ML22140A377

Reference File for DPO-2020-004 Appeal Case File - Redacted, Public

ML22140A377
Person / Time
Issue date:	05/20/2022
From:	Carolyn Lauron NRC/NRR/DNRL/NRLB
To:
Carolyn Lauron - 301-415-2736
References
DPO-2020-004
Download: ML22140A377 (54)

Text

Reference file for DPO-2020- 004 This reference file includes additional information related to the Differing Profession Opinion (DPO) Case File DPO-2020- 004 ( Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML22056A017). The below table provides a roadmap of publicly available information referenced in the DPO casefile. It includes a brief description of the information, where that information is referenced in the DPO casefile, and where that information can be located. The identified locations of the DPO casefile where particular information is discussed are provided for information only and may not be exhaustive.

DPO-2020-004 Case File PDF Brief Description Location Page Number 3, 7, 23-24, 26, 40, SECY-93- 087, Policy, Technical, and 44, 66, 79, 80, 84, Licensing Issues Pertaining to ADAMS Accession No.

87, 91, 96-97,100 Evolutionary and Advanced Light-Water ML003708021 Reactor (ALWR) Designs (Apr. 2, 1993).

3, 21-22, 35, 40-41, Staff Requirements SECY-93-087 44-45, 59-60, 62, Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues ADAMS Accession No.

64-65, 67, 73-75, Pertaining to Evolutionary and AdvancedML003708056 82-83, 91-92, 96-Light-Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs 97, 100 (July 21, 1993).

3, 22, 35, 41, 45 - DC/COL-ISG-020, Interim Staff Guidance 46, 59-65, 67, 73 -on Implementation of a Probabilistic Risk ADAMS Accession No.

74, 91, 101 Assessment-Based Seismic Margin ML100491233 Analysis for New Reactors (May 2010).

NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports 3, 22, 45, 67, 100- for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition, ADAMS Accession No.

101 Section 19.0, Probabilistic Risk ML15089A068 Assessment and Severe Accident Evaluation for New Reactors (Dec. 2015).

10-12, 14-15, 16, Stanford Seismic Design Guidelines (forhttps://lbre.stanford.edu/sites/lb 19-20, 23, 26, 53, Engineers & Architects), by Stanford re-56, 67, 80, 82, 87 University, ( Jan. 2020). production/files/publications/sd g january 2020.pdf) 14-16, 19-20, 24, https://www.structuremag.org/w 27, 56, 67, 82, 84 -Vancouver House, by Geoff Poh, p-85, 105, 107, 109-P.Eng., Structure (Jan. 2020). content/uploads/2019/12/27200 110 1-F-Vancouver.pdf 14, 16-17, 19, 20, Salesforce Tower by Ron Klemencic, https://www.structuremag.org/w 27, 51-52, 66, 82, P.E., S.E., Michael T. Valley, P.E. andp-content/uploads/2017/05/F-84, 85, 107, 109-John D. Hooper, P.E., S.E.; Structure Salesforce-Jun17.pdf 110 (June 2017).

DPO-2020-004 Case File PDF Brief Description Location Page Number NEHRP Recommended Seismic https://www.fema.gov/node/neh 15, 23, 27, 49-50, Provisions for New Buildings and Other rp-recommended-seismic-66 Structures FEMA P-750 / 2009 Edition. provisions-new-buildings-and-other-structures

21, 27, 86 ACI Presidents Memorandum Concrete https://www.concrete.org/news/

International (Jan. 2020). newsdetail.aspx?f=51723494

NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports ADAMS Accession No.

34, 44-45, 64, 67 for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition, ML13198A258 Section 3.8.4, Other Seismic Category I Structures (Sept. 2013).

Emails between the DPO submitter, the 40, 88 DPO submitters supervisor, and other Pages 5 - 7 of this document staff during the safety review of the NuScale application in 2017 and 2018.

Email and email attachment from DPO 40, 41, 42, 88 submitter to the DPO panel members with Pages 8 - 13 of this document additional clarifications and information.

https://www.fema.gov/sites/defa FEMA P-695, Quantification of Building ult/files/2020-46, 49-50, 53, 66 Seismic Performance Factors:, (June 08/fema earthquakes quantific 2009). ation-of-building-seismic-performance-factors-fema-p-695.zip

46, 60, 66 EPRI Report NP-6041, Nuclear Plant https://www.epri.com/research/

Seismic Margin R-1, ( Aug. 1991). products/NP-6041-SLR1

National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST), E valuation of the https://www.nehrp.gov/pdf/nistg 46, 66 FEMA P-695 Methodology for cr10- 917-8.pdf Quantification of Building Seismic Performance Factors (Nov. 2010).

Villaverde, Roberto, Methods to Assess the Seismic Collapse Capacity of Building https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE) 47-48, 67 Structures: State of the Art, American 0733-9445(2007)133:1(57)

Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), J.

Struct. Eng., 133(1):57-66.

DPO-2020-004 Case File PDF Brief Description Location Page Number https://www.energy.gov/sites/pr Anderson, Lisa, et al., Consideration of od/files/2019/01/f58/7%20Consi Component Level vs. Element Level deration%20of%20Component Stresses in Concrete Nuclear Safety- %20Level%20vs.%20Element 58, 59, 66 Related Structures Under High Seismic %20Level%20Stresses%20in%

Loading, Presented at the 2018 DOE-20Concrete%20Nuclear%20Saf NRC Natural Phenomena Hazards ety-Meeting, October 23, 2018. Related%20Structures%20Und er%20High%20Seismic%20Loa ding.pdf NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report (Rev. 3) - Part 02 - Tier 2 - Chapter 03 - Design of ADAMS Accession No.

58, 67 Structures, Systems, Components and ML19248B833 (Package)

Equipment - Appendices 3A - 3C -

Design Reports and Critical Sections Details, (Sept. 30, 2019).

EPRI Report TR-103959, Methodology https://www.epri.com/research/

60, 66 for Developing Seismic Fragilities ( June products/1022995 1994).

NUREG/CR-5720, Assessment of ADAMS Accession No.

60, 66 Seismic Margin Calculation Methods ML20248D089 (March 1989).

ASCE 43-19, Seismic Design Criteria for https://ascelibrary.org/doi/epdf/

61,66 Structures, Systems, and Components in 10.1061/9780784415405 Nuclear Facilities ( 2019).

Document from DPO submitter explaining fundamental differences between DPO ADAMS Accession No.

71, 79, 81, 88 and DPO Panels Report (attachment to ML21132A136 email from DPO submitter to NRR Office Director).

79, 81 Email from DPO submitter to NRR Office Director. Page 14 of this document

88, 108 Email from DPO submitter to staff Page 15 of this document

88, 108 Email from staff to DPO submitter Page 16 of this document Email from DPO submitter to the DPO N/A appeal review team responding to Pages 17 - 18 of this document questions on the DPO.

DPO-2020-004 Case File PDF Brief Description Location Page Number Email Attachment to email from DPO N/A submitter to the EDO appeal review team, Pages 19 - 23 of this document EDO question on my DPO and my answer.

Email Attachment to email from DPO N/A submitter to the EDO appeal review team, Pages 24 - 54 of this document Performance-Based Seismic Design of Seismic Category I Structures.

N/A Email from EDO to NRR Office Director. ADAMS Accession No. ML22082A178

Staff Response to Taskings i n Decision ADAMS Accession No.

N/A on Differing Professional Opinion Appeal ML22062A007 Concerning (DPO2020004)

Disagreement w ith the Deputy Directors Response and Conclusion

I (the N C P subm ittal) apprec iate the response f rom the D eputy D irec tor. I believ e his c onc lusions are w rong bec ause (1) he neglec ted the f ac ts that are presented in the N C P subm ittals, and he did not dispute those f ac ts, and (2) his understanding and interpretation of the N R C polic y in SRM SECY 93 -087, S R P, str uc tur al engineer ing, P R A, and the G L 88-20 and IPEEE are im proper. These w ill be stated and disc ussed below.

The D eputy D irec tor stated, I hav e read through the ref erenc es in this N C P, as stated on page 12 of 13 in this N O N-C O N CU RR E NC E P R O CE S S. If he did, he should k now the f ollow ing f ac ts as stated and desc ribed in those ref erenc es:

1. The f undam ental goal of building design is to ac hiev e no c ollapse.

2. The struc tural engineering analy sis/design m ethod is the tool to ac hiev e that goal.

3. The PR A m ethod is to ev aluate the c onsequenc e of a building c ollapse, suc h as the probabilistic risks of nuc lear c ore dam age resulting fr om the c ollapse of the N uS c ale reac tor building, or its struc tural m em bers suc h as roof s, f loors, and w alls, but is not intended to predic t and c annot predic t the building behav iors (responses) and c ollapse during earthquak es.

4. Im portant buildings are designed f or a m ax im um c onsider ed ear thquak e ( M C R ), w hic h equals a m inim um m agnitude of 1.5 tim es the ac c eleration of its design basis earthquak e ground m otions, as a required seism ic m argin, using the struc tural engineering analy sis/design m ethod. That m agnitude, or seism ic m argin, is inc reased proportionally f or buildings w hose c ollapse c ould c ause signif ic antly m ore death.

5. The N R C polic y spec if ied that m agnitude or seism ic m argin to be 1.67, or (R LE = 1.67 x SSE) in SRM SECY 93-087.

6. The shield building of AP 1000 and the c ontainm ent building of KH N P dem onstrated that they c ould sustain R LE w ith no c ollapse through struc tural engineering analy sis/design m ethods.

7. The staf f of the PR A group stated that the N uSc ale reac tor building should not be allow ed to c ollapse during the R LE.

8. The N R O m anagem ent (SEB C hief and an Ac ting D irec tor) ordered m e not to request the N uSc ale applic ant to dem onstrate that the reac tor building c ould sustain R LE w ith no c ollapse using the struc tural engineering analy sis/m ethod. Instead they w anted to use a P R A appr oac h.

I believ e that the m anagem ent was w rong bec ause (1) its order is against the saf ety princ iple of building design f or not using a seism ic m argin of 1.5 or 1.67, (2) replac ing the struc tural engineering analy sis/design m ethod that has been used by the w orldw ide struc tural engineering c om m unity (prac tic ing lic ensed prof essional engineers and building of f ic ials) by a PR A m ethod that c annot predic t building behav iors (responses) or c ollapse of a building during earthquak es,

and (3) and its order c aused no dem onstration that the building w ill not c ollapse bey ond the SSE.

The D eputy D irec tor did not dispute any f ac ts as stated in item 1 through 8 but only tried to justif y that the N R O m anagem ents order to be proper. He m isinterpreted the polic y and the S R P and of f ered his im proper understanding and interpretation of how the reac tor building should be designed w ith respec t to the R LE. H e f urther tried to use G L-88-20 and IPEEE that were issued and prac tic ed m ore than 30 y ears ago to resolv e the c urrent unanaly zed/undersigned problems of the N uSc ale reac tor building w ith respec t to the R LE. H is m isinterpretations and im proper understandings c an be seen f rom the f ollow ing ex c erpts of his statem ents:

1) N R O m anagem ent indic ated that the ground m otion ac c eleration sc reening threshold of 1.67 tim es design basis SSE is a C om m ission polic y that is im plem ented using the guidanc e in SR P Sec tion 19.0, Probabilistic R isk Assessm ent and Sev ere Ac c ident Ev aluation f or N ew R eac tors. (page 12 of 13 in this N O N -CONCURRENCE PROCES)

2) The agenc y has im plem ented the C om m ission' s direc tion in SR M SEC Y 93-087 through the Standardized R ev iew Plan (SR P) C hapter 19, dated D ec em ber 2015..(page 11 of 13 in this N O N-CONCURRENCE PROCESS)

3) Theref ore, there is not a no c ollapse standard def ined by the C om m ission polic y appr ov ed in S R M S E C Y 93-087. (page 12 of 13 in this N O N -CONCURRENCE PROCES)

4) I hav e c onc luded that SR M-SECY-93-087 does not im pose a no c ollapse ac c eptanc e c riteria f or ground m otion of one and tw o-thirds of the D esign Basis SSE. (page 12 of 13 in this N O N-CONCURRENCE PROCESS)

5) Instead, the ground m otion lev el ref erenc ed by SR M-SECY-93-087 is intended to be used to identif y design spec if ic seism ic v ulnerabilities. (page 12 of 13 in this N O N-CONCURRENCE PROCESS)

The D eputy D irec tors interpretation in item 1) is to tie the polic y and the SR P C hapter 19 together as a unit, and he thus c onc luded that only PR A c an be us ed related to the R LE bec aus e the SR P mentions PR A. H is interpretation is inc orrec t bec aus e the N R C polic y defines the required magnitude of the s eis mic margin bey ond the SSE to be 1.67 or R LE = 1.67 x SSE, and it s tands alone to be a requirement w ithout the need of any SR P. SR P C hapter 19 is a doc ument prov iding guidance to ac hiev e that polic y requirement. Ev en if the methods s tated in the SR P w ere inc orrec t, it does not alter the requirement of the polic y that is the R LE = 1.67 x SSE. E v en if the s tr uc tur al engineer ing analy s is /des ign method w ere not mentioned in the SRP, one c annot, bas ed on that omis s ion in the S R P, to c onc lude that the polic y ex c ludes the us e of s truc tural engineering analy s is /des ign methods for R LE. The fac t that SR P, C hapter 19, does mention the s truc tural engineering analy s is /des ign method for c alc ulating the c apac ity (c ollaps e) of a building and its s truc tural members and they areto be ev aluated by the Struc tural Engineering Branc h further demons trates that the D eputy D irec tor is not only w rong in his unders tanding and interpretation betw een the polic y and the SR P but als o lac k ing the k now ledge of the SR P on us ing the s truc tural engineering method for predic ting w hether a building w ould c ollaps e or not during the R LE (s ee proof below ).

SRP C hapter 19, dated D ec ember 2015, s tates, The organization res pons ible for str uctur al engineering s upports the rev iew of the PR A and s ev ere ac c ident ev aluation in tw o main area:

the applic ants ev aluation of s eis mic c ontributors (s pec ific ally the s eis mic hazar d analy s is and es timation of seismic capacities (ac c eleration at w hic h there is high c onfidenc e in low probability of failure [H C LPF] and the applic ants analy s is of c ontainment performanc e. The w or ds of str uctur al engineer ing and seismic capacities are bolded and underlined by me to emphas ize that the v alue of seismic capacities is dev eloped by s tr uc tur al engineer s and r ev iew ed by the structural engineering ( B r anc h), and then pr ov ide thos e c apac ity v alues to the PR A analy s ts (group) for their c ons equenc e analy s is. The w or ds seismic capacity in s truc tural engineering mean c ollaps e of a beam, a c olumn, or the w hole building, s uc h as the N uSc ale reac tor building, during earthquak es.

About ten (10) y ears ago, the applic ant of AP1000 demons trated that the s hield building element c ould res is t three (3) times SSE w ith no c ollaps e through phy s ic al laboratory tes ting, and the w hole s hield building c ould res is t three (3) times SSE w ith no c ollaps e through structural engineering analysis. The K H N P c ontainment building has a margin of s trength (ov ers trength) of 1.44 agains t SSE through s truc tural engineering analy s is. In attac hment 1 of referenc e 2 of this N O N-C O N CU RR E NC E P R O CE S S, a gener ic c onc r ete c ontainment w ith 1%

of s teel reinforc ement pos s es s ed a s eismic margin of s afety 1.54 agains t a far field earthquak e, and 1.43 agains t a near field earthquak e through duc tility. The ac tual margin of s afety of a building agains t earthquak es is the produc t of both ov ers trength and duc tility. The ov ers trength of 1.44 times the duc tility of 1.43 = 2.06. R ec ognizing that the KH N P c ontainment has reinforc ement more than 1% and that w ould dec reas e the duc tility v alue, and the ac tual duc tility v alue c an be obtained for the KH N P c ontainment by us ing the ac tual reinforc ement in the c ontainment through structural engineering analysis. H ow ev er, w ith a s eis mic margin of 2.06 agains t SSE, the reduc ed duc tility v alue in the KH N P c ontainment w ould be s till enough to mak e the final s eis mic margin greater than 1.67 times SSE, required by the N R C polic y. The major portion of the abov e s tatement, w ith res pec t to the seismic mar gin of AP1000 s hield building and KH N P c ontainment, w ere doc umented in referenc e 3 of this N O N-CONCURRENCE PROCESS.

Sinc e The N R C /N R O /SEB C hief and an Ac ting D irec tor refus ed to s end the ques tions to the applic ant to obtain seismic capacities of the reac tor building and the s truc tural members that form the building, or w hether the building c ould s us tain R LE w ith no c ollaps e, thus It is unk now n w hether the building c ould s us tain an earthquak e bey ond the SSE w ith no c ollaps e.

Therefore, the D eputy D irec tors c onc lus ion in item 2) abov e is inc orrec t.

The D eputy D irec tor c onc luded in items 3) and 4) abov e that the N R C polic y in SRM-SECY 087 does not require a demons tration of no c ollaps e of the reac tor building during the R LE bec aus e he did not find a no c ollaps e c riterion in it. H is c onc lus ion bas ed on the abs enc e of a no c ollaps e c riterion in the SR M-SECY-93-087 is jus t as w rong as he w as ty ing the polic y to the SR P in item 1), bec aus e the polic y is to define R LE = 1.67 SSE, and it does not and s hould not tell s truc tural engineers how to des ign buildings w ith w hat k ind of c riteria. The no c ollaps e c riterion belongs to the s truc tural engineering bec aus e the goal of des igning a building is to ac hiev e no c ollaps e. The D eputy D irec tor s hould remember in the meeting, dated N ov ember 29, 2018, w ith the PR A s taff members w hen they s aid NO in res pons e to the ques tion w hether the N uSc ale reac tor building c ould be allow ed to c ollaps e during the R LE. Therefore, the D eputy D irec tors c onc lus ion in items 3) and 4) is not only w rong but als o dangerous.

In item 5) abov e the D eputy D irec tor believ ed that the R EL is intended to be us ed to identify des ign s pec ific s eis mic v ulnerabilities w ithout s pec ify ing the v ulnerabilities that he s aw. H e c ited the 1988 N R C G eneric Letter (G L 88-20) for performing IPEEE to find v ulnerabilities and fix them. This generic letter w as is s ued more than 30 y ears ago for problems related to plants that had not been des igned and built for R LE, and the IPEEE w as us ed to find and fix major s eis mic problems in the plants. I partic ipated in the IPEEE w alk dow ns, and I k now that it w as a band-aid for mis tak es that plants had not been des igned for the R LE, and is not for the des ign of new plants, s uc h as the N uSc ale.

The mos t v ulnerable is s ue for building des ign is w hether the w hole building w ill c ollaps e or not.

If the w hole building w ill not c ollaps e through the demons tration of the s tr uc tur al engineer ing analy s is /des ign method, the nex t v ulnerable is s ue is to c hec k w hether there are partial c ollaps es in s truc tural members, s uc h as beams, c olumns, roofs, w alls, s labs, and their c onnec tions. Thes e v ulnerabilities c an be and hav e been identified through s truc tural engineering analy s is, and the des ign was rev is ed to eliminate all the v ulnerabilities until the analy s is demons trates that there is no w hole building c ollaps e or partial c ollaps es. This is the nor mal pr oc es s s tr uc tural engineers hav e been doing for building des ign in r ec ent dec ades.

Shall w e des ign the N uSc ale reac tor building w ithout the R LE and then require the plant to go through the IPEEE proc es s as s tated in G L 88-20 as the D eputy D irec tor might hav e s ugges ted, or us e the s truc tural engineering analy s is /des ign method w ith the R LE to ens ure that it c an s us tain the R LE w ithout c ollaps e s ame as the method us ed for the des ign of important buildings w orldw ide as s tated in attac hments 1 and 2 in referenc e 2 of this N on-C onc ur r enc e P r oc es s ?

The ans w er s hould be obv ious. We found our mis tak e w ithout des igning buildings for the R LE more than 30 y ears ago and then tried to fix and mitigate the problem through G L 88-20 and IPEEE. Are w e going to c ommit the s ame mis tak e for the N uSc ale?

The fact that no buildings, w hether or dinar y or impor tant ones, has ever been designed using a PRA method, and all buildings have been designed using the structural engineering analysis/design method as described and documented in the tw o attachments in r efer ence 2 of this NO N-CONCURRENCE PROCESS should serve as a w arning to managers w ho insist to replace the structural engineering analysis/design method by a PRA method for the design of the NuScae reactor building subjected to the RLE.