria.
D.      Operable during:
: 1.      A loss of offsite power (LOSP) on one unit or both units.
: 2.      Loss of river water system with or without offsite power.
: 3.      A loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) in one unit while the other unit is in normal operating mode or normal shutdown mode with or without offsite power.
: 4.      A safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) affecting the Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) site with or without offsite power.
: 5.      A fire in a single fire area of one unit while the other unit is in normal operating mode or normal shutdown mode with or without offsite power.
These accident conditions are discussed in further detail in FSAR paragraph 9.2.1.3.
E.      No loss of function during adverse environmental conditions.
Table 9.2-2 delineates the number of river and service water pumps required per unit to provide adequate cooling for different plant conditions.
The service water system is designed to supply the flowrates listed in table 9.2-3.
9.2-1                                      REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 Additionally, the service water system is designed to minimize leakage of radioactive material to the environment by maintaining system pressure above that of the medium being cooled where possible. Some system fluctuations and lineups may result in either component cooling water (CCW) or service water having the higher pressure of the two systems. The CCW system is typically operated at a higher pressure than the associated service water system. In the event of leakage from the CCW system to the service water system, the CCW surge tank will decrease in level. Control room alarms will alert the operators to this condition. Operator action will then be required to secure the leakage path.
9.2.1.2        System Description The station cooling water systems for the FNP include a river water system which is shared by both units. The cooling system also includes a separate service water system for each unit and a circulating water system for each unit.
The river water system pumps water from the Chattahoochee River to the storage pond.
Though the river water system has no safety-related functions, the pumps and many of the valves (as indicated on drawing D-170119, sheets 6 and 7) were originally designed to nuclear quality standards. Some designated instrumentation for the river water system, physically located in the service water intake structure, performs safety-related functions for the service water system as indicated on drawing D-170119, sheet 7. The service water system pumps water from the storage pond to various heat exchangers throughout the plant. A listing of service water design flowrates is provided in table 9.2-3. Safety-related portions of the service water system are indicated on drawings D-170119, sheets 1, 2, and 3 and D-175003, sheets 1, 2, 3, and 4. The overall relationship of the river and service water systems to plant arrangement is shown in figure 9.2-1. The circulating water system provides cooling water to the main turbine condensers and has no safety-related functions. The circulating water system is shown on drawings D-170119, sheets 9 and 10 and D-200013, sheet 6.
The river water intake structure is designed to prevent flooding from sources outside the building up to el 127 ft mean sea level (msl). Sump pumps are provided inside the structure to discharge the normally expected water accumulation from the various sources inside the building. However, the sump pumps are not large enough to handle the water volume that would result from a major line break of the river water system. To assure maximum availability of the river water system, the pump rooms (train A and train B) are separated by a watertight wall. Flooding on either side of the wall will be detected and alarmed by level switches.
The functions of the river water system, the service water system, and the circulating water system during various modes of operation are described in the following section.
9.2-2                                    REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.2.1.2.1        Normal Power Operation During normal operation, the river water system takes suction from the Chattahoochee River by means of river water pumps which discharge into a 60-in. header. The river water pump discharge header is divided into two separate trains by means of redundant isolation valves QSP25V511 and QSP25V512. The river water is then carried to a valve box located near the service water intake structure at the pond via two 60-in. pipes. From the valve box, the river water exits via two 54-in. lines which then combine into one 54-in. line which passes along the top of the pond dike and discharges into the storage pond through a discharge flume. The river water system is provided with ten river water pumps, five on each train.
Each pump is provided with a five-position control switch with reset, off, auto, run, and close positions. The reset and close positions are momentary positions which spring return to the off and run positions, respectively. During normal power operation the pumps will operate as follows:
A.      Switch turned to reset or off position, pump will turn off.
B.      Switch turned to auto position, pump will turn on and off responding to the water level fluctuations in the pond.
C.      Switch turned to close or run position, pump should run. If the pump does not start, an alarm will result while the switch is in the run position or after the switch spring returns to run from the close position.
During normal operation the pond water level is controlled approximately between el 185 ft 6 in.
and el 185 ft. With two units on line, it is expected that six to eight river water pumps will be required to maintain the pond water level. Typically, one or more river water pump(s) on each train will be placed in the auto position. When the water level in the pond drops down to el 185 ft, level switches QSP25LS510 and QSP25LS511 located in the wet pit will automatically turn on the river water pumps in auto position. When the pond level reaches el 184 ft 4 in., an alarm will be annunciated, alerting the control room operator. When the water level in the pond reaches el 185 ft 6 in., the same switches will turn off the river water pumps in the auto position.
In the event that these level switches fail to operate, the level transmitters NSP25LT501 and NSP25LT502 located in the wet pit will give a service water structure alarm in the control room at el 185 ft 9 in., at which time the operator will take the appropriate action to shut off the necessary number of river water pumps. These level transmitters also feed into the control room pond level indicators.
The service water system takes suction from the service water intake structure located at the storage pond. Stop logs are provided in the service water intake structure which will prevent the water in the wet pit from dropping below el 180 ft. Five service water pumps are provided for each unit. The service water system is a nonshared system between the two units except for:
the intake structure, the shared diesel generators, the recirculation line to the pond, the divert line to the wet pit, and the discharge piping and structure to the river. Therefore, the following discussion which is written for Unit 1 is the same for Unit 2. During normal operation, four service water pumps are required to maintain the plant service water requirements. These service water pumps discharge into a 42-in. header which is divided into 2 trains by means of valves Q1P16V506 and Q1P16V507, pumps 1A and 1B for one train, and pumps 1D and 1E for 9.2-3                                      REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 the other train. Pump 1C can be aligned to either train by means of the above valves. These valves are procedurally controlled so that when one is open the other must be closed, thereby maintaining the train separation. After the header, each train of the service water, supplied via 42-in. lines, proceeds to the service water strainers. The strainers are periodically manually backwashed so that the backwash flows to a sump and is then drained back to the pond. A differential pressure switch across the strainer inlet and outlet alarms in the control room upon an increase in differential pressure. A 36-in. bypass line is also provided around the strainers.
After the strainers, the service water from the intake structure proceeds via 42-in. lines to a valve box. Prior to entering the valve box, a 12-in. line branches off from each train to the diesel generator building. After entering the valve box, the following lines branch off from each train: (1) a 24-in. dilution bypass line, (2) a 24-in. supply line to the turbine building, (3) a 30-in.
supply line to the auxiliary building, and (4) a 2-in. supply line to the air compressors located within the turbine building.
The lines going to the diesel generator building supply the cooling water requirements of the diesel generators. This is shown in drawings D-170119, sheet 3 and D-200013, sheet 3. A description of this portion of the service water system is given in subsection 9.5.5.
The dilution bypass line provides the bypass capability to prevent the overpressurization of the service water system.
The Train A and Train B lines to the turbine building combine into a 24-in. supply line just outside the valve box. Service water is supplied to the turbine oil coolers, the steam generator feed pump turbine oil coolers, the turbine building HVAC condensers, the hydrogen coolers, the plant instrument air compressors, the exciter coolers, the seal oil coolers, the generator bus cooling units, the EH fluid reservoir coolers, the condensate pumps, the heater drain pumps, the water analysis room HVAC condenser, and the water analysis room chiller. This portion of the service water system is nonsafety-related and is separated from the safety-related portion by means of redundant isolation valves on both the Train A and Train B supply lines. In the safety-related portion of each train, prior to combining into one 24-in. header, excess flow instrumentation (differential pressure switches Q1P16DPS565, DPS566, DPS568, and DPS569) is provided. This instrumentation automatically isolates the cooling water supply to the turbine building (valves Q1P16V514, V515, V516, and V517) should the flow exceed approximately 17,500 gal/min from either of the trains. These valves also automatically isolate upon receipt of a Phase A SI signal. Additionally, these valves throttle the supply flow to the turbine building during a LOSP event. This throttling function serves to provide a limited amount of cooling water to the turbine building during a LOSP event to support a controlled shutdown/cooldown of the secondary side, while at the same time ensuring maximum cooling water flow is available for the emergency diesel generators. A 2-in. line from each train upstream of these valves supplies cooling water to the air compressors when the turbine building is isolated.
9.2-4                                      REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The service water system inside the containment and the auxiliary building is shown on drawing D-175003, sheets 1 through 4. Each train supplies cooling water to at least one CCW system heat exchanger, two containment air coolers, one 600-V load center cooler, one battery charging room cooler, one motor control center room cooler, one residual heat removal pump room cooler, one containment spray pump room cooler, one auxiliary feedwater pump room cooler and high-head SI pump room cooler, and one CCW system pump room cooler. Service water is also supplied to the following nonsafety-related equipment: steam generator blowdown heat exchanger, BTRS chillers, and reactor coolant pump motor air coolers.
Service water discharging from the auxiliary building, the turbine building, the diesel generator building, and the dilution bypass line junctions in another valve box. Exiting from this valve box are the redundant 30-in. discharge headers supplying water to the circulating water canal and service water return to the river. Each line is equipped with an isolation valve (Q1P16V545 and 546). Service water is supplied to the circulating water makeup system via a 30-in. line. This line is equipped with an isolation valve (Q1P16V550) and a circulating water makeup control valve (Q1P16V560). The control valve is an automatic air-operated control valve, controlled by the level controller located in the circulating water pump structure wet pit. The service water return line to the river is a 36-in. line. It is equipped with an isolation valve (Q1P16V549) and a standpipe discharging into a surge tank. The standpipe maintains a backpressure on the service water return lines from the auxiliary building, containment, and turbine building. During normal operation the standpipe provides the necessary backpressure on the systems being serviced. The surge tank provides the volumetric capacity to allow for flow transients.
Upstream of the standpipe/surge tank, cooling tower blowdown joins this stream and the line continues to the standpipe/surge tank across a flow measuring device. The flow proceeds from the surge tank through the 36-in. diameter pipe and joins with the Unit 2 service water system.
The combined Unit 1 and Unit 2 discharge flow proceeds from this junction through the 60-in.
diameter pipe to the discharge structure at the river.
The circulating water system takes suction from the circulating water pump structure wet pit via two circulating water pumps, each rated at about 327,000 gal/min. Fixed screens are provided at this pump intake structure to prevent possible debris from entering the pumps. Circulating water enters into the supply water passage which supplies cooling water to the turbine condensers. Cooling tower blowdown is branched from this supply passage with a flow controller and an air-operated control valve in order to control the solids buildup in the cooling tower basin and also to provide the river discharge from the cold side of the circulating water.
Circulating water from the condensers enters the cooling towers and returns to the circulating water pump structure wet pit via the return water canal. Motor-operated butterfly valves which can be operated locally are provided at the discharge of the circulating water pumps, at the inlets and outlets of each condenser, and at the cooling tower supply lines. A cooling tower bypass system is provided for cold weather operation.
9.2.1.2.2        Startup and Shutdown Operation and the flow path described above for normal operation is the same for the startup and shutdown operation. In this mode, the operator will manually adjust flows or shut off cooling paths to the various equipment as required by the normal operating procedures.
9.2-5                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.2.1.2.3        Emergency Modes of Operation The design features facilitating the normal operation of the plant are described above. The following describes the provisions that have been made in the design to ensure the safe shutdown of the plant in the event of a failure in the system.
9.2.1.2.3.1      Loss of River Water Intake Structure or River Water Pump Suction.
The station cooling water system is designed such that the safe shutdown of the plant is not dependent on the river as a cooling water source. The primary purpose of the river water system is to provide make up to the storage pond. The storage pond alone serves as the ultimate heat sink for the plant. However, the river water system is available as a cooling water source as long as offsite power is available for the river water pumps.
9.2.1.2.3.2      Loss of Storage Pond Dam.
The storage pond dam was designed and constructed and is maintained in compliance with applicable industry standards. Additionally, a detailed analysis was performed to demonstrate the reliability of the pond dam and the results of this analysis indicated the possibility of a dam failure is approximately 1.9 x 10-7 failures per year. Therefore, the loss of the storage pond dam is not considered to be a credible event and such an event is not postulated as part of the design basis of the station cooling water system.
9.2.1.2.3.3      Flood Protection.
The river water pumps are protected from flooding up to el 127 ft msl. At flood elevations above el 127 ft msl to maximum flood water level at el 144.2 ft msl, no provisions have been made to ensure river water pump operation. The service water pumps and pond are protected up to maximum flood level.
The service water pumps are operable at the maximum level the pond can maintain. The pond spillway is at el 186 ft, and the top of the pond dike is at el 195 ft. The probable maximum precipitation (PMP) flood of el 192 ft 2 1/2 in. will not flood the pump and equipment rooms, since the entrances are located above this elevation and the building is protected against flooding to el 195 ft 4 1/2 in. In addition, the pump and equipment rooms of the service water intake structure are drained by gravity to an area outside the PMP associated with the pond.
The river basin PMP flood is el 144 ft 2 in. The nonsealed structure openings communicating to the outside of the structure are located above the pond PMP flood elevation, except for the sump drain mentioned above. Therefore, the station cooling water system and the ultimate heat sink would not be affected by a flood.
9.2-6                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.2.1.2.3.4    Pump Minimum Submergence.
The minimum submergence given by the service water pump manufacturer is 5 ft, which corresponds to a minimum operating water level of 157 ft 6 in. msl. If the pond water level drops to el 184 ft, river water makeup is automatically directed to the service water pump wetpit. The wetpit has stoplogs to maintain the water level at el 180 ft. Therefore, in the highly unlikely event of a storage pond dam failure, the service water system could operate as long as the river water system remained available. Should the river water system become incapable of providing sufficient makeup to the service water pond, the service water system would be placed in the recirculation-to-pond mode of operation. If the pond level decreases due to loss of the river water system with the pond dam intact, the stoplogs must be removed to ensure that an adequate supply of water can enter the service water wetpit. For a discussion of the pond levels during recirculation mode of operation, refer to subsection 9.2.5. At all times the level in the wetpit sump would be greater than the minimum submergence.
The minimum submergence given by the river water pump manufacturer is 4 ft 6 in., which gives a minimum operating water level of 67 ft msl. With Jim Woodruff Dam in place, the minimum operating level normally maintained by the Corps of Engineers in the Chattahoochee River is el 76 ft msl. Therefore, the drought condition should not cause the water level to drop below the minimum submergence required for the pumps.
9.2.1.2.3.5    Storage Pond Protection.
The design of the service water system is such that during normal operating conditions service water is not returned to the storage pond, but is returned to the river in the Seismic Category II service water dilution line. Pond level is maintained by makeup from the river through the river water pumps and piping. Therefore, the service water system is normally a once-through system. When the river water system is not available as makeup to the pond, the pond level will drop and initiate an alarm. The service water system is then placed in the recirculation mode by operator action. This is accomplished by opening the train-oriented valves in the recirculation line to the pond and isolating the Seismic Category II dilution line from the remainder of the system via the train-oriented isolation valves.
9.2.1.2.4      Service Water Equipment Room Drainage The lowest elevation of the service water intake structure, excluding the wet pit area, is el 167 ft.
The gravity sump drain extends from immediately below this elevation to a point 937 ft east of the structure, which is downhill from the structure and pond dike. It emerges to grade elevation at el 143 ft. Since it in no way communicates with the water contained in the storage pond, the only flooding condition that could enter the discharge end of the pipe is that associated with the river basin maximum flood. This flood elevation is el 144 ft 2 in., which is well below the lowest elevation of the service water intake structure. Therefore, means to prevent backflooding such as check valves are not necessary. However, the discharge of the drain is equipped with a 24-in. flap valve to prevent the entry of rodents or reptiles.
9.2-7                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.2.1.2.5        Service Water Pumps Internally Generated Missiles The probability that a missile generated from the motor of one service water pump will damage another safety-related pump or other safety-related equipment is estimated to be < 4.5 x 10-9 per year. This extremely low value does not warrant additional design efforts to prevent damage. The design against missile damage has been adequately accomplished by the motor manufacturer. The most probable missile is a fan blade 6 in. x 4 in. x 1/8 in., which will not have sufficient energy to penetrate the 1/2-in., 2000-grade cast iron casing. A less probable missile is a 1/2-in. cap screw, 1 in. long, which also will not penetrate the casing. There are no physical barriers between redundant service water pumps for protection from internally generated missiles.
9.2.1.3          Safety Evaluation All safety-related portions of the station service water system, including the service water intake structure and pumps, are Seismic Category I and meet the single-failure criteria, as analyzed in the failure analysis in table 9.2-5.
All structures containing station safety-related service water components are watertight up to the maximum external flood level.
In the event of storage pond low water level, the river water system will be valved to discharge directly into the service water pump wet pit. Should the river system become unavailable, the service water system will be valved to recirculate the cooling water to the storage pond in order to maintain pond level.
A discussion of the long term capability of the system to dissipate waste heat is found in subsection 9.2.5.
Most safety-related piping located outdoors is covered by a minimum of 3 ft 10 in. of soil for missile protection. Redundant lines are physically separated so that the failure of one line will not affect the redundant line. Two locations of safety-related piping located outdoors are not covered by a minimum of 3ft 10 in. of soil. There is a small section of 24 in. line that recirculates service water to the wet pit that is above ground. There are small sections on the two 60 in.
lines that recirculate SW back to the pond that are above ground.
In the event of LOSP, the service water pumps will automatically be supplied power from the emergency diesel generators in order to supply the cooling water required to hold both units at hot shutdown conditions. Through operator action, the river water pumps can also be connected to the emergency diesel generators but no credit is assumed for their operation in the plant safety analysis.
The nonsafety-related portions of the service water system in the auxiliary building, containment, and turbine building, with the exception of the 2-in. lines supplying the air compressors on each unit, are automatically isolated on an SI signal by MOVs. Fire protection hose station service water valves inside containment are normally locked closed.
9.2-8                                    REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 Because the service water operates continuously during normal plant operation, its availability is apparent to plant operators. Radiation monitors located in the return lines from the containment air coolers alarm in the main control room. If not previously opened, bypass valves on the service water lines exiting the containment air coolers would automatically open on an SI signal and increase post-LOCA flow to these coolers. Regardless of the initial position of the bypass valves, the containment air coolers would receive an increase in post-LOCA flow due to the automatic isolation of the nonsafety-related portions of the service water system on an SI signal.
Allowance has been made in the selection of pipe wall thickness for corrosion effects. All underground service water and river water piping is protected by a coal tar enamel coating on the exterior. A cathodic protection system is also provided but not credited for aging management.
In addition to the component failure analysis presented in table 9.2-5, the following is the failure modes and effects analysis of the service water system under various emergency modes of operation.
Case 1: The following discussion is the evaluation of system operation during LOSP for both units. The primary impact on the system is due to the loss of the river water and instrument air systems.
The LOSP results in the diesel generators starting and loading. As the river water pumps are not automatically loaded onto the diesel generators, a LOSP will result in the loss of the river water system which provides makeup water to the service water pond. Per FSAR paragraph 9.2.5.3, the loss of the river water system will result in the service water system being placed in the recirculation-to-pond mode before the pond level reaches el 184 ft-0 in.
A loss of instrument air causes air-operated valves (AOVs) in the service water system to go to their failed position. Although some AOVs fail open on a LOSP, the service water miniflow valves (Q1/Q2P16V577, V578, and V579) and the dilution bypass AOVs (Q1/Q2P16V562 and V563) fail closed. Following a LOSP, the turbine building supply MOVs (Q1/Q2P16V514, V515, V516, and V517) move to a throttled position.
Once plant operators isolate the nonsafety-related loads (the turbine building, the steam generator blowdown heat exchanger, letdown chillers, and the reactor coolant pump motor air coolers) on the affected units, service water flowrates to the safety-related components in at least one train are sufficient for safe long-term operation. The isolated loads are the nonsafety-related loads on the service water system and are the same components automatically isolated by an SI-generated Phase A isolation signal following a LOCA.
The reduced flowrates to safety-related components prior to operator actions are adequate in at least one train per unit during the initial 15 min following this event. The manual operator actions along with the automatic actions discussed above result in acceptable service water flowrates to the diesel generators and other safety-related components, thus ensuring safe long-term operation. The loss of any single component will not render the system incapable of supplying sufficient service water flowrates.
9.2-9                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 Case 2: The following discussion is the evaluation of the system operation under loss of the river water system combined with LOSP, with both units operating and subsequently being brought to cold shutdown.
On loss of the river water system, the operator will divert service water return flow to the pond.
The operator has more than ample time to make the diversion.
The loss of any single component, including diesel generator, electrical bus, etc., will not render the system incapable of supplying the required service water flow.
The service water makeup line to the service water wet pit is designed such that there is always a path for return flow to the pond and/or wet pit. The spurious closure of one of valves QSP16V508-B(13), QSP16V507-A(14), QSP16V506-B(15), or QSP16V505-A(16) in the pond recirculation lines will not render the system incapable of providing the required service water flow. In the event of a loss of the river water system, the operator will verify that valves QSP16V508-B(13) and QSP16V507-A(14) are fully open and that valves QSP16V506-B(15) and QSP16V505-A(16) are closed.
Case 3: The following discussion is the evaluation of the system operation under loss of the river water system with offsite power available, with both units operating and subsequently being brought to cold shutdown.
The evaluation of this case is identical to case 2 except that offsite power is used instead of the diesel generators.
Case 4: The following discussion is the evaluation of the system operation under LOSP, while one unit is operating and subsequently being brought to cold shutdown and the other unit is undergoing a LOCA.
The storage pond level will decrease due to the loss of flow to the pond from the river water system. When the pond level drops to el 184 ft 4 in., it will be alarmed in the control room. The operator will then divert the service water return flow to the storage pond by opening valves Q1P16V539-A(5), Q2P16V538-B(6), Q1P16V538-B(11), and Q2P16V539-A(12) and by closing valves Q1P16V546-A(7), Q2P16V545-B(8), Q1P16V545-B(9), and Q2P16V546-A(10). The operator has more than ample time to make the diversion.
As discussed in Case 1, a loss of instrument air causes AOVs in the service water system to go to their failed position. Although some AOVs fail open on a LOSP, the service water miniflow valves (Q1/Q2P16V577, V578, and V579) and the dilution bypass AOVs (Q1/Q2P16V562 and V563) fail closed. The failed open AOVs result in a reduction of flow to the safety-related components. Following a LOSP, the turbine building supply MOVs (Q1/Q2P16V514, V515, V516, and V517) move to a throttled position.
The SI-generated Phase A isolation signal associated with a LOCA automatically isolates the major nonsafety-related loads (the turbine building, the steam generator blowdown heat exchanger, letdown chillers, and the reactor coolant pump motor air coolers). Implementation of the operator actions on the non-LOCA unit also reduces the demand on the service water system by isolating the major nonsafety-related loads. These actions increase the service water flowrates to safety-related components in at least one train per unit for safe long-term operation.
9.2-10                                    REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The reduced flowrates to safety-related components prior to operator actions on the non-LOCA unit are adequate in at least one train during the initial 15 minutes following this event.
The loss of any single component, including a diesel generator, electrical bus, etc., will not render the system incapable of supplying the required service water.
Case 5: The following discussion is the evaluation of the system operation with offsite power available, while one unit is operating and subsequently being brought to cold shutdown and the other unit is undergoing a LOCA.
The evaluation of this case is identical to Case 4 except that offsite power is available instead of only having the diesel generators to supply electrical power. With offsite power available, the river water pumps will be available to provide makeup to the pond. As shown in Case 4, operation of the river water system is not required to bring the plant to a cold shutdown condition.
Case 6: The following discussion is the evaluation of the system operation under LOSP, with one unit operating and subsequently being brought to cold shutdown while the other unit is being brought to cold shutdown with a major line break resulting from an SSE.
An SSE seismic event may be postulated to result in a single-line break on site in any Seismic Category II (nonseismic) line in the service water system or in any supporting system.
Bounding breaks may be postulated to occur on the 24-in. supply line in either the Unit 1 or Unit 2 turbine building or on the 10-in. supply line to either the Unit 1 or Unit 2 steam generator blowdown heat exchanger and letdown chillers in the auxiliary building.
The primary impact on the system from the LOSP is due to the loss of the river water and instrument air systems. As discussed in Case 1, loss of the river water system terminates makeup water to the service water pond. However, the service water system will be placed in the recirculation to pond mode before the pond level decreases to el 184 ft-0 in.
As discussed in Case 1, a loss of instrument air causes AOVs in the service water system to go to their failed position. Although some AOVs fail open on a LOSP, the service water miniflow valves (Q1/Q2P16V577, V578, and V579) and the dilution bypass AOVs (Q1/Q2P16V562 and V563) fail closed. Along with the unisolated line break caused by the SSE, the failed open AOVs result in a reduction of flow to the safety-related components. Following a LOSP, the turbine building supply MOVs (Q1/Q2P16V514, V515, V516, and V517) move to a throttled position.
Operator actions to isolate the major nonsafety-related loads (the turbine building, the steam generator blowdown heat exchanger, letdown chillers, and the reactor coolant pump motor air coolers) on both units within 15 min will isolate any postulated line break and increase service water flowrates to safety-related components in at least one train per unit for safe long-term operation.
9.2-11                                    REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The reduced flowrates to safety-related components prior to operator actions are adequate in at least one train per unit during the initial 15 min following this event. The manual operator actions discussed above result in acceptable service water flowrates to the systems safety-related components, thus ensuring safe long-term operation. The loss of any single component will not render the system incapable of supplying sufficient service water flowrates.
Case 7: The following discussion is the evaluation of the system operation with offsite power available, with one unit operating and subsequently being brought to cold shutdown while the other unit is being brought to cold shutdown with a major line break resulting from an SSE.
This evaluation is identical to Case 6 except that offsite power is available instead of only having diesel generators to supply electrical power. With offsite power, the river water system will be available to provide makeup water to the service water pond. Additionally, all AOVs will continue operation due to availability of the instrument air system. As shown in Case 6, neither the river water system nor the instrument air system is required to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition.
Case 8: The following discussion is the evaluation of the system operation under LOSP, with one unit operating and subsequently being brought to cold shutdown while the other unit is being brought to cold shutdown with a fire in a single fire area.
The performance of the service water system following a postulated LOSP is described in Case 1. The addition of a fire on one unit, concurrent with a LOSP on both units, decreases the flowrates to the safety-related components on the fire-related unit. Some valves used to isolate the major nonsafety-related loads (the turbine building, the steam generator blowdown heat exchanger, letdown chillers, and the reactor coolant pump motor air coolers) can no longer be remotely operated due to fire-related failures. Under these conditions, the service water system can supply sufficient flow to safety-related components in at least one train for safe long-term operation.
Implementation of the operator actions on the unit unaffected by the fire would reduce the demand on the service water system by isolating the major nonsafety-related loads. These actions increase the service water flowrates to safety-related components in at least one train for safe long-term operation.
The reduced flowrates to safety-related components prior to operator actions on the unit unaffected by the fire would be adequate in at least one train during the initial 15 min following this event.
There are no single component failures associated with a fire as only failures caused by the fire are assumed. These fire-related failures will not render the system incapable of supplying sufficient service water flowrates.
9.2-12                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.2.1.4        Tests and Inspections The river and service water systems are in constant use during plant operation. Therefore, the availability and performance of all normally functioning components is evident to plant operators. In addition to normal maintenance, service water pumps, valves, piping, and supports will be tested/inspected per the requirements of the plant Technical Specifications, Inservice Inspection Program, and Inservice Testing Program. Service Water Program activities credited as a license renewal aging management program are described in chapter 18, subsection 18.2.1.
9.2.1.5        Instrumentation Applications Instrumentation is provided to indicate whether the system is operating properly. In the event of a LOCA, automatic controls operate the service water system, as required for safety.
Redundant supply trains from the river to the pond are furnished with pressure switches which alarm in the control room in the event of a header break. Valves are manually controlled to isolate the break and divert flow to the redundant train. The service water intake structure has redundant level indicators to monitor and control the storage pond level as follows:
A.      High level (el 185 ft 9 in.) - Alarms operator.
B.      Normal high level (el 185 ft 6 in.) - Trips river water pumps if no LOSP.
C.      Normal low level (el 185 ft) - Starts river water pump in auto if no LOSP.
D.      Low level (el 184 ft 4 in.) - Alarms operator.
E.      Divert level (el 184 ft) - Actuates valves to divert river water flow directly to the wet pit.
F.      Divert level (el 180 ft) - Actuates valves to divert service water to pond recirculation directly to the wet pit.
G.      Low-low level (el 170 ft) - Alarms operator.
9.2.1.6        Service Water Treatment Systems Prevention of fouling in the plant service water system piping and equipment will be accomplished by intermittent treatment of the service water using appropriate biocides and by the use of other appropriate water treatment chemicals if necessary. These may include the systems described below.
A.      A chlorine dioxide generator may be provided to feed both service water systems at once with the generator output split between units or to feed both units on an alternating basis.
The generator produces chlorine dioxide from the reaction of appropriate precursor chemicals as they are mixed in a stream of service water. The resulting chlorine dioxide solution is diffused into the service water flow using the solution lines.
9.2-13                                    REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The chlorine dioxide generator has a flow switch which shuts the generator down upon low service water flow.
The control panel is designed to allow adjustments to the length and frequency of chlorine dioxide treatment cycles and to the chlorine dioxide feed rate, as experience deems necessary.
B.      Sodium Hypochlorite Addition Sodium Hypochlorite solution may be added to both service water systems at once, or to a single service water system 9.2.2  COOLING SYSTEM FOR REACTOR AUXILIARIES 9.2.2.1        Design Bases The component cooling system, a closed cooling water system, transfers heat to the service water system from components which process radioactive fluid. The system is designed to function during all modes of plant operation, including heat removal following a LOCA.
Portions of the component cooling system which are required for postaccident heat removal are redundant. Separate headers and redundant pumps and heat exchangers are provided so that a single failure will not preclude the supply of sufficient cooling water to the engineered safeguards.
The system is continuously monitored for radioactivity, and all components can be isolated.
9.2.2.2        System Description This system consists of three component cooling pumps, three component cooling heat exchangers, a surge tank, and interconnecting piping. One pump and one component cooling heat exchanger will normally be operated to provide cooling water for various components located in the auxiliary building and containment. Drawings D-175002, sheets 1 through 3, and D-205002, sheets 1 through 3 show the component cooling system. Equipment associated with the component cooling system is shown in figures 1.2-4 and 9.1-3.
Component cooling will be provided for the following heat sources:
A.      Residual heat exchangers [residual heat removal system (RHRS)].
B.      Reactor coolant pump oil coolers and thermal barrier cooling coil (reactor coolant system).
C.      Letdown heat exchanger (chemical and volume control system).
D.      Excess letdown heat exchanger (chemical and volume control system).
9.2-14                                    REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 E.      Seal water heat exchanger (chemical and volume control system).
F.      Recycle evaporator condenser, vent condenser, and distillate cooler (chemical and volume control system).
G.      Waste evaporator condenser, vent condenser, and distillate cooler (waste processing system).
H.      Waste gas compressors (waste processing system).
I.      Residual heat removal pump seal heat exchangers (RHRS).
J.      SI/charging pump lube oil (bearing) and gear oil heat exchangers (emergency core cooling system).
K.      Spent-fuel pool heat exchangers (spent-fuel pool cooling system).
L.      Sample heat exchangers (sample system).
M.      Reactor coolant drain tank heat exchanger (waste processing system).
N.      Waste gas hydrogen recombiners (waste processing system).
O.      Liquid Radwaste Processing System (LRWPS) Chiller P.      Liquid Radwaste A/C System The component cooling system acts as an intermediate heat transfer system between potentially radioactive heat sources and the service water system. This additional leakage barrier greatly reduces the probability of radioactive releases to the environment resulting from a leaking component. The CCW is constantly monitored for radioactivity by monitors located in the pump suction headers.
One component cooling pump and one component cooling heat exchanger are required to accommodate the heat loads for full power operation. During normal power operation, the on-service train of CCW consisting of one component cooling pump and one component cooling heat exchanger is in operation to deliver CCW to the charging pump bearing oil and gear oil heat exchangers, the shell of the spent-fuel pool heat exchanger, the RHR pump seal cooler, and the miscellaneous equipment header. The other train of CCW may be run to deliver CCW to its train associated charging pump bearing oil and gear oil heat exchangers, the shell of the spent-fuel pool heat exchanger, and the RHR pump seal cooler. The manual valves in the interconnecting piping between the component cooling pumps and the component cooling heat exchangers and in the crossover lines between redundant headers are prepositioned such that, if the operating component cooling pump trips, the train A/B (swing) component cooling pump lined up on the same train starts automatically and supplies CCW to the component cooling heat exchanger in operation. The redundant CCW train is completely isolated from the train in operation by the prepositioned manual block valves. A standby heat exchanger is available should it become necessary to isolate the operating heat exchanger.
9.2-15                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 Flowrates and heat loads for the component cooling system components are given in tables 9.2-6 and 9.2-7, respectively. CCW and service water inlet and outlet temperatures for the CCW heat exchangers are summarized in table 9.2-8. During the normal cooldown mode, two component cooling pumps and heat exchangers are available. However, the heat loads for the two CCW heat exchangers differ, as shown in table 9.2-7. The normal cooldown temperatures listed in table 9.2-8 are for the CCW heat exchanger aligned to the onservice train. In the limiting case of a LOCA in one unit, cooldown in the other unit, LOSP and loss of electrical bus in the cooldown unit, one component cooling pump and heat exchanger will be available in the cooldown unit with the CCW heat exchanger operating at the abnormal cooldown temperatures listed in table 9.2-8.
The surge tank accommodates expansion, contraction, and inleakage of water and, in addition, ensures a reserve CCW supply until a leaking cooling line can be isolated. The tank is normally vented to the atmosphere; however, a radiation monitor in each of the component cooling pump inlet headers actuates an annunciator in the control room and automatically closes the valve in the surge tank vent line in the unlikely event that the radiation level has reached a preset level above the normal background.
Demineralized makeup water is supplied as required and delivered to the component cooling surge tank. A backup source of water is provided from the reactor makeup water system (RMWS).
The following equipment is provided:
A.      Component Cooling Heat Exchangers The three component cooling heat exchangers are located in the auxiliary building and are of the shell and straight tube type. Service water circulates through the tubes while CCW circulates through the shell side. Parameters are presented in table 9.2-9.
B.      Component Cooling Pumps The three component cooling pumps which circulate CCW through the component cooling system are horizontal, centrifugal units. Parameters are presented in table 9.2-9.
The component cooling pumps are located at elevations high enough to avoid any damage or malfunction due to the maximum flooding condition in the component cooling heat exchanger room.
Pump room coolers are used to maintain air temperature in the pump rooms at or below 104&deg;F during normal operation. Refer to table 9.4-6A for post-design basis accident (DBA) room temperatures. Component cooling pump room coolers are discussed in paragraph 9.4.2.1.9.
9.2-16                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 C.      Component Cooling Surge Tank The component cooling surge tank accommodates changes in CCW volume.
Parameters are presented in table 9.2-9. Provisions are made for makeup and addition of the chemical corrosion inhibitor to the component cooling loop. The surge tank has two surge line connections separated by a partition.
D.      Component Cooling Valves The valves used in the component cooling system are of standard design.
Self-actuated, spring-loaded relief valves are provided for overpressure protection.
All MOVs in the component cooling heat exchanger room are located at elevations high enough to avoid any damage or malfunction due to a maximum flooding condition in that room.
E.      Component Cooling Piping All component cooling system piping is carbon steel with welded joints and connections wherever practical to minimize the possibility of leakage.
The portion of the CCW system piping located in the component cooling heat exchanger room is Seismic Category I. The CCW piping is routed such that the larger diameter piping is located at lower elevations than the smaller diameter piping. A failure of any nonseismic piping from other systems in the component cooling heat exchanger room will not affect the operation of the safeguard component cooling system.
9.2.2.3          Safety Evaluation All portions of the component cooling system that are safety related are Seismic Category I design. Valves in the supply and return lines for nonsafety-related equipment will be automatically closed by a low-low level signal in the surge tank or remote manually from the control room. System components are designed to the codes given in table 9.2-10.
During the recirculation phase following a LOCA, at least one of the three component cooling pumps delivers flow to at least one residual heat exchanger, one low-head SI pump, one high-head SI pump, and one spent-fuel pool heat exchanger. At least one of the three component cooling heat exchangers is in operation to transfer heat to the service water system.
9.2-17                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 A failure analysis of pumps, heat exchangers, and valves is presented in table 9.2-11. No single failure in one CCW system train can cause a loss of the redundant train. During normal operation, the two trains of the CCW system are isolated from each other by manual isolation valves. Critical components are elevated above floor level so that the water level resulting from the release of water inventory in either CCW system train into the CCW equipment room will not damage components in the other train. Pumps are driven by constant speed motors.
Pumps and motors are designed for a 25-percent overspeed condition. Pump and motor internals are enclosed in housings which would act to contain any debris resulting from a postulated internal failure. The motor coupling is of a one-piece design without bolts or nuts.
Pump or motor missiles are not postulated.
All portions of the component cooling system within the containment are designed as Seismic Category I. Cooling water is circulated through all equipment even though a component may not be in service. None of the equipment within the containment will require CCW during the recirculation phase following a LOCA, and the supply and return lines will be automatically isolated outside the containment on a containment isolation signal. The component cooling system containment isolation valves inside the containment are located outside the secondary shield at an elevation well above the anticipated post-LOCA water level in the containment.
Outside the containment, the residual heat removal pumps, the residual heat exchangers, the spent-fuel heat exchanger, the component cooling pumps and heat exchangers, and associated valves, piping, and instrumentation are accessible for maintenance and inspection during power operation. System design provides for the replacement of one pump or one heat exchanger while the other units are in service.
During the recirculation phase following a LOCA, makeup to the component cooling system will be available from the RMWSs described in subsection 9.2.7.
Except for the normally closed makeup line and equipment vent and drain lines, there are no direct connections between the cooling water and other systems. The equipment vent and drain lines have manual valves which will normally be closed, except when the equipment is being vented or drained for maintenance or repair operations, or for the periodic connection to temporary CCW fluid cleanup systems that meet CCW system design pressure and temperature. The vent lines are capped as an additional safety feature.
The relief valves on the cooling water lines downstream from the sample, excess letdown, seal water, letdown, spent-fuel pool, and residual heat exchangers are sized to relieve the volumetric expansion occurring if the exchanger shell side is isolated when cooling with high temperature coolant flowing through the tube side. The valve set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the shell side of the heat exchangers.
The relief valve on the component cooling surge tank is sized to relieve the maximum flowrate of water which will enter the surge tank following a rupture of a reactor coolant pump thermal barrier cooling coil. The relief valve set pressure equals the design pressure of the component cooling surge tank. Initial protection is provided by an isolation valve which is located to isolate a particular branch and which will close automatically in the event of a thermal barrier coil rupture.
9.2-18                                    REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 System fluctuations and lineups may result in either CCW or service water having the higher pressure of the two systems.
Leakage from the component cooling system will be detected by a drop in the level of the component cooling surge tank. Nonsafeguard equipment will be automatically isolated on low-low level.
The leaking component will then be located by sequential isolation or inspection of equipment in the system. If the leak is in the online CCW heat exchanger, the standby exchanger would be put on the line and the leaking exchanger isolated and repaired. During normal operation the leaking exchanger could be left in service with leakage up to the capacity of the makeup line to the system from the demineralized makeup water source, until such time as an alternate heat exchanger is placed in service.
Should a large tube-side to shell-side leak develop in a residual heat exchanger, the water level in the component cooling surge tank would rise; thus, the operator would be alerted by a high water level alarm. The atmospheric vent on the tank will close automatically in the event of a high radiation level at the CCW pump suction headers. If the leaking residual heat exchanger is not isolated from the component cooling loop before the inflow completely fills the surge tank, the surge tank relief valve will discharge to the auxiliary building floor drain tank.
Provision is also made to connect and operate a temporary demineralizer for purification of one CCW train.
9.2.2.4          Tests and Inspection Because the component cooling system is in constant use during plant operation, the availability and performance of all normally functioning components of the inservice train are evident to plant operators. The MOVs in the cooling water supply to the residual heat exchangers that are required to open for post-LOCA heat removal can be tested during power operation.
CCW pumps and valves are tested in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
9.2.2.5          Instrumentation Applications Low flow alarms in the CCW return lines from the seal heat exchanger of the low-head SI pumps sound an alarm in the control room. Each of these pumps normally receives flow from that CCW pump which is powered from the associated emergency bus.
The component cooling pumps and heat exchangers are fully instrumented for flow, pressure, and temperature so that any degradation in performance can be noted and corrective action taken.
High pressure switches on the return line from each reactor coolant pump thermal barrier cooling coil and a high flow switch on the common return from all three pumps will initiate the rapid closure of isolation valves to isolate the reactor coolant pumps in the event of a leak in the thermal barrier.
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FNP-FSAR-9 Control room indication of surge tank level and high, low, and low-low level alarms in the control room keep the operator informed of any leakage into or out of the component cooling system.
Actuation of the remote manual makeup valves is normally initiated on a low level alarm.
Should the surge tank reach low-low level, the cooling water lines for all nonsafety-related equipment are automatically isolated.
The CCW is constantly monitored for radioactive leaks into the system by radiation monitors in the pump suction headers.
9.2.3  DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM 9.2.3.1        Design Bases One demineralized water makeup system is designed to provide demineralized water for Units 1 and 2 during all phases of plant operations. This includes water for filling, flushing, and making up losses during startup, shutdown, refueling, power, and maintenance operations.
This system has no nuclear safety function. It is designed and installed to the requirements of nonnuclear safety (NNS) equipment under the American Nuclear Society safety criteria.
9.2.3.2        System Description The piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) for the demineralized water makeup system is shown on drawings D-175047, sheets 1 and 2, and D-205047. During normal power operation this system receives demineralized water from the plant water treatment system and supplies it as makeup to the following components:
A. Reactor makeup water storage tanks.
B. Boric acid batching tanks.
C. Resin fill tanks.
D. Component cooling surge tanks.
E. Spent-fuel pools.
F. Condensate storage tanks.
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FNP-FSAR-9 G.      Turbine building auxiliary boiler.
The demineralized water makeup system is also a source of cleaning and flushing water for demineralizers, evaporators, pumps, piping, tanks, and the high-pressure water spray decon unit.
The system is composed of one 200,000-gal demineralized water storage tank, 3 demineralized water makeup pumps, and associated valves, piping, and instrumentation.
9.2.3.2.1      Components A.      Demineralized Water Storage Tank One 200,000-gal demineralized water storage tank provides the demineralized water requirements for Units 1 and 2 during all phases of plant operations. The vinyl-lined tank is constructed of carbon steel and is designed to the standards of the American Water Works Association D-100.
B.      Demineralized Water Pumps Three demineralized water pumps take suction from the demineralized water storage tank and supply demineralized water to both units. These centrifugal pumps are constructed of carbon steel.
C.      Valves Diaphragm valves and globe valves are used to regulate the flow of demineralized water to the various components. These valves are located adjacent to the components supplied with demineralized water to facilitate filling and maintenance operations.
D.      Piping Demineralized water makeup system piping does not handle radioactive liquid and is therefore constructed of carbon steel. Piping joints and connections are welded, except where flanged connections are required to facilitate equipment removal for maintenance.
9.2.3.3        Safety Evaluation The demineralized water makeup system is not required for any safety-related functions.
Consequently, the failure of any part of this system will not adversely affect the nuclear safety of the plant.
The demineralized water storage tank is located so that water from a tank rupture would flow into the yard drainage system without affecting any safety-related equipment.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.2.3.4        Tests and Inspections The demineralized water makeup system is operated intermittently during all phases of plant operations. The major components of the system are located in the yard and are easily accessible for inspection at any time.
9.2.3.5        Instrumentation Applications The instrumentation that is available for the demineralized water makeup system is shown in drawings D-175047, sheets 1 and 2, and D-205047. Alarms are provided as noted.
9.2.4  POTABLE AND SANITARY WATER SYSTEM 9.2.4.1        Design Bases The potable and sanitary water system will provide water for drinking and sanitary purposes.
The system has no safety function and is Safety Class NNS.
The potable and sanitary water system is designed to supply 300 gal/min of water per unit. The water will be chemically treated in accordance with all State and Federal regulations.
9.2.4.2        System Description The P&ID for the potable and sanitary water system is shown in drawing D-170127. The system water is supplied to a 20,000-gal capacity sanitary water storage tank from the well water system, which is discussed in subsection 9.2.9.
There are three 300-gal/min sanitary water pumps (one pump is a spare) which take their suction from the storage tank. Two of the pumps will be installed with Unit 1 and the third with Unit 2. The piping system is arranged to receive the third pump during the installation of the Unit 2 pump.
Chlorine will be added to meet State and Federal requirements. Residual chlorine content will be analyzed and regulated to maintain government standards.
9.2.4.3        Safety Evaluation The design of the potable and sanitary water supply provides water that will meet all sanitary requirements. The design of the piping system ensures that impurities cannot enter the system by backflow. The system waste water does not contain any radioactive material and will be directed to a sewage treatment system.
There are no safety implications since this system is shared between Unit 1 and Unit 2.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.2.4.4        Tests and Inspections The system is proved operable by its use during normal plant operation. Periodic samples will be tested to ensure meeting water standards.
9.2.4.5        Instrumentation Applications The sanitary water tank is provided with a level controller which maintains the level in the sanitary water storage tank. The sanitary water pump discharge supply header will be provided with a self-actuated, pressure reducing regulator to maintain system pressure limit.
Local and remote indications and alarms are provided as required for monitoring and protection of the components in the system.
9.2.5  ULTIMATE HEAT SINK The ultimate heat sink consists of the storage pond described in paragraph 2.4.8.1 and the service water system described in subsection 9.2.1.
9.2.5.1        Design Bases A.      The ultimate heat sink is capable of providing sufficient cooling for at least 30 days, to permit simultaneous safe shutdown and cooldown of both nuclear reactor units and to maintain them in a safe shutdown condition or, in the event of an accident in one unit, to permit safe control of the accident and simultaneously permit safe shutdown and cooldown of the other unit and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. These requirements are in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.27.
B.      Procedures for ensuring continued capability beyond the 30-day requirement are available in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.27.
C.      The ultimate heat sink has the capability to perform safety functions required by Design Basis A during and after any one of the following events, in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.27:
: 1.      The most severe natural phenomena expected at the site, with appropriate ambient conditions, but with no two or more such phenomena occurring simultaneously.
: 2.      The site-related events (e.g., transportation accident, river diversion) that historically occurred or that may occur during the plant lifetime.
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FNP-FSAR-9
: 3.      Reasonably probable combinations of less severe natural phenomena and/or site-related events.
: 4.      A single failure of nonseismic manmade structural features.
9.2.5.2        System Description Figure 2.3-27 shows the location of the Seismic Category I pond, which stores water pumped from the river prior to its use in the plant service water system and cooling towers. Additional information on the pond may be found in paragraph 2.4.8.1. As described in subsection 9.2.1, the service water system provides cooling water during both normal and accident conditions. All components necessary to perform this function are Seismic Category I, meet single-failure criteria, are operable during LOSP, and sustain no loss of function during adverse environmental conditions.
Between el 184.0 and 185.0, up to approximately 100 acre-ft of water is in storage. Enough water is available between elevations 185.0 and 184.0 to operate two units for several hours at full power without the river water system in operation before implementing shutdown procedures. If the pond level drops below el 184 ft, shutdown procedures must begin.
Indications of river pump operation and storage pond level are provided in the control room.
Therefore, insofar as loss of the river intake structure and equipment is concerned, the need to shut down is indicated by the storage pond level. An alarm will sound in the control room when this pond is lowered to el 184 ft 4 in. Under two-unit operation, this will allow a minimum of 90 min to evaluate the situation prior to reaching 184 ft.
9.2.5.3        Safety Evaluation The design of the ultimate heat sink provides sufficient capacity and reliability to ensure compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.27, Ultimate Heat Sink.
The storage pond has the capability to provide sufficient cooling for at least 30 days to permit simultaneous safe shutdown and cooldown of both nuclear reactor units and to maintain them in a safe shutdown condition or, in the event of an accident in one unit, to permit safe control of the accident and simultaneously permit safe shutdown and cooldown of the other unit and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. The water in storage is sufficient to ensure that evaporation losses during the 30-day period will not reduce the water surface elevation to an unacceptable level. In evaluating the capability of the storage pond to meet its requirements, the following conservative assumptions have been made:
A. The surface of the pond at the beginning of the analysis is assumed to be at el 184 ft 0 in. This assumption is conservative as the pond level is normally maintained between el 185 ft 0 in and 185 ft 6 in.
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FNP-FSAR-9 B. Initial pond temperature is 95.3&deg;F. Temperature records of the Chattahoochee River(1) reveal the maximum temperature of record is 93&deg;F, recorded at West Point, Georgia, in August 1955. It is estimated that the water temperature can increase 2.3&deg;F in the pond, bringing the maximum initial temperature to 95.3&deg;F.
Peirce(2) substantiates this value with his measurements of five Alabama reservoirs.
C. No makeup is available to the service water pond from the river water system, from rain, or from any other source for a period of 30 days consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.27. Makeup will be available following this 30-day period.
D. The service water system is placed in the recirculation to pond mode before the pond level decreases to el 184 ft 0 in. by closing valves Q1P16V545, Q1P16V546, Q2P16V545, and Q2P16V546, and opening valves Q1P16V538, Q1P16V539, Q2P16V538, and Q2P16V539. It is assumed these valves are used in the realignment of the system in order to prevent the potential loss of pond inventory through the makeup supply to the circulating water system. In the recirculation to pond mode, the heat loads from the service water system of both units are returned to the service water pond.
E. A loss of the pond dam is not considered to be a credible failure. A description of the seismic analysis used for the storage pond is given in section 2.5.
F. The divert system, which was originally intended to divert service directly to the service water intake structure following a loss of the dam, is either inoperable or will be defeated by operator action. Therefore, the service water system will not go into divert when the pond level drops to el 180 ft 0 in.
G. A LOSP is postulated to occur coincident with the beginning of the analyzed 30-day period and offsite power is not restored during the 30-day period. All five diesels are in operation throughout the 30-day period in order to provide the maximum probable heat load on the pond as further discussed in assumption H below.
H. The service water pond is subject to its maximum probable heat load during the 30-day period. The calculation of maximum probable heat loads is conservative and includes a 5,000,000-Btu/h heat load margin to account for uncertainties in actual heat loads and a 5,000,000-Btu/h margin for possible future service water system heat loads. As a point of reference, this total margin of 10,000,000 Btu/h is approximately equivalent to the heat load imposed on the service water system by one diesel generator.
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FNP-FSAR-9 Seven different heat load versus time profiles were evaluated as listed below:
Service Water System Heat Load vs. Time Profiles Case 1:        LOCA in one unit with a minimum ESF cooldown. Normal shutdown in the other unit with a 50&deg;F/h cooldown rate.
Case 2:        LOCA in one unit with a minimum ESF cooldown. Normal shutdown in the other unit with a 16-h cooldown.
Case 3:        LOCA in one unit with a maximum ESF cooldown. Norma l shutdown in the other unit with a 50&deg;F/h cooldown rate.
Case 4:        LOCA in one unit with a maximum ESF cooldown. Normal shutdown in the other unit with a 16-h cooldown.
Case 5:        Simultaneous normal shutdown of both units with a 50&deg;F/h cooldown rate.
Case 6:        Simultaneous normal shutdown of both units with a 16-h cooldown.
Case 7:        Simultaneous normal shutdown of both units, one unit with a 50&deg;F/h cooldown rate and the other unit with a 16-h cooldown.
NOTES
* Minimum ESF cooldown indicates that one train of residual heat removal, containment spray, and containment coolers is in service. Maximum ESF indicates that both trains of these systems are in service.
* The 50&deg;F/h and 16-h cooldown refer to the rate of cooldown of the RCS from 350&deg;F to 140&deg;F. This is the temperature range in which the RHRS operates.
Multiple cases were analyzed because the function of heat input rate versus time can have an effect on the peak service water inlet temperature. Cases with less than the maximum integrated heat load were evaluated to ensure the calculation identified the peak service water inlet temperature. As an example, it is possible that a case with a high heat input rate near the end of the 30-day period may result in a higher peak service water inlet temperature than a case with a higher integrated heat load but with a lower heat input rate at the end of the 30-day period.
I. Varying service water system flowrates were assumed and evaluated to ensure that the UHS evaluation places no constraints on service water system flowrates.
This evaluation was required as (1) the service water system flowrate during the 30-day shutdown/cooldown period may vary significantly depending on plant 9.2-26                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 conditions and operator preference and (2) it is not obvious, due to the complexity of the pond heat transfer model, whether higher or lower flowrates would tend to result in higher peak service water inlet temperatures.
J. For all pond water evaluations, the volume of water in the pond and the surface area of the pond as assumed in the evaluation is defined by figure 9.2-2. These curves are estimates of the pond volume and area following 40 years of plant operation. The curves were prepared by extrapolating the pond volume and surface area measurements made yearly from 1985 to 1989. Based on these curves, at a pond elevation of 184 ft 0 in, the volume of the pond assumed in the evaluation is 1325 acre-ft, and the surface area of the pond assumed in the evaluation is 89 acres.
The renewed operating licenses authorize an additional 20-year period of extended operation for both FNP units, resulting in a plant operating life of 60 years. The pond volume calculation was evaluated as a time-limited aging analysis (TLAA) during the license renewal process in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21. It was determined that the current pond volume calculation remains conservative assuming a plant operating life of 60 years. See chapter 18, subsection 18.4.5.
K. A seismic event may result in one line break of any nonseismic (Seismic Category II) service water line on site. Should a line break occur during the 30-day shutdown/cooldown period, the analysis assumes it will be quickly isolated and any losses of pond volume through a service water pipe break will not be significant.
As discussed in paragraph 9.2.1.3, the service water system design basis assumes that a service water system line break in the nonseismic turbine building, containment, or auxiliary building service water piping will be isolated within 15 min. The largest break which can be postulated occurs at the turbine building inlet and results in a loss of not more than 36,750 gal/min. A break flowrate of 36,750 gal/min for a period of 30 min (twice the period of time assumed in the design basis of the system) results in an inventory loss of approximately 1,100,000 gal or 3.4 acre-ft. This is a small volume in comparison to the minimum initial pond volume of 1325 acre-ft and a small loss in comparison to other assumed plant losses (service water that is supplied to the plant but not returned to the pond when in recirculation mode) of 1145 gal/min for the entire 30-day period or a total loss of approximately 150 acre-ft.
L. The pond seepage rate is assumed to be 15 ft3/s at the initial water level of 184 ft 0 in and to decrease as the pond level decreases. Testing has indicated the actual seepage rate to be less than 3 ft3/s. However, due to problems associated with field verification of such low seepage rates, the higher value of 15 ft3/s, which includes conservative allowances for measurement errors, was assumed for the analysis.
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FNP-FSAR-9 The assumption that seepage decreases as the level in the pond decreases is appropriate as actual seepage would decrease with decreasing pond depth and decreasing area of the pond bottom. The UHS evaluation models the pond as a grid of 200-ft x 200-ft cells. In the model, as the pond inventory decreases, cells in shallower areas of the pond become dry and are therefore "inactive."
Seepage is modeled as a loss of 0.152 ft3/s from each active cell. There are 99 cells that are active at el 184 ft 0 in (15 ft3/s / 99 cells = 0.152 ft3/s per cell).
Thus, as the pond level decreases and cells become inactive, the modeled seepage rate decreases.
M. Meteorological data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric station at Columbus, Georgia, are sufficiently representative of the meteorological conditions at the Farley Nuclear Plant site to allow its use as the meteorological record for this analysis. A 42-year meteorological record (1948 to 1989) was examined which meets the Regulatory Guide 1.27, Revision 2, recommendation that a record of at least 30 years be evaluated.
N. Regulatory Guide 1.27, Section B, recommends that "meteorological conditions considered in the design of the sink should be selected with respect to the controlling parameters and critical time periods unique to the specific design of the sink."
Controlling parameters for the service water pond are dry bulb, wet bulb, and dewpoint temperatures; windspeed and direction; and solar radiation.
Critical time periods considered in the analysis are 1 day, 7 days, and 30 days for the maximum intake temperature and 30 days for maximum evaporation. The 1-day period was selected to maximize the intake temperature, the 30-day period was selected as it coincides with the 30-day Regulatory Guide 1.27 design period, and the 7-day period was selected as an intermediate value in anticipation of a pond response temperature on the order of 1 week.
O. The service water intake structure stoplogs, which extend from the bottom of the wetpit to el 180 ft 0 in, were assumed to be in place when the event begins. It was also assumed that the stoplogs are removed before the pond level drops below el 181 ft 10 in. This action is required to ensure that sufficient water can enter the service water wetpit.
P. A simplifying assumption is made that the heat transferred from heat exchangers to the service water system is equal to the maximum design heat transfer value independent of the service water system flowrate. This is conservative as lower flowrates would tend to reduce the heat input to the pond.
Q. See figure 3.8-28 for the service water intake structure and drawings D-171417 and D-171419 for the river water discharge to pond structures.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.2.5.4          Description of Analysis Method and Summary of Results An analysis of the ultimate heat sink was conducted to evaluate the ability of the Farley Nuclear Plant service water pond to function as an ultimate heat sink in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.27. The service water pond is considered to be an acceptable ultimate heat sink based on cooling water capacity and heat storage/dissipation capabilities if the following two criteria are met:
: 1.      The maximum service water intake temperature does not exceed the maximum temperature acceptable for the continued operation of safety-related equipment during the accident.
: 2.      The water losses over the 30-day cooldown period do not cause the pond level to drop below el 161 ft 0 in. This is the minimum pond level required to permit sufficient water to enter the service water intake structure.
The analysis consists of two parts. In one part, offsite meteorological data were examined and periods of maximum natural heating and evaporation were identified. Use was made of an offsite station because the onsite meteorological record was only 13 years in length, too short for the analysis suggested in Regulatory Guide 1.27. To select an appropriate offsite meteorological station from candidate sites, representative water temperatures (called response temperatures) for a pond with an average depth equal to that of the service water pond were calculated. Response temperature records at 1- or 3-h intervals were created--one based on Columbus, Georgia, meteorological data and one based on Tallahassee, Florida, data. These stations were the nearest National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) stations reporting a full set of meteorological parameters; each station has a 42-year record (1948 to 1989) available on magnetic tape.
Daily averages of the computed response temperatures were then compared to measure pond temperatures, for which there were 13 years of record. Measured pond temperatures are influenced not only by meteorological conditions, but also by the pumping of water from the Chattahoochee River into the service water pond for normal operations and by the occasional recirculation of service water heat loads to the pond. Response temperatures were plotted against measured pond temperatures in order to provide a basis for comparison of the two candidate offsite meteorological stations and to demonstrate general agreement with the calculated response temperatures. The calculated response temperature record was then used to determine periods of maximum natural heating and maximum evaporation of the pond.
These periods were determined to be mid-July 1980 and late June 1986, respectively, and to be based on the Columbus, Georgia, meteorological record.
The second part of the analysis was the detailed computation of pond hydraulics and heat transfer using a time-varying, three-dimensional finite difference code. The application of the code to the service water pond included gridding the pond into 200-ft x 200-ft horizontal cells and 3.3-ft vertical layers, mapping pond intake and discharge structures onto the resulting grid, and applying the time-varying boundary conditions of (1) meteorological data for the chosen period, (2) heat loads and pumping rates, and (3) seepage. The grid layout and the location of the pond inlet/outlet structures are shown on figure 9.2-8. The heat load and pumping data consisted of seven cases, four of which modeled a post-LOCA shutdown on one unit and a 9.2-29                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 normal shutdown on the other unit, and three of which were two-unit normal shutdowns. These cases are listed in item H of paragraph 9.2.5.3.
Each of the boundary condition effects was integrated by the model as it simulated pond circulation, drawdown, and temperature at computational time steps of 7.5 min or less. For example, the code considered decreasing pond volume and area in response to seepage and evaporation, thereby reducing the amount of heat transferred to the atmosphere. Other transient events, such as the removal of the service water intake structure stoplogs as the water surface elevation reaches 181 ft 10 in. were also included in the simulation.
The final analysis showed that under historic meteorological conditions, maximum pond temperatures were reached 30 days after initiation of the shutdown. The following table shows the peak service water intake temperatures and minimum elevation at the end of 30 days:
1980 Columbus, GA, Meteorological Data for Maximum Temperature:
Heat Load            Peak Service Water                  Pond Elevation at Case No.              Intake Temperature                    End of 30 days 3 and 4                    106.2&deg;F                          172 ft 4 in.
1986 Columbus, GA, Meteorological Data for Maximum Evaporation:
Heat Load            Peak Service Water                  Pond Elevation at Case No.              Intake Temperature                    End of 30 days 4                        98.1&deg;F                          172 ft 1 in.
The calculated peak service water inlet temperature is 106.2&deg;F, which is reached at the end of the 30-day period analyzed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.27. The design basis maximum service water temperature for safety-related components has been established as 106.2&deg;F in accordance with this evaluation.
Two different cases both resulted in a 106.2&deg;F peak temperature. These are cases 3 and 4, which involve maximum ESF cooldown on the LOCA unit and either a 50&deg;F/h cooldown rate (case 3) or a 16-h cooldown (case 4) on the other unit. Figures 9.2-3 and 9.2-4 show the service water inlet temperature versus time curves for the 30-day post-LOCA period for cases 3 and 4.
Based on the meteorological data for maximum evaporation, at the end of the 30-day period, the pond elevation had dropped from el 184 ft 0 in. to 172 ft 1 in., which is a decrease of 11 ft 11 in. The final elevation is acceptable as it is above el 161 ft 0 in. The pond volume at the end of the 30-day period is 333 acre-ft, which is a reduction of 992 acre-ft (75-percent reduction) from the assumed initial volume of 1325 acre-ft. Of this 992 acre-ft loss, 88 acre-ft (9 percent of the total loss) are due to evaporation, 750 acre-ft (76 percent of the total loss) are due to seepage, and 154 acre-ft (16 percent of the total loss) are due to plant losses.
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FNP-FSAR-9 Therefore, it is concluded that the service water pond can supply the plant's DBA cooling requirements for the required 30-day period and that the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.27 have been met.
If the river water system were to be unavailable for pond makeup, continued capability of the pond after 30 days could be ensured by the use of portable pumps or water trucked to the pond.
A description of the seismic analysis used for the storage pond is given in section 2.5. A safety evaluation of the service water system is given in paragraph 9.2.1.3. An evaluation of the capability of the ultimate heat sink under adverse water conditions is given in section 2.4.
9.2.5.5          Tests and Inspections Periodic inservice testing of the service water pond will be performed to demonstrate that the seepage rate does not exceed that used for the service water pond thermal analysis in subsection 9.2.5.
Additional testing and inspections for the station service water system are discussed in paragraph 9.2.1.4.
Periodically, the instrumentation described below can be checked for operability.
9.2.5.6          Instrumentation Applications Instrumentation is provided to indicate whether the station service water system is operating properly. In the event of a LOCA, automatic controls operate the service water system (as required for safety) and the river water system.
The water level in the pond is continuously monitored in the service water pump wet pit, as discussed in subsection 2.4.8 and paragraph 2.4.11.6.
9.2.6    CONDENSATE STORAGE FACILITIES 9.2.6.1          Design Bases The condensate storage facility provides makeup and surge capacity to compensate for changes in the turbine plant systems inventory and provides reserve supply for emergency shutdown decay heat removal, should the normal feedwater system fail.
The condensate storage tank and all piping and components required to supply the auxiliary feedwater pumps are Safety Class 2B and Seismic Category I.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.2.6.2        System Description The condensate storage facility consists of a 500,000-gal capacity steel tank, the bottom of which is at grade. The condensate makeup connection is located so that 164,000 gal remain in the tank for emergency use. The auxiliary feedwater pump intake lines are near the bottom of the tank. The tank is lined with a corrosion resistant coating and contains a diaphragm for water chemistry control.
9.2.6.3        Safety Considerations The carbon steel tank fulfills the requirements for water chemistry and corrosion control.
Radioactive concentrations are held to the limits of plant technical specifications. The condensate makeup suction elevation ensures a reserve of 164,000 gal for emergency decay heat removal.
In order to ensure the 164,000-gal reserve, the lower 13.26 ft of the tanks are designed to withstand ruptures caused by missiles. Certain connections to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 CSTs, within the lower 13.26 ft of the tank, are protected by structures. The subject connections are:
CST drain, vacuum degasifier tank connection, and the sensing lines for the level transmitters.
However, portions of the AFW pumps minimum flow recirculation line and the flow instrumentation lines attached to the AFW pump suction pipes are located outdoors and exposed to a potential tornado missile. An analysis was performed to ensure that adequate reserve margin in the CST water is available considering a rupture of these lines from missile impact. The result of the analysis showed that the reserve water margin available in the protected volume (164,000 gal) in the CST is sufficient to maintain the plant at hot standby for a 2-h period after a reactor trip, followed by a 4-h cooldown to 350&deg;F, including the total water volume lost from the assumed ruptured lines (AFW pump recirculation lines isolated within 30 minutes, and four unisolated flow instrumentation lines). The assumptions used to determine this evaluation were: reactor trip occurs at 102% rated thermal power, RCS temperature uncertainty is 6&deg;F, net RCP head addition is 5 MWt for one pump in operation or 10 MWt for three pumps in operation, and the feedwater source temperature is 110&deg;F.
The Technical Specification basis is to ensure sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at hot standby for 9 h with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with a total loss of offsite power. Additional conservative assumptions were used in sizing the CST in conjunction with maintaining the plant at hot standby for 2 h, followed by a 4-h cooldown to 350&deg;F.
9.2.6.4        Tests and Inspections Only visual inspection is required.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.2.6.5          Storage Tank Fill The condensate storage tank main fill line is from the water treatment system. The condensate tank can also be filled from the demineralized water tank as a backup to the main fill line.
During load changes and resulting condenser high level, the condensate/feedwater system may be manually aligned to overflow to the condensate storage tank.
9.2.6.6          Flooding Due to Storage Tank Rupture The worst case to cause flooding of the new fuel storage building due to the rupture of the condensate storage tank is a 20-ft2 round hole punched by a 4000-lb car hitting the tank at an elevation of 12 to 25 ft from the ground at the critical location. The lower 13.26 ft of the tank are protected against missile hazards as described in paragraph 9.2.6.3. For a 20-ft2 hole with its center at 14 ft above the ground facing the entrance door of the new fuel storage building, a jet stream of up to 600 ft3/s will hit the ground at a distance of 39 ft from the edge of the tank at a 36&deg; angle from the horizontal plane with a jet diameter of 3.8 ft. The time required to empty the tank from full to 12 ft from the ground is about 160 s. If the location of the rupture hole is raised from 14 ft up to 25 ft above the ground, the discharge rate will decrease to 450 ft3/s, and the horizontal distance the jet travels before it hits the ground will increase to 41 ft; the angle of the jet before hitting the ground will increase from 36&deg; to 51&deg;.
Because of the relative position of the storage tank and the new fuel storage building, it is possible that the large jet flowing out from the ruptured hole will impinge on the road in front of the entrance door of the new fuel storage building. This entrance is protected by a Seismic Category I door, designed to withstand tornado loads, which is normally closed. The door opens in a direction that would cause the door to deflect the water jet away from the building and will withstand the forces that would result from the water jet impinging directly on the door in any opened or closed position (figures 9.2-9 and 9.2-10). Therefore, little or no water is expected to enter the building during the postulated event. However, no safety-related equipment would be damaged by water entering the door from this source. The auxiliary building external wall would not be damaged by direct impingement of the water jet from the ruptured tank.
The 8 surface drainage grates in the vicinity of the storage tank can drain up to about 60 ft3/s of water or 10 percent of the maximum discharge resulting from a 20-ft2 ruptured hole. The rest of the water will be retained on the ground and cause flooding in the area up to el 154.5 ft, which is 6 in. below the floor slab elevation of the building. The flooding can last up to 9 min.
The maximum discharge rate can be 12 ft3/s for an 8-in. ruptured hole at a height of 12 ft from the ground. This discharge rate will not cause flooding.
9.2-33                                      REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.2.7    REACTOR MAKEUP WATER SYSTEM 9.2.7.1        Design Bases The RMWS provides nonborated makeup water for the reactor coolant system and emergency makeup to the component cooling system.
The RMWS is also used to provide makeup and flushing water for various other components listed in paragraph 9.2.7.2.
All piping, valves, and other components shown in drawings D-175036 and D-205036 are Seismic Category I, with the exception of that piping shown with an HCD or HBD number (nonseismic).
The Category I portion of this system is designed, fabricated, and installed to the requirements of American Society of Mechanical Engineers Section III, Class 3 components.
9.2.7.2        System Description The P&ID for the RMWS is shown in drawings D-175036 and D-205036.
The RMWS provides a source of recycled demineralized water which is used as makeup for the following components:
A. Boric acid blenders.
B. Chemical mixing tanks.
C. Pressurizer relief tanks.
D. Reactor coolant pump standpipes.
The RMWS provides a source of flushing water to the liner fill system and the fill system sampler for the solidification and dewatering facility. The RMWS also provides a source of cleaning and flushing water for various equipment such as evaporators, pumps, and tanks.
The Units 1 and 2 RMWS are cross-connected such that the reactor makeup water pumps and storage tank of one unit can supply reactor makeup water to the users of the other unit. This cross-connection provides for uninterrupted operation of the units when one of the RMWS is out of service.
The system is composed of one 200,000-gal reactor makeup water storage tank, two reactor makeup water pumps, and associated valves, piping, and instrumentation.
9.2-34                                    REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.2.7.2.1      Components A. Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank The 200,000-gal reactor makeup water storage tank provides the makeup water for the reactor coolant system and stores the distillate from the recycle and waste evaporators. These stainless steel tanks contain a diaphragm membrane and the Unit 1 tank contains a 150-gal/min recirculating vacuum degasifier to exclude oxygen from the makeup water.
B. Reactor Makeup Water Pumps Two reactor makeup water pumps take suction from the reactor makeup water storage tanks. These pumps are used to feed dilution water to the boric acid blender and to supply makeup water for intermittent flushing of equipment and piping.
Each pump is sized to match the maximum letdown flow from the reactor coolant system. One pump serves as a standby for the other. These centrifugal pumps are constructed of austenitic stainless steel.
C. Valves Diaphragm valves are used to regulate the flow of demineralized water to the various components. Air-operated globe valves are used to regulate the flow of makeup water to the reactor coolant system.
D. Piping The RMWS piping is fabricated of austenitic stainless steel. Piping joints and connections are welded, except where flanged connections are required to facilitate equipment removal for maintenance.
9.2.7.3        Safety Evaluation The sole safety function of the RMWS is to provide makeup water to the component cooling surge tank in the event of a low level in that tank resulting from a leak in the component cooling system and in the event that the demineralized water makeup system is unavailable.
The RMWS is provided with two pumps; each is a backup for the other, and each is on a separate emergency power bus.
Reactor makeup water pumps 1A and 1B (drawings D-175036 and D-205036) are supplied with emergency power through their motor control centers, 1A and 1B, respectively. The motor control centers are fed from the 4-kV emergency buses 1F and 1G, respectively, through the 600-V emergency load centers 1D and 1E, respectively.
9.2-35                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 Therefore, the CCW and other essential systems will receive makeup water from the reactor makeup water storage tank in the event of LOSP.
9.2.7.4          Tests and Inspections The RMWS is operated intermittently during all phases of plant operations. The major components of the system are located in the yard and are easily accessible for inspection at any time.
9.2.7.5          Instrumentation Applications The instrumentation that is available for the RMWS is shown in drawings D-175036 and D-205036. Alarms are provided as noted.
9.2.8      PLANT WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM 9.2.8.1          Design Bases The plant water treatment system is designed to provide both Units 1 and 2 with normal demineralized water requirements during all phases of plant operations. This includes water for filling, flushing, and making up losses during startup, shutdown, refueling, power, and maintenance operations.
This system does not service any nuclear safety function and is Safety Class NNS .
9.2.8.2          System Description A simplified flow diagram of the plant water treatment system is shown on figure 9.2-11.
The plant water treatment system equipment is housed in the Water Treatment Building which is separated from the main power generation building. The system consists of an Avantech water treatment package with piping, pumps, power feeds and other equipment as required to support the plant water treatment system. The plant water treatment system receives raw water from the nonsafety-related portion of the service water system with the well water system as a backup and supplies demineralized water to the plant.
The following plant equipment is provided to support the Avantech water treatment package.
A. Raw Water Storage Tank The Raw Water Storage tank provides a source of water to the Avantech water treatment package.
B. Well Water (Alternate Water Source)
Well water is available as an alternate suction source for the Avantech water treatment package.
9.2-36                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 C.      Avantech Water Treatment Package The Avantech water treatment package is provided to process raw water provided by the service water system or well water into demineralized water.
Power to the Avantech equipment is from nonsafety-related sources.
: 1.      Clarifier supply pumps - Two pumps, rated at 800 gal/min and 50 ft total dynamic head (TDH), pump service water from the clarifier supply sump to the clarifier. During normal operation, one pump would be running with one pump as a spare.
: 2.      Clearwell pumps - Three pumps, rated at 400 gal/min and 60 ft TDH, pump clarified water from the clarifier clear well to the water storage tank.
During normal operation, two pumps will be running with one pump as a spare.
: 3.      Backwash pump - One pump, rated at 1750 gal/min and 50 ft TDH, supplies clarified water from the water storage tank to the clarifier for backwash.
D.      Waste Neutralization System Waste water is collected in the waste neutralization sump and pumped into the 19,000-gal waste collection tank. The contents of the tank are released to the sediment pond by gravity flow. Since the demineralizer waste water cannot contain radioactive contamination, only the pH of the waste tank effluent is monitored.
Waste neutralization sump pumps - Two pumps, rated at 300 gal/min and 50-ft TDH, transfer water from the waste neutralization sump to the waste storage tank. Both pumps are normally controlled by a level controller in the sump.
The final plant effluent water is typically maintained at or below the following limits:
Conductivity .......................... 0.10 mho/cm at 25&deg;C Average soluble silica ........... 0.02 ppm Oxygen ................................. 0.10 ppm The Avantech Water Treatment System will improve the reliability and service life of the steam generators. This system is sized to purify 550 gal/min of water. The objectives of this facility are to decrease the quantity of organic material passing through the plant and in the long term, a decreased probability of corrosion for the secondary side of the steam generators, a decreased inventory of hideout return chemicals when the FNP units are shut down, and the elimination of chemistry related power holds during restarts.
9.2.8.3        Safety Evaluation The plant water treatment system is not required for any safety-related functions.
Consequently, the failure of any part of this system will not adversely affect the nuclear safety of the plant.
9.2-37                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The possibility of radioactively contaminated water siphoning into the demineralized water system from the reactor makeup water storage tank is precluded by a check valve at the inlet of each reactor makeup water storage tank, as shown in figure 9.2-11.
9.2.8.4          Tests and Inspections The plant water treatment system is operated intermittently during all phases of plant operations. The major components of the system are located in the water treatment building and are easily accessible for inspection at any time.
9.2.8.5          Instrumentation Applications The clarifier has a control panel with all the instruments and alarms necessary to allow the early detection of abnormal conditions. The major instrumentation that is available for the water treatment plant is shown on figure 9.2-11.
9.2.9  WELL WATER SYSTEM 9.2.9.1          Design Bases The well water system provides water for the potable and sanitary water system discussed in subsection 9.2.4, the fire protection system discussed in subsection 9.5.1, and the demineralized water system discussed in subsection 9.2.3. The system is Safety Class NNS and Seismic Category II.
9.2.9.2          System Description The well water system is shown schematically in drawing D-170110, sheet 1. Two operational deep wells are located at the plant site. The 500-gal/min-capacity pump on deep well No. 2 and the 300-gal/min-capacity pump on deep well No. 4 serve as the primary supply to the 20,000-gal sanitary water tank and the two 300,000-gal fire protection tanks and serve as backup supply to the 200,000-gal filtered water storage tank. Depending on which pump is selected for the lead position, one of these two pumps is automatically initiated when there is demand for water in the sanitary or fire protection tanks. The other of these two pumps will start automatically (lag position) if the lead pump does not start after a short time delay, or may be started manually for additional well water supply. A third water well pump, No. 3, may be started manually, if needed.
The piping system is designed such that all three pumps are interconnected to ensure that proper levels are maintained in all tanks. No. 2 and No. 4 deep well pumps are capable of producing approximately 500 gal/min and 300 gal/min, respectively; well water pump No. 3 will produce approximately 100 gal/min. Refer to table 2.4-9 for additional well data.
Usage of the plant well water is described by paragraph 2.4.13.1.4.
9.2-38                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.2.9.3          Safety Evaluation Deep well pump No. 2 (NSY36P501B) or No. 4 (NSY36P501F) serves as the primary supply to the fire protection system. Well water pump No. 3 (NSY36P501F) serves as a manual backup.
Each well water pump is equipped with a safety relief valve to protect system piping and components. The discharge line of each pump is provided with a pressure switch which trips the pump to prevent it from operating at its shutoff head. A time delay on the pressure switches prevents the pumps from tripping due to momentary pressure surges that may occur during the starting or stopping of an adjacent pump.
The filtered water storage tank and fire protection tanks are located approximately 500 ft from the nearest safety-related equipment. Water resulting from the rupture of any of these tanks would flow into the yard drainage system without affecting any safety-related equipment.
9.2.9.4          Tests and Inspections The well water system supply is periodically tested and certified as to quality.
9.2.9.5          Instrumentation Applications Each tank that is provided water from the well water system is equipped with level instrumentation which ensures proper tank level. Additional system instrumentation (pressure switches) ensures that the pumps are running when they are required and tripped when they are not required.
9.2-39                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 REFERENCES
: 1. Avrett, J. R., "A Compilation of Surface Water Quality Data in Alabama," Geological Survey of Alabama, Circular 36, 1966.
: 2. Peirce, L. B., "Reservoir Temperatures in North Central Alabama," Geological Survey of Alabama, Bulletin 82, 1964.
9.2-40                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9
[HISTORICAL]
[TABLE 9.2-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
RIVER WATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA River water pumps installed with Unit 1 Quantity                                                  5 Manufacturer                                              Byron Jackson Type                                                      One-stage vertical circulator Rated capacity (gal/min)                                  9750 Rated heat (ft)                                          175 Motor horsepower                                          600 Design pressure (psig)                                    150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                                  125 River water pumps installed with Unit 2 Quantity                                                  5 Manufacturer                                              Johnston Type                                                      Two-stage vertical circulator Rated capacity (gal/min)                                  9750 Rated head (ft)                                          175 Motor horsepower                                          600 Design pressure (psig)                                    150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                                  125 River water piping and valves Design pressure (psig)                                    150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                                  125 ]
REV 23 5/11
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA Service water pumps (Unit 1)
Quantity                                              5 Manufacturer                                          Sulzer Type                                                  Two-stage vertical circulator Rated capacity (gal/min)                              9000 Rated head (ft)                                        210 Motor horsepower                                      600 Design pressure (psig)                                150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                                125 Service water pumps (Unit 2)
Quantity                                              5 Manufacturer                                          Johnston Type                                                  Two-stage vertical circulator Rated capacity (gal/min)                              9000 Rated head (ft)                                        210 Motor horsepower                                      600 Design pressure (psig)                                150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                                125 Service water piping and valves Design pressure (psig)                                150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                                125 REV 23 5/11
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-2 NUMBER OF PUMPS REQUIRED PER UNIT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE COOLING River Water              Service Water Condition                                  Pumps(a)                  Pumps Safe cold shutdown (normal)                                            0                        4 Loss of offsite power                                                  0                        2 LOCA (minimum safeguards)                                              0                        2 Probable maximum flood                                                0                        4(b)
: a. River water is available during normal operating conditions for use as makeup to the service water storage pond, which serves as the ultimate heat sink. However, river water is not required for any of the conditions listed in this table. When river water is not available, the service water system can be recirculated to the pond to minimize the ponds inventory losses.
: b. At the probable maximum flood, the river water pump structure will be flooded; therefore, the service water pump flow will be supplied from storage pond volume. The number of pumps required (four) assumes a normal safe cold shutdown condition, recirculating the cooling water to the storage pond.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-3 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DESIGN FLOWRATES Normal Operation        Loss of Offsite Power              Hot Shutdown                  Cold Shutdown              LOCA Injection        LOCA Recirculation Number of              Number of                    Number of                      Number of                  Number of                  Number of Components    Flowrate/ Components        Flowrate/  Components          Flowrate/ Components      Flowrate/ Components      Flowrate/ Components    Flowrate/
Receiving  Component  Receiving      Component    Receiving        Component    Receiving      Component  Receiving      Component  Receiving    Component Component Description      SW Flow        (GPM)    SW Flow            (GPM)      SW Flow              (GPM)      SW Flow        (GPM)      SW Flow          (GPM)    SW Flow        (GPM)
Component Cooling Water              1          10,000      1            10,000          1                10,000        1            10,000        1            10,000      1          10,000 Heat Exchangers Containment Coolers                  4            800        2                800          4                  800        4              800        2              2,000      2          2,000 Pump Room Coolers:
RHR (LHSI)                            2            40        1                40          2                  40        2              40        1                40        1            40 Charging (HHSI)                      3            105        2                105          3                  105        3              105        2              105        2            105 Containment Spray                    2            105        1                105          2                  105        2              105        1              105        1            105 Auxiliary Feedwater                  2            105        1                105          2                  105        2              105        1              105        1            105 Component Cooling                    2            105        1                105          2                  105        2              105        1              105        1            105 600V Load Center Room Cooler          2            75        1                75          2                  75        2              75        1              75        1            75 Battery Charging Room Coolers        2            30        1                30          2                  30        2              30        1              30        1            30 (Swing HX)                          1            24        1                24          1                  24        1              24        1                24        1            24 Motor Control Center Room Cooler      2            20        1                20          2                  20        2              20        1              20        1            20 Diesel Generators:
Small Diesel (2C & 1C)              2            540        1                540          2                  540        2              540        1              540        1            950 Large Diesel (1B, 2B, & 1-2A)        2            820        1                820          2                  820        2              820        1              820        1          1,450 (SEE NOTE 3)
Letdown Chiller Condenser            1            420      ---                0          1                  420        ---              0        ---                0      ---            0 (SEE NOTE 5)
Steam Generator Blowdown              1          1,800      ---                0          ---                  0        ---              0        ---                0      ---            0 Heat Exchanger (SEE NOTES 4 & 5)
Reactor Coolant Pump                  3            162      ---                0          3                  162        3              162        ---              0        ---            0 Motor Air Coolers (SEE NOTE 5)
Turbine Building Heat Exchangers    ---        12,000      ---              4,615        ---              12,000      ---            200        ---                0      ---            0 (SEE NOTES 5 & 6)
REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-3 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Notes:
: 1. These values are design flowrates for each component listed. Actual flowrates to individual components will vary depending on service water temperature and component operational conditions.
: 2. This table is applicable for one unit operation. The number of components receiving SW flow from one unit is indicated for each condition listed. For a single failure involving the loss of a train, this table assumes that the on-service train is available for each unit.
: 3. The number of diesels receiving SW flow from one unit is indicated for each condition listed. See FSAR section 9.5.5 for a description of SW cooling the diesel generators.
Service water is normally supplied to all five diesel generators continuously, even though only one SW train/unit is required for safe shutdown.
This requirement is fulfilled even though SW may supply between two and five diesel generators, depending upon which SW trains are assumed lost to a single failure.
Diesel Generator 2C will not automatically start upon a LOSP as it has been designated the Alternate AC Supply during a Station Blackout.
: 4. The steam generator blowdown heat exchanger is operating during normal operation of the plant only. During intermittent blowdown operation, the service water flowrate to the heat exchanger may reach 3,200 GPM.
: 5. These loads are isolated either automatically following a LOCA or by operator action following a LOSP.
: 6. Following a LOSP, the Turbine Building inlet valves automatically throttle to allow minimum service water flow to aid in equipment cooldown. No equipment within the Turbine Building is required to operate following a LOSP.
REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-4 (This Table Intentionally Deleted)
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-5 SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Effect on Safety-Related Component                              Malfunction                                      Systems                                        Comments Service water pump                                  Pump failure                                  No effect                  Pump trip will be alarmed in the control room. Two pumps are the minimum required for post-LOCA operation. The failed pump will be isolated and repaired. The spare pump may be manually started to replace the failed pump.
Service water pump                                  Header break                                    No effect                  Low pressure will be alarmed discharge header                                                                                                                in the control room. The header is valved so that failure of the header will not result in less than two pumps supplying water.
Service water supply                                  Line break                                    No effect                  Low pressure will be alarmed in line                                                                                                                            the control room. Redundant supply line will be used to supply the full flow required.
Isolation valve                                      Valve failure                                  No effect                  Valves are arranged so that no single failure will render less than two pumps available.
Emergency recirculation                              Line break                                    No effect                  Redundant line available.
line to pond
: a. Analysis given above is for one pump, one valve, one line, etc. Analysis is similar for all other components. Analysis given is for one unit.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-6 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM DESIGN FLOWRATES [Note a]
(For Each Plant Unit, gal/min)
Normal                        Hot                                  LOCA [Note b]        LOCA [Note b]
Operation                    Shutdown        Cooldown [Note c]        (Injection)        (Recirculation)
Charging Pump(s)
Lube Oil Cooler(s)                              20 (2)                      20 (2)              20 (2)                20 (2)                20 (2)
Gear Oil Cooler(s)                      16/10 (2) [Note d, h]      16/10 (2) [Note d, h] 16/10 (2) [Note d, h] 16/10 (2) [Note d, h] 16/10 (2) [Note d, h]
Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger [Note j]                  (230 gal/min during startup only)
Hydrogen Recombiner(s)                                20 (2)                      20 (2)                N/A                    N/A                  N/A Letdown Heat Exchanger [Note k]                    240 [Note f]                530 [Note f]            240                    N/A                  N/A Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Heat Exchanger              230                          230                  N/A                    N/A                  N/A
[Note j]
Reactor Coolant Pump(s)                              585 (3)                      585 (3)                585            585 (3) [Note g]            N/A Recycle Evaporator Package [Note j]                    780                          780                  780                    N/A                  N/A RHR Heat Exchanger(s)                                  N/A                          N/A                5600                  5600                5600 RHR Pump(s)                                              5                          5                    5                    5                    5 Sample System [Note j]                                  50                          50                    50                    N/A                  N/A Seal Water Heat Exchanger                              200                          200                  200                    N/A                  N/A Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger(s)                      3000                        3000                3000              3000 [Note i]        3000 [Note i]
Waste Evaporator Package [Note j]                  780 [Note e]                780 [Note e]          780 [Note e]              N/A                  N/A Waste Gas Compressor(s) [Note j]                      100 (2)                      100 (2)              100 (2)                  N/A                  N/A Liquid Radwaste Processing System Chiller                60                          60                    60                    N/A                  N/A
[Note j]
Liquid Radwaste A/C System [Note j]                    30 (2)                      30 (2)              30 (2)                  N/A                  N/A
( )      Number of components if more than one REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-6 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
[a] These values are design flowrates for the components listed. Actual flowrates to individual components will vary depending on component operational conditions.
[b] Only one train of components are assumed in service following a LOCA.
[c] This column denotes components in operation during a single train cooldown. Both trains of CCW are normally placed in service during the cooldown period. However, only one train of CCW is required to operate during this cooldown period.
[d] Unit 1 flow given first (Unit 1/Unit 2).
[e] The waste evaporator is not currently used.
[f] With maximum purification, the flow requirement is 530 gpm.
[g] CCW flow to the RCPs is terminated on a Phase B isolation signal.
[h] Two charging pumps are normally aligned to the on-service train of CCW.
[i] The original CCW system design criteria assumed the Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchangers were isolated during the initial phase of LOCA Recirculation. However, the current alignment would allow the on-service Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger to receive CCW flow during LOCA Recirculation. When a Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger and an RHR heat exchanger are aligned to the same train, as they could be during LOCA Recirculation, the CCW flow available to the Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger will decrease.
(j) CCW flow to these components is isolated by a failed closed air-operated valve following a loss of offsite power (LOSP).
(k) Even though letdown flow to the letdown heat exchanger is isolated following a loss of offsite power (LOSP), CCW flow to this component could increase as the air operator flow control valve fails open.
REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-7 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEAT LOADS (For Each Plant Unit, 106 Btu/h)
Normal                      Hot                              LOCA            LOCA Operation [Note l]            Shutdown      Cooldown [Note h]  (Injection)    (Recirculation)
CCW Pump(s)                                          0.833                  0.833              0.833          0.833        0.833 Charging Pump(s) [Note g]
Lube Oil Cooler(s)                          0.096 (2)              0.096 (2)          0.096 (2)      0.096 (2)    0.096 (2)
Gear Oil Cooler(s)                          0.045 (2)              0.045 (2)          0.045 (2)      0.045 (2)    0.045 (2)
Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger [Note j]    (4.9 x 106 Btu/h during startup only)
Hydrogen Recombiner(s)                                0.14 (2)                0.07              N/A              N/A                N/A Letdown Heat Exchanger [Note k]                      5.37 [Note a]        11.67 [Note a]      4.8 [Note a]    N/A                N/A Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Heat Exchanger            2.23                    2.23              N/A              N/A                N/A
[Note j]
Reactor Coolant Pump(s)                              2.34 (3)                2.34 (3)          0.78            N/A                N/A Recycle Evaporator Package [Note j]                  8.8                    8.8                8.8 [Note d]    N/A                N/A RHR Heat Exchanger(s)                                N/A                      N/A              93.85 [Note b]    N/A        108.9 [Note i, m]
RHR Pump(s)                                          N/A                      N/A                0.035          0.035          0.035 Sample System [Note j]                                1.06 [Note e]          1.06 [Note e]      1.06 [Note e]    N/A                N/A Seal Water Heat Exchanger                            1.4                    1.4                1.4              N/A                N/A Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger(s)                    15.6 [Note c]          15.6 [Note c]      15.6 [Note c]  15.6 [Note c]    [Note c, m]
Waste Evaporator Package [Note j]                N/A [Note f]              N/A [Note f]      N/A [Note f]        N/A                N/A Waste Gas Compressor(s) [Note j]                      0.27 (2)                0.135              0.27 (2)        N/A                N/A
( ).No. of components if more than one.
REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-7 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
[a] With normal purification, the heat load is 5.37 x 106 Btu/hr. With maximum purification, the heat load is 11.67 x 106 Btu/hr. During cooldown, the heat load is 4.8 x 106 Btu/hr.
[b] Initial RHR heat load for a single train cooldown.
[c] The spent fuel pool heat load is based on a 74 assembly per cycle discharge schedule with 23 days decay time for the last discharge and was calculated using the NRCs uncertainty factors.
[d] The evaporator is not required to operate during the cooldown period. If it is necessary to reduce the heat load on the component cooling water system, the evaporator can be shut down and the cooling flow terminated.
[e] Maximum calculated heat load assuming that the Gross Failed Fuel Detector (GFFD), the Fine Cooling Chiller, and 9 sample coolers are in operation.
[f] The waste evaporator is not currently used. Therefore, the Waste Evaporators heat load of 8.8 MBtu/Hr is not listed.
[g] Two charging pumps are normally aligned to the on-service train of CCW.
[h] This column denotes components in operation during a single train cooldown. Both trains of CCW are normally placed in service during the cooldown period. However, only one train of CCW is required to operate during the cooldown period.
[i] Initial RHR heat load for a single train cooldown for LOCA recirculation mode.
[j] CCW flow to these components is isolated by a failed closed air-operated valve following a loss of offsite power (LOSP). Therefore, should a LOSP occur, these heat loads would not be transferred to the CCW system.
[k] Letdown flow to the letdown heat exchanger is isolated following a loss of offsite power (LOSP). Therefore, should a LOSP occur, the letdown heat exchanger heat load would not be transferred to the CCW system.
[l] Represents start-up and at-power operation.
[m] The heat loads on the RHR and spent fuel pool (SFP) heat exchangers (HXs) vary during the LOCA recirculation event with a resultant heatup of the SFP. The combined heat loads do not exceed 115.3 MBTU/hr which is the bounding combined heat load based on the power uprate analyses. The maximum RHR HX heat load occurs at the start of recirculation phase, and the maximum SFP HX heat load occurs after the peak SFP temperature is reached and SFP cooldown commences. The maximum SFP heat removal rate slightly exceeds the assumed decay heat load of 15.4 MBTU/hr from the power uprate analyses.
REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-8 COMPONENT COOLING WATER/SERVICE WATER TEMPERATURES (&deg;F)
(c)(d)                        (c)(e)                (c)(f)              (c)(g)
CCW Heat                          Normal                      Hot                    Normal                  Abnormal                    LOCA                  LOCA (a)                        (b)
Exchanger Nozzle                    Operation                Shutdown                  Cooldown                  Cooldown                    Injection          Recirculation Component cooling                      118.8                    118.8                    155.4                    163.2                      109.0                167.1 water inlet Component cooling                      105.0                    105.0                    128.9                    132.8                      101.9                134.5 water outlet (h)                        (h)
Service water                          95.0                      95.0                      97.3                      97.3                        97.3                  97.3 inlet Service water                          104.1                    105.0                    116.9                    119.5                      100.6                120.7 outlet
: a.        With maximum purification. Temperatures based on 6,600 gal/min CCW flow and 10,000 gal/min service water flow.
: b.        Temperatures based on 6,400 gal/min CCW flow and 8,340 gal/min service water flow.
2
: c.        All temperatures listed are based on 0.0028 hr. ft &deg;F/Btu overall fouling and 5% tube plugging (118) tubes for the CCW heat exchanger. Additionally, the CCW heat exchanger 2              2 heat transfer area is assumed to be reduced from 13,052 ft to 12,841 ft due to the 12-inch Plasticor coating on the inside inlet tube end.
: d.        Temperatures based on 7,500 gal/min CCW flow and 10,000 gal/min service water flow.
: e.        Temperatures based on 7,419 gal/min CCW flow and 10,000 gal/min service water flow.
: f.        Temperatures based on 4,643 gal/min CCW flow and 10,000 gal/min service water flow.
: g.        Temperatures based on 7,299 gal/min CCW flow and 10,000 gal/min service water flow.
: h.        A LOCA is assumed to occur on the other unit causing the SW inlet temperature to rise from 95&deg;F to 97.3&deg;F.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-9 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA Component cooling pumps Quantity                                                          3 Type                                                              Horizontal, centrifugal Rated capacity (gal/min)                                          6700 Rated head (ft)                                                    175 Motor horsepower                                                  400 Casing material                                                    Cast steel Design pressure (psig)                                            150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                                            200 Component cooling heat exchangers (per exchanger)
Quantity                                                          3 Type                                                              Shell and straight tube Heat transferred (Btu/h)                                          45.6 x 106 (normal operation with maximum letdown)
Shell side (component cooling water)
Inlet temperature (&deg;F)                                        118.8 Outlet temperature (&deg;F)                                        105 Design flowrate (lb/h)                                        3.28 x 106 Design temperature (&deg;F)                                        200 Design pressure (psig)                                        150 Material                                                      Carbon steel Tube side (service water)
Inlet temperature (&deg;F)                                        95 Outlet temperature (&deg;F)                                        104.1 Design flowrate (lb/h)                                        4.96 x 106 Design pressure (psig)                                        150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                                        200 Material                                                      Admiralty Note:  An epoxy coating has been applied to the tubesheets, the first 12 of the tubes on the inlet end, channel head, channel head gasket surface, cover plate, and first 12 of the service water inlet piping for erosion/corrosion protection.
Component cooling surge tank Quantity                                                          1 Volume (gal)                                                      2000 Design pressure (psig)                                            14 Design temperature (&deg;F)                                            200 Construction material                                              Carbon steel REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-9 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Component cooling loop piping and valves Design pressure (psig)                                  150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                                200 REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-10 COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM CODE REQUIREMENTS Component cooling pumps                          ASME Pump and Valve Code Component cooling heat exchangers                ASME Section VIII (Unit 1)
Component cooling heat exchangers                ASME Section III (Unit 2)
Component cooling surge tank                    API 620 Component cooling piping                        ASME Section III Component cooling valves:
Nuclear class valves,                        ASME Pump and Valve Code 2 1/2 in. and larger Nuclear class valves,                        ASME Section III 2 in. and smaller Butterfly valves                                ASME Section III Nuclear control valves                          ASME Section III Nuclear relief valves                            ASME Section III REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-11 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS Component              Malfunction                Comments and Consequences Component cooling        Fails to              Three pumps are provided. One pump                    start                pump required for normal, hot shutdown or post-LOCA heat removal.
Motor-operated          Unable to open        Two valves and heat exchangers valve on RHR            post-LOCA            are provided. One heat exchanger exchanger inlet                                is required to operate post-LOCA.
Component cooling        Tube leakage          Each unit was hydrostatically heat exchanger                                tested and freon leak-tested prior to shipment. Leakage is detected by change in surge tank level. Each unit is isolable.
Component cooling        Failure              The system is always valved system pressure          resulting in          into two separate flow trains, boundary                abnormal              each of which meets minimum leakage of            safeguard requirements.
component            Leakage cannot affect both cooling water        trains. Low operating pressures make ruptures improbable.
Component cooling        Manual valve          This will be prevented by pumps                    on a pump            prestartup and operational suction or            check. Further, during normal discharge            operation, each pump will be line closed          checked on a periodic basis which would indicate if a valve were closed. Annuncia-tion in the control room for low flow for certain equipment cooled by CCW.
Component cooling        Left open            This will be prevented by system vent or                                prestartup and operational drain valve                                    checks. On the operating train such a situation will readily be assessed by makeup requirements to system. On the second train, such a situation will be ascertained by surge tank level alarms.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-11 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Component    Malfunction              Comments and Consequences Demineralized          Stick open      The check valve will be backed water makeup                          up by the motor-operated valve.
line check valve                      Valve will normally be closed.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-12 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM HEAT LOAD: (e)
ONE UNIT LOCA WITH MAXIMUM ESF, (a)ONE UNIT SHUTDOWN/COOLDOWN 6
All heat loads are in 10 Btu/h Single Unit:                        Two Units: LOCA +
Shutdown                          Shutdown + Margin (b)                (b)                (b)                (b)
LOCA          50&deg;F/h              16-h              50&deg;F/h              16-h (b)                                          (c)
Time(s)                  Unit        Cooldown            Cooldown  Margin    Cooldown          Cooldown 1                          0            179                179      10        189                189 32                        443            179                179      10        632                632 50                        443            179                179      10        632                632 100                        447            179                179      10        636                636 150                        448            179                179      10        637                637 200                        446            179                179      10        635                635 250                        440            179                179      10        629                629 300                        429            179                179      10        618                618 350                        420            179                179      10        609                609 400                        409            179                179      10        598                598 450                        400            179                179      10        589                589 500                        390            179                179      10        580                580 700                        361            179                179      10        550                550 3
1.0 x 10                  306            179                179      10        495                495
    -      3 1.50 x 10                  214            179                179      10        403                403
    +      3 1.50 x 10                  405            179                179      10        594                594 3
2.0 x 10                  350            179                179      10        539                539 3
3.0 x 10                  340            179                179      10        529                529 3
5.0 x 10                  321            179                179      10        510                510 3
7.0 x 10                  289            179                179      10        478                478
    -      3 7.20 x 10                  287            179                179      10        476                476
    +      3 7.20 x 10                  287            199                199      10        496                496 4
1.0 x 10                  252            187                187      10        450                450 4
1.5 x 10                  206            169                169      10        385                385 4
2.0 x 10                  183            155                155      10        348                348
    -      4 2.16 x 10                  178            149                149      10        337                337
    +      4 2.16 x 10                  178            364                296      10        552                484 4
3.0 x 10                  161            346                279      10        517                450
    -      4 3.67 x 10                  156            332                265      10        498                431
    +      4 3.67 x 10                  156            189                265      10        355                431 4
5.0 x 10                  146            172                247      10        328                403 4
7.0 x 10                  137            146                221      10        293                368
    -      4 7.92 x 10                  134            134                209      10        278                353
    +      4 7.92 x 10                  134            134                134      10        278                278 5
1.0 x 10                  129            118                118      10        257                257 5
1.5 x 10                  122            113                113      10        245                245 5
2.0 x 10                  117            109                109      10        236                236 5
3.0 x 10                  112            101                101      10        223                223 5
5.0 x 10                  104            96                  96      10        210                210 5
7.0 x 10                    99            92                  92      10        201                201 6
1.0 x 10                    95            86                  86      10        191                191 6(d) 2.59 x 10                  95            86                  86      10        191                191 REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-12 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
: a. Maximum ESF indicates that two RHR heat exchangers, two containment spray pumps, and four containment coolers are in service.
: b. The heat load on the service water system from the shutdown/ cooldown of a unit that has experienced a LOCA is described in more detail in table 9.2-13.
The heat load on the service water system from the unit that is undergoing a shutdown/cooldown with a 50&deg;F/h cooldown is described in more detail in table 9.2-14. 50&deg;F/h cooldown refers to the rate of the cooldown of the RCS from 350&deg;F to 140&deg;F. This is the temperature range through which the RHRS operates.
The heat load on the service water system from the unit that is undergoing a shutdown/cooldown with a 16-h cooldown is described in more detail in table 9.2-15. Sixteen-hour cooldown refers to the length of time required to cool the RCS from 350&deg;F to 140&deg;F. This is the temperature range through which the RHRS operates. Sixteen hours is the normal time required to provide this cooldown using one train of RHR; however, to maximize heat input to the service water pond, this analysis assumes both trains of RHR are operating during the 16-h cooldown.
: c. The UHS analysis includes a 10 million Btu/h heat load as a margin for possible future additional service water system heat loads.
6
: d. The value of 2.59 x 10 s equals 30 days.
: e. The heat loads rejected by individual components into the SWS were reevaluated to assess the impact of power uprating both FNP units on the projected maximum SW pond (UHS) temperature. While some component heat loads increase as a result of power uprate, many others decrease for reasons other than uprate. These include the reduction in the heat load from Diesel Generator 2C (SBO diesel which does not start on LOSP), from the Waste Evaporator Package (no longer in use at FNP), and from the control room air conditioner (no longer cooled by service water). The net of these changes to the overall UHS heat load, including changes related to power uprating and those unrelated to power uprating, is a decrease in the heat load beginning on the second day of the 30-day period of evaluation and continuing through the end of the 30-day period. As the reevaluated overall heat load into the UHS is lower than that described in the current UHS evaluation, the UHS remains capable of performing its safety-related function and the peak supply temperature from the service water pond will be below the current design basis value of 106.2&deg;F.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-13 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM HEAT LOAD(e)
LOCA WITH MAXIMUM ESF(a)
Sensible Heat + Decay Heat(b)
RHR HXs              Ctmt. Coolers Aux. Loads(c)  Total Load Time(s)        (106 Btu/h)            (106 Btu/h)  (106 Btu/h)    (106 Btu/h) 1                    0                      0            0                    0 32                  0                    368            75                  443 50                  0                    368            75                  443 100                  0                    372            75                  447 150                  0                    374            75                  448 200                  0                    371            75                  446 250                  0                    365            75                  440 300                  0                    355            75                  429 350                  0                    345            75                  420 400                  0                    334            75                  409 450                  0                    325            75                  400 500                  0                    316            75                  390 700                  0                    286            75                  361 1.0 x 103            0                    232            75                  306 1.50 x 103(b)      0                    139            75                  214 1.50+ x 103(b)    191                    139            75                  405 2.0 x 103        177                      98            75                  350 3.0 x 103        149                    106            75                  340 5.0 x 103        142                    105            75                  321 7.0 x 103        127                      87            75                  289 1.0 x 104        107                      70            75                  252 1.5 x 104          80                      51            75                  206 2.0 x 104          66                      41            75                  183 3.0 x 104          54                      33            75                  161 5.0 x 104          45                      26            75                  146 7.0 x 104          39                      23            75                  137 1.0 x 105          34                      19            75                  129 1.5 x 105          31                      16            75                  122 2.0 x 105          28                      14            75                  117 3.0 x 105          25                      12            75                  112 5.0 x 105          20                        9            75                  104 7.0 x 105          17                        7            75                    99 1.0 x 106          15                        5            75                    95 2.59 x 106(d)      15                        5            75                    95 REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-13 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
: a.      Maximum ESF indicates that two RHR heat exchangers, two containment spray pumps, and four containment coolers are in service.
: b.      Sensible and decay heat loads are the sum of the heat loads of the RHR heat exchanger, the containment air coolers, and containment heat sinks. The RHRS begins operating in the recirculation mode at t = 1.50 x 103 s after the LOCA.
: c.      Auxiliary Loads:
Heat Load Component                                                          (106 Btu/h)
ESF pump room coolers                                                      1.4 Control room ac condensers**                                                1.2**
Other auxiliary building room coolers and air conditioning units            0.4 Loads on CCW HX (other than RHR HX)
Spent-fuel pool heat exchanger                                        11.9 RHR pump seal cooler (2 pumps)                                        0.2 Charging pump seal cooler, gear oil cooler and bearing cooler (3 pumps)                                          0.9 Service water pumps (4 pumps)                                              6.1 Diesel generators (5 diesels)                                              52.6 Total auxiliary loads:                                                      74.7 x 106 Btu/h
  ** The water cooled control room AC units have been replaced with air cooled AC units. Thus, the UHS analysis considers this heat load (1.2 x 106 Btu/h) as additional margin.
: d. The value of 2.59 x 106 s equals 30 days.
: e. The heat loads rejected by individual components into the SWS were reevaluated to assess the impact of power uprating both FNP units on the projected maximum SW pond (UHS) temperature.
While some component heat loads increase as a result of power uprate, many others decrease for reasons other than uprate. These include the reduction in the heat load from Diesel Generator 2C (SBO diesel which does not start on LOSP), from the Waste Evaporator Package (no longer in use at FNP), and from the control room air conditioner (no longer cooled by service water). The net of these changes to the overall UHS heat load, including changes related to power uprating and those unrelated to power uprating, is a decrease in the heat load beginning on the second day of the 30-day period of evaluation and continuing through the end of the 30-day period. As the reevaluated overall heat load into the UHS is lower than that described in the current UHS evaluation, the UHS remains capable of performing its safety-related function and the peak supply temperature from the service water pond will be below the current design basis value of 106.2&deg;F.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-14 (SHEET 1 OF 4)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM HEAT LOAD(f)
SHUTDOWN WITH 50&deg;F/h COOLDOWN(a)
Time          RHR HXs(b)      Other CCW(d)    Auxiliary Loads(e) Total Load (s)            (106 Btu/h)      (106 Btu/h)        (106 Btu/h)    (106 Btu/h) 1                  0              49                130            179 30                  0              49                130            179 50                  0              49                130            179 100                0              49                130            179 150                0              49                130            179 200                0              49                130            179 250                0              49                130            179 300                0              49                130            179 350                0              49                130            179 400                0              49                130            179 450                0              49                130            179 500                0              49                130            179 700                0              49                130            179 3
1.0 x 10            0              49                130            179 1.5 x 103          0              49                130            179 2.0 x 103          0              49                130            179 3.0 x 103          0              49                130            179 5.0 x 103          0              49                130            179 7.20 x 103(c)      0              49                130            179 7.20+ x 103(c)      0              49                150            199 1.0 X 104          0              49                138            187 1.5 X 104          0              49                120            169 2.0 X 104          0              49                106            155 2.16 x 104(c)      0              49                100            149 2.16+ x 104(c)  218                50                  96            364 3.0 x 104        208                50                  88            346 3.67 x 104(c)  199                50                  83            332 3.67+ x 104(c)    80                30                  79            189 5.0 x 104        74                30                  68            172 7.0 x 104        64                30                  52            146 1.0 x 105        56                30                  32            118 1.5 x 105        51                30                  32            113 2.0 x 105        47                30                  32            109 3.0 x 105        39                30                  32            101 5.0 x 105        34                30                  32              96 7.0 x 105        30                30                  32              92 1.0 x 106        24                30                  32              86 2.59 x 106(c)    24                30                  32              86 REV 25 4/14
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-14 (SHEET 2 OF 4)
: a. 50&deg;F/h cooldown refers to the rate of the cooldown of the RCS from 350&deg;F/h to 140&deg;F/h. This is the temperature range through which the RHRS operates.
: b. The RHRS removes reactor sensible and decay heat loads. The heat load due to the reactor coolant pumps is included in the sensible heat load value. In order to be conservative, it is assumed that all three RCPs are operating until the RCS temperature is 140&deg;F.
: c. The analysis assumes the unit is tripped from 100-percent power at time t = 0 s. Reactor power is reduced from 100-percent power to 0-percent power in 2 h (at t = 7200 s). Based on a 50&deg;F/h cooldown from 547&deg;F to 350&deg;F, the unit is in hot shutdown and the RHRS is placed in service 4 h following attaining 0-percent power (at t = 21,600 s). With a 50&deg;F cooldown rate, the unit is in cold shutdown 4.2 h later (at t = 36,720 s) when the RCS temperature has decreased to 140&deg;F. The UHS analysis models a period of 30 days (2.59 x 106 s equals 30 days).
: d. Other CCW loads (other than RHR HX):
Heat Loads in 106 Btu/h Trip        HSD Component                                        to HSD        to CSD      CSD Spent-fuel pool heat exchanger                              11.9        11.9        11.9 Letdown heat exchanger                                      12.0        14.3          0 RCP thermal barrier                                          3.6          3.6          0 Seal water heat exchanger                                    1.3          1.3          0 Recycle evaporator                                          8.8          8.8        8.8 Reactor coolant drain tank HX                                1.7            0          0 Waste evaporator*                                            8.8          8.8        8.8 Waste gas compressor                                        0.3          0.3        0.1 RHR pump seal cooler (2 pumps)                                  0          0.2        0.2 Sample HX                                                    0.3          0.3        0.3 Catalytic H2 Recombiner                                      0.1            0          0 Charging pump seal HX, gear oil HX, and bearing HX (2 pumps)                            0.6          0.6          0 Total other CCW loads (x 106 Btu/h)                                          49.4        50.1        30.1 REV 25 4/14
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-14 (SHEET 3 OF 4)
* Though the waste evaporator package is not currently in use, its design heat load of 8.8 x 106 Btu/h is included as a conservatism.
: e. Auxiliary Loads:
Heat Loads in 106 Btu/h Trip        HSD Component                                                    to HSD      to CSD        CSD Reactor coolant pump air coolers                                  4.0        4.0          0 BTRS chillers (Note 4)                                            4.5        0            0 Containment coolers                                                7.4        7.4          7.4 ESF pump room coolers                                              1.4        1.4          1.4 Other auxiliary building room coolers                              0.4        0.4            0.4 and air conditioning units Blowdown heat exchanger                                                        Note 2 Service water pumps (4 pumps)                                      6.1        6.1            6.1 Diesel generators                                                              Note 1 Turbine building loads                                                        Note 3 Total Auxiliary Loads                                          23.8        19.3          15.3 (x 106 Btu/h)                                            (+ Steam generator blowdown
                                                                      + turbine building heat loads)
Notes:
: 1.      The heat load of these components is included in the heat loads for the unit that has experienced a LOCA.
: 2.      The blowdown heat exchanger is in operation for 4 h following 0-percent reactor power.
It is assumed that 0-percent reactor power is reached 2 h following the trip. From the trip until 0-percent power, the blowdown heat exchanger sees a blowdown flowrate of 75 6
gal/min and a heat load of 18.0 x 10 Btu/h. In the period from 2 h (t = 7200 s) to 6 h (t = 21,600 s) following the trip, the blowdown rate is increased to 200 gal/min. The heat load initially increases to 37.6 x 106 Btu/h due to the increased blowdown flowrate but then decreases with the decreasing RCS temperature. Blowdown is isolated when the RCS temperature reaches 140&deg;F (at t = 21,600 s).
REV 25 4/14
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-14 (SHEET 4 OF 4)
: 3.      It is assumed that the service water system sees the design turbine building heat load of 87.8 x 106 for the 2-h period from the trip until reactor power is reduced to 0 percent (at t = 7200 s). The turbine building heat load then drops linearly over a period of 24 h to 16.8 x 106 Btu/h (at t = 93,600 s). It then remains at 16.8 x 106 Btu/h for the remainder of the 30-day period.
: 4.      The BTRS chillers have been retired in place and are no longer in use. The BTRS chiller heat load of 4.5 x 106 Btu/h is included to maintain margin.
: f. The heat loads rejected by individual components into the SWS were reevaluated to assess the impact of power uprating both FNP units on the projected maximum SW pond (UHS) temperature. While some component heat loads increase as a result of power uprate, many others decrease for reasons other than uprate. These include the reduction in the heat load from Diesel Generator 2C (SBO diesel which does not start on LOSP), from the Waste Evaporator Package (no longer in use at FNP), and from the control room air conditioner (no longer cooled by service water). The net of these changes to the overall UHS heat load, including changes related to power uprating and those unrelated to power uprating, is a decrease in the heat load beginning on the second day of the 30-day period of evaluation and continuing through the end of the 30-day period. As the reevaluated overall heat load into the UHS is lower than that described in the current UHS evaluation, the UHS remains capable of performing its safety-related function and the peak supply temperature from the service water pond will be below the current design basis value of 106.2&deg;F.
REV 25 4/14
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-15 (SHEET 1 OF 4)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM HEAT LOAD(f)
NORMAL SHUTDOWN WITH 16-h COOLDOWN(a)
Time          RHR HXs(b)      Other CCW(d)    Auxiliary Loads(e)  Total Load (s)            (106 Btu/h)      (106 Btu/h)        (106 Btu/h)      (106 Btu/h) 1                    0                49                130            179 30                  0                49                130            179 50                  0                49                130            179 100                  0                49                130            179 150                  0                49                130            179 200                  0                49                130            179 250                  0                49                130            179 300                  0                49                130            179 350                  0                49                130            179 400                  0                49                130            179 450                  0                49                130            179 500                  0                49                130            179 700                  0                49                130            179 3
1.0 x 10            0                49                130            179 1.5 x 103            0                49                130            179 2.0 x 103            0                49                130            179 3.0 x 103            0                49                130            179 5.0 x 103            0                49                130            179 7.20 x 103(c)      0                49                130            179 7.20+ x 103(c)      0                49                150            199 1.0 X 104            0                49                138            187 1.5 X 104            0                49                120            169 2.0 X 104            0                49                106            155 2.16 x 104(c)      0                49                100            149 2.16+ x 104(c)    151                50                  96          296 3.0 x 104          140                50                  88          279 5.0 x 104          125                50                  68          247 7.0 x 104          116                50                  52          221 7.92 x 104        111                50                  48          209 7.92+ x 104        60                30                  44          134 1.0 x 105          56                30                  32          118 1.5 x 105          51                30                  32          113 2.0 x 105          47                30                  32          109 3.0 x 105          39                30                  32          101 5.0 x 105          34                30                  32            96 7.0 x 105          30                30                  32            92 1.0 x 106          24                30                  32            86 2.59 x 106(c)      24                30                  32            86 REV 25 4/14
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-15 (SHEET 2 OF 4)
: a.        Sixteen-hour cooldown refers to the length of time required to cool the RCS from 350&deg;F to 140&deg;F.
This is the temperature range through which the RHRS operates. Sixteen hours is the normal time required to provide this cooldown using one train of RHR; however, to maximize heat input to the service water pond, this analysis assumes both trains of RHR are operating during the 16-h cooldown.
: b.        The RHRS removes reactor sensible and decay heat loads. The heat load due to the reactor coolant pumps is included in the sensible heat load value. In order to be conservative, it is assumed that all three reactor coolant pumps are operating until the RCS temperature is 140&deg;F.
: c.        The analysis assumes the unit is tripped from 100-percent power at time t = 0 s. Reactor power is reduced from 100-percent power to 0-percent power in 2 h (at t = 7200 s). Based on a 50&deg;F/h cooldown from 547&deg;F to 350&deg;F, the unit is in hot shutdown and the RHRS is placed in service 4 h following attaining 0-percent power (at t = 21,600 s). The unit is then in cold shutdown 16 h (at t = 70,200 s) when the RCS temperature has decreased to 140&deg;F. The UHS analysis models a period of 30 days (2.59 x 106 s equal 30 days).
: d.        Other CCW loads (other than RHR HX):
Heat Loads in 106 Btu/h Trip          HSD Component                                              to HSD        to CSD        CSD Spent-fuel pool heat exchanger                                  11.9          11.9        11.9 Letdown heat exchanger                                          12.0          14.3            0 RCP thermal barrier                                                3.6          3.6            0 Seal water heat exchanger                                          1.3          1.3            0 Recycle evaporator                                                8.8          8.8          8.8 Reactor coolant drain tank HX                                      1.7            0            0 Waste evaporator*                                                  8.8          8.8          8.8 Waste gas compressor                                              0.3          0.3          0.1 RHR pump seal cooler (2 pumps)                                      0          0.2          0.2 Sample HX                                                          0.3          0.3          0.3 Catalytic H2 Recombiner                                            0.1            0            0 Charging pump seal HX, gear oil HX, and bearing HX (2 pumps)                                  0.6          0.6            0 Total other CCW Loads (x 106 Btu/h)                                                49.4          50.1        30.1 REV 25 4/14
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-15 (SHEET 3 OF 4)
* Though the waste evaporator package is not currently in use, its design heat load of 8.8 x 106 Btu/h is included as a conservatism.
: e. Auxiliary Loads:
Heat Loads in 106 Btu/h Trip          HSD Component                                                      to HSD        to CSD      CSD Reactor coolant pump air coolers                                          4.0            4.5          0 BTRS chillers (Note 4)                                                    4.5              0          0 Containment coolers                                                      7.4            7.4        7.4 ESF pump room coolers                                                    1.4            1.4        1.4 Other auxiliary building room coolers                                    0.4            0.4        0.4 and air conditioning units Blowdown heat exchanger                                                                Note 2 Service water pumps (4 pumps)                                            6.1            6.1        6.1 Diesel generators                                                                      Note 1 Turbine building loads                                                                Note 3 Total Auxiliary Loads                                                  23.8          19.3      15.3 (x 106 Btu/h)
(+ Steam generator blowdown
                                                                      + turbine building heat loads)
Notes:
: 1.      The heat load of these components is included in the heat loads for the unit that has experienced a LOCA.
: 2.      The blowdown heat exchanger is in operation for 4 h following 0-percent reactor power.
It is assumed that 0-percent reactor power is reached 2 h following the trip. From the trip until 0-percent power, the blowdown heat exchanger sees a blowdown flowrate of 75 6
gal/min and a heat load of 18.0 x 10 Btu/h. In the period from 2 h (t = 7200 s) to 6 h (t = 21,600 s) following the trip, the blowdown rate is increased to 200 gal/min. The heat load initially increases to 37.6 x 106 Btu/h due to the increased blowdown flowrate, but then decreases with the decreasing RCS temperature. Blowdown is isolated when the RCS temperature reaches 140&deg;F (at t = 21,600 s).
REV 25 4/14
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.2-15 (SHEET 4 OF 4)
: 3.      It is assumed that the service water system sees the design turbine building heat load of 87.8 x 106 for the 2-h period from the trip until reactor power is reduced to 0 percent (at t = 7200 s). The turbine building heat load then drops linearly over a period of 24 h to 16.8 x 106 Btu/h (at t = 93,600 s). It then remains at 16.8 x 106 Btu/h for the remainder of the 30-day period.
: 4.      The BTRS chillers have been retired in place and are no longer in use. The BTRS chiller heat load of 4.5 x 106 Btu/h is included to maintain margin.
: f. The heat loads rejected by individual components into the SWS were reevaluated to assess the impact of power uprating both FNP units on the projected maximum SW pond (UHS) temperature. While some component heat loads increase as a result of power uprate, many others decrease for reasons other than uprate. These include the reduction in the heat load from Diesel Generator 2C (SBO diesel which does not start on LOSP), from the Waste Evaporator Package (no longer in use at FNP), and from the control room air conditioner (no longer cooled by service water). The net of these changes to the overall UHS heat load, including changes related to power uprating and those unrelated to power uprating, is a decrease in the heat load beginning on the second day of the 30-day period of evaluation and continuing through the end of the 30-day period. As the reevaluated overall heat load into the UHS is lower than that described in the current UHS evaluation, the UHS remains capable of performing its safety-related function and the peak supply temperature from the service water pond will be below the current design basis value of 106.2&deg;F.
REV 25 4/14
 
REV 21 5/08 JOSEPH M. FARLEY                SERVICE WATER SYSTEM NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-1 (SHEET 1 OF 3)
 
REV 25 4/14 MAJOR SERVICE WATER SUPPLY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT AND DISCHARGE PIPING UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-1 (SHEET 2 OF 3)
 
REV 21 5/08 MAJOR SERVICE WATER SUPPLY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                    AND DISCHARGE PIPING UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-1 (SHEET 3 OF 3)
 
REV 21 5/08 EMERGENCY COOLING POND ESTIMATED JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT    AREA AND VOLUME FOLLOWING 40 YEARS OF SERVICE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-2
 
REV 21 5/08 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK, HEAT INPUT VERSUS JOSEPH M. FARLEY            TIME, LOCA WITH MAXIMUM ESF AND NUCLEAR PLANT        NORMAL SHUTDOWN WITH 50&deg; F/h COOLDOWN UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-3
 
REV 21 5/08 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK, HEAT INPUT VERSUS JOSEPH M. FARLEY            TIME, LOCA WITH MAXIMUM ESF AND NUCLEAR PLANT          NORMAL SHUTDOWN WITH 16-h COOLDOWN UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-4
 
REV 21 5/08 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK, INTEGRATED JOSEPH M. FARLEY          HEAT LOAD, LOCA WITH MAXIMUM ESF AND NUCLEAR PLANT        NORMAL SHUTDOWN WITH 50&deg;F/h COOLDOWN UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-5
 
REV 21 5/08 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK, INTEGRATED HEAT JOSEPH M. FARLEY            LOAD, LOCA WITH MAXIMUM ESF AND NUCLEAR PLANT          NORMAL SHUTDOWN WITH 16-h COOLDOWN UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-6
 
REV 21 5/08 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK JOSEPH M. FARLEY                SERVICE WATER INLET NUCLEAR PLANT                TEMPERATURE VERSUS TIME UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-7
 
REV 21 5/08 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK, POND JOSEPH M. FARLEY              CONFIGURATION AS MODELED IN NUCLEAR PLANT                    THE UHS EVALUATION UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-8
 
REV 21 5/08 ROUND JET FROM A 20-FT2 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                  RUPTURED HOLE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-9
 
REV 21 5/08 PLAN VIEW OF THE CONDENSATE JOSEPH M. FARLEY                  STORAGE TANK AND ITS NUCLEAR PLANT                  SURROUNDING FACILITIES UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-10
 
REV 30 10/21 JOSEPH M. FARLEY              PLANT WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-11
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.3      PROCESS AUXILIARIES The process auxiliaries consist of those auxiliary systems associated with the reactor process system. These systems include the compressed air system, process sampling systems, equipment and floor drainage system, chemical and volume control system (CVCS), and failed fuel detection systems. The evaluations of radiological considerations are presented in chapter 12. Only the CVCS is necessary for safe shutdown of the plant.
9.3.1    COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM The compressed air system, as shown in drawings D-170131, sheets 1 and 2; D-200019, sheets 1 and 2; D-175035, sheet 1; D-205035; D-175034, sheets 1 through 3; and D-205034, sheets 1 through 4, provides all plant compressed air requirements for pneumatic instruments and valves and for service air outlets located throughout the plant. There are two primary trains of air compressors per unit with each unit having a spare air compressor which is arranged so that it may be used for either unit. The compressed air system is not required for the safe shutdown of the plant. The following subdivisions provide information on design bases, system descriptions, safety evaluation, tests and inspections, and instrumentation applications for the compressed air system.
9.3.1.1          Design Bases The two primary trains of air compressors provided in the system are sized to furnish the total average instrument air requirements plus an allowance for service air use. Two parallel instrument air filtering and drying trains are provided to treat the normal maximum quantity of air required for instrument air and service air requirements and to deliver dry air having a dewpoint of -40&deg;F or less at 100 psig. One filtering and drying train has sufficient capacity to accommodate normal operation of all three air compressors simultaneously.
The compressed air piping system which furnishes air inside the containment is equipped with containment isolation valving in accordance with the criteria for containment isolation systems as discussed in subsection 6.2.4.
All parts of the system located within the auxiliary building and containment, with the exception of the containment penetrations, are designed to meet Seismic Category II requirements. The air receivers and instrument air dryers were designed and fabricated in accordance with Section VIII of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. System piping, with the exception of the containment penetrations, was fabricated and installed in accordance with American National Standards Institute (ANSI) B31.1, Code for Pressure Piping. The containment penetration piping was fabricated and installed in accordance with Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
9.3.1.2          System Description The compressed air system consists of three compressors, three aftercoolers, four air receivers, and instrument air filtering and drying equipment. The cooling water for aftercoolers and 9.3-1                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 compressors is supplied from the service water system. The air receivers are connected to a common compressed air header that serves both instrument air and service air.
Each air header supplies branch lines which supply instrument air and service air to all parts of the plant. All instrument air lines penetrating the containment have isolation valves located outside the containment which are installed in series with check valves located inside the containment. All service air lines penetrating the containment have one locked closed globe valve on both sides of the containment penetration.
The three Unit 1 compressors and two of the Unit 2 compressors are two-stage, water-cooled, rotary screw compressors with a capacity of 800 scfm at 110-psig discharge pressure. Each of these compressors is equipped with an intercooler and aftercooler and discharge compressed air to a 150-ft3-capacity air receiver tank. One of the Unit 2 compressors is a two-stage, water-cooled, rotary screw compressor with 789 scfm at 100-psig discharge pressure. This compressor is equipped with an intercooler and aftercooler and discharges compressed air to an 89-ft3 air receiver tank. Each compressor takes suction from inside the turbine building through an air filter.
The compressor controls are designed to permit continuous operation of any number of the compressor motors with the compressors automatically loaded and unloaded in response to system pressure or automatic start and stop operation of any number of the compressor motors in response to system pressure. During normal plant operation, one of the compressors is selected for continuous motor operation, while the other compressors serve as standbys and start automatically if the continuously operating compressor cannot meet system demand.
Compressed air normally passes through one or two parallel filtering and drying trains before being distributed to the instrument air and service air piping systems. One filtering and drying train is sufficient to accommodate the normal operation of both the instrument air and service air systems. The arrangement of the filtering and drying equipment allows cleaning or changing of filters while the unit is in operation by diverting the airflow through the other parallel train. Each air dryer has two independent drying chambers connected in parallel. The air dryer automatically alternates airflow through each of the chambers to permit automatic drying of the desiccant in one chamber while the other chamber is in service.
9.3.1.3          Safety Evaluation The compressed air system is required for normal operation and startup of the plant; however, all pneumatically operated devices in the plant essential for safe shutdown are designed to operate to the safe position upon loss of air pressure. Therefore, a supply of compressed air is not essential for safe shutdown of the plant, and the compressed air system is, accordingly, not designed to meet the single failure criterion. All pneumatically operated valves essential for safe shutdown and not used for containment isolation are listed in table 9.3-1. Those valves necessary for containment isolation are listed in table 6.2-31.
The isolation valves installed in the instrument air containment penetrations will prevent releases from the containment in the event of failure of the compressed air system pressure boundary inside the containment. The air-operated isolation valves automatically operate to the 9.3-2                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 closed position upon initiation of a containment isolation signal and are designed to operate to the closed position upon failure of air pressure or electrical power to the valves.
Required air cleanliness is maintained by the following features:
A. Filters installed at the inlets to the compressors.
B. Filters at each end of the air dryer elements. The afterfilters are designed to remove particulates down to .9m absolute.
C. Filters installed in all lines to instruments and valves essential for safe shutdown.
The compressors and the air dryer units are designed for full capacity operation over the full range of environmental temperature and humidity conditions that can occur in the turbine building.
9.3.1.4          Tests and Inspections The compressed air system will be tested in accordance with written procedures during the initial testing and operation program. All engineered safety features systems will be tested for performance capability under conditions of loss of instrument air as outlined in chapter 14.
9.3.1.5          Instrumentation Applications For each operating unit, the air compressors can be controlled either by sequence control logic integrated into one air compressor or by remote hand switches located in the control room. The sequence control logic will make one compressor the master and the others will be slaves. The sequence control logic will load and unload the selected air compressors based on header pressure. Each compressor can be deselected from sequence control in order to be controlled by its remote hand switch. The hand switch can be placed in off or auto. When the switch is in the auto position the compressor will load and unload based on the compressors discharge pressure.
The following pressure switches (drawings D-170131, sheets 1 and 2; D-200019, sheets 1 and 2; D-175035, sheet 1; D-205035; D-175034, sheets 1 through 3; and D-205034, sheets 1 through 4) located in the system allow for an order of priority in removal of various compressed air loads in the event of a system failure:
Actuation Switch                        Point                                      Function N1P19PS503              80 psig decreasing                  Closes N1P18V901; isolates service air header; must be manually reset N1P19PS504              70 psig decreasing                  Opens N1P19V902; bypasses air dryers and filters; must be manually reset 9.3-3                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 Actuation Switch                      Point                                    Function N1P19PS506            55 psig decreasing              Closes N1P19V904; isolates nonessential air header; must be manually reset N1P19PS505A          45 psig decreasing              2/3 logic to close N1P19V903; N1P19PS505B          45 psig decreasing 45 psig      isolates essential air header; must be N1P19PS505C          decreasing                      manually reset 9.3.2  PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEMS 9.3.2.1        Design Bases The sampling systems are designed to permit liquid and gaseous sampling for analysis and chemistry control, both primary and secondary, of the plant primary and secondary fluids.
Samples are used to provide information for monitoring the operational performance of plant equipment and for making operational decisions. The following description is for Unit l; the second unit is a separate but identical system, except as noted.
9.3.2.2        System Description The sampling system is divided into two sections, the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) sampling section and the turbine plant analyzer sampling section.
9.3.2.2.1      Nuclear Steam Supply System Sampling Stations The NSSS sampling station, located in the auxiliary building sample room, provides sample streams for grab samples or collection in sample bombs as listed in table 9.3-2. Chemical and radiochemical analyses are performed on these samples, as appropriate, to determine boron concentration, fission and corrosion product concentration, and pH and conductivity levels.
Analytical results are then used to regulate boron concentration, to evaluate fuel rod integrity, to evaluate ion exchanges and filter performance, and to specify chemical additions to related systems. The system is designed to permit remote collection of selected samples during all modes of operation, from full power to cold shutdown, without requiring access to the containment. Administrative procedures will ensure that precollection purging, sample collection time, and sample volume will provide representative samples for analysis.
Sample point locations have been selected to ensure that representative samples are obtained.
Also included in the design are provisions for local grab samples of liquid and gaseous fluid streams. These points, though not considered part of the sampling system, are listed in table 9.3-3.
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FNP-FSAR-9 At the NSSS sampling station, all radioactive and potentially radioactive sample streams are routed to a sampling facility contained within an exhaust ventilated, hooded enclosure. Process fluids at temperatures greater than 140&deg;F will be cooled to < 100&deg;F before being routed to sample pressure vessels or grab sample points.
From the sample station, purge recirculation, with appropriate pressure reduction, is routed to the volume control tank (VCT) for all points except the VCT gas sample. When operating conditions preclude purge recirculation to the VCT, i.e., CVCS system out-of-service, grab samples are obtained by directing sample system flush water to the waste holdup tank. The VCT gas sample is returned to the suction of the waste processing system gas compressor.
The sample lines are shielded to reduce radiation exposure to personnel in the sample room.
Shielding is designed to reduce the radiation level to 15 mrem/h or less. Additional personnel protection is provided by an exhaust ventilation hood, sample coolers, pressure relief valves, and an area radiation monitor with high alarm.
A sample system control panel is provided and located inside the primary chemistry lab for Unit 1 and sample room for Unit 2. Control switches are provided on the panel for control of the sample isolation valves shown in drawings D-175009, sheets 1 through 3 and D-205009, sheets 1 through 3. The panel is designed to meet the requirements of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 279, 323, 344, and Seismic Category I criteria.
A remotely operated postaccident sample panel and shielded pass through (figure 9.3-1) have been added to obtain samples of highly radioactive reactor coolant. This system has the capability for taking a pressurized reactor coolant system (RCS) sample from the RCS hot leg and pressurizer and unpressurized samples from the residual heat exchangers. The postaccident sample system was installed to meet the requirements of NUREG 0578. Based on the results of the shielding design study, with subsequent modification and time studies from drawing postaccident samples, the estimated whole body or extremities radiation doses to any individual will not exceed 3 rem and 18 3/4 rem, respectively. The postaccident sample has both local and remote control panels independent of other sample system control panels. The postaccident sample panel is shown in drawing D-175009, sheet 3, with sample system connection points shown in sheet 1.
As documented in NRC SERs(1)(2)(3), postaccident sampling of reactor coolant either conforms to NRC acceptance criteria contained in NUREG-0578, NUREG-0737, and Regulatory Guide 1.97 or deviations have been justified.
Amendments 156 and 148 to the Facility Operating Licenses for Units 1 and 2, respectively, removed the PASS and related administrative controls from the Technical Specifications. The associated NRC SER(4) states that issuance of these amendments supersedes the PASS-specific requirements imposed by post-TMI confirmatory orders.
In addition to the enclosed sample station, there is also a sample station for process streams that will not contain radioactive materials. As shown in drawings D-175009, sheets 1 through 3 and D-205009, sheets 1 through 3, these streams include the steam line sample process streams and the steam generator sample streams.
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FNP-FSAR-9 Because of the potential for radioactively contaminated samples being drawn from the steam generators, the steam generator sample streams are routed to the enclosed sample station before being routed to the open sample station. These sample streams are continuously monitored for radioactivity by a scintillation counter and holdup tank assembly. Upon reaching a high radiation level, the isolation valves between the hooded and unhooded sample stations are automatically closed. Each steam generator is then individually sampled, within the hooded station, to determine the source of radioactivity. This procedure will minimize the amount of liquid containing radioactivity that is released to the environment through the steam generator blowdown treatment systems.
Steam generator sample temperature control is accomplished by two stages of cooling. The first stage of cooling is through roughing coolers, followed by a second stage of cooling in a refrigerator compressor condensing unit. The refrigerator compressor condenser rejects its heat through a closed cooling system to the component cooling water system.
All process sample lines penetrating the containment boundary are protected by automatic valves that close on the receipt of a high radiation signal on any one of the three steam generator blowdown sample lines. The valves are capable of remote closure from the control room.
Portions of the sample system as shown on drawings D-175009, sheets 1 through 3 and D-205009, sheets 1 through 3 are safety-related, Seismic Category I to provide for containment isolation and to interface with other safety-related systems. The remainder of the sample system is nonsafety related, nonseismic. The boundaries are specified on drawings D-175009, sheets 1 through 3 and D-205009, sheets 1 through 3. The safety-related portions of the sample system were designed to the following codes and standards:
Piping, tubing, and fittings                          ASME III Valves                                                ASME III The nonsafety-related portions were designed to the following codes and standards:
Sample pressure vessels                              ASME VIII Piping, tubing, and fittings                          ANSI B31.1 Valves                                                ANSI B31.1 The sample coolers are located in the nonsafety-related portion of the system. The design requirements for the sample coolers are identified in table 3.2-1.
The postaccident sampling system is nonseismic.
The NSSS sampling system is not necessary to ensure either the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the capability to shut down the reactor.
The process sampling system is proved operable by its use during normal plant operation.
Grab samples are taken to verify the proper operation of the continuous samplers. Portions of the system normally closed to flow can be tested to ensure the operability and integrity of the system.
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FNP-FSAR-9 Local temperature indicators after the high temperature and high pressure sample heat exchangers determine the sample temperature before a sample is drawn in a sample sink.
Local pressure indicators after the high temperature and high pressure sample heat exchangers guide the adjustment of any throttling valves. Pressure reduction valves are provided to protect the equipment and operators.
9.3.2.2.2      Turbine Plant Analyzer Sampling Section The turbine plant analyzer sampling section draws continuous samples from the turbine cycle for automatic or manual water quality analysis. Sample inlet conditions are listed in table 9.3-4.
The turbine plant analyzer station is located in the turbine building. This station contains sample pressure reducing and cooling equipment including valves, pressure regulators, pressure indicators, flow regulators, piping grab sample sinks, and continuous analyzers for conductivity, dissolved oxygen, and pH. Recorders, indicators, and an annunciator to alarm abnormal conditions are also located at this station.
9.3.3  EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM 9.3.3.1        Design Bases The equipment and floor drainage system ensures that waste liquids, valve and pump leakoffs, tank drains, etc., are directed to the proper area for processing or disposal. The drains are separated according to their activity and quality. Drains containing tritiated water are collected and deposited in the waste processing system. Drains containing nontritiated water and nontritiated, chromated water are also collected and recycled or disposed of, according to the needs of the water system.
The system piping is designed to transport fluids during normal and abnormal conditions. Drain headers are large enough to accommodate the normal drain flow and minimize the possibility of fouling. Lower elevation sumps are sized to collect excess floor drainages; the sump pumps then transfer drainage to the waste processing system. An evaluation of radiological considerations of this system during normal operation is presented in chapter 11.
9.3.3.2        System Description Each floor of the auxiliary building and containment (drawings D-175005; D-175004, sheets 1 and 2; and D-205004, sheets 1 and 2) is supplied with a separate drain header for the tritiated water drains and for the nontritiated water drains found on that level. The floor drain header and equipment drain header are provided with running traps to provide loop seals to prevent spreading of radioactive gasses in the auxiliary building. This gas migration can be further reduced by exhausting the equipment drain and the floor drain running traps located in the chemical drain tank room via negative pressure units to the radwaste area ventilation system. A maximum of three drain headers for each level are installed. The lower floor of the auxiliary 9.3-7                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 building has two drain collection tanks, the floor drain tank and the waste holdup tank, which collect most of the drains from the floors above. Some drains are routed to sumps which pump to one or both of the drain collection tanks for processing. The sump contents are then pumped to the waste processing system. Drains in the containment flow to the reactor coolant drain tank or to the containment sump. They are then pumped to the waste processing system.
9.3.3.3          Design Evaluation The equipment and floor drainage system accommodates the auxiliary building and containment drains during each normal mode of plant operation. It is mainly a passive system required to function at all times. Because the drain headers are not pressurized, a line rupture is unlikely.
Plugging of the header is minimized by installing main headers large enough to accommodate more than the design flow and by making the flow path as straight as possible. Main headers are at least 4 in. in diameter.
The volume of the floor drain tank is 10,000 gal. [HISTORICAL] [Under normal operation it is expected that 51,000 gal/year of liquid wastes will be processed through the tank for a single unit. This consists of the following flows:
Decontamination water                                                  15,000 gal/year Laboratory equipment rinses                                  16,000 gal/year Nonrecyclable reactor coolant                                7000 gal/year Nonreactor grade leaks                                      13,000 gal/year This corresponds to a daily average flowrate of ~140 gal/day. With a single unit feeding the floor drain tank, and assuming filling for 30 days, the tank will be about half full at processing.
In addition to the above, consideration was also given to fabrication, standardization, and layout criteria in finally sizing the tank.]
Sumps and sump pumps in the auxiliary building lower elevations collect drainage from the floor drain system and discharge to the waste processing system. Each of the low-head safety injection pump rooms, the containment spray pump rooms, and the high-head safety injection pump rooms is watertight and is protected by an individual sump containing two nonsafety-related sump pumps which are powered from the same electrical train as the pumps they are protecting. Each sump receives only drainage from the individual pump room that it is protecting.
Each sump pump has a design flowrate of 100 gal/min. Each sump is equipped with a mechanical alternator and high level alarm. When the level in the sump rises to within 13 in. of the cover, the leading pump is started. An indicator light on the control board signifies that one pump is running. If the leading pump cannot handle the full flow of incoming liquid and the level rises to within 12 in. of the cover, the lagging pump starts and an indicator light on the control board signifies that both pumps are running. If both pumps are unable to handle the load and the level rises to within 6 in. of the cover, an alarm is sounded in the control room. If the leading pump alone is able to reduce the level in the sump to the pump cutoff point, the mechanical alternator will then cause the lagging pump to become the leading pump for the next required operation. The liquid in these sumps is pumped to the waste processing system.
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FNP-FSAR-9 The watertight rooms protect each pump from flooding from outside the room. Frequency of sump pump operation, one-pump versus two-pump operation, and sump high level alarms will indicate leaks within the individual pump rooms and will provide the operator with a gross indication of the magnitude of the leak.
9.3.3.4        Tests and Inspections
[HISTORICAL] [Each drain header is flushed and inspected with regard to leaktightness, flow capacity, and flow path. Pumps and level switches are tested for start and stop at the proper sump levels. Piping and valves are inspected for leaktightness, flow paths, and mechanical operability.]
9.3.3.5        Instrumentation and Control Level switches and indicators are provided in the control room to control stopping and starting of pumps and to indicate a flood condition of a residual heat removal pump or containment spray system pump compartment. The waste processing system radiation monitor (R-18) is described in paragraph 11.4.2.2.11.
9.3.3.6        Nonradioactive Auxiliary Building Sump Transfer A manual mode of operation exists which allows nonradioactive drainage in the auxiliary building sumps to be transferred to the turbine building sumps. This mode also allows for transfer of service water from containment components to the turbine building sump to support component maintenance during an outage. The transfer path to the nonradioactive sump is established using a CTMT service penetration under administrative controls. To accomplish a transfer, the handswitches for the nonradioactive auxiliary building sump pumps are placed in the "pull-to-lock" position. This overrides the automatic sump pump operation described in paragraph 9.3.3.3 and allows these sumps to be selectively aligned with turbine building sumps.
In order to align the auxiliary building nonradioactive sumps to the turbine building sumps, cross-connect valve N1G21V325/ N2G21V320 must be unlocked and opened. Subsequent to opening this cross-connect valve, the handswitch for the desired pump may be removed from the "pull-to-lock" position and started as required. After the nonradioactive drainage has been pumped to the turbine building sump, the pump is stopped and the handswitch returned to the "pull-to-lock" position. Cross-connect valve N1G21V325/N2G21V320 is then closed and locked to ensure that no fluid is unintentionally transferred to the turbine building sumps.
9.3.4          CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM AND LIQUID POISON SYSTEM 9.3.4.1        Chemical and Volume Control System The CVCS shown in drawings D-175039, sheets 1 through 7 and D-205039, sheets 1 through 5 is designed to provide the following services to the RCS:
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FNP-FSAR-9 A. Maintenance of programmed water level in the pressurizer, i.e., maintain required water inventory in the RCS.
B. Maintenance of seal water injection flow to the reactor coolant pumps.
C. Control of water chemistry conditions, activity level, soluble chemical neutron absorber concentration, and makeup.
D. Processing of effluent reactor coolant to effect recovery and reuse of soluble chemical neutron absorber and makeup water.
E. Emergency core coolant [part of the system is shared with the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)].
9.3.4.1.1      Design Bases Quantitative design bases are given in table 9.3-5 with qualitative descriptions given below.
A. Reactivity Control The CVCS regulates the concentration of chemical neutron absorber in the reactor coolant to control reactivity changes resulting from the change in reactor coolant temperature between cold shutdown and hot full power operation, burnup of fuel and burnable poisons, and xenon transients.
Reactor makeup control is as follows:
: 1.      The CVCS is capable of borating the RCS through any of three flow paths and from any of three boric acid sources.
: 2.      The amount of boric acid stored in the CVCS always exceeds that amount required to borate the RCS to cold shutdown concentration, assuming that the control assembly with the highest reactivity worth is stuck in its fully withdrawn position. This amount of boric acid also exceeds the amount required to bring the reactor to hot shutdown and to compensate for subsequent xenon decay.
: 3.      The CVCS is capable of counteracting inadvertent positive reactivity insertion caused by the maximum boron dilution accident (chapter 15).
B. Regulation of Reactor Coolant Inventory The CVCS maintains the coolant inventory in the RCS within the allowable pressurizer level range for all normal modes of operation including startup from cold shutdown, full power operation, and plant cooldown. This system also has sufficient makeup capacity to maintain the minimum required inventory in the event of minor RCS leaks. (See the plant Technical Specifications for a discussion of maximum allowable RCS leakage.)
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FNP-FSAR-9 The CVCS flowrate is based on the requirement that it permit the RCS to be heated to or cooled from hot standby condition at the design rate and maintain pressurizer level within the limits of the operating band.
C. Reactor Coolant Purification The CVCS removes fission and activation products (other than tritium) from the reactor coolant during operation of the reactor. The CVCS can also remove excess lithium from the reactor coolant, keeping the lithium concentration within the desired limits for pH control. (See table 5.2-22.)
Tritium is produced within the fuel by ternary fission and from neutron reactions with the soluble boron, the lithium used for the pH control, and naturally occurring deuterium within the coolant. The lithium concentration is maintained within the desired range by the addition of Li7OH and by a cation or mixed-bed demineralizer that will remove any excess of lithium produced by the B10(n,)Li7 reaction. The Li6(n,)T reaction is controlled by limiting the Li6 impurity to 0.1 atomic percent. The contributions from these sources are slight, as indicated in appendix 11A. As can be seen, the primary sources of tritium in the coolant are from ternary fission and the B10(n,2)T reaction with the boron in the coolant.
Once the tritium is in the coolant, the only method of controlling the concentration is by dilution of the primary coolant. There is a letdown from the primary coolant system to the CVCS of 135 gal/min (maximum). Thus tritium is distributed throughout the recycle holdup tanks, the boric acid tanks, and the reactor makeup water storage tank. During refueling operations some water is exchanged between the RCS and the refueling water storage tank. There is also some exchange of water with the spent-fuel pool. Without exchange of any of this water with the environment (complete holdup of tritium) the coolant concentration would reach the levels given in appendix 11A.1.5. Actual tritium concentrations will depend on plant operating parameters, such as leakage (requiring makeup) and planned releases of tritiated water.
The CVCS is capable of removing fission and activation products, in ionic form or as particulates, from the reactor coolant in order to provide access to those process lines carrying reactor coolant during operation and to reduce activity releases due to leaks.
D. Chemical Additions for Corrosion Control The CVCS provides a means for adding chemicals (batch addition) to the RCS which control the pH of the coolant during initial startup and subsequent operation, scavenge oxygen from the coolant during startup, and control the oxygen level of the reactor coolant due to radiolysis during all operations subsequent to startup.
Chemicals may also be added on a continuous basis to control stress corrosion cracking in Alloy 600 materials and to reduce RCS radiation levels.
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FNP-FSAR-9 The CVCS is capable of maintaining the oxygen content and pH of the reactor coolant within limits specified in table 5.2-22.
The dilution effect of chemical addition (both batch and continuous) must be compensated for in selecting the proper reactor makeup boron concentration as discussed in paragraph 9.3.4.1.1A.
E. Seal Water Injection The CVCS is able to supply filtered water continuously to each reactor coolant pump seal, as required by the reactor coolant pump design.
F. Emergency Core Cooling The centrifugal charging pumps in the CVCS also serve as the high-head safety injection pumps in the ECCS. Other than the centrifugal charging pumps and associated piping and valves, the CVCS is not required to function during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). During a LOCA, the CVCS is isolated except for the centrifugal charging pumps and the piping in the safety injection path.
9.3.4.1.2      System Description The CVCS is shown in drawings D-175039, sheets 1 through 7 and D-205039, sheets 1 through 7, with design parameters listed in table 9.3-5. The CVCS consists of several subsystems: the charging, letdown, and seal water system; the chemical control, purification, and makeup system; and the boron recycle system.
9.3.4.1.2.1    Charging, Letdown, and Seal Water System. The charging and letdown functions of the CVCS are employed to maintain a programmed water level in the RCS pressurizer, thus maintaining proper reactor coolant inventory during all phases of plant operation. This is achieved by means of a continuous feed and bleed process, during which the feed rate is automatically controlled on the basis of pressurizer water level. The bleed rate can be chosen to suit various plant operational requirements by selecting the proper combination of letdown orifices in the letdown flow path. This selection is made through remote manual operation of valves located in the parallel orificed paths as discussed in paragraph 9.3.4.1.2.2.4.
Reactor coolant is discharged to the CVCS from the reactor coolant loop piping upstream of the reactor coolant pump; it then flows through the shell side of the regenerative heat exchanger, where its temperature is reduced by heat transfer to the charging flow passing through the tubes. The coolant then experiences a large pressure reduction as it passes through a letdown orifice and flows through the tube side of the letdown heat exchanger, where its temperature is further reduced to the operating temperature of the mixed-bed demineralizers (140&deg;F).
Downstream of the letdown heat exchanger a second pressure reduction occurs. This second pressure reduction is performed by the low-pressure letdown valve, the function of which is to maintain upstream pressure which prevents flashing downstream of the letdown orifices.
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FNP-FSAR-9 The coolant then flows through one of the mixed-bed demineralizers. The flow may then pass through the cation bed demineralizer, which is used intermittently when additional purification of the reactor coolant is required. The cation bed demineralizer flow is limited to a maximum of 60 gal/min.
During boric acid storage and release operations, especially during load follow, part or all of the letdown flow leaving the demineralizers is directed to the boron thermal regeneration system (BTRS), discussed in paragraph 9.3.4.2. The coolant then flows through the reactor coolant filter and into the volume control tank through a spray nozzle in the top of the tank. The gas space in the volume control tank may be continuously purged with hydrogen. Subsection 11.3.4 contains descriptions of operation with and without continuous purge. The partial pressure of hydrogen in the volume control tank determines the concentration of hydrogen dissolved in the reactor coolant.
The charging pumps normally take suction from the volume control tank and return the cooled, purified reactor coolant to the RCS through the charging line. Normal charging flow is handled by one of the three charging pumps. The bulk of the charging flow is pumped back to the RCS through the tube side of the regenerative heat exchanger. The letdown flow in the shell side of the regenerative heat exchanger raises the charging flow to a temperature approaching the reactor coolant temperature. The flow is then injected into a cold leg of the RCS. Two charging paths are provided from a point downstream of the regenerative heat exchanger. A flow path is also provided from the regenerative heat exchanger outlet to the pressurizer spray line. An air-operated valve in the spray line is employed to provide auxiliary spray to the vapor space of the pressurizer during plant cooldown. This provides a means of cooling the pressurizer near the end of plant cooldown, when the reactor coolant pumps are not operating.
A portion of the charging flow (nominally 8 gal/min per reactor coolant pump) is directed to the reactor coolant pumps through a seal water injection filter. It is directed down to a point between the pump shaft bearing and the thermal barrier cooling coil. Here the flow splits and a portion (nominally 5 gal/min per pump) enters the RCS through the labyrinth seals and thermal barrier. The remainder of the flow is directed up the pump shaft, cooling the lower bearing, and to the No. 1 seal leakoff. The No. 1 seal leakoff flow discharges to a common manifold, exits from the containment, and then passes through the seal water return filter and the seal water heat exchanger to the suction side of the charging pumps, or by alternate path to the volume control tank. A check valve in the spool piece between the reactor coolant pumps and the No. 1 seal leakoff line prevents reverse flow through the seal. A very small portion of the seal flow leaks through to the No. 2 seal. A No. 3 seal provides a final barrier to leakage to containment atmosphere. The No. 2 seal leakoff flow is discharged to the reactor coolant drain found in the waste processing system, and the No. 3 seal leakoff flow is discharged to the containment sump.
An alternate letdown path from the RCS is provided in the event that the normal letdown path is inoperable. Reactor coolant can be discharged from a cold leg and flows through the tube side of the excess letdown heat exchanger, where it is cooled by component cooling water flowing through the shell side. Downstream of the heat exchanger, a remote manual control valve controls the excess letdown flow. The flow normally joins the No. 1 seal discharge manifold and passes through the seal water return filter and heat exchanger to the suction side of the charging pumps. The excess letdown flow can also be directed to the reactor coolant drain tank. When the normal letdown line is not available, the normal purification path is also not in 9.3-13                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 operation. Therefore, this alternate condition would allow continued power operation for limited periods of time dependent on RCS chemistry and activity. The excess letdown flow path is also used to provide additional letdown capability during the final stages of plant heatup. This path removes some of the excess reactor coolant due to expansion of the system as a result of the RCS temperature increase. In this case, the excess letdown is diverted to the reactor coolant drain tank.
Surges in RCS inventory due to load changes are accommodated for the most part in the pressurizer. The volume control tank provides surge capacity for reactor coolant expansion not accommodated by the pressurizer. If the water level in the volume control tank exceeds the normal operating range, a proportional controller modulates a three-way valve downstream of the reactor coolant filter to divert a portion of the letdown to the recycle holdup tanks in the boron recycle system. If the high level limit in the volume control tank is reached, an alarm is actuated in the control room and the letdown is completely diverted to the recycle holdup tanks.
The boron recycle system (paragraph 9.3.4.1.2.3) can be used to receive and process reactor coolant effluent for reuse of the boric acid and purified water. The system decontaminates the effluent by means of demineralization and gas stripping and uses evaporation to separate and recover the boric acid and reactor makeup water.
Low level in the volume control tank initiates makeup from the reactor makeup control system.
If the reactor makeup control system does not supply sufficient makeup to keep the volume control tank level from falling to a lower level, an emergency low level signal causes the suction of the charging pumps to be transferred to the refueling water storage tank.
9.3.4.1.2.2      Chemical Control, Purification, and Makeup System. The pH control, oxygen control, reactor coolant purification, and chemical shim and reactor coolant makeup of this system are discussed below.
9.3.4.1.2.2.1 The pH Control. The pH control chemical employed is lithium hydroxide. This chemical is chosen for its compatibility with the materials and water chemistry of borated water/stainless steel/zirconium/inconel systems. In addition, Li7 is produced in the core region due to irradiation of the dissolved boron in the coolant.
The concentration of Li7 in the RCS is maintained in the range specified for pH control (table 5.2-22). If the concentration exceeds this range, as it may during the early stages of core life, the cation bed demineralizer is employed in the letdown line in series operation with a mixed bed demineralizer. Since the amount of lithium to be removed is small and its buildup can be readily calculated, the flow through the cation bed demineralizer is not required to be full letdown flow. As an alternate, a nonlithiated mixed-bed demineralizer may be used to remove the lithium. If the concentration of Li7 is below the specified limits, lithium hydroxide can be introduced into the RCS via the charging flow. The solution is prepared in the laboratory and poured into the chemical mixing tank. Reactor makeup water is then used to flush the solution to the suction manifold of the charging pumps.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.3.4.1.2.2.2 Oxygen Control. During reactor startup from the cold condition, hydrazine is employed as an oxygen scavenging agent. The hydrazine solution is introduced into the RCS in the same manner as described above for the pH control agent. Hydrazine is not employed at any time other than startup from the cold shutdown state.
Dissolved hydrogen is employed to control and scavenge oxygen produced due to radiolysis of water in the core region. Sufficient partial pressure of hydrogen is maintained in the volume control tank so that the specified equilibrium concentration of hydrogen is maintained in the reactor coolant. A pressure control valve maintains a minimum pressure in the vapor space of the volume control tank. This valve can be adjusted to provide the correct equilibrium hydrogen concentration (25 to 50 cm3 hydrogen at STP/kg water for power operation). If operating without continuous VCT purge as described in subsection 11.3.4, the pressure control valve may be isolated and hydrogen pressure controlled by manual operation as necessary to maintain the required partial pressure of hydrogen.
9.3.4.1.2.2.3 Reactor Coolant Purification. Mixed-bed demineralizers are provided in the letdown line to provide cleanup of the letdown flow. The demineralizers remove ionic corrosion products and certain fission products. One demineralizer is in continuous service and can be supplemented intermittently by the cation bed demineralizer, if necessary, for additional purification. The cation resin removes principally cesium and lithium isotopes from the purification flow. The second mixed-bed demineralizer serves as a standby unit for use if the operating demineralizer becomes exhausted during operation.
A further cleanup feature is provided for use during cold shutdown and residual heat removal.
A remotely operated valve admits a bypass flow from the residual heat removal system into the letdown line upstream of the letdown heat exchanger. The flow passes through the heat exchanger, through a mixed-bed demineralizer and the reactor coolant filter to the volume control tank. The fluid is then returned to the RCS via the normal charging route.
Filters are provided at various locations to ensure filtration of particulate and resin fines and to protect the seals on the reactor coolant pumps.
Fission gases can be removed from the system by purging the volume control tank gas space with hydrogen to the gaseous waste processing system.
9.3.4.1.2.2.4 Chemical Shim and Reactor Coolant Makeup. The soluble neutron absorber (boric acid) concentration is controlled by the BTRS and by the reactor makeup control system.
The reactor makeup control system is also used to maintain proper reactor coolant inventory.
For emergency boration and makeup, the capability exists to provide refueling water or 4-wt-percent boric acid to the suction of the charging pump.
The boric acid is stored in two boric acid tanks. Two boric acid transfer pumps are provided, with one pump normally aligned to provide boric acid to the boric acid blender and the second pump in reserve. On a demand signal by the reactor makeup control system, the pump starts and delivers boric acid to the boric acid blender. The pump can also be used to recirculate the boric acid tank fluid.
9.3-15                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The reactor makeup water pumps, taking suction from the reactor makeup water storage tank, are employed for various makeup and flushing operations throughout the systems. One of these pumps also starts on demand from the reactor makeup control system and provides flow to the boric acid blender. For a description of the reactor makeup water system see subsection 9.2.7.
The flow from the boric acid blender is directed to either the suction manifold of the charging pumps or the volume control tank through the letdown line and spray nozzle.
During reactor operation, changes are made in the reactor coolant boron concentration for the following conditions:
A. Reactor startup - Boron concentration must be decreased from shutdown concentration to achieve criticality.
B. Load follow - Boron concentration must be either increased or decreased to compensate for the xenon transient following a change in load.
C. Fuel burnup - Boron concentration must be decreased to compensate for fuel burnup, except as offset by (E) below.
D. Cold shutdown - Boron concentration must be increased to the cold shutdown concentration.
E. Burnable poison depletion - Boron concentration must be increased to compensate for burned poison depletion.
The BTRS is used to control boron concentration to compensate for xenon transients during load follow operations. Boron thermal regeneration can also be used during dilution operations to reduce the amount of effluent to be processed by the boron recycle system portion of the CVCS.
The reactor makeup control system consists of a group of instruments arranged to provide a manually preselected makeup composition to the charging F1-6 pump suction header or the volume control tank. The makeup control functions are those of maintaining desired operating fluid inventory in the volume control tank and adjusting reactor coolant boron concentration for reactivity control.
A. Automatic Makeup (F1)
The automatic makeup mode of operation of the reactor makeup control system provides boric acid solution preset to match the boron concentration in the RCS.
The automatic makeup compensates for minor leakage of reactor coolant without causing significant changes in the coolant boron concentration.
Under normal plant operating conditions, the mode selector switch and makeup stop valves are set in the automatic makeup position. A present low level signal from the volume control tank level controller causes the automatic makeup control action to start a reactor makeup water pump, start a boric acid transfer 9.3-16                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 pump, open the makeup stop valve to the charging pump suction, open the concentrated boric acid control valve, and open the reactor makeup water control valve. The flow controllers then blend the makeup stream according to the preset concentration. Makeup addition to the charging pump suction header causes the water level in the volume control tank to rise. At a preset high level point, the makeup is stopped, the reactor makeup water pump stops, the reactor makeup water control valve closes, the boric acid transfer pump stops, the concentrated boric acid control valve closes, and the makeup stop valve to charging pump suction closes.
If the automatic makeup fails or is not aligned for operation and the tank level continues to decrease, a low-level alarm is actuated. Manual action may correct the situation, or, if the level continues to decrease, an emergency low level signal from both channels opens the stop valves in the refueling water supply line to the charging pumps and closes the stop valves in the volume control tank outlet line.
B. Dilution (F2)
The dilute mode of operation permits the addition of a preselected quantity of reactor makeup water at a preselected flowrate to the RCS. The operator sets the mode selector switch to dilute, the reactor makeup water flow controller setpoint to the desired flowrate, and the reactor makeup water batch integrator to the desired quantity, and he then initiates system start. This opens the reactor makeup water control valve to the volume control tank and starts a reactor makeup water pump which will deliver water to the volume control tank. From here the water goes to the charging pump suction header. Excessive rise of the volume control tank water level is prevented by automatic actuation (by the tank level controller) of a three-way diversion valve which routes the reactor coolant letdown flow to the recycle holdup tanks. When the preselected quantity of water has been added, the batch integrator causes the pump to stop and the control valve to close.
Dilution can also be accomplished by operating the BTRS in the boron storage mode.
C. Alternate Dilution (F3)
The alternate dilute mode of operation is similar to the dilute mode, except that a portion of the dilution water flows directly to the charging pump suction and a portion flows into the volume control tank via the spray nozzle and then flows to the charging pump suction. Dilution water can be directed entirely to the charging pump suction, if desired, by manually closing the makeup water control valve to the VCT.
D. Boration (F4)
The borate mode of operation permits the addition of a preselected flowrate to the RCS. The operator sets the mode selection switch to borate, the concentrated boric acid flow controller setpoint to the desired flowrate, and the 9.3-17                            REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 concentrated boric acid batch integrator to the desired quantity, and he then initiates system start. This opens the makeup stop valve to the charging pumps suction and starts the boric acid solution to the charging pumps suction header.
The total quantity added in most cases is so small that it has only a minor effect on the volume control tank level. When the preset quantity of concentrated boric acid solution is added, the batch integrator stops the boric acid transfer pump and closes the makeup stop valve to the suction of the charging pumps.
Boration can also be accomplished by operating the BTRS in the boron release mode.
E. Manual (F5)
The manual mode of operation permits the addition of a preselected quantity and blend of boric acid solution to the refueling water storage tank, the spent-fuel pool, or the recycle holdup tanks in the boron recycle system. While it is in the manual mode of operation, automatic makeup to the RCS is precluded. The discharge flow path must be prepared by opening manual valves in the desired path.
The operator then sets the mode selector switch to manual, the boric acid and reactor makeup water flow controllers to the desired flowrates, and the boric acid and reactor makeup water batch integrators to the desired quantities, and he then actuates the makeup start switch. The start switch actuates the boric acid flow control valve and the reactor makeup water flow control valve to the boric acid blender and starts the preselected reactor makeup water pump and the boric acid transfer pump.
When the preset quantities of boric acid and reactor makeup water have been added, the pumps stop and the boric acid and reactor makeup water flow control valves close. This operation may be stopped manually by actuating the makeup stop switch.
If either batch integrator is satisfied before the other has recorded its required total, the pump and valve associated with the integrator that has been satisfied will terminate flow. The flow controlled by the other integrator will continue until that integrator is satisfied.
F. Alarm Functions (F6)
The reactor makeup control is provided with alarm functions to call the operator's attention to the following conditions:
: 1.      Deviation of reactor makeup water flowrate from the control setpoint.
: 2.      Deviation of concentrated boric acid flowrate from control setpoint.
: 3.      High level in the volume control tank. This alarm indicates that the level in the tank is approaching high level and a resulting 100-percent diversion 9.3-18                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 of the letdown stream to the recycle holdup tanks in the boron recycle system.
: 4.      Low level in the volume control tank. This alarm indicates that the level in the tank is approaching emergency low level and resulting realignment of charging pump suction to the refueling water storage tank.
9.3.4.1.2.3    Boron Recycle System. The boron recycle system can be used to receive and recycles reactor coolant effluent for reuse of the boric acid and makeup water. The system decontaminates the effluent by means of demineralization and gas stripping and uses evaporation to separate and recover the boric acid and makeup water.
The system is designed to collect the excess reactor coolant that results from the following plant operation during one core cycle (approximately 1 year):
A. Dilution for core burnup from approximately 1200-ppm boron at beginning of a core cycle to approximately 100 ppm near the end of a core cycle (dilution from 100- to 10-ppm boron is handled by the thermal regeneration demineralizers in the BTRS).
B. Hot shutdowns and startups. Four hot shutdowns are assumed to take place during a core cycle.
C. Cold shutdowns and startups. Three cold shutdowns are assumed to take place during a core cycle.
D. Refueling shutdown and startup.
The boron recycle system is designed to process the total volume of water collected during a core cycle as well as short term surges. The design surge is that produced by a cold shutdown and subsequent startup during the latter part of a core cycle.
Water is also collected from the following sources:
A. Volume control tank pressure relief (CVCS).
B. Boric acid blender (CVCS) - Provides storage of boric acid if a boric acid tank must be emptied for maintenance. The boric acid solution is stored in a recycle holdup tank after first being diluted with reactor makeup water by the blender.
The boric acid concentration is reduced to ensure against precipitation of the boric acid in the unheated recycle holdup tank.
C. ECCS flush - Accepts flush water from safety injection lines.
D. Waste processing system - Provides capability for using the recycle evaporator as a waste evaporator and vice versa.
9.3-19                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 E.      Spent-fuel pool pumps (spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system) - Provide a means of storing the fuel transfer canal water in case maintenance is required on the transfer equipment.
F.      Valve leakoffs and equipment drains.
The water collected by the boron recycle system contains dissolved gases, boric acid, and suspended solids. Based on reactor operations with 1 percent of the rated core thermal power being generated by fuel elements with defective cladding, the boron recycle system is designed to provide sufficient cleanup of the water to satisfy the chemistry requirements of the recycled reactor makeup water and 4-wt-percent boric acid solution.
The maximum radioactivity concentration buildup in the boron recycle system components is based on operation of the reactor at its engineered safeguards design rating, with defective fuel rods generating 1 percent of the rated core thermal power. For each component, the shielding design considers the maximum buildup on an isotopic basis including only those isotopes which are present in significant amounts. Filtration, demineralization, and evaporation are the means by which the activity concentrations are controlled.
All portions of the boron recycle system that contain concentrated boric acid solution are located within a heated area in order to maintain solution temperature at  65&deg;F. This is 10&deg;F above the solubility limit for the nominal 4 wt percent boric acid solution. If a portion of the system which normally contains concentrated boric acid solution is not located in a heated area, it must be provided with some other means (e.g., heat tracing) to maintain solution temperature at  65&deg;F.
The boron recycle system is manually operated with the exception of a few automatic protection functions. These automatic functions protect the recycle evaporator feed demineralizers from a high inlet temperature and a high differential pressure, prevent a high vacuum from being drawn on the recycle holdup tank, and prevent high activity recycle evaporator condensate from being sent to the reactor makeup water storage tank. The boron recycle system has sufficient instrumentation readouts and alarms to provide the operator information to ensure proper system operation.
A.      Evaporation When water is directed to the boron recycle system for reprocessing, the flow passes first through the recycle evaporator feed demineralizers and filter and then into the recycle holdup tanks. The recycle evaporator feed pumps can be used to transfer liquid from one recycle holdup tank to the other, if desired.
When sufficient water is accumulated to warrant evaporator operation, the recycle evaporator feed pumps take suction from the selected recycle holdup tank. The fluid then flows through the recycle evaporator package. Here hydrogen, nitrogen, and residual fission gases are removed in the stripping column before the liquid enters the evaporator shell.
These gases are directed to the gas portion of the waste processing system.
9.3-20                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 During evaporator operation, distillate from the evaporator flows continuously to the reactor makeup water storage tank. Also located in this flow path are the recycle evaporator condensate demineralizer and the recycle evaporator condensate filter.
The evaporator concentrates the boric acid solution until a 4-wt-percent solution is obtained. The accumulated batch is normally transferred directly to the boric acid tanks through the recycle evaporator concentrates filter. If, for some reason, this batch cannot be discharged to the boric acid tanks, it can be diverted back to the recycle holdup tanks or to the waste processing system.
Connections are provided so that, if necessary, the recycle evaporator can be used as a waste evaporator and vice versa.
B. Recycle Holdup Tank Venting Because hydrogen is dissolved in the reactor coolant at approximately one atmosphere overpressure, a portion of the hydrogen along with fission gases will come out of solution in the recycle holdup tank under the diaphragm. The hydrogen and fission gases are vented to the waste processing system (gas portion) or the plant vent stack (via a portable pump) and the radwaste ventilation system as required. The total integrated flow of hydrogen-bearing water to the recycle holdup tanks is monitored. An alarm indicates when a sufficient amount of water has passed to the recycle holdup tanks to require venting of the accumulated gases.
C. Maintenance Drains When large amounts of water must be drained from the RCS or the spent-fuel pool (or fuel transfer canal) to the boron recycle system, a recycle holdup tank is drained of water and vented to the waste processing system. The water can then be stored in this tank until maintenance is completed and, after checking the chemistry, returned. After returning the water, the recycle holdup tank is again vented to the waste processing system.
D. Reactor Makeup Water Cleanup If the reactor makeup water requires purification, it can be recirculated through the recycle evaporator condensate demineralizer until its chemistry is within specifications. If further processing is necessary, water from the reactor makeup water storage tank can be directed through the recycle evaporator condensate demineralizer and into the recycle holdup tank for reevaporation. Alternatively, reactor makeup water can be directed to the recycle evaporator through its flush line, bypassing the demineralizer and holdup tank, provided that the reactor makeup water storage tank is maintained above established minimum level.
9.3-21                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 E.      Waste Processing with the Recycle Evaporator The recycle evaporator can be used to perform the function of the waste evaporator except that, since heat tracing is not provided for the recycle evaporator, the boric acid would be concentrated to no more than 4 wt%.
After using the recycle evaporator to process water from the waste processing system, it is thoroughly rinsed out. During initial recycle processing, the condensate is directed to the waste condensate tank for analysis prior to transfer to the reactor makeup water storage tank. Depending upon the purity of the evaporator bottoms, the concentrated boric acid can be transferred to the boric acid tanks or it can be drummed.
9.3.4.1.2.4    Layout. The volume control tank is located above the charging pumps to provide sufficient net positive suction head. All parts of the charging and letdown system are shielded as necessary to limit dose rates during operation with 1-percent fuel defects assumed.
The regenerative heat exchanger, excess letdown heat exchanger, letdown orifices, and seal bypass orifices are located within the reactor containment. All other system equipment is located inside the auxiliary building.
9.3.4.1.2.5    Component Description. A summary of principal component design parameters is given in table 9.3-6, and safety classifications and design codes are given in section 3.2.
All CVCS piping that handles radioactive liquid is austenitic stainless steel. All piping joints and connections are welded, except where flanged connections are required to facilitate equipment removal for maintenance and hydrostatic testing.
9.3.4.1.2.5.1 Charging Pumps. Three charging pumps are supplied to inject coolant into the RCS. The charging pumps are all of the horizontal, multistage, centrifugal type. All parts in contact with the reactor coolant are fabricated of austenitic stainless steel or other material of adequate corrosion resistance. There is a minimum flow recirculation line to protect the centrifugal charging pumps from a closed discharge valve condition.
Charging flowrate is determined from a pressurizer level signal. Charging flow control is accomplished by a modulating valve on the discharge side of the centrifugal pumps. The centrifugal charging pumps also serve as high head safety injection pumps in the ECCS.
Only one charging pump will be operable at RCS temperatures below 180&deg;F, except during pump swap operations. The remaining two charging pumps will have power removed from the pump. This procedure will reduce the likelihood of overpressurizing the RCS due to inadvertent operation of the charging pumps.
9.3.4.1.2.5.2 Boric Acid Transfer Pumps. Two horizontal, centrifugal pumps are supplied.
One pump is normally aligned to supply boric acid to the boric acid blender, while the second 9.3-22                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 serves as a standby. Manual or automatic initiation of the reactor coolant makeup system will start a pump to provide normal makeup of boric acid solution through the boric acid blender.
Emergency boration, supplying 4-wt-percent boric acid solution directly to the suction of the charging pumps, can be accomplished by manually starting either pump. The transfer pumps also function to transfer boric acid solution from the batching tank to the boric acid tanks.
The pumps are located in a heated area to prevent crystallization of the boric acid solution. All parts in contact with the solution are of austenitic stainless steel.
9.3.4.1.2.5.3 Recycle Evaporator Feed Pumps. Two centrifugal pumps supply feed to the recycle evaporator package from the recycle holdup tanks. Two pumps are supplied for redundancy. A cross-connect pipe is provided between the pumps of Units 1 and 2. The cross-connect allows the pumps to be used to transfer liquid from one holdup tank to either units holdup tanks, to either units spent-fuel pool, and to either units charging pumps for transfer into the RCS. The pumps can also be used to recirculate water from the recycle holdup tanks through the recycle evaporator feed demineralizers for cleanup if required.
9.3.4.1.2.5.4 Regenerative Heat Exchanger. The regenerative heat exchanger is designed to recover heat from the letdown flow by reheating the charging flow, which reduces thermal shock on the charging penetrations into the reactor coolant loop piping.
The letdown stream flows through the shell of the regenerative heat exchanger, and the charging stream flows through the tubes. The unit is constructed of austenitic stainless steel and is of all welded construction.
The temperatures of both outlet streams from the heat exchanger are monitored with indication given in the control room. A high temperature alarm is given on the main control board if the temperature of the letdown stream exceeds desired limits.
9.3.4.1.2.5.5 Letdown Heat Exchanger. The letdown heat exchanger cools the letdown stream to the operating temperature of the mixed-bed demineralizers. Reactor coolant flows through the tube side of the exchanger, while component cooling water flows through the shell side. All surfaces in contact with the reactor coolant are austenitic stainless steel; the shell is carbon steel.
The low-pressure letdown valve, located downstream of the letdown heat exchanger, maintains the pressure of the letdown flow, upstream of the heat exchanger, in a range sufficiently high to prevent two-phase flow.
The letdown temperature control indicates and controls the temperature of the letdown flow exiting from the letdown heat exchanger. The temperature sensor, which is part of the CVCS, provides input to the controller in the component cooling system. The exit temperature is controlled by regulating the component cooling water flow through the letdown heat exchanger by using the control valve located in the component cooling water discharge line. Temperature indication is provided on the main control board. If the temperature of the letdown stream 9.3-23                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 exceeds approximately 140&deg;F, the flow is diverted to the volume control tank in order to avoid damaging the resin in the mixed bed demineralizer.
9.3.4.1.2.5.6 Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger. The excess letdown heat exchanger cools reactor coolant letdown flow at a rate which is equivalent to the nominal seal injection flow, which flows downward through the reactor coolant pump labyrinth seals.
The excess letdown heat exchanger can be employed either when normal letdown is temporarily out of service to maintain the reactor in operation or when it can be used to supplement maximum letdown during the final stages of heatup. The letdown flows through the tube side of the unit, and component cooling water is circulated through the shell. All surfaces in contact with reactor coolant are austenitic stainless steel, and the shell is carbon steel. All tube joints are welded.
A temperature detector measures temperature of excess letdown downstream of the excess letdown heat exchanger. Temperature indication and high temperature alarm are provided on the main control board.
A pressure sensor indicates the pressure of the excess letdown flow downstream of the excess letdown heat exchanger and excess letdown control valve. Pressure indication is provided on the main control board.
9.3.4.1.2.5.7 Seal Water Heat Exchanger. The seal water heat exchanger is designed to cool fluid from three sources: reactor coolant pump seal water returning to the CVCS, reactor coolant discharged from the excess letdown heat exchanger, and centrifugal charging pump bypass flow. Reactor coolant flows through the tube side of the heat exchanger, and component cooling water is circulated through the shell. The design flowrate is equal to the sum of the excess letdown flow, maximum design reactor coolant pump seal leakage, and bypass flow from one centrifugal charging pump. The unit is designed to cool the above flow to the temperature normally maintained in the volume control tank. All surfaces in contact with reactor coolant are austenitic stainless steel; the shell is carbon steel.
9.3.4.1.2.5.8 Volume Control Tank. The volume control tank provides surge capacity for part of the reactor coolant expansion volume not accommodated by the pressurizer. When the level in the tank reaches the high-level setpoint, the remainder of the expansion volume is accommodated by diversion of the letdown stream to the recycle holdup tanks. It also provides a means for introducing hydrogen into the coolant to maintain the required equilibrium concentration of 25 to 50 cm3 hydrogen (at STP/kg water) for power operations, is used for degassing the reactor coolant, and serves as a head tank for the charging pumps.
A spray nozzle located inside the tank on the letdown line nozzle provides liquid to gas contact between the incoming fluid and the hydrogen atmosphere in the tank.
A remotely operated vent valve, discharging to the gaseous waste processing system, permits removal of gaseous fission products, which are stripped from the reactor coolant and collected in the gas space of this tank. Relief protection, gas space sampling, and nitrogen purge 9.3-24                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 connections are also provided. The tank can also accept the seal water return flow from the reactor coolant pumps, although this flow normally goes directly to the suction of the charging pumps.
Volume control tank pressure and temperature are monitored with indication given in the control room. Alarm is given in the control room for high and low pressure conditions and for high temperature.
Two level channels govern the water inventory in the volume control tank. These channels provide local and remote level indication, level alarms, level control, makeup control, and emergency makeup control.
If the volume control tank level rises above the normal operating range, one channel provides an analog signal to a proportional controller which modulates the three-way valve downstream of the reactor coolant filter to maintain the volume control tank level within the normal operating band. The three-way valve can split letdown flow so that a portion goes to the recycle holdup tanks and a portion to the volume control tank. The controller would operate in this fashion during a dilution operation, when reactor makeup water is being fed to the volume control tank from the reactor makeup control system.
If the modulating function of the channel fails and the volume control tank level continues to rise, the high level alarm will alert the operator to the malfunction and the letdown flow can be manually diverted to the holdup tanks. If no action is taken by the operator and the tank level continues to rise, the full letdown flow will be automatically diverted.
During normal power operation, a low level in the volume control tank initiates automatic makeup which injects a preselected blend of boron and water into the charging pump suction header. When the volume control tank is restored to normal, automatic makeup stops.
If the automatic makeup fails or is not aligned for operation and the tank level continues to decrease, a low-level alarm is actuated. Manual action may correct the situation or, if the level continues to decrease, an emergency low-level signal from both channels opens the stop valves in the refueling water supply line and closes the stop valves in the volume control tank outlet line.
9.3.4.1.2.5.9 Boric Acid Tanks. The combined boric acid tank capacity is sized to store sufficient boric acid solution for a cold shutdown from full-power operation immediately following refueling with the most reactive control rod not inserted, plus operating margins.
The concentration of boric acid solution in storage is maintained between 4- and 4.4-wt-percent.
Periodic manual sampling and corrective action, if necessary, ensure that these limits are maintained. As a consequence, measured amounts of boric acid solution can be delivered to the reactor coolant to control the concentration. The boron concentration limits are specified in the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM).
A temperature sensor provides temperature measurement of each tank's contents. Local temperature indication is provided, as well as high and low temperature alarms which are 9.3-25                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 indicated on the main control board. The minimum solution temperature is specified in the TRM.
Two level detectors indicate the level in each boric acid tank. Level indication with high-, low-,
and low-low-level alarms is provided on the main control board. The low-low alarm is set to indicate the minimum level of boric acid in the tank to ensure sufficient boric acid to provide for a cold shutdown with one stuck rod. The minimum contained borated water volume is specified in the TRM.
9.3.4.1.2.5.10 Batching Tank. The batching tank is used for mixing a makeup supply of boric acid solution for transfer to the boric acid tanks. The tank may also be used for solution storage.
A local sampling point is provided for verifying the solution concentration prior to transferring it out of the tank. The tank is provided with an agitator to improve mixing during batching operations and a steam jacket for heating the boric acid solution.
9.3.4.1.2.5.11 Chemical Mixing Tank. The primary use of the chemical mixing tank is in the preparation of caustic solutions for pH control and hydrazine solution for oxygen scavenging.
9.3.4.1.2.5.12 Recycle Holdup Tanks. Three recycle holdup tanks provide storage of excess reactor effluents for future reuse, disposal, or processing by the recycle evaporator package.
Each tank has a diaphragm which prevents air from dissolving in the tank liquid and prevents the hydrogen and fission gases under the diaphragm from mixing with the air. The air space in the tank above the diaphragm is vented to the plant vent.
9.3.4.1.2.5.13 Recycle Evaporator Reagent Tank. This tank provides a means of adding chemicals to the recycle evaporator package, e.g., for cleanup.
9.3.4.1.2.5.14 Mixed-Bed Demineralizers. Two flushable, mixed-bed demineralizers assist in maintaining reactor coolant purity. A lithium or hydrogen form cation resin and hydroxyl form anion resin are charged into the demineralizers. Each form of resin removes fission and corrosion products. The resin bed is designed to reduce the concentration of ionic isotopes in the purification stream, except for cesium, yttrium, and molybdenum, by a minimum factor of 10.
In preparation for an outage and during an outage where a release of particulate and soluble corrosion products is anticipated, a specialty resin, such as a coated weak acid cation resin, may be added to a mixed-bed demineralizer for removal of particulate radio-cobalt and particulate nickel.
This demineralizer may be used during power operations for reactor coolant Lithium control during periods when the cation demineralizer or alternate mixed-bed demineralizer are not available for this purpose.
9.3-26                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 Each demineralizer has sufficient capacity for approximately one core cycle with 1-percent failed fuel. One demineralizer serves as a standby unit for use if the operating demineralizer becomes exhausted during operation.
A temperature sensor measures temperature of the letdown flow downstream of the letdown heat exchanger and controls the letdown flow to the mixed-bed demineralizers by means of a three-way valve. If the letdown temperature exceeds the allowable resin operating temperature, the flow is automatically bypassed around the demineralizers. Temperature indication and high alarm are provided on the main control board. The air-operated, three-way valve failure mode directs flow to the volume control tank.
9.3.4.1.2.5.15 Cation Bed Demineralizer. A flushable cation resin bed in the hydrogen form is located downstream of the mixed-bed demineralizers and is used intermittently to control the concentration of Li7 which builds up in the coolant from the B10(n,)Li7 reaction. The demineralizer also has sufficient capacity to maintain the cesium-137 concentration in the coolant below 1.0 Ci/cm3 with 1-percent failed fuel. The resin bed is designed to reduce the concentration of ionic isotopes, particularly cesium, yttrium, and molybdenum, by a minimum factor of 10.
The cation bed demineralizer has sufficient capacity for approximately one core cycle with 1-percent failed fuel.
9.3.4.1.2.5.16 Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizers. Two flushable, mixed bed demineralizers remove fission products from the fluid directed to the recycle holdup tanks. The demineralizers also provide a means of cleaning the recycle holdup tank contents via recirculation.
9.3.4.1.2.5.17 Recycle Evaporator Condensate Demineralizer. A sluicable, mixed-bed resin demineralizer is used to remove any boric acid, other anionic impurities such as chloride and fluoride, cationic impurities such as sodium, calcium, magnesium, and aluminum and also any particulate activity carryover contained in the evaporator condensate. The mixed-bed resin provides the system with the capability to remove a wide range of chemical and radiochemical contaminants resulting in high quality water for plant operations. Although the bed may become saturated with boron at the normally low concentration (< 10 ppm) leaving the evaporator, it will still remove most of the boron if the concentration increases because of an evaporator upset.
The demineralizer also provides a means of cleanup of the reactor makeup water storage tank contents.
9.3.4.1.2.5.18 Reactor Coolant Filter. The reactor coolant filter is located on the letdown line upstream of the volume control tank. The filter collects resin fines and particulates from the letdown stream. The nominal flow capacity of the filter is greater than the maximum purification flowrate.
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FNP-FSAR-9 Two local pressure indicators are provided to show the pressures upstream and downstream of the reactor coolant filter and thus provide filter differential pressure.
9.3.4.1.2.5.19 Seal Water Injection Filters. Two seal water injection filters are located in parallel in a common line to the reactor coolant pump seals; they collect particulate matter that could be harmful to the seal faces. Each filter is sized to accept flow in excess of the normal seal water flow requirements.
A differential pressure indicator monitors the pressure drop across each seal water injection filter and gives local indication with high differential pressure alarm on the main control board.
9.3.4.1.2.5.20 Seal Water Return Filter. The filter collects particulates from the reactor coolant pump seal water return and from the excess letdown flow. The filter is designed to pass flow in excess of the sum of the excess letdown flow and the maximum design leakage from the reactor coolant pump seals.
Two local pressure indicators are provided to show the pressures upstream and downstream of the filter and thus provide differential pressure across the filter.
9.3.4.1.2.5.21 Boric Acid Filter. The boric acid filter collects particulates from the boric acid solution being pumped from the boric acid tanks. The filter is designed to pass the design flow of two boric acid transfer pumps operating simultaneously.
Local pressure indicators indicate the pressure upstream and downstream of the boric acid filter and thus provide filter differential pressure.
9.3.4.1.2.5.22 Recycle Evaporator Feed Filter. This filter collects resin fines and particles from the fluid entering the recycle holdup tanks.
9.3.4.1.2.5.23 Recycle Evaporator Condensate Filter. This filter collects particulates from the boric acid evaporator condensate stream.
9.3.4.1.2.5.24 Recycle Evaporator Concentrates Filter. This filter removes particulates from the evaporator concentrate as it leaves the evaporator.
9.3.4.1.2.5.25 Boric Acid Blender. The boric acid blender promotes thorough mixing of boric acid solution and reactor makeup water for the reactor coolant makeup circuit. The blender consists of a conventional pipe tee fitted with a perforated tube insert. The blender decreases the pipe length required to homogenize the mixture for taking a representative local sample. A sample point is provided in the piping just downstream of the blender.
9.3.4.1.2.5.26 Letdown Orifices. The three letdown orifices are arranged in parallel and serve to reduce the pressure of the letdown stream to a value compatible with the letdown heat 9.3-28                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 exchanger design. Two of the three are sized so that either can pass normal letdown flow of 60 gal/min; the third can pass 45 gal/min. One or both standby orifices may be used with the normally operating orifice in order to increase letdown flow, such as during reactor heatup operations and maximum purification. This arrangement also provides a full standby capacity for control of letdown flow. Orifices are placed in and taken out of service by remote manual operation of their respective isolation valves.
A flow monitor provides indication in the control room of the letdown flowrate. A high flow alarm is provided to indicate flowrates exceeding 140 gal/min.
A low pressure letdown controller controls the pressure downstream of the letdown heat exchanger to prevent flashing of the letdown liquid. Pressure indication and high pressure alarm are provided on the main control board.
9.3.4.1.2.5.27 Recycle Evaporator Package. The recycle evaporator package processes dilute boric acid and produces distillate and approximately 4-wt-percent boric acid stripped of hydrogen, nitrogen, and radioactive gases.
A boric acid solution is fed from the recycle holdup tanks to the evaporator by the recycle evaporator feed pumps. The feed first passes through a heat exchanger where condensing steam raises its temperature. The feed then passes into the top of the stripping column. Gases are stripped off as the feed passes over the packing in the tower in contraflow to stripping steam from the evaporator. After stripping, the feed is introduced into the evaporator as makeup. The vapors leaving the boiling pool are stripped of entrained liquid and volatile boron carryover.
Pure vapors are then condensed in the condenser section and pumped from the system. When the desired concentration is reached in the boiling pool, the concentrates are pumped from the system.
Radioactive gases and other noncondensables are discharged from the system into the waste gas vent header.
The recycle and waste evaporators are identical units and are interconnected so that they serve as standbys for each other under abnormal conditions.
9.3.4.1.2.5.28 Recycle Holdup Tank Vent Eductor. The eductor is designed to pull gases from under the diaphragm in the recycle holdup tank. Nitrogen, provided by the waste gas compressor, provides the motive force.
9.3.4.1.2.5.29 Valves. Valves, other than diaphragm valves, that perform a modulating function are equipped with a stuffing box containing two sets of packing and an intermediate leakoff connection. Valves are normally installed so that, when closed, the high pressure is not on the packing. Basic material of construction is stainless steel for all valves that handle radioactive liquid or boric acid solutions.
Isolation valves are provided for all lines entering the reactor containment. These valves are discussed in detail in subsection 6.2.4.
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FNP-FSAR-9 Relief valves are provided for lines and components that might be pressurized above design pressure by improper operation or component malfunction.
A. Charging Line Downstream of Regenerative Heat Exchanger If the charging side of the regenerative heat exchanger is isolated while the hot letdown flow continues at its maximum rate, the volumetric expansion of coolant on the charging side of the heat exchanger is relieved to the RCS through a spring-loaded check valve.
The spring in the valve is designed to permit the check valve to open in the event that the differential pressure exceeds the design pressure differential.
B. Letdown Line Downstream of Letdown Orifices The pressure relief valve downstream of the letdown orifices protects the low-pressure piping and the letdown heat exchanger from overpressure when the low-pressure piping is isolated. The capacity of the relief valve exceeds the maximum flowrate through all letdown orifices. The valve set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the letdown heat exchanger tube side.
C. Letdown Line Downstream of Low Pressure Letdown Valve The pressure relief valve downstream of the low pressure letdown valve protects the low-pressure piping, demineralizers, and filter from overpressure when this section of the system is isolated. The overpressure may result from leakage through the low-pressure letdown valve. The capacity of the relief valve exceeds the maximum flowrate through all letdown orifices. The valve set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the demineralizers.
D. Volume Control Tank The relief valve on the volume control tank permits the tank to be designed for a lower pressure than the upstream equipment. This valve has a capacity greater than the summation of the following items: maximum letdown, maximum seal water return, excess letdown, and nominal flow from one reactor makeup water pump. The valve set pressure equals the design pressure of the volume control tank.
E. Charging Pump Suction A relief valve on the charging pump suction header relieves pressure that may build up if the suction line isolation valves are closed or if the system is overpressurized. The valve set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the associated piping and equipment.
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FNP-FSAR-9 F.      Seal Water Return Line (Inside Containment)
This relief valve is designed to relieve overpressurization in the seal water return piping inside the containment if the motor-operated isolation valve is closed. The valve is designed to relieve the total leakoff flow from the No. 1 seals of the reactor coolant pumps plus the design excess letdown flow. The valve is set to relieve at the design pressure of the piping.
G.      Seal Water Return Line (Charging Pumps Bypass Flow)
This relief valve protects the seal water heat exchanger and its associated piping from overpressurization. If either of the isolation valves for the heat exchanger is closed and if the bypass line is closed, the piping could be overpressurized by the bypass flow from the centrifugal charging pumps. The valve is sized to handle full bypass flow with all centrifugal pumps running. The valve is set to relieve at the design pressure of the heat exchanger.
H.      Steam Line to Batching Tank The relief valve on the steam line to the batching tank protects the low-pressure piping and batching tank heating jacket from overpressure when the condensate return line is isolated. The capacity of the relief valve equals the maximum expected steam inlet flow. The set pressure equals the design pressure of the heating jacket.
9.3.4.1.2.5.30 Piping. All CVCS piping handling radioactive liquid is austenitic stainless steel.
All piping joints and connections are welded, except where flanged connections are required to facilitate equipment removal for maintenance and hydrostatic testing.
9.3.4.1.2.6      System Operation. The reactor startup, power generation and hot standby operation, and reactor shutdown of the CVCS are discussed below.
9.3.4.1.2.6.1 Reactor Startup. Reactor startup is defined as the operations which bring the reactor from cold shutdown to normal operating temperature and pressure. It is assumed that:
A.      Normal residual heat removal is in progress.
B.      The RCS boron concentration is at the cold shutdown concentration.
C.      The reactor makeup control system is set to provide makeup at the cold shutdown concentration.
D.      The RCS is either water solid or drained to minimum level for the purpose of refueling or maintenance. If the RCS is water solid, system pressure is controlled by letdown through the residual heat removal system and through the low pressure letdown valve in the letdown line.
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FNP-FSAR-9 E.      The charging and letdown lines of the CVCS are filled with coolant at the cold shutdown boron concentration. The letdown orifice isolation valves are closed.
If the RCS requires filling via dynamic venting, the procedure is as follows:
A.      One charging pump is started, which provides blended flow from the reactor makeup control system at the cold shutdown boron concentration. Charging and letdown flows and seal injection flow to reactor coolant pumps are established.
B.      The vents on the head of the reactor vessel and pressurizer are opened.
C.      The RCS is filled and the vents closed.
The system pressure is raised using the charging pump and controlled by the low-pressure letdown valve. When the system pressure is adequate for operation of the reactor coolant pumps, seal water leakage flow from the pumps is verified and the pumps are operated and vented sequentially until all gases are cleared from the system. Final venting takes place at the pressurizer.
If the RCS requires filling and venting via use of the reactor coolant vacuum refill system (RCVRS), the procedure is as follows:
Air is removed from the RCS by the RCVRS via a connection to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT) inlet line. Initial conditions are as follows: the RCS level is at midloop and the PRT level is below the sparging header. The vacuum pump skid suction hose is connected to the PRT inlet line connection. The RHR flow is adjusted to prevent vortexing and to ensure adequate net positive suction head (NPSH). The air evacuation path is established by opening the reactor vessel head vent valves, the pressurizer spray valves, the power-operated relief valve (PORV) block valves and the PORVs.
After the filling and venting operations are completed, all pressurizer heaters are energized, and the reactor coolant pumps are employed to heat up the system. After the reactor coolant pumps are started, pressure control via the residual heat removal system and the low pressure letdown line is continued as the pressurizer steam bubble is formed. At this point, steam formation in the pressurizer is accomplished by manual control of the charging flow and automatic pressure control of the letdown flow. When the pressurizer water level reaches the no-load programmed setpoint, the pressurizer level control is shifted to control the charging flow to maintain programmed level. The residual heat removal system is then isolated from the RCS.
The reactor coolant boron concentration is now reduced either by operating the reactor makeup control system in the dilute mode or by operating the BTRS in the boron storage mode and, when the resin beds are saturated, washing off the beds to the recycle holdup tanks. The reactor coolant boron concentration is corrected to the point where the control rods may be withdrawn and criticality achieved. Nuclear heatup may then proceed, with corresponding manual adjustment of the reactor coolant boron concentration to balance the temperature coefficient effects and maintain the control rods within their operating range. During heatup, the appropriate combination of letdown orifices is used to provide necessary letdown flow.
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FNP-FSAR-9 Prior to or during the heating process, the CVCS is employed to obtain the correct chemical properties in the RCS. The reactor makeup control is operated on a continuing basis to ensure correct control rod position. Chemicals are added through the chemical mixing tank, as required, to control reactor coolant chemistry such as pH and dissolved oxygen content.
Hydrogen overpressure is established in the volume control tank to ensure the appropriate hydrogen concentration in the reactor coolant.
9.3.4.1.2.6.2 Power Generation and Hot Standby Operation. Base load, load follow, and hot shutdown of this operation are discussed below.
A.      Base Load At a constant power level, the rates of charging and letdown are dictated by the requirements for seal water to the reactor coolant pumps and the normal purification of the RCS. One charging pump is employed, and charging flow is controlled automatically from pressurizer level. The only necessary adjustments in boron concentration are those to compensate for core burnup. These adjustments are made at infrequent intervals to maintain the control groups within their allowable limits. Rapid variations in power demand are accommodated automatically by control rod movement. If variations in power level occur and the new power level is sustained for long periods, some adjustment in boron concentration may be necessary to maintain the control groups within their maneuvering band.
During normal operation, normal letdown flow is maintained and one mixed-bed demineralizer is in service. Reactor coolant samples are taken periodically to check boron concentration, water quality, pH, and activity level. The charging pump flow to the RCS is controlled automatically by the pressurizer level control signal through the discharge header flow control valve.
B.      Load Follow A power reduction will initially cause a xenon buildup followed by xenon decay to a new, lower equilibrium value. The reverse occurs if the power level decreases and then increases to a new and higher equilibrium value associated with the amount of the power level change.
The BTRS is normally used to vary the reactor coolant boron concentration to compensate for xenon transients occurring when reactor power level is changed.
The reactor makeup control system may also be used to vary the boron concentration in the reactor coolant.
The most important intelligence available to the plant operator, enabling him to determine whether dilution or boration of the RCS is necessary, is the position of the control rods within the maneuvering band. If, for example, the control rods are moving down into the core and are approaching the bottom of the maneuvering band, the operator must borate the reactor coolant to bring the rods outward. If not, the control rods may move into the core beyond the shutdown 9.3-33                            REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 limit. If, on the other hand, the rods are moving out of the core, the operator dilutes the reactor coolant to keep the rods from moving above the top of the maneuvering band. Keeping the control rods at the top of the maneuvering band ensures the capability of immediate return to full power. However, violation of the upper limit of the maneuvering band is not safety related and is allowed.
With the control rods above the top of the maneuvering band the reactor cannot return to full power immediately; it can return to some rate determined by the xenon burnout transient.
During periods of plant loading, the reactor coolant expands as its temperature rises. The pressurizer absorbs most of this expansion as the level controller raises the level setpoint to the increased level associated with the new power level. The remainder of the excess coolant is let down and is stored in the volume control tank. During this period, the flow through the letdown orifice remains constant and the charging flow is reduced by the pressurizer level control signal, resulting in an increased temperature at the regenerative heat exchanger outlet. The temperature controller downstream from the letdown heat exchanger increases the component cooling water flow to maintain the desired letdown temperature.
During periods of plant unloading, the charging flow is increased to make up for the coolant contraction not accommodated by the programmed reduction in pressurizer level.
C. Hot Standby and Hot Shutdown When the reactor is shutdown and the RCS temperature is  350&deg;F, the plant is in the Hot Standby operational mode. When the reactor is shutdown and the RCS temperature is > 200&deg;F and < 350&deg;F, the plant is in the Hot Shutdown operational mode. RCS temperature is normally the result of RCP heat and decay heat additions. Normally RCS temperature is controlled by the steam dumps or atmospheric relief valves when at higher temperatures. When at lower temperatures, the RHR system is normally used to control RCS temperature.
Technical Specifications provide additional details regarding plant operational modes.
Following a normal reactor shutdown or reactor trip, for a finite period of time, the reactor can be returned to some power using only the control rods. Through design, procedural reactivity management requirements, and Technical Specification requirements, the reactor maintains a minimum shutdown margin of 1.77% k/k. The shutdown reactivity (assuming no-load Tavg and no change in RCS boron) immediately following a normal reactor shutdown or reactor trip is a result of control rod and shutdown rod insertions, while also accounting for the reactivity associated with the pre-shutdown power. Subsequently, xenon buildup following reactor shutdown adds additional shutdown reactivity for approximately 8 h, returns to the initial post trip value in approximately 24 h, and then reduces shutdown reactivity over the next approximately 72 h. RCS boron 9.3-34                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 additions/deletions can compensate for the effects of xenon decay/buildup and reduction in RCS temperature. The magnitude of xenon effects vary with pre-shutdown power history status and the operating cycle fuel characteristics.
The core specific Nuclear Design and Core Management manuals should be referred to for specific information regarding reactivity effects associated with various plant operational modes.
9.3.4.1.2.6.3 Reactor Shutdown. Reactor shutdown is defined as the operations that bring the reactor to cold shutdown.
Before initiating a cold shutdown, the RCS hydrogen concentration is reduced by replacing the volume control tank hydrogen atmosphere with nitrogen by purging to the gaseous waste processing system. An alternate method of reducing the hydrogen concentration in the RCS is chemical degassing. Both methods are explained in detail in paragraph 11.3.4.1 Before cooldown and depressurization of the reactor plant is initiated, the reactor coolant boron concentration is increased to the cold shutdown value. The operator sets the reactor makeup control to borate, selects the volume of concentrated boric acid solution necessary to perform the boration, selects the desired flowrate, and actuates makeup start. After the boration is completed and reactor coolant samples verify that the concentration is correct, the operator resets the reactor makeup control system for leakage makeup and system contraction at the shutdown reactor coolant boron concentration.
Contraction of the coolant during cooldown of the RCS results in actuation of the pressurizer level control to maintain normal pressurizer water level. The charging flow is increased, relative to letdown flow, and results in a decreasing volume control tank level. The volume control tank level controller automatically initiates makeup to maintain the inventory.
After the residual heat removal system is placed in service and the reactor coolant pumps are shut down, further cooling of the pressurizer liquid is accomplished by charging through the auxiliary spray line. Coincident with plant cooldown, a portion of the reactor coolant flow may be diverted from the residual heat removal system to the CVCS for cleanup. Demineralization of ionic radioactive impurities and stripping of fission gases reduce the reactor coolant activity level sufficiently to permit personnel access for refueling or maintenance operations.
9.3.4.1.3        Safety Evaluation 9.3.4.1.3.1      Reactivity Control. Any time that the plant is at power, the quantity of boric acid retained and ready for injection always exceeds that quantity required for the normal cold shutdown, assuming that the control assembly of greatest worth is in its fully withdrawn position.
This quantity always exceeds the quantity of boric acid required to bring the reactor to hot shutdown and to compensate for subsequent xenon decay. An adequate quantity of boric acid is also available in the refueling water storage tank to achieve cold shutdown.
When the reactor is subcritical (i.e., during cold or hot shutdown, refueling, and approach to criticality), the neutron source multiplication is continuously monitored and indicated. Any 9.3-35                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 appreciable increase in the neutron source multiplication, including that caused by the maximum physical boron dilution rate, is slow enough to give ample time to start a corrective action (boron dilution stop and boration) to prevent the core from becoming critical.
Two separate and independent flow paths are available for reactor coolant boration, i.e., the charging line and the reactor coolant pump seal injection. A single failure does not result in the inability to borate the RCS.
As backup to the normal boric acid supply, the operator can align the refueling water storage tank outlet to the suction of the charging pumps, thus injecting 2300-ppm boron solution (minimum) into the RCS.
In Mode 6, with any valve used to isolate an unborated water source not secured in the closed position, the TRM ensures that at least one flow path is available for boron injection. When the unborated water source isolation valves are secured in the closed position in Mode 6, a boron dilution accident is precluded. In this case, plant procedures ensure the availability of at least one boron injection flow path.
In Mode 5, the TRM ensures that at least one flow path is available for boron injection and that the capability of such injection is adequate to ensure that cold shutdown can be maintained.
In Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 the TRM ensures that redundant boration capability is available in quantity sufficient to ensure shutdown to cold conditions.
An upper limit to the boric acid tank boron concentration and a lower limit to the temperature for the tank and for flow paths from the tank are specified in order to ensure that solution solubility is maintained.
Since inoperability of a single component does not impair ability to meet boron injection requirements, plant operating procedures allow components to be temporarily out of service for repairs. However, with an inoperable component, the ability to tolerate additional component failure is limited. Therefore, operating procedures require immediate action to effect repairs of an inoperable component, restrict permissible repair time, and require demonstration of the operability of the redundant component.
9.3.4.1.3.2      Reactor Coolant Purification. The CVCS is capable of reducing the concentration of ionic isotopes in the purification stream as required in the design basis. This is accomplished by passing the letdown flow through the mixed-bed demineralizers that remove ionic isotopes, except those of cesium, molybdenum, and yttrium, with a minimum decontamination factor of 10. Through occasional use of the cation bed demineralizer, the concentration of cesium can be maintained below 1.0 Ci/cm3, assuming 1 percent of the rated core thermal power is being produced by fuel with defective cladding. The cation bed demineralizer is capable of passing the normal letdown flow, though only a portion of this capacity is normally utilized. Each mixed-bed demineralizer is capable of processing the maximum letdown flowrate. If the normally operating mixed-bed demineralizer's resin has become exhausted, the second demineralizer can be placed in service. Each demineralizer is designed, however, to operate for one core cycle with 1-percent defective fuel.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.3.4.1.3.3    Seal Water Injection. Flow to the reactor coolant pumps' seals is ensured by the fact that there are three charging pumps, any one of which is capable of supplying the normal charging line flow plus the nominal seal water flow.
9.3.4.1.3.4    Leakage Provisions. The CVCS components, valves, and piping that see radioactive service are designed to limit leakage to the atmosphere. Leakage to the atmosphere is limited through: welding of all piping joints and connections except where flanged connections are provided to facilitate maintenance and hydrostatic testing, extensive use of leakoffs to collect leakage, and use of diaphragm valves where conditions permit.
The volume control tank in the CVCS provides an inferential measurement of leakage from the system as well as the RCS. Low level in the volume control tank actuates makeup at the prevailing reactor coolant boron concentration.
The amount of leakage can be inferred from the amount of makeup added by the reactor makeup control system.
9.3.4.1.3.5    Ability to Meet the Safeguards Function. A failure analysis of the portion of the CVCS which is safety related (used as part of the ECCS) is included as part of the ECCS failure analysis presented in appendix 6A.
9.3.4.1.4      Tests and Inspections As part of plant operation, periodic tests, surveillance inspections, and instrument calibrations are made to monitor equipment condition and performance. Most components are in use regularly; therefore, assurance of the availability and performance of the systems and equipment is provided by control room and/or local indication.
The plant Technical Specifications and requirements in the TRM have been established concerning calibration, checking, and sampling of the CVCS.
9.3.4.1.5      Instrumentation Application Process control instrumentation is provided to acquire data concerning key parameters about the CVCS. The location of the instrumentation is shown in drawings D-175039, sheet 1 through 7 and D-205039, sheets 1 through 5. The instrumentation furnishes input signals for monitoring and/or alarming purposes. Indications and/or alarms are provided for the following parameters:
temperature, pressure, flow, water level, and radiation.
The instrumentation also supplies input signals for control purposes. Some specific control functions are:
A.      Letdown flow is diverted to the volume control tank upon high temperature indication upstream of the mixed-bed demineralizers.
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FNP-FSAR-9 B.      Pressure downstream of the letdown heat exchangers is controlled to prevent flashing of the letdown liquid.
C.      Charging flowrate is controlled during charging pump operation.
D.      Water level is controlled in the volume control tank.
E.      Temperature of the boric acid solution in the batching tank is maintained.
F.      Reactor makeup is controlled.
G.      DELETED 9.3.4.2          Boron Thermal Regeneration System The BTRS varies the RCS boron concentration to compensate for xenon transients and other reactivity changes which occur when the reactor power level is changed.
9.3.4.2.1        Design Basis The BTRS is designed to accommodate the changes in boron concentration required by the design load cycle without requiring makeup for either boration or dilution.
9.3.4.2.2        System Description During normal operation of the CVCS, the letdown flow from the RCS passes through the regenerative heat exchanger, letdown heat exchanger, mixed-bed demineralizers, reactor coolant filter, and volume control tank. The charging pumps then take suction from the volume control tank and return the purified reactor coolant to the RCS.
An alternate letdown path is provided which allows part or all of the letdown flow to pass through the BTRS (shown in drawings D-175040 and D-205040) when boron concentration changes are made to follow plant load. The letdown flow is directed to the BTRS from a point downstream of the mixed-bed demineralizers. After processing by the BTRS, the flow is returned to the CVCS at a point upstream of the reactor coolant filter.
Storage and release of boron during load follow operation is determined by the temperature of the fluid entering the thermal regeneration demineralizers. A group of heat exchangers is employed to provide the desired fluid temperatures at the demineralizer inlet for either storage or release operation of the system.
The flow path through the BTRS is different for boron storage and release operations. During boron storage, the letdown stream enters the moderating heat exchanger and from there it passes through the letdown chiller heat exchanger. The moderating heat exchanger cools the letdown stream prior to its entering the demineralizers. The letdown reheat heat exchanger is 9.3-38                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 valved out on the tube side and performs no function during boron storage operations. After passing through the demineralizers, the letdown enters the moderating heat exchanger shell side, where it is heated by the incoming letdown stream before going to the volume control tank.
Therefore, for boron storage, a decrease in the boric acid concentration in the reactor coolant is accomplished by sending the letdown flow at relatively low temperatures to the thermal regeneration demineralizers. The resin, which was depleted of boron at high temperature during a prior boron release operation, is now capable of storing boric acid from the low temperature letdown stream. Reactor coolant with a decreased concentration of boric acid leaves the demineralizers and is directed to the CVCS. Procedures are also available to decrease the concentration of boric acid in the reactor coolant using BTRS demineralizers without using BTRS chillers.
During the boron release operation, the letdown stream enters the moderating heat exchanger tube side, bypasses the letdown chiller heat exchanger, and passes through the shell side of the letdown reheat heat exchanger. The moderating and letdown reheat heat exchangers heat the letdown stream prior to its entering the resin beds. The temperature of the letdown at the point of entry to the demineralizers is controlled automatically by the temperature control valve which controls the flowrate on the tube side of the letdown reheat heat exchanger. After passing through the demineralizers, the letdown stream enters the shell side of the moderating heat exchanger, passes through the tube side of the letdown chiller heat exchanger, and then goes to the volume control tank. Thus, for boron release, an increase in the boric acid concentration in the reactor coolant is accomplished by sending the letdown flow at relatively high temperatures to the thermal regeneration demineralizers. The water flowing through the demineralizers now releases boron that was stored by the resin at low temperature during a previous boron storage operation. The boron-enriched reactor coolant is returned to the RCS via the CVCS.
Although the BTRS is primarily designed to compensate for xenon transients occurring during load follow, it can also be used to handle boron swings far in excess of the design capacity of the demineralizers. During startup dilution, for example, the resin beds are first saturated, then washed off to the recycle holdup tanks in the CVCS, and then again saturated and washed off.
This operation continues until the desired dilution in the RCS is obtained.
As an additional function, a thermal regeneration demineralizer can be used as a deborating demineralizer, which would be used to dilute the RCS down to very low boron concentrations toward the end of core life. To make such a bed effective, the effluent concentration from the bed must be kept very low, close to 0-ppm boron. This low effluent concentration can be achieved by using fresh resin. When RCS boron concentrations are low during the end of a core cycle, the four BTRS demineralizers are evaluated for boron removal capability. The boron removal efficiency of each demineralizer resin will determine when the demineralizer will be placed in service, and when the resin will be replaced with fresh resin.
A.      Component Description Component safety classifications and design codes are given in section 3.2, and a summary of principal component design parameters is given in table 9.3-7.
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FNP-FSAR-9
: 1. Chiller Pumps (ABANDONED)
These centrifugal pumps circulate the water through the chilled-water loop. One pump is supplied for each chiller.
: 2. Moderating Heat Exchanger The moderating heat exchanger operates as a regenerative heat exchanger between incoming and outgoing streams to and from the thermal regeneration demineralizers.
The incoming flow enters the tube side of the moderating heat exchanger.
The shell-side fluid, which comes directly from the demineralizers, enters at low temperature during boron storage and enters at high temperature during boron release.
: 3. Letdown Chiller Heat Exchanger During the boron storage operation, the process stream enters the tube side of the letdown chiller heat exchanger after leaving the moderating heat exchanger.
: 4. Letdown Reheat Heat Exchanger The letdown reheat heat exchanger is used only during boron release operations and it is then used to heat the process stream. Water used for heating is diverted from the letdown line upstream of the letdown heat exchanger in the CVCS, passed through the tube side of the letdown reheat heat exchanger, and then returned to the letdown stream upstream of the letdown heat exchanger.
: 5. Chiller Surge Tank (ABANDONED)
The chiller surge tank handles the thermal expansion and contraction of the water in the chiller loop. The surge volume in the tank also acts as a thermal buffer for the chiller.
: 6. Thermal Regeneration Demineralizers The function of the thermal regeneration demineralizers is to store the total amount of boron that must be removed from the RCS to accomplish the required dilution during a load cycle in order to compensate for xenon buildup resulting from a decreased power level. Furthermore, the demineralizers must be able to release the previously stored boron to accomplish the required boration of the reactor coolant during the load cycle in order to compensate for a decrease in xenon concentration resulting from an increased power level.
9.3-40                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The demineralizers are of the type that can accept flow in either direction.
The flow direction during boron storage is therefore always opposite to that during release. This provides much faster response when the beds are switched from storage to release, and vice versa, than would be the case if the demineralizers could accept flow in only one direction.
: 7.      Chillers (ABANDONED)
The chillers are located in a chilled-water loop containing a surge tank, chiller pumps, the letdown chiller heat exchanger, piping, valves, and controls. The purpose of the chillers is twofold: to cool down the process stream during storage of boron on the resin and to maintain an outlet temperature from the BTRS at or below 115&deg;F during release of boron.
B. System Operation A master switch is provided which places the system in either the boron release or boron storage mode of operation or turns the system off. The operational modes determined by the thermal regeneration selector switch are boration, dilution, and off.
When the switch is set on off, the BTRS is isolated from the letdown line and the chiller and chiller pumps are stopped. Valve 1-8547 opens to permit normal letdown flow directly to the volume control tank.
With the switch set for dilution (boron storage), the following alignments occur:
: 1.      Proper flow path to BTRS is established.
: 2.      Tube side flow (hot letdown) of the letdown reheat heat exchanger is isolated.
: 3.      The BTRS bypass valve (1-8547) diverts all letdown flow into the BTRS.
The chiller heat exchanger shell flow control valve (TCV-386) is set to control the temperature of the water leaving the tube side and going to the BTRS demineralizers. Valve 1-HCV-387 is adjusted to control the amount of water that flows through the demineralizer beds.
When the selector switch is set for boration (boron release), the system automatically:
: 1.      Aligns the proper flow path in the BTRS.
: 2.      Controls the temperature leaving the shell side and going to the BTRS demineralizers via the letdown reheat heat exchanger tube flow control valve (TCV-381).
: 3.      Directs all letdown flow into the BTRS via bypass valve 1-8547.
9.3-41                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The chiller heat exchanger flow control valve (TCV-386) is set to control the temperature of the water leaving the tube side and going to the volume control tank. Valve 1-HCV-387 is adjusted to control the amount of water that flows through the demineralizer beds.
After the mode of operation has been selected and the system prepared for operation by actuation of the master switch, flow is admitted to the BTRS by throttling back on the diversion valve in the letdown line. The flowrate through the BTRS is dictated by the desired reactor coolant dilution (boration) rate.
When the boron concentration of the reactor coolant reaches the desired level, the BTRS is shut down by placing the master switch in the off position.
Table 9.3-8 shows certain values associated with operation of the BTRS and their position in each operating mode.
9.3.4.2.3      Safety Evaluation Any partial or total malfunction of the BTRS would result only in loss of plant load following capability. This system is nonsafety related. The postulated full power dilution accident considered in chapter 15 is not influenced by dilution with this system. The dilution flow depends solely upon the delivery capability of the charging pumps, which remains unchanged with or without BTRS operability.
9.3.4.2.4      Tests and Inspections The BTRS is in intermittent use throughout normal reactor operation. Periodic visual inspection and preventive maintenance are conducted using normal industry practice.
9.3.4.2.5      Instrumentation Application A.      Temperature Instrumentation is provided to monitor the chiller outlet temperature and to control chiller operation. Instrumentation is also provided to monitor the chiller surge tank temperature. Readout for both sets of instrumentation is located on the main control board.
Instrumentation is provided to control the temperature of the letdown flow passing through the demineralizers. During dilution, it controls a valve which throttles the letdown chiller heat exchanger shell-side flow. During boration, it controls the valves which throttle the letdown reheat heat exchanger tube side flow. Readout and a high temperature alarm are provided on the main control board.
9.3-42                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 Protection of the thermal regeneration demineralizer resins from high temperature flow is provided by instrumentation which, upon reaching the high temperature setpoint, operates a three-way valve in the letdown line upstream of the mixed-bed demineralizers in the CVCS in order to divert the letdown flow to the volume control tank. Readout is provided on the main control board.
Instrumentation is provided to monitor the temperature of the flow leaving the demineralizers. Temperature indication is provided on the main control board.
The temperature of the flow leaving the BTRS during boration (boron release) operations is controlled by instrumentation controlling a valve which throttles the letdown chiller heat exchanger shell-side flow. Thus the temperature of the fluid being routed to the volume control tank is prevented from becoming too high.
B.      Pressure Instrumentation is provided which monitors and gives local indication of the pressure at each chiller pump suction and discharge and at the inlet and outlet to the bank of demineralizers.
C.      Flow Instrumentation on the return line to the chiller surge tank maintains chiller loop flow at a constant value by controlling the valve which adjusts the amount of flow bypassing the letdown chiller heat exchanger. Thus, if the shell-side flow in the heat exchanger is restricted by the temperature controlled valve, the bypass valve is automatically adjusted to maintain full flow in the chiller loop.
Instrumentation is provided to monitor the flowrate through the BTRS. Indication is on the main control board.
D.      Level Instrumentation is provided to measure the fluid level in the chiller surge tank.
Level readout and high and low level alarms are provided on the main control board.
9.3.5  FAILED FUEL DETECTION SYSTEM 9.3.5.1        Design Bases The gross failed fuel detection system consists of equipment designed to detect gross fuel failure by the measurement of delayed neutron activity in the reactor coolant.
9.3-43                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.3.5.2          System Description The gross failed fuel detector is connected to the hot leg of a primary coolant loop (figure 9.3-2).
The coolant sample passes through a cooler and then into a coil containing a neutron detector and moderator, after which it flows back into the volume control tank. The sample delay time to the neutron detector is adjusted by means of a flow controller. The delay time also depends on the length of tubing used. Once set, the flow is kept relatively constant by the automatic flow control valve. A transmitting flowmeter is installed for periodic checks of the flowrate. A sensor monitors the temperature within the neutron coil.
Figure 9.3-3 shows the block diagram of the gross failed fuel detector channel. The detector, preamplifier, sample cooler, and associated flow controls are located outside the containment.
The signal processing equipment and readout are mounted in a rack located in the control room. The delayed neutron signal of the detector is displayed on a recorder located in the rack.
The response time for the gross failed fuel detector is on the order of 60 s.
9.3.5.3          Safety Evaluation The gross failed fuel detection system does not perform a safety-related function and is not designed to satisfy any specific safety criteria. As shown in figure 9.3-2, the gross failed fuel detector is outside the containment and is installed in the primary coolant hot leg sample line. It is isolated from the containment by means of the sample system isolation valves. The safety evaluation of the sampling system, including the isolation valves, is discussed in subsection 9.3.2.
9.3.5.4          Tests and Inspections The gross failed fuel detection system is equipped with a test oscillator in the preamplifier and a test oscillator in the electronics drawer, each of which can be used to test the proper operation of the signal processing circuitry. Routine tests and inspections will be performed in accordance with procedures described in section 13.5.
9.3.5.5          Instrument Applications Instrumentation associated with the gross failed fuel detection system is described in paragraph 9.3.5.2.
9.3-44                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9
 
==REFERENCES:==
: 1. NRC Safety Evaluation Report, J. M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2, NUREG-0117 Supplement No. 5 to NUREG-75/034, dated March 1981.
: 2. Letter from NRC, dated March 26, 1985, and enclosed SER related to the Post-Accident Sampling System.
: 3. Letter from NRC, dated January 7, 1987, and enclosed SER related to Regulatory Guide 1.97.
: 4. Letter from NRC, dated May 22, 2002, and enclosed SER related to FOL amendments 156 and 148 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.
9.3-45                            REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-1 (SHEET 1 OF 3)
SAFETY-RELATED AIR-OPERATED VALVES Piping              Elementary Diagram FSAR                Diagram    Location Item                  Drawing No.            Drawing No. Drawing No.
Containment Isolation Phase A, Control Room Vent Motors 3622                            D-175012                  177373    175144 3623                            D-175012                  177373    175144 3624                            D-175012                  177373    175144 3625                            D-175012                  177373    175144 3626                            D-175012                  177373    175144 3627                            D-175012                  177373    175144 3628                            D-175012                  177373    175144 3629                            D-175012                  177373    175144 3649A                          D-175012                  177373    175144 3649B                          D-175012                  177373    175144 3649C                          D-175012                  177373    175144 3234A                      D-175033, Sheet 2            177857    175142 3234B                      D-175033, Sheet 2            177857    175142 3772A                      D-175000, Sheet 1            177373    175142 3772B                      D-175000, Sheet 1            177373    175142 3772C                      D-175000, Sheet 1            177373    175142 Electric Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and Flow Control Valves 3227A                          D-175007                  177591    175142 3227B                          D-175007                  177591    175142 3227C                          D-175007                  177591    175142 3328                        D-175009, Sheet 2            177844    175146 3329                        D-175009, Sheet 2            177844    175146 3330                        D-175009, Sheet 2            177844    175146 Steam Line Isolation 3368AA                      D-175033, Sheet 1            177864    175142 3368AB                      D-175033, Sheet 1            177864    175142 3368BA                      D-175033, Sheet 1            177864    175142 3976A                      D-175033, Sheet 1            177866    175142 3976B                      D-175033, Sheet 1            177866    175142 3976C                      D-175033, Sheet 1            177866    175142 3369AA/AC                  D-175033, Sheet 1            177863    175142 3369BA/BC                  D-175033, Sheet 1            177863    175142 REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-1 (SHEET 2 OF 3)
Piping              Elementary Diagram FSAR              Diagram      Location Item          Drawing No.            Drawing No. Drawing No.
3369CA/CC            D-175033, Sheet 1            177863      175142 3370AA/AC            D-175033, Sheet 1            177867      175142 3370BA/BC            D-175033, Sheet 1            177867      175142 3370CA/CC            D-175033, Sheet 1            177867      175142 Safety Injection 2229                D-175002, Sheet 2            177853      175147 3096A                D-175002, Sheet 2            177853      175147 3096B                D-175002, Sheet 2            177853      175147 LCV-115A            D-175039, Sheet 7            177604      175145 033A                D-175043, Sheet 1            507141      175146 033B                D-175043, Sheet 1            507141      175146 033A                D-205043, Sheet 1            356839      205145 033B                D-205043, Sheet 1            356839      205145 Supporting Systems 444B                D-175037, Sheet 2            177381      175148 445A                D-175037, Sheet 2            177381      175148 8875A                D-175038, Sheet 2            177858      175150 8875B                D-175038, Sheet 2            177858      175150 8875C                D-175038, Sheet 2            177858      175150 Supporting Equipment 0459                D-175039, Sheet 1            177585      175150 0460                D-175039, Sheet 1            177586      175150 8141A                D-175039, Sheet 1            177861      175149 8141B                D-175039, Sheet 1            177861      175149 8141C                D-175039, Sheet 1            177861      175149 8146                D-175039, Sheet 1            177861      175150 8147                D-175039, Sheet 1            177861      175150 8145                D-175039, Sheet 1            177858      175150 8153                D-175039, Sheet 1            177858      175150 8154                D-175039, Sheet 1            177858      175149 0113A                D-175039, Sheet 6            177379      175147 0113B                D-175039, Sheet 2            177509      175147 0114A                D-175039, Sheet 2            177510      175147 0114B                D-175039, Sheet 7            177511      175147 REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-1 (SHEET 3 OF 3)
Piping              Elementary Diagram FSAR              Diagram    Location Item    Drawing No.            Drawing No. Drawing No.
3009A      D-175003, Sheet 1            177856    175143 3009B      D-175003, Sheet 1            177856    175143 3009C      D-175003, Sheet 1            177856    175143 3028      D-175002, Sheet 1            177584    175140 3105      D-175009, Sheet 1                      175143 3106      D-175009, Sheet 1                      175143 3371A      D-175033, Sheet 1            177401    175324 3371B      D-175033, Sheet 1            177401    175324 3371C      D-175033, Sheet 1            177401    175324 7614A      D-175071, Sheet 1            177054    175146 7614B      D-175071, Sheet 1            177054    175146 7614C      D-175071, Sheet 1            177054    175146 REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-2 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
PRIMARY SAMPLE SYSTEM SAMPLE POINT DESIGN DATA Sample Conditions Design/        Design/
Sample                                          Service        Service Point              Sample Point Name            (psig)        (&deg;F)
XE-3101            Reactor coolant hot          2458/2235      650/600 leg, loop 2 XE-3102            Reactor coolant hot          2485/2235      650/600 leg, loop 3 XE-3103            Pressurizer liquid            2485/2235      680/653 XE-3104            Pressurizer steam            2485/2235      680/650 XE-3105            Discharge residual            600/400        400/350 heat exchanger 1 XE-3106            Discharge residual            600/400        400/350 heat exchanger 2 XE-3117            Volume control tank          150/60        500/120 gas space XE-3162            Accumulator tank 1            700/650        650/150 XE-3163            Accumulator tank 2            700/650        650/150 XE-3164            Accumulator tank 3            700/650        650/150 XE-3127            Discharge letdown            370/200        650/127 heat exchanger XE-3151            Discharge mixed bed          370/150        650/127 demineralizers XE-3179A          Steam generator 1A,          1085/775      600/517 bottom XE-3180A          Steam generator 1B,          1085/775      600/517 bottom REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-2 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Sample Conditions Design/          Design/
Sample                                  Service          Service Point    Sample Point Name              (psig)            (&deg;F)
XE-3181A Steam generator 1C,            1085/775          600/517 bottom XE-3182A Main steam line 1A              1085/775          600/517 XE-3182B Main steam line 1B              1085/775          600/517 XE-3182C Main steam line 1C              1085/775          600/517 REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-3 (SHEET 1 OF 3)
LOCAL GRAB SAMPLES Sample Conditions Design/        Design/
Service        Service Sample Point Name                                          (psig)          (&deg;F)
Boric acid blender discharge to volume                      ATM/ATM        300/165 control tank Boric acid tank 1                                          ATM/ATM        200/60-80 Boric acid tank 2                                          ATM/ATM        200/60-80 Boric acid batching tank                                    ATM/ATM        300/165 Discharge recycle evaporator feed                          150/75          200/115 demineralizer 1 Discharge recycle evaporator feed                          150/75          200/115 demineralizer 2 Recycle holdup tank 1 (bottom of                            ATM/ATM        200/120 diaphragm)
Recycle holdup tank 2 (bottom of                            ATM/ATM        200/120 diaphragm)
Recycle holdup tank 3 (bottom of                            ATM/ATM        200/120 diaphragm)
Discharge recycle evaporator feed pumps                    150/140        200/120 Discharge recycle evaporator condensate                    150/100        200/115 demineralizer Recycle evaporator package concentrates                    150/135        500/120 sample Recycle evaporator package distillates                      150/135        500/120 sample Recycle holdup tanks to WPS gas                            ATM/ATM        200/120 compressor REV 22 8/09
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-3 (SHEET 2 OF 3)
Sample Conditions Design/          Design/
Service          Service Sample Point Name                                          (psig)            (&deg;F)
Floor drain tank pump discharge                            150/110          200/120 Gas decay tanks (gas sample)                                50/20            150/140 Water from spent fuel pool pump 1                          150/30            200/120 Refuel water from demineralizer to spent                    200/120          150/60 fuel pool Discharge residual heat removal pump 1                      600/400          400/350 Discharge residual heat removal pump 2                      600/400          400/350 Discharge thermal regenerative heat                        250/200          150/140 exchanger to modified heat exchanger Letdown chiller heat exchanger                              25/100            150/100 discharge to chiller surge tank Reactor coolant drain tank discharge                        150/100          250/100 Vent from reactor coolant drain tank                        100/10            200/100 to WPS Waste evaporator condensate from waste                      150/100          200/120 evaporator condition tank or demineralizer Waste evaporator feed pump discharge                        150/110          200/120 to waste evaporator filter Waste evaporator demineralizer discharge                    150/110          200/120 to waste evaporator condition tank Waste condensate pump discharge                            150/110          200/120 Waste evaporator concentrate sample                        150/135          500/120 REV 22 8/09
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-3 (SHEET 3 OF 3)
Sample Conditions Design/          Design/
Service          Service Sample Point Name                                            (psig)            (&deg;F)
Waste evaporator distillate sample                          150/135          500/120 Spent resin storage tank sluice filter                      150/110          200/120 discharge Laundry and hot shower pump discharge                        150/110          200/120 Discharge of waste monitor tank                              150/110          200/120 discharge pumps 1 and 2 to environment Component cooling heat exchanger A                          150/100          200/120 (component cooling water)
Component cooling heat exchanger B                          150/100          200/120 Component cooling heat exchanger C                          150/100          200/120 Component cooling heat exchanger A                          150/100          200/120 (service water)
Component cooling heat exchanger B                          150/100          200/120 Component cooling heat exchanger C                          150/100          200/120 Reactor makeup water tank                                    ATM/ATM          200/120 Demineralized water tank                                    ATM/ATM          200/120 Boric acid transfer pump A discharge                        150/120          500/80 Boric acid transfer pump B discharge                        150/120          500/80 REV 22 8/09
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-4 TURBINE PLANT ANALYZER SAMPLING SECTION SAMPLE POINT DESIGN DATA Sample Conditions Design/          Design/
Service          Service Sample Point Name                    (psig)            (&deg;F)
Makeup to condenser                  50/35            150/121 Condensate pump discharge            550/466          300/121 Steam generator feedwater            550/466          470/121 pump suction Steam generator inlet                1180/775          470/442 Steam generator outlet 1            1085/775          600/517 Steam generator outlet 2            1085/775          600/517 REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-5 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS General Features                                                                      Parameter Seal water supply flowrate for three reactor                                          24 coolant pumps, nominal (gal/min)
Seal water return flowrate for three reactor                                          9 coolant pumps, nominal (gal/min)
Letdown flow (gal/min)
Normal                                                                            60 Maximum                                                                            135 Charging flow, excluding seal water (gal/min)
Normal                                                                            45 Maximum                                                                            105(a)
Temperature of letdown reactor coolant                                                543.5 entering system (&deg;F)
Temperature of charging flow directed to                                              485 reactor coolant system (&deg;F)
Centrifugal charging pump bypass flow,                                                60 each (gal/min)
Amount of 4 percent boric acid solution                                              11,300 required to meet cold shutdown requirements shortly after full power operation (gal)
: a. The original design value of 105 gal/min has been reevaluated for a flow controller limit increase to 130 gal/min and has been found acceptable.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-6 (SHEET 1 OF 9)
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT DATA
 
==SUMMARY==
 
Centrifugal Charging Pumps Number                                                  3 Design pressure (psig)                                  3000 Design temperature (F)                                  300 Design flow (gal/min)                                    150 Design head (ft)                                        5800 Material                                                Austenitic stainless steel Boric Acid Transfer Pumps Number                                                  2 Design pressure (psig)                                  150 Design temperature (F)                                  200 Design flow (gal/min)                                    75 Design head (ft)                                        235 Material                                                Austenitic stainless steel Recycle Evaporator Feed Pumps Number                                                  2 Design pressure (psig)                                  150 Design temperature (F)                                  200 Design flow (gal/min)                                    30 Design head (ft)                                        320 Material                                                Stainless steel
: a. The 2A charging pump (Q2E21P002A), the 2B charging pump (Q2E21P002B), the 1C charging pump (Q1E21P002C), and the 2C charging pump (Q2E21P002C) design pressure is 3000 psig.
REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-6 (SHEET 2 OF 9)
Regenerative Heat Exchanger Number                                                  1 Heat transfer rate at design                            8.2 x 106 conditions (Btu/h)
Shell side Design pressure (psig)                                2485 Design temperature (F)                              650 Fluid                                                Borated reactor coolant Material                                              Austenitic stainless steel Tube side Design pressure (psig)                                2735 Design temperature (F)                              650 Fluid                                                Borated reactor coolant Material                                              Austenitic stainless steel Shell side (letdown, normal operation)
Flow (lb/h)                                          29,826 Inlet temperature (F)                                543.5 Outlet temperature (F)                              290 Tube side (charging)
Flow (lb/h)                                          22,370 Inlet temperature (F)                                130 Outlet temperature (F)                              485 Letdown Heat Exchanger Number                                                    1 Heat transfer rate at design                              16.1 x 106 conditions (Btu/h)
Shell side Design pressure (psig)                                150 Design temperature (F)                                250 Fluid                                                  Component cooling water Material                                              Carbon steel REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-6 (SHEET 3 OF 9)
Tube side Design pressure (psig)                              600 Design temperature (F)                            400 Fluid                                              Borated reactor coolant Material                                            Austenitic stainless steel Shell side                                  Normal      Design - Heatup Flow (lb/h)                            117,733    551,000 Inlet temperature (F)                  105        105 Outlet temperature                      150.7      134.3 (F)
Tube side (letdown)
Flow (lb/h)                            29,826      59,700 Inlet temperature (F)                  290        380 Outlet temperature                      110.9      115 (F)
Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Number                                    1 Heat transfer rate at                    5.03 x 106 design conditions (Btu/h)
Shell Side  Tube Side Design pressure (psig)                    150          2485 Design temperature (F)                  250          650 Design flow (lb/h)                        125,700      12,400 Inlet temperature (F)                    105          547 Outlet temperature (F)                  145          165 Fluid                                    Component    Borated cooling      reactor water        coolant Material                                  Carbon      Austenitic steel        stainless steel Seal Water Heat Exchanger Number                                  1 REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-6 (SHEET 4 OF 9)
Heat transfer rate at                1.5 x 106 design conditions (Btu/h)
Shell Side    Tube Side Design pressure (psig)                150          150 Design temperature (F)              250          250 Design flow (lb/h)                    115,000      64,075 Inlet temperature (F)                105          138.5 Outlet temperature (F)              118          115 Fluid                                Component    Borated cooling      reactor water        coolant Material                              Carbon        Austenitic steel        stainless steel Volume Control Tank Number                                              1 Volume (ft3)                                        300 Design pressure (psig)                              75 Design temperature (F)                            250 Material                                            Austenitic stainless steel Boric Acid Tanks Number                                              2 Capacity                                            21,000 Design pressure (psig)                              Atmospheric Design temperature (F)                            170 Material                                            Austenitic stainless steel Boric Acid Batching Tank Number                                              1 Capacity (gal)                                      400 Design pressure (psig)                              Atmospheric Design temperature (F)                            300 Material                                            Austenitic stainless steel REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-6 (SHEET 5 OF 9)
Recycle Holdup Tank Number                                              3 Volume (gal)                                        28,000 Design pressure (psig)                              Atmospheric Design temperature (F)                            200 Material                                            Austenitic stainless steel Recycle Evaporator Reagent Tank Number                                              1 Volume (gal)                                        5 Design pressure (psig)                              150 Design temperature (F)                            200 Material                                            Austenitic stainless steel Mixed Bed Demineralizers Number                                              2 Design pressure (psig)                              300 Design temperature (F)                            250 Design flow (gal/min)                              120 Resin volume, each (ft3)                            30 Typical/39 maximum Material                                            Austenitic stainless steel Cation Bed Demineralizer Number                                              1 Design pressure (psig)                              300 Design temperature (F)                            250 Design flow (gal/min)                              60 Resin volume (ft3)                                  20 Material                                            Austenitic stainless steel REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-6 (SHEET 6 OF 9)
Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizers Number                                              2 Design pressure (psig)                              150 Design temperature (F)                            200 Design flow (gal/min)                              120 Resin volume (ft3)                                  30 Material                                            Austenitic stainless steel Recycle Evaporator Condensate Demineralizer Number                                              1 Design pressure (psig)                              150 Design temperature (F)                            200 Design flow (gal/min)                              30 Resin volume (ft3)                                  20 Material                                            Austenitic stainless steel Reactor Coolant Filter Number                                                1 Design pressure (psig)                                300 Design temperature (&deg;F)                              250 Design flow (gal/min)                                150 Particle retention                                  Greater than or equal to 98-percent retention of particles for the applicable micron size Material (vessel)                                    Austenitic stainless steel Seal Water Injection Filters Number                                                2 Design pressure (psig)                                2735 Design temperature (&deg;F)                              200 Design flow (gal/min)                                80 REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-6 (SHEET 7 OF 9)
Particle retention                              Greater than or equal to 98-percent retention of particles for the applicable micron size Material (vessel)                                Austenitic stainless steel Seal Water Return Filter Number                                          1 Design pressure (psig)                          150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                          250 Design flow (gal/min)                            150 Particle retention                              Greater than or equal to 98-percent retention of particles for the applicable micron size Material (vessel)                              Austenitic stainless steel Boric Acid Filter Number                                          1 Design pressure (psig)                          150 Design temperature (F)                        200 Design flow (gal/min)                          150 Particle retention                              98-percent retention of particles 25 m and above for the Cuno filter and 98-percent retention of particles 6 m and above for the ultipor GF Plus filter REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-6 (SHEET 8 OF 9)
Material (vessel)                                        Austenitic stainless steel Recycle Evaporator Feed Filter Number                                                    1 Design pressure (psig)                                    150 Design temperature (F)                                  200 Design flow (gal/min)                                    150 Particle retention                                        98-percent retention of particles 5 m and above for the Cuno filter and 98-percent retention of particles 1 m and above for the ultipor GF Plus filter Material (vessel)                                        Austenitic stainless steel Recycle Evaporator Condensate Filter Number                                                    1 Design pressure (psig)                                    150 Design temperature (F)                                  200 Design flow (gal/min)                                    35 Retention of 25- m particles                              98 percent Material (vessel)                                        Austenitic stainless steel Recycle Evaporator Concentrates Filter Number                                                    1 Design pressure (psig)                                    150 Design temperature (F)                                  200 Design flow (gal/min)                                    35 Retention of 25 m particles                              98 percent Material (vessel)                                        Austenitic stainless steel Boric Acid Blender REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-6 (SHEET 9 OF 9)
Number                                                    1 Design pressure (psig)                                    150 Design temperature (F)                                    250 Design flow (gal/min)                                      35 Boric acid solution                                        35 Reactor makeup water                                      85 Material                                                  Austenitic stainless steel Letdown Orifice                          45 gal/min        60 gal/min Number                                  1                2 Design flow (lb/h)                      22,400            29,826 Differential pressure at                1700  100        1700  100 design flow (psi)
Design pressure (psig)                  2485              2485 Design temperature (F)                  650              650 Material                                Austenitic        Austenitic stainless          stainless steel              steel Recycle Evaporator Package Number                                                    1 Concentration of concentrate, boric                        4 acid (wt percent)
Concentration of condensate                                <10 ppm boron as H3B3 Material                                                  Stainless steel Recycle Holdup Tank Vent Eductor Number                                                    1 Design pressure (psig)                                    150 Design temperature (F)                                    200 Suction flow (sf3/min)                                    1 of H2 Motive flow (sf3/min)                                      40 of N2 Material                                                  Carbon steel REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-7 (SHEET 1 OF 3)
BORON THERMAL REGENERATION SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA Chiller Pumps Number                                      2 Design pressure (psig)                      150 Design temperature (&deg;F)                    200 Design flow (gal/min)                      500 Design head (ft)                            150 Material                                    Carbon steel Moderating Heat Exchanger Number                                      1 Design heat transfer                        2.53 x 106 (Btu/h)
Shell        Tube Design pressure (psig)                      300          300 Design temperature (&deg;F)                    200          200 Design flow (lb/h)                          59,640      59,640 Design inlet                                50          115 temperature, boron storage mode (&deg;F)
Design outlet                              92.4        72.6 temperature, boron storage mode (&deg;F)
Inlet temperature, boron                    140          115 release mode (&deg;F)
Outlet temperature,                        123.7        131.3 boron release mode (&deg;F)
Fluid circulated                            Reactor      Reactor coolant    coolant Material                                    Stainless    Stainless steel      steel REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-7 (SHEET 2 OF 3)
Letdown Chiller Heat Exchanger Number                                    1 Design heat transfer                      1.65 x 106 (Btu/h)
Shell      Tube Design pressure (psig)                    150        300 Design temperature (&deg;F)                  200        200 Design flow (lb/h)                        175,000    59,640 Design inlet                              39        72.6 temperature, boron storage mode (&deg;F)
Design outlet                            48.4      45 temperature, boron storage mode (&deg;F)
Inlet temperature,                        90        123.7 boron release mode
(&deg;F)
Outlet temperature,                      99.4      96.1 boron release mode
(&deg;F)
Fluid circulated                          Chromated  Reactor water      coolant Material                                  Carbon    Stainless steel      steel Letdown Reheat Heat Exchanger Number                                    1 Design heat transfer                      1.49 x 106 (Btu/h)
Shell      Tube Design pressure (psig)                    300        600 Design temperature (&deg;F)                  200        400 Design flow (lb/h)                        59,640    44,730 Inlet temperature (&deg;F)                    115        280 Outlet temperature (&deg;F)                  140        246.7 Fluid circulated                          Reactor    Reactor coolant    coolant Material                                  Stainless  Stainless steel      steel REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-7 (SHEET 3 OF 3)
Chiller Surge Tank Number                                            1 Volume (gal)                                      400 Design pressure (psig)                            Atmospheric Design temperature (&deg;F)                            200 Material                                          Carbon steel Thermal Regeneration Demineralizers Number                                            4 Design pressure (psig)                            300 Design temperature (&deg;F)                            250 Design flow (gal/min)                              120 Resin volume (ft3)                                70 Material                                          Stainless steel Chillers Number                                            2 Capacity (Btu/h)                                  1.66 x 106 Design flow (gal/min)                              352 Inlet temperature (&deg;F)                            48.4 Outlet temperature (&deg;F)                            39 REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.3-8 VALVE POSITIONS FOR OPERATING MODES OF BORON THERMAL REGENERATION SYSTEM Valve                          Dilute                Off    Borate 7054                          Open                  Closed Open 7002A                          Open                  Closed Closed 7002B                          Open                  Closed Closed 7022                          Open                  Closed Closed 7040                          Closed                Open  Open 7041                          Closed                Open  Open 7045                          Open                  Open  Closed 7046                          Closed                Closed Open TCV-381A                      Closed                Closed (a)
TCV-381B                      Open                  Open  (a)
TCV-386                        (a)                  Closed (a)
HCV-387 (3-way)                (a)                  Open  (a) 8547                          Closed                Open  Closed
: a. Limit switch indication not available, since position varies.
REV 21 5/08
 
REV 21 5/08 JOSEPH M. FARLEY            REACTOR COOLANT SAMPLING SYSTEM NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.3-1
 
REV 21 5/08 GROSS FAILED FUEL JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                DETECTOR FLOW DIAGRAM UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.3-2
 
REV 21 5/08 GROSS FAILED FUEL DETECTOR JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                  ELECTRONICS DIAGRAM UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.3-3
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.4    AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING, COOLING, AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS 9.4.1  CONTROL ROOM 9.4.1.1        Design Bases The control room air conditioning and filtration system is designed with sufficient redundancy and separation of components to provide reliable operation under normal conditions and to ensure operation under emergency conditions.
Two separate and redundant air conditioning systems are provided to maintain the temperature in the control room at approximately 78&deg;F (db). Safety-related components in the control room are designed to withstand a maximum environmental temperature of 120&deg;F. Therefore, control room temperatures will not approach the design limit of the safety-related components, even considering a single active or passive failure in the control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems.
The control room has been analyzed as meeting the dose requirements of 10 CFR 50.67. The control room doses were analyzed based on the following design parameters:17 A.      Containment isolation signal from the engineered safety features actuation system automatically switches the control room HVAC system from normal to emergency mode of operation.
B.      High radiation levels entering the control room will automatically isolate the normal air systems with the pressurization and recirculation systems being manually initiated by the operator.
C.      The control room is pressurized greater than all adjacent areas with a redundant air intake on the auxiliary building roof. The air intake rate is 300 ft3/min in the emergency mode. Deep bed charcoal filters (6 in.) at the intake have 99 percent efficiency for removal of all forms of iodine. This design minimizes the possibility of any unfiltered leakage into the control room.
D.      The control room recirculation system flowrate is 3000 ft3/min. This system has a filter efficiency of 95 percent (2 in.) for all forms of iodine except particulates which are treated as in C above.
Provisions are made in the system to detect and limit the introduction of airborne radioactive material into the control room. Provisions are also made in the system for the removal of radioactive and foreign material from the control room environment.
The system is designed to provide an environment with controlled temperature and humidity to ensure both the comfort and safety of the operators and the integrity of the control room 9.4-1                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 components. Design ambient conditions are approximately 78&deg;F (db) and 50-percent relative humidity.
The system is designed to permit periodic inspection of the principal system components.
9.4.1.2          System Description The control room air conditioning and filtration system is shown schematically in drawings D-175012 and D-205012. Principal system components are listed and described in Table 9.4-1.
The conformance of the control room filtration units to Regulatory Guide 1.52 is presented in Table 9.4-2.
During normal plant operation, one of the two 100-percent capacity, Category I air handling units recirculates 21,000 ft3/min of cooled, filtered air through the control room. Each air handling unit consists of a recirculation fan, prefilter, cooling coil, and the associated instrumentation and controls. One of four 100 percent capacity, Category I air-cooled condensing units rejects the control room heat to the atmosphere. Each condensing unit consists of compressors, condenser coils, condenser fans and controls. Should the operating unit fail to function in some way, the second 100-percent capacity unit can be manually started by the operator.
Two full capacity, redundant, Seismic Category I air pressurization systems are provided to maintain the control room at a positive pressure post accident. Each train is capable of supplying 300 ft3/min through electric heating coils, prefilter, high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, and 6-in., deep bed, charcoal filters, designed in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Installed in parallel to the suction side of each control room main air conditioning unit are 1000-ft3/min filtration units, consisting of prefilters, HEPA filters, and 2-in.charcoal filters, and a 2000-ft3/min filtration unit incorporating the same composite filter elements as the 1000-ft3/min units. Therefore, the overall recirculation filtration capacity is 3000 ft3/min.
During normal operation, an air supply system delivers fresh outside air to the control room and to the computer room. (See drawings D-175012 and D-205012.) The makeup air supplied to the control room by this system maintains the control room at a slight positive pressure, thereby preventing the introduction of air into the control room from sources other than the design fresh air makeup system. The actuation logic for the emergency pressurization system is described in paragraph 9.4.1.5.
A smoke detector near the return air duct to each recirculation fan will sound an alarm in the control room on high smoke level. If necessary, the operator can exhaust air from the control room by manually opening the three pneumatically-operated exhaust isolation valves and starting one of the two 100-percent capacity exhaust fans. These exhaust fans and isolation valves are operated/opened only for purging smoke or toxic chemicals from the main control room. An area radiation monitoring system and redundant control room charcoal filter recirculation systems are provided to detect and reduce radiation levels in the control room.
The filters are composite units and have been furnished to the same specifications as the filters for the penetration room filtration system (subsection 6.2.3). An area radiation monitor located 9.4-2                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 in the control room alarms on high radiation level and alerts the operator to the need for filtration of recirculated air.
Redundant Category I process radiation monitors are provided at the control room normal fresh air intake. Redundant Category I smoke detectors are provided in the fresh air intake and return air duct of the computer room air handling unit. The air-operated isolation damper on the computer room recirculation line is interlocked with the computer room fire detectors and will automatically close in the event of smoke detection. The computer room fire detectors are also the means for actuating the halon release into this area. The halon storage tank is located outside the computer room. Inadvertent release of halon is discussed in paragraph 9.4.1.3 below. Tripping any one of the detectors will cause an alarm to sound in the control room and the closing of all air-operated and motor-operated isolation valves in the non-engineered safety features HVAC ducting penetrating the control room boundary, thereby isolating the control room. If required, and if contaminants are within safe levels, the operator can draw outside air by manually starting the emergency pressurization system, in which the air is filtered through deep bed filters.
A containment isolation actuation system (CIAS) phase A initiation signal or high radiation entering the control room causes the normal makeup air to be cut off and all control room isolation valves are closed. In this event, the positive pressure in the control room is maintained by the startup of one of the emergency pressurization systems, each consisting of an air inlet, an isolation valve, and a 300-ft3/min, deep bed, charcoal filtration unit. Emergency pressurization is automatically initiated by a CIAS signal or manually initiated by the operator for the high radiation isolation condition. In like manner, the standby filtration units will be started and recirculate 3000 ft3/min out of the 21,000 ft3/min total room recirculation flowrate through charcoal filters.
Following CIAS a phase A signal, control room isolation, and charcoal filtration atmosphere cleanup will be initiated by the plant engineered safeguard instrumentation. High radiation levels entering the control room will also automatically initiate control room isolation; however, the pressurization and filtration systems must be manually initiated by the operator. During other situations requiring control room isolation, the operator manually initiates closure of the motor- and air-operated valves required to effect control room isolation.
All penetrations into the control room are sealed to minimize inleakage of outside air.
Mechanical penetrations are sealed by the use of silicone rubber foam or by fiberglass impregnated boots. Electrical penetrations are sealed with silicone rubber foam. The HVAC system duct penetrations are provided with airtight automatic butterfly valves.
9.4.1.3        Safety Evaluation The safety classification of the control room air conditioning and filtration system components is given in subsection 3.2.2. The redundant system has been designed to provide minimum filtering and ventilation and ensures that no single failure will prevent the safe occupancy of the control room under any mode of plant operation. A single-failure analysis is presented in table 9.4-3.
9.4-3                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 Power for the fan and condensing units of each air conditioner is supplied from emergency power supplies. A separate, independent system of distribution ducts is installed for each train.
The duct from the computer room air conditioning unit that normally supplies fresh makeup air to the control room contains two pneumatically operated valves in series. Two pneumatically operated valves in series are provided for the utility exhaust subsystem. These valves are powered from redundant power supplies and close automatically on a containment isolation signal to isolate the control room from outside air.
Since redundancy does not exist for the smoke purge exhaust isolation valves, the exhaust fans are normally not in operation and the isolation valves are normally closed to provide a passive isolation boundary. The exhaust fans and isolation valves are operated/opened only for purging smoke or toxic chemicals from the main control room.
The control room habitability is maintained by continually monitoring radiation levels and smoke concentration inside the room plus continually monitoring radiation levels, including monitoring smoke concentration, in the control room air intake duct and computer room return duct. To minimize inleakage, the control room is provided with normal and emergency pressurization systems designed to maintain positive pressure.
Upon smoke detection, an alarm is annunciated in the control room and all fail-safe, airtight isolation valves are closed automatically and remain closed until they are reopened manually.
The normal makeup air is cut off and the operator can manually start the exhaust fan to purge smoke. If necessary, the operator can manually isolate the control room and make use of self-contained breathing apparatus. After a safe level of smoke concentration is reached, the operator can draw outside air either from the normal makeup air subsystem or from the emergency (pressurization system) makeup air subsystem.
Upon a high radiation signal from the makeup air inlet, an alarm is sounded in the control room and all isolation valves are closed automatically and remain closed until they are reopened manually. This will result in a loss of positive pressure in the control room. In this event, the operator will manually start one of the redundant pressurization systems and one of the redundant recirculation filtration systems (one 2000-ft3/min and one 1000-ft3/min system). The HEPA and 6-in., deep bed, charcoal filter unit in the pressurization system and the HEPA and 2-in. charcoal filters in the recirculation system provide additional assurance that the dose received by control room personnel will not exceed the limits of 10 CFR 50.67.
Upon receipt of a containment isolation signal, the control room is automatically isolated as described above. The air pressurization system and recirculation system are automatically actuated to maintain the positive pressure and to provide control room cleanup, respectively. A flow control damper mounted on the bleedoff leg of the pressurization system will respond automatically to the pressure controller in the control room if in automatic, or may be manually positioned to achieve a slightly positive pressure. In automatic: if the positive pressure drops below 0.25-in. water gauge, the bleedoff damper will automatically restrict the bleedoff flow to divert maximum air supply into the room, in order to achieve a rapid pressure buildup. On a rising room pressure, the bleedoff damper will function in the opposite manner. Therefore, the control room pressure will be sensed and maintained, as well as exhibited for operator information.
9.4-4                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 Upon receipt of a smoke detection signal from the computer room smoke detector, the computer room HVAC is automatically isolated as described in paragraph 9.4.1.2. In addition, redundant Seismic Category I smoke detectors downstream of the return air subsystem from the computer room will automatically isolate redundant Seismic Category I isolation valves in the computer room recirculation line in the event of smoke recirculation following a computer room fire.
Radiation monitors are provided within the control room boundary. Radiation monitors are also provided within each of the various ventilation systems serving all radiation release points in the plant. These monitors provide indication in the control room and alarm whenever predetermined radiation levels are exceeded. These HVAC systems discharge through the plant vent stack. Additional radiation monitors are provided at the vent stack discharge which will provide a backup means of detecting abnormal plant releases. These monitors are designed to detect releases in excess of the maximum permissible concentrations guidelines established under column 1, Table II, Appendix B to 10 CFR 20.1 - 20.601. Based on the availability and sensitivity of the monitoring systems provided, the operator will have adequate indication and information to evaluate the magnitude of any abnormal plant releases and will manually isolate the control room if required.
An analysis of dose levels in the control room under accident conditions is presented in the applicable sections of chapter 15.
[HISTORICAL] [An analysis of a chlorine release accident has been performed. This analysis is for historical purposes since single container quantities of gaseous chlorine are limited to 150 lbs. or less.
(Locations and quantities of onsite chlorine storage are given in Table 2.2-3.) Because of the proximity of the closest circulating water chlorination house, the analysis was performed for the release of 2 tons of chlorine (the maximum amount of chlorine headered together at one time). Twenty-five percent of the chlorine was assumed to flash to gas. This is analyzed as a puff release. The remainder is assumed to form a 200-ft2 pool where it evaporates due to the heat load from the sun and from ambient air and ground temperature.
No credit is taken for the channeling of the dense chlorine gas around buildings and along ditches. No credit is taken for an elevated air intake, even though the intake is at an elevation of approximately 177 ft.
To evaluate the control room habitability, considering the closest circulating chlorination house, the following cases have been analyzed using the techniques outlined in references 1, 2, and 3:
A.      Two-ton chlorine spill, 450 ft from control room air intake, 0.5 m/s wind, Pasquill Class F meteorology, shared Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room, 70-ft3/min unfiltered inleakage, and no credit for building wake effect.
B.      The same as case A except a wind speed of 1.0 m/s is used.
C.      The same as case A except building wake effect is considered.
D.      The same as case B except building wake effect is considered.
The time (after chlorine accident) required to reach 15, 30, 45, 60, and maximum chlorine concentration ppm by volume inside the control room is given in Table 9.4-4. This table also shows the peak chlorine concentration. The original analysis assumes a 5-s detector response time from 5 ppm 9.4-5                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 setpoint (chlorine detector at air intake), a 5-s transport time of chlorinated air from air intake to the isolation valve, and a 6-s closing time of the isolation valve.
Plots of the chlorine concentration vs time for case A showing the time history for maximum chlorine concentration in the control room are presented in figure 9.4-1, sheets 1 and 2. Similar plots are presented in figure 9.4-1, sheets 3 and 4, for case B to show the least time required to reach 15 ppm.
In case B the operators will have over 2 min to put on self-contained breathing apparatus before a concentration of 15 ppm is reached in the control room, after allowing 5-s detection time at 5 ppm for the chlorine detectors at the chlorination house. This is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.78.
An inleakage rate of 70 ft3/min is used based on 0.06 air exchange per hour for Type A control room defined in Regulatory Guide 1.78. Self-contained breathing apparatus with a minimum 30-min air supply are stored in the control room. Sufficient apparatus is provided to allow one spare per three units required. An additional 6-h air supply is provided in the auxiliary building as close as practical to the control room. An offsite source of air will also be available.]
An analysis of the halon 1301 concentration in the control room following an accidental spill in the computer room, without fire, has been performed. It is assumed that the total amount of halon 1301 flooding the computer room mixes with the air in the computer room. This yields a maximum initial concentration of 6 percent by volume in the computer room. Using the maximum control room makeup air quantity of 1650 ft3/min, the maximum concentration of halon 1301 in the control room is 0.47 percent by volume after 15 min. This is well below the 7 percent maximum recommended concentration for normally occupied areas of National Fire Protection Association standard 12A. Figure 9.4-1, sheet 5, shows the time history of the halon 1301 concentration in the control room following the accidental release in the computer room.
9.4.1.4          Inspection and Testing Requirements The control room filtration units, consisting of prefilters, HEPA filters, charcoal filters, and fans, are tested and qualified in the same manner as the filtration units furnished for the penetration system (subsection 6.2.3). Throughout plant life, periodic tests will be performed on all filters in the same manner as for the penetration room filtration units. Testing of this system is discussed in the Technical Specifications.
The control room air conditioning subsystem, consisting of redundant fans, coils, and air cooled condensing units, was tested before installation as follows:
9.4-6                                    REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 Major Air Conditioning Components                                    Code or Standard Fans                                AMCA 210-67 Cooling coils                        American Refrigeration Institute (ARI) standard 410-91 Air-cooled condensing                ARI Standard 365-87 units The filtration and air conditioning equipment, including refrigerant piping and distribution ductwork, was tested for leaks and balanced after installation in accordance with the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association, Low Velocity Duct Construction and Associated Air Balance Council, Standards for Field Measurement and Instrumentation, form 81266, Volume 1, 1970.
Isolation butterfly valves were subjected to leakage tests in accordance with standard MSS-SP-67, Type 1, Manufacturers Standardization Society of the Valve and Fitting Industry, and were found bubbletight against air at 25 psig.
Each component is inspected prior to installation and will be available for periodic inspection during plant operation. Instruments and controls are tested for actuation at the proper setpoints, and alarm functions are checked for operability and limits during pre-operational testing.
Because the control room air conditioning system is in use during normal plant operation, the availability of active components is evident to the plant operators, and there is no need for further online testing. Portions of the system normally closed to flow are periodically tested to ensure operability and integrity of the system. Periodic testing of the control room air conditioning system is discussed in the Technical Specifications.
9.4.1.5          Instrumentation One train of the control room air conditioning system is operating during normal conditions and both trains are automatically started during post-LOCA conditions. Both trains of the control room recirculation filtration and emergency pressurization systems are automatically started upon receipt of a containment isolation A system signal. Instrumentation and associated analog and logic channels utilized for the initiation of the air conditioning, recirculation, filtration, and pressurization systems are described in chapter 7.
The following are displayed and/or located in the control room:
A.      Control room air temperature.
B.      Air intake smoke concentration indication.
9.4-7                                    REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 C.      Air intake radiation level.
D.      Room smoke detectors.
E.      Alarm for high differential pressure across each filter train.
F.      Differential pressure between the control room and atmosphere.
Position indication of all isolation valves and dampers is locally displayed. Differential pressure across each filter train and fan is locally displayed in the control room mechanical equipment room.
9.4.1.6        Analysis of Site Boundary, Low Population Zone (LPZ) Boundary, and Control Room Operator Dose Following a LOCA See subsection 15.4.1.
9.4.2  AUXILIARY BUILDING The auxiliary building ventilation system is designed to provide a suitable environment for equipment and personnel. The system provides maximum safety and convenience for operating personnel by arranging the ventilation equipment in zones so that potentially contaminated areas are separated from clean areas. The path of ventilating air is from areas of low activity toward areas of progressively higher activity.
Separate heating and ventilating systems serve the radwaste areas and nonradioactive areas, including the lower equipment rooms, technical support center, and fuel handling areas of the auxiliary building. The computer room, access control room, electrical equipment rooms, and technical support center have individual air conditioning systems.
Electrical equipment within nonengineered safety feature electrical equipment rooms, computer room, and cable spreading room is not required to mitigate the consequences of a postulated accident; therefore, failure of the associated air conditioning equipment will not affect the safe shutdown capability.
Each engineered safety feature electrical motor control center and 600-V load center room is provided with a Seismic Category I room air cooling unit powered from the same diesel as the motor control center or load center being served. These units are designed to limit the environmental temperature within the electrical equipment room under all postulated accident conditions. Any single failure will not affect safe shutdown capability. Table 9.4-6 depicts the sizing design parameters, and table 9.4-6A depicts the maximum temperatures in the rooms cooled by service water post-DBA.
The radwaste area heating, ventilating, and filtration system is discussed in subsection 9.4.3.
The remaining systems are discussed below.
9.4-8                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.2.1        Design Bases 9.4.2.1.1      Nonradioactive Area Heating and Ventilating System The nonradioactive area heating and ventilating system is designed to perform the following functions:
A.      Remove the sensible heat loss from all equipment and piping in the nonradioactive area during normal plant operation.
B.      Limit the maximum ambient temperature to 110&deg;F when the outdoor temperature is 95&deg;F and minimize to 60&deg;F when the outdoor temperature is 20&deg;F.
The lower equipment rooms heating and ventilating system is comprised of a supply air handling unit containing a fan, a prefilter, an electric heating coil, and an exhaust fan. The system provides and tempers outside air to ventilate the lower equipment rooms. These rooms are included in and are part of the nonradioactive ventilation area.
9.4.2.1.2      Fuel Handling Area Heating, Ventilating, and Filtration System The fuel handling area heating, ventilating, and filtration system is designed to perform the following functions:
A.      Remove the sensible heat loss from all equipment and piping in the fuel handling area during normal plant operation.
B.      Limit the maximum ambient temperature to 110&deg;F when the outdoor temperature is 95&deg;F and minimize to 60&deg;F when the outdoor temperature is 20&deg;F.
C.      Remove water vapors above the spent-fuel pool to improve visibility of fuel elements within the pool.
D.      Provide filtering by routing 100 percent of the spent-fuel pool area exhaust air through pre-filter, HEPA, and charcoal filters during normal plant operation.
E.      Provide filtering by routing exhaust air from the spent-fuel pool through the penetration room filtration system. Movement of new fuel over spent fuel with the spent fuel area roof new fuel access hatch open creates the potential for spent fuel damage with a release pathway which bypasses the fuel handling area heating, ventilating, and filtration system. This configuration may also bypass the radiation monitors in the exhaust duct, and consequently bypass the PRF post-accident. This configuration is specifically evaluated in subsection 15.4.5 as being bounded by the design basis accident FHA.
F.      Maintain a slightly negative pressure in the spent-fuel pool area with respect to the surrounding areas and outside at all times.
9.4-9                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The conformance of the fuel handling area heating, ventilating, and filtration system is presented in table 9.4-5.
9.4.2.1.3      Computer Room HVAC System The computer room HVAC system is designed to do the following:
A.      Provide an environment with controlled temperature and humidity to ensure both the comfort and safety of the operators and the integrity of the computer room components.
B.      Provide sufficient air capacity to maintain the computer room and control room at a slightly positive pressure.
The computer room environment is maintained between 60 and 80&deg;F and 50-percent relative humidity. This ensures both the comfort and safety of the operators and the integrity of the computer room components.
9.4.2.1.4      Access Control Area HVAC System The access control area HVAC system is designed to do the following:
A.      Maintain ventilation and constant temperature and limit humidity in the clean zone to suit personnel working conditions.
B.      Provide filtering of the exhaust air from controlled zones by directing the effluent to the radwaste area ventilating system HEPA/charcoal filters.
The design conditions for the air-conditioned rooms are 75&deg;F and 50-percent relative humidity.
9.4.2.1.5      Electrical Equipment Room Air Conditioning Systems The electrical equipment room air conditioning systems for the cable spreading room, the 600-V load center rooms, the 600-V load center 1M and 1N rooms in Unit 1, and the 600-V load center 2M room in Unit 2 are designed to remove the sensible heat loss from all equipment in the rooms to limit the ambient temperature to 95&deg;F.
In addition to serving the 600-V load center 1M and 1N rooms in Unit 1 and the 600-V load center 2M room in Unit 2, the hot instrument shop is maintained at 75&deg;F by the 600-V load center 1M and 1N air conditioning system.
Unit 1 and Unit 2 cable spreading rooms are provided with a smoke purge system. The smoke purge system has one exhaust fan with interconnecting ductwork to exhaust both units cable spreading rooms. This exhaust fan is manually operated. An interlock is provided between the 9.4-10                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 exhaust fan and the fire protection CO2 system to prevent fan operation when the CO2 system is in use.
9.4.2.1.6      Battery Room Exhaust System The battery room exhaust system is designed to do the following:
A.      Provide ventilation at the rate of at least 5 air changes/h.
B.      Prevent hydrogen generation in the room from exceeding a 4-percent concentration by volume.
C.      Prevent the room ambient temperature from exceeding 110&deg;F.
9.4.2.1.7      Battery Charger Room, Motor Control Center, and 600-V Load Center Cooling Systems The battery charger room, motor control center 1A, motor control center 1B, 600-V load center 1D, and 600-V load center 1E coolers are designed to maintain the ambient temperature in each respective room at or below 104&deg;F during normal operation. Table 9.4-6 depicts the sizing design parameters, and table 9.4-6A depicts post-DBA room temperatures.
An engineering analysis has been performed for all rooms with room coolers. This analysis demonstrates that the equipment in MCC 1A, 2A, 1B and 2B are capable of performing their specified function, during the temporary unavailability of the room cooler with the plant encountering a design basis accident (DBA). In battery charger room A, B, or C the analysis indicates that the room with the room cooler temporarily out of service must have the room door open (Reference 5) to the adjoining room with a room cooler in service for the equipment to be capable of performing its specified function, with the plant encountering a DBA.
All components of the battery charger room, motor control centers, and 600-V load center coolers are designed to meet Seismic Category I requirements. Power supplies and cooling water supplies to these units are arranged in a manner that will satisfy the single failure criterion. The single failure analysis is shown in table 9.4-7.
9.4.2.1.8      Sampling Room, Gas Analysis Room, Counting Room, and Radioactive Laboratory Heating and Air Conditioning System A separate, individual heating and air conditioning system is provided for the sampling room, gas analysis room, counting room, and radioactive laboratory room. The system is designed to maintain each individual room ambient temperature at 75&deg;F all year round, with the exception of the sampling room, which is maintained at 80&deg;F.
The sampling room, gas analysis room, and radioactive laboratory exhaust systems are designed to draw air through the exhaust hood sufficient to convey entrained fumes through 9.4-11                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 exhaust ducts connected to the main radioactive area filtration unit. The counting room is exhausted directly to the radwaste ventilation system without the use of an exhaust hood.
9.4.2.1.9      Engineered Safety Feature Pump Room Coolers The pump room coolers are designed to maintain the ambient temperature in each of the charging/high head, residual heat removal, containment spray, component cooling, and auxiliary feedwater pump rooms at or below 104&deg;F during normal operation of the pumps. Table 9.4-6 depicts the sizing design parameters, and table 9.4-6A depicts post-DBA room temperatures.
An engineering analysis has been performed for all engineered safety feature pump rooms with room coolers. This analysis demonstrates that the equipment in the CCW pump rooms are capable of performing their specified function, during the temporary unavailability of one or both room coolers with the plant encountering a design basis accident (DBA).
Calculations show that with the safety-related room coolers out of service under accident conditions, temperature of the CCW pumps room will not exceed the continuous-duty rating of the ESF TS equipment in the room. Thus, the associated safety-related room coolers are not considered support equipment for the ESF TS equipment in this room and, as such, are not required for the ESF TS equipment in the room to remain operable. Therefore, other than for pressure boundary integrity, the safety-related room coolers for the CCW pumps room are not considered a required ESF room cooler subsystem.
All components of the pump room coolers that serve engineered safety feature pumps are designed to meet Seismic Category I requirements. Power supplies and cooling water supplies to these units are arranged in a manner that will satisfy the single failure criterion.
9.4.2.1.10      Technical Support Center HVAC System The technical support center HVAC system is designed to maintain the center at 78&deg;F and 50-percent relative humidity during the summer and 72&deg;F during the winter. The system is designed so that the technical support center can be occupied by personnel during plant accident conditions. The system is designed to provide personnel protection from external airborne radiation. The system is powered by a safety-related power supply unit designed to meet safety-related system criteria. The technical support center HVAC system is not classified, however, as safety-related, nor is it redundant.
9.4.2.2        System Description 9.4.2.2.1      Nonradioactive Area Heating and Ventilating Systems The nonradioactive area heating and ventilating system is independent of any other system and includes provisions to supply and exhaust air from the nonradioactive area. The system is shown in drawings D-175014, sheets 1 and 2; and D-205014, sheets 1 and 2, and principal 9.4-12                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 components are listed in table 9.4-6. The system consists of one full capacity supply air handling unit complete with hot water heating coil, prefilter, and pneumatically operated dampers and one full capacity exhaust fan, connecting ductwork, and all controls.
The supply air handling unit provides once-through filtered and tempered outside air to the area through supply distribution ductwork when the outside air temperature is above 60&deg;F. When the outside air temperature falls below 60&deg;F, the supply unit will operate with approximately 20-percent outside air and approximately 80-percent recirculated air. A separate 100-percent capacity exhaust fan picks up the exhaust air through exhaust ductwork. A pneumatically operated damper located on the downstream side of the exhaust fan opens in proportion with the supply unit outside and return air dampers.
A.      Heating and Ventilating Unit The supply unit employed in the system is a floor-mounted, horizontal, drawthrough, cabinet type, single zone, air handling unit consisting of a centrifugal fan, hot water heating coil, flat type prefilter, outdoor return air dampers with pneumatic operators, and a mixing box designed to handle a nominal 24,000 sft3/min, at 2.5-in. water gauge static pressure, 2.6 x 105 btu/h heating capacity. The fan motor is 20 hp.
B.      Exhaust Fan The system exhaust fan is of the centrifugal type, with a nominal design flowrate of 20,000 sft3/min, at 1.7-in. water gauge static pressure. The fan motor is rated at 15 hp.
The fans used for the nonradioactive area heating and ventilating system supply air handling unit and exhaust system are designed in accordance with the applicable portions of Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) 99-67, Standards Handbook, and AMCA 210-67, Test Codes for Air Handling Devices.
Moreover, additional ventilation has been provided to certain rooms in Unit 1 (i.e., rooms 463, 464, 506) and Unit 2 (i.e., rooms 2462, 2463, 2464, 2506) to account for the heat produced by the electrical equipment installed in these rooms. The ventilation air to these rooms is supplied from outside by the nonradwaste air handling unit and the computer UPS supply fan. The computer UPS primary exhaust fan and secondary exhaust fan provide adequate exhaust from these rooms. Design parameters for the computer UPS supply fan and computer UPS primary and secondary exhaust fans are shown in table 9.4-6.
The computer UPS primary exhaust fan operates continuously to prevent hydrogen buildup in rooms 464 (Unit 1) and 2464 (Unit 2) and the adjacent areas. The computer UPS supply and secondary exhaust fans run only on an as-required basis during the summer.
9.4.2.2.2      Fuel Handling Area Heating, Ventilating, and Filtration Systems 9.4-13                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The fuel handling area heating, ventilating, and filtration system is independent of any other system and includes provisions to ventilate and filter the area atmosphere by the use of a supply heating and ventilating unit, HEPA charcoal filter unit, and exhaust fans. The system is shown in drawings D-175045 and D-205045, and principal components are listed in table 9.4-6.
One 100-percent capacity supply air handling unit supplies filtered and tempered outside air to two sides of the fuel handling area, namely, the spent-fuel pool and the new fuel storage areas.
The air supplied to the pool mixes with the water vapor emanating from the pool surface. An exhaust fan picks up air through a manifold located on the opposite side of the pool and draws it through pre-filters, HEPA, and charcoal filters prior to being released through the vent stack.
Movement of new fuel over spent fuel with the spent fuel area roof new fuel access hatch open creates the potential for a fuel handling accident with a release pathway which bypasses the radiation monitors in the exhaust duct, and consequently a bypass of the PRF. This configuration is specifically evaluated in section 15.4.5 as being bounded by the design basis accident FHA. A separate gravity roof vent releases the air from the new fuel storage area.
While the penetration room filtration system is not credited in the FHA dose analysis (subsection 15.4.5), this section describes the normal operation of the two 100% capacity penetration room filtration systems. During movement of recently irradiated (i.e., less than 70 h after shutdown) fuel assemblies in the spent fuel room, if either of the penetration room filtration systems are inoperable for more than 7 days, the operable penetration filtration train must be immediately placed in operation or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool room must be immediately suspended.
A single PRF system is capable of meeting all requirements of the fuel handling accident analyses.
Whenever irradiated fuel is in the spent-fuel storage pool, one of the penetration room filtration systems is aligned to the spent-fuel pool area. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool room, both of the penetration room filtration systems are aligned to the spent-fuel pool area to process automatically the spent-fuel area exhausts in the event of a fuel handling accident. During this mode of operation, a fuel handling accident signal from the redundant radiation monitors in the Seismic Category I exhaust line automatically de-energizes the supply and exhaust ventilation fans and isolates the fuel handling area. Isolation of the spent-fuel pool area is accomplished by the automatic closure of one of the redundant isolation dampers located in the Seismic Category I supply and exhaust ductwork that connects the spent-fuel pool area to the fuel handling ventilation mechanical equipment room. Due to the relative location of the radiation monitors in the fuel handling area ventilation exhaust duct work and the isolation dampers, a brief initial unfiltered release from a fuel handling accident will occur prior to the automatic start of the penetration room filtration system and the closure of the isolation dampers. However, the fuel handling accident dose analysis (subsection 15.4.5) does not credit the penetration room filtration system or isolation of the fuel handling area and assumes a 2-h unfiltered release to the environment. Two pneumatically operated dampers will normally be left open to connect the fuel handling area with the penetration room filtration system through Seismic Category I ducting. The Seismic Category I fan and filter subsystems of the penetration room filtration system maintain a slightly negative pressure in the fuel handling area. The exhaust air passes through the particulate, absolute, and charcoal filters prior to being released through the vent stack. The two pneumatically operated fail closed 9.4-14                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 valves (air to open) with backup air accumulators, are manually shut remotely to isolate the fuel handling area from the penetration room filtration system during a LOCA.
A.      Heating and Ventilating Unit The supply unit employed in the system is a floor- mounted, horizontal, drawthrough, cabinet type, single zone, air handling unit consisting of centrifugal fan, hot water heating coil, flat prefilter, outdoor return air dampers with pneumatic operators, and mixing box designed to handle 16,000 sf3/min at 2.75-in. water gauge static pressure, 8.65 x 105 btu/h heating capacity. The fan motor is 15 hp.
B.      Fans The exhaust fans (2) used in the spent fuel pool system are of the centrifugal type, with a design flowrate of 13,100 sf3/min each. Fan motors are 30 hp each.
The roof vent used in the fuel storage system is of the gravity type, with a design flowrate of 3500 ft3/min. The fans are designed in accordance with the applicable portions of AMCA 99-67, Standards Handbook; AMCA 210-67, Test Codes for Air Handling Devices; and AMCA 211A-65, Certified Rating Program for Air Moving Devices.
C.      Filters of the Spent Fuel Pool Filtration System The filters of the spent fuel pool filtration system are composite units consisting of prefilter section, absolute filter section, and impregnated charcoal bed filter section. Each section is designed as follows:
: 1.      The prefilters are designed to have a mean efficiency of 85 percent when tested in accordance with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) discoloration test method.
: 2.      The HEPA filters are designed to be capable of removing 99.97 percent minimum of particulate matter 0.3 mm or larger in size. This particulate filter is water and fire resistant design.
: 3.      The charcoal filters are impregnated, activated carbon beds designed to be capable of removing 99.9 percent minimum of inorganic iodine.
Organic iodine is removed by impregnated charcoal filters, with an efficiency of at least 95.0 percent at relative humidities below the area design value of 70 percent.
The prefilter and absolute filters are designed for a nominal flowrate of 1000 ft3/min/ft2 face area.
Charcoal filters are designed for 40 ft3/min/ft2 face area. Carbon weight is approximately 3800 lb.
9.4-15                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.2.2.3      Computer Room HVAC System The computer room HVAC system is shown in drawings D-175012 and D-205012, and principal components are listed and described in table 9.4-6.
The computer room conditioned air is supplied by a single 100 percent capacity, air conditioning, air handling unit and a remotely located split type air-cooled condensing unit. A split type system consists of a condensing unit remotely located from the air handling unit being served. The system is provided with approximately 30 percent outside makeup to maintain a slight positive pressure in the control room and computer room. Supply ductwork conveys air from the conditioning equipment to the computer room, while air return is accomplished by a return fan through separate return ductwork.
A. Heating and Cooling Unit The supply heating and cooling unit employed in the system is a floor-mounted, horizontal, drawthrough, cabinet type, single zone, air handling unit consisting of centrifugal fan, hot water heating coil, direct expansion cooling coil, angle prefilters, outdoor return air dampers with pneumatic motor operators designed to handle 5550 sf3/min at 5.7-in. water gauge static pressure, 160,160 Btu/h sensible cooling capacity and 122,000 Btu/h heating capacity. The fan motor is 10 hp.
B. Return Fans The fan used in the return subsystem of the computer room air conditioning unit is of the vane axial type with a design flowrate of 3600 sf3/min. The fan motor is 2 hp.
C. Condensing Unit The remotely located condensing unit used in the split type air conditioning system consists of an air-cooled, fan coil condenser and a refrigerant reciprocating compressor designed to handle 240,000 btu/h. The condenser unit has two fans with motor horsepower ratings of 1/2 hp each, for a total of 1 hp. The compressor power rating is 25 kW.
In addition to the 100-percent capacity air conditioning system described above, two recirculation type air handling units along with their associated condensing units have been provided. Normally, one of these units is operated in conjunction with the 100-percent capacity air conditioning unit. However, in the event the 100-percent capacity unit is out of service, both recirculation units operate in parallel to provide adequate cooling of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 computer rooms and the Unit 2 communication room. In this mode of operation, the airflow from each unit is estimated to be 4300 sf3/min with a total cooling capacity of 278,300 btu/h.
A. Air Handling Units The air handling units employed in the system are the floor mounted, vertical draw-through type consisting of centrifugal fans, direct expansion cooling coils, prefilters, return air OBVDs, and parallel blade 9.4-16                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 back-draft dampers, each designed to handle 7500 sf3/min at 6.31 in. WG static pressure, and 193,000 btu/h cooling. The fan motor is 15 hp.
B.      Condensing Units The remotely located condensing units used in the split type air conditioning system consist of air-cooled, fan coil condensers and refrigerant reciprocating compressors designed to handle 237,000 btu/h. The condenser motor and compressor motor horsepower ratings are 1 hp and 20 hp, respectively.
The fans are designed in accordance with the applicable portions of AMCA 99-67, Standards Handbook; AMCA 210-67, Test Codes for Air Handling Devices; and AMCA 211A-65, Certified Rating Program for Air Moving Devices.
The direct expansion cooling coils, air-cooled condensing unit, and refrigerant circuit components are designed in accordance with Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI) 410-64, 450, and 520-68.
9.4.2.2.4        Access Control Area HVAC System The access control area HVAC system is shown in drawing D-175001, and principal components are listed and described in table 9.4-6. The access control area is divided into clean and controlled zones and consists of rooms such as offices, analysis rooms, laboratory, instrument calibration and storage room, and hot and clean restroom facilities. Both the controlled zones and clean zones are air conditioned.
A separate cooling and heating unit supplies conditioned air to the personnel dosimetry laboratory. The personnel dosimetry laboratory is served by a system which provides approximately 3 1/2 tons of cooling. The heating is provided from the plant hot water heating system. The dosimetry laboratory system provides the minimum required fresh outside air at all times. When outside air conditions are appropriate, the systems enthalpy controlled economizer arrangement increases the proportion of outside air supplied while providing free cooling. The extra outside air provides added positive pressurization of the access control area while maintaining flow from the clean area to an area of relatively higher radioactivity. Fresh air for the dosimetry laboratory is drawn directly from the outside.
The balance of the access control area is supplied with conditioned air by an independent air handling unit, which provides approximately 23 tons of cooling. The heating for this area is provided by electric heaters mounted in the ducts supplying conditioned air to each space. The system serving this area is provided with outside air from the nonradwaste outside air supply system. The air is at ambient conditions in summer and tempered to 60&deg;F in the winter. The outside airflow for this system is high due to the clean toilet ventilation requirements and because the exhaust air from potentially radioactive areas cannot be recirculated. The ventilation for the clean toilet areas is provided by an exhaust fan located on the roof.
The air from the clean zones is returned to the air handling units. Exhaust air from the controlled areas is directed through the HEPA and charcoal filters of the radwaste area filtration unit and then to the plant exhaust vent.
9.4-17                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The direction of airflow between rooms is carefully controlled and moves from clean toward controlled areas. To ensure such airflow patterns at all times, a booster fan is utilized.
A. Heating and Cooling Unit (Dosimetry Laboratory)
The supply heating and cooling unit used in the system is a floor-mounted, horizontal, draw-through, cabinet type, single zone, air handling unit consisting of centrifugal fan, hot water heating coil, direct expansion cooling coil, flat prefilters, outdoor return air dampers with pneumatic motor operators designed to handle 1450 sf3/min at 2.34-in. WG static pressure, 52,000 btu/h cooling, and 34,000 btu/h heating. The fan motor is 1.5 hp.
B. Cooling Unit (Access Control Area)
The supply cooling unit used in the system is a floor-mounted, horizontal, draw-through, cabinet type, single zone, air handling unit consisting of centrifugal fan, direct expansion cooling coil, flat prefilters, and outdoor and return air dampers with electric motor operators. This unit is designed to handle 4250 sf3/min at 3.29-in. WG static pressure and 268,000 btu/h cooling. The fan motor is 5 hp.
C. Exhaust Fan The exhaust fan used in exhausting the air from the clean areas is a roof exhaust fan, centrifugal type, with a design flowrate of 4530 sf3/min at 1.2-in. WG static pressure. The fan motor is 2 hp.
D. Condensing Unit (Dosimetry Laboratory)
The remotely located condensing unit used in the split type air conditioning system consists of an air-cooled fan coil condenser and a refrigerant reciprocating compressor designed to handle 52,000 btu/h and 1450 sf3/min of conditioned air. The condenser motor and compressor motor horsepower ratings are 1/2 hp and 7.5 hp, respectively.
E. Condensing Unit (Access Control Area)
The remotely located condensing unit used in the split type air conditioning system consists of an air-cooled fan coil condenser and a refrigerant reciprocating compressor designed to handle 279,000 btu/h and 25,200 sf3/min.
The condenser motors and compressor motor horsepower ratings are three at 1 hp each and 30 hp, respectively.
The fans are designed in accordance with the applicable portions of AMCA 99-67, Standards Handbook; AMCA 210-67, Test Codes for Air Handling Devices; and AMCA 211A-65, Certified Rating Program for Air Moving Devices.
The direct expansion cooling coil, air-cooled condensing unit, and refrigerant circuit components are designed in accordance with ARI 410-64, 450, and 520-68.
9.4-18                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.2.2.5      Electrical Equipment Room Air Conditioning Systems A separate and independent air conditioning system is used for the electrical cable spreading room, the 600-V load center 1M and 1N rooms in Unit 1, the 600-V load center 2M room in Unit 2, and the 600-V load center rooms. The smoke purge system for cable spreading rooms provides a means of removing smoke and CO2 as required by the fire brigade or operators. The air conditioning systems are shown in drawings D-175014, sheets 1 and 2; and D-205014, sheets 1 and 2, and principal components are listed and described in table 9.4-6.
The cable spreading room air conditioning unit is located inside the penetration room boundary.
Conditioned air is recirculated in the cable spreading room through supply and return ductwork.
The 600-V load center 1M and 1N air conditioning unit is mounted in the ceiling of the hot instrument shop adjoining the load center rooms. Conditioned air is supplied to the load centers and the hot instrument shop through supply ductwork. The air from the load centers is recirculated and air from the instrument shop is exhausted to the radwaste ventilation system.
The 600-V load center air conditioning unit is located inside the nonradioactive area heating and ventilating mechanical equipment room. Conditioned air is recirculated in the 600-V load center rooms located on two different floor levels. Supply and return ductwork is used to supply the air to and draw the air from the 600-V load center rooms.
Each of the air conditioning units utilizes a roof-mounted, air-cooled condensing unit.
A.      Air Conditioning Units The air conditioning units used in the systems are vertical, floor-mounted (except the 600-V load center 1M, 1N, and 2M units which are horizontal, ceiling-mounted), drawthrough, cabinet type, single zone, air handling units consisting of centrifugal fan, direct expansion cooling coil, and flat prefilters.
B.      Condensing Units The remote condensing units used in the systems consist of air-cooled fan coil condensers and refrigerant reciprocating or scroll compressors.
The cable spreading room smoke purge systems exhaust fan is a centrifugal type fan, mounted on the roof at el 190 ft-6 in.
The fans are designed in accordance with the applicable portions of AMCA 99-67, Standards Handbook; AMCA 210-67, Test Codes for the Air Handling Devices; and AMCA 211A-65, Certified Rating Program for Air Moving Devices.
The direct expansion cooling coil, air-cooled condensing units, and refrigerant circuit components are designed in accordance with the ARI 410-64, 450, and 520-68.
9.4-19                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.2.2.6      Battery Room Exhaust System The battery room exhaust system is shown in drawings D-175014, sheets 1 and 2; and D-205014, sheets 1 and 2, and principal components are listed and described in table 9.4-6.
The air in each battery room is drawn out by an independent exhaust fan through Seismic Category I exhaust ducts during normal and accident modes of battery operation. Air is drawn from the high point of each battery room at the rate of at least 5 air changes/h. The makeup air to each battery room is directly supplied from the nonradioactive supply air handling unit.
All components of both systems are designed to meet Seismic Category I requirements. Power supplies to both fans are Class 1E electric systems.
9.4.2.2.7      Battery Charger Room, Motor Control Centers, and 600-V Load Centers Cooling Systems Room coolers are floor- or ceiling-mounted, horizontal or vertical, air handling unit type, each containing a direct driven vaneaxial fan, finned tube water coils, and a return air plenum, all assembled in one package unit. The coolers recirculate conditioned air from the respective battery charger rooms, motor control centers, and 600-V load centers through short supply and return ducts. Cooling water supplied from the service water system is recirculated through the cooling coils of the coolers.
A temperature switch located in each battery charger room, motor control center, and 600-V load center area energizes the respective cooler serving the rooms upon detecting a rise in room ambient temperature beyond the predetermined setpoint. These cooling systems are shown in drawings D-175014, sheets 1 and 2; D-205014, sheets 1 and 2; D-175011, sheets 1 through 3; D-205011, sheets 1 through 4, and principal components are listed and described in table 9.4-6 with sizing design parameters.
9.4.2.2.8      Sampling Room, Gas Analysis Room, Counting Room, and Radioactive Laboratory Heating and Air-Conditioning System The heating and air-conditioning system is shown in drawings D-175011, sheets 1 through 3 and D-205011, sheets 1 through 4. An individual heating and air-conditioning unit supplies conditioned air to the sampling room, gas analysis room, counting room, and radioactive laboratory. Sufficient outside makeup air taken from the radwaste heating and ventilating system supply duct provides ventilation for room occupants and for makeup air for the exhaust system.
Each of the four air-conditioning units utilizes a roof-mounted, air-cooled condensing unit.
9.4.2.2.9      Engineered Safety Feature Pump Room Coolers Drawings D-175011, sheets 1 through 3 and D-205011, sheets 1 through 4 show the entire HVAC system in the radioactive portion of the auxiliary building. Although pump room coolers 9.4-20                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 are included in this flow diagram, they are a separate system and are not a part of the radwaste HVAC system. The seismic category of engineered safety feature pump room air cooling units is shown in table 3.2-1.
Each of the pump room coolers is an air handling unit type containing a direct driven vaneaxial fan, finned tube water coils, and a return air plenum, all assembled in one package unit. The coolers draw air from the respective pump rooms being served and supply cooled air back to the same room. No ductwork is used in the air distribution except that of the auxiliary feedwater pump room coolers which utilize short ducts.
Cooling water supplied from the service water system circulates continuously through the cooling coils of the pump room coolers. Each of the coolers serving engineering safety feature pumps is supplied with water from the same service water system train. The cooler fan starts and stops automatically as its respective pump starts and stops. The fan starter cannot control the pump. If either one of the pump cooler motors fails, then this group of engineered safety features equipment will be isolated for immediate action. The spare safety feature pump and pump room cooler would then be started from the spare emergency bus. Cooler sizing design parameters are tabulated under table 9.4-6. The single-failure analysis of the pump room coolers is described in table 9.4-7.
9.4.2.2.10      Technical Support Center HVAC System The technical support center HVAC system is comprised of a safety-related bus, an air handling unit, DX coils, a charcoal filter with fan, and all associated ductwork.
During normal operation of the system, outside air is drawn into the system and is mixed with recirculated air. The air is then cooled (or heated) to maintain the design temperature of the technical support center. When high radiation is detected in the control room, the centers HVAC system automatically diverts the fresh/recirculated air mixture through the charcoal filter before directing this mixture back into the air handling unit just prior to entering the technical support center. A positive pressure is maintained in the technical support center at all times to prevent infiltration of the center. The technical support center HVAC system is shown on drawing D-205014 sheet 2.
9.4.2.3          Safety Evaluation 9.4.2.3.1        Nonradioactive Area Heating and Ventilating System This system provides adequate capacity to ensure that proper temperatures are maintained in the various portions of the building under operating and shutdown conditions in all types of weather. The system is located within the auxiliary building and arranged for ease of access, control, and monitoring.
The nonradioactive area heating and ventilating system is not an engineered safeguard system, and no credit is taken for its operation in analyzing the consequences of any accident.
9.4-21                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.2.3.2        Fuel Handling Area Heating, Ventilating, and Filtration System This system provides adequate capacity to ensure that proper temperatures are maintained in the various portions of the fuel handling area under operating and shutdown conditions in all types of weather and to ensure that effluent discharges are maintained within acceptable limits during normal operation.
Isolation of the spent-fuel pool area is achieved by quick closing, air-operated, low leakage, Seismic Category I dampers installed in all ducts that penetrate the spent fuel pool boundary, with those portions of the conventional ducts containing isolation dampers being Seismic Category I.
Redundant Seismic Category I radiation monitors are provided. Upon receipt of a high radiation signal in the spent-fuel area, the spent-fuel HVAC system will be automatically isolated and an alarm will sound in the control room, alerting the operator. The auxiliary building penetration room filtration system is automatically actuated by the high radiation signal. Also, redundant Seismic Category I pressure sensors monitor the differential pressure between the suction side of the fan and the spent-fuel pool area. A low differential pressure reading below the predetermined setpoint indicates a low or no-flow condition in the exhaust duct, which could make the radiation detectors ineffective in sampling effluent. Either a high radiation signal or a low differential pressure signal from these monitors will automatically shut off all operating ventilation fans associated with the spent-fuel pool supply and exhaust subsystems and automatically close all air-operated isolation dampers within the boundary. Fans will remain off and dampers closed until the activity level in the pool area is within safe limits. Switching of fans, valves, and dampers back to the normal mode is accomplished manually.
Movement of new fuel over spent fuel with the spent fuel area roof new fuel access hatch open creates the potential for a fuel handling accident with a release pathway which bypasses the radiation monitors in the exhaust duct, and consequently a bypass of the PRF. This configuration is specifically evaluated in subsection 15.4.5 as being bounded by the design basis accident FHA.
Due to the relative location of the radiation monitors in the fuel handling area ventilation exhaust duct work and the isolation dampers, a brief initial unfiltered release from a fuel handling accident will occur prior to the automatic start of the penetration room filtration system and the closure of the isolation dampers. However, the fuel handling accident dose analysis (subsection 15.4.5) does not credit the penetration room filtration system or isolation of the fuel handling area and assumes a 2-h unfiltered release to the environment. The system is located within the auxiliary building and arranged for ease of access, control, and monitoring. This system is not used to reduce accident doses.
9.4.2.3.3        Computer Room, Access Control Area, and Electrical Equipment Rooms HVAC Systems These systems provide adequate capacity to ensure that proper temperatures are maintained in the various portions of the building under operating and shutdown conditions in all types of 9.4-22                                  REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 weather. The systems are located within the auxiliary building and are arranged for ease of access, control, and monitoring.
These HVAC systems are not engineered safeguard systems, and no credit is taken for their operation in analyzing the consequences of any accident.
9.4.2.3.4      Battery Room Exhaust System The exhaust fans provided for the two battery rooms will prevent the buildup of hydrogen concentration in the rooms by exhausting the air continually during normal and accident modes of operation.
Low air flow switches in each exhaust fan duct provide an alarm when either battery room exhaust fan is not operating. When either exhaust fan fails, it would take approximately 200 h for the battery room hydrogen concentration to approach 4.0 volume percent. The low air flow alarm will provide the operator with sufficient time to analyze the situation and take necessary measures to restore exhaust flow well before flammable limits would be approached.
As a safety precaution, each battery room is furnished with a temperature switch that will give an alarm in the control room once 110&deg;F ambient temperature is reached. This signal will alert the operator to take corrective action.
9.4.2.3.5      Battery Charger Room, Motor Control Centers, and 600-V Load Centers Cooling Systems The coolers provided to cool the battery charger rooms, motor control centers, and 600-V load centers will maintain the environmental conditions required for the integrity of the electrical equipment under failure conditions of the normal ventilation system due to loss of power or component failure. The arrangement of the power supplies and cooling water supplies to these coolers meets the single failure criterion. Coolers have safety functions in mitigating the consequences of an accident but are not required to control the release of radioactivity.
9.4.2.3.6      Sampling Room, Gas Analysis Room, and Radioactive Laboratory Heating and Air Conditioning The system provides adequate capacity to ensure that proper temperatures are maintained in these rooms and laboratories under operating and shutdown conditions in all types of weather.
The system is located within the auxiliary building and is arranged for ease of access, control, and monitoring.
The heating and air conditioning system is not an engineered safety features system, and no credit is taken for its operation in analyzing the consequences of any accident.
9.4-23                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.2.3.7        Technical Support Center HVAC System The technical support center HVAC system provides adequate cooling and heating capacity to meet the specified design temperatures for occupying personnel. It also provides adequate protection for occupying personnel from airborne radiation in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 19, for radiation doses in the control room.
The technical support center HVAC system is located within the auxiliary building next to the control room. Access can be from either the control room or the auxiliary building.
All damper shafts, ducting, and other equipment within the system are provided with seals to minimize leakage. The filtration unit meets the design requirements of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N509-1976.
9.4.2.4          Tests and Inspection 9.4.2.4.1        Nonradioactive Area Heating and Ventilating System Each component is inspected prior to installation. Components of each system shall be accessible for periodic inspection during plant operation.
Instruments are calibrated during testing. Automatic controls are tested for actuation at the proper setpoints. Alarm functions will be checked for operability and limits during preoperational testing.
The system is operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity, and mechanical operability.
9.4.2.4.2        Fuel Handling Area Heating, Ventilating, and Filtration System Each component is inspected prior to installation. Components of each system are accessible for periodic inspection during normal plant operation.
Instruments are calibrated during testing. Automatic controls are tested for actuation at the proper setpoints. Alarm functions are checked for operability and limits during preoperational testing.
The system is operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity, and mechanical operability.
After initial startup and filter replacements, the HEPA filters are tested using dioctylphtalate (DOP) smoke and the charcoal filters are tested for bypass using freon 112.
9.4-24                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.2.4.3      Computer Room, Access Control Area, and Electrical Equipment Rooms HVAC Systems Each component is inspected prior to installation. Components of each system are accessible for periodic inspection during plant operation.
Instruments are calibrated during testing. Automatic controls are tested for actuation at the proper setpoints. Alarm functions are checked for operability and limits during preoperational testing.
Each system is operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity, and mechanical operability.
9.4.2.4.4      Battery Room Exhaust System Battery room exhaust fans are tested in the manufacturers shop to verify their performance in accordance with AMCA 211A-65 and 300-67. Each component is inspected prior to installation.
Each exhaust system is operated and tested with regard to flow paths, flow capacity, and mechanical operability.
9.4.2.4.5      Battery Charger Room, Motor Control Centers, and 600-V Load Centers Cooling Systems Cooler components are tested in the factory. Fans are tested to verify their performance in accordance with AMCA 211A-65 and 300-67. Coils are pneumatically and hydrostatically tested in the shop to verify the pressure ratings specified in the procurement specification.
Systems acceptance tests are performed to demonstrate the proper mounting of components, proper hookup of circuits and connections, setting of instrumentation, and operation of interlocks. Equipment and system performance is monitored and rated.
9.4.2.4.6      Sampling Room, Gas Analysis Room, Counting Room, and Radioactive Laboratory Heating and Air Conditioning System Fans are warranted to meet the requirements of AMCA 210-67, Test Codes for Air Handling Devices, and AMCA 211A-65, Certified Rating Programs for Air Moving Devices.
The split system heat pump units are certified in accordance with ARI 210/240.
Distribution ductwork is operated and tested with regard to flow paths, flow capacity, and mechanical operability.
9.4-25                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.2.4.7        Engineered Safety Feature Pump Room Coolers Component qualification tests demonstrate the characteristics of material to be incorporated by the manufacturer into components for the coolers and ensure that they meet the requirements of procurement specification.
Component acceptance tests are factory tests that demonstrate the capability of the components incorporated into the coolers. Fans are tested in the manufacturers shop to verify their performance in accordance with AMCA 211A-65 and 300-67. Coils are pneumatically and hydrostatically tested to verify pressure ratings specified in the procurement specification.
Systems acceptance tests consist of deenergized and energized tests which demonstrate the proper mounting of components, proper hookup of circuits and connections, setting of instrumentation, and operation of interlocks. Equipment and system performance is monitored and rated.
9.4.2.4.8        Technical Support Center HVAC System The filter is tested by the manufacturer in accordance with the ANSI N509 construction test.
The pressure boundary leakage test is conducted in accordance with section 4.12 of ANSI N509-1976 for the filter housing by the manufacturer; leakage limits as stated in section 4.12 shall be met. The mounting frame pressure leakage test is conducted in accordance with section 7.0 of ANSI N510-1975 by the manufacturer. An in-place leakage test is performed in accordance with sections 10.0 and 12.0 of ANSI N510-1980 for the HEPA filter and the charcoal filters. All ducts are tested for leakage after initial startup and after major modifications to the ductwork.
9.4.2.5          Instrumentation Application 9.4.2.5.1        Nonradioactive Area Heating and Ventilating System During power operation, temperature indications will verify the proper operation of the heating and ventilating system.
A pressure sensor is installed in each fan, as necessary. If an operating fan fails, the sensor detects the loss of pressure and an alarm is annunciated in the control room.
9.4.2.5.2        Fuel Handling Area Heating, Ventilating, and Filtration System During power operation, temperature and pressure indications verify the proper operation of the heating, ventilating, and filtration system. The fuel handling area particulate and gas monitor indications of the activity levels in the system exhaust are used to determine routine releases from the area and are indicated in the control room. If a high radiation level is detected, an alarm is annunciated in the control room and automatically isolates the normally operating heating and ventilating equipment and automatically starts the penetration room filtration 9.4-26                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 system. As a backup to the radiation monitors and to ensure that a representative sample is available to these monitors, Seismic Category I pressure sensors are installed in the exhaust duct serving the spent-fuel pool. They will automatically isolate the spent-fuel pool ventilation system and automatically start the penetration room filtration system, upon a low differential pressure signal which indicates low flow in the exhaust duct.
Seismic Category II differential pressure sensors are installed for each fan or fan group and filter. If the normal operating fan in the exhaust subsystem fails, this sensor detects the loss of pressure and initiates alarms in the control room. High differential pressure in the filters initiates alarms in the control room.
9.4.2.5.3        Computer Room, Access Control Areas, and Electrical Equipment HVAC Systems During power operation, temperature indications verify the proper operation of the HVAC systems.
A pressure sensor is installed in each fan. If the operating fans fail, this sensor detects the loss of pressure and alarms are annunciated in the control room.
Each of the air handling units for the dosimetry laboratory and access control area is interlocked with the access control area fire protection system and will shut down upon receipt of a fire alarm signal. Each electric duct heater for the access control areas is equipped with an integral airflow switch that disables heater operation if airflow is not maintained.
9.4.2.5.4        Battery Room Exhaust System A flow sensor is provided for each fan. If a fan fails, the sensor detects the loss of flow and alarms are annunciated in the control room. A temperature switch is located in each battery room. If the room ambient temperature goes beyond 110&deg;F, the switch detects the high temperature and alarms are annunciated in the control room.
9.4.2.5.5        Battery Charger Room, Motor Control Centers, and 600-V Load Centers Cooling Systems Each of the battery charger room coolers is provided with a pressure indicator mounted between the inlet and outlet sides of the fan for low differential indication in case of low airflow.
Each cooler is controlled by a room thermostat designed to meet single failure criterion.
9.4.2.5.6        Sampling Room, Gas Analysis Room, Counting Room, and Radioactive Laboratory Heating and Air Conditioning System During power operation, temperature indications verify the proper operation of the heating and air conditioning system.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.2.5.7      Engineered Safety Feature Pump Room Coolers Each of the pump room coolers is provided with a pressure indicator mounted between the inlet and outlet sides of the fan for local low differential pressure indication in case of low airflow.
9.4.2.5.8      Technical Support Center HVAC System Upon receipt of a signal from the control room high radiation detectors located in the control room air intake, the technical support center HVAC system automatically switches into the emergency mode of operation. This action can also be accomplished by means of a manual switch located at the technical support center HVAC system control panel. If either the filter fan or the air handling unit fan stops, an alarm will sound in the technical support center.
A fire in the charcoal beds will be alarmed in the control room. Automatic fire extinguishing capability is provided for the room in which the charcoal beds are located. The position of all dampers is indicated at the HVAC system control panel in the technical support center.
9.4.2.6        Materials A. Decomposition Products Materials used in or on battery exhaust systems, battery charger room cooling systems, and engineered safety feature pump room coolers have been chosen so that the decomposition products, if any, of each material will not interfere with safe operation of any engineered safety feature.
B. Material Compatibility Material compatibility of the battery room exhaust and battery charger room cooling systems is discussed in paragraph 6.2.3.6.
9.4.3    RADWASTE AREA The heating, ventilating, and filtration system for the radwaste area is independent from that used in any other area and is designed to control and direct all potentially contaminated air to the vent stack via prefilter, HEPA, and charcoal filters.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.3.1        Design Bases The radwaste area heating, ventilating, and filtration system is designed to provide a suitable environment for equipment and personnel operation by performing the following functions:
A. Limit compartment temperature to 110&deg;F when outdoor temperature is 95&deg;F and maintain compartments above 65&deg;F when outdoor temperature is 20&deg;F.
B. Limit temperature in the Liquid Radwaste Processing Facility (LRWPF) area to 104&deg;F when the Liquid Radwaste Processing System (LRWPS) is operating.
C. Maintain compartments at a slightly negative pressure with respect to the surrounding corridors to prevent outleakage of contaminants.
9.4.3.2        System Description The radwaste area heating, ventilating, and filtration system includes provisions to supply, exhaust, and filter air from the radwaste area. The system is shown in drawings D-175011, sheets 1 through 3, D-205011, sheets 1 through 4 and principal components are listed in tables 9.4-8 and 9.4-9. The system consists of one supply fan which is a full capacity air handling unit complete with hot water heating coil, prefilter, and pneumatically operated outside air damper, two full capacity exhaust fans, connecting ductwork, and all controls.
The supply air handling unit provides once-through filtered and tempered outside air to all personnel occupancy areas, the monitor tank compartments, and treated waste holdup tank areas when the outside air temperature is above 65&deg;F. When the outside air temperature falls below 28&deg;F for Unit 1 and 65&deg;F for Unit 2, the supply unit will operate with approximately 90-percent outside air and approximately 10-percent recirculated air. The air is exhausted from lesser areas to areas of increasingly greater potential radioactive contamination. The exhaust air is exhausted through banks of prefilters, HEPA, and charcoal filters by one of the two full capacity, redundant exhaust fans before discharging to the plant vent stack. One exhaust fan is normally running and one is a standby fan.
The radwaste exhaust fan can be operated while the radwaste supply fan is inoperable by defeating the interlocks that prevent such operation. When initiating this mode of operation, a penetration room door must be held open during exhaust fan startup to avoid excessive differential pressure between the penetration room and the auxiliary building.
Air exhausted from the chemical and laundry drain tank room, the waste gas processing area, and the waste monitor tank room is processed by a charcoal filter unit on Unit 2 as the air leaves the area.
The radwaste area heating, ventilating, and filtration system also includes the Liquid Radwaste A/C System. This independent system provides supplementary cooling to the Liquid Radwaste Processing Facility (LRWPF) Iocated at the Auxiliary Building elevation 130-0".
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.3.2.1        Heating and Ventilating Unit The supply unit employed in the system is a floor-mounted, horizontal, drawthrough, cabinet type, single zone, air handling unit consisting of centrifugal fan, hot water heating coil, and flat type prefilter, designed to handle a nominal flowrate of 50,000 sf3/min at 4.5-in. WG static pressure, 2.16 x 106 Btu/h heating capacity. The fan motor is 75 hp.
9.4.3.2.2        Fans The fans used in the full capacity exhaust subsystem of the radwaste area filtration system are of the vane axial type with a nominal design flowrate of 50,000 sf3/min each. Fan motors are 75 hp each.
The fans are designed in accordance with the applicable portions of AMCA 99-67, Standards Handbook; AMCA 210-67, Test Codes for Air Handling Devices; AMCA 211A-65, Certified Rating Program for Air Moving Devices; and AMCA 300-67, Test Code for Sound Rating of Air Moving Devices.
9.4.3.2.3        Exhaust Filter Unit The exhaust filter unit is a composite unit consisting of a prefilter section, absolute filter section, and impregnated charcoal filter section. Each section is designed as follows:
A.      The prefilters are designed to have a mean efficiency of 85 percent when tested in accordance with the NIST discoloration test method.
B.      The HEPA filter is designed to be capable of removing 99.97 percent minimum of particulate matter 0.3 mm or larger in size. This particulate filter is of water and fire resistant design.
C.      The charcoal filter is an impregnated, activated, 6-in. deep carbon bed that is designed to be capable of removing 99.9 percent minimum of inorganic iodine and, at relative humidities less than 70 percent, 99.0 percent minimum of organic iodines.
The prefilter and absolute filter are designed for a nominal flowrate of 1000 ft3/min/ft2 face area.
The charcoal filter is designed for a nominal face velocity of 40 ft/min and 0.75-s gas residence time. The weight of charcoal is approximately 23,000 lb.
The filters used in the radwaste area filtration system are designed and manufactured in accordance with the requirements of NRC Health and Safety Bulletin No.306 (Military Specification MIL-F-51068C, June 8, 1970, Filter, Particulate, High Efficiency, Fire Resistant) and NRC Health and Safety Bulletin No.297.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.3.2.4      Liquid Radwaste A/C System The Liquid Radwaste A/C System provides supplementary cooling to the Liquid Radwaste Processing Facility (LRWPF). The system consists of two water cooled air conditioners, independent ductwork, and controls. This system operates by recirculating the air provided by the main radwaste ventilation system through separate ductwork to the area. Its main purpose is to limit the temperature within the Liquid Radwaste Processing Facility (LRWPF) to 104&deg;F.
The air conditioner units employed in the system are ceiling-mounted, horizontal, drawthrough, cabinet type, single zone, consisting of a fan and water cooled coil, designed to handle a nominal flowrate of 4,000 sf3/min at 0.55-in. WG static pressure, 0.12 x 106 btu/h cooling capacity. The fan motor is 2 hp.
9.4.3.3        Safety Evaluation The system provides adequate capacity to ensure that proper temperatures are maintained in the various portions of the building under operating and shutdown conditions in all types of weather.
Exhaust air is drawn from areas of progressively high potential radiation to prevent exfiltration of this air from the building and to provide rapid cleanup. On Unit 2, a charcoal filter unit connected to the radwaste exhaust system is provided for potentially radioactive rooms, such as chemical and laundry drain tank room, waste gas processing area, and waste monitor tank room. The filter unit processes the air as it leaves the area and discharges it to the radwaste exhaust ducts, thus preventing the spread of airborne contamination from the radioactive equipment in these rooms.
This system is not safety related, and system failure will not adversely affect safe operations of the plant as shown by table 9.4-10.
9.4.3.4        Inspection and Testing Requirements Each component is inspected prior to installation. Components of each system shall be accessible for periodic inspection during plant operation.
Instruments are calibrated during testing. Automatic controls are tested for actuation at the proper setpoints. Alarm functions are checked for operability and limits during preoperational testing.
The system is operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity, and mechanical operability.
The radwaste area supply air handling units and exhaust fans are tested before installation in accordance with AMCA 210-67 and ARI 410-64.
Systems equipment, piping, and distribution ductwork are tested and balanced after installation in accordance with Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association, for High 9.4-31                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 Velocity Duct Construction and Associated Air Balance Council, Standards for Field Measurement and Instrumentation, form 81266, Volume 1, 1970.
The HEPA filters are tested before installation as follows:
A.      Media tensile test.
B.      Sequential test.
C.      Efficiency penetration test (DOP) in accordance with MTL-STD-282. Penetration will not exceed 0.03 percent for 0.3-m diameter homogeneous particle of DOP.
D.      Shipped to quality assurance station (Oak Ridge) for acceptance test using the hot smoke (thermally generated DOP) test.
The HEPA filter banks are given an in-place test for leakage and element imperfection using DOP. This test is similar to that described in 136 300-175A, Instruction Manual for the Installation, Operation, and Maintenance of Penetrometer, Filter Testing, DOP, Q107, U. S.
Army Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, January 15, 1965, and in Filter Testing Program Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, by F. Panchuk and W. Rachuk, in Proceedings of the Ninth AEC Air Cleaning Conference, September 1966, CONF-660904, Volume 2, Harvard University and NRC, January 1967.
Charcoal tests data are made available before installation as required by the purchase specifications in order to satisfy the following criteria:
A.      The charcoal bed filter is capable of removing 99.9 percent of molecular iodine-131 in the presence of a gaseous concentration of 50 mg/m3 of nonradioactive molecular iodine (I2-131) plus 5 mg/m3 of nonradioactive methyl iodide. The integrated I2-131 removal efficiency for the test unit, including both iodine feed and dilution periods, is no less than 95. 0 percent.
B.      The charcoal bed filter is capable of removing at least 99.0 percent of the methyl iodide-131 (CH3I-131). The integrated efficiency in the removal of CH3I-131 by the test unit, including both iodine feed and dilution periods, is no less than 95.0 percent.
C.      The carbon lot tests used consist of gas life, wash, ignition temperature, and carbon tetrachloride tests.
Each HEPA filter bank is given an in-place system integrity test with cold generated DOP to detect leaks in filter cells. The in-place testing of the prefilters consists of checking the completed installation for leaks due to damaged filters, faulty bolting, gasketing, etc.
The in-place testing of the charcoal beds is performed with freon 112, using similar portable equipment described in paragraph 7.5.1, pages 7.8 and 7.9, NRC Report ORNL-NSIC-65, 1970, by C. A. Burchsted and A. B. Fuller, Design, Construction, and Testing of High Efficiency Filtration Systems for Nuclear Application. The testing procedure is in accordance with Standardized Non-Destructive Test of Carbon Beds for Reactor Containment 9.4-32                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 Applications, by D. R. Muhlbaier, DP-1082, July 1967. Test results show an efficiency of 99.5 percent.
9.4.3.5        Instrumentation Application During power operation, temperature indications will verify the proper operation of the heating and ventilating system. The radwaste area particulate and gas monitor indications of the activity levels in the system exhaust are used to determine routine releases from the area.
A pressure sensor is installed across the exhaust fans. If the normal operating fan in the exhaust subsystem fails, this sensor will sense the loss of pressure, will automatically start the standby fan, and will initiate alarms in the control room.
Differential pressure switches are installed across the HEPA and charcoal filters. High pressure drop across either filter will initiate an alarm in the control room.
9.4.4  TURBINE BUILDING The turbine building is provided with a recirculation cooling and heating system designed to achieve maximum safety and convenience for operating personnel and to maintain building temperature within acceptable limits for equipment operation. This system is discussed in this section.
9.4.4.1        Design Bases 9.4.4.1.1      Turbine Building Heating and Cooling System The turbine building heating and cooling system performs the following functions:
A.      Provides temperature and humidity control for personnel working conditions and optimum equipment performance.
B.      Provides cooling during normal plant operation.
C.      Provides recirculation of indoor air.
D.      Limits maximum ambient temperature to 100&deg;F on the operating floor during normal plant operation.
E.      Limits maximum temperature to 95&deg;F on floors below the operating floor during normal plant operation.
F.      Provides temperature and humidity control for personnel comfort in the water analysis room.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.4.1.2      Steam Jet Air Ejector Filtration System This system filters the effluent of the steam jet air ejector through a separate charcoal filtration system, as shown in drawings D-175031, sheets 1 through 3; D-205031, sheets 1 through 3; and D-175027.
9.4.4.2        System Description 9.4.4.2.1      Turbine Building Heating and Cooling System The turbine building heating and cooling system is shown in drawings D-175031, sheets 1 through 3; D-205031, sheets 1 through 3; and D-175027. The system is designed to air condition various areas of the three main zones of the turbine building: above the operating floor, between the mezzanine and operating floors, and below the mezzanine floor. Each of 14 areas in the 3 zones is air conditioned by a factory built air handling unit and associated distribution ductwork. Four units are located on the operating floor, six on the mezzanine floor, and four on the basement floor. There are no interconnections between ductwork of adjacent areas. Each unit is designed to permit air mixing between the hot and cold spots of the area being served. Supply ductwork is used with each air handling unit to transport the conditioned air to the hottest equipment locations. Discharge velocities are sufficient to disperse the conditioned air throughout the area and overcome any convective air currents which may be present.
The turbine building cooling system air handling units are supplied with demineralized, chilled water by a primary pump and a closed loop primary piping system. A second pump is provided for standby service. The piping system is protected by an air separator with strainer and a closed expansion tank. The system utilizes the primary secondary circuiting arrangement, the secondary chilled water circuit consisting of 2 parallel arrangement, 70 percent cooling capacity centrifugal water chillers, two 50 percent capacity chilled water pumps, and associated piping, valves, instruments, and controls.
Additional design data for the water and air systems are given in table 9.4-11.
A. Cooling Air Handling Unit Each area cooling air handling unit is a ceiling or floor-mounted, horizontal or vertical, draw-through cabinet type, single zone unit consisting of a flat prefilter, finned tube water coils, and a centrifugal fan. Additional design parameters for the cooling units are given in table 9.4-11.
B. Coils The water coils used for the air handling units are designed in accordance with ARI standard 410-64.
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FNP-FSAR-9 C. Fans The fans used for the air handling units are double width, double inlet, centrifugal ones designed in accordance with the applicable portions of AMCA 99-67, Standards Handbook, and AMCA 210-67, Test Code for Air Handling Devices.
D. Motors The motors used for the air handling units were designed in accordance with the applicable portions of National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)
MG1-1967, Standards for Motors and Generators; ANSI C-50.20-1954, Polyphase Induction Motors and Generators; and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 85-1965, Test Procedure for Airborne Noise Measurements on Rotating Electric Machinery.
Replacement motors are designed in accordance with the applicable portions of the edition of NEMA MG-1 in effect at the time of purchase. The water analysis room air conditioning unit and associated ductwork and controls are designed to maintain comfort temperatures and humidity for personnel in the water analysis room on the basement floor of the turbine building. The air conditioning unit is a self-contained package with a water-cooled condenser and is controlled by a thermostat located in the room.
E. Smoke Vents The open, passive smoke vents on the turbine building roof allow smoke and heat to exit the turbine building.
9.4.4.2.2        Steam Jet Air Ejector Filtration System The steam jet air ejector filtration system is served by one full capacity exhaust fan and one full capacity filtration unit consisting of a prefilter, HEPA filter, and a charcoal filter. The fan and filters are located inside the turbine building. The gaseous releases from the steam jet air ejector vents are routed from the filtration unit to the exhaust line of the turbine building main filtration unit.
A. Fans The exhaust fan for the steam jet air ejector filtration system is a direct-driven centrifugal fan. Additional design parameters for the fans are given in table 9.4-11. The fans are designed in accordance with the applicable portions of AMCA 99-67, Standards Handbook, and AMCA 210-67, Test Code Air Handling Devices. The flowrate through the steam jet air ejector filtration unit is 1000 sf3/min, 60 sf3/min of which is steam jet air ejector effluent.
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FNP-FSAR-9 B.      Filters The filters are composite units consisting of a prefilter section, absolute filter section, and impregnated charcoal filter section. Each section is designed as follows:
: 1.      The prefilters have a mean efficiency of 85 percent when tested in accordance with the NIST discoloration test method.
: 2.      The HEPA filter is capable of removing 99.97 percent minimum of particulate matter 0.3 mm or larger in size. This particulate filter is water and fire resistant in design.
: 3.      The charcoal filter is an impregnated, activated 6-in., deep carbon bed, capable of removing 99.9 percent minimum of inorganic iodine. At relative humidities below 70 percent, all iodines, including organic, are removed with an efficiency of at least 99.0 percent.
Additional design parameters for the filters are given in table 9.4-11.
The filters used in each filtration subsystem are designed and manufactured in accordance with the requirements of NRC Health and Safety Bulletin No.306 (Military Specification MIL-F-51068C, June 8, 1970, Filter, Particulate, High Efficiency, Fire Resistant) and NRC Health and Safety Bulletin No.297.
C.      Dampers The damper in the ducting upstream of the filter trains and the dampers at the discharge of the fan are pneumatically operated, two-position, fail-open butterfly dampers.
D.      Motors The motors used for the air handling units and filtration unit were designed in accordance with the applicable portions of NEMA MG1-1967, Standards for Motors and Generators; ANSI C-50.20-1954, Polyphase Induction Motors and Generators; and IEEE 85-1965, Test Procedure for Airborne Noise Measurements on Rotating Electric Machinery.
Replacement motors are designed in accordance with the applicable portions of NEMA MG-1 in effect at the time of purchase.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.4.3          Safety Evaluation 9.4.4.3.1        Turbine Building Cooling System The system provides adequate capacity to ensure that proper temperatures are maintained in the various portions of the building while the plant is operating. The system is located within the turbine building and arranged for ease of access, control, and monitoring.
The turbine building cooling system is not an engineered safety features system, and no credit is taken for its operation when analyzing the consequences of any accident. Failure of selective system components could temporarily cause system performance degradation to the extent that preferred airflow patterns could not be maintained.
9.4.4.3.2        Steam Jet Air Ejector Filtration System The system provides charcoal filtration of radioisotopes that may have leaked from the secondary systems into the turbine building.
The steam jet air ejector filtration system is not used to reduce accident doses.
The ductwork conveying unfiltered air upstream of the filtration units is at negative pressure, barring the possibility of outleakage of contaminants.
Filter components receive factory and field test to ensure against bypass and to confirm specified efficiencies.
9.4.4.4          Inspection and Testing Requirements 9.4.4.4.1        Turbine Building Cooling System Fans are tested and rated in accordance with the standards of the AMCA. Water coils are tested and rated in accordance with the standards of the ARI.
The main system pumps and the chilled water pumps are tested and rated in accordance with the standards of the Hydraulic Institute. The centrifugal chiller components are tested in accordance with the ANSI B9.1-1971, the ASME Code for Unified Pressure Vessels, Section VIII, and ARI 550-69.
Each component is inspected prior to installation, and all components of the system are accessible for periodic inspection during plant operation.
Instruments will be calibrated during testing; automatic controls will be tested for actuation at the proper setpoints; and alarm functions will be checked for operability and limits during preoperational testing.
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FNP-FSAR-9 The system will be operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity, and mechanical operability.
9.4.4.4.2      Steam Jet Air Ejector Filtration System The fan is tested and rated in accordance with standards of the AMCA.
The steam jet air ejector filtration system, as well as its components, will be tested prior to startup and periodically during operation. Written test procedures establish minimum acceptance values for all tests. A record of test results will be useful in enabling early detection of faulty performance.
Instruments will be calibrated during testing. Automatic controls will be tested for actuation at the proper setpoints. Alarm functions will be checked for operability and limits during preoperational testing.
The steam jet air ejector filtration system is provided with testing facilities to demonstrate system operability.
Each HEPA filter is tested with DOP smoke. The charcoal filters are tested with freon for bypass.
9.4.4.5        Instrumentation Application 9.4.4.5.1      Turbine Building Cooling Systems During power operation, temperature and pressure indicators verify the proper operation of the cooling system. The air handling unit fans are started manually, while chilled water flows constantly through the coils. Space temperatures are controlled by thermostats which cycle the unit fan motors.
9.4.4.5.2      Steam Jet Air Ejector Filtration System The following instrumentation for the steam jet air ejector filtration system is displayed locally:
A. Position indication of all fan discharge and intake dampers.
B. Differential pressure across each filter.
9.4.5    SERVICE WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE The heating and ventilation system for the service water intake structure consists of three types of subsystems:
A. Pump room heating and ventilation system.
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FNP-FSAR-9 B. Switchgear rooms heating and ventilation systems.
C. Battery rooms/battery charger rooms heating and ventilation systems.
There are a pump room, two switchgear rooms, and two battery rooms/battery charger rooms.
9.4.5.1        Design Bases 9.4.5.1.1      Pump Room Heating and Ventilation System The pump room heating and ventilation system is designed to perform the following functions:
A. Maintain a maximum temperature of 125&deg;F within the pump room.
B. Maintain a minimum temperature of 40&deg;F within the pump room.
C. Exhaust heat and smoke from the pump room in the event of a fire.
9.4.5.1.2      Switchgear Rooms Heating and Ventilation Systems The switchgear rooms heating and ventilation systems are designed to perform the following functions:
A. Maintain a maximum temperature of 105&deg;F within the switchgear rooms.
B. Maintain a minimum temperature of 40&deg;F within the switchgear rooms.
C. Exhaust heat and smoke from the switchgear room in the event of fire.
9.4.5.1.3      Battery Rooms/Battery Charger Rooms Heating and Ventilation System The battery rooms/battery charger rooms heating and ventilation systems are designed to perform the following functions:
A. Maintain a minimum temperature of 40&deg;F in the battery rooms/battery charger rooms.
B. Prevent a buildup of hydrogen gas within the battery rooms/battery charger rooms.
C. Exhaust heat and smoke from the battery rooms/battery charger rooms in event of fire.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.5.2          System Description The heating and ventilation system for the service water intake structure is shown in drawings D-170332 and D-170333 and is designed to meet Class 1 requirements. Note the capacity percentages in this section are based on sizing parameters.
9.4.5.2.1        Pump Room Heating and Ventilation System The pump room heating and ventilation system consists of redundant power roof exhaust ventilators (six 33 percent units) for exhausting heat from the room, redundant roof air intake ventilators with connecting ductwork and motor-operated dampers for supplying air to the exhaust ventilators and for opening and closing the dampers, redundant electric resistance unit heaters (fourteen 15 percent units) for maintaining a minimum temperature within the rooms, controls for automatically activating the standby equipment in the event of failure of primary equipment, redundant controls for activating the ventilating systems in the event of fire within the room, and annunciation equipment for alarming the control room in the event of excessively high or low temperatures within the room.
It should be noted that 100 percent capacity is based on eight of ten service water pumps operating simultaneously.
The sequence of control is:
A.      Upon a rise in temperature, ventilating thermostats activate their respective roof exhaust ventilators and open their respective motor-operated dampers upon reaching setpoint.
B.      Upon a further rise in temperature, secondary ventilating thermostats activate their respective roof exhaust ventilators upon reaching setpoint.
C.      Upon a drop in temperature, ventilating thermostats deactivate their respective exhaust ventilators and close their respective dampers upon reaching setpoint.
Dampers will close only when all ventilating fans are deactivated.
D.      Upon a drop in temperature, each heating thermostat activates its matching heater upon reaching setpoint.
E.      Each heating thermostat will deactivate its matching heater when the room temperature rises above its setpoint.
F.      Upon failure of any primary roof exhaust ventilator, the standby exhaust ventilator fan motors are started upon a room temperature rise above their respective thermostats setpoint.
G.      Either firestat, upon reaching its setpoint, activates all exhaust ventilator fan motors and opens all motor-operated dampers in the room.
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FNP-FSAR-9 H.      Upon reaching setpoint, the high temperature thermostat will activate the high temperature indicator on the local annunciator and the service water intake building alarm in the control room.
I.      Upon reaching setpoint, the low temperature thermostat will activate the low temperature indicator on the local annunciator and the service water intake building alarm in the control room.
Manual overrides are provided to activate or deactivate each exhaust ventilator fan motor and heater as required.
9.4.5.2.2      Switchgear Rooms Heating and Ventilation Systems The switchgear rooms heating and ventilation systems include in each room a power roof exhaust ventilator, a nonpowered roof exhaust ventilator, and a power roof intake ventilator with connecting ductwork and redundant motor-operated dampers. Both the power intake and power exhaust ventilators are sized to individually provide 100 percent of the heat removal requirements and are totally redundant. Other equipment consists of controls for automatically activating and deactivating the power exhaust and intake ventilators and for opening and closing the dampers, redundant electric resistance unit heaters (three 50-percent units each room) for maintaining a minimum temperature within the rooms, controls for automatically activating the standby equipment in the event of failure of primary equipment, redundant controls for starting the ventilation systems in the event of fire within the rooms, and annunciation equipment for alarming the control room in the event of excessively high or low temperatures within the room.
The sequence of control is:
A.      Upon a rise in temperature in each room the ventilating thermostat activates the power roof intake ventilator and opens all dampers in its respective room upon reaching its setpoint.
B.      Upon a drop in temperature in each room, the ventilating thermostat deactivates the intake ventilator and closes all dampers in its respective room upon reaching its setpoint.
C.      Upon a continued drop in temperature in each room, each heating thermostat activates its matching heater upon reaching its setpoint.
D.      Each heating thermostat will deactivate its matching heater when the room temperature rises above its setpoint.
E.      Upon failure of the power intake ventilator, the power exhaust ventilator fan motor is started upon a room temperature rise above its respective thermostats setpoint.
F.      Either firestat and/or carbon dioxide triggering device in each room, upon reaching its setpoint, activates the exhaust and intake ventilator fan motors and opens all motor-operated dampers in its respective room.
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FNP-FSAR-9 G.      Upon reaching setpoint, the high temperature thermostat will activate the high temperature indicator on the local annunciator and the service water intake building alarm in the control room.
H.      Upon reaching setpoint, the low temperature thermostat will activate the low temperature indicator on the local annunciator and the service water intake building alarm in the control room.
Manual overrides are provided to activate or deactivate each ventilator fan motor and heater as required.
9.4.5.2.3      Battery Rooms/Battery Charger Rooms Heating and Ventilation Systems The battery rooms/battery charger rooms heating and ventilation systems consist of redundant power roof exhaust ventilators (two 100-percent units each battery room) for exhausting hydrogen fumes from the rooms, roof air intake ventilators with connecting ductwork and redundant motor-operated dampers (in battery charger rooms) for supplying air to the exhaust ventilators, controls for automatically activating and deactivating the exhaust ventilators and for opening and closing the dampers, redundant electric resistance unit heaters (two 100-percent units each battery charger room) for maintaining a minimum temperature within the rooms, controls for automatically activating and deactivating the heaters, a fire damper (in the divider walls between the battery rooms and battery charger rooms) for sealing the rooms from each other in the event of fire in either room, and redundant controls for activating the ventilation systems and closing the fire dampers in the event of fire within the battery rooms.
The control of the system is as follows:
A.      Both exhaust ventilators are normally in service and each timer activates its matching roof exhaust ventilator for a period of 5 min every hour.
B.      Upon a drop in temperature in each room, each heating thermostat activates its matching heater upon reaching its setpoint.
C.      Each heating thermostat will deactivate its matching heater when the room temperature rises above its setpoint.
D.      Either firestat in each room, upon reaching its setpoint, activates all exhaust ventilator fan motors, opens all motor-operated dampers, and automatically closes the fire damper in its respective room.
Manual overrides are provided to activate and deactivate each exhaust ventilator fan motor and heater as required.
9.4.5.3        Safety Evaluation At worst, a single failure can render inoperable a subsystem of the heating and ventilation system which serves one of the redundant trains of safety-related equipment.
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FNP-FSAR-9 The air intakes and exhausts are mounted on the roof of the service water intake structure well above flood level.
9.4.5.4        Inspection and Testing Requirements All components of the heating and ventilation system of the service water intake structure will be tested prior to placing the system in service.
Because the heating and ventilation system of the service water intake structure is in use during normal plant operation, the availability of active components is evident to the plant operators and there is no need for further online testing. Portions of the system normally not in use are periodically tested to ensure operability of the system.
9.4.6  RIVER WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE The heating and ventilation system for the river water intake structure consists of two types of subsystems:
A.      Pump rooms heating and ventilation systems.
B.      Switchgear rooms heating and ventilation systems.
There are two pump rooms and two switchgear rooms.
9.4.6.1        Design Bases 9.4.6.1.1      Pump Rooms Heating and Ventilation Systems The pump room heating and ventilation systems are designed to perform the following functions:
A.      Maintain a maximum temperature of 125&deg;F within the pump room.
B.      Maintain a minimum temperature of 40&deg;F within the pump room.
C.      Exhaust heat and smoke from the pump room in the event of a fire.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.6.1.2      Switchgear Rooms Heating and Ventilation Systems The switchgear rooms heating and ventilation systems are designed to perform the following functions:
A. Maintain a maximum temperature of 105&deg;F within the switchgear rooms.
B. Maintain a minimum temperature of 40&deg;F within the switchgear rooms.
C. Exhaust heat and smoke from the switchgear rooms in the event of a fire.
9.4.6.2        System Description The heating and ventilation system for the river water intake structure is shown in drawings D-170330 and D-170331. The system was originally designed to meet Seismic Class I requirements, but is no longer required to be designed or maintained as such.
9.4.6.2.1      Pump Rooms Heating and Ventilation System The pump rooms heating and ventilation systems consist of redundant power roof exhaust ventilators (three 50 percent units each room) for exhausting heat from the rooms, redundant roof air intake ventilators with connecting ductwork and motor-operated dampers for supplying air to the exhaust ventilators, controls for automatically activating and deactivating the exhaust ventilators and for opening and closing the dampers, redundant electric resistance unit heaters (six 25 percent units each room) for maintaining a minimum temperature within the rooms, controls for automatically activating and deactivating the heaters, controls for automatically activating the standby equipment in the event of failure of primary equipment, redundant controls for activating the ventilation systems in the event of fire within the rooms, and annunciation equipment for alarming the control room in the event of excessively high or low temperatures within the rooms.
It should be noted that 100 percent capacity is based on all river water pumps operating simultaneously.
The sequence of control is:
A. Upon a rise in temperature in each room, each individual ventilating thermostat activates its respective roof exhaust ventilator upon reaching its individual setpoint. The first ventilator activated opens all motor-operated dampers in its respective room upon reaching its setpoint.
B. Upon a drop in temperature in each room, each individual ventilating thermostat deactivates its respective exhaust ventilator upon reaching its individual setpoint.
The last ventilator deactivated closes all dampers in its respective room upon reaching its setpoint.
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FNP-FSAR-9 C.      Upon a continued drop in temperature in each room, each heating thermostat activates its matching heater upon reaching its setpoint.
D.      Each heating thermostat will deactivate its matching heater when the room temperature rises above its setpoint.
E.      Upon failure of any primary roof exhaust ventilator, the standby exhaust ventilator fan motor is started upon a room temperature rise above its thermostats setpoint.
F.      Either firestat in each room, upon reaching its setpoint, activates all exhaust ventilator fan motors and opens all motor-operated dampers in its respective room.
G.      Upon reaching its setpoint, the high temperature thermostat will activate the high temperature indicator on the local annunciator and the river intake structure alarm in the control room.
H.      Upon reaching its setpoint, the low temperature thermostat will activate the low temperature indicator on the local annunciator and the river intake structure alarm in the control room.
Manual overrides are provided and activate or deactivate the exhaust ventilator fan motors and heaters as required.
9.4.6.2.2      Switchgear Rooms Heating and Ventilation Systems The switchgear rooms heating and ventilation systems consist of redundant power roof exhaust ventilators (two 100 percent units each room) for exhausting heat from the rooms, roof air intake ventilators with connecting ductwork and redundant motor-operated dampers for supplying air to the exhaust ventilators, controls for automatically activating and deactivating the exhaust ventilators and for opening and closing the dampers, redundant electric resistance unit heaters (three 50 percent units each room) for maintaining a minimum temperature within the rooms, controls for automatically activating and deactivating the heaters, controls for activating the standby equipment in the event of failure of primary equipment, redundant controls for starting the ventilation systems in the event of fire within the rooms, and annunciation equipment for local alarm and alarming the control room in the event of excessively high or low temperatures within the rooms.
The sequence of control is:
A.      Upon a rise in temperature in each room, the ventilating thermostat activates the primary roof exhaust ventilator and opens all motor-operated dampers in its respective room upon reaching its setpoint.
B.      Upon a drop in temperature in each room, the ventilating thermostat deactivates the primary exhaust ventilators and closes all dampers in its respective room upon reaching its setpoint 9.4-45                                REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 C.      Upon a continued drop in temperature in each room, each heating thermostat activates its matching heater upon reaching its setpoint.
D.      Each heating thermostat will deactivate its matching heater when the room temperature rises above its setpoint.
E.      Upon failure of any primary exhaust ventilator, the standby exhaust ventilator fan motor is started upon reaching its respective thermostats setpoint.
F.      The first firestat and/or carbon dioxide triggering device in each room, upon reaching its setpoint, activates all exhaust ventilator fan motors and opens all motor-operated dampers in its respective room.
G.      Upon reaching its setpoint, the high temperature thermostat will activate the high temperature indicator on the local annunciator and the river intake structure alarm in the control room.
H.      Upon reaching its setpoint, the low temperature thermostat will activate the low temperature indicator on the local annunciator and the river intake structure alarm in the control room.
Manual overrides are provided to activate and deactivate each exhaust ventilator fan motor and heater as required.
9.4.6.3        Inspection and Testing Requirements All components of the heating and ventilation system at the river water intake structure will be tested prior to placing the system in service.
Because the heating and ventilation system at the river water intake structure is in use during normal plant operation, the availability of active components is evident to the plant operators, and there is no need for further online testing. Portions of the system normally not in use are periodically tested to ensure operability of the system.
9.4.7  DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING The heating and ventilation system for the diesel generator building consists of four types of subsystems:
A.      Generator rooms heating and ventilation systems.
B.      Switchgear rooms heating and ventilation systems.
C.      Oil storage rooms ventilation systems.
D.      Vestibule area heating system.
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FNP-FSAR-9 There are five generator rooms, two switchgear rooms, five oil storage rooms, and one vestibule area.
9.4.7.1        Design Bases 9.4.7.1.1      Generator Rooms Heating and Ventilation Systems The generator rooms heating and ventilation systems are designed to perform the following functions:
A.      Maintain a maximum temperature of 104&deg;F during the generator shutdown cycle and 122&deg;F during the generator operation cycle within the generator rooms.
B.      Maintain a minimum temperature of 40&deg;F within the generator room.
C.      Prevent escape of carbon dioxide from the generator rooms in the event of the activation of the carbon dioxide flooding system in the generator rooms.
9.4.7.1.2      Switchgear Rooms Heating and Ventilation Systems The switchgear rooms heating and ventilation systems are designed to perform the following functions:
A.      Maintain a maximum temperature of 104&deg;F within the switchgear rooms.
B.      Maintain a minimum temperature of 40&deg;F within the switchgear rooms.
C.      Exhaust heat and smoke from the switchgear rooms in the event of a fire.
9.4.7.1.3      Oil Storage Rooms Heating and Ventilation Systems The oil storage rooms heating and ventilation systems are designed to perform the following functions:
A.      Operate continuously under normal conditions.
B.      Prevent escape of carbon dioxide from the oil storage rooms in the event of the activation of the carbon dioxide flooding system in the oil storage rooms.
9.4.7.1.4      Vestibule Area Heating System The vestibule area heating system is designed to maintain a minimum temperature of 40&deg;F within the vestibule area.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.7.2        System Description The heating and ventilation system for the diesel generator building is shown in drawings D-170336; D-177337, sheet 1; D-170338, sheets 1 and 2;and D-170339, and is designed to meet Class 1 requirements.
9.4.7.2.1      Generator Rooms Heating and Ventilation Systems The generator rooms heating and ventilation systems consist of one power roof exhaust ventilator in each room for exhausting heat from the rooms during the generator shutdown cycle, redundant power roof exhaust ventilators (two 100 percent units each room) for exhausting heat from the rooms during the generator operation cycle, one motor-operated wall air intake louver with redundant sections and redundant operators for each section in each room for supplying air to the exhaust ventilators, one rolling fire door in each room for sealing the louver opening in the event of fire within the room, controls for automatically activating and deactivating the exhaust ventilators and for opening and closing the wall louvers, redundant electric resistance unit heaters (three 50 percent units each room) for maintaining a minimum temperature within the rooms, controls for automatically activating and deactivating the heaters, controls for automatically activating the standby equipment in the event of failure of primary equipment, redundant controls for deactivating the ventilating systems in the event of fire within the rooms, and annunciation equipment for alarming the control room in the event of excessively high or low temperatures within the rooms.
The sequence of control is:
A. Upon a rise in temperature in each room, the ventilating thermostat for the small exhaust ventilator activates this ventilator and fully opens the wall louver in its respective room upon reaching its setpoint.
B. Upon a continued rise in temperature in each room, the ventilating thermostat for the primary exhaust ventilator activates the primary exhaust ventilator in its respective room upon reaching its setpoint.
C. Upon a drop in temperature in each room, the ventilating thermostats for the primary exhaust ventilator deactivates the primary exhaust ventilator in its respective room upon reaching its setpoint.
D. Upon a continued drop in temperature in each room, the ventilating thermostat for the small exhaust ventilator deactivates this ventilator and closes the wall louver in its respective room upon reaching its setpoint.
E. Upon an additional temperature drop in each room, each heating thermostat activates its respective heater upon reaching its setpoint.
F. Each heating thermostat will deactivate its respective heater when the room temperature rises above its setpoint.
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FNP-FSAR-9 G.      Upon failure of the primary roof exhaust ventilator, the standby ventilator is activated upon its respective thermostat reaching its setpoint.
H.      Any firestat in each room, upon reaching its setpoint, deactivates all exhaust ventilators, closes the wall louver, and closes the fire door in its respective room.
I.      Prior to manually activating the fire protection system, a manual HVAC pushbutton station adjacent to the carbon dioxide pushbutton station is activated to provide positive shutdown of exhaust fans and intake louvers to preclude carbon dioxide purge.
J.      Upon reaching its setpoint, the high temperature thermostat will activate the high temperature indicator on the local annunciator and the diesel generator building alarm in the control room.
K.      Upon reaching its setpoint, the low temperature thermostat will activate the low temperature indicator on the local annunciator and the diesel generator building alarm in the control room.
Manual override is provided to activate or deactivate each exhaust ventilator fan motor, heater, and louver motor as required.
9.4.7.2.2      Switchgear Rooms Heating and Ventilation Systems The switchgear rooms heating and ventilation systems include in each room a power roof exhaust ventilator, a nonpowered roof exhaust ventilator, and a power roof intake ventilator with connecting ductwork and redundant motor-operated dampers. Both the power intake and power exhaust ventilators are sized to individually provide 100 percent of the heat removal requirements and are totally redundant. Other equipment consists of controls for automatically activating and deactivating the power exhaust and intake ventilators and for opening and closing the dampers, redundant electric resistance unit heaters (three 50-percent units each room) for maintaining a minimum temperature within the rooms, controls for automatically activating and deactivating the heaters, controls for automatically activating the standby equipment in the event of failure of primary equipment, redundant controls for activating the ventilating systems in the event of fire within the rooms, and annunciation equipment for alarming the control room in the event of excessively high or low temperatures in the rooms.
The sequence of control is as follows:
A.      Upon a rise in temperature in each room, a ventilating thermostat activates the roof intake ventilator and opens all motor-operated dampers in its respective room upon reaching its setpoint.
B.      Upon a drop in temperature in each room, the ventilating thermostat deactivates the intake ventilator and closes all dampers in its respective room upon reaching its setpoint.
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FNP-FSAR-9 C.      Upon failure of the roof intake ventilator, the roof exhaust ventilator is activated upon its respective thermostat reaching setpoint.
D.      Upon a continued drop in temperature in each room, each heating thermostat activates its matching heater upon reaching its setpoint.
E.      Each heating thermostat will deactivate its matching heater when the room temperature rises above its setpoint.
F.      Either firestat and/or carbon dioxide triggering device in each room, upon reaching its setpoint, activates the exhaust and intake ventilator fan motors and opens all motor-operated dampers in its respective room.
G.      Upon reaching its setpoint, the high temperature thermostat will activate the high temperature indicator on the local annunciator and the diesel generator building alarm in the control room.
H.      Upon reaching its setpoint, the low temperature thermostat will activate the low temperature indicator on the local annunciator and the diesel generator building alarm in the control room.
Manual override is provided to activate and deactivate each ventilator fan motor, heater, and damper motor as required.
9.4.7.2.3        Oil Storage Rooms Heating and Ventilation Systems The oil storage rooms ventilation systems consist of redundant power roof exhaust ventilators (two 100 percent units each room) for exhausting fumes from the rooms, one motor-operated wall air intake louver in each room for supplying air to the exhaust ventilators, one fire damper in each room for sealing the louver opening and one fire damper in each room sealing the roof exhaust opening in the event of fire within the room, controls for automatically activating the standby equipment in the event of failure of primary equipment, and controls for deactivating the ventilating systems, closing the wall louver, and closing the fire damper in the event of fire within the rooms.
The sequence of control is:
A.      The primary and standby exhaust ventilator in each room operates continuously under normal operating conditions.
B.      The wall louver in each room is fully open under normal operating conditions.
C.      Upon failure of the primary roof exhaust ventilator, its matching standby exhaust ventilator fan motor in each room is already activated, providing 100 percent ventilation capacity.
D.      Ventilation systems operating status is checked periodically according to a predetermined schedule to ensure operational capability.
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FNP-FSAR-9 E. The firestat in each room, upon reaching its setpoint, deactivates all exhaust ventilator fan motors and closes the wall louver and fire dampers in its respective room.
F. Manual actuation of the CO2 system will result in automatic shutdown of the HVAC exhaust fans and intake louvers to preclude carbon dioxide purge.
Manual override is provided to activate and deactivate each exhaust ventilator fan motor and louver motor as required.
9.4.7.2.4      Vestibule Area Heating System The vestibule area heating system consists of one electric resistance unit heater for maintaining a minimum temperature within the area and controls for automatically activating and deactivating the heater.
The sequence of control is:
A. Upon a drop in temperature in the area, the heating thermostat activates the heater upon reaching its setpoint.
B. The heating thermostat will deactivate the heater when the area temperature rises above its setpoint.
Manual override is provided to activate and deactivate the heater as required.
9.4.7.3        Safety Evaluation At worst, a single failure can render inoperable a subsystem of the heating and ventilation system which serves one of the redundant trains of safety-related equipment.
Analyses have been performed to determine the concentrations of several types of gases.
Twenty-eight cases have been analyzed, with the results presented in table 9.4-12.
9.4.7.3.1      Cases 1, 2, 5, and 6 A two stage diffusion model is used. The model includes a first-stage Gaussian plume and a second-stage wake plume.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.4.7.3.1.1    First-Stage Gaussian Plume. The diffusion equation for a continuous ground level release is given below:
2                  2 y
X=
Qc exp - 1/2        exp - 1/2  z y z u              y z
Where:
X      =      The short term concentration (g/m3).
Qc      =      Amount of chlorine as continuous release (g/s).
u      =      Wind speed (m/s).
y      =      The horizontal standard deviation of the plume (m).
z      =      The vertical standard deviation of the plume (m).
The diffusion equation for an instantaneous (puff) ground level release with a finite initial volume is given below:
Q1 X=
2              2 7.87( x,y  + I 2) ( z + I 2) 1/2 2                  2                  2 y
exp - 1/2      x      +                    +        z 2
                              + I    2    y      2 +  2  2 +  2 x                            I        z      I Where:
X              =      Concentration at coordinates x, y, z from the center of the puff (g/m3).
QI              =      The puff release quantity (g).
x y z        =      Standard deviations of the gas concentration in the horizontal alongwind, horizontal crosswind direction, respectively, (assuming x = y) (m).
7.87            =      21/2 3/2 1              =      Initial standard deviation of the puff (m).
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FNP-FSAR-9 Q1
                              =                , where X is the density of chlorine at standard 7.87x o conditions (g/m3).
9.4.7.3.1.2    Second-Stage Wake Plume. The diffusion equation is given below:
QK X=
Au Where:
X      =      Concentration (g/m3).
K      =      Shape factor (K = 2 is used).
A      =      Projected area of the structure (m2).
U      =      Wind speed (m/s).
Q      =      Total amount of chlorine release at the interstage line (g/s).
                      =      Qc + QI 9.4.7.3.2      Cases 3, 4, 7, and 8 The Bureau of Census, 1972, estimated 220,000 service stations in the U. S. The American Petroleum Institute estimated two to five underground storage tanks per station (assume an average of three). The National Fire Protection Association has no record of an active underground gasoline storage tank burning or exploding. The upper bound probability of this event is estimated at much less than 1/(220,000 x 3) or much less than 1.5 x 10-6.
A more reasonable fire would be from a large tank truck during filling operations. Assume a truck containing 8000 gal of fuel with the spill and fire restricted to the area above the underground emergency fuel storage area, about 7500 ft2. Using this hypothetical fire, a plume rise was calculated by:
h      =      1.6 F1/3 u-1 x2/3 Where:
h      =      Plume rise (m).
u      =      Wind speed (m/s-1).
X      =      Distance between fire and intake (m).
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FNP-FSAR-9 F        =      Buoyancy flux parameter (m4/s-3).
                        =      3.7 x 10-5 QH, where 3.7 x 10-5 has units m4/s, cal-1/s.
QH      =      Heat production rate (cal/s-1).
9.4.7.3.3      Cases 9 through 28 All deal with actuation of a carbon dioxide fire protection system within an inside room equipped with redundant trains of safety-related equipment. The following steps are taken:
A.      Calculate the pressure buildup within the room and the venting rate of carbon dioxide from the room. The calculation is based on a modification of Bechtel computer program PRESS,(4) a mass and energy balance taking into account the liquid, solid, and gaseous carbon dioxide phases and the venting area. The output provides the amount of carbon dioxide escaping from the room under consideration. It is assumed that all of the carbon dioxide released is evaporated to constitute the source.
B.      Estimate reasonable dilutions following the escaped carbon dioxide along a path it must follow until it reaches the most critical diesel air intake. The buildup of the concentration of carbon dioxide inside the parapet walls (see figure 9.4-2) is limited by the intake rate of the diesel generator air intakes. The assumptions below are reasonably conservative.
: 1.      Carbon dioxide leaking from fire doors, louvers, etc. , will have an equal opportunity to go either way in the corridor. Assume one-half goes each direction and is diluted into the volume of the corridor.
: 2.      Wind speed is 10 mph. At 10 mph, about one-third of the carbon dioxide will aerodynamically get over the parapet wall and be diluted in the volume of the space inside the parapet. The other two-thirds will split on the wall and go the other two ways. At the density of a cold mixture of carbon dioxide and air, this is conservative.
: 3.      A buildup of carbon dioxide inside the parapet wall is allowed to continue as long as the source is continued, but it is limited by the intake rate of the diesel generator air intakes.
: 4.      Wind direction is always from the point where it escapes to the outside directly toward the air intake that would produce the worst case.
9.4.7.3.4      Chlorine Accident The peak chlorine concentration of the diesel generator air intake is 82,000 ppm at 136 s after the incident. The plot of the concentration is shown in figure 9.4-3.
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FNP-FSAR-9 According to the information supplied by the diesel generator manufacturer, the effect of chlorine on the diesel general performance will not be observed until the chlorine concentration reaches about 15 percent by volume or 150,000 ppm. Since the peak is well below this value, no effect on diesel generator performance is expected.
Also, based on the information supplied by the manufacturer, effects of 86,000 ppm chlorine on engine lube oil, seals, or other organic materials are negligible, due to the short time period of this concentration at the diesel generator intake locations.
9.4.7.3.5      Combustion Products Due to a Fire Because the plume rise at the intake is much greater than the diesel generator intake height, the combustion products due to a fire will have no effect on diesel generator performance.
9.4.7.3.6      Combustion Products Due to Diesel Exhaust The result of recirculation from the diesel exhaust to the intake of diesel generators is given in case 7 in table 9.4-12. (See table 9.4-13 for assumptions. ) The worst case is the small diesel generator where the total concentration of combustion products is 4939 mg/m3 or about 26,000 ppm. Effects of such gaseous contaminants are discussed specifically for carbon dioxide in paragraph 9.4.7.3.7 below; there will be no effect on diesel generator performance.
9.4.7.3.7      Carbon Dioxide from the Fire Protection System According to data supplied by the diesel manufacturer, the combined effect of carbon dioxide on the diesels from both oxygen starvation due to displacement of air from carbon dioxide acting as a combustion depressant is provided in the following table:
Concentration of                                              Maximum Output Carbon Dioxide                                                  of Diesel (percent volume)                                                  (percent) 15                                                        100 20                                                        90 25                                                        80 The maximum carbon dioxide concentration is conservatively calculated to be 22,167 ppm as given in table 9.4-14 for case 16. Since this is well below the 150,000 ppm level, no effect on the performance of the diesel generators is expected.
Carbon dioxide is utilized in three types of areas within the diesel generator building:
A.      Oil storage rooms (total flooding).
B.      Diesel generator rooms (total flooding).
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FNP-FSAR-9 C.      Switchgear rooms (local application).
The location of roof ventilators from these rooms with respect to the diesel air intakes is shown in figure 9.4-2.
9.4.7.4          Testing and Inspection Requirements All components of the heating and ventilation system at the diesel generator building will be tested prior to placing the system in service and periodically thereafter.
Because the heating and ventilation system at the diesel generator building is in use during normal plant operation, the availability of active components is evident to operators, and there is no need for further online testing. Portions of the system not normally in use are periodically tested to ensure operability of the system.
9.4-56                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 REFERENCES
: 1. Turner, D. B., Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates, EPA Publication AP-26, 1970.
: 2. Halitsky, J., Golder, J., Halpen P., and Wu, P., Wind Tunnel Tests of Gas Diffusion from a Leak in the Shell of a Nuclear Power Reactor and from a Nearby Stack, New York University, Department of Meteorology and Oceanography, GSL Report 63-2, 1963.
: 3. Slade, D.H., Meteorology and Atomic Energy. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission DTI, 1968.
: 4. Bechtel Computer Program PRESS (modified for this safety evaluation), 1974. A mass and energy balance model, taking into account the solid, liquid, and gaseous carbon dioxide phases and the venting area. Output gives the amount of carbon dioxide escaping from the room under consideration.
: 5. NRC letter (SNC LC #14794) Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Re:
Addition of Engineered Safety Features Room Cooler Technical Specification, June 27, 2008.
9.4-57                            REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 BIBLIOGRAPHY Briggs, G. A., Plume Rise, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1969.
Halitsky, J., Estimate of Xu/Q at the Control Room Intake for a Chlorine Gas Leak at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant of the Alabama Power Company, 1974.
Hilliard, R. K., et al., Removal of Iodine and Particles from Containment Atmosphere by Sprays, BNWK-1244, February 1970.
Knudsen, J. G. and Hilliard, R. K., F. P. Transport by Natural Processes in Containment Vessel, BNWL-943, January 1969.
Marviken Full Scale Experiments, Containment Response to a LOCA Blowdown 7 - Results, MXA-1-207, Joint Reactor Safety Experiments in the Marviken Power Station, Sweden, January 1974.
Slade, D. H., ed, Meteorology and Atomic Energy, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1968.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.78, Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release, 1974.
WASH-1400 (draft), Appendix III, page 37, August 1974.
9.4-58                            REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-1 (SHEET 1 OF 4)
CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING AND FILTRATION SYSTEM - COMPONENT DESCRIPTION Air Conditioning Units Fans Type                                                Centrifugal Quantity (100 percent capacity)                    2 Capacity (ft3/min each)                            21,000 Total static pressure (in. WG)                      3.5 Drive                                              Belt Motor (hp)                                          20 Condensing unit Condenser Type                                            Air-cooled Quantity per train                              2 (100% capacity)
Total cooling (Btu/h each)                      600,000 Compressor Type                                            Refrigerant, scroll Quantity per condensing unit                    4 (100 percent capacity)
Drive                                            Direct Exhaust Fans Type                                                  Vane axial Quantity (100 percent capacity)                        2 Capacity (ft3/min each)                                7200 Total static pressure (in. WG)                        2.5 Drive                                                  Direct Motor (hp)                                            7.5 REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-1 (SHEET 2 OF 4)
Control Room Filtration Units (1000 ft3/min)
Fans Type                                                  Centrifugal Quantity (100 percent capacity)                      2 Capacity (ft3/min each)                              1000 Total static pressure (in. WG)                        4.8 Drive                                                Direct Motor (hp)                                            1.5 HEPA filters Type                                                  High efficiency, dry Media                                                Glass fiber (water-proof, fire retardant)
Design Efficiency, removal of 0.3    m DOP            99.97 smoke (percent)
Efficiency, 0.3 m DOP smoke                          99.5 removal credit allowed by the NRC (percent)
Pressure drop, clean (in. WG)                        1.0 Charcoal filters Type                                                  2-in. tray Media                                                Activated, impreg-nated carbon Design Efficiency, elemental iodine                  99.9 (percent)
Testing Efficiency, methyl iodide                    97.5 (percent)
Efficiency, elemental and organic                    94.5 iodine removal credit allowed by the NRC (percent)
Pressure drop, clean (in. WG)                        1.1 REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-1 (SHEET 3 OF 4)
Control Room Recirculation Filtration Units (2000 ft3/min)
Fans Type                                                  Vane axial Quantity (100 percent capacity)                      2 Capacity (ft3/min each)                              2000 Total static pressure (in. WG)                        8 Drive                                                Direct Motor (hp)                                            7.5 HEPA filters Type                                                  High efficiency, dry Media                                                Glass fiber (water-proof, fire retardant)
Design efficiency, removal of 0.3 m DOP              99.97 smoke (percent)
Efficiency, 0.3 mm DOP smoke removal                  99.5 credit allowed by the NRC (percent)
Pressure drop, clean (in. WG)                        1.0 Charcoal filters Type                                                  2-in. HECATM Media                                                Activated, impreg-nated carbon Design efficiency, elemental iodine                  99.9 (percent)
Testing efficiency, methyl iodide                    97.5 (percent)
Efficiency, elemental and organic                    94.5 iodine removal credit allowed by the NRC (percent)
Pressure drop, clean (in. WG)                        1.25 REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-1 (SHEET 4 OF 4)
Control Room Filtration Units (Air Pressurization System)
Fans Type                                                  Centrifugal Quantity (100 percent capacity)                      2 Capacity (ft3/min each)                              300 Total static pressure (in. WG)                        9 Drive                                                Direct Motor (hp)                                            1.5 HEPA filters Type                                                  High efficency, dry Media                                                Glass fiber (water-proof, fire retardant)
Design efficiency, removal of 0.3 m DOP              99.97 smoke (percent)
Efficiency, 0.3 m DOP smoke removal                  99.5 credit allowed by the NRC (percent)
Pressure drop, clean (in. WG)                        1.0 Charcoal filters Type                                                  6-in. deep bed, HECATM Media                                                Activated, impreg-nated carbon Design efficiency, elemental iodine                  99.9 (percent)
Testing efficiency, methyl iodide                    99.5 (percent)
Efficiency, elemental and organic                    98.5 iodine removal credit allowed by the NRC (percent)
Pressure drop, clean (in. WG)                        2.7 Electric heater Type                                                  Finned tube Capacity (kW)                                        2.5 REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 1 OF 9)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 0 APPLICABILITY FOR THE CONTROL ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM (PRESSURIZATION)
Reg.        Applicability                  Reg.      Applicability Guide          to This          Note      Guide        to This            Note Section        System          Index    Section      System            Index C.1.a              Yes              1      C.3.h          Yes                9 C.1.b              Yes              -      C.3.i          Yes                -
C.1.c              Yes              -      C.3.j          No                10 C.1.d              Yes              -      C.3.k          Yes                -
C.1.e              Yes              -      C.3.l          Yes              11 C.2.a              No              2      C.3.m          Yes              12 C.2.b              No              3      C.3.n          Yes                -
C.2.c              Yes              -      C.4.a          Yes                -
C.2.d              Yes              -      C.4.b          Yes                -
C.2.e              Yes              -      C.4.c          Yes              13 C.2.f              Yes              -      C.4.d          Yes                -
C.2.g              Yes              4      C.4.e          Yes                -
C.2.h              No              5      C.4.f          Yes                -
C.2.i              Yes              -      C.4.g          Yes                -
C.2.j              No              6      C.4.h          Yes              14 C.2.k              Yes              -      C.4.i          Yes                -
C.2.l              Yes              -      C.4.j          Yes                -
C.2.m              Yes              -      C.4.k          Yes                -
C.3.a              No              7      C.4.l          Yes                -
C.3.b              Yes              -      C.4.m          Yes                -
C.3.c              Yes              -      C.5.a          Yes                -
C.3.d              Yes              -      C.5.b          Yes              15 C.3.e              Yes              8      C.5.c          Yes              15 C.3.f              Yes              -      C.6.a          Yes                -
C.3.g              Yes              -      C.6.b          Yes                -
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 2 OF 9)
NOTES
: 1. The design basis accident is the postulated LOCA.
: 2. No demister is provided because the unit is located outside the containment and no entrained water droplets are anticipated. No HEPA filters are provided downstream of the charcoals, since radioactive fines carryover is very unlikely. This is true because the charcoal trays are pressure tested at high velocity in the manufacturer's shop prior to delivery, thereby removing fines. Also, during system operation, air is passing through the charcoal at a very low velocity.
: 3. No physical separation is provided, since these units are located in a room where no missiles are postulated.
: 4. Pressure drops across the prefilters, HEPA, and charcoal filters are instrumented to indicate in the equipment room. Pressure drops across the HEPA and charcoal filters are instrumented to alarm in the control room. No recording of these signals is provided.
Fan loss of flow is also instrumented to signal in the equipment room and alarm in the control room.
: 5. Fan motors and motor-operated valves installed outside containment and in a nonradioactive area are not in conformance with IEEE 323.
: 6. The size of the engineered safety feature filtration units precludes replacement as a single unit. The unit components are replaced individually.
: 7. Demisters are not provided.
: 8. Mounting frames for filter and charcoals are constructed of carbon steel coated with an inorganic nuclear grade paint.
: 9. Internal welds are carbon steel coated with an inorganic nuclear grade paint.
: 10. The deluge and drain system has been eliminated due to recurring problems experienced at other facilities associated with inadvertent wetting of the absorber.
Temperature gauges have been installed to monitor any heat rise in the filter housing.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 3 OF 9)
: 11. Environmental conditions for systems considered are those specified under outside containment and nonradioactive area.
: 12. Duct construction guidelines follow SMACNA, in addition to ORNL-NSIC-65.
: 13. Vacuum breakers are not used. This prevents the probability of system leakage from pressure relieving device leakage or failure.
: 14. Test probes are not manifolded and are located in readily accessible locations with minimum piping.
: 15. Periodic testing to confirm a penetration of less than 0.5% at rated flow.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 4 OF 9)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 0 APPLICABILITY FOR THE CONTROL ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM (RECIRCULATION)
Reg.      Applicability                  Reg.      Applicability Guide        to This          Note      Guide        to This            Note Section        System          Index    Section      System            Index C.1.a              Yes              1      C.3.h          Yes                9 C.1.b              Yes              -      C.3.i          Yes                -
C.1.c              Yes              -      C.3.j          No                10 C.1.d              Yes              -      C.3.k          Yes                -
C.1.e              Yes              -      C.3.l          Yes              11 C.2.a              No              2      C.3.m          Yes              12 C.2.b              No              3      C.3.n          Yes                -
C.2.c              Yes              -      C.4.a          Yes                -
C.2.d              Yes              -      C.4.b          Yes                -
C.2.e              Yes              -      C.4.c          Yes              13 C.2.f              Yes              -      C.4.d          Yes                -
C.2.g              Yes              4      C.4.e          Yes                -
C.2.h              No              5      C.4.f          Yes                -
C.2.i              Yes              -      C.4.g          Yes                -
C.2.j              No              6      C.4.h          Yes              14 C.2.k              Yes              -      C.4.i          Yes                -
C.2.l              Yes              -      C.4.j          Yes                -
C.2.m              Yes              -      C.4.k          Yes                -
C.3.a              No              7      C.4.l          Yes                -
C.3.b              No                -      C.4.m          Yes                -
C.3.c              Yes              -      C.5.a          Yes                -
C.3.d              Yes              -      C.5.b          Yes              15 C.3.e              Yes              8      C.5.c          Yes              15 C.3.f              Yes              -      C.6.a          Yes                -
C.3.g              Yes              -      C.6.b          Yes                -
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 5 OF 9)
NOTES
: 1. The design basis accident is the postulated LOCA.
: 2. No demister is provided because the unit is located outside the containment and no entrained water droplets are anticipated. No HEPA filters are provided downstream of the charcoals, since radioactive fines carryover is very unlikely. This is true because the charcoal trays are pressure tested at high velocity in the manufacturer's shop prior to delivery, thereby removing fines. Also, during system operation, air is passing through the charcoal at a very low velocity.
: 3. No physical separation is provided, since these units are located in a room where no missiles are postulated.
: 4. Pressure drops across the prefilters, HEPA, and charcoal filters are instrumented to indicate in the equipment room. Pressure drops across the HEPA and charcoal filters are instrumented to alarm in the control room. No recording of these signals is provided.
Fan loss of flow is also instrumented to signal in the equipment room and alarm in the control room.
: 5. Fan motors and motor-operated valves installed outside containment and in a nonradioactive area are not in conformance with IEEE 323.
: 6. The size of the engineered safety feature filtration units precludes replacement as a single unit. The unit components are replaced individually.
: 7. Demisters are not provided.
: 8. Mounting frames for filter and charcoals are constructed of carbon steel coated with an inorganic nuclear grade paint.
: 9. Internal welds are carbon steel coated with an inorganic nuclear grade paint.
: 10. The deluge and drain system has been eliminated due to recurring problems experienced at other facilities associated with inadvertent wetting of the absorber.
Temperature gauges have been installed to monitor any heat rise in the filter housing.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 6 OF 9)
: 11. Environmental conditions for systems considered are those specified under outside containment and nonradioactive area.
: 12. Duct construction guidelines follow SMACNA, in addition to ORNL-NSIC-65.
: 13. Vacuum breakers are not used. This prevents the probability of system leakage from pressure relieving device leakage or failure.
: 14. Test probes are not manifolded and are located in readily accessible locations with minimum piping.
: 15. Periodic testing to confirm a penetration of less than 0.5% at rated flow.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 7 OF 9)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 0 APPLICABILITY FOR THE CONTROL ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM (FILTRATION)
Reg.      Applicability                Reg.        Applicability Guide        to This          Note    Guide        to This            Note Section        System          Index    Section      System            Index C.1.a              Yes              1      C.3.h          Yes                9 C.1.b              Yes              -      C.3.i          Yes                -
C.1.c              Yes              -      C.3.j          No                10 C.1.d              Yes              -      C.3.k          Yes                -
C.1.e              Yes              -      C.3.l          Yes              11 C.2.a              No              2      C.3.m          Yes              12 C.2.b              No              3      C.3.n          Yes                -
C.2.c              Yes              -      C.4.a          Yes                -
C.2.d              Yes              -      C.4.b          Yes                -
C.2.e              Yes              -      C.4.c          Yes              13 C.2.f              Yes              -      C.4.d          Yes                -
C.2.g              Yes              4      C.4.e          Yes                -
C.2.h              No              5      C.4.f          Yes                -
C.2.i              Yes              -      C.4.g          Yes                -
C.2.j              No              6      C.4.h          Yes              14 C.2.k              Yes              -      C.4.i          Yes                -
C.2.l              Yes              -      C.4.j          Yes                -
C.2.m              Yes              -      C.4.k          Yes                -
C.3.a              No              7      C.4.l          Yes                -
C.3.b              No                -      C.4.m          Yes                -
C.3.c              Yes              -      C.5.a          Yes                -
C.3.d              Yes              -      C.5.b          Yes              15 C.3.e              Yes              8      C.5.c          Yes              15 C.3.f              Yes              -      C.6.a          Yes                -
C.3.g              Yes              -      C.6.b          Yes                -
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 8 OF 9)
NOTES
: 1. The design basis accident is the postulated LOCA.
: 2. No demister is provided because the unit is located outside the containment and no entrained water droplets are anticipated. No HEPA filters are provided downstream of the charcoals, since radioactive fines carryover is very unlikely. This is true because the charcoal trays are pressure tested at high velocity in the manufacturer's shop prior to delivery, thereby removing fines. Also, during system operation, air is passing through the charcoal at a very low velocity.
: 3. No physical separation is provided, since these units are located in a room where no missiles are postulated.
: 4. Pressure drops across the prefilters, HEPA, and charcoal filters are instrumented to indicate in the equipment room. Pressure drops across the HEPA and charcoal filters are instrumented to alarm in the control room. No recording of these signals is provided.
Fan loss of flow is also instrumented to signal in the equipment room and alarm in the control room.
: 5. Fan motors and motor-operated valves installed outside containment and in a nonradioactive area are not in conformance with IEEE 323.
: 6. The size of the engineered safety feature filtration units precludes replacement as a single unit. The unit components are replaced individually.
: 7. Demisters are not provided.
: 8. Mounting frames for filter and charcoals are constructed of carbon steel coated with an inorganic nuclear grade paint.
: 9. Internal welds are carbon steel coated with an inorganic nuclear grade paint.
: 10. The deluge and drain system has been eliminated due to recurring problems experienced at other facilities associated with inadvertent wetting of the absorber.
Temperature gauges have been installed to monitor any heat rise in the filter housing.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 9 OF 9)
: 11. Environmental conditions for systems considered are those specified under outside containment and nonradioactive area.
: 12. Duct construction guidelines follow SMACNA, in addition to ORNL-NSIC-65.
: 13. Access doors are not used.
: 14. Test probes are not manifolded and are located in readily accessible locations with minimum piping.
: 15. Periodic testing to confirm a penetration of less than 0.5% at rated flow.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-3 CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING AND FILTRATION SYSTEM - SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS Component                  Malfunction          Comments and Consequences Air handling          Component failure            Two units provided; unit                                                operation of one required Condensing unit        Component failure            Four units provided; operation of one required Filter train          Failure resulting in        Two filter trains pro-high differential            vided; operation of pressure across the          one required train Isolation valve,      Fails to close after        Two valves in series; fresh air supply      high radiation signal,      operation of one required and utility            safety injection            for isolation exhaust                signal, containment isolation signal, or smoke detection signal Duct system            Failure resulting in        Two full capacity loss of air recircu-        systems provided; lation                      operation of one required Outside air            Fails to open                Two provided; operation supply valve                                        of one required Isolation valve,            N/A                    Single isolation valves smoke purge                                        are maintained in closed exhaust                                            position during normal operation to provide control room isolation boundary (passive component)
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-4 TIME CALCULATIONS FOR VARIOUS CHLORINE CONCENTRATIONS Time Required to Reach                      Maximum the Following Cl2 Concentration (s)            Concentration (ppm by Case  15 ppm    30 ppm      45 ppm      60 ppm  Maximum        volume)
A  264.5      268.25      271        273.61    9392  368.8 B  134.0      137.0      139.5      143      9254  184.4 C  274        286        2736        6451      9433  70.3 D  455        7377            --          --    9318  33.5 REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-5 (SHEETS 1 THROUGH 3)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52 APPLICABILITY FOR THE SPENT FUEL POOL FILTRATION SYSTEM (This Table has been deleted.)
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-6 (SHEET 1 OF 9)
AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION, AIR CONDITIONING, AND FILTRATION SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS 600-V Load Center 600-V Load Center Item            Non-Radwaste Area Computer Room      Access Control Area Cable Spreading Area    1M and 1N            Room Air Handling Unit (Supply)
(Access Control Area)
Type                          None            None              Horizontal,            None                None              None draw through, floor mounted Number                                                                  1 Flowrate each, sf3/min                                                4250 Static Head, in. WG                                                  3.29 Heating capacity, Btu/h                                                NA Cooling capacity, Btu/h                                            2.68 x 105 Mtr horsepower, each                                                    5 Air Handling Unit (Supply)
(Dosimetry Lab)
Type                        Horizontal,        None              Horizontal,            None                None              None draw through,                        draw through, floor mounted                        floor mounted Number                          1                                      1 Flowrate each, sf3/min        24,000                                  1450 Static head, in. WG            2. 5                                  2.34 Heating capacity, Btu/h      2.6 x 105                            0.34 x 105 Cooling capacity, Btu/h        NA                                0.52 x 105 Mtr horsepower, each            20                                    1.5 Air Conditioning Unit (Supply)
Type                          None          Horizontal,            None            Horizontal,        Horizontal,      Horizontal, draw through                            draw through,      draw through,    draw through, floor mounted                            floor mounted      floor mounted    ceiling mounted Number                                            1                                        1                  11 Flowrate, sf3/min                                5550                                    2010                5620            16,000 Static head, in. WG                              5.7                                    1.74                1.85            3.95 Heating capacity, Btu/h                      1.22 x 105                                  NA                  NA              NA Cooling capacity, Btu/h                      1.60 x 105                              0.54 x 105          1.79 x 105      6.17 x 105 Mtr horsepower, each                              10                                      1.0                  5              25 REV 24 10/12
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-6 (SHEET 2 OF 9) 600-V Load Center    600-V Load Center Item            Non-Radwaste Area  Computer Room          Access Control Area Cable Spreading Area      1M and 1N                Room Air Conditioning Condensing Unit (Access Control Area)
Type                          None                  None          Split, roof mounted          None                None                  None air cooled Number                                                                        1 Cooling capacity, Btu/h                                                  2.79 x 105 Refrigerant type                                                            R-22 Fan motor, hp                                                      Three at 1 hp each Compressor motor                                                            30 power, hp Air Conditioning Condensing                                                                                                                    (Unit 1)
Unit Type                          None        Split, roof mounted    Split, roof mounted  Split, roof mounted Split, roof mounted  Split, roof mounted air cooled              air cooled          air cooled          air cooled            air cooled Number                                                1                      11                                      1                    1 Cooling Capacity, Btu/h                          2.4 x 105              0.52 x 105            1.21 x 105        3.29 x 105            5.83 x 105 Refrigerant type                                    R-22                    R-22                R-22                R-22                  R-22 Fan motor, hp                                        1                      1/2                  1/2                7 1/2                  4 Compressor motor                                  25 kW                  7. 5 hp              15 hp              30 hp                  45 hp power, kW input or hp Air Handling Unit                                  (Recirculation)
(Recirculation)
Type                          None        Vertical, draw through,          None                None                None          Horizontal, draw floor mounted                                                                    through, floor mounted Number                                                2                                                                                      1 Flowrate each, sf3/min                              7500                                                                                  1300 Static head, in. WG                                6.31                                                                                    4 Cooling capacity, Btu/h                          1.93 x 105                                                                            4.98 x 105 Motor horsepower,                                    15                                                                                    15 each REV 24 10/12
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-6 (SHEET 3 OF 9) 600-V Load Center 600-V Load Center Item            Non-Radwaste Area  Computer Room        Access Control Area  Cable Spreading Area    1M and 1N              Room Air Conditioning Condensing                                                                                                                (Unit 2)
Unit Type                          None        Split, roof mounted,        None                None                None        Split, roof mounted, air cooled                                                                        air cooled Number                                              2                                                                                1 Cooling capacity, Btu/h                        2.37 x 105                                                                          5 x 105 Refrigerant type                                  R-22                                                                              R-22 Fan motor, hp                                        1                                                                                4 Compressor motor                                    20                                                                                40 power, hp Filtration Unit Type                          None                None                None                None                None                None Number Prefilter media Prefilter efficiency, %
HEPA media HEPA efficiency, %
Charcoal media Charcoal efficiency, %
Pressure drop, in. WG Exhaust Fan Type                        Centrifugal            None                None              Centrifugal          None                None Number                          1                                                            1 Flowrate each, sf 3/min      20,000                                                        4200 Static head, in. WG            1.7                                                          0.75 Motor horsepower,              15                                                            2 each Roof Exhaust Fan Type                          None                None          Power roof, exhaust        None                None                None Number                                                                    1 Flowrate each, sf 3/min                                                4530 Static head, in. WG                                                      1.2 Motor horsepower,                                                        2 each REV 24 10/12
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-6 (SHEET 4 OF 9) 600-V Load Center 600-V Load Center Item            Non-Radwaste Area Computer Room  Access Control Area Cable Spreading Area    1M and 1N            Room Return Fan Type                          None          Vaneaxial          None                None                None              None Number                                          1 Flowrate each, sf 3/min                      3600 Static head, in. WG                            1.5 Motor horsepower,                              2 each REV 24 10/12
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-6 (SHEET 5 OF 9)
Charging High Fuel Handling  Battery Room  Battery Charger    Head Pump      RHR Pump    Ctmt. Spray Compo. Cooling  Aux Feedwater Item                  Area        Exhaust          Room              Room          Room      Pump Room    Pump Room      Pump Room Air Handling Unit (Supply)                      None Type                    Horizontal                    Horizontal,      Horizontal,    Horizontal,  Horizontal,  Horizontal,    Horizontal, draw through,                  axial ceiling    axial ceiling  axial ceiling axial ceiling axial ceiling  axial ceiling floor mounted                  mounted          mounted        mounted      mounted      mounted        mounted Number                  1                              3                32                          2            2              2 Flow rate each, scfm    16,000                        16,000            30,260        9,440        12,600        23,000          17,150 Static head, in. w.g. 2.75                          1.7              3.2            1.4          1.5          1.55            1.47 Heating capacity, Btu/hr 8.65 x 105                    None              None          None          None          None            None Cooling capacity, Btu/hr NA                            48,000            202,000        63,000        83,800        156,300        108,120 (Swing) 58,100 (Non-Swing)
Motor horsepower, each  15                            5                25            5            5            15              7-1/2 Air Conditioning Unit (Supply)  None            None          None              None          None          None          None            None Type Number Flow rate, scfm Static head, in w.g.
Cooling capacity, Btu/hr Motor horsepower, each Air Conditioning Condensing    None            None          None              None          None          None          None            None Unit Type Number Cooling capacity Btu/hr Refrigerant type Fan motor horsepower Compressor mtr power, hp Filtration Unit                                None          None              None          None          None          None            None Type                    Composite Prefilter-HEPA-charcoal Number                  1 REV 24 10/12
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-6 (SHEET 6 OF 9)
Charging High Fuel Handling    Battery Room  Battery Charger  Head Pump      RHR Pump  Ctmt. Spray Compo. Cooling  Aux Feedwater Item                Area          Exhaust          Room          Room          Room    Pump Room    Pump Room      Pump Room Prefilter media        Dry, replaceable cartridge Prefilter efficiency, % 85, NBS Dust Spot HEPA media              Dry extended HEPA efficiency, %      99.97, DOP @
0.3 Charcoal media          Coconut, active, impregnated Charcoal efficiency, %  99.9 I2, 95.0 CH3 I Pressure drop, in. w.g. 3.0 Exhaust Fan                                    N              one            None          None      None          None            None Type                    Centrifugal      Centrifugal Number                  2                2 Flow rate each, scfm    13,100          350 Static head, in. w.g. 6.64            0.375 Motor horsepower, each  30 HP Roof Exhaust Fan            None            None            None            None          None      None          None            None Type Number Flow rate each, scfm Static head, in. w.g.
Motor horsepower, each Return Fan                  None            None            None            None          None      None          None            None Type Number Flow rate each, scfm Static head, in. w.g.
Motor horsepower, each REV 24 10/12
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-6 (SHEET 7 OF 9)
Unit 2 Lub. Oil Storage Item                  MCC 1A        MCC 1B (MCC 2B)        600 V Load Center ID 600 V Load Center 1E 600 V Load Center 2M          Area Air Handling Unit (Supply)
Type                              Vertical,          Vertical,                Vertical,            Vertical,              None            Centrifugal axial floor mounted axial floor mounted      axial floor mounted  axial floor mounted Number                                1          2              (1)              1                    1                                        1 Flow rate each, scfm                4,000      3,000        (4000)            11,500              11,500                                      945 Static head, in. w.g.                1.5        1.0            (1.5)            2.5                  2.5                                      0.625 Heating capacity, Btu/hr            NA          NA            (NA)              NA                  NA                                        NA Cooling capacity, Btu/hr          24,750      11,000      (24,750)          74,200              74, 200                                    NA Motor horsepower, each                2          2              (2)              10                  10                                        1.0 Air Conditioning Unit (Supply)
Type                                None                None                    None                None              Horizontal,            None drawn through suspended Number                                                                                                                        1 Flow rate, scfm                                                                                                            1,300 Static head, in. w.g.                                                                                                      0.67 Cooling capacity, Btu/hr                                                                                                  51,200 Motor horsepower, each                                                                                                      1/2 Air Conditioning Condensing Unit Type                                None                None                    None                None          Split roof mounted          None air cooled Number                                                                                                                        1 Cooling capacity Btu/hr                                                                                                    51,200 Refrigerant type                                                                                                            R-22 Fan motor horsepower                                                                                                        1/4 Compressor motor power, hp                                                                                                  7.1 REV 24 10/12
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-6 (SHEET 8 OF 9)
Unit 2 Lub. Oil Storage Item        MCC 1A MCC 1B (MCC 2B)  600 V Load Center ID 600 V Load Center 1E 600 V Load Center 2M          Area Filtration Unit Type                    None      None                None                  None                None                  None Number Prefilter media Prefilter efficiency, %
HEPA media HEPA efficiency, %
Charcoal media Charcoal efficiency, %
Pressure drop, in w.g.
Exhaust Fan Type                    None      None                None                  None                None                  None Number Flow rate each, scfm Static head, in. w.g.
Motor horsepower, each Roof Exhaust Fan Type                    None      None                None                  None                None                  None Number Flow rate each, scfm Static head, in. w.g.
Motor horsepower, each Return Fan Type                    None      None                None                  None                None                  None Number Flow rate each, scfm Static head, in. w.g.
Motor horsepower, each REV 24 10/12
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-6 (SHEET 9 OF 9)
NON-RADWASTE AREA Item                                              Unit 1      Unit 2 Computer UPS Supply Fan Type                                        Centrifugal Centrifugal Number                                          1          1 Flowrate each (sf3/min)                      7060        8980 Static head (in. WG)                          2.2        3.0 Motor horsepower, each                        5.0        7.5 Computer UPS Primary Exhaust Fan                                  Tubular    Tubular T    ype                                  Centrifugal Centrifugal Numb        er                                  1          1 3
Flo    wrate each (sf /min)                  1425        1425 Static head, (in. WG)                    0.65        1.0 Motor      horsepower, each                  0.5        1.0 Computer UPS Secondary Exhaust Fan T    ype                                  Centrifugal Centrifugal Numb        er                                  1          1 Flo    wrate each (sf3/min)                  7060        8980 Static head, (in. WG)                    1.1        1.5 Motor      horsepower, each                  3.0        5.0 REV 24 10/12
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-6A AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM TEMPERATURES FOR POST-ACCIDENT HEAT LOADS Rm. Temp.(a)(b)
Room No.                                Room Description                                        at end of post-accident period 173/174/181 (2173/2174/2181)              CH/HH Safety Inject. Pump Rms.                          119&deg;F 129/131 (2129/2131)                      RHR/LH Injection Pump Rms.                              129&deg;F 111/125 (2111/2125)                      Containment Spray Pump Rms.                            122&deg;F 185 (2185)                                Component Cooling Pump Room                            126&deg;F 191/192 (2191/2192)                      Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rms.                          116&deg;F 224/226 (2224/2226)                      Battery Charger Rooms (A & B)                          114&deg;F 225 (2225)                                Battery Charger Rooms (C)                              114&deg;F 332 (2332)                                MCC 1A (2A) Areas                                      121&deg;F 209                                      MCC 1B Area                                            131&deg;F 2209                                      MCC 2B Area                                            129&deg;F 229/335 (2229/2335)                      600 V Load Center 1D, 2D, 1E, & 2E                      130&deg;F Area (a)    The room and area temperatures listed are based on assumptions of design service water flow rates, design air flow rates and design fouling factor for the associated air coolers.
(b)    The room temperatures listed in this column are at the end of a 30 day accident and are based on service water temperature of 106.2&deg;F, equipment in operation and loss of normal non-safety related HVAC for all 30 days.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-7 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST, BATTERY CHARGER ROOM, MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS, AND 600-V LOAD CENTERS AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES PUMP ROOM COOLING SYSTEMS - SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS Component              Malfunction              Comments and Consequences Battery room          Fan failure              One exhaust fan is provided exhaust fan                                    for each battery room; one battery is required during post-LOCA operation The failed exhaust fan will be isolated and repaired Battery room          Duct failure            Low flow will be alarmed exhaust duct                                    locally The failed exhaust fan will be isolated and repaired Battery charger        Component failure        One cooler is provided for room cooler                                    each battery charger; two battery chargers operate and one is spare during post-LOCA operation The failed cooler will be isolated and repaired; the spare battery charger will be started, including the associated cooler Battery charger        Duct failure            Low differential pressure room cooling                                    will be alarmed locally system duct The failed duct will be isolated and repaired; the spare cooler will be started REV 22 8/09
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-7 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Component      Malfunction            Comments and Consequences Engineered safety Component failure    One cooler is provided for features pump                          each charging high head, room coolers                          residual heat removal, containment spray, and auxiliary feedwater pump; two coolers for three component cooling pumps; each spare pump has its own spare pump room cooler The failed cooler will be isolated and repaired; the spare pump and cooler will be started Motor control    Component failure    One cooler each is provided center cooler                          for motor control center 1A, 2A and 2B and two coolers are provided for motor control center 1B; each of the coolers operates during post-LOCA operation The failed cooler will be isolated; the ambient temperature in the room being served by the failed cooler will rise but not exceed the design basis temperature of the service equipment 600-V load        Component failure    One cooler each is provided center cooler                          for 600-V load center 1D and 1E; both 600-V load centers operate The failed cooler will be isolated; the room ambient temperature associated with the failed cooler will rise until the cooler is repaired and reenergized REV 22 8/09
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-8 RADWASTE AREA HEATING, VENTILATING, AND FILTRATION SYSTEMS DESIGN PARAMETERS Radwaste Item                                      Area Air handling unit (supply)
Type                                        Horizontal, drawthrough, floor-mounted Number                                      1 Flowrate (sf3/min)                          50,000 Static head (in. WG)                        4.5 Heating capacity (Btu/h)                    2.16 x 106 Motor hp, each                              75 Air conditioning unit (recirculating)
Type Horizontal, drawthrough, ceiling-mounted Number 2
Flowrate (sf3/min) 4,000 Static head (in. WG) 0.55 Cooling Capacity (Btu/h) 0.12 x 106 Motor hp, each 2
Exhaust fan Type                                        Vaneaxial Number                                      2 Flowrate, each (sf3/min)                    50,000 Static head (in. WG)                        6.5 Motor hp, each                              75 Filtration unit Type                                        Composite prefilter, HEPA charcoal Number                                      1 Prefilter media                            Dry, cartridge Prefilter efficiency                        85, NIST dust spot (percent)
HEPA media                                  Dry, extended HEPA efficiency                            99.97, DPO at 0.3 m (percent)
Charcoal media                              Coconut, activated, impregnated Charcoal efficiency                        99.9 - I2; 99.0 - CH3I (percent)
REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-9 UNIT 2 RADWASTE AREA HEATING, VENTILATING, AND FILTRATION SYSTEMS DESIGN PARAMETERS Waste Gas Area Item                                      Filtration Unit(a)
Air handling unit (supply)                            None Exhaust fan Type                                                  Centrifugal Number                                                1 Flowrate, each (sf3/min)                              3000 Static head (in. WG)                                  4.0 Motor hp, each                                        10.0 Filtration unit Type                                                  HEPA, charcoal filter, totally enclosed, refillable Number                                                2 Prefilter media                                      Dry cartridge Prefilter efficiency (percent)                        85, NIST discoloration HEPA media                                            -
HEPA efficiency (percent)                            -
Charcoal media                                        Coconut, activated, impregnated charcoal Charcoal efficiency (percent)                        99.9 - I2; 99.0 - CH3I
: a. Exhaust airflow from the chemical and laundry drain tank room, waste monitor tank room, and the waste gas area processing area.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-10 RADWASTE HEATING, VENTILATION, AND FILTRATION SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS Component                Malfunction          Comments and Consequences Air handling          Failure of fan,              Loss of airflow actuates an unit supply          resulting in loss            annunciation system until corrective fan                  of airflow                  action is taken Ventilation          Failure of fans,            Loss of airflow actuates an exhaust fans          resulting in loss            annunciation system; after 10 s of airflow                  have elapsed, standby fan will auto-matically start Radwaste area        Filter overload,            Increase in filter pressure drop has -
filter unit          resulting in in-            no sudden effect on system capability; creased air filter          local filter pressure drop display pressure drop                provides alarm for corrective action Instrumentation      Instrumentation              Control actuators assume fail-safe power failure                position until corrective action is taken Ventilation          Failure of or leak-          Decreased or loss of airflow indicates supply duct          age from exhaust            low pressure; system loss of or duct, resulting in          decrease in air capacity actuates an decreased or loss            annunciation system; after 10 s have of airflow                  elapsed, standby will automatically start Ventilation          Failure of or leak-          Decrease or loss of airflow indicates exhaust duct          age from exhaust            low pressure; system loss of or duct, resulting in          decrease in air capacity actuates an decreased or loss            annunciation system; after 10 s have of airflow                  elapsed, standby fan will automatically start REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-11 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
TURBINE BUILDING HEATING, COOLING, AND STEAM JET AIR EJECTOR FILTRATION SYSTEMS COMPONENT DESIGN PARAMETERS Cooling and Heating System Water analysis room air condition unit Number of units                        1 Unit type                              Single package Fan type                              Centrifugal Airflow (ft3/min)                      2300 Total pressure (in. WG)                1.27 Motor (hp)                            1 Total cooling (Btu/h)                  100,000 Refrigerant                            22 Condenser type                        Water-cooled Waterflow (gal/min)                    28 Air handling units Service                                Operating floor, el 189 ft Number of units                        4 Unit type                              Horizontal, single zone, drawthrough Components                            Fans, coil, filter Fan type                              Centrifugal Airflow (ft3/min)                      15,350 Total pressure (in. WG)                2.5 Motor (hp)                            10 Water coil                            Finned tube, chilled water Total load (Btu/h)                    493,000 (cooling)
Waterflow (gal/min)                    55 (cooling)
Service                                Mezzanine floor, el 155 ft Number of units                        6 Unit type                              Horizontal or vertical, single zone, draw-through Components                            Fan, coil, filter Fan type                              Centrifugal Airflow (ft3/min)                      16,400 Total pressure (in. WG)                2.5 Motor (hp)                            15 Water coil                            Finned tube, chilled water Total load (Btu/h)                    530,100 (cooling)
Waterflow (gal/min)                    59 (cooling)
REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-11 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Service                                Basement floor, el 137 ft Number of units                        4 Unit type                              Horizontal or vertical, single zone, draw-through Components                            Fan, coil, filter Fan type                              Centrifugal Airflow (ft3/min)                      24,000 Total pressure (in. WG)                2.25 Motor (hp)                            15 Water coil                            Finned tube, chilled water Total load (Btu/h)                    1,176,700 (cooling)
Waterflow (gal/min)                    130 (cooling)
Steam Jet Air Ejector Filtration Unit Fans Number                                1 Type                                  Centrifugal Rated flow (ft3/min)                  1000 Rated head (in. WG)                    3.5 Filter train Number                                1 Type                                  Single pass, high efficiency Rated flow (ft3/min)                  1000 Components                            Prefilter, HEPA, 6-in. fixed bed charcoal filter Design efficiency (percent)
Prefilter                            80-85 NIST dust spot High efficiency                      99.97 DOP test on 0.3 m particles particulate Charcoal                            99.0 for iodine removal Smoke and Heat Vents Service                                    Operating floor, el 189 ft Number of units                            13 Unit type                                  Passive roof gravity exhaust ventilator REV 27 4/17
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-12 (SHEET 1 OF 4)
DESCRIPTION OF CASES EVALUATED IN SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING Case      Location and Event                      Assumptions                Intakes      Maximum Concentration
[HISTORICAL]
[1    Chlorine spill, 2 tons at              Wind speed 0.5 mps,            Large      1684 ppm or 5 mg/m3 circulating water house                direction toward intake, about 900 ft NNW of                    Pasquill F stability generator building 3
2    Chlorine spill, 2 tons at              Wind speed 0.5 mps,            Large      81,969 ppm or 242 mg/m circulating water house                direction toward intake, about 200 ft NE of genera-              Pasquill F stability tor building]
3      Combustion products due to              Wind speed 10 mph, direc-      Nearest    Insignificant, plume rise fire at underground fuel                tion toward intakes                      is about 192 ft in the distance storage tanks, 8000-gal                                                          between fire and intake; intake spill from a tank truck                                                          is at 22 ft above ground and resulting fire 4      Heat or air temperature due            Wind speed 10 mph,            Nearest    Insignificant, plume rise is to fire at underground fuel            direction toward intakes                  about 192 ft in the distance storage tanks, 8000-gal                                                          between fire and intake; intake spill from a tank truck                                                          is at 22 ft above ground and resulting fire
[5    Same as case 1                          Same as case 1                Small      1684 ppm or 5 mg/m3 6      Same as case 2                          Same as case 2                Small      80,929 ppm or 239 mg/m3 ]
3 7      Combustion products con-                Wind speed 5 m/s, di-          Both large CO2 at large intake - 793 mg/m 3
sidering effect of diesel              rection from nearest          and small  CO2 at small intake - 903 mg/m 3
exhaust pipes                          exhaust to intakes                        H2O at large intake - 297 mg/m 3
H2O at small intake - 338 mg/m 3
SO2 at large intake - 1.2 mg/m 3
SO2 at small intake - 1.3 mg/m 3
N2 at large intake - 3246 mg/m 3
N2 at small intake - 3697 mg/m REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-12 (SHEET 2 OF 4)
Case          Location and Event                  Assumptions      Intakes          Maximum Concentration 8  Air temperature rise        Same as case 7, except          Both large T rise at large intake - 8&deg;F considering effect of        ambient outside temperature      and small  T rise at small intake - 5&deg;F diesel exhaust pipes        90&deg;F 9  Actuation of CO2 fire        Ventilators, doors, louvers        Large    11,280 ppm protection system in the    etc., operate normally, wind large diesel generator      speed 10 mph, direction room, 2800 lb CO2 re-        toward intake leased in 1 min 10  Same as case 9              Same as case 9, except            Large    15,412 ppm roof ventilators fail to turn off 11  Same as case 9              Same as case 9, except            Large    2807 ppm failure of fire doors (behind louvers) to close 12  Same as case 9              Same as case 9, except            Large    13,495 ppm failure of louvers to close 13  Actuation of CO2 fire        Same as case 9                    Small    22,157 ppm protection system in the small diesel generator room, 2800 lb CO2 released in 1 min 14  Same as case 13              Same as case 9, except            Small    18,469 ppm roof ventilators fail to turn off 15  Same as case 13              Same as case 9, except            Small    12,877 ppm failure of fire doors (behind louvers) to close 16  Same as case 13              Same as case 9, except            Small    22,167 ppm failure of the louvers in fire door to close REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-12 (SHEET 3 OF 4)
Case            Location and Event                  Assumptions    Intakes      Maximum Concentration 17  Actuation of the CO2 fire    Wind speed 10 mph, direc-        Large  2150 ppm protection system in the      tion toward intake, rest large oil storage room        of system operates normally releases 136 lb CO2 in 1 min 18  Case as case 17              Same as case 17, except roof    Large  8169 ppm ventilators fail to turn off 19  Same as case 17              Same as case 17, except          Large  1308 ppm failure of fire door (behind louvers) to close 20  Same as case 17              Same as case 17, except          Large  2139 ppm failure of louvers in fire door to close 21  Actuation of the CO2          Wind speed 10 mph, direc-        Small  1433 ppm fire protection system        tion toward intake, rest in the small oil storage      of system operates normally room; release 136 lb CO2 in 1 min 22  Same as case 21              Same as case 21, except roof    Small  8876 ppm ventilators fail to close 23  Same as case 21              Same as case 2, except          Small  876 ppm failure of fire door (behind louvers) to close 24  Same as case 21              Same as case 21, except          Small  1433 ppm failure of louvers in fire door to close 25  Actuation of the CO2 fire    Wind speed 10 mph,              Large  6281 ppm protection system in the      direction toward nearest large diesel generator        intake room, 10,000 lb CO2 released in 3.65 min REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-12 (SHEET 4 OF 4)
Case            Location and Event            Assumptions      Intakes      Maximum Concentration 26  Actuation of the CO2 fire    Same as case 25                Small  17,995 ppm protection system in the small diesel generator room, 10,000 lb CO2 released in 3.65 min 27  Actuation of the CO2 fire    Same as case 25                Large  2515 ppm protection system in the large oil storage room, 10,000 lb CO2 released in 33.9 min 28  Actuation of the CO2 fire    Same as case 25                Small  6824 ppm protection system in the small oil storage room, 10,000 lb of CO2 released in 33.9 min REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-13 RECIRCULATION OF EXHAUST GAS TO INTAKES - ASSUMPTIONS Wind speed of 5 m/s Wind direction from closest exhaust directly to diesel air intake Complete combustion of fuel Vertical thermal jet Final Plume rise calculated by h      =          1.6 F1/3 (3.5x)2/3 (u)-1 Where:
X        =          Distance to final rise (m)
U        =          Wind speed (m/s)
F        =          Buoyancy Flux (m4/s3)
Plume rise at diesel intake is calculated by:
1/3 2
3  Fm  x  3  F  x h =                  +
b 2m  u  u  2b 2  u  u Where:
m      =          Entrainment Coefficient (Momentum)
                      =          Entrainment Coefficient (Buoyancy)
Fm      =          Momentum Flux (m4/s2)
F        =          Buoyancy Flux (m4/s3) u        =          wind speed (m/s) x        =          Distance between Exhaust and Intake (m)
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-14 CONCENTRATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE AT DIESEL AIR INTAKE FROM VENTILATORS Maximum Concentration at Air Intake No. of Times                                Amount from Case                Fan Vents Open            Duration (s)          Vent (ppm) 9                        4                        4                11,280 10                Stay open                        --                15,412 11                        0                        0                        0 12                        5                      18                  13,495 13                        5                        8                22,157 14                Stay open                        --                18,469 15                        0                        0                        0 16                        5                        8                22,167 17                        1                        6                    2150 18                Stay open                        --                    8169 19                        1                        6                    1308 20                        1                        6                    2139 21                        1                        2                    1433 22                Stay open                        --                    8876 23                        1                        2                    876 24                        1                        2                    1433 25                        3                      30                    6281 26                        3                      15                      614 27                      (a)                  ~1900                      2515 28                      (a)                  ~2000                      6824
: a. The ventilators have stayed closed all the time.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 1 OF 14)
CONFORMANCE TO ASME N510-1989 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM (CREFS)
FILTRATION FILTER UNITS Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                  Surveillance      or Repair 5 VISUAL INSPECTION 5.5.1 Guidance for Visual Inspection 5.5.1.1(a)    Adequate access to housing.                                      Yes              Yes 5.5.1.1(b)*  Adequate space for personnel and equipment for                    No              Yes maintenance and testing.                                    (Not required) 5.5.1.1(c)*  Doors of rigid construction to resist unacceptable                No              N/A flexure under operating conditions.                          (Not required)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.1(d)    Adequate seal between door and casing.                            N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.                (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.1(e)    Gasket joints are dovetail type with seating                      No              Yes surface suitable for accommodating a knife edge                (See note)      (See note) sealing device.
Note: The design does not include this feature. Gaskets will be inspected when housing is disassembled.
5.5.1.1(f)*  Provision for opening doors from inside and                        No              N/A outside of housing.                                          (Not required)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.1(g)    Adequate number and acceptable condition of                      N/A              N/A operable latches on access doors to achieve                    (See note)      (See note) uniform seating.
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.1(h)*  Provision for locking doors.                                      No              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.              (Not required)    (See note)
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 2 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph  Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                  Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.1(i)* Adequate structural rigidity of housing to resist                  No              Yes unacceptable flexure during operating conditions.            (Not required) 5.5.1.1(j)* Access to upper tiers, (above the 7 ft level),                      No              N/A provided with permanent ladders and platforms.                (Not required)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.1(k)* At least 3 ft clearance between banks of                            No              N/A components for maintenance and testing.                      (Not required)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature throughout the housing.
5.5.1.1(l)* Door provided on each side, (upstream and                          No              N/A downstream), of each component bank.                          (Not required)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.1(m)* No back-to-back installation of components.                        No              Yes Note: Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.      (Not required)    (See note) 5.5.1.1(n)  Sample ports located and labeled upstream and                      Yes              Yes downstream of each HEPA filter and adsorber bank.
5.5.1.1(o)  Challenge injection ports located and labeled.                    Yes              Yes 5.5.1.1(p)  Sample and injection ports equipped with leak-                    Yes              Yes tight caps or plugged.
5.5.1.1(q)  Housekeeping in and around housing adequate                        Yes              Yes for maintenance, testing, and operation.
5.5.1.1(r)  Adequate guards provided on fans for personnel                    Yes              Yes safety.
5.5.1.1(s)  Condition of flexible connection between housing                  Yes              Yes and fan located external to housing adequate to prevent leakage of untreated air.
5.5.1.1(t)  Fan-shaft seals installed where required.                          Yes              Yes REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 3 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.1(u)      Airtight seals for conduits, electrical connections,            Yes              Yes plumbing, drains, or other conditions that could            (See note)      (See note) result in bypassing of the housing or any component therein.
Note: Inspect accessible/visible items. Air tightness of components that could cause bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.1(v)      No sealant or caulking of any type on/in housings              Yes              Yes or component frames. Caulking on/in ducts may                (See note)      (See note) be permissible depending on project specifications.
Note: Inspect only external to ducts and housing where accessible during inspections.
5.5.1.1(w)      Loop seals have adequate water level.                            N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.              (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.1(x)      Satisfactory condition of fire protection                        N/A            N/A components (if provided).                                    (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature. No fire protection provided for the filtration unit filter.
5.5.1.2 Local Instrumentation 5.5.1.2(a)      No unacceptable damage to instrumentation (e.g.,                Yes              Yes gages, manometers, thermometers, etc.).
5.5.1.2(b)      All connections complete.                                      Yes              Yes 5.5.1.3 Lighting, Housing 5.5.1.3(a)      Adequate lighting provided for visual inspection of              N/A            N/A housing and components.                                      (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature. Temporary lighting utilized, as necessary, to perform internal, visual inspections.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 4 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement              Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.3(b)*  Flush mounted fixtures serviceable from outside                No              N/A the housing.                                              (Not required)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.4 Mounting Frames for Filters and Moisture Separators 5.5.1.4(a)*  Continuous seal weld between members or                        No              Yes frames and between frame and housing.                    (Not required)    (See note)
Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.4(b)*  Adequate structural rigidity for supporting internal            No              Yes components during operating conditions without            (Not required)    (See note) flexure.
Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
5.5.1.4(c)    No unacceptable damage to the frames that may                  No              Yes interfere with proper seating of components.                (See note)      (See note)
Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.4(d)    Sample canisters installed and unused                          Yes              Yes connections capped or plugged leak-tight.
5.5.1.4(e)    No penetrations of the mounting frame except for                No              Yes test canisters.                                            (See note)
Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.
5.5.1.4(f)    No sealant or caulking of any type.                            No              Yes Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing  (See note)      (See note) disassembled.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 5 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement              Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.5 Filter Clamping Devices 5.5.1.5(a)      Sufficient number of devices of adequate size to                No              Yes assure specified gasket compression.                        (See note)      (See note)
Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.5(b)*    Individual clamping of filters and adsorbers.                  No              Yes Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing (Not required)    (See note) disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.5(c)      All clamping hardware complete and in good                      No              Yes condition.                                                  (See note)      (See note)
Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.5(d)*    Adequate clearances provided between filter and                No              Yes adsorber units in same bank to tighten clamping          (Not required)    (See note) devices.
Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.
5.5.1.6 Moisture Separators 5.5.1.6(a)      No unacceptable damage to media, frame, or                    N/A              N/A gaskets.                                                    (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.6(b)      No dirt or debris loading which creates higher                N/A              N/A than the specified pressure drop across the bank            (See note)      (See note) of components at the design airflow rate.
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.6(c)      Proper installation of moisture separators.                    N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.            (See note)      (See note)
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 6 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement            Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.7 Air Heating Coils - Inside Housing 5.5.1.7(a)      No unacceptable damage to coils which may                    N/A            N/A affect operability of the heaters.                        (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.7(b)      No unacceptable dirt or debris on or between                N/A            N/A coils.                                                    (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.8 Prefilters 5.5.1.8(a)      No damage to media, frame, or gaskets which                  No              Yes may affect operability of prefilters.                    (See note)      (See note)
Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.
5.5.1.8(b)      No dirt or debris loading which creates higher              No              Yes than the specified pressure drop across the filter        (See note)      (See note) bank at the design flow rate.
Note: Pressure drop will be checked by installed gauges.
5.5.1.8(c)      Proper installation of prefilters.                          No              Yes Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing (See note)      (See note) disassembled.
5.5.1.9 HEPA Filters 5.5.1.9(a)      No unacceptable damage to filter media.                      No              Yes Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing (See note)      (See note) disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.9(b)      Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with            No              Yes at least 50% compression.                                (See note)      (See note)
Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 7 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement              Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.9(c)    No dirt or debris loading which creates higher                No              Yes than the specified pressure drop across the filter        (See note)      (See note) bank at the design flow rate.
Note: Pressure Drop will be checked by installed pressure gauges.
5.5.1.9(d)    No sealant or caulking of any type.                          No              Yes Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing (See note)      (See note) disassembled.
5.5.1.9(e)    Filters are properly installed with pleats vertical.          No              Yes Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing (See note)      (See note) disassembled.
5.5.1.10 Adsorbers 5.5.1.10(a)  No unacceptable damage to adsorbers or                        No              Yes adsorbent beds.                                          (See note)      (See note)
Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.10(b)  Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with              No              Yes at least 50 % compression.                                (See note)      (See note)
Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.10(c)  No through bolts on Type II adsorbers or other                No              Yes structure that could cause bypass in an adsorber          (See note)      (See note) bank where visible.
Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.
5.5.1.10(d)  No sealant or caulking of any type.                          No              Yes Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing (See note)      (See note) disassembled.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 8 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.11 Dampers - Housing and Associated Bypass Duct 5.5.1.11(a)    No unacceptable damage to or distortion of frame                N/A              N/A or blades.                                                  (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.11(b)    No missing seats or blade edging.                              N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.
(See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.11(c)    No unacceptable damage to shaft, pivot pins,                    N/A              N/A operator linkages, operators, or packing.                    (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.11(d)    Linkage connected and free from obstruction.                    N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.              (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.11(e)    No unacceptable damage to gaskets.                              N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.              (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.12 Manifolds 5.5.1.12(a)    No unacceptable damage to test manifolds.                      N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.              (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.12(b)    Adequate clearance between permanent                            N/A              N/A manifolds and filters.                                      (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
6.0 DUCT AND HOUSING LEAK AND STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY TESTS 6.5 Duct and Housing Leak and Structural Capability Tests - Procedure 6.5.1*        Structural Capability Test                                      No              Yes Note: Testing to be conducted only on affected components. (Not required)    (See note)
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 9 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph  Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                  Surveillance      or Repair 6.5.2*      Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Constant                          No            Yes Pressure Method)                                              (Not required)    (See note)
Note: This test will be performed only following major modification or repair and conducted on affected components only. Either constant pressure method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
6.5.3*      Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Pressure                          No            Yes Decay Method)                                                (Not required)    (See note)
Note: This test will be performed only following major modification or repair and conducted on affected components only. Either constant pressure method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
6.5.4        Bubble Leak Location Method                                        No              No Note: This method is not a test but rather a leak detection  (Not required)    (See note) method typically used for identifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohibit the use of other detection methods.
6.5.5        Audible Leak Location Method                                        No              No Note: This method is not a test but rather a leak detection  (Not required)    (See note) method typically used for identifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohibit the use of other detection methods.
6.6 Acceptance Criteria 6.6.1        Structural Capability Test. Meets the                              No              No requirements of ASME N509, test program, and                  (Not required)    (See note) project specifications.
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work scope and the system functional requirements.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 10 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                      Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                  Surveillance      or Repair 6.6.2          Duct and Housing Leak Test. Meets the                              No              No requirements of ASME N509, test program, and project specifications.                                      (See notes for    (See note)
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for    6.5.2 and 6.5.3) testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work scope and the system functional requirements.
7.0 Mounting Frame Pressure Leak Test (Optional)                                  No              No (Optional)      (Optional) 8 AIRFLOW CAPACITY AND DISTRIBUTION TESTS 8.5.1. Airflow Capacity Test Procedure 8.5.1.1        Start system fan and verify stable (no surging) fan              Yes              Yes operation for 15 min.
8.5.1.2        Measure system airflow in accordance with 2.2 or                  Yes              Yes equivalent.                                                    (See note)      (See note)
Note: Reference 2.2 Industrial Ventilation: A Manual of Recommended Practice (20th Edition) excluding figure 9-5.
8.5.1.3*      Clean System Airflow. With the new housing                        No              Yes components installed, or simulated, operate at the          (Not required) clean differential pressure and compare measured flow rate (using methods of para.
8.5.1.2) with the value specified by the test program or project specification. If the specified value cannot be achieved, report to owner.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 11 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                          Routine          Modification Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                          Surveillance          or Repair 8.5.1.4*  Maximum Housing Component Pressure Drop                                    No                  Yes Airflow. After successful completion of Para.                        (Not required) 8.5.1.3, increase housing component resistance (artificially by blanking off portions of the filter bank or by adjusting throttling dampers) until the maximum housing component pressure drop for the system (as specified in the test program or project specifications) is achieved. Measure flow rate per para. 8.5.1.2. If the maximum housing component pressure drop airflow cannot be achieved, report to owner.
8.5.1.5*  Return system to clean condition.                                        No                  Yes (Not required) 8.5.2      Airflow Distribution Test Procedure NOTE: Airflow distribution tests are not required for a filter bank containing a single HEPA filter.
8.5.2.1*  Airflow Distribution Through HEPA Filter Banks.                            No                  N/A The minimum number of velocity measurements                          (Not required)        (See note) shall be one in the center of each filter. All measurements should be made an equal distance away from the filters. Velocity measurements should be made downstream of the filters to take advantage of the airflow distribution dampening effects of the HEPA filters.
Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA filter is present.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 12 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                              Routine      Modification Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement              Surveillance      or Repair 8.5.2.2*  Airflow Distribution Through Adsorber Banks. For                No              N/A banks containing Type I adsorbers, the air                (Not required)    (See note) distribution test shall follow the same procedures specified for HEPA filter banks in para. 8.5.2.1.
For banks containing Type II modular trays, the air distribution test shall follow the same procedure specified for filter banks in para.
8.5.2.1, except that all velocity measurements shall be made in the plane of the face of the air channels, in the center of every open channel and an equal distance away from the adsorbers. For type III adsorbers, velocity measurements shall be made in the plane of the face of the air channels. These measurements shall be made in centers of equal area that cover the entire open face, not in excess of 12 in. between points on a channel, and an equal distance away from the adsorber.
Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA filter is present.
8.5.2.3*  Calculate the average of the velocity readings                  No              N/A (Section 3)                                              (Not required)    (See note)
Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA filter is present.
8.5.2.4*  Note the highest and lowest velocity readings and              No              N/A calculate the percentage they vary from the              (Not required)    (See note) average found in para. 8.5.2.3. If acceptance criteria are exceeded, notify owner.
Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA filter is present.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 13 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                Surveillance      or Repair 8.6.0 Acceptance Criteria 8.6.1        Acceptance Criteria for Airflow Capacity Test.                  Yes              Yes Airflow shall be within + 10% of the value                  (See note 1)    (See note 2) specified in the test program or project specifications. Maximum housing component pressure drop airflows shall be + 10% of the value specified in the test program or project specifications with the pressure drop greater than or equal to the maximum housing component pressure drop. For systems with carbon adsorbers, the maximum velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be limited to that value specified in the laboratory test (Section 15).
Notes:
(1) Applies only to sections 8.5.1.1 and 8.5.1.2.
(2) Maximum housing component pressure drops will be based on those that result in the system maintaining the TS flowrate +10%.
8.6.2*        Airflow Distribution Test. No velocity readings                  No              N/A shall exceed + 20% of the calculated average.              (Not required)    (See note)
For system with carbon adsorbers, maximum velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be limited to that value specified in the laboratory test. (Section 15)
Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA filter is present.
9.0          AIR-AEROSOL MIXING UNIFORMITY TEST                              N/A              N/A Note: This is a single HEPA system and this test does not    (See note)      (See note) apply.
10.0          HEPA FILTER BANK IN-PLACE TEST                                  Yes              Yes 11.0          ADSORBER BANK IN-PLACE LEAK TEST                                Yes              Yes REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 14 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                Surveillance    or Repair 12.0          DUCT DAMPER BYPASS TEST                                          N/A            N/A Note: System design does not include bypass damper.          (See note)      (See note) 13.0          SYSTEM BYPASS TEST                                              N/A            N/A Note: Tests performed per Section 10 satisfy Section 13 test (See note)      (See note) requirements.
14.0          Air Heater Performance Test                                      N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.              (See note)      (See note) 15.0          LABORATORY TESTING OF ADSORBENT                                Yes              Yes Note: Laboratory testing will be performed in accordance    (See note)      (See note) with ASTM D3803-1989.
* ASME N510-1989 clearly delineates these steps are intended for acceptance tests performed after any major system modification or major repair.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 1 OF 14)
CONFORMANCE TO ASME N510-1989 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM (CREFS)
PRESSURIZATION FILTER UNITS Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                  Surveillance    or Repair 5 VISUAL INSPECTION 5.5.1 Guidance for Visual Inspection 5.5.1.1(a)    Adequate access to housing.                                      Yes            Yes 5.5.1.1(b)*  Adequate space for personnel and equipment for                    No            Yes maintenance and testing.                                    (Not required) 5.5.1.1(c)*  Doors of rigid construction to resist unacceptable                No            Yes flexure under operating conditions.                          (Not required)  (See note)
Note: The pressurization unit has bolted access panels.
5.5.1.1(d)    Adequate seal between door and casing.                            Yes            Yes Note: The pressurization unit has bolted access panels.        (See note)    (See note) 5.5.1.1(e)    Gasket joints are dovetail type with seating                      Yes            Yes surface suitable for accommodating a knife edge                (See note)    (See note) sealing device.
Note: Gaskets are not dovetail type. The pressurization unit has bolted access panels with flat gaskets with flat surface seal on filter housing.
5.5.1.1(f)*  Provision for opening doors from inside and                        No            N/A outside of housing.                                          (Not required)  (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature. The pressurization unit has bolted access panels.
5.5.1.1(g)    Adequate number and acceptable condition of                      N/A            N/A operable latches on access doors to achieve                    (See note)    (See note) uniform seating.
Note: The design does not include this feature. The pressurization unit has bolted access panels.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 2 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph  Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                  Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.1(h)* Provision for locking doors.                                      No            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature. The          (Not required)  (See note) pressurization unit has bolted access panels.
5.5.1.1(i)* Adequate structural rigidity of housing to resist                  No            Yes unacceptable flexure during operating conditions.            (Not required) 5.5.1.1(j)* Access to upper tiers, (above the 7 ft level),                    No            N/A provided with permanent ladders and platforms.              (Not required)  (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.1(k)* At least 3 ft clearance between banks of                          No            N/A components for maintenance and testing.                      (Not required)  (See note)
Note: The pressurization units have less than 3 feet between some banks by design.
5.5.1.1(l)* Door provided on each side, (upstream and                          No            Yes downstream), of each component bank.                        (Not required)  (See note)
Note: The pressurization unit has bolted access panels.
There is no door downstream of the HEPA filter.
5.5.1.1(m)* No back-to-back installation of components.                        No            Yes (Not required) 5.5.1.1(n)  Sample ports located and labeled upstream and                    Yes            Yes downstream of each HEPA filter and adsorber bank.
5.5.1.1(o)  Challenge injection ports located and labeled.                    Yes            Yes 5.5.1.1(p)  Sample and injection ports equipped with leak-                    Yes            Yes tight caps or plugged.
5.5.1.1(q)  Housekeeping in and around housing adequate                      Yes            Yes for maintenance, testing, and operation.
5.5.1.1(r)  Adequate guards provided on fans for personnel                    Yes            Yes safety.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 3 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement            Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.1(s)      Condition of flexible connection between housing            N/A            N/A and fan located external to housing adequate to          (See note)    (See note) prevent leakage of untreated air.
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.1(t)      Fan-shaft seals installed where required.                    Yes            Yes 5.5.1.1(u)      Airtight seals for conduits, electrical connections,        Yes            Yes plumbing, drains, or other conditions that could          (See note)    (See note) result in bypassing of the housing or any component therein.
Note: Inspect accessible/visible items. Air tightness of components that could cause bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.1(v)      No sealant or caulking of any type on/in housings            Yes            Yes or component frames. Caulking on/in ducts may            (See note)    (See note) be permissible depending on project specifications.
Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
5.5.1.1(w)      Loop seals have adequate water level.                        N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.          (See note)    (See note) 5.5.1.1(x)      Satisfactory condition of fire protection                    N/A            N/A components (if provided).                                (See note)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature. No fire protection provided for the pressurization unit filter.
5.5.1.2 Local Instrumentation 5.5.1.2(a)      No unacceptable damage to instrumentation                    Yes            Yes (e.g., gages, manometers, thermometers, etc.).
5.5.1.2(b)      All connections complete.                                    Yes            Yes REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 4 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                      Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                  Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.3 Lighting, Housing 5.5.1.3(a)    Adequate lighting provided for visual inspection                    N/A            N/A of housing and components.                                      (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature. Temporary lighting utilized, as necessary, to perform internal, visual inspections.
5.5.1.3(b)*    Flush mounted fixtures serviceable from outside                    No              N/A the housing.                                                  (Not required)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.4 Mounting Frames for Filters and Moisture Separators 5.5.1.4(a)*    Continuous seal weld between members or                            No              Yes frames and between frame and housing.                        (Not required)    (See note)
Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
5.5.1.4(b)*    Adequate structural rigidity for supporting internal                No              Yes components during operating conditions without                (Not required)    (See note) flexure.
Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
5.5.1.4(c)    No unacceptable damage to the frames that may                      Yes            Yes interfere with proper seating of components.
5.5.1.4(d)    Sample canisters installed and unused                              Yes            Yes connections capped or plugged leak-tight.                      (See note)      (See note)
Note: Pressurization unit contains internal sample canisters.
Check that internal unused connections are sealed.
5.5.1.4(e)    No penetrations of the mounting frame except for                    Yes            Yes test canisters.
5.5.1.4(f)    No sealant or caulking of any type.                                Yes            Yes Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.        (See note)      (See note)
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 5 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                          Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement      Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.5 Filter Clamping Devices 5.5.1.5(a)      Sufficient number of devices of adequate size to      Yes            Yes assure specified gasket compression.
5.5.1.5(b)*    Individual clamping of filters and adsorbers.          No              Yes (Not required) 5.5.1.5(c)      All clamping hardware complete and in good            Yes            Yes condition.
5.5.1.5(d)*    Adequate clearances provided between filter and        No              Yes adsorber units in same bank to tighten clamping  (Not required) devices.
5.5.1.6 Moisture Separators 5.5.1.6(a)      No unacceptable damage to media, frame, or            N/A            N/A gaskets.                                          (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.6(b)      No dirt or debris loading which creates higher        N/A            N/A than the specified pressure drop across the bank  (See note)      (See note) of components at the design airflow rate.
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.6(c)      Proper installation of moisture separators.            N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.    (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.7 Air Heating Coils - Inside Housing 5.5.1.7(a)      No unacceptable damage to coils which may              Yes            Yes affect operability of the heaters.
5.5.1.7(b)      No unacceptable dirt or debris on or between          Yes            Yes coils.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 6 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement              Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.8 Prefilters 5.5.1.8(a)      No damage to media, frame, or gaskets which                    Yes            Yes may affect operability of prefilters 5.5.1.8(b)      No dirt or debris loading which creates higher                Yes            Yes than the specified pressure drop across the filter        (See note)      (See note) bank at the design flow rate.
Note: Inspect for visible loading - pressure drop will be checked by installed gauges.
5.5.1.8(c)      Proper installation of prefilters.                            Yes            Yes 5.5.1.9 HEPA Filters 5.5.1.9(a)      No unacceptable damage to filter media.                        Yes            Yes 5.5.1.9(b)      Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with              Yes            Yes at least 50% compression.                                  (See note)      (See note)
Note: HEPAs have self adjusting clamps-inspect clamps and visually confirm that gaskets appear tight. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place leak testing.
5.5.1.9(c)      No dirt or debris loading which creates higher                Yes            Yes than the specified pressure drop across the filter        (See note)      (See note) bank at the design flow rate.
Note: Inspect upstream side for visible loading - pressure drop will be checked by installed pressure gauges.
5.5.1.9(d)      No sealant or caulking of any type.                            Yes            Yes Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.    (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.9(e)      Filters are properly installed with pleats vertical.          Yes            Yes 5.5.1.10 Adsorbers 5.5.1.10(a)    No unacceptable damage to adsorbers or                        Yes            Yes adsorbent beds.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 7 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.10(b)  Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with                N/A            N/A at least 50 % compression.                                  (See note)      (See note)
Note: The pressurization unit design is Type III adsorbers.
Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place leak testing.
5.5.1.10(c)  No through bolts on Type II adsorbers or other                  N/A            N/A structure that could cause bypass in an adsorber            (See note)      (See note) bank where visible.
Note: The pressurization unit design does not have through-bolts. Type III adsorbers.
5.5.1.10(d)  No sealant or caulking of any type.                            Yes            Yes Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.    (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.11 Dampers - Housing and Associated Bypass Duct 5.5.1.11(a)  No unacceptable damage to or distortion of frame                N/A            N/A or blades.                                                  (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.11(b)  No missing seats or blade edging.                              N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.            (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.11(c)  No unacceptable damage to shaft, pivot pins,                    N/A            N/A operator linkages, operators, or packing.                  (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.11(d)  Linkage connected and free from obstruction.                    N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.            (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.11(e)  No unacceptable damage to gaskets.                              N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.            (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.12 Manifolds 5.5.1.12(a)  No unacceptable damage to test manifolds.                      N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.            (See note)      (See note)
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 8 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph  Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                  Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.12(b) Adequate clearance between permanent                                N/A              N/A manifolds and filters.                                          (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
6.0 DUCT AND HOUSING LEAK AND STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY TESTS 6.5.1*      Structural Capability Test                                          No              Yes Note: Testing to be conducted only on affected components.    (Not required)    (See note) 6.5.2*      Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Constant                          No              Yes Pressure Method)                                              (Not required)    (See note)
Note: This test will be performed only following major modification or repair and conducted on affected components only. Either constant pressure method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
6.5.3*      Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Pressure                          No              Yes Decay Method)                                                (Not required)    (See note)
Note: This test will be performed only following major modification or repair and conducted on affected components only. Either constant pressure method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
6.5.4      Bubble Leak Location Method                                        No              No Note: This method is not a test but rather a leak detection  (Not required)    (See note) method typically used for identifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohibit the use of other detection methods.
6.5.5      Audible Leak Location Method                                        No              No Note: This method is not a test but rather a leak detection  (Not required)    (See note) method typically used for identifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohibit the use of other detection methods.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 9 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                Surveillance      or Repair 6.6 Acceptance Criteria 6.6.1          Structural Capability Test. Meets the                            No              No requirements of ASME N509, test program, and                (Not required)    (See note) project specifications.
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work scope and the system functional requirements.
6.6.2          Duct and Housing Leak Test. Meets the                            No              No requirements of ASME N509, test program, and                (See Notes for    (See note) project specifications.                                        6.5.2 and Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for        6.5.3) testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work scope and the system functional requirements.
7.0 Mounting Frame Pressure Leak Test (Optional)                                No              No (Optional)      (Optional) 8.0 AIRFLOW CAPACITY AND DISTRIBUTION TESTS 8.5.1 Airflow Capacity Test Procedure 8.5.1.1        Start system fan and verify stable (no surging)                  Yes              Yes fan operation for 15 min.
8.5.1.2        Measure system airflow in accordance with 2.2 or                  Yes              Yes equivalent.                                                  (See note)      (See note)
Note: Reference 2.2 Industrial Ventilation: A Manual of Recommended Practice (20th Edition) excluding figure 9-5.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 10 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                        Routine          Modification Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                        Surveillance          or Repair 8.5.1.3*  Clean System Airflow. With the new housing                                No                Yes components installed, or simulated, operate at                      (Not required) the clean differential pressure and compare measured flow rate (using methods of para.
8.5.1.2) with the value specified by the test program or project specification. If the specified value cannot be achieved, report to owner.
8.5.1.4*  Maximum Housing Component Pressure Drop                                    No                Yes Airflow. After successful completion of para.                      (Not required) 8.5.1.3, increase housing component resistance (artificially by blanking off portions of the filter bank or by adjusting throttling dampers) until the maximum housing component pressure drop for the system (as specified in the test program or project specifications) is achieved. Measure flow rate per para. 8.5.1.2. If the maximum housing component pressure drop airflow cannot be achieved, report to owner.
8.5.1.5*  Return system to clean condition.                                        No                Yes (Not required) 8.5.2      Airflow Distribution Test Procedure NOTE: Airflow distribution tests are not required for a filter bank containing a single HEPA filter.
8.5.2.1*  Airflow Distribution Through HEPA Filter Banks.                          No                  N/A The minimum number of velocity measurements                        (Not required) shall be one in the center of each filter. All measurements should be made an equal distance away from the filters. Velocity measurements should be made downstream of the filters to take advantage of the airflow distribution dampening effects of the HEPA filters.
Note: This test will not be performed due to a single HEPA.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 11 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                Routine      Modification Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                Surveillance    or Repair 8.5.2.2*  Airflow Distribution Through Adsorber Banks. For                  No            N/A banks containing Type I adsorbers, the air                  (Not required)  (See Note) distribution test shall follow the same procedures specified for HEPA filter banks in para. 8.5.2.1.
For banks containing Type II modular trays, the air distribution test shall follow the same procedure specified for filter banks in para.
8.5.2.1, except that all velocity measurements shall be made in the plane of the face of the air channels, in the center of every open channel and an equal distance away from the adsorbers.
For type III adsorbers, velocity measurements shall be made in the plane of the face of the air channels. These measurements shall be made in centers of equal area that cover the entire open face, not in excess of 12 in. between points on a channel, and an equal distance away from the adsorber.
Note: This test will not be performed due to a single HEPA.
8.5.2.3*  Calculate the average of the velocity readings                    No            N/A (Section 3)                                                (Not required)  (See Note)
Note: This test will not be performed due to a single HEPA.
8.5.2.4*  Note the highest and lowest velocity readings and                No            N/A calculate the percentage they vary from the                (Not required)  (See Note) average found in para. 8.5.2.3. If acceptance criteria are exceeded, notify owner.
Note: This test will not be performed due to a single HEPA.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 12 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine        Modification Paragraph  Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                  Surveillance      or Repair 8.6.0 Acceptance Criteria 8.6.1        Acceptance Criteria for Airflow Capacity Test.                    Yes              Yes Airflow shall be within + 10% of the value                    (See Notes 1    (See Notes 2 specified in the test program or project                        and 3)          and 3) specifications. Maximum housing component pressure drop airflows shall be + 10% of the value specified in the test program or project specifications with the pressure drop greater than or equal to the maximum housing component pressure drop. For systems with carbon adsorbers, the maximum velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be limited to that value specified in the laboratory test (Section 15).
Notes:
(1) Applies only to sections 8.5.1.1 and 8.5.1.2.
(2) Maximum housing component pressure drops will be based on those that result in the system maintaining the TS flowrate +/-10%.
(3) Air flow shall be within +25% to -10% of specified value.
8.6.2*      Airflow Distribution Test. No velocity readings                    No              N/A shall exceed + 20% of the calculated average.                (Not required)    (See Note)
For system with carbon adsorbers, maximum velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be limited to that value specified in the laboratory test. (Section 15)
Note: This test will not be performed due to a single HEPA 9.0          AIR-AEROSOL MIXING UNIFORMITY TEST                                N/A              N/A Note: This is a single HEPA system and this test is not        (See Note)      (See Note) applicable.
10.0        HEPA FILTER BANK IN-PLACE TEST                                    Yes              Yes REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 13 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                              Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement            Surveillance    or Repair 11.0          ADSORBER BANK IN-PLACE LEAK TEST                            Yes            Yes 12.0          DUCT DAMPER BYPASS TEST                                    N/A            N/A Note: System design does not include bypass damper.    (See Note)      (See Note) 13.0          SYSTEM BYPASS TEST                                          N/A            N/A Note: Tests performed per Section 10 satisfy Section 13 (See Note)      (See Note) test requirements.
14.0 AIR HEATER PERFORMANCE TEST 14.3 Prerequisites 14.3.1        Prerequisite: Visual inspection of the heater is            Yes            Yes completed (para. 5.5.1.7).
14.3.2        Prerequisite: Electrical control and feed power is          Yes            Yes available and all safety interlocks have been checked.
14.5 Procedure 14.5.1        With power on, and system operating at rated                Yes            Yes flow, measure the voltage and current of all power circuits.
14.5.2        With heater energized and system operating at              Yes            Yes rated airflow, measure the temperature of the entering and leaving air. A sufficient number of measurements shall be taken to determine average entering and leaving temperatures.
14.5.3        If measured values do not meet acceptance                  Yes            Yes criteria, notify the owner.
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FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 14 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                              Routine      Modification Paragraph  Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement            Surveillance    or Repair 14.6 Acceptance Criteria 14.6.1        Operating currents, voltages and change in                  Yes            Yes temperature shall be within the limits of test program or project specifications.
15.0          LABORATORY TESTING OF ADSORBENT                              Yes            Yes Note: Laboratory testing will be performed in accordance (See note)      (See note) with ASTM D3803-1989.
* ASME N510-1989 clearly delineates these steps are intended for acceptance tests performed after any major system modification or major repair.
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FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 1 OF 13)
CONFORMANCE TO ASME N510-1989 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM (CREFS)
RECIRCULATION FILTER UNITS Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                Routine        Modification Paragraph  Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement              Surveillance      or Repair 5 VISUAL INSPECTION 5.5.1 Guidance for Visual Inspection 5.5.1.1(a)  Adequate access to housing.                                    Yes              Yes 5.5.1.1(b)*  Adequate space for personnel and equipment                      No              Yes for maintenance and testing.                              (Not required) 5.5.1.1(c)*  Doors of rigid construction to resist                          No              Yes unacceptable flexure under operating                      (Not required) conditions.
5.5.1.1(d)  Adequate seal between door and casing.                        Yes              Yes 5.5.1.1(e)  Gasket joints are dovetail type with seating                  Yes              Yes surface suitable for accommodating a knife                  (See note)      (See note) edge sealing device.
Note: Gaskets are not dovetail type - inspect gaskets for seating surface.
5.5.1.1(f)*  Provision for opening doors from inside and                    No              Yes outside of housing.                                      (Not required) 5.5.1.1(g)  Adequate number and acceptable condition of                    Yes              Yes operable latches on access doors to achieve uniform seating.
5.5.1.1(h)*  Provision for locking doors.                                    No              Yes (Not required) 5.5.1.1(i)*  Adequate structural rigidity of housing to resist              No              Yes unacceptable flexure during operating                    (Not required) conditions.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 2 OF 13)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                  Routine        Modification Paragraph  Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                  Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.1(j)* Access to upper tiers, (above the 7 ft level),                    No              N/A provided with permanent ladders and platforms.              (Not required)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.1(k)* At least 3 ft clearance between banks of                          No              N/A components for maintenance and testing.                      (Not required)    (See note)
Note: Units have less than 3 feet between some banks by design.
5.5.1.1(l)* Door provided on each side, (upstream and                          No              Yes downstream), of each component bank.                        (Not required)    (See note)
Note: No door upstream of prefilter.
5.5.1.1(m)* No back-to-back installation of components.                        No              Yes (Not required) 5.5.1.1(n)  Sample ports located and labeled upstream                        Yes              Yes and downstream of each HEPA filter and adsorber bank.
5.5.1.1(o)  Challenge injection ports located and labeled.                    Yes              Yes 5.5.1.1(p)  Sample and injection ports equipped with leak-                    Yes              Yes tight caps or plugged.
5.5.1.1(q)  Housekeeping in and around housing adequate                      Yes              Yes for maintenance, testing, and operation.
5.5.1.1(r)  Adequate guards provided on fans for                              N/A              N/A personnel safety.                                              (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature (direct drive vane axial fan).
5.5.1.1(s)  Condition of flexible connection between                          N/A              N/A housing and fan located external to housing                    (See note)      (See note) adequate to prevent leakage of untreated air.
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.1(t)  Fan-shaft seals installed where required.                        N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.                (See note)      (See note)
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 3 OF 13)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement              Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.1(u)    Airtight seals for conduits, electrical                      Yes            Yes connections, plumbing, drains, or other                    (See note)    (See note) conditions that could result in bypassing of the housing or any component therein.
Note: Inspect accessible/visible items. Air tightness of components that could cause bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.1(v)    No sealant or caulking of any type on/in                      Yes            Yes housings or component frames. Caulking on/in              (See note)    (See note) ducts may be permissible depending on project specifications.
Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
5.5.1.1(w)    Loop seals have adequate water level.                        N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.            (See note)    (See note) 5.5.1.1(x)    Satisfactory condition of fire protection                    N/A            N/A components (if provided).                                  (See note)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature. No fire protection provided.
5.5.1.2 Local Instrumentation 5.5.1.2(a)    No unacceptable damage to instrumentation                      Yes            Yes (e.g., gages, manometers, thermometers, etc.).
5.5.1.2(b)    All connections complete.                                      Yes            Yes 5.5.1.3 Lighting, Housing 5.5.1.3(a)    Adequate lighting provided for visual inspection              Yes            Yes of housing and components.
5.5.1.3(b)*    Flush mounted fixtures serviceable from                        No            Yes outside the housing.                                    (Not required)
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 4 OF 13)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement            Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.4 Mounting Frames for Filters and Moisture Separators 5.5.1.4(a)*    Continuous seal weld between members or                      No            Yes frames and between frame and housing.                  (Not required)  (See note)
Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
5.5.1.4(b)*    Adequate structural rigidity for supporting                  No            Yes internal components during operating                    (Not required)  (See note) conditions without flexure.
Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
5.5.1.4(c)    No unacceptable damage to the frames that                    Yes            Yes may interfere with proper seating of components.
5.5.1.4(d)    Sample canisters installed and unused                        Yes            Yes connections capped or plugged leak-tight.                (See note)    (See note)
Note: Filter unit contains internal sample canisters.
Check that unused connections are sealed.
5.5.1.4(e)    No penetrations of the mounting frame except                Yes            Yes for test canisters.
5.5.1.4(f)    No sealant or caulking of any type.                          Yes            Yes Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.  (See note)    (See note) 5.5.1.5 Filter Clamping Devices 5.5.1.5(a)    Sufficient number of devices of adequate size                Yes            Yes to assure specified gasket compression.
5.5.1.5(b)*    Individual clamping of filters and adsorbers.                No            Yes Note: Adsorber is type III filter.                      (Not required)  (See note) 5.5.1.5(c)    All clamping hardware complete and in good                  Yes            Yes condition.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 5 OF 13)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                          Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement      Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.5(d)*    Adequate clearances provided between filter            No            Yes and adsorber units in same bank to tighten      (Not required) clamping devices.
5.5.1.6 Moisture Separators 5.5.1.6(a)      No unacceptable damage to media, frame, or            N/A            N/A gaskets.                                          (See note)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.6(b)      No dirt or debris loading which creates higher        N/A            N/A than the specified pressure drop across the        (See note)    (See note) bank of components at the design airflow rate.
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.6(c)      Proper installation of moisture separators.          N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.    (See note)    (See note) 5.5.1.7 Air Heating Coils - Inside Housing 5.5.1.7(a)      No unacceptable damage to coils which may            N/A            N/A affect operability of the heaters.                (See note)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.7(b)      No unacceptable dirt or debris on or between          N/A            N/A coils.                                            (See note)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.8 Prefilters 5.5.1.8(a)      No damage to media, frame, or gaskets which          Yes            Yes may affect operability of prefilters.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 6 OF 13)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                Routine      Modification Paragraph  Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement              Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.8(b)  No dirt or debris loading which creates higher                Yes            Yes than the specified pressure drop across the                (See note)    (See note) filter bank at the design flow rate.
Note: Inspect for visible loading - pressure drop will be checked by installed gauges.
5.5.1.8(c)  Proper installation of prefilters.                            Yes            Yes 5.5.1.9 HEPA Filters 5.5.1.9(a)  No unacceptable damage to filter media.                        Yes            Yes 5.5.1.9(b)  Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets                    Yes            Yes with at least 50% compression.                              (See note)    (See note)
Note: Visually confirm that gaskets appear tight. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.9(c)  No dirt or debris loading which creates higher                Yes            Yes than the specified pressure drop across the                (See note)    (See note) filter bank at the design flow rate.
Note: Inspect upstream side for visible loading - pressure drop will be checked by installed pressure gauges.
5.5.1.9(d)  No sealant or caulking of any type.                            Yes            Yes Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.    (See note)    (See note) 5.5.1.9(e)  Filters are properly installed with pleats vertical.          Yes            Yes 5.5.1.10 Adsorbers 5.5.1.10(a)  No unacceptable damage to adsorbers or                        Yes            Yes adsorbent beds.
5.5.1.10(b)  Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets                    N/A            N/A with at least 50 % compression.                            (See note)    (See note)
Note: Adsorber is Type III. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 7 OF 13)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                              Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement            Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.10(c)  No through bolts on Type II adsorbers or other              N/A            N/A structure that could cause bypass in an                  (See note)    (See note) adsorber bank where visible.
Note: Adsorber is type III.
5.5.1.10(d)  No sealant or caulking of any type.                        Yes            Yes Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.  (See note)    (See note) 5.5.1.11 Dampers - Housing and Associated Bypass Duct 5.5.1.11(a)  No unacceptable damage to or distortion of                  N/A            N/A frame or blades.                                        (See note)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.11(b)  No missing seats or blade edging.                          N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.          (See note)    (See note) 5.5.1.11(c)  No unacceptable damage to shaft, pivot pins,                N/A            N/A operator linkages, operators, or packing.                (See note)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.11(d)  Linkage connected and free from obstruction.                N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.          (See note)    (See note) 5.5.1.11(e)  No unacceptable damage to gaskets.                          N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.          (See note)    (See note) 5.5.1.12 Manifolds 5.5.1.12(a)  No unacceptable damage to test manifolds.                  N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.          (See note)    (See note) 5.5.1.12(b)  Adequate clearance between permanent                        N/A            N/A manifolds and filters.                                  (See note)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 8 OF 13)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph  Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                  Surveillance    or Repair 6.0 DUCT AND HOUSING LEAK AND STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY TESTS 6.5 Duct And Housing Leak And Structural Capability Tests - Procedure 6.5.1*      Structural Capability Test                                        No            Yes Note: Testing to be conducted only on affected              (Not required)  (See note) components.
6.5.2*      Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Constant                          No            Yes Pressure Method)                                            (Not required)  (See note)
Note: This test will be performed only following major modification or repair and conducted on affected components only. Either constant pressure method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
6.5.3*      Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Pressure                          No            Yes Decay Method)                                                (Not required)  (See note)
Note: This test will be performed only following major modification or repair and conducted on affected components only. Either constant pressure method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
6.5.4        Bubble Leak Location Method                                        No              No Note: This method is not a test but rather a leak detection  (Not required)  (See note) method typically used for identifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohibit the use of other detection methods.
6.5.5        Audible Leak Location Method                                      No              No Note: This method is not a test but rather a leak detection  (Not required)    (See note) method typically used for identifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohibit the use of other detection methods.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 9 OF 13)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                Surveillance      or Repair 6.6 Acceptance Criteria 6.6.1        Structural Capability Test. Meets the                            No              No requirements of ASME N509, test program,                    (Not required)    (See note) and project specifications.
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work scope and the system functional requirements.
6.6.2        Duct and Housing Leak Test. Meets the                            No              No requirements of ASME N509, test program, and project specifications.                                (See notes for    (See note)
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for      6.5.2 and testing following major modification or repair based on the      6.5.3) extent of the work scope and the system functional requirements.
7.0 MOUNTING FRAME PRESSURE LEAK TEST                                          No              No (OPTIONAL)                                                                  (Optional)      (Optional) 8 AIRFLOW CAPACITY AND DISTRIBUTION TESTS 8.5.1 Airflow Capacity Test Procedure 8.5.1.1      Start system fan and verify stable (no surging)                  Yes            Yes fan operation for 15 min.
8.5.1.2      Measure system airflow in accordance with 2.2                    Yes            Yes or equivalent.                                                (See note)      (See note)
Note: Reference 2.2 Industrial Ventilation: A Manual of Recommended Practice (20th Edition) excluding figure 9-5.
8.5.1.3*      Clean System Airflow. With the new housing                        No              Yes components installed, or simulated, operate at              (Not required) the clean differential pressure and compare measured flow rate (using methods of para.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 10 OF 13)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                              Routine        Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                        Surveillance      or Repair 8.5.1.2) with the value specified by the test program or project specification. If the specified value cannot be achieved, report to owner.
8.5.1.4*        Maximum Housing Component Pressure Drop                                  No              Yes Airflow. After successful completion of para.                      (Not required) 8.5.1.3, increase housing component resistance (artificially by blanking off portions of the filter bank or by adjusting throttling dampers) until the maximum housing component pressure drop for the system (as specified in the test program or project specifications) is achieved. Measure flow rate per para. 8.5.1.2. If the maximum housing component pressure drop airflow cannot be achieved, report to owner.
8.5.1.5*        Return system to clean condition.                                      No              Yes (Not required) 8.5.2 Airflow Distribution Test Procedure NOTE: Airflow distribution tests are not required for a filter bank containing a single HEPA filter.
8.5.2.1*        Airflow Distribution Through HEPA Filter                                  No              Yes Banks. The minimum number of velocity                              (Not required) measurements shall be one in the center of each filter. All measurements should be made an equal distance away from the filters.
Velocity measurements should be made downstream of the filters to take advantage of the airflow distribution dampening effects of the HEPA filters.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 11 OF 13)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                              Routine      Modification Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement              Surveillance    or Repair 8.5.2.2*  Airflow Distribution Through Adsorber Banks.                    No            Yes For banks containing Type I adsorbers, the air            (Not required) distribution test shall follow the same procedures specified for HEPA filter banks in para. 8.5.2.1. For banks containing Type II modular trays, the air distribution test shall follow the same procedure specified for filter banks in para. 8.5.2.1, except that all velocity measurements shall be made in the plane of the face of the air channels, in the center of every open channel and an equal distance away from the adsorbers. For type III adsorbers, velocity measurements shall be made in the plane of the face of the air channels. These measurements shall be made in centers of equal area that cover the entire open face, not in excess of 12 in. between points on a channel, and an equal distance away from the adsorber.
8.5.2.3*  Calculate the average of the velocity readings                  No            Yes (Section 3).                                              (Not required) 8.5.2.4*  Note the highest and lowest velocity readings and              No            Yes calculate the percentage they vary from the average found (Not required) in para. 8.5.2.3. If acceptance criteria are exceeded, notify owner.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 12 OF 13)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph  Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                Surveillance      or Repair 8.6.0 Acceptance Criteria 8.6.1        Acceptance Criteria for Airflow Capacity Test.                  Yes              Yes Airflow shall be within + 10% of the value                  (See note 1)    (See note 2) specified in the test program or project specifications. Maximum housing component pressure drop airflows shall be + 10% of the value specified in the test program or project specifications with the pressure drop greater than or equal to the maximum housing component pressure drop. For systems with carbon adsorbers, the maximum velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be limited to that value specified in the laboratory test (Section 15).
Notes:
(1) Applies only to sections 8.5.1.1 and 8.5.1.2.
(2) Maximum housing component pressure drops will be based on those that result in the system maintaining the TS flowrate +/-10%.
8.6.2*      Airflow Distribution Test. No velocity readings                  No              Yes shall exceed + 20% of the calculated average.              (Not required)
For system with carbon adsorbers, maximum velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be limited to that value specified in the laboratory test (Section 15).
9.0          AIR-AEROSOL MIXING UNIFORMITY TEST                              No              Yes Note: Test will be performed only following relocation of  (Not required)    (See note) the challenge gas injection port or upstream sample port or major modifications or repair that may affect flow distribution.
10.0        HEPA FILTER BANK IN-PLACE TEST                                  Yes              Yes REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 13 OF 13)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                              Routine      Modification Paragraph  Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement            Surveillance    or Repair 11.0        ADSORBER BANK IN-PLACE LEAK TEST                            Yes            Yes 12.0        DUCT DAMPER BYPASS TEST                                      N/A            N/A Note: System design does not include bypass damper.      (See note)    (See note) 13.0        SYSTEM BYPASS TEST                                          N/A            N/A Note: Tests performed per Section 10 satisfy Section 13  (See note)    (See note) test requirements.
14          Air Heater Performance Test                                  N/A            N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.          (See note)    (See note) 15.0        LABORATORY TESTING OF ADSORBENT                              Yes            Yes Note: Laboratory testing will be performed in accordance  (See note)    (See note) with ASTM D3803-1989.
* ASME N510-1989 clearly delineates these steps are intended for acceptance tests performed after any major system modification or major repair.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 1 OF 14)
CONFORMANCE TO ASME N510-1989 PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION (PRF)
SYSTEM FILTER UNITS Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement            Surveillance      or Repair 5 VISUAL INSPECTION 5.5.1 Guidance for Visual Inspection 5.5.1.1(a)    Adequate access to housing.                                    Yes              Yes 5.5.1.1(b)*  Adequate space for personnel and equipment for                  No              Yes maintenance and testing.                                  (Not required) 5.5.1.1(c)*  Doors of rigid construction to resist unacceptable              No              Yes flexure under operating conditions.                      (Not required) 5.5.1.1(d)    Adequate seal between door and casing.                        Yes              Yes 5.5.1.1(e)    Gasket joints are dovetail type with seating                  Yes              Yes surface suitable for accommodating a knife edge            (See note)      (See note) sealing device.
Note: Gaskets are not dovetail type - inspect gaskets for seating surface.
5.5.1.1(f)*  Provision for opening doors from inside and                    No              Yes outside of housing.                                      (Not required) 5.5.1.1(g)    Adequate number and acceptable condition of                    Yes              Yes operable latches on access doors to achieve uniform seating.
5.5.1.1(h)*  Provision for locking doors.                                    No              Yes (Not required) 5.5.1.1(i)*  Adequate structural rigidity of housing to resist              No              Yes unacceptable flexure during operating conditions.        (Not required)
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 2 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                              Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement          Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.1(j)* Access to upper tiers, (above the 7 ft level),                No              N/A provided with permanent ladders and platforms.          (Not required)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.1(k)* At least 3 ft clearance between banks of                      No              N/A components for maintenance and testing.                  (Not required)    (See note)
Note: PRF units have less than 3 feet between some banks by design.
5.5.1.1(l)* Door provided on each side, (upstream and                      No              Yes downstream), of each component bank.                    (Not required)    (See note)
Note: None provided for section between HEPA and carbon filters.
5.5.1.1(m)* No back-to-back installation of components.                    No              Yes (Not required) 5.5.1.1(n)  Sample ports located and labeled upstream and                Yes              Yes downstream of each HEPA filter and adsorber bank.
5.5.1.1(o)  Challenge injection ports located and labeled.                Yes              Yes 5.5.1.1(p)  Sample and injection ports equipped with leak-                Yes              Yes tight caps or plugged.
5.5.1.1(q)  Housekeeping in and around housing adequate                  Yes              Yes for maintenance, testing, and operation.
5.5.1.1(r)  Adequate guards provided on fans for personnel                Yes              Yes safety.
5.5.1.1(s)  Condition of flexible connection between housing              Yes              Yes and fan located external to housing adequate to prevent leakage of untreated air.
5.5.1.1(t)  Fan-shaft seals installed where required.                    Yes              Yes REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 3 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph        Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement              Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.1(u)    Airtight seals for conduits, electrical connections,            Yes              Yes plumbing, drains, or other conditions that could            (See note)      (See note) result in bypassing of the housing or any component therein.
Note: Inspect accessible/visible items. Air tightness of components that could cause bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.1(v)    No sealant or caulking of any type on/in housings              Yes              Yes or component frames. Caulking on/in ducts may                (See note)      (See note) be permissible depending on project specifications.
Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
Adhesive on flexible fan boot is acceptable.
5.5.1.1(w)    Loop seals have adequate water level.                          N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.              (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.1(x)    Satisfactory condition of fire protection                      N/A              N/A components (if provided).                                    (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature. No fire protection provided for PRF filter.
5.5.1.2 Local Instrumentation 5.5.1.2(a)    No unacceptable damage to instrumentation (e.g.,                Yes              Yes gages, manometers, thermometers, etc.).
5.5.1.2(b)    All connections complete.                                      Yes              Yes 5.5.1.3 Lighting, Housing 5.5.1.3(a)    Adequate lighting provided for visual inspection of            N/A              N/A housing and components.                                      (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature. Temporary lighting utilized, as necessary, to perform internal, visual inspections.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 4 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph        Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement          Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.3(b)*    Flush mounted fixtures serviceable from outside              No              N/A the housing.                                            (Not required)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.4 Mounting Frames for Filters and Moisture Separators 5.5.1.4(a)*    Continuous seal weld between members or                      No              Yes frames and between frame and housing.                  (Not required)    (See note)
Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
5.5.1.4(b)*    Adequate structural rigidity for supporting internal          No              Yes components during operating conditions without          (Not required)    (See note) flexure.
Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
5.5.1.4(c)      No unacceptable damage to the frames that may                Yes              Yes interfere with proper seating of components.
5.5.1.4(d)      Sample canisters installed and unused                        Yes              Yes connections capped or plugged leak-tight.
5.5.1.4(e)      No penetrations of the mounting frame except for            Yes              Yes test canisters.
5.5.1.4(f)      No sealant or caulking of any type.                          Yes              Yes Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.  (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.5 Filter Clamping Devices 5.5.1.5(a)      Sufficient number of devices of adequate size to            Yes              Yes assure specified gasket compression.
5.5.1.5(b)*    Individual clamping of filters and adsorbers.                No              Yes (Not required) 5.5.1.5(c)      All clamping hardware complete and in good                  Yes              Yes condition.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 5 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph        Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement            Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.5(d)*      Adequate clearances provided between filter and                No              Yes adsorber units in same bank to tighten clamping          (Not required) devices.
5.5.1.6 Moisture Separators 5.5.1.6(a)      No unacceptable damage to media, frame, or                    N/A              N/A gaskets.                                                    (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.6(b)      No dirt or debris loading which creates higher                N/A              N/A than the specified pressure drop across the bank            (See note)      (See note) of components at the design airflow rate.
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.6(c)      Proper installation of moisture separators.                    N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.            (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.7 Air Heating Coils - Inside Housing 5.5.1.7(a)      No unacceptable damage to coils which may                      Yes              Yes affect operability of the heaters.
5.5.1.7(b)      No unacceptable dirt or debris on or between                  Yes              Yes coils.
5.5.1.8 Prefilters 5.5.1.8(a)      No damage to media, frame, or gaskets which                    Yes              Yes may affect operability of prefilters.
5.5.1.8(b)      No dirt or debris loading which creates higher                Yes              Yes than the specified pressure drop across the filter          (See note)      (See note) bank at the design flow rate.
Note: Inspect for visible loading - pressure drop will be checked by installed gauges.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 6 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement            Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.8(c)    Proper installation of prefilters.                            Yes              Yes 5.5.1.9 HEPA Filters 5.5.1.9(a)    No unacceptable damage to filter media.                      Yes              Yes 5.5.1.9(b)    Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with              Yes              Yes at least 50% compression.                                  (See note)      (See note)
Note: HEPAs have self adjusting clamps-inspect clamps and visually confirm that gaskets appear tight. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.9(c)    No dirt or debris loading which creates higher                Yes              Yes than the specified pressure drop across the filter        (See note)      (See note) bank at the design flow rate.
Note: Inspect upstream side for visible loading - pressure drop will be checked by installed pressure gauges.
5.5.1.9(d)    No sealant or caulking of any type.                          Yes              Yes Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.    (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.9(e)    Filters are properly installed with pleats vertical.          Yes              Yes 5.5.1.10 Adsorbers 5.5.1.10(a)  No unacceptable damage to adsorbers or                        Yes              Yes adsorbent beds.
5.5.1.10(b)  Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with              Yes              Yes at least 50 % compression.                                (See note)      (See note)
Note: Visually confirm that gaskets appear tight. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.10(c)  No through bolts on Type II adsorbers or other                N/A              N/A structure that could cause bypass in an adsorber          (See note)      (See note) bank where visible.
Note: PRF design does not have through-bolts.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 7 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                              Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement          Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.10(d)    No sealant or caulking of any type.                        Yes              Yes Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections. (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.11 Dampers - Housing and Associated Bypass Duct 5.5.1.11(a)    No unacceptable damage to or distortion of frame          N/A              N/A or blades.                                              (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.11(b)    No missing seats or blade edging.                          N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.        (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.11(c)    No unacceptable damage to shaft, pivot pins,              N/A              N/A operator linkages, operators, or packing.              (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.11(d)    Linkage connected and free from obstruction.              N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.        (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.11(e)    No unacceptable damage to gaskets.                        N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.        (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.12 Manifolds 5.5.1.12(a)    No unacceptable damage to test manifolds.                  N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.        (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.12(b)    Adequate clearance between permanent                      N/A              N/A manifolds and filters.                                  (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
6.0 DUCT AND HOUSING LEAK AND STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY TESTS 6.5 Duct And Housing Leak And Structural Capability Tests - Procedure REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 8 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                Surveillance      or Repair 6.5.1*      Structural Capability Test                                          No              Yes Note: Testing to be conducted only on affected components.    (Not required)    (See note) 6.5.2*      Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Constant                          No              Yes Pressure Method)                                              (Not required)    (See note)
Note: This test will be performed only following major modification or repair and conducted on affected components only. Either constant pressure method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
6.5.3*      Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Pressure                          No              Yes Decay Method)                                                (Not required)    (See note)
Note: This test will be performed only following major modification or repair and conducted on affected components only. Either constant pressure method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
6.5.4        Bubble Leak Location Method                                        No              No Note: This method is not a test but rather a leak detection  (Not required)    (See note) method typically used for identifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohibit the use of other detection methods.
6.5.5        Audible Leak Location Method                                        No              No Note: This method is not a test but rather a leak detection  (Not required)    (See note) method typically used for identifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohibit the use of other detection methods.
6.6 Acceptance Criteria 6.6.1        Structural Capability Test. Meets the                              No              No requirements of ASME N509, test program, and                  (Not required)    (See note) project specifications.
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work scope and the system functional requirements.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 9 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                      Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                Surveillance      or Repair 6.6.2          Duct and Housing Leak Test. Meets the                              No              No requirements of ASME N509, test program, and                (See notes for    (See note) project specifications.                                    6.5.2 and 6.5.3)
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work scope and the system functional requirements.
7.0 MOUNTING FRAME PRESSURE LEAK TEST (OPTIONAL)                                  No              No (Optional)      (Optional) 8.0 AIRFLOW CAPACITY AND DISTRIBUTION TESTS 8.5.1 Airflow Capacity Test Procedure 8.5.1.1        Start system fan and verify stable (no surging) fan              Yes              Yes operation for 15 min.
8.5.1.2        Measure system airflow in accordance with 2.2 or                  Yes              Yes equivalent.                                                    (See note)      (See note)
Note: Reference 2.2 Industrial Ventilation: A Manual of Recommended Practice (20th Edition) excluding figure 9-5.
8.5.1.3*      Clean System Airflow. With the new housing                        No              Yes components installed, or simulated, operate at the          (Not required) clean differential pressure and compare measured flow rate (using methods of para.
8.5.1.2) with the value specified by the test program or project specification. If the specified value cannot be achieved, report to owner.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 10 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                          Routine          Modification Paragraph  Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                        Surveillance        or Repair 8.5.1.4*  Maximum Housing Component Pressure Drop                                    No                  Yes Airflow. After successful completion of para.                        (Not required) 8.5.1.3, increase housing component resistance (artificially by blanking off portions of the filter bank or by adjusting throttling dampers) until the maximum housing component pressure drop for the system (as specified in the test program or project specifications) is achieved. Measure flow rate per para. 8.5.1.2. If the maximum housing component pressure drop airflow cannot be achieved, report to owner.
8.5.1.5*  Return system to clean condition.                                        No                  Yes (Not required) 8.5.2      Airflow Distribution Test Procedure NOTE: Airflow distribution tests are not required for a filter bank containing a single HEPA filter.
8.5.2.1*  Airflow Distribution Through HEPA Filter Banks.                            No                  Yes The minimum number of velocity measurements                          (Not required) shall be one in the center of each filter. All measurements should be made an equal distance away from the filters. Velocity measurements should be made downstream of the filters to take advantage of the airflow distribution dampening effects of the HEPA filters.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 11 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                      Routine      Modification Paragraph  Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement      Surveillance      or Repair 8.5.2.2*  Airflow Distribution Through Adsorber Banks. For        No              Yes banks containing Type I adsorbers, the air        (Not required) distribution test shall follow the same procedures specified for HEPA filter banks in para. 8.5.2.1.
For banks containing Type II modular trays, the air distribution test shall follow the same procedure specified for filter banks in para.
8.5.2.1, except that all velocity measurements shall be made in the plane of the face of the air channels, in the center of every open channel and an equal distance away from the adsorbers. For type III adsorbers, velocity measurements shall be made in the plane of the face of the air channels. These measurements shall be made in centers of equal area that cover the entire open face, not in excess of 12 in. between points on a channel, and an equal distance away from the adsorber.
8.5.2.3*  Calculate the average of the velocity readings          No              Yes (Section 3).                                      (Not required) 8.5.2.4*  Note the highest and lowest velocity readings and        No              Yes calculate the percentage they vary from the        (Not required) average found in para. 8.5.2.3. If acceptance criteria are exceeded, notify owner.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 12 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                  Surveillance      or Repair 8.6.0 Acceptance Criteria 8.6.1        Acceptance Criteria for Airflow Capacity Test.                      Yes              Yes Airflow shall be within + 10% of the value                      (See note 1)    (See note specified in the test program or project                                              2) specifications. Maximum housing component pressure drop airflows shall be + 10% of the value specified in the test program or project specifications with the pressure drop greater than or equal to the maximum housing component pressure drop. For systems with carbon adsorbers, the maximum velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be limited to that value specified in the laboratory test (Section 15).
Notes:
(1) Applies only to sections 8.5.1.1 and 8.5.1.2.
(2) Maximum housing component pressure drops will be based on those that result in the system maintaining the TS flowrate +/-10%.
8.6.2*      Airflow Distribution Test. No velocity readings                      No              Yes shall exceed + 20% of the calculated average.                  (Not required)
For system with carbon adsorbers, maximum velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be limited to that value specified in the laboratory test (Section 15).
9.0          AIR-AEROSOL MIXING UNIFORMITY TEST                                  No              Yes Note: Test will be performed only following relocation of the (Not Required)    (See note) challenge gas injection port or upstream sample port or major modifications or repair that may affect flow distribution.
10.0        HEPA FILTER BANK IN-PLACE TEST                                      Yes              Yes 11.0        ADSORBER BANK IN-PLACE LEAK TEST                                    Yes              Yes REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 13 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                    Routine      Modification Paragraph        Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement              Surveillance    or Repair 12.0          DUCT DAMPER BYPASS TEST                                          N/A            N/A Note: System design does not include bypass damper.          (See note)      (See note) 13.0          SYSTEM BYPASS TEST                                              N/A            N/A Note: Tests performed per Section 10 satisfy Section 13 test (See note)      (See note) requirements.
14 AIR HEATER PERFORMANCE TEST 14.3 Prerequisites 14.3.1        Prerequisite: Visual inspection of the heater is                N/A            N/A completed (para. 5.5.1.7).
14.3.2        Prerequisite: Electrical control and feed power is              N/A            N/A available and all safety interlocks have been checked.
14.5 Procedure 14.5.1        With power on, and system operating at rated                    N/A            N/A flow, measure the voltage and current of all power circuits.
14.5.2        With heater energized and system operating at                    N/A            N/A rated airflow, measure the temperature of the entering and leaving air. A sufficient number of measurements shall be taken to determine average entering and leaving temperatures.
14.5.3        If measured values do not meet acceptance                        N/A            N/A criteria, notify the owner.
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FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 14 OF 14)
Testing Conformance Following Major N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph        Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement          Surveillance    or Repair 14.6 Acceptance Criteria 14.6.1          Operating currents, voltages and change in                  N/A            N/A temperature shall be within the limits of test program or project specifications.
15.0 LABORATORY TESTING OF ADSORBENT                                        Yes              Yes Note: Laboratory testing will be performed in accordance with ASTM D3803- (See note)      (See note) 1989.
* ASME N510-1989 clearly delineates these steps are intended for acceptance tests performed after any major system modification or major repair.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-19 (SHEETS 1 THROUGH 6)
CONFORMANCE TO ASME N510-1989 (SECTION 5)
CONTAINMENT PURGE EXHAUST FILTRATION (CPEF) SYSTEM FILTER UNITS (This table has been deleted.)
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 1 OF 12)
CONFORMANCE TO ASME N510-1989 POST-ACCIDENT PURGE FILTRATION SYSTEM Testing Conformance Following N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement            Surveillance      or Repair 5 VISUAL INSPECTION 5.5.1 Guidance for Visual Inspection 5.5.1.1(a)  Adequate access to housing.                                    Yes              Yes 5.5.1.1(b)*  Adequate space for personnel and equipment for                  No              Yes maintenance and testing.                                  (Not required) 5.5.1.1(c)*  Doors of rigid construction to resist unacceptable              No              Yes flexure under operating conditions.                      (Not required) 5.5.1.1(d)  Adequate seal between door and casing.                        Yes              Yes 5.5.1.1(e)  Gasket joints are dovetail type with seating                  Yes              Yes surface suitable for accommodating a knife edge            (See note)      (See note) sealing device.
Note: Gaskets are not dovetail type - inspect gaskets for seating surface only when accessible.
5.5.1.1(f)*  Provision for opening doors from inside and                    No              N/A outside of housing.                                      (Not required)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.1(g)  Adequate number and acceptable condition of                    Yes              Yes operable latches on access doors to achieve uniform seating.
5.5.1.1(h)*  Provision for locking doors.                                    No              Yes (Not required) 5.5.1.1(i)*  Adequate structural rigidity of housing to resist              No              Yes unacceptable flexure during operating conditions.        (Not required)
REV 29 4/20
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 2 OF 12)
Testing Conformance Following N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.1(j)* Access to upper tiers, (above the 7 ft elev),                      No              N/A provided with permanent ladders and platforms.              (Not required)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.1(k)* At least 3 ft clearance between banks of                          No              N/A components for maintenance and testing.                      (Not required)    (See note)
Note: Units have less than 3 feet between some banks by design.
5.5.1.1(l)* Door provided on each side, (upstream and                          No              N/A downstream), of each component bank.                        (Not required)    (See note)
Note: No door upstream of HEPA or charcoal filters are proved in design. (Housing is a pressure vessel with limited access.)
5.5.1.1(m)* No back-to-back installation of components.                        No              Yes (Not required) 5.5.1.1(n)  Sample ports located and labeled upstream and                    Yes              Yes downstream of each HEPA filter and adsorber bank.
5.5.1.1(o)  Challenge injection ports located and labeled.                    Yes              Yes 5.5.1.1(p)  Sample and injection ports equipped with leak-                    Yes              Yes tight caps or plugged.
Note: Valves may be used for the sample and injection ports. Outlets are capped.
5.5.1.1(q)  Housekeeping in and around housing adequate                      Yes              Yes for maintenance, testing, and operation.
5.5.1.1(r)  Adequate guards provided on fans for personnel                    N/A              N/A safety.                                                      (See Note)      (See Note)
Note: The design does not include this feature (no fan).
5.5.1.1(s)  Condition of flexible connection between housing                  N/A              N/A and fan located external to housing adequate to              (See Note)      (See Note) prevent leakage of untreated air.
Note: The design does not include this feature (no fan).
REV 29 4/20
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 3 OF 12)
Testing Conformance Following N510-1989                                                                Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement          Surveillance    or Repair 5.5.1.1(t)    Fan-shaft seals installed where required.                  N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature (no fan). (See Note)      (See Note) 5.5.1.1(u)    Airtight seals for conduits, electrical connections,        Yes              Yes plumbing, drains, or other conditions that could        (See note)      (See note) result in bypassing of the housing or any component therein.
Note: Inspect accessible/visible items. Air tightness of components that could cause bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.1(v)    No sealant or caulking of any type on/in housings          Yes              Yes or component frames. Caulking on/in ducts may            (See note)      (See note) be permissible depending on project specifications.
Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without disassembly during inspections.
5.5.1.1(w)    Loop seals have adequate water level.                      N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.          (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.1(x)    Satisfactory condition of fire protection                  N/A              N/A components (if provided).                                (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature. No fire protection provided.
5.5.1.2 Local Instrumentation 5.5.1.2(a)    No unacceptable damage to instrumentation                  Yes              Yes (e.g., gages, manometers, thermometers, etc.).
5.5.1.2(b)    All connections complete.                                  Yes              Yes REV 29 4/20
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 4 OF 12)
Testing Conformance Following N510-1989                                                                      Routine      Modification Paragraph        Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement              Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.3 Lighting, Housing 5.5.1.3(a)    Adequate lighting provided for visual inspection of              N/A              N/A housing and components.                                      (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature. Temporary lighting utilized, as necessary, to perform internal visual inspections.
5.5.1.3(b)*    Flush mounted fixtures serviceable from outside                  No              N/A the housing.                                                (Not required)    (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.4 Mounting Frames for Filters and Moisture Separators 5.5.1.4(a)*    Continuous seal weld between members or                          No              Yes frames and between frame and housing.                      (Not required)    (See note)
Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without disassembly during inspections.
5.5.1.4(b)*    Adequate structural rigidity for supporting internal              No              Yes components during operating conditions without              (Not required)    (See note) flexure.
Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without disassembly during inspections.
5.5.1.4(c)    No unacceptable damage to the frames that may                    Yes            Yes interfere with proper seating of components.                  (See note)      (See note)
Note: Not accessible. Inspect only normally accessible areas without disassembly during inspections. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.4(d)    Sample canisters installed and unused                            N/A            N/A connections capped or plugged leak-tight.                    (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.4(e)    No penetrations of the mounting frame except for                  Yes            Yes test canisters.                                              (See note)      (See note)
Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without disassembly during inspections.
REV 29 4/20
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 5 OF 12)
Testing Conformance Following N510-1989                                                              Routine      Modification Paragraph        Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement        Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.4(f)      No sealant or caulking of any type.                      Yes              Yes Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without  (See note)      (See note) disassembly during inspections.
5.5.1.5 Filter Clamping Devices 5.5.1.5(a)      Sufficient number of devices of adequate size to          Yes              Yes assure specified gasket compression.
5.5.1.5(b)*    Individual clamping of filters and adsorbers.              No              Yes Note: Adsorber is type III Filter.                  (Not required)    (See note) 5.5.1.5(c)      All clamping hardware complete and in good                Yes              Yes condition.
5.5.1.5(d)*    Adequate clearances provided between filter and            No              Yes adsorber units in same bank to tighten clamping      (Not required) devices.
5.5.1.6 Moisture Separators 5.5.1.6(a)      No unacceptable damage to media, frame, or                N/A              N/A gaskets.                                              (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.6(b)      No dirt or debris loading which creates higher            N/A              N/A than the specified pressure drop across the bank      (See note)      (See note) of components at the design airflow rate.
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.6(c)      Proper installation of moisture separators.              N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.        (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.7 Air Heating Coils - Inside Housing 5.5.1.7(a)      No unacceptable damage to coils which may                N/A              N/A affect operability of the heaters.                    (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
REV 29 4/20
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 6 OF 12)
Testing Conformance Following N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph        Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement          Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.7(b)      No unacceptable dirt or debris on or between                N/A              N/A coils.                                                    (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.8 Prefilters 5.5.1.8(a)      No damage to media, frame, or gaskets which                  N/A              N/A may affect operability of prefilters                      (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.8(b)      No dirt or debris loading which creates higher              N/A              N/A than the specified pressure drop across the filter        (See note)      (See note) bank at the design flow rate.
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.8(c)      Proper installation of prefilters.                          N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.          (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.9 HEPA Filters 5.5.1.9(a)      No unacceptable damage to filter media.                      Yes              Yes 5.5.1.9(b)      Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with            Yes              Yes at least 50% compression.                                (See note)      (See note)
Note: Visually confirm that gaskets appear tight. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.9(c)      No dirt or debris loading which creates higher              Yes              Yes than the specified pressure drop across the filter        (See note)      (See note) bank at the design flow rate.
Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without disassembly during inspections. Pressure drop will be checked by installed pressure gauges.
5.5.1.9(d)      No sealant or caulking of any type.                          Yes              Yes Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without      (See note)      (See note) disassembly during inspections.
REV 29 4/20
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 7 OF 12)
Testing Conformance Following N510-1989                                                                  Routine      Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement              Surveillance      or Repair 5.5.1.9(e)    Filters are properly installed with pleats vertical.            Yes              Yes 5.5.1.10 Adsorbers 5.5.1.10(a)  No unacceptable damage to adsorbers or                          Yes              Yes adsorbent beds.
5.5.1.10(b)  Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with                Yes              Yes at least 50 % compression.                                  (See note)      (See note)
Note: Visually confirm that gaskets appear tight.
Adsorber is type III. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
5.5.1.10(c)  No through bolts on Type II adsorbers or other                  N/A              N/A structure that could cause bypass in an adsorber            (See note)      (See note) bank where visible.
Note: Adsorber is type III.
5.5.1.10(d)  No sealant or caulking of any type.                            Yes              Yes Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without        (See note)      (See note) disassembly during inspections.
5.5.1.11 Dampers - Housing and Associated Bypass Duct 5.5.1.11(a)  No unacceptable damage to or distortion of frame                N/A              N/A or blades.                                                  (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.11(b)  No missing seats or blade edging.                              N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.              (See note)      (See note) 5.5.1.11(c)  No unacceptable damage to shaft, pivot pins,                    N/A              N/A operator linkages, operators, or packing.                    (See note)      (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
5.5.1.11(d)  Linkage connected and free from obstruction.                    N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.              (See note)      (See note)
REV 29 4/20
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 8 OF 12)
Testing Conformance Following N510-1989                                                                              Routine          Modification Paragraph      Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                      Surveillance          or Repair 5.5.1.11(e)    No unacceptable damage to gaskets.                                        N/A                  N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.                      (See note)          (See note) 5.5.1.12 Manifolds 5.5.1.12(a)    No unacceptable damage to test manifolds.                                N/A                  N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.                      (See note)          (See note) 5.5.1.12(b)    Adequate clearance between permanent                                      N/A                  N/A manifolds and filters.                                                (See note)          (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature.
6 DUCTWORK AND HOUSING LEAK AND STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY TESTS Note: The design does not include this feature. Piping is utilized for the flow path and the filter housing is a pressure vessel.
8 AIRFLOW CAPACITY AND DISTRIBUTION TESTS 8.5.1 Airflow Capacity Test Procedure 8.5.1.1        Start system fan and verify stable (no surging) fan                      N/A                  N/A operation for 15 minutes.                                            (See note)          (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature (no fan).
8.5.1.2        Measure system airflow in accordance with 2.2 or                          Yes                  Yes equivalent.                                                          (See note)          (See note)
Note: The design does not include this feature (no field measurement points provided in piping). Air flow will be measured with in-place instrumentation and associated accuracy or with external instrumentation in the supply line from a temporary air source.
REV 29 4/20
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 9 OF 12)
Testing Conformance Following N510-1989                                                                                Routine        Modification Paragraph        Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement                        Surveillance        or Repair 8.5.1.3*      Clean System Air flow. With the new housing                                  No              Yes components installed, or simulated, operate at                        (Not required) the clean differential pressure and compare measured flow rate (using methods of para.
8.5.1.2) with the value specified by the test program or project specification. If the specified value cannot be achieved, report to owner.
8.5.1.4*      Maximum Housing Component Pressure Drop                                      No              N/A Airflow. After successful completion of para.                        (Not required)      (See note) 8.5.1.3, increase housing component resistance (artificially by blanking off portions of the filter bank or by adjusting throttling dampers) until the maximum housing component pressure drop for the system (as specified in the test program or project specifications) is achieved. Measure flow rate per para. 8.5.1.2. If the maximum housing component pressure drop airflow cannot be achieved, report to owner.
Note: The design does not include this feature (no fan) 8.5.1.5*      Return system to clean condition.                                          No              N/A (Not required) 8.5.2 Airflow Distribution Test Procedure Note: Airflow distribution tests are not required for a filter bank containing a single HEPA filter.
8.5.2.1*      Airflow Distribution Through HEPA Filter Banks.                              No              N/A The minimum number of velocity measurements                          (Not required)      (See note) shall be one in the center of each filter. All measurements should be made an equal distance away from the filters. Velocity measurements should be made downstream of the filters to take advantage of the airflow distirbution dampening effects of the HEPA filters.
Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA filter is present.
REV 29 4/20
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 10 OF 12)
Testing Conformance Following N510-1989                                                              Routine      Modification Paragraph    Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement            Surveillance    or Repair 8.5.2.2*  Airflow Distribution Through Adsorber Banks. For                No            N/A banks containing Type I adsorbers, the air                (Not required)  (See note) distribution test shall follow the same procedures specified for HEPA filter banks in para 8.5.2.1.
For banks containing Type II modular trays, the air distribution test shall follow the same procedure specified for filter banks in para.
8.5.2.1, except that all velocity measurements shall be made in the plane of the face of the air channels, in the center of every open channel and an equal distance away from the adsorbers.
For type III adsorbers, velocity measurements shall be made in the plane of the face of the air channels. These measurements shall be made in centers of equal area that cover the entire open face, not in excess of 12 in. between points on a channel, and an equal distance away from the adsorber.
Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA filter is present.
8.5.2.3*  Calculate the average of the velocity readings                  No            N/A (Section 3).                                              (Not required)  (See note)
Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA filter is present.
8.5.2.4*  Note the highest and lowest velocity readings and              No            N/A calculate the percentage they vary from the              (Not required)  (See note) average found in para. 8.5.2.3. If acceptance criteria are exceeded, notify owner.
Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA filter is present.
REV 29 4/20
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 11 OF 12)
Testing Conformance Following N510-1989                                                                      Routine      Modification Paragraph            Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement            Surveillance      or Repair 8.6.0 Acceptance Criteria.
8.6.1              Acceptance Criteria for Airflow Capacity Test.                Yes              Yes Airflow shall be within the values specified in the        (See note) test program or project specifications. Maximum housing component pressure drop airflows shall be less than or equal to the values specified in the test program or project specifications with the pressure drop greater than or equal to the maximum housing component pressure drop.
For systems with carbon adsorbers, the maximum velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be limited to that value specified in the laboratory test (Section 15).
Note: Applies only to section 8.5.1.2.
8.6.2*            Airflow Distribution Test. No velocity readings                No              N/A shall exceed 20% of the calculated average.              (Not required)    (See note)
For system with carbon adsorbers, maximum velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be limited to that value specified in the laboratory test (Section 15).
Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA filter is present.
9 AIR-AEROSOL MIXING UNIFORMITY TEST                                              N/A              N/A Note: This is a single HEPA system and this test does not apply.              (See note)      (See note) 10 HEPA FILTER BANK IN-PLACE TEST                                                Yes              Yes Note: In-place leak testing will be performed following HEPA filter                            (See note) replacement.
11 ADSORBER BANK IN-PLACE TEST                                                    Yes              Yes REV 29 4/20
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 12 OF 12)
Testing Conformance Following N510-1989                                                                      Routine      Modification Paragraph          Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement              Surveillance      or Repair 12 DUCT DAMPER BYPASS TEST                                                        N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include bypass damper.                                (See note)      (See note) 13 SYSTEM BYPASS TEST                                                              N/A              N/A Note: Tests performed per Section 10 satisfy Section 13 requirements.          (See note)      (See note) 14 AIR HEATER PERFORMANCE TEST                                                    N/A              N/A Note: The design does not include this feature.                                (See note)      (See note) 15 LABORATORY TESTING OF ADSORBENT                                                Yes              Yes Notes:                                                                        (See notes)    (See notes)
: 1. Laboratory testing will be performed in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989.
: 2. Laboratory testing will be performed following adsorber replacement, at approximately 24-month intervals, 720 h of system operation, or following exposure to solvent, paints, or other organic fumes or vapors which exceed the administrative limit.
* ASME N510-1989 clearly delineates these steps are intended for acceptance tests performed after any major system modification or repair.
REV 29 4/20
 
REV 21 5/08
[CONCENTRATION OF CHLORINE IN JOSEPH M. FARLEY            CONTROL ROOM AFTER ONSITE CHLORINE NUCLEAR PLANT                RELEASE - CASE A (SMALL SCALE)
UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-1 (SHEET 1 OF 5)]
 
REV 21 5/08
[CONCENTRATION OF CHLORINE IN JOSEPH M. FARLEY            CONTROL ROOM AFTER ONSITE CHLORINE NUCLEAR PLANT                RELEASE - CASE A (LARGE SCALE)
UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-1 (SHEET 2 OF 5)]
 
REV 21 5/08
[CONCENTRATION OF CHLORINE IN JOSEPH M. FARLEY            CONTROL ROOM AFTER ONSITE CHLORINE NUCLEAR PLANT                RELEASE - CASE B (SMALL SCALE)
UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.41 (SHEET 3 OF 5)]
 
REV 21 5/08
[CONCENTRATION OF CHLORINE IN JOSEPH M. FARLEY            CONTROL ROOM AFTER ONSITE CHLORINE NUCLEAR PLANT                RELEASE - CASE B (LARGE SCALE)
UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-1 (SHEET 4 OF 5)]
 
REV 21 5/08 HALON 1301 CONCENTRATION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                    IN CONTROL ROOM UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-1 (SHEET 5 OF 5)
 
REV 21 5/08 UNITS 1 AND 2 DIESEL GENERATOR JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT          BUILDING EQUIPMENT LOCATION ON ROOF UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-2 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
 
REV 21 5/08 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING EQUIPMENT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                ON ROOF (ELEVATION AS SHOWN)
UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-2 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
 
REV 21 5/08 CHLORINE CONCENTRATION VERSUS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                  TIME DIESEL GENERATOR UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-3
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.5      OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5.1    FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM The fire protection program is based on the NRC requirements and guidelines, Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL) Property Loss Prevention Standards and related industry standards.
With regard to NRC criteria, the fire protection program meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c), which endorses, with exceptions, the National Fire Protection Associations (NFPA) 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants - 2001 Edition. Farley Nuclear Plant has further used the guidance of NEI 04-02, Guidance for Implementing a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program under 10 CFR 50.48(c) as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.205, Risk-Informed, Performance Fire Protection for Existing Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants.
Adoption of NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) serves as the method of satisfying 10 CFR 50.48(a) and General Design Criterion 3. Prior to adoption of NFPA 805, General Design Criterion 3, Fire Protection of Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, to 10 CFR Part 50, Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, was followed in the design of safety and nonsafety-related structures, systems, and components, as required by 10 CFR 50.48(a).
NFPA 805 does not supersede the requirements of GDC 3, 10 CFR 50.48(a), or 10 CFR 50.48(f). Those regulatory requirements continue to apply. However, under NFPA 805, the means by which GDC 3 or 10 CFR 50.48(a) requirements are met may be different than under 10 CFR 50.48(b). Specifically, whereas GDC 3 refers to SSCs important to safety, NFPA 805 identifies fire protection systems and features required to meet the Chapter 1 performance criteria through the methodology in Chapter 4 of NFPA 805. Also, under NFPA 805, the 10 CFR 50.48(a)(2)(iii) requirement to limit fire damage to SSCs important to safety so that the capability to safely shut down the plant is satisfied by meeting the performance criteria in Section 1.5.1 of NFPA 805.
A License Amendment and Safety Evaluation were issued on March 10, 2015 and October 17, 2016, by the NRC, that transitioned the existing fire protection program to a risk-informed, performance-based program based on NFPA 805, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c).
9.5-1                          REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.5.1.1        Design Basis Summary 9.5.1.1.1      Defense-in-Depth The fire protection program is focused on protecting the safety of the public, the environment, and plant personnel from a plant fire and its potential effect on safe reactor operations. The fire protection program is based on the concept of defense-in-depth. Defense-in-depth shall be achieved when an adequate balance of each of the following elements is provided:
(1)    Preventing fires from starting.
(2)    Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting fire damage.
(3)    Providing an adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
9.5.1.1.2      NFPA 805 Performance Criteria The design basis for the fire protection program is based on the following nuclear safety and radiological release performance criteria contained in Section 1.5 of NFPA 805:
* Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. Fire protection features shall be capable of providing reasonable assurance that, in the event of a fire, the plant is not placed in an unrecoverable condition. To demonstrate this, the following performance criteria shall be met:
(a)    Reactivity Control. Reactivity control shall be capable of inserting negative reactivity to achieve and maintain subcritical conditions. Negative reactivity inserting shall occur rapidly enough such that fuel design limits are not exceeded.
(b)    Inventory and Pressure Control. With fuel in the reactor vessel, head on and tensioned, inventory and pressure control shall be capable of controlling coolant level such that subcooling is maintained such that fuel clad damage as a result of a fire is prevented for a PWR.
(c)    Decay Heat Removal. Decay heat removal shall be capable of removing sufficient heat from the reactor core or spent fuel such that fuel is maintained in a safe and stable condition.
9.5-2                            REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 (d)    Vital Auxiliaries. Vital auxiliaries shall be capable of providing the necessary auxiliary support equipment and systems to assure that the systems required under (a), (b), (c), and (e) are capable of performing their required nuclear safety function.
(e)    Process Monitoring. Process monitoring shall be capable of providing the necessary indication to assure the criteria addressed in (a) through (d) have been achieved and are being maintained.
* Radioactive Release Performance Criteria. Radiation release to any unrestricted area due to the direct effects of fire suppression activities (but not involving fuel damage) shall be as low as reasonable achievable and shall not exceed applicable 10 CFR, Part 20 limits.
Chapter 2 of NFPA 805 establishes the process for demonstrating compliance with NFPA 805.
Chapter 3 of NFPA 805 contains the fundamental elements of the fire protection program and specifies the minimum design requirements for fire protection systems and features.
Chapter 4 of NFPA 805 establishes the methodology to determine the fire protection systems and features required to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria outlined above.
The methodology shall be permitted to be either deterministic or performance-based.
Deterministic requirements shall be deemed to satisfy the performance criteria, defense-in-depth, and safety margin and require no further engineering analysis. Once a determination has been made that a fire protection system or feature is required to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria of Section 1.5, its design and qualification shall meet the applicable requirement of Chapter 3.
9.5.1.1.2      Codes of Record The codes, standards, and guidelines used for the design and installation of plant fire protection systems are listed in DWG A-181805, NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Design Basis Document.
9.5-3                            REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.5.1.2        System Description 9.5.1.2.1      Required Systems Nuclear Safety Capability Systems, Equipment, and Cables Section 2.4.2 of NFPA 805 defines the methodology for performing the nuclear safety capability assessment. The systems equipment and cables required for the nuclear safety capability assessment are contained in DWG A-181805, NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Design Basis Document.
Fire Protection Systems and Features Chapter 3 of NFPA 805 contains the fundamental elements of the fire protection program and specifies the minimum design requirements for fire protection systems and features.
Compliance with Chapter 3 is documented in DWG A-181805, NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Design Basis Document.
Chapter 4 of NFPA 805 establishes the methodology and criteria to determine the fire protection systems and features required to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria of Section 1.5 of NFPA 805. These fire protection systems and features shall meet the applicable requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3. These fire protection systems and features are documented in DWG A-181805, NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Design Basis Document.
Radioactive Release Structures, systems, and components relied upon to meet the radioactive release criteria are documented in DWG A-181805, NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Design Basis Document.
9.5.1.2.2      Definition of Power Block Structures Where used in NFPA 805 Chapter 3, the terms Power Block and Plant refer to structures that contain equipment required for nuclear plant operations. For the purposes of establishing the structures included in the fire protection program in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) and NFPA 805, the plant structures listed in DWG A-181805, NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Design Basis Document, are considered to be a part of the power block.
9.5-4                        REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 9.5.1.3          Safety Evaluation DWG A-181805, NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Design Basis Document documents the achievement of the nuclear safety and radioactive release performance criteria of NFPA 805 as required by 10 CFR 50.48(c). This document fulfills the requirements of Section 2.7.1.2, Fire Protection Program Design Basis Document of NFPA 805. The document contains the following:
* Identification of significant fire hazards in the fire area. This is based on NFPA 805 approach to analyze the plant from an ignition source and fuel package perspective.
* Summary of the Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment (at power and non-power) compliance strategies.
        - Deterministic compliance strategies.
        - Performance-based compliance strategies (including defense-in-depth and safety margin).
* Summary of the Non-Power Operations Modes compliance strategies.
* Summary of the Radioactive Release compliance strategies.
* Summary of the Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessments.
* Key analysis assumptions to be included in the NFPA 805 monitoring program.
9.5.1.4          Fire Protection Program Documentation, Configuration Control, and Quality Assurance In accordance with Chapter 3 of NFPA 805, a fire protection plan documented in DWG A-181805, NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Design Basis Document, defines the management policy and program direction and defines the responsibilities of those individuals responsible for the plans implementation. This includes:
* Designating the senior management position with immediate authority and responsibility for the fire protection program.
* Designating a position responsible for the daily administration and coordination of the fire protection program and its implementation.
* Defining the fire protection interfaces with other organizations, assigning responsibilities for the coordination of activities, and identifying the various plant positions having the authority for implementing the various areas of the fire protection program.
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FNP-FSAR-9
* Identifying the appropriate authority having jurisdiction for the various areas of the fire protection program.
* Identifying the procedures established for the implementation of the fire protection program, including the post-transition change process and the fire protection monitoring program.
* Identifying the qualifications required for various fire protection program personnel.
* Identifying the quality requirements of Chapter 2 of NFPA 805.
Detailed compliance with the programmatic requirements of Chapters 2 and 3 of NFPA 805 is contained in DWG A-181805, NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Design Basis Document.
9.5.2  COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS The communication systems include internal (in-plant) and external communications designed to provide convenient and effective operational communications among various plant locations and between the plant and locations external to the plant.
The communication systems are not required for the safe shutdown of the reactor except in response to fires as discussed in appendix 9B and after incidents that require hot shutdown as discussed in paragraph 7.4.1.3.F.
9.5.2.1        Design Bases Various communication systems are provided in the plant to ensure reliable communications during plant startup, operation, shutdown, and maintenance under normal conditions.
9.5.2.2        Description Interplant and intraplant communications systems consist of telephones, handsets, and loudspeakers. These systems include a plant address system, an intraplant telephone system, an intraplant sound-powered telephone system, microwave communication system, two-way radio communication, an emergency alarm system, the Gra-Ceba Telephone Company system, an intracompany computer network, and the ftS-2000 emergency telecommunications system.
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FNP-FSAR-9 The plant public address system operates from an ac bus which is powered by the diesel generators upon loss of offsite power. This ensures communication to all areas of the plant, and that the plant alarm may be sounded. The system uses noise canceling dynamic microphone handsets located in strategic positions. Loudspeakers located throughout the plant are powered by individual amplifiers. Muting facilities are provided where required. In the event of a plant alarm, individual volume control is overridden and the speaker amplifiers are automatically set to the maximum volume. The system has one paging and five party line channels.
The intraplant telephone system employs handsets at strategic areas for private conversation and supports a Pico-Cellular cordless telephone system. The Pico-Cellular System provides wireless telephone coverage for strategic areas of the plant.
The intraplant sound-powered telephone system employs a multiple set of circuits based on operating systems to aid in startup and checkout procedures.
The microwave communication is connected to the intraplant telephone switchboard to enable the plant personnel to have dial service to other Alabama Power Company (APC) locations, including the general office in Birmingham, Alabama.
The two-way radio communication system permits communications in strategic areas of the plant via an antenna system comprised of leaky coaxial cable and regular antennae. This system also provides communication capability outside of the plant within the coverage area of the outside antenna. Individual radio power is controlled to 5 watts or less of output.
Administrative controls ensure the radio will not be used near EMI sensitive equipment or in EMI sensitive areas. Each portable radio must be keyed before transmission occurs.
The commercial telephone is available in the plant, providing service through connecting (Gra-Ceba Telephone Company) companies to the South Central Bell System.
The Southern Company Computer network provides communication between the high voltage substation switchhouse, the APC load dispatcher, the Southern Company power pool, and other Southern Company plants.
Emergency telecommunications are provided through the Federal Government's ftS-2000 phone system. This system consists of dedicated circuits from within the plant to the NRC Operations Center in Bethesda, MD, and is used in the event of a plant emergency. The circuits are listed below:
ENS    -  Emergency Notification System HPN    -  Health Physics Network RSCL  -  Reactor Safety Counterpart Link PMCL  -  Protective Measures Counterpart Link MCL    -  Management Counterpart Link LAN    -  Local Area Network 9.5-7                            REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The above circuits are all telephone circuits. ERDS transmits specified plant parameters directly from the Unit 1 and Unit 2 plant computers to the NRC Operations Center in Bethesda, MD.
9.5.2.3          Inspection and Tests All communication systems with the exception of the sound-powered telephone and emergency alarm system are in operation daily; this allows for testing to ensure that the system is operable.
The sound-powered system and emergency alarm system are tested periodically to ensure that they remain operable (excluding the sound powered phone circuits in CTMT).
9.5.2.4          Safety Evaluation The communication system allows maximum flexibility and redundancy to prevent loss of either offsite or intraplant communication from a single failure. Five channels are available for offsite communications: direct microwave telephone lines to general office and APC communication network, Gra-Ceba Telephone Company system, two-way radio, intracompany computer network, and ftS-2000 emergency telecommunications to the NRC. Each of these systems is separate; therefore, failure of any one system does not result in loss of offsite communication.
The intraplant system consists of an emergency alarm, public address system, intraplant telephone system, two-way radio system, and an intraplant sound-powered telephone system.
These systems are separated so that a failure in any one system does not result in a failure of any other system. However, only the Public Address System (PA), the Intrasite Telephone System (PAX), and the Sound Powered Phone System have been evaluated for operability due to a fire in a given fire area. Note that the two-way radio communications system has not been evaluated for the effects of a fire. Reference A-180583 and A-203583 for locations evaluated.
Refer to drawings D-177331; D-177334, sheets 1 through 3; D-177335; D-177336; D-177337, sheets 1 through 3; D-177338; D-177339; D-207331; D-207334, sheets 1 and 2; D-207336; D-207337, sheets 1 and 2; and D-207339, for the communication system.
9.5.3    LIGHTING SYSTEMS Plant lighting is divided into three categories: normal, essential, and emergency. Normal and essential lighting are both ac, with essential lighting capable of operation from the plant diesels.
Emergency lighting is either dc, supplied from station batteries and individual battery packs, or is ac, supplied from emergency lighting transformers. Essential lighting levels are designed to be either equal to or in excess of the levels stipulated in the seventh edition of the Illuminating Engineering Society (IES) standards (1972).
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.5.3.1          Normal Lighting Power for normal lighting in the auxiliary and containment buildings is provided from 600-V load centers A, B, and C. All fixtures and lamps are rated for 277 V, except for underwater lamps and lamps associated with cranes, which are rated for 120 V. Incandescent lamps are used in areas with floor drains. Fluorescent lamps are used in areas without floor drains.
Industrial and commercial aluminum fixtures are used in the auxiliary building. Steel and epoxy-coated cast iron fixtures are used in the containment.
Normal lighting outside of the auxiliary and containment buildings is powered from local ac supplies. The rating of the lamps depends on the voltage of the available local power. The type of fixtures used is dependent on application and location.
9.5.3.2          Essential Lighting Power for essential ac lighting in the Unit 1 auxiliary building and in the areas shared between Units 1 and 2 is provided from the shared 600-V motor control centers 1F and 1G. Power for essential lighting in the Unit 2 auxiliary building is supplied from 600-V motor control centers 2CC and 2DD. Essential lighting in the auxiliary building is in operation at all times. The fixtures are located in close proximity to equipment necessary for safe shutdown of the plant. In case of a loss of offsite power, the essential lighting power is supplied by plant diesels.
Essential ac lighting in buildings other than the auxiliary building is also located in close proximity to equipment necessary for safe shutdown of the plant and is fed from local diesel backed motor control centers.
9.5.3.3          Emergency Lighting Emergency dc lighting is designed for personnel safety and plant shutdown. Direct current lighting for the control room is supplied from station batteries. In the event of loss of ac power, the dc lights will automatically switch on to provide the required lighting.
All other dc lighting receives its power from individual self-contained battery packs.
Battery packs in Category I structures are recharged from ac emergency buses. Battery packs in other structures are recharged from local ac supplies. The battery pack units are capable of providing light for a minimum of 90 min at illumination levels either equal to or in excess of the requirements stipulated in the seventh edition of the IES standards (1972).
Each individual battery pack unit is connected to a 277-V, or 120-V single-phase, 60-Hz unswitched power supply. In Category I structures, emergency lights are designed as Category I equipment. In the event of loss of ac power, the battery pack is switched on automatically to provide the required lighting.
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FNP-FSAR-9 The ac emergency lighting systems for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containments are each comprised of two uninterruptible power supply units, two step-down distribution transformers, and multiple 120 V-ac sealed-beam units. The UPS units are connected to emergency lighting transformers that supply power to the sealed-beam units. Upon loss of power from a lighting transformer, the associated UPS units will switch on emergency power to the sealed-beam units.
9.5.4    DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM 9.5.4.1        Design Bases The emergency diesel generator fuel oil system is a Safety Class 2B system designed to supply the minimum number of diesels required for 7 days of operation with 10 percent excess capacity for testing using the deliverable capacity of four of the five underground storage tanks. The minimum number of required diesels is described in paragraph 8.3.1.1.7.2. The required storage tank capacities are based on the following values:
A. Diesel fuel oil heating capacity of 135,000 Btu/gal at 60&deg;F.
B. Diesel generator fuel oil consumption rates as identified in manufacturer's data.
The diesel generator fuel oil system meets the requirements of the single-failure criteria and is Seismic Category I.
The total diesel fuel oil storage capacity is divided as follows:
A. Day tanks for each diesel generator sized with a capacity sufficient for at least 4 h of operation.
B. Five shared underground storage tanks for the diesel generators are sized such that four tanks provide sufficient capacity for the 7-day requirement, plus an additional 10 percent of the 7-day requirement.
The following design data are applicable to the diesel generator fuel oil system:
Number of storage tanks                                5 Storage tank capacity                                  40,000 gal/tank Storage tank design pressure                          Atmospheric Storage tank design temperature                        Ambient Number of transfer pumps                              10 (2 per storage tank)
Transfer pump capacity                                20 gal/min Transfer pump head                                    40 ft Number of day tanks                                    5 (1 per diesel) 9.5-10                            REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 The emergency diesel generators use Grade No. 2 fuel oil:
Day tank capacity                                      1000 gal (2 tanks) 1325 gal (3 tanks)
Day tank design pressure                                Atmospheric Day tank design temperature                            Ambient The diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks are buried. The specification for these tanks required that they be designed to Article ND-3800 of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section III nuclear code. Since this article does not specifically cover underground tanks subjected to external soil pressure, the tanks were designed in accordance with the spirit of the article. Section VIII, Division I, was used to obtain allowable external pressure on the tanks.
No code gives specific instructions for calculating the external pressure caused by soil cover.
Therefore, the methods developed by the American Water Works Association (AWWA) were used because they have been proven by experience to be adequate. The ASME Section VIII code is much more conservative with regard to required shell thickness than the methods used by the AWWA. Thus, the methods used by AWWA to calculate soil pressure, combined with use of the ASME Section VIII code for shell thickness, give a very safe margin.
Underground piping is protected by a wrapping system which conforms to AWWA C203-66 (standard for coal tar enamel protective coatings for steel pipe). Corrosion protection for the underground storage tank consists of a bitumastic coating, similar to that used for the piping.
A cathodic protection system is also provided for all underground piping and the underground storage tanks but not credited for aging management. Provision is made on each tank for periodic draining of any water which might collect.
All tanks, pumps, valves, and piping conform to the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Class 3, with the exception of the day tanks and the storage tank vent lines. The day tanks conform to the requirements of Section VIII of the code and the vent lines meet B 31.1 criteria.
9.5.4.2        Description The diesel generator fuel oil system is shown in drawing D-170060, and additional drawings further describing the physical layout and dimensions of the system are D-170210, sheet 1; D-170211; D-170357, sheet 1; D-170357, sheet 2; and figure 9.5-1. The shared fuel oil storage system consists of five underground storage tanks interconnected with piping, valves, and redundant capacity fuel transfer pumps.
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FNP-FSAR-9 The diesel engine day tanks are replenished from the onsite storage tanks by individual supply lines with cross-connecting capability to the other day tanks. Each tank has the necessary fittings required for the following:
A.      Truck fill and water removal.
B.      Venting.
C.      Instrument connections.
D.      Mounting flanges for transfer pumps.
Each storage tank has two vertical, centrifugal transfer pumps that provide a redundant means for transferring fuel oil from the storage tanks to the day tanks and other storage tanks. These transfer pumps can also be aligned for fuel oil recirculation. The minimum recirculation time necessary for representative sampling can be established by dye tracer testing. Wye strainers fitted with type 316 stainless steel screen with 0.045-in. perforations are installed in the discharge line of each pump. System instrumentation and control are provided on the tanks and pumps as stated below.
Each day tank is equipped with level switches for starting and stopping one transfer pump with a switch at the low level giving an alarm and a second switch at the low-low level giving a second alarm so that the other pump can be started manually.
Local control stations, located in switchgear rooms, allow the transfer pumps to be individually started or stopped by the operator. All controls are powered from the respective pumps motor control center via control transformers that reduce the control voltage to a nominal 120 V-ac.
Day tank high-level and low-level alarms actuate in both the diesel generator building and the main control room. Alarms are powered from the 125 V-dc system.
Each day tank has the capacity for at least 4 h of operation of its respective diesel generator at rated continuous load. The tank has the fittings required for the following:
A.      Water removal and drain valve.
B.      Venting.
C.      Instrument connections.
D.      Suction and recirculation line connections and valves.
9.5.4.3          Evaluation The minimum onsite fuel storage capacity has been determined to be adequate based on 7 days of operation of the minimum required diesels as described in paragraph 3.8.1.1.7.2.
Allowing an additional storage capacity of 10 percent for periodic testing of the diesel generators ensures that 7 days of useable fuel oil is always available.
The underground storage tanks can be filled directly from tank trucks. The possibility that delivery trucks could not reach the site under adverse weather conditions is very remote, since hard-surfaced roads for year-round transportation exist between the site and the metropolitan areas of Dothan and Columbia, Alabama. If road transportation cannot be provided, barge delivery can be used, as could delivery by helicopter.
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FNP-FSAR-9 Sizing criteria of each day tank were selected to provide adequate capacity to preclude excessive cycling of the transfer pump and at least 2 h of operation after the low-level alarm to allow sufficient time for manual operator action(s) in response to system or equipment problems. The low-low level alarm will warn the operator that at least a 1-h supply remains in the tank. A failure analysis of the system is presented in table 9.5-1.
9.5.4.4          Tests and Inspections All components of the system are tested in accordance with applicable codes and standards.
The entire diesel generator fuel oil system is flushed with oil and then functionally tested in accordance with the procedure outlined in chapter 14. The fuel oil in the storage tanks and the day tanks will be periodically tested to detect any contamination or deterioration.
The diesel generator fuel oil system is required to supply acceptable quality diesel oil to the emergency diesel generators in an emergency condition for safe shutdown of the plant. The surveillance requirements of the diesel fuel oil system are delineated in the plant technical specifications. The Fuel Oil Chemistry Control Program credited as a license renewal aging management program is described in chapter 18, subsection 18.2.9.
9.5.4.5          Instrumentation Application The diesel generator fuel oil system is provided with required level switches for automatic operation of the pumps.
The underground storage tanks are equipped with level transmitters which provide indication on the main control board. An insertion point for a manual dipstick gauge is also provided for each underground storage tank.
The emergency diesel generator fuel oil day tank instrumentation consists of: a liquid level control switch for controlling the operation of the automatic transfer pump and to provide a local and main control room low-low level alarm; a liquid level switch to provide local and main control room high-low level alarm; a level transmitter to provide main control room indication; and a sight glass. The sight glass is normally isolated to assure inadvertent breakage of the glass will not result in loss of fuel oil.
Control switches located on local panels can be used for starting or stopping the automatic and the manual transfer pumps. These control switches can also be aligned for automatic operation of the automatic transfer pump.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.5.5    DIESEL GENERATOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM 9.5.5.1        Design Bases The diesel generator cooling water system is a Safety Class 2B system designed to supply a continuous flow of cooling water to the heat exchangers on all diesel generators. The system meets the requirements of the single failure criteria and is Seismic Category I.
9.5.5.2        Description The diesel generator cooling water system which supplies all diesel generator heat exchangers is shown in drawings D-170119, sheet 3 and D-200013, sheet 3.
Each diesel generator has a separate closed cooling water system. The assured Category I makeup source for diesel generator's closed cooling water system is from the Seismic Category I service water system. The normal operating source is from demineralized water, with the service water providing emergency backup.
9.5.5.3        Evaluation The diesel generator cooling water system provides a completely redundant supply of cooling water to each diesel. Since the diesels themselves are redundant, this provides a complete backup. Valving is arranged so that no single failure renders the diesel generator system incapable of performing its safety function.
As shown in drawings D-170119, sheet 3 and D-200013, sheet 3, check valves are provided in the cooling water supply lines to the three shared diesels, so that cooling water is available from either of the operating units.
The isolation valves in the supply lines from both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to the shared diesels (1-2A, 1C, and 2C) will be left open. The nonshared diesels (1B and 2B) will be supplied only from the unit to which that diesel generator furnishes electrical power. The isolation valves in the line from the other unit are normally closed.
All diesels on one train are supplied with cooling water from the same train. Following a postulated failure of the common header supply piping of train B of Unit 1, diesel generator 2B will be receiving cooling water from train B of Unit 2, which is its designated supply source, 9.5-14                            REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 since the isolation valve in the Unit 1 supply line will be closed. In addition, diesel generator 2C will be receiving cooling water from train B of Unit 2.
Since the isolation valves in the discharge lines from the shared diesels will be left open during operation, these diesels will always have a cooling water discharge path to either Unit 1 or Unit 2.
A single-failure analysis is presented in table 9.5-2.
All piping is located in the diesel generator building or buried with a minimum of 3 ft 10 in. of cover. All valves are located inside the diesel generator building.
9.5.6    DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING SYSTEM 9.5.6.1          Design Basis The diesel generator starting system is designed to:
* Supply sufficient compressed air at sufficient pressure which, introduced into the cylinder above the pistons in the normal firing order, cranks the engine at a speed sufficient for engine starting and reaching rated speed within the licensing basis time of 12 s after receipt of the initial start signal.
* Provide two redundant air starting trains for each engine so that no single active failure renders the diesel generator starting system inoperable.
* Meet Seismic Category I requirements for the portions of the diesel generator starting system which are required to start the diesel upon receipt of an actuation signal.
9.5.6.2          Description The diesel generator starting air system is shown in drawings D-170806, sheets 1 and 2; D-170807, sheets 1 and 2; and D-200212. The starting system includes two completely redundant trains consisting of an air compressor large enough to recharge an accumulator in 30 min. The accumulator is of sufficient size to furnish air for five engine starts without recharging.
The starting air system configuration differs slightly between the 3 large diesel engines and the 2 small diesel engines as described below.
A.      PC-2 Diesel Engines 1-2A, 1B, and 2B (large engines)
For the large diesel engines, the starting air is piped from the accumulator to the air start valve (air operated). Upon an automatic start or a manual start signal from the control room, a solenoid valve is energized to admit air to open the air 9.5-15                            REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 start valve which pressurizes the starting air header. The starting air from the header is distributed to each air start check valve on the cylinders in the right bank. The starting air distributor is driven from the free end of the camshaft and delivers air as it rotates to open the starting air check valves in the correct firing order. As air enters the cylinders and pushes on the pistons, the engine rotates until it starts. The redundant air starting train, which is also energized simultaneously with the first train by the same signal, consists of the same components and configuration except air is supplied to the left bank of cylinders.
B.      38TD8-1/8 Diesel Engines 1C and 2C (small engines)
For the small diesel engines, the starting air is piped from the accumulator to the air-operated air start valve and the solenoid-operated pilot valve. The starting signal (automatic or manual) causes the solenoid-operated pilot valve to bleed the control air from the air start valve, causing the air start valve to open. Thus, receiver air at high pressure is admitted to a starting air header and a starting air distributor. The starting air distributor is driven from the free end of the camshaft and delivers air in the correct firing order to open the air start check valves for cylinders 1 through 6. As air enters the cylinders and pushes on the pistons, the engine rotates until it starts. The redundant air starting train, which is also energized simultaneously with the first train by the same signal, consists of the same components and configuration except air is supplied to cylinders 7 through 12.
9.5.6.3        Safety Evaluation The two complete starting trains ensure that the failure of any one component will not affect the starting of the engine.
9.5.7  DIESEL GENERATOR LUBRICATION SYSTEM 9.5.7.1        Design Basis The engine is equipped with a pressure lubrication and piston cooling system which supplies a continuous flow of oil to all surfaces requiring lubrication and to the pistons for cooling when the engine is running and a standby system to warm and circulate the oil when the engine is not running.
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FNP-FSAR-9 9.5.7.2          Description of External Oil System 9.5.7.2.1        Engine PC-2 The built-in lubricating oil pump is driven from the engine drive gear and draws oil from the oil sump through a mesh intake screen. The oil is then forced through an external cooler and strainer and back into the engine through the lower oil header. The lubricating oil temperature is regulated by means of a temperature regulator which bypasses more or less oil around the cooler. An electrically operated "keep-warm" pump runs continuously to circulate the oil through a thermostatically controlled heater and then through a 5-m filter and back to the engine lower oil header. An additional electrically operated prelube pump is used to prelube the rocker arm system according to manufacturers recommendations prior to any start other than automatic.
9.5.7.2.2        Engine 38TD8-1/8 The built-in lubricating oil pump is driven by the engine through a flexible drive coupling and draws oil from the oil sump through a mesh intake screen. The oil is then forced through an external filter, cooler, and strainer then back into the engine through the lower oil header. The lubricating oil temperature is regulated by means of a temperature regulator which bypasses more or less oil around the cooler. When the engine is not running, an electrically operated keep-warm pump circulates oil from the sump through a thermostatically controlled heater and is introduced back into the lube oil system at the discharge side of the engine-driven lube oil pump. An additional electrically operated prelube pump is used to prelube all engine bearings according to manufacturers recommendations prior to any start other than automatic.
9.5.7.3          Description of Internal Oil System 38TD8-1/8 Engines 1C and 2C Oil flows through the lower header toward the blower end where a vertical pipe carries the oil to the upper header so that the header will not readily drain. Through supply pipes from both lower and upper headers, oil is forced to each main bearing and thence through tubes swagged into the crankshaft to each crankpin bearing. From each crankpin bearing, oil passes through the drilled passage in the connecting rod to the piston pin bearings and to the pistons.
The cooling oil from each lower piston is discharged through a hole in the insert. Oil from each upper piston is discharged through a hole in the insert into the compartment around the upper ends of the cylinders. This oil then drains either toward the blower or the control end and down to the oil pan or subbase.
The two camshafts receive lubrication from the upper oil header. The camshafts are hollow, and small openings at each bearing allow oil to reach the bearing surfaces. An opening in the end of each camshaft supplies oil to the camshaft sprockets and to the overspeed governor.
During engine startup, a lube oil accumulator supplies oil to the upper crankcase oil system.
The accumulator fills with oil during normal engine operation. The next time the engine is started, the oil accumulated in the cylinder is forced by starting air pressure into the bearings.
9.5-17                          REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 As documented in the NRC SER for Design of Diesel Generator Lubrication Modifications for Diesel Generators 1C and 2C Farley Unit 2, dated 120/28/9982, the lubrication system of these engines conforms to the NRC acceptance criteria contained in the recommendations of NUREG/CR-0660 and will prevent a dry start during automatic starting.
9.5.7.4          Description of Internal Oil System PC-2 Engines 1-2A, 1B, and 2B On the PC-2 engine 1-2A, 1B, and 2B, oil flows through the oil header and individual pipes distribute the oil to each of the crankshaft main bearings. Oil is then fed to the crankpin bearings through holes drilled to the crankshaft. Special drilling in the connecting rod allows the oil to flow up to the piston pin bushing, around the cooling tubes cast in the piston crown, and down the connecting rod to return to the engine sump.
Separate feeds are also taken into the camshaft drive gear, the governor drive, the end camshaft bearings, overspeed trip, and water pump bearings. Oil is also fed to a header along each side of the engine situated behind the fuel pumps. Individual pipes from these headers lubricate the intermediate camshaft bearings, push rods, rollers, and injection pump rollers.
A separate lubricating oil system is provided for lubrication of the valve rocker gear on the cylinder heads. This system incorporates its own pump, driven from the engine camshaft, and a small reservoir tank in which the oil level is automatically controlled. A duplex filter is provided in this system.
9.5.7.5          Safety Evaluation A failure of one component of the lubricating oil system will not jeopardize the availability of onsite generation for safe shutdown requirements. The lubricating system for each diesel is located totally within the compartment of its associated diesel. Therefore, failure of this system associated with a particular diesel will not affect the integrity of the other diesel generators.
9.5-18                              REV 30 10/21
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.5-1 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS OF DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM Failure                                                    Method of Items Description          Function              Mode    Cause of Failure      Effect on Subsystem          Failure      Effect on System Detection
: 1. Diesel oil      Each tank stores 3 1/2      Leaks    Crack, corrosion  Loss of insignificant oil      Level indicator None: Tanks still storage tank  days supply of fuel per                                  supply                        and periodic          available tank for 1 diesel                                                                        inspection
: 2. Transfer pump  Pump fuel to day tank or    No output (1) Motor fail    Cannot pump fuel oil          Level alarm    None: Use redundant storage tanks                                                                                                  diesel (2) Pump fail      Cannot pump fuel oil          Level alarm    None: Use redundant diesel (3) Loss of power  Cannot pump fuel oil          Level alarm    None: Use redundant diesel
: 3. Transfer line  Pipe fuel to day tank        Rupture  Crack, corrosion  Only 3 hours of available fuel Level alarm    None: Use redundant oil to the diesel it serves                          diesel
: 4. Day tank        Stores 4-hour fuel supply    Rupture  Crack, corrosion  Loss of fuel supply to the    Level alarm    None: Use redundant at diesel                                                diesel it serves                                      diesel
: 5. Valve          Isolate portion of line to  Leaks    Crack, corrosion  Loss of part of oil supply    Level indicator None: Four tanks still transfer fuel                                                                                                  available
: 6. Valve          Unisolate portion of line to Frozen in Valve disc to      Cannot transfer oil supply    Operator        None: Use redundant transfer fuel                place    stem separation                                  identified            diesel REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.5-2 SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS DIESEL GENERATOR COOLING WATER Effect on Safety-Related Component            Malfunction      Systems                                  Comments Diesel generator      Diesel failure            No effect    Redundancy of the diesel generators is provided.
Cooling water supply  Line break                No effect    Failure of either cooling water train of either unit header                                                      can result in the disabling of no more than one large and one small diesel generator. One large diesel per unit is capable of furnishing the required safety-related power to its assigned unit. A total of two small and three large diesels is provided.
Supply header        Header isolation          No effects  During two-unit operation, no single train valve fails closed                    supplies cooling water to more than one small diesel and one large diesel. Therefore, any train failure affects only these diesels.
During one-unit operation, the above statement is also true. Only a total of four diesels is considered operational during one-unit operation. The large diesel assigned to the nonoperating unit will be isolated. The nonshared large diesel will be isolated from the unit not required to furnish cooling water to that diesel.
Discharge header      Header isolation          No effects  During two-unit operation, each diesel will valve fails closed                    have a discharge path to either of the units.
Therefore, this single failure will not result in loss of flow to the diesels. During one-unit operation, this failure will result in the loss of flow to the diesel of the failed cooling water train only. The remaining train will provide cooling water to the required number of diesels in that train.
REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.5-3 (DELETED)
REV 30 10/21
 
REV 21 5/08 DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT                SYSTEM PHYSICAL LAYOUT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.5-1
 
FNP-FSAR-9A APPENDIX 9A ULTIMATE HEAT SINK EVALUATION -
RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 9A.1 RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT .......................................................................................... 9A-1 9A-i                                                      REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9A LIST OF TABLES 9A-1 Residual Decay Heat Values Used in the Updated UHS Calculations 9A-2 Deleted 9A-ii                      REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9A LIST OF FIGURES 9A-1 Residual Decay Heat Finite Irradiation of Three-Region Cores 9A-2 Comparison of Westinghouse and UHS Calculation Residual Decay Heat Curves 9A-iii                        REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9A APPENDIX 9A ULTIMATE HEAT SINK ELEVATION - RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT 9A.1    DECAY HEAT The decay heat generation for the Farley units is given in figure 9A-1. These curves are provided in Westinghouse Specification No. BOP-FR-8, Rev. 1, Functional Requirements and Design Criteria-Residual Decay Heat Standard. The decay heat values for the Farley units are taken from these curves. The finite irradiation time assumes a three-region core with equal mass regions irradiated for 8000, 16,000, and 24,000 h (effective full power), respectively.
These data have been compared to those which result from an application of the American Nuclear Society standard (ANS-5) for finite times using, for the contribution from fission products, the formula:
3
[                  (        )]
P /Po(t) = (1+ u) 1/3  P /Po (, t )  P /Po , t + t i
i=1 Where:
I              =        Core region of interest.
ti              =        Irradiation time of region i (8000 h for region 1, 16,000 h for region 2, and 24,000 h for region 3).
P/Po (t)        =        Decay heat fraction of initial power at time t.
P/Po (,t)      =        Decay heat fraction for infinite irradiation time from ANS-5 curve.
u              =        Recommended uncertainties per ANS-5 (20 percent t is 103 s, 10 percent 103 s < t < 107 s).
The result, within the accuracy of reading two values from the ANS-5 curve for infinite irradiation and the accuracy of plotting the difference plus prescribed uncertainties, agrees with the fission product decay curve in figure 9A-1.
The U-238 capture decay (due to U-239 and Np-239 decay) contribution shown in figure 9A-1 was calculated with equations prescribed by ANS-5 plus a 10-percent uncertainty.
The contribution from delay neutron-induced fissions is excluded from consideration by ANS-5.
A sample of the decay heat values used in the evaluation of the ultimate heat sink is given in table 9A-1. These values are based on the residual decay heat curves provided in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Revision 2, July 1981, Branch Technical Position ASB 9A-1                                    REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9A 9-2 (pages 9.2.5-11 to 9.2.5-13). Figure 9A-2 compares the Westinghouse total decay heat curve to the curve obtained using the total decay heat values from the updated ultimate heat sink evaluation. The curve formed using the total residual decay heat values from the UHS envelopes the Westinghouse curve; hence, the values used in the UHS calculation are conservative.
NUREG-0800 was employed in the heat sink calculation because it provides an added conservatism in the determination of residual decay heat and, subsequently, to the heat load to the ultimate heat sink. Furthermore, in no way does the use of NUREG-0800 in the ultimate heat sink calculation alter the existing design basis provided by the Westinghouse curves.
9A-2                              REV 21 5/08
 
FNP-FSAR-9A TABLE 9A-1 RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT USED IN THE UPDATED UHS CALCULATION The total residual decay heat values used in the updated heat sink calculation are based on the residual decay heat curves provided in NUREG-0800 (page 9.2.5-11 to 9.2.5-13). The curves provide residual decay heat values in terms of fractions of full power. The value for full power that is used to determine the megawatt value of residual decay heat is 2774 MW. This MW decay heat is then converted to Watts and, finally, to Btu/h. The decay heat values are reported relative to the time when the reactor is shutdown.
Tshutdown (s)                  Residual Decay Heat Rate (107 Btu/h) 14800                                          9.8 34800                                          7.7 54800                                          6.8 74800                                          5.9 92800                                          5.5 112800                                          5.3 132800                                          5.2 152800                                          5.0 172800                                          4.8 192800                                          4.7 217800                                          4.4 242800                                          4.2 267800                                          4.0 292800                                          3.8 317800                                          3.7 342800                                          3.6 392800                                          3.5 442800                                          3.4 492800                                          3.3 542800                                          3.2 592800                                          3.0 642800                                          2.9 692800                                          2.7 792800                                          2.5 992800                                          2.3 2584800                                          2.3 REV 21 5/08
 
REV 21 5/08 RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT FINITE JOSEPH M. FARLEY              IRRADIATION OF THREE-REGION NUCLEAR PLANT                          CORES UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9A-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
 
REV 21 5/08 RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT FINITE JOSEPH M. FARLEY              IRRADIATION OF THREE-REGION NUCLEAR PLANT                          CORES UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9A-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
 
REV 21 5/08 COMPARISON OF WESTINGHOUSE JOSEPH M. FARLEY              AND UHS CALCULATION RESIDUAL NUCLEAR PLANT                    DECAY HEAT CURVES UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9A-2
 
FNP-FSAR-9B APPENDIX 9B FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM Refer to A-181805, NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Design Basis Document.
9B-i                          REV 26 11/15}}

Latest revision as of 12:09, 19 November 2024

0 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 9, Auxiliary Systems
ML21313A332
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Issue date: 10/28/2021
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