05000443/FIN-2009004-01: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The NRC identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix-B Criteria III, Design Control, for the failure to verify that service water (SW) isolation valve leakage was within design assumptions for ultimate heat sink (UHS) water inventory. Specifically, the NextEra had not verified by analysis or test that the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Class 3 boundary isolation valves, for the safety-related SW piping, provided an adequate leak tight boundary to ensure that the design minimum volume of water would remain in the UHS at the end of a seven-day period with no make-up. Following the identification, NextEra placed the issue into the corrective action program and performed an assessment, which concluded there was reasonable assurance the UHS cooling tower could perform its safety function. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, during a loss of normal ocean water cooling, a leak on the non-safety SW piping could result in a significant loss of inventory from the UHS over a seven-day period. In addition, this finding adversely affected the reliability objective of the protection against external events attribute under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because it was not representative of current licensee performance. When NextEra modified the valve seats in the early 1990's, they did not verify the modified design by either analysis or test. The valves in question have not been reworked or internally inspected since they were modified. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that this was not reflective of current performance | | description = The NRC identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix-B Criteria III, Design Control, for the failure to verify that service water (SW) isolation valve leakage was within design assumptions for ultimate heat sink (UHS) water inventory. Specifically, the NextEra had not verified by analysis or test that the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Class 3 boundary isolation valves, for the safety-related SW piping, provided an adequate leak tight boundary to ensure that the design minimum volume of water would remain in the UHS at the end of a seven-day period with no make-up. Following the identification, NextEra placed the issue into the corrective action program and performed an assessment, which concluded there was reasonable assurance the UHS cooling tower could perform its safety function. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, during a loss of normal ocean water cooling, a leak on the non-safety SW piping could result in a significant loss of inventory from the UHS over a seven-day period. In addition, this finding adversely affected the reliability objective of the protection against external events attribute under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because it was a design deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because it was not representative of current licensee performance. When NextEra modified the valve seats in the early 1990\'s, they did not verify the modified design by either analysis or test. The valves in question have not been reworked or internally inspected since they were modified. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that this was not reflective of current performance | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:37, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Seabrook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000443/2009004 Section 1R07 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.07 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Moslak J Richmond S Barr T Burns W Raymond A Burritt M Balazik J Johnson |
| INPO aspect | |
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