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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000445/1998011]]
| number = ML20216H350
| issue date = 04/16/1998
| title = Insp Repts 50-445/98-11 & 50-446/98-11 on 980323-27.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Physical Security Program
| author name = Murray B
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000445, 05000446
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-445-98-11, 50-446-98-11, NUDOCS 9804210117
| package number = ML19044A108
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 11
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000445/1998011]]
 
=Text=
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                                        ENCLOSURE
                        U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                          REGION IV
    Docket Nos.:      50-445;50-446
    License Nos.:    NPF-87; NPF-89
    Report No.':      50-445/98-11; 50-446/98-11
    Licensee:        TU Electric
    Facility:        Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2
    Location:        FM-56
                      Glen Rose, Texas
    Dates:            March 23-27,1998
                ,
    Inspector:        A. Bruce Earnest, Physical Security Specialist
                      Plant Support Branch
    Approved By:      Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch
                      Division of Reactor Safety
    ATTACHMENTS: SupplementalInformation
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                                    "
    9804210117 900416
    PDR      ADOCK 05000445
    G                  PDR          .
 
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                                                        2-
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                                          EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
                            Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2
                            NRC inspection Report 50-445/98-11; 50-446/98-11
    This routine, announced inspection focused on the licensee's physical security program. The
    areas inspected included review of alarm stations, communications, personnel and vehicle
    access control, protected area detection aids, security event logs, assessment aids, and the
    security organization.
    Plant Sunood
    .
            Excellent performance was noted in the areas of alarm stations, communications,
            protecjed area detection aids, security event logs, assessment aids, vehicle access
            control, and the security organization (Section S1.1).
,
    . .
            A noncited violation was identified for failing to adequately search personnel for
            explosives and incendiary devices (Section S1,1).
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                                                    3-
                                              Report Details
                                            IV. Plant Suonort
    S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities                                                    q
    S1.1 Access Control - Personnel
      a.  Insoection Scone
          The personne; access control program was inspected to determine compliance with the
          requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1), (2), (3), (5), (6), and (7), and the physical security
          plan. ,
      b.  Observations and Findinos
          The inspector determined through observation that personnel access to the protected
          area was adequately controlled. The protected area access control equipment was
          inspected and found to be functional and well maintained. The last control area for -
          access to the plant was contained within a bullet resistant enclosure. The inspector
          confirmed by interview that the security officers clearly understood their responsibilities
          as related to allowing access to visitors.
          Section 6.2.4.1 of the Physical Security Plan, Revision 27, required that personnel be
          searched utilizing detection equipment described in paragraph 7.2. Paragraph 7.2
          described explosive detection equipment capable of detecting nitrogen-based
          explosives.
          Paragraph 3.2.1.1C of Security Instruction Procedure 3.2, Revision 12, required that if a
          search device fails during testing or operation, the device was not to be used until it was
          repaired and tested. Further, paragraph 3.2.1.2A required that all personnel and
          packages be searched for explosives and incendiary devices.
          The licensee discovered, reported, and corrected a violadun of the above requirements
          on February 12,1998. On that date, the only operable explosive detector in the primary
          access point failed prior to rush hour. The test utilized by the licensee to determine
          operability was ineffective in determining that the detector had failed. Prior to discovering
          the failed detector, 312 personnel were inadequately searched for explosives and
          incendiary devices. The root cause of the failure was the testing methodology used
          every 8-hour shift as an operability test. The licensee was not using a nitrate based
          source as a part of the operability testing. The licensee did not realize that testing
          without the source only tested the delay mechanism in the detector and not the detection
          capability. The type of failure experienced caused the equipment to appear to function
          correctly, therefore, there was no predictability to the failure. As far as the personnel
                                                                                                        i
 
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                                                  -4-
        processed were concerned, the equipment performed as required. As corrective action,
        the licensee changed the testing methodology prior to the inspection. The corrective
        action should be sufficient to prevent recurrence. The inspector determined that the
        licensee failed to meet physical security plan requirements to adequately search          ;
        personnel, constituting a violation of the physical security plan. This nonrepetitive,
        licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation,
        consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-445;-446/9811-01).
  c.  Conclusion
        A noncited violation was identified for failing to adequately search personnel for
        explosives and incendiary devices.
                                                                                                  1
  S1.2 Acces,s Control- Vehicles                                                                  !
  a.  Insoection Scopa
        The vehicle access control program was inspected to determine compliance with the
        requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 (d)(4) and the physical security plan.
  b.  Observations and Findinas
        The inspector observed searches of two vehicles to ensure that they were properly
        searched prior to entering the protected area. The security officers conducted the search
        in compliance with their procedural requirements.
        A resident inspector identified that on March 16,1998, a portion of a vehicle's cargo was
        not completely searched at the south vehicle access point.10 CFR 73.55(d)(3) permits
        the cargo of a vehicle to be exempted from search prior to entering the protected area if
        that cargo presented a safety hazard to the security force. The rule also states that the
        cargo will be searched inside the protected or vital area when unloaded. The cargo
        consisted, in part, of radiologically contaminated equipment. Review during this
        inspection determined that radiological procedures did not contain requirements for
        radiation protection personnel to search contaminated equipment / cargo. The inspector
        interviewed a radiation protection manager and determined that the cargo in question
        was searched and that radiation protection personnel were aware of their search
        responsibilities. The licensee security manager made a commitment at the exit meeting
        to review plant procedures and to change, as appropriate, those procedures that do not
        contain procedural requirements to search hazardous cargo. The commitment to review
        the plant procedures as they apply to search requirements inside the protected and vital
        areas is an inspection followup item (50-445;-446/9811-02).
 
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                                                        5-
        c.    Conclusion
              The licensee had an efficient vehicle access control program. An inspection followup
              item was identified regarding the procedural search requirements for cargo unsearched
              at the entrance to the protected area.
      ' S1.3 Communications
        a.    Insoection Scone
              The communications capabilities were inspected to determine compliance with the
              requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 (f)(1) through (4), (g)(3), and the requirements of the
              physical security plan. The areas inspected included the operability of both radio and
              teleptpne systems and the capability to effectively communicate both telephonically and
              by radio with the local law enforcement agencies.
        b.    Observations and Findinos
                                                                                                        i
              The inspector confirmed that the licensee had telephone and radio systems capable of
              meeting all communications requirements of the security organization. The inspector
              observed a test of the radio system. The alarm station operator demonstrated the ability
              to communicate with local law enforcement authorities. In addition, the inspector
              observed an onsite communications check with all security officers. The radio equipment
              was effective and very well maintained.
        c.    Conclusion                                                                              l
                                                                ~
              The licensee had an excellent communications capability that performed well during the
              inspection.
        S1.4 Alarm Stations
        a.    insoection Scope
                The alarm stations were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of
                10 CFR 73.55(e)(1) and (2), (f)(1) and (2), and the physical security plan.
    '
        b.  . Observations and Findinas
                The inspector confirmed the redundancy and diversity of the alarm stations. Action by
                one operator cannot reduce the effectiveness of the security systems without the
                knowledge of the other alarm station operators. The central alarm station and secondary
                                                                                                        !
 
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                                                  -6-
      alarm station were bullet resistant. The inspector observed the work conditions and the
      capabilities of the station operators in both alarm stations. The inspector asked
      questions of the station operators and determined that they were very effectively trained
      and knowledgeable of their duties. Forther, the operators did an excellent job of handling
      alarms and radio traffic promptly and efficiently.
      On March 20,1998, the HALON fire suppression system in the central alarm station
      activated and forced the evacuation of the alarm station for approximately 3 hours.
      During that time, the secondary alarm station successfully handled all alarm station
      requirements.10 CFR 73.55(e)(1) requires that all detection alarms annunciate in a
      continuously-manned central alarm station.
      Review during this inspection determined that when the fire suppression system was
      designed and installed, the system audio alarm was installed outside the area being
      protected. As a result, when the HALON activation alarm activated, the alarm station
      operator was unsure which area was about to activate. If the system had been correctly
      designed, the operator could have manually shut off the HALON prior to activation in the
      absence of a fire. Further, the licensee had not determined the cause of the activation at
      the end of the inspection. In addition, the inspector determined that the alarm station
      operators were not trained in the manual activation or deactivation of the system. Prior
      to the end of the inspection, the training issue had been resolved. The licensee was also
      studying means to install the alarm in the area to be protected as well as continuing to
      investigate the cause of the activation. The matter will be reviewed as an inspection
      followup item (50-445;-446/9811-03).
  c.  Conclusion
      The alarm stations were redundant, well protected, and the operators were alert, well
      trained, and efficient. An inspection followup item was identified to review corrective
      actions for a fire suppression activation that caused the evacuation of the central alarm
      station.
  S2  Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
  S2.1 D_etection Aids - Protected Area
  a.  Insoection Scoce
      The detection aids program for the protected area was inspected to determine
      compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(c)(4), (e)(2) and (3) and the
      requirements of the physical security plan. The areas inspected included the detection
      systems' capabilities, detection system security, and maintenance of the detection aids
      system.
                                                                                                  1
                                                                                                  l
                                                                                                  l
 
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                                                    7
    b.  Observations and Findings
        The inspector observed nine licensee tests of the perimeter microwave and E-field
        detection system. All tests were effectively detected. The detection system was well
        designed and maintained. The microwave heads were double and triple stacked and
        provided an effective detection capability to detect any intruder attempting to enter the
        plant undetected.
    c.  Conclusion
        An excellent perimeter detection system was installed and maintained.
  S2.2 61sessment Aids
    a.  [0.Uwction Scoce
        The assessment aids program was inspected to determine compliance with
        10 CFR 73.55 (h)(4) and (6) and the physical security plan. The areas inspected
        included the application of closed-circuit television to provide observation of the
        perimeter isolation zones and the adequacy of the monitoring system in the alarm
        stations,
    b.  Observations and Findings
        The inspector observed the operation of the closed-circuit television system and
        determined that it was an excellent system. The closed-circuit television cameras were
        properly placed to ensure 100 percent coverage of the alarmed zones. The alarm station
        monitors were positioned to facilitate assessment by operators. Further enhancement
        was evident in the resolution of the cameras. The old tube cameras had been replaced
        with new solid state cameras during a recent camera system upgrade,
    c.  Conclusion
        The assessment aids system provided excellent assessment of the perimeter detection
        zones. The addition of the new solid state cameras was a significant enhancement to
        the assessment aids system.
  S3    Security and Safeguards Procedures and Implementation
  S3.1  Security Event Logs
    a.  Insoection Scoce
        The security program safeguards event logs were inspected to determine compliance
        with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71(b) and (c),10 CFR 73.70(a)-(c), and the physical
                                                                                                  1
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                                                  -8-
        security plan. The inspector reviewed the safeguards event logs for the third and fourth
        quarters of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998.
    b.  Observations and Findinas
                                                                                                    l
        The inspector determined that the licensee conformed to the regulatory and license        i
        requirements to report security events. The licensee's security staff was correctly
        identifying security events required by regulations. In addition, the licensee used the
        information contained in their records and reports to track and trend problem areas.
        After identification of problem areas, effective corrective action appeared to have        j
        resulted in a reduction of reportable safeguards events. During the first week of the      l
        previous outage, eight reportable events occurred involving vital area door infractions. A I
        recent, innovation involving new card readers and audible and visual alarm systems that    I
        indicated when the person utilizing the door had not adequately followed the
        requirements had been installed on high traffic vital area doors since the last outage.
        The first week of the current outage had resulted in only one reportable door event.
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    c.  Conclusion
                                                                                                    i
                                                                                                    l
l        An excellent records and reporting system was in place for reporting safeguards events.    ;
    S6  Security Organization and Administration                                                    l
    S6.1 Security Oraanization
                                                                                                    \
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    a.  Insoection Scope
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        The security organization was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements
l        of 10 CFR 73.55(a), (b)(1), (2), and (h), and the requirements of the physical security
        plan.
    b.  Observations and Findinas
        The security force consisted of adequate numbers of armed uniformed officers to meet
        the plan requirements. The licensee had sufficient security force personnel to meet
          contingencies. Morale appeared to be good. The officers appeared to be capable of
          performing any assigned tasks. During the inspection, the licensee was in an outage.
    c.  Conclusion
          The licensee has a good security organization capable of meeting security and
          contingency plan requirements.
 
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                                                -9-
                                    V. Management Meetings
    X1 Exit Meeting Summary
        The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management
        at the conclusion of the inspection on March 27,1998. Mr. Don Alps, plant security
        manager stated that TU Electric would review, and change as appropriate, plant
        procedures to ensure that unsearched hazardous material will be searched within the
        vital or protected areas. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
              .
                                                                                            f
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    a
                                                ATTACHMENT
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l'                              PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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  !  Licensee
      C. L. Terry, Group Vice President
      M. Blevins, Plant Manager -
      D. R. Alps, Security Manager
      J. Ardizzoni, Admin Security Supervisor
l    J. M. Ayres, Plant Support Overview Manager
'
      B. Bird, Plant Support Manager
      J. Braun, Security Coordinator
      J. B. Britt, Corporate Security -
      D. Davis, Nuclear Oversight Division Manager
l    N. Harris, Licensing Engineer
      T. Hope, Regulatory Compliance Manager
      D. Kay, Radiation Protection Manager -
      M. Marciniak, SMART Team 1 - Security
      P. E. Mills, Senior Quality Assurance Specialist, Operations Quality Assurance
      P. Passulugo, System Manager
      R. Walker, Regulatory Affairs Manager
!
      Contractor
      B. Bordeker, Security Test Group Supervisor
      W. Cravey, Training Security Coordinator
      K. Hayes, Burns Security Chief
      M. Millsap, Training Supervisor
      A. Wooldridge, Security Shift Supervisor
      NRC
      N/A
                                      INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
      IP 81700        Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
;                                      ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
      Ooened
      50-445;-446/9811-01            NCV inadequate Search For Explosives / Incendiary Devices
      50-445;-446/9811-02            IFl    Search of Hazardous Cargo
      50-445;-446/9811-03            .IFl    Review of Corrective Action For HALON Activation
I
 
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                                                    -2-
  Closed
  50-445;-446/9811-01            NCV inadequate Search For Explosives / Incendiary Devices
                                  LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
  Station Procedure STA-308, Revision 7, Protection of Unclassified Safeguards information
  Security Instruction / Procedure 4.0, Revision 4, Compensatory and Contingency Instructions
  Security Procedure SEC-304, Revision 10, Vehicle and Material Control
  Security lastruction/ Procedure 3.9, Revision 3, Material Inspection Building
  Security Instruction / Procedure 3.2, Revision 12, Access Control
  Security Procedure SEC-302, Revision 11, Personnel identification, Key Card, Badge issuance,
  and Access Qontrol
  Safeguards Event Logs, Third and Fourth Quarters of 1997 and First Quarter of 1998
  Security Field Reports 0301-98,0262-98, and 0134-98
}}

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