ENS 54605: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change) |
||
| Line 10: | Line 10: | ||
| utype = W-4-LP, W-4-LP | | utype = W-4-LP, W-4-LP | ||
| cfr = 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) | | cfr = 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) | ||
| emergency class = | | emergency class = Non Emergency | ||
| notification date = 03/24/2020 17:15 | | notification date = 03/24/2020 17:15 | ||
| notification by = Michael Chandler | | notification by = Michael Chandler | ||
| Line 17: | Line 17: | ||
| last update date = 03/24/2020 | | last update date = 03/24/2020 | ||
| title = Specified System Actuation - Auto Start Emergency Diesel Generators | | title = Specified System Actuation - Auto Start Emergency Diesel Generators | ||
| event text = At 1046 CDT on 3/24/2020, with Unit 1 defueled and Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the South Texas Project (STP) South switchyard electrical bus was deenergized. | | event text = At 1046 CDT on 3/24/2020, with Unit 1 defueled and Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the South Texas Project (STP) South switchyard electrical bus was deenergized. This resulted in a loss of power to Standby Transformer 2 which was supplying power to the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) 4160v busses for Unit 1 A- and C-Trains, and Unit 2 B-Train. Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) 11, 13, and 22 automatically started in response to the undervoltage condition. | ||
The cause for the loss of the South switchyard electrical bus was an error in relay testing in the switchyard. | The cause for the loss of the South switchyard electrical bus was an error in relay testing in the switchyard. | ||
This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in the valid actuation of emergency AC electrical power systems (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8)) as well as the Unit 1 A- and C-Train and Unit 2 B-Train Reactor Containment Fan Coolers (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(7)) and Unit 2 B-Train Auxiliary Feedwater pump (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6)). | This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in the valid actuation of emergency AC electrical power systems (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8)) as well as the Unit 1 A- and C-Train and Unit 2 B-Train Reactor Containment Fan Coolers (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(7)) and Unit 2 B-Train Auxiliary Feedwater pump (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6)). | ||
There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. | There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. | ||
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2020/20200325en.html#en54605 | | URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2020/20200325en.html#en54605 | ||
}} | }} | ||
{{ENS-Nav}}[[Category:Power Reactor]] | {{ENS-Nav}}[[Category:Power Reactor]] | ||
Latest revision as of 12:48, 15 January 2021
| Where | |
|---|---|
South Texas  Texas (NRC Region 4) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.48 h0.0617 days <br />0.00881 weeks <br />0.00203 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Michael Chandler 17:15 Mar 24, 2020 |
| NRC Officer: | Kerby Scales |
| Last Updated: | Mar 24, 2020 |
| 54605 - NRC Website
| |