ML20210T144

Provides Results of Preliminary Review of Sar.Mechanical Engineering Branch Area of Review Concerns Design Criteria of Sections 3.6,3.9,3.10,4.2,5.2 & 5.5 of Oct 1972 Std Format (Reg Guide 1.70).Areas Requiring Addl Info Encl

ML20210T144
Person / Time
Site:	Satsop
Issue date:	09/26/1974
From:	Maccary R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	Deyoung R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
CON-WNP-1796 NUDOCS 8605290760
Download: ML20210T144 (52)

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! The Meehmaisal Engineering 'Brameh area of rwiew concerns the design

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. g 11-1 11.0 MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 110.1 Under 3.6.2.1.4(a) piping systems having an internal pressure of (3.6.2.1) up to 27$ psia and fluid temperatures not in excess of 200*F are excluded from pipe break criteria. This is not consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.46 nor the present MEB position. The present MEB position is that through wall leakage cracks should be postulated for such piping as delineated in Attachment A which is generally applicable for piping outside the containment.

110.2 PSAR states that criteria for postulating pipe breaks for (3.6.2.2) piping outside the containment will be per AEC letter from i J. O' Leary of 7/12/73. This is acceptable, however, imple-

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mentation of this criteria should be as contained in Attachment A.

110.3 (1) Provide loading combinations and stress criteria for

,(3.6.3.1) normal, upset, and emergency conditions for Class 1, 2 and 3 piping in the A/E - BOP scope. -

(2) Provide more specific criteria than "per code" for faulted condition stress criteria for Class 1 piping. For example, ASHE Section III permits the use of Appendix F of the code for faulted conditions; but, does not require it. State specifically what is to be used.

(3) Provide specific design details for,the three types of piping penetration guard pipes. Also discuss the access provisions to carry out inservice inspection of the flued head to process pipe welds for the Type I and III penetrations, 110.4 (1) Identify the computer program to be used for the calculation (3.6.4.1) of postulated pipe break and if the program is not widely used in the nuclear industry, provide justification for its applic~ ability and validity for this type of analysis. -

(2) In the computation of the thrust force using the simplified forcing function, justify the u's e of P sat in lieu of Po for compressed (flashing) or saturated water.

110.5 (1) For unchoked flow, the Regulatory staff will accept use of (3.6.4.2) a model with a uniform half angle of dispersion not exceeding 10*.

(2) In calculating jet impingement force as described in Eq. (1),

the definition of the velocity ratio Um is not clear. Current '

MEB position requires that the steady state forcing function for jet impingement should have a magnitude (T) not less than l e ,

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h 11-2 f.

110.5 T = KPA (3.6.4.2)

Where P = system pressure prior to pipe brealt A = pipe break area, and K = thrust coefficient.

(3) For choked flow, provide justification for the following assumed angles of dispersion for the jets:

Flashing water - 45' Steam - 22*

Non- Flashing Water - 25' .

and clarify the pressure that is going to be used for calculating jet force.

(4) Define the symbols for calculating the jet impingement forces as given in cases A, B, C and D. In those formulas, explain the missing pressure force component.

(5) For the calculation of the Drag Force (Case C) expand the discussiontoincludeabroaderrangegfReynoldsnumbers other than the range of R, = 10 3 to 10 given.

110.6 (1) The information presented in this section of the PSAR does (3.9.1.1) not satisfy the requirements concerning " Seismic Category I Mechanical Equipment Testing and Analysis - C.E. Scope of Supply" for plants currently undergoing review. Provide the appropriate commitments from CESSAR.

(2) Clarify type of operating experience to be used to verify '

. that equipnent will operate under SSE conditions.

(3) Provide commitment that all Category I mechanical equipment and stipports will be qualified to requirements of specifi-cations 7-74 in Appendix 3.9.A.

I (4) In paragraph 3.02 d of Appendix 3.9.A, when using the Response Spectrum Modal Analysis method, provide criteria '

for determining closely space modes.

- (5) In Appendix 3.9.A. paragraph 3.02.e permits an allowable stress of 0.9 of the material yield stress for faulted conditions. This is not consistent with limits stated per Table 3.9.3 of the PSAR. Revise the Appendix to conform with Table 3.9.3.

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3 -s 11_3 110.7 The seismic qualification program described in this section is (3.9.1.2) no,t totally acceptable. Revise the program to be in accordance (3.10) with criteria provided in Attachment B " Electrical and Seismic Qualification Program."

110.3 '

(1) In the last sentence of Part I of Appendix 3.9.B change (3.9.2.4) "uill" to "may".

(2) in Section II of Appendix 3.9.B expand the valve operability testing criteria to include the valve design pressure.

. (3) In Section II of Appendix 3.9.B under criterion d state the

, Qualification Standards to be employed.

(4) In Appendin 3.9.B define the horizontal and vertical accel-crations to be used for static valve qualification.

(5) In Appendix 3.9.B,ISection II, your position that for valves with natural frequencies less than 33 Hz operability can be verified without ' performing valve exercising per step C requires justification.

110.9 Provide m6:e specific equations of motion and discuss methods (3.9.2.5) of solution for the dynamic analysis for closed systems. Provide the same for open systems if the time history dynamic analysis is used.

110.10 The information provided in this section is not adequate. In (3.9.2,7) addtcion to the nominal pipe size which determine whether ASME (5.2.19) C1sss 2 and 3 piping vill be field run, identify in the PSAR chose Cctegory I piping systems which will be field run. Include any epecial or simplified procedures which will be used for designjng acd installing this piping.

110.11 Provide the-spscific criteria that will be used to guarantee (3.10.2) operability of instrumentation and electrical equipment, not furnished by C.E., under faulted conditions when a dynamic analy.91s without performance testing is employed in the design of this equipnent.

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Attachment A BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION-MEB NO. 1 l MECRANICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH .

DIRECTORATE OF LICE:' SING CRITERIA FOR POSTULATED FAILURE AND LEAKAGE LOCATIONS IN FLUID SYSTE! PIPING OUTSIDE CONTAIN'!ENT Thefollovkngcriteriaarewithinthereviewresponsibilityofthe Mechanical Engineering Branch with the exception of. I.A.,

II.A., II.D.,

l II.E and 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 2.a and 2.c.(3) of Appendix A.

I. Righ-Energy Fluid Systenl!Ptoing ,

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.s A. Fluid Systems Separated from Essential Structures, Systems d Components ,

jf For the purpose of satisfying the separation provisions of 1.s.

of Appen' dix A, a review of the piping layout and plant arrangement drawings should clearly show that the effects of postulated piping breaks at any location are isolated or physically remote from essential structures, systems, and components. At the designer's option, break locations as determined from I.C., I.D., and I.E below may be selected for this purpose..

B. Fluid System Piping Between Containment Isolation Valves '

Breaks need not be postulated in those portlens of piping identified in 2.C. (1) and 2.C. (2) of Appendix A provided the'y meet the requirements of ASME Code,Section III - Subarticle ,

NE-1110 and are designed to meet the following additional requirements:

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. . t. . . t s, 1. The folloving design stress and fatigue limits should not be

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t For AS'!E Code,Section III, Class 1 Piping ,

(a) Maximum stress ranges should not exceed the following limits: '

' Ferritic steel < 2.0S Austenitic steel < 2.4S '

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(b) The maximum stress range between any two load sets .

(including' the zero load set) should be calculated by l i

Eq. (10) in Par. NB-3653, ASME Code,Section III, for I

up'asb[ plant egnditions and an OBE event tiransient.

. . If the calculated maximum stress range of Eq. (10) eueeds the limits of I.B.1(a) but is.not greater than 3Sg the limit of I.B.l(c) should be met. .

If the calculated maximum stress range of Eq. (10)

N - exceeds 3S , the stress ranges calculated by both Eq. (12) and Eq. (13) should meet the limits of I.B.1(a) i - -

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a_nd the limit of I.B.1(c). ,

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('c) Cumulative usage factor < 0.1, as required by I.B.1(b) .

For ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 Piping Maximum stress range as calculated by Eq. (9) and (10) in Par. NC-3652, ASME Code,Section III, considering upset plcnt conditions (i.e. , sustained loads, occasional loads, and thermal 9

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expansion) and an OBE event should not exceed (S, + h S ")"2/

2. Welded attachments, for pipe supports or other purposes, to these portions of piping should be avoided except where detailed

' stress analyses; or tes.ts, are performed to demonstrate compliance with the limits of I.B.l.

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,' 3. The number of piping circumferential and longitudinal welds i -

and. branch connections should be minimized. . i d

4. The length of the piping run should be reduced to the minimum length practical,.

'5. The derign at points of pipe fixity (e.g. , pipe anchors or welded connections at containment penetrations) should not require welding directly to the outer surface of the piping (e.g. , fluid integral forged pipe fittings may be,!used) except

where detailed stress analyses are performed to demonstrate

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j compliance with the limits of I.B.l.

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d: 6. Geometric discontinuities, such as at pipe-to-valve section

. transitions, at branch connections, and at changes in pipe L wall thickness should be designed to minimize the discontinuity stresses.

1.

C. Fluid Systems Enclosed Within Protective Structures

, 1. Breaks in ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 and 3 piping should

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, be postulated at the following locations in each piping and branch run (except those portions of fluid system piping'

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identified in I.B.) within a protective structure containing

.sssentict systems cnd components and designed to satisfy the provisions of 1.'b. or 1.c. of Appendix A:

a. At terminal ends of the pressurized portions of the run if located within the protective structure.

I

b. At intermediate locations selected by either of the following criteria:

(i)' At each pipe fitting (e.g., elbow, tee, cross, and non-standard fitting) or, if the run contains no fittings, at one location at each extreme of the run (a terminal end, if located within the protective structure may substitute for one intermediate break).

3 (ii) At each location where the stresses / exceed (S. n + Sa )2/

but at not less than two separated locations chosen on the basis of highest strese4 / . In the case of a straight

. pipe run without any pipe fittings or welded attach-i"i*" f "*

ments and stresses below (Sh+S)** c location chosen on the basis of highest stress.

-3/ Stresses associated with nonncl and upset plant conditions, and an OBE event as calculated by Eq. (9) and (10), Par. NC-3652 of the ASME Code,Section III, for Class 2 and 3 piping 4/ Two highest stress points; select second point at least 10% below the highest stress.

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. 2. Breaks in non-nuclear class piping should be postulated at the following locations in each piping or branch run:

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a. At tenninc2 ends of the pressurized portions of the run if

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located within the protective structure.

b. At each intermediate pipe fitting and welded attachment.

D. Flu.id Systems Not Enclosed Within Protective Structures

1. Breaks in ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 and 3 piping, should 1

be postulated at the following locations in each piping and branch run (except those portions of f7uid system piping

, identified in I B) outside but routed alongside, above, or below a protective structure containing essential systems and components and designed to satisfy the provisions of 1.b, or 1.c of Appendix A. -

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a. At terminal' ends of pressurized portions of the run if located adjacent to the protective structure.

l l b. At intermediate locations selected by either of the following criteria:

(1) At each pipe fitting (e.g. , elbow, tee, cross, and non-standard fitting).

2 (ii) At each location where the stresses / exceed c (S but at not less than two separated locations chosen on the basis of highest stress4 / . In the case of a 1

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i straight pipe run without any pipe fittings or J welded attachnents and stresses below (S. + S ), a-n c g minimum of one. location chosen on the basis of highest stress. [

2. Breaks in non-nuclear class piping should be postulated at the following locations in each piping or branch run:

- a. At terminal. ends of pressurized portions of the run if located adjacent to the protective structure.

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b. At each intermediate pipe fitting and welded attachment.  ;

8

11. Moderate-Energu Fluid Sustem ptotng  !

A. Fluid Systems Separated from Essential Structures, Systems &

. Components Jor the purpose of satisfying the ' separation provisions of 1.a. of Appendix A, a review of the piping layout and plant arrangement drawings should clearly show that the effects of through-wall leakage cracks at any loca' tion are isolated or physically remote from essential structures, systems, and components. '

B. Fluid' System Piping Between Containment Isolation Valves Breaks need not be postulated in those portions of piping identified in 2.c. of Appendix A provided they meet the requirements of ASME Code,Section III - Subarticle NE-1110, and are designed such that the stresses do not exceed 0.5(Sh * #c )5/ f r ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 piping.

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-- The limit 0.4 (1.2 Sh*S)mybeusedinlieuof0.5(Sy+S)*

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C. Fluid Systems Within or Outside and Adjacent to Protective Structures .

Through-wall leakage cracks should be postulated in fluid system piping located within or outside and adjacent to protective structures containing essential systems and components and designed to" satisfy the provisions of 1.b. .

or 1.c. of Appendix A, c= cept where exe=pted by II.B. II.D, l or in those portions of ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 or 3 ,

4 piping or no.n-nuclear piping where the stresses are less than .

3 Th'e cracks should be postulated to occur 0.5(Sh+ c) .

individually at locat, ions that r,esult in the maximum effects from fluid spraying and flooding, and the consequent hazards or environmental conditions developed.

D. Moderate-Energy Fluid Systems in Proximity to High-Energy Fluid ,

. Systems Cracks need not be postulated in moderate-energy fluid system piping located in an area in which a break in high-energy fluid system piping is postulated, provided such cracks would not result in more limiting environmental conditions than the high-energy piping break. Where a postulated leakage crack in the moderate-energy fluid system piping results in more limiting environmental conditions than the break in proximate .high-energy fluid system P ii P ng, the provisions of II.C should be applied.

E. Fluid Systems Qua11fying as High-Energy or Moderate-Energy Systems Through-wall leakage cracks instead of breaks may be postulated l

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in the piping of those f2uid systems that qualify as high energy f2uid systers for only short operational periods5 / but qualify as moderate-energy fTuid systems for the major operational period.

III. Type of Breaks and Leakage Cracks in Fluid Sustem Piping A. Circumferential Pipe Breaks The following circumferential breaks should be postulated in high-energy fluid system piping at the locations specified in

Section I above: l

1. Circumferential breaks should be postulated in fluid systen piping and branch runs exceeding a nominal pipe size of 1 inch, except that, if the maximum stress range in the circumferential direction is at least twice that in the axial direction, only a

. , longitudinal break need be postulated. Instrument' lines, one inch and less nominal pipe size for tubing should meet the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.11.

2. Where break locations are selected at-pipe fittings without

.' the benefit of stress calculations, breaks should be postulated I at each pipe-to-fitting weld. If detailed stress analyses l

l I! n A operational period is considered "shorp"~1f the fractien of time that the system operates within the pressure-temperature conditions specified

, for high-energy fluid systems is less than 2 percent of the time that

! the system operates as a moderate energy f2 aid system (e.g., systems such as the reactor decay heat removal systems qualify as coderate-energy fluid sys$ cms; however, systems such as auxiliary feedwater systems operated during PWR reactor startup, hot standby, or shutdown

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(e.g., finite element analyses) or tests are performed, the ,

t maximum stressed location in the fitting may be selected instead of tihe pipe-to-fitting weld.. ,

3..' Circumferential breaks should be assumed to result in pipe severance and separati n amounting to a one-diameter lateral displacement of the ruptured piping sections unless physically limited by piping restraints, structural members, or piping ~

stiffness as may be demonstrated by inelastic limit analysis (e.g., a plasti'c hinge in the piping is not developed under loading). , ,

4. The ' dynamic force of the jet discharge at the break location should be based on the effective cross-sectional flow area

. of the pipe and on a calculated fluid pressure as modified .

by an analytically or experimentally determined thrust coefficient. Limited pipe displacement at the break location, line restrictions, flow limiters, positive pump-controlled flow,,and the absence of energy reservoirs may be taken into i

, . account, as applicable, in the reduction of jet discharge.

5. Pipe whipping should be assumed to occur in the plane defined by the piping geometry and configuration, and to cause pipe movement in the direction of the jet reaction.

B. Longitudinal Pipe' Breaks The following l'ongitudinal breaks should be postulated in hich-energy f7trd system piping a't the locations of each circumferential break'specified in III.A.:

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1. Longitudinal break in fTaid system piping and branch runs should be postulated in nominal pipe sizes 4-inch and larger, except that, if the maximum stress range in the axial direction

, is at l' east twice that in the circumferential direction, only a circumferential break need be postu. lated. ,

2. Longitudinal breaks need not be postulated at terminal ends if the piping at the ternincI ends contains no longicudinal pipe welds and major geometric discontinuities at the circumferential

. weld joints of the terminal ends are designed to minimize d'is-continuity stresses.

3. Longitudinal breaks should be assumed to result in an axial split without pipe severan'ce. Splits should be located (but not concurrently) at two diametrically-opposed points on the piping circumference such that a jet reaction causing out-of-plane bending of the piping configuration results.

4. The dynamic force of the fluid jet discharge should be based

- on a circular or elliptical (2D x 1/2D) break area equal to the effective cross-sectional flow area of the pipe at the break location and on a calculated fluid pressure modified by

- an analytically or experimentally determined thrust coefficient as determined for a circumferential break at the same location.

Line restrictions, flow limiters, positive pump-controlled flow, and the absence of energy reservoirs may be taken into account, as applicable, in the r' eduction of jet discharge. 1

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5. Piping movement should be assumed to occur in the direc, tion of the jet reaction unless limited by structural members, piping restraints, or piping stiffness as demonstrated by inelastic limit analysis.

C. Through-Wall Leakage Cracks ,

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The following through-wall laakage cracks should be postulated in t

moderate-energy f7uid system piping at the locations specified in l

i'Section II above:  ;

1. Cracks should be postulated in moderate-energy f7 aid system piping and branch runs exceeding a nominal pipe size of 1 inch.

2. Fluid flow from a crack should be based on a circular opening

.of area equal to that of a rectangle one-half pipe-diameter in length and one-half pipe wall Ahickness in width.

3. The flow from the crack should be assumed to result in an

• environment that wets all unprotected components within the l

i compartment, with consequent flooding in the compartment.

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i , . and communicating compartments. Flooding effects may be determined on the basis of a conservatively-estimated time period required to effect corrective actions.

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APPENDIX A .

PLANT ARRANGEMENT CRITERIA AND SELECTED PIPING DESIGN FEATURES

1. Plant Arrangement Protection of essential structures, systems, and components against postulated piping failures in high or moderate energy fluid systems that operate during normal plant conditions and that are located out-

. side of containment .should be provided by one of the following plant i

• arranger:ent considerations:

a. Plant arrangements should separate fluid system piping from essential structures, systems, and components. Separation should be achieved by plant physical layouts that provide sufficient distances betueen essential structures, systems, and components and fluid system piping such that the effects of any postulated piping failure therein (i.e. , pipe whip, jet impingement, and the environmental conditions resulting from the escape of contained fluids as appropriate to high or moderate-energy fluid system

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p,iping) cannot impair the integrity or operability of essential structures, systems, and components.

b. Fluid system piping or portions thereof not satisfying the

. provisions f 1.a. above should be. enclosed within structures or compartments designed 'to protect' nearby essential structtmes,

. systems, and components. Alternatively, essential systems and M-

i<** '

components may be enclosed within structures or compartments designed to withstand the effects of postulated ptptng fattures ,

1 in nearby fluid systems. I

c. Plant arrangements or system features that do not satisfy the provisions of either 1.a. or,1.b. above should be limited to those for which the above provisions are impractical. Such cases may arise, for example, (1) at interconnections between f7uid systems and e_ssential systems and components, or (2) in f7uid systems having dual functions (i.e., required to operate during normal plant' conditions as well as to shut down the reactor).

In such cases, redundant design features, separated or otherwise protected from effects of postulated piping failures, or additional protection should be provided so that reactor shutdown is assured in the event of a failure in the interconnecting piping of (1),

or in the dual function piping of (2). Additional protection may be provided by restraints and barriers or by designing or testing essential systems and components to withstand the effects associated with postulated piping failures.

2. Design Features

a. Essential systems and components should be designed to meet the seismic design require =ents of Regulatory Guide 1.29.

b. Protective structures or compartments, fluid system piping restraints,~and other protective measures should be designed in accordance with the following: .

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(1) Protective structures or co=partments needed to i=plement I 1.b..or 1.c. above should be designed to ' Seismic Category I requirements. ,Th e effects of a postulated pipir.g failure (i.e. , pipe whip, jet impingement, pressurization of compart-ment, water spray, and flooding, as appropriate) in combination l with loadings associated with the Safe Shutdown Earthquake and normal operation should be used for the design of required l protective structures. Piping restraints, if used, may be taken into account to ligit effects of the postulated pipir;g failure.

(2) High-energy fluid system piping restraints and protective measures should be designed- such that the effects of a postulated break 1/ in one pipe cannot, in turn, rupture

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other nearby pipes or co=ponents which could result in unacceptable offsite consequences or in loss of ca7 ability

'i of essential systems and components to initiate, actuate, and complete actions-required for reactor shutdown.

c. Fluid sysfon piping between containment isolation valves should

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meet the following design provisions:

1/ In the design of piping restraint, an unrestrained whipping pipe should be considered capable of (a) rupturing impacted pipes of s= aller nominal pipe sizes and (b) developing a through-wall leakage crack in larger nominal pipe sizes with thinner wall thicknesses except where experimental or analytical data for specific impact energies demonstrate the capability to withstand the impact without failure.

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(1) Portions of fluid sydsca piping between isolation valves of single barrier containment structures (including any rigid connect, ion to the containment nenetration) that connect, on a continuous or intermittent basis to the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the steam and feedwater syst' ems of PWR plants should be designed to the stress limits specified in I.B. or II.B. of this document.

5 These portions of high-energy fluid system piping should be provided with pipe whip restraints (i.e., capable of resisting bending and torsional coments) located reasonably close to the containment isolation valves. The restraints should be designed to withstand the loadings resulting from a posculated piping failure beyond these portions of piping so that neither isolation valve operability nor the leaktight integrity of the contain=ent will be impaired.

Terminal ends of the ' piping runs outside containment should be I

considered to originate at the pipe whip restraint locations j .outsfde containment.

I Where contain=ent isolation valves are not required inside containment, those portions of. the fluid system piping extending from the outside isolation valve to either the rigid pipe connection to the containment penetration or the first pipe i

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whip restraint inside containment should be considered as the boundary of the system piping required to meet the a'bove

' design limits and restraint provisions .

(2) Portions of fluid system piping between isolation valves of dual barrier containment structures should not exceed the

-1 stress limits in I.B. or* II.B. of this document. These portions of high-energy fluid system piping that pass through the annulus, and whose failure could affect the leaktight -

integrity of the containment structure or result in pressur-ization of the annulus. beyond design limits, should be provided with pipe wh'ip restraints (i.e., capable of resisting bending and torsional moments) located reasonably close to the containment isolation valves and should be provided with an enclosing structure or guard pipe. Restraints should be designed to withstand the loadings resulting from a posculated piping failure beyond these portions of piping so that neither

- isolation valve operability nor the leaktight integrity of the associated containment penetration will be impaired.

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Terminal ends of the piping runs outside containment should be considered to originate at the pipe whip restraint locations outside containment. -

For the purpose of establishing the design parameters (e.g. ,

pressure, temperature, axial loads) only of the enclosing

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structure or guard pipe, a full flow. area break shoul_d be assumed in that portion of piping within the enclosing structure or guard pipe.

(3) For those portions of fTuid system piping identified .in 2.c. (1) and 2.c. (2) above, the extent of inservice examination

- conducted as specified iIt Division 1 of Section XI of the ASME j - Code during each inspection interval should be increased to provide volumetric examination of 100 percent of the ci cum-ferential and longitudinal weld joints in piping identified in Section III.A.1: and S'ection III.B.l. of this document. The

- area.s subject to examination should comply with the require-ments of the following categories as specified in Section XI of the ASME Code:

(a) ASME Class 1 piping welds, Examination Category B-J in Table IWB-2500.

(b) ASME Class ~ 2,pipitig welds, Examination Category C-F and C-G in Table IWC-2500.

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. i GLOSSARY Essential Structures, Systems, and Cc~ronents. Structures, systems, "and co=ponents required for reactor shutdown without off site power or -

to mitigate the consequences of a postulated piping failure in fluid systen piping that results in trip,of the turbine-generator or the reactor protection system. ,

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Fluid G:ssten:. High and mrderate energy fluid systems that are subJeet j to tha postulation of piping failures against which protection of essential etructures, systems, and components is needed.

Ht'ah-Energy Fluid Systems. ' Fluid system's that, during normal plant conditions, are either in operation or maintained pressurized under conditions where either or both of the following are met:

a. maximum operating temperature exceeds 200*F, or

b. maximum operating pressure exceeds 275 psig.

Moderate-Energ's Fluid Systems. Fluid systems that, during normal plant conditions, are either in operation or maintained pressurized (above ,

atmospheric pressure) under conditions where both of the following are met:

a. maximum oper.ating temperature is 200*F or less, and

b. maximum operating pressure is 275 psig or less.

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Nore:I Plant Conditions. Plant operating conditions during reactor startup, operation at power, hot standby. .or reactor cooldown to cold shutdown ~ condition.

ULoset Plant Conditions. Plant operating conditions during system transients that may occur with moderate frequency during plant service life and are anticipated operational occurrences, but not during system

} testing. '

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.4 Postulated Picing Failures. . Longitudinal and circumferential breaks in high-energy fluid system piping and through-wall leakage cracks in moderate-energy fluid systes piping postblated according to the provisions of this document.

Sp Sj and Sj . Allowable stresses at maximum (hot) temperature, at minimum.(cold) temperature, and allowable stress range for thermal expansion respectively, as defined in Article NC-3600 of the ASME Code,Section III.

S. Design stress intensity as defined in Article NB-3600 of the ASME

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i Code,Section III. -

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.. Single Active Cceronent Failure. Malfunction or loss of function of a component of electrical or fluid systems. The failure of an active component of a fluid system is considered to be a loss of component l

I function as a result.of mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, or electrical malfunction, but not the loss of component structural integrity. The direct consequences of a single active component failure are considered to be part of the single failure. -

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rigid constraints to piping thermal expansion. A branch connection to a main piping run is a terminal end of the branch run.

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Attcchm2nt B ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL EOUIPMENT SEISMIC QUALIFICATION PROGRAM I. Seismic Test for Equipment Operability

1. A test program is required to confirm the functional operability of all Seismic Category I electrical'and mechanical equipment and instrumentation during and af ter an earthquake of magnitude up to and ir.cluding the SSE. Analysis without testing may be acceptable o~nly if structural integrity alone can assure the design intended function. When a complete seismic testing is impracticable, a combination of test and analysis may be accept-able.

2. The characteristics of the required input motion should be I

specified by one of the following

! (a) response spectrum  !

(b) power spectral density function l

'- ,(c) time history '

Such characteristic 5, as derived from the structures or systems seismic analysis, should be representative of the input motion j at the equipment mounting locations. 5

3. Equipment should be tested in the operational condition. Oper- .

ability should be verified during and~after the testing. -

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4. , The actual input motion should be characterized in the same

. manner as the required input motion, and the conservatism in amplitude and frequency ecntent should he demonstrated.

5. Seicmic excitation generally have a broad frequency content.

Random vibration input motion abould be used. However, single frequency input, such as sine beats, may be applicable provided one of'the following conditions aie met:

(a) The characteristics of the required input motion indicate ,

. that the motion is dominated by one frequency (i.e., ty '

structural filtering effects).

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(b) The anticipated response of the equipment is adequately representdd by one mode.

l (c) The input has sufficient intensity and doration to exc.ite '

all modes to the required magnitude, such that the testing response spectra will envelope the corresponding response spectra of the individual modes.

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6. The input notion should be applied to one vertical and one principal (or two orthogonal) horizontal axes simultenecusly .

unless it can be demonstrated thar. the 6quipment response along the vertical direction is uct sensitice to -the vibratory motion along the horizontal direction, und vice versa. The time phasing of the inputs in the vertical and horizontal direc-tions must be such that a purely rectil,inear resultant input is avoided, The acceptable alternative is to have vertical and borizontal inputs in-phasa, and then repeated with inputs 180 degrees out-of-phase. In addition, the test must be repeated with the equipment rotated 90 degrees horizontally, l

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7. The fixture design should meet the following requirements:

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(a) Simulate the actual service mounting l (b) Cause no dynamic coupling to the test iteo.

l 8. The in-situ application of vibratory devices ta cuperimpose the seismic vibratory loadings en the complex active device for operability tasting is acceptable when application is justifiable.

9. The test program may be based upon selec:1vely testing a repre-sentative number of mechanical components according to type, load invel, size, etc. on a prototype basis. .

II. Seismic Design Adequacy of Supports l'. Analyses or tcs s should be performed for all supports of ,

electrical and mechanical equipment and instrumentation to ensure their structural capability to withstand seismic

. excitation.

2. The analytical results must include the following: ,

(a) The required input motions to the ecunted equipment should *

• te obtained and characterized in the manner as stated in Secti'on I.2. ,  ;

9 (b) The combined stresses of the appport structures should be within the lit:ia:s of ASME Section III, Substetton NP -

" Component Support Structures" (draf t version) or other comparable stress limits.

3, Supports should be tested with equipmeat installed. If the l aquipment is inoperative during the support rest, the response at the equipment mounting locations should be monitored and ch.irecterized in the manner as stated in Section I.2. In suc!!

a case, equipment should be tested separately and the actual input to the equipment should be more conservative in amplitude and frequency content than ene monitored response.

4. The requirements of Secti6ns I.2, I.l, I.5, I.6 and I 7 are applicable when testa are conductest on the equipnent supports.

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Kasponsible TR Branch and Techn M 1 Reviewers: MEB, F. Cherny, P. Chen '

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. Requested Coupletion Dates. 9/27/74 Descripties of Emeposes: qi Review of PSAR . ,

Review Status Amaiting Inferumtion "-

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s . y Florest (Regulatory Guide 1.70) dated Deteber 1972. Since the WP-3 , '

U and 5 PSAR references CESSAR, only nea-CESSAR portions of these sections have been reviewed.

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3 11-1 11.0 MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 110.1 Under 3.6.2.1.4(a) piping systems having an. internal pressure of (3.6.2,1) up to 275. psia and fluid temperatures not in excess of 200*F are excluded from pipe break criteria. This is not consistent with Regulatory Guide 1,46 nor the present MEB position. The present MEB position is that through, wall leakage cracks should be postulated for such piping as delineated in Attachment A which is generally applicable for piping outside the containment.

110.2 PGAR states that criteria for postulating pipe breaks for (3.6.2.2) piping outside the containment will be per AEC letter from .

l J. O' Leary of 7/12/73. This is acceptab1:a, however, imple- -

gentation of,this criteria should be as c.ontained in Attachment i

A. .

110.3 (1) Provide leading combinations and stress criteria for (3,6.3.1) norzal, upset, and energency conditions for Class 1, 2 .

and 3 piping in the A/E - BOP scope.

(2) Provide more specific criteria than "per code" for faulted condition stress criteric for Clare 1 piping. For exampic, ASHE scetion III permits the use of Appendix F of the code far faulted conditions; but, does not require it. S tate specificcily what is to be used.

(3) Provide specific design details for the three typas of piping penetration guard pipes. Also discuss the access proviritons ta carry out innervice inspection of the flued head to procass pipe welds for the Type I and III penetrations.

110.4 . (1) Identify the coeputer progran to be used for the calculation (3.6.4.1) of postulated pipe break and if the program is not widely used in the nuclear industry, provide justification for its '

applicability and validity for this t pc of analysis.

(2) In the corputation of the thrust force using the simplified foredng fucction, justity the use of Psat in lieu of Po for compresaed (flashing) er saturated water.

110.5 (1) For unchoked flov, the Regulatory staff will accept use of

( 3'. 6. 4. 2) a model with a usiforn .ha:f angle of dispersion noc exceeding 10'. .

(2) In calculating jc c imfingement force as described in Eq. (1) ,

the de.finition'of the velocity ratic Um is not clear. Current MEB position requires that the steady state forcing function for jet impingenent should have a nagnitude (T) cot Lass than 6 4m> = mas. . - ,

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110.5 T = KPA ,

(3.6.4.2) '

Where P = system pressure prict to pipe break A = pipe break area, and K = thrust coefficient. l (3) For choked flow, provide justification for the following .l assumed angles of dispersion for the jeto: .

Flashing water - 45*

Steau - 22* ,

Non . Flashing Water - 25*

] and clarify the pressure that is goin.g to be used for calculating jet force.

(4) Define the sym*ools for calculating the jet impingement forces as given in cases A, B, C and D. In those formulas, explain the missing pressure force conponent.

(5) For the. calculation of the Drag Force (Case C) expand the discussion to include a broader, range gf Reynolds numbers other than the range of R = 104 to 103 given.

110.6 (1) The information presented in this section of the PSAR does

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(3.9.1.1) not satisfy the requirements concerning "Seisni: Category I Mechanical Equipment Testing and Analysis - C.E. Scope of Supply" for plants currently undergoing review. Provide the appropriate comnitments from CESSAR.

(2) Clarify type of operating experience to be used to verify '

that equipment will operate under SSE conditions.

(3) Provide commitment that all Category I mechanical equipment

i. and supports will be qualified to requirements of specifi-cations 7-74 in Appendix 3.9.A.

(4) In paragraph 3.02 d of Appendix 3.9.A, when using the Response Spectrum Modal Analysis nethod, provide criteria for determining closely space nodes.

(5) In Appendix 3.9. A, paragraph 3.02.e permits an allowable stress of.0.9 of the material yield stress for faulted conditions. This is not consistent with limits stated per Table 3.9.3 of the PSAR. Revise the Appendix to conform with Table 3.9.3.

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11-3 1 110.7 The seismic qualification program described in this section is (3.9.1.2) not totally acceptabic. Revise the program to be in accordance (3.10) with criteria provided in Attachment B " Electrical and Seismic  !

Qualification Program."

110.8 (1) In the last sentence of Part I of Appendix 3.9.B change (3.9.2.4) "will" to "may".

(2) In Section II of Appendix 3 9.B expand the valve operability testing criteria to include the valve design pressure.

(3) In Section II of Appendix 3.9.B under criterion d state the Qualification Standards to b.e employed.

(4) In Appendix 3.9.B define the horizontal and vertical accel-erations to be used for static valve qualification. .

(5) In Appendix 3.9.B.Section II, your position that for valves with natura,1 frequencies less than 33 Hz operability can be verified without performing valve exercising per step C requires justification.

110.9 Provide more specific equations of motion and discuss methcds (3.9.2.5) of solution for the dynamic analysis for closed systems. Provide the same for open systems if the time history dynamic analysis is used.

9 110.10 The information provided in this section is not adequate. In (3.9.2.7) addition to the ncminal pipe size which determine whether ASME (5.2.19) Class 2 and 3 piping will be field run, identify in the PSAR those Category I piping systems which will be field run. Include any special or simplified procedures which will be used for designing and installing this piping. ,

110.11 Provide the specific criteria that will be used to guarantee l (3.10.2) operability of instrumentation and electrical equipment, not furnished by C.E. , under faulted conditions when a dynamic analysis without performance testing is employed in the design i of this equipment.

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Att chm:nt A BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION-}IEB NO.1

> MECHA:!ICAL ENGINEERI::G BRANCH .

DIRECTORATE OF LICENSING r

CRITERIA FOR FOSTULATED FAILURE A:;D LEAKAGE LOCATIONS IN FLUID SYSTOI PIPING OUTSIDE CONTAI:!'!E:G, The follow'ing criteria are within the review responsibility of the Mechanical Engineering Branch with the exception of. I. A. , II.A. , II.D. ,

II.E and 1.a. , I.b. ,1.c. , 2.a and 2.c. (3) of Appendix A.

1. Rich-EnerquFluidSystehPtoing

• A. Fluid Systems Separated from Sasential Structures, Systems d Components

• For the purpose of satisfying the separation provisions of 1.a.

of Appendix A, a review of the piping layout and plant arrangement drawings should clearly show that the effects of postulated' piping breaks at any location are isolated or physically remote from

~ essential structurca, systems, and components. At the designer's option, break locations as determined from I.C., I.D., and I.E below may be selected for this purpose.

. B. Fluid System Piping Between Containment Isolation Valves Breaks need not be postulated in those portions of piping identified in 2.C. (1) and 2.C.(2) of Appendix A provided they meet the requirements of ASI!E Code,Section III - Subarticle NE-ll10 and are designed to neet the following additional requirements:

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1. The following design stress and fatigue limits should not be exceeded; For ASME Code, heetion III, Class 1 Piping ,

(A) Maximum str. ass ranges should not exceed the following limits:

Territic steel 1 2.0S

. Austenitic steel < 2.4S .

i (b) The maximum stress range between any two load sets 4

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.! (including 'the zero load set) should be calculated by f

6 Eq. (10) in' Par. NB-3653, ASME Code,Section III, for upset plant egnditions a,nd an OBE event transient.

. If the calculated maximum stress range of Eq. (10) exceeds the limits of 'I.B.l(a) but is.not greater than 3Sg the limit of I.B.'l(c) should be met. .

Ifthe*egiculatedmaritumstressrangeofEq.(10) eiceeds 3S , the stress ranges calculated by both Eq. (12) and Eq. (13) should meet the limits of I.B.l(a) apd the limit of I.B.l(c). ,

(c) Cumulative usage factor 10.1, as required by I.B.l(b)..

For ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 Piping Maximum stress range as calculated by Eq. (9) and (10) in Par. NC-3652, ASME Code,Section III, considering upset plant' s

condicions (i.e., sustained loads, occasional loads, and thermal 1

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expansion) and an OBE event should not exceed (S + S) h

2. Welded attach =ents, for pipe supports or other purposes, to these portions of piping should be avoided except where detailed' '

' stress analyses; or tests, are performed to demonstrate compliance with the limits of I.B.1.

3. The number of piping circumferential and longitudinal welds-and, branch connections should be minimized. t

4. The length of the piping run should be reduced to the minimum length practical.

'5. The design at points of pipe fixity (e.g., pipe anchors or

- welded connections at containment penetrations) should not require welding directly to the outer surface of the piping (e.g. , fluid integral forged pipe fittings may be, used) except where detailed stress analyses are performed to demonstrate compliance with the limits of I.B.1.

6. Geometric discontinuities, such as at pipe-to-valve section

, transitions, at branch connections, and at changes in pipe wall thickness should be designed to minimize the discontinuity stresses.

C. Fluid Systems Enclosed Within Protective Structures

1. Breaks in ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 and 3 piping should M Th e limit of 'O.8(1.2 'S3 + Sj ) may be used in lieu of (S, + Sh)*

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be postulated at the following locations in each piping and

branch run (except those portions of flu *d system piping- .

identified in I.B.) within a protective structure containing essential systems cnd components and designed to satisfy the provisions of l.'b. or 1.c. of Appendix A:

a. At terminal ends of the pressurized portions of the run if located within the protective structure.

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b. At intermediate locations selected by either of the

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following criteria:

(i)' At each pipe fitting (e.g. , elbow, tee, cross, and non-standard fitting) or, if the run contains no fittings, at one location at each extreme of the run (a, terminal end, if located within th'e protective str'ucture may substitute for one intermediate break).

(ii) At each location where the stresses-3/ exceed c (S but at not less than two separated locations chosen on

_ the basis of highest stress . In the case of a straighe

. pipe run without any pipe fittings or welded attach-ments and stresses below (Sh c + S )' * *i"i "* f ""

location chosen on the basis of highest stress.

3/ Stresses associated with nom::L and upset plant conditions, and an OBE event as calculated by- Eq. (0; and (10), Par. NC-3652 of the ASME Code,Section III, for Class 2 and 3 piping

-4/Twe highest stress points; select second point at least 107. below the

' highest stress.

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2. Breaks in non-nuclear class piping should be postulated at the following locations in each piping or branch run: -

a. At terminal ends of the pressurized portions of the run if located within the protective structure.

b. At each intermediate pipe fitting and welded attachment.

D. Flu.id Systems Not Enclosed Within Protective Structures

1. Breaks in ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 and 3 piping, phould be postulated at the following locations in each piping and branch run (except those por.tions of f7 aid system piping

, identified in I.B) ou'tside but routed alongside, above, or below a protective structure containing essential systems and components and designed to satisfy the provisions of 1.b or 1.c of Appendix A. -

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a. At tenninal ends of pressurized portions of the run if located adjacent to the protective structure.

b. at intermediate locations selected by either of the t

following criteria:

l (1) At each pipe fitting (e.g. , elbow, tee, cross, and 1

non-standard fitting).

(ii) At each location where the stresses exceed (S. n + SC)E l

but at not less than two separated locations chosen on the basis of highest strect4 / . In the case of a

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• straight pipe run without any pipe fittings or welded attach =ents and stresses below (S. + S'), a n c minimum of one location chosen on the basis of highest stress.

2. Breaks in non-nuclear class piping should be postulated at the following locations in each pipin'g or branch run:

a. At terminal ends of pressurized portions of the run if located adjacent to the protective structure.

l

. b. At each intermediate pipe fitting and wel'ded attachment.

II. Moderate-Energu Fluid Suetem Piping A. Fluid Systems Separated from Essential btructures, Systems d Components for the purpose of satisfying the ' separation provisions of 1.a. of Appendix A, a review of the piping layout and plant arrangement

, drawings should clearly show'that the effects of through-wall leakage cracks at any location are isolated or physically remote l ,

from essential structures, systems, and components.

B. Fkuid' System Piping Between Containment Isolation Valves Breaks need not be postulated in those portions of piping identified in 2.c. of Appendix A provided they meet the. requirements of ASME Code,Section III - Subarticle NE-1110, and are designed such that the stresses do not exceed 0.5(Sh * #c )S_/for ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 piping.

1 5/

- The limit 0.4(1.2 Sh " #A) may be us-d in lieu of 0.5(S, + S3) .

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i C. Fluid Systems Within or Outside and Adjacent to Protective Structures Through-wall leakage cracks should be postulated in f7 aid ,

system piping located within or outside and adjacent to protective structures containing essential systems and 4

components and designed to satisfy the provisions of 1.b. .

I or 1.c. of Appendix A, execpt where exe=pted by II.B, II.D.

or in those portions of ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 or 3 1, .

l piping or non-nuclear piping where the stresses are less than Th-e cracks should be postulated to occur 0.5(Sh*#) c individu$llyatlocat,1onsthatr,esultinthemaximumeffects from fluid spraying and flooding, and the consequent hasards or environmental conditions developed.

D. Moderate-Energy Fluid Systems in Proximity to High-Energy Fluid

, Systems Cracks need not be postulated in moderale-energy f7 aid system piping located in an area in which a break in high-energy fluid system piping is postulated, provided such cracks would not result in more limiting environmental conditions than the high-energy

{ piping break. Where a postulated leakage crack in the moderate-energy fluid system piping results in more limiting environmental 1

conditions chan the break in proximate high-energy f2uid systen piping, the , provisions of II.C should be applied.

E. Fluid Systems Qua11fying as High-Energy or Moderate-Energy Systems l Through-wall leakage cracks instead of breaks may be postulated I .

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in the piping of those fluid syscems that qualify as high encryy fluid systens for only short operational periode6 / but qualify as moderate-energy fluid systems for the =ajor operational period.

III. Type of Breaks'and Leakage Cracks in Fluid Sustem Piping A. Circumferential Pipe Breaks The following circumferential breaks should be postulated in i high-energy f2uid system piping at the locations specified in Section I above: i ,

. 1. Circumferential breaks should be postulated in fluid systen piping and branch runs exceeding a nominal pipe size of 1 inch, except that, if the maximum stress range in the circumferential direction is at- least twice that in the axial direction, only a

. longitudinal break need be postulated. Instrument'11nes, one inch and less nominal pipe size for tubing should meet the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.11.

2. Where break locations are selected at pipe fittings without

the benefit of stress calculations, breaks should be postulated at each pipe-to-fitting weld. If detailed stress analyses 6/ An operational period is considered "short" if the' fraction of time that the system operates within the pressure-temperature conditions specified

~

for high-energy fluid systems is less than 2 percent of the time that the system operates as a moderate encrgy fluid system (e.g., systems such as the reactor decay heat removal systems qualify as moderate-

. energy fluid sysices; however, systems such as auxiliary feedwater systems operated during PtiR reactor startup, hot standby, or shutdown qualify as high-energy fluid systems).

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, , , j (e.g., finite ele =ent analyses) or tests are performed, the maximum stressed location in the fitting may be selected instead of the pipe-to-fitting weld. ,

3., circumferential breaks should be assumed to result in pipe severance and separation amounting to a one-diameter lateral displacement of the ruptured piping sections unless physically limited by piping restraints, structural members, or piping stiffness as may be demonstrated by inelastic limit analysis (e.g., a plastic hinge in the piping is not developed under loading). . . , ,

4. The ' dynamic force of the jet discharge at the break location should be based on the effective cross-sectional flow area of the pipe and on a calculated fluid pressure as modified .

by an analytically or experimentally determined thrust coefficient. Limited pipe displacement at the break location, line restrictions, flow limiters, positive pump-controlled flow,,and the absence of energy reservoirs may be taken into

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,, . account, as applicable, in the reduction of jet discharge.

5. Pipe whipping should be assumed to occur in the plane defined by the piping geometry and configuration, and to cause pipe movement *in the direction of the jet reaction.

B. Longitudinal Pipe' Breaks The following longitudinal breaks should,be postulated in high-energy f~luid system piping at the locations of each circumferential break'specified in III.A.:

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1. Longitudinal break in fluid system piping and branch runs should' be postulated in nominal pipe sizes 4-inch and larger, except that, if the maximum stress range in the axial direction is at least twice. that in the circumferential direction, only a circumferential break need be postulated. ,

2. Longitudinal breaks need not be postulated at terninal ends if the p,iping at the tenninal ends contains no longitudinal pipe velds and major geometric discontinuities at the circumferential weld joints of the tenninal ends are designed to minimize dis-continuity stresses.

3. Longitudinal breaks should be assumed to result in an axial split without pipe severance. Splits should be located (but not concurrently) at two diametrically-opposed points on the piping circumference such that a jet reaction causing out-of-plane bending of the piping configuration results.

4. The dynamic force of the fluid jet discharge should be based on a circular or elliptical (2D x 1/2D) break area equal to the effective cross-sectional flow area of the pipe at the t

break location and on a calculated . fluid pressure modified by an analytically or experimentally determined thrust coefficient as determined for a circumferential break at the same location.

Line restrictions, flow limiters, positive pump-controlled flow, and the absence of energy reservoirs may be takea into account, as applicable, in the reduction of jet discharge.

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5. Piping movement should be assumed to occur in the direction of the jet reaction unless limited by structural members, piping restraints, or piping stiffness as demonstrated by inelastic

. limit analysis.

C. Through-Wall Leakage Cracks ,

The following through-wall leakage cracks should be postulated in i

j moderate-energy f7 aid system piping at the locations specified in Section II hbove: -

1. Cracks should be postulated in moderate-energy f7uid system

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piping and. branch runs exceeding a. nominal pipe size of 1 inch.

2. Fluid flow from a crack should be based on a circular opening of area equal to that of a rectangle one-half pipe-diameter in 1ength and one-half pipe wall thickness in width.

3. The flow from the crack should be assumed to result in an environment that wets all unprotected components within the 6

- compartment, with consequent flooding in the compartment l .

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and communicating compartments. Flooding effects may be determined on the basis of a conservatively-estimated time period required to effect corrective actions.

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APPENDIX A PLANT ARRANGDIEhT CRITERIA AND SELECTED PIPING DESIGN FEATURES

1. Plant Arraneement Protection of essential structures, systems, and components against postulated piping failures in high or moderate energy fluid systems that operate during norect plant conditions and that are located out-side of containment .should be provided by one of the following plant arrangement considerations: -

a. Plant arrangements should separate fluid system piping from essential structures, systems, and components. Separation should be achieved by plant physical layouts that provide sufficient distances between essential structures, systems, and components and fluid sy' stem piping such that the effects of any postulated piping failure therein (i.e. , pipe whip, jet impingement, and the environmental conditions resulting from the escape of contained fluids as appropriate to high or moderate-energy fluid system

,. piping) cannot impair the integrity or operability of essential i

structures, systems, and components.

b. Fluid system piping or portions thereof not satisfying the provisions of 1.a. above should be. enclosed within structures or compartments designed to protect nearby essential structures, systems, and components. Alternatively, essential systems and 6

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components may be enclosed within structures or compart=ents designed to withstand the effects of postulated piping failures in nearby fluid systems.

c. Pl'a nt arrangements or system features that do not satisfy the provisions of either 1.a. or,1.b. above should be limited to

those for which the above provisions are . impractical. Such t cases may arise, for example, (1) at interconnections between 1

i fluid systems and e,ssential systems and components, or (2) in fluid systems having dual functions (i.e., required to operate during normal plant conditions as well as to shut down the reactor).

In such ' cases, redundant design features, separated or otherwise protected from effects of posrulated piping failures, or additional protection should be provided so that reactor shutdown is assured in the event of a failure in the interconnecting piping of (1),

or in the dual function piping of (2). Additional protection may be provided by restraints and barriers or by designing or testing essential systems and components to withstand the effects -

, associated with postulated piping failures. *

2. Design Features

a. Essential systems and components should be designed to meet the seismic design requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.29.

b. Protective structures or compar'tments, fluid system piping restraints, and other protective measures should be designed in accordance with the following:

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(1) Protective structures or compartments needed to implement 1.b. or 1.c. above should be designed to. Seismic Category I requirements. The effects of a postulated piping failure (i.e. , pipe whip, jet impingement, pressurization of compart-ment, water spray and flooding, as appropriate) in combination with loadings associated with the Safe Shutdown Earthquake and normal operation should be used for the design of required protective structures. Piping restraints, if used, may be i

taken into account to limit effects of the postulated piping i

failure.

(2) High-energy fluid system piping restraints and protective measures should be designed such that the effects of a postulated break1! n i one pipe cannot, in turn, rupture other nearby pipes or components which could result in unacceptable offsite consequences or in loss of caaability n

of essential systems and components to initiate, actuate,

. and complete actions required for reactor shutdown.

c .' Fluid sysfen piping between containment isolation valves should l

meet the following design provisions:

l 1/ In the design of piping restraint, an unrestrained whipping pipe

, should be considered capable of (a) rupturing impacted pipes of smaller l nominal pipe sizes and (b) developing a' through-wall leakage crack in larger nominal pipe sizes with thinner wall thicknesses except where experimental or analytical data for specific impact energies demonstrate the capability to withstand the impact without failure.

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, (1) Portions of fluid sys en piping between isolation valves of single barrier containment structures (including any rigid connection to the containment penetration) that connect, on a continuous or intermittent basis to the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the steam and feedwater systems of PWR plants should be designed to the stress limits specified in I.B. or II.B. of this document.

These portions of high-energy f7 aid system piping should be provided with pipe whip restraints (i.e., capable of resisting bending and torsional moments) located reasonably close'to the containment isolation valves. The restraints should be designed to withstand the loadings resulting from a postulated piping failure beyond these portions of piping so t. hat neither isolation valve operability nor the leaktight integrity of the containment will be impaired.

Tenninal ends of the' piping runs outside containment should be I

considered to originate at the pipe whip restraint locations

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.outsfde containment.

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1 Where containment isolation valves are not required inside containment, those portions of. the fluid system piping extending 4

from the outside isolation valve to either the rigid pipe connection to the containment penetration or the first pipe

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. . i whip restraint inside containment should be considered as the boundary of the system piping required to meet the above.

design limits and restraint provisions.

(2) Portions of fluid system piping between isolation valves of dual, barrier containment structures should not exceed the stress li=its in I.B. or*II.B. of this document. These portions of high-energy fluid system piping that pass through ,

the annulus, and whose failure could affect the leaktight ,

integrity of the containment. structure or result in pressur-ization of the annulus.beyond design limits, should be provided with pipe whip restraints (i.e., capable of resist 1~ ng bending and torsional moments) located reasonably close to the containment isolation valves and should be provided with an enclosing structure or guard pipe. Restraints should be designed to withstand the loadings resulting from a postulated

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piping failure beyond these portions of piping so that neither isolation valve operability nor the leaktight integrity of the

! associated containment penetration will be impaired. ,

1 l

l ' Terminal ends of the piping runs outside containment should be considered to originate at the pipe whip restraint locations

( outside containment.

l l e l For the purpose of establishing the design parameters (e.g. ,

pressure, temperature, axial loads) only of the enclosing 1 .

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+ structure or guard pipe, a full flow area break should be assumed in that portion of piping within the enclosing structsre or guard pipe.

(3) For those portions of f2uid system piping identified in 2.c. (1) and 2.c. (2) above, the extent of inservice examination conducted as specified in Division 1 of Section XI of the ASME

=i Code during each inspection interval should be increased to

! provide volumetric examinacion of 100 percent of the circum-ferential and longitudinal weld joints in piping identified in Section III.A.l. and S'ection III.B.l. of' this document. The

- areas subject to examination should comply with the require-ments of the following categories as specified in Section XI of the ASME Code:

(a) ASME Class 1 piping welds, . Examination Category B-J in

- Table IWB-2500.

'(b) ASME Class 2, piping welds, Examination Category C-F and C-G in Table IWC-2500.

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- GLOSSARY Essential St~ustures. Sist:~s; and Cc~conents. Structures, systems,'

and components required for reactor shutdown without off-site power or to mitigate the consequences of a postulated piping failure in fluid system piping that results in trip.of the turbine-generator or the reactor protection system. ,

Fluid Syst:~:s. High and moderate energy fluid systems that are subiect t

to the postulation of piping failures against which protection of essential structures, systems, and components is needed.

High-Enerm/ Fluid Systems. Fluid system's that, during normal plant conditions, are either in operation or maintained pressurized under conditions where either or both of the following are met:

a. maximum operating temperature exceeds 200*F, or b,. maximum operating pressure exceeds 275 psig.

Noderate-Energy Fluid Sustems. Fluid systems that, during normal plant conditions, are either in operation or maintained pressurized (above .

atmospheric pressure) under conditions where both of the following are met:

i

! a. maximum operating temperature is 200*F or less, and

b. maximum operating pressure is 275 psig or less,.

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I.'orm I Plant Conditions. Plant operating conditions during reactor startup, operation at power, hot standby, or reactor cooldown to cold shutdown condition. -

m i Upset Plant Ccniitions.

i Plant operating conditions during system transients that may occur with moderate frequency during plant service life and are anticipated operational occurrences, but not during system testing.

i i.

j Postulated Pisino Failures. , Longitudinal and ci cumferential breaks in high-energy f1uid system piping and through-vall leakage cracks in i

moderate-energy f7uid systen piping postN1ated according to the provisions of this document.

S ' # , and S .

h c j Allowable stresses at cr.ximum (hot) . temperature, at minimum (cold) temperature, and allot <able stress range for thermal expansion respectively, as defined in ' Article NC-3600 of the ASME Code,Section III.

S. Design stress intensity as defined in Article NB-3600 of the ASNE i

Code,Section III.

Li -

Sinale Active Com onent Failure. Malfunction or loss of function of a component of electrical or fluid systems. The failure of an active 1

[ .- component of a fluid system is considered to be a loss of component

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i function as a result of mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic,, or electrical malfunction, but not the loss of component structural integrity. The direct consequences of a single active component failure are considered i

to be part of the single failure. i w $ Y

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per-fr:! DS. Extrc=cties of piping runs that connect to structures, components (e.g',, vessels, pumps, valves), or pipe anchors that act as rigid constraints to piping thermal expansion. A branch connection to a main piping run is a terminal end of the branch run.

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1 ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT SEISMIC QUALIFICATION PROGRAM l 1

l I. Seismic Test for Ecuipment Operability )

1. A test program is required to confirm the functional operability of all Seismic Category I electrical ~and mechanical equipment and instrumentation during and after an earthquake of magnitude up to and ' including the SSE. Analysis without testing may be acceptable only if structural integrity alone can assure the -

design intended function. When a complete seismic testing is impracticable, a combination of test and analysis may be accept-able.

2. The characteristics of the required input motion should be specified by one of the following:  !

(a) response spectrum ,

(b) power spectral density function (c) time history Such characteristics, as derived from the structures or systems seismic analysis, should be representative of the input motion at the equipment mounting locations. [

i

3. Equipment should be tested in the operational condition. Oper- .

ability should be verified,during and after the testing.  !

4. The actual input motion should be characterized in the same manner as the required input motion, and the conservatism in amplitude and frequency content should be demonstrated.

5. Seismic excitation generally have a broad frequency content.

Random vibration input motion should be used. However, single frequency input, such as sine beats, may be applicable provided -

one of^the following conditions are met:

l (a) The characteristics of the required input motion indicate '

that the motion is dominated by one frequency (i.e., by structural filtering effects)..

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1 (b) The anticipated response of the equipment is adequately represented by one mode.

(c) The input has sufficient intensity and duration to excite l all modes to the required magnitude, such that the testing response spectra will envelope the corresponding response l spectra of the individual modes. -

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6. The input motion should be applied to one vertical and one principal (or two orthogonal) horizontal axes simultaneously ,

unless it can be demonstrated that the equipment response along-the vertical direction is not sensitive to the vibratory motion along the h'orizontal direction, and vice versa. The time phasing of the inputs in the vertical and horizontal direc- ,

tions must be such that a purely rectilinear resultant input is avoided. .13ut acceptable alternative is to have vertical and )

horizontal inputs in-phase, and then repeated with inputs 180 degrees out-of-phase. In addition, the test must be repeated j with the equipment rotated 90 degrees horizontally.

7. The fixture design should meet the following requirements: )

i (a) Simulate the actual serv' ice mounting i (b) Cause no dynamic coupling to the test item.

8. The in-situ application of vibratory devices to superimpose the seismic vibratory loadings on the complex active device for

, operability testing is acceptable when application is justifiable.

l

9. The test program may be based upon selectively testing a repre-sentative number of mechanical components according to type, load level, size, etc. on a prototype basis.

II. Seismic Design Adequacy of Supports

~

l. Analyses or tests should be performed for all supports of' electrical and mechanical equipment ani instrumentation to ensure their structural capability to withstand seismic excitation. _

2 The analytical results must include the following:

i (a) The required input motions to the mounted equipment should be obtained and characterized in the manner as stated in Sect.fon I.2.

(b) The combined stresses of the support structures should be -

within the limits of ASME Sectlon III, Subsection NF -

" Component Support Structures" (draf t version) er other comparable stress limits. -

3. Supports should be tested with equipment installed. If the equipment is inoperative during the support test,, the response at the equipment mounting locations should be monitored and characterized in the manner as stated in Section I.2. In such a case, equipment should be tes'ted separately and the actt al input to the equipment should be more conservative in amplitude and frequency content than the monitored response.

4. The requirements of Sections I.2, I.4, I.5, I.6 and I.7 ace applicable when tests are conducted on the equipment supports.

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SEP 2 71974 Yilliam P. Gammill, Chief, Site Analysis Branch, L TH3U:- L. G. Ilulman, Section Lander, Hydrologic En31neering Section, E SITS VISIT TO UPESS NUCLEA7. PROJECT KOS. 3 & 5 - Vocket Hos,. 50-508 & 509 The site visit t6 the subject plant r.cok place on $cpterber 16, 1.974.

After a briaf int.roduction to the plant, which included inspeer. ion of it scale model df the plant vicinity, the undersigned were given

+ a tour of the general area, whcre we Icok6d at the proposed plant area and streams, watercouress, well fields, and other hydrologic features.

Af ter tite tout, ve met trit.h the applicant and his cCnsultants to discuss our various concerns in the genersi areas .af fl9ad estimates, water supply, site drainnge, and gtound writer. We wer; assuyed that our questions were understood and wi.1.1 be addressed in a subsequent -

armendment to the PSAR.

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}M // W\ i r.8.w T. L. $hnson, I!ydrateld Engineer Hydrologic Engineering Factica Site Analysis 3fanch Directprate of ticensing

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E. F. Hawkins, Rydraulips Engineer Ilydrologic Engince;-ing Sectiori Site Analysig Branch Dire.ctorate of Licensing cc: T. Schroeder A. Giambusso i

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