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Requests Commission Approval of Effective Rule Change That Would Require Licensees to Prepare Safeguards Contingency Plans
	ML20203D242
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/15/1977
From:	Minogue R; NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
To:	;
References
	SECY-77-141B, SECY-77-141B-R, NUDOCS 9902160099
	Download: ML20203D242 (102)
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RELEASED TO THE PDR December 15, 1977 ,,,, m ,,, l g)/99 k/ f NUCLEAR REGULATORY cOMMISslON SECYe77-141B inds ;

<ues........mssssun CONSERT CALENDAR ITEM For: The Comissioners From: Robert B. Minogue, Director, Office of Standards Development Thru: Executive Director for Operations

Subject:

SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS, FUEL

, CYCLE FACILITIES AND FOR CERTAIN QUANTITIES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN TRANSIT; AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PARTS 50, 70, AND 73.

Purpose:

To obtain Comission approval of an effective rule change that would require licensees to prepare Safeguards Contingency Plans.

Category: This paper covers a major issue requiring Comission action.

Issue: Should the Commission publish the effective rule at this time or delay publication of this rule and integrate it with other rules being prepared in order to avoid revisions to contingency plans that may be necessary if the proposed amendments, to upgrade physical security (Performance Oriented Safeguards Requirements, published in the Federal Register, July 5, 1977, 42 FR 34310) fo fuel cycle facilities and transport.ation are made effective.

Decision.

Criteria: Would delaying the publication of required detailed criteria for licensee contingency plans, until a rule to upgrade physical security in the fuel cycle is approved, cause an unwarranted safeguards risk?

Discussion: On May 19, 1977, the Comission issued for public coment amend-ments to 10 CFR Parts 50, 70, and 73 dealing with the requiremer i that licensee safeguards contingency plans be developed. Member of the public, including licensees, were given a period of sixty l days to comment on the proposed amendments. A sumary of the coments and our responses thereto is included in Enclosure "B".

Enclosure "A" contains the changes to the proposed amendments as a result of the public coments, and other factors, and a state- '

ment of considerations outlining the changes that have been made ,

along with the reasons for these changes. The changes that have i been made are administrative and are not major. The staff believes that all issues raised by the comments have been 1

Contact:

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T. S. Michaels 443-6937 m T. F. Carter, Jr.

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resolved, but would like to bring to the Commission's attention

, one issue which needs further consideration as follows.

! Three other rule changes, considered as the " Safeguards Upgrading Program," have been proposed that could impact the development of contingency plans. These are as follows:

Federal Register Comment Period Rule Change Notice Expired

1. Performance Oriented 42 FR 34310 9/19/77 i Safeguards Require- 7/5/77 I ments (upgrade rule)

2. Guard Training and 42 FR 34321 9/19/77 l Qualification 7/5/77

3. Clearance Program 42 FR 14880 5/16/77 for Access to Special 3/17/77 Nuclear Material' The reason given by licensees as to why these rule changes could impact contingency plans is that contingency plans may have to be i revised when these rule changes become effective. The staff !

believes that only one of these, the Performance Oriented Safe- )

guards Requirements (upgrade rule), could possibly cause some revising of contingency plans, but that the changes would not be extensive. The only changes involved are those resulting from an ,

increase in physical protection resources, if any, needed to l satisfy the upgrade rule. The question therefore arises as to whether the Commission should proceed with this effective rule at l this time to secure an added measure of protection against possi- !

ble adversary acts and to satisfy the Congressional concern with ;

safeguards contingency planning, or wait to integrate the con-tingency planning rule with the upgrade rule for fuel-cycle :

facilities and transportation, thereby reducing the paperwork ;

burden on licensees. The staff believes that the added measure of protection outweighs the benefit resulting from the possible reduction in paperwork burden on licensees.

The following alternatives present themselves with regard to this issue.

Alternative 1 - Issue the contingency plan requirements rule, as r

per Enclosure "A", in effective form after the Commission's

! consideration. All affected licensees would have to submit contingency plans under this alternative. '

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Pro: (1) All affected licensees would begin immediately to l

- < develop a more comprehensive response posture to safe- j guards contingency events. ;

l (2) Reactor licensees, who comprise by far the greater i number affected, would not have to revise their con-tingency plans in any event as a result of promulgation of the upgrade rule because that rule applies only to !

fuel-cycle licensees. )

l Con: Fuel-cycle facility licensees might have to prepare I revisions to their contingency plans based on any addi- l tional resources required after promulgation of the upgrade rule. ;

Alternative 2 - Issue the contingency plan requirements rule in final form after the Commission's consideration, but make it '

currently effective only as to reactor licensees, with a deferred !

effective date for others until the upgrade rule is made effective. !

I Pro: (1) Reactor licensees would begin immediately to develop a I more comprehensive response posture to safeguards I contingency events.

(2) Fuel-cycle facility and transportation contingency I plans would not have to be revised when the upgrade rule becomes effective.

Con: The improved protection afforded by comprehensive, pre-planned response procedures at fuel-cycle facilities would not be provided.

Alternative 3 - Issue the contingency planning requirements simultaneously with issuance of the upgrade rule in effectile form.

)

Pro: Fuel cycle facility and transportation contingency l plans would not have to be revised when the upgrade !

rule goes into effect. 1 l Con: Comprehensive, preplanned response' procedures would not i be developed for am licensees until the upgrade rule l became effective. l, I

Certain paragraphs of the upgrade rule published for comment on July 5, 1977, referred to aspects of contingency planning. The i

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The Commissioners 4 staff has determined (since the comments on these paragraphs were w . not substantive and do not warrant changes) for administrative convenience that these paragraphs be incorporated in this rule-making procedure.

Recomendations: That the Commission:

1. Approve publication of the amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50, j 70, and 73 as set forth in Enclosure "A" in effective form. '

(Alternative 1).

Note:

2. The amendment will become effective 30 days after publica-tion and that licensees would be given a period of 180 days to submit their plans after publication of the amendments in i the Federal Register. Plans would have to be implemented !

and followed by the licensee within 30 days after approval by the Commission er 300 days after date of publication in ;

the Federal Register, whichever is later. !

3. The appropriate congressional committees will be notified of this Commission action.

4. A summary of the comments on the proposed rule and the responses thereto are attached as Enclosure "B".

5. Enclosure "C" will be submitted to the Comptroller General for such review as may be appropriate under the Federal Reports Act.

6. A value/ impact assessment has been prepared and is attached I as Enclosure "D".

7. A public announcement such as Enclosure "D" will be issued l when the amendments are filed with the Office of Federal Register.

8. Since the proposed amendments are insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact, pursuant to the criteria ;

of 10 CFR Part 51 and guidelines of the Council on Environ-mental Quality, an Environmental Impact Statement has not been prepared.

9. An Environmental Impact Appraisal, intended to support a Negative Declaration, had been prepared with the proposed m

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i The Commissioners 5 i

rule, was placed in the Public Document Room, and is still l

applicable.

10. Regulatory Guides, " Standard Format and Content of Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans for Fuel-Cycle Facilities,"

" Standard Format and Content of Licensee Safeguards Con-tingency Plans for Transporation," and " Standard Format and Content of Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans for Nuclear Power Plants" have been prepared and will be available when the rule is published in effective form.

Coordination: The Offices of Nuclear Material Safety and_ Safeguards, and Inspection and Enforcement concur in the recommendations of this paper. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation concurs in the recommendations of this paper but indicates that a period of 360 days is needed for licensees to submit their plans rather than 180 days. The Office of the Executive Legal Director has no legal objection to the recommendations of this paper. The Office of Public Affairs prepared the draft public announcement.

Scheduling: For affirmation at an early policy session. (Anticipated the Week of January 9, 1977).

Sunshine Act Recommendation: It is recommended that this paper be considered in an open meeting.

The Executive Director for Operations concurs in this recommendatit

%f6 Robert B. Minogue, irector

Enclosures:

"" " * *

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"A' - Federal Register Notice "B" - Sumary of Coments "C" - Report Justification to GA0 "D" - alue/ Impact Assessment on Contingency Plans "E" - Draft Public Announcement Comissioners' coments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by cobThursday, December 29, 1977.

Comission staff office coments, if any, should be submitted to the Comissioners NLT December 23, 1977, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and coment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when coments

! may be expected.

L DISTRIBUTION ,

l Comissioners Commission Staff Offices l Exec Dir for Operations Secretariat

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ENCLOSURE A FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE i

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ENCLOSURE "A" NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR PARTS 50, 70, and 73 !

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LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES:

SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL: PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF l PLANTS AND MATERIALS i

. Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans ;

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission ACTION: Final Rule

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regula-tions to require that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor 1

(other than certain research and test reactors), and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 develop and implement acceptable plans for responding to threats, thefts, and sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities.

The plans will provide a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies ai 1 will be an important segment of NRC's contingency planning programs. Licensee safeguards contingency

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l plans will result in organizing licensee's safeguards resources !

1 in such a way that, in the unlikely event of a safeguards contin- i gency, the responding participants will be identified, their

-- several responsibilities specified, and their responses coordi-nated.

EFFECTIVE 'DATE: (30 days after date of publication in the FEDERAL l REGISTER) l NOTE: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has submitted this rule to the Comptroller General for review of its reporting requirement under the Federal Reports Act, as amended, 44 U.S.C. 3512. The date on which the reporting requirement of the rule becomes effective, unless advised to the contrary, includes a 45-day

! period which that statute allows for Comptroller General review (44U.S.C.3512(c)(2)).

l FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas F. Carter, Jr., Chief, l

l Contingency Planning Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

l Washington, D.C. 20555. Telephone 301-427-4191.

l SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On May 19, 1977, the Nuclear Regula-tory Commission (NRC) published in the FEDERAL REGISTER (42 FR 25744) proposed amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50, 70, and 73 of its regula-tions. Interested persons were invited to submit' written comments 1

2 Enclosure "A"

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ms and suggestions in connection with the proposed amendments within 60 days after publication in the FEDERAL REGICTER. The Commission

+ also has under consideration other proposed amendments to 10 CFR ,

Part 73 that relate to the response to a safeguards contingency.

These were published on July 5, 1977 (42 FR 34310), and were f i

titled, " Performance Oriented Safeguards Requirements." The ;

i coment period expired on September 19, 1977.

I For administrative convenience the Comission is incorporating some sections of the proposed amendments published on July 5, l 1977, in the final rule on safeguards contingency planning. Upon l l

consideration of the coments received on the proposed amendments published on May 19, 1977, and on the pertinent sections of the proposed amendments published on July 5, 1977, and upon considera-tion of other factors involved, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission has adopted the proposed amendments with certain modifications as set forth below. (The pertinent sections of the proposed rule published on July 5, 1977, are paragraphs 73.26(c)(3)(iii),

73.26(d), 73.46(b)(3)(iii), 73.46(h), 73.55(b)(3)(iii) and 73.55(h).)

l Significant differences from the proposed amendments published for coment on May 19, 1977, are: (1) licensees will be required l to submit for NRC approval all. categories of information in a safeguards contingency plan (as set forth in Appendix C to 10 CFR 3 Enclosure "A" I

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Part 73) except the implementing Procedures; the proposed rule required that implementing Procedures also be subject to NRC

~ ~ approval as part of the licensing process; (2) the ob:ervation that a goal of contingency planning is for licensee responses to be compatible with Federal responses has been removed; (3) the requirement concerning "a statement of the perceived danger" has been clarified by stating that such a statement promulgated by the Commission'may be used by the licensee; (4) cross-reference to the licensee's physical security plan is explicitly permitted for topics that are adequately covered in that plan; (5) the requirement for periodic drills or tests of the licensee's safe-guards contingency plan has been modified to relieve the licensee from responsibility for testing the response of entities not under the licensee's control; (6) paragraphs 73.50(g) and 73.55(h) have been revised to include an explicit requirement for safeguards contingency plans in accordance with the proposed rule published on July 5, 1977; and (7) the requirements on " Development and Maintenance of the Plan" have been removed from Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 73 and placed at appropriate places in the text of the rule.

The following discussion pertains to items (1) through (7) above.

(1) Several commentators suggested that the fifth category of information (Procedures) contained in a safeguards contingency 4 Enclosure "A" I 4 I I

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.yg plan as set forth in Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 73 should not be a part of a licensee's approved safeguards contingency plan because of the lack of flexibility associated with requiring NRC approval or concurrence of day-to-day opera-l tions. They cited other precedents in this area, such as l 5 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

The amendments as proposed contained the flexibility suggested by these comments. In paragraphs 50.54(p) and 70.32(g) as proposed on May 19, 1977, the licensee would not be required to submit changes to the contingency plan to the NRC if the changes did not decrease the plan's effectiveness. Para-graph 50.54(p) has been revised to state this option more explicitly.

In consideration of the comments, however, the Commission I has decided to omit the Procedures as part of the licensee safeguards contingency plan approved by the Comission. The Procedures, which are derived from the Responsibility Matrix, will be a document that can be changed by the licensee. If the Responsibility Matrix is changed as a result of a proce-dure change, however, an amendment to the plan must be submitted for approval in accordance with Paragraph 50.54(p) 5 Enclosure "A" l

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22 3, ,

-wm or 70.32(g). The Procedures will continue to be a part of-the plan, and NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement

. . will ensure that they conform to the licensee's Responsibil-ity Matrix.

Paragraphs 50.34(d), 50.54(p), 70.22(g), 70.22(j), 70.32(g),

73.30(g), Section 73.40, and Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73 have been revised to reflect this change.

(2) Several commentaters suggested that the goal of having licensee contingency plans compatible with Federal responses should be the responsibility of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission rather that the licensee's, because the Commis-sion is in a better position to integrate this capability.

The Commission did not intend to imply that licensees were i

responsible for ensuring compatibility of licensee and )

Federal-level safeguards contingency plans. The goal that the plans be compatible will be achieved through licensee plans prepared in accordance with the " Standard Format and Content" guides that the Commission is furnishing to the licensees. The Commission will assure that the guides l provide for the desired compatibility.

l 6 Enclosure "A"

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Nevertheless, because the statement regarding compatibility of licensee and Federal responses has been subject to mis-interpretation, it has been deleted from the introduction to r

Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 73.

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(3) Several commentators believed that a " statement of the perceived danger" is in the purview of the Commission and J

that further theorizing by the licensee on additional threats !

would be a drain on resources already allocated to implement existing plans.

The requirement for the licensee to submit a " statement of the perceived danger" in the Background section of his safe- l guards contingency plan (cf. Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73) ,

I has been modified to pennit the licensee to incorporate such a statement promulgated by the Comission if the licensee chooses to do so. However, the licensee should examine his facility or operation to determine its vulnerabilities in light of the adversary characteristics postulated by the Commission. This examination would make the licensee more aware of the total scope of a response and could promote the generation of additional stimuli in the Generic Planning Base.

f 7 Enclosure "A"

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(4) Many comments dealt with the contention that contingency l plans duplicate other plans. Recomendations were made to .

t l combine all security-related plans into a single plan.

i

' The licensee or applicant may submit a single security- .

i related plan as long as he assures that all requirements of i Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 73 have been addressed. The three

" Standard Format and Content" guides that are being issued t concurrently with these amendments provide guidance developed j by the staff on the kind of information needed in the safe-guards contingency plan and also permit reference to informa- f tion that may have been submitted in an existing security plan.

Section 50.34(d) and Appendix C (under Licensee Planning Base) l I

have been revised to more explicitly state the acceptability of l incorporation by reference of those topics treated in adequate detail in the licensee's or applicant's physical security plan. j Paragraph 73.55(h) has also been revised to allow the incorpora- ;

tion of contingency plan information into security plans. .

(5) The Comission recognizes the inappropriateness of holding licensees responsible for actions of persons not subject to licensee control. Therefore, licensee responsibility during periodic drills or tests has been clarified to exclude 1

l l 8 Enclosure "A"

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( responsibility for testing the reaction of response forces not under i '

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(6) Paragraphs 73.50(g) and 73.55(h) have been revised to include an explicit requirement for safeguards contingency plans prepared in

1 l

l accordance with the criteria in Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 73, in order to eliminate an ambiguity that previously existed. Appro-priateparagraphs,73.46(h)(1),73.46(h)(2)and73.55(h)(1)oYN l f !

the proposed amendments published for comment in the FEDERAL l REGISTER on July 5,1977 (42 FR 34310) have been modified and l

l used for this purpose.

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l (7) Upon further consideration, the Commission believes that the !

r requirements in that section of the proposed Appendix C entitled !

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" Development and Maintenance of the Plan" should more appro-l priately appear elsewhere in the rule. Hence, the requirement on j assignment of responsibilities was moved to the discussion of the Responsibility Matrix and the other requirements were incorporated with tha proposed amendments published on July 5,1977, and moved to the body of the rule.

Concerning the proposed amendments published for comment on July 5,1977, no substantive comments were received on the remaining portions of paragraph 73.46(h) nor on paragraphs i

9 Enclosure "A" l'

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l or>ad 73.26(c)(3)(iii),73.26(d),73.46(b)(3)(iii),73.55(b)(3)(iii),

and 73.55(h). Appropriate portions of these paragraphs have therefore been incorporated into the final rule on safeguards contingency plans.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and section 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter 1 Code of Federal Regula-tions, Parts 50, 70, and 73 are published as a document subject to codification.

10 Enclosure "A"

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w PART 50 - LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

1. Section 50.34 of 10 CFR Part 50 is amended by adding a new paragraph (d) to read as follows:*

5 50.34 Contents of applications; technical information (d) Safeguards contingency plan. Each application for a

- license to operate a production or utilization facility that shall be subject to 55 73.50, 73.55, or 73.60 of this chapter shall include a licensee safeguards contingency plan in accordance with the criteria set forth in Aopendix C to 10 CFR Part 73. The safeguards contingency plan shall include plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage, as defined in Part 73 of this chapter, relating to the special nuclear material and nuclear facilities licensed under this chapter and in the applicant's possession and control. Each application for such a license shall include the first four categories of information contained in the applicant's safeguards contingency plan. (The first four categories of information, as set forth in Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73, are Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, and Responsibility Matrix. The fifth category of information.

Comparative text to the proposed rules published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on May 19,1977 (42 FR 25744 and July 5,1977 (a2 FR 34310). Deletions are lined through and additions are underscored.

I 11 Enclosure "A" l

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Procedures, does not have to be submitted for approval.)I l

[ Append 4x-G-te-Part-73-ef-this-ehapter-sets-ferth-the-eriteria-te be-fellowed-4n-develeping-such-safeguards-eentingency-planse] l

2. Section 50.54(p) of 10 CFR Part 50 is amended to read as ;

-follows:

5 50.54 Conditions of licenses. ;

Whether stated therein or not,_the following shall be deemed l conditions in every license issued:

l (p) The licensee shall prepare and maintain safeguards contingency plan Procedures in accordance with Appendix C l of 10 CFR Part 73 for effecting the actjons and decisions contained in the Responsibility Matrix of the safeauards contingency plan. I l

! I The licensee shall may make no change which'would decrease the effectiveness of a security plan prepared pursuant to 5 50.34(c) or Part 73 of this chapter, or of the first four categories of information (Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, Responsibility Matrix) contained in a licensee safeguards IA physical security plan that contains all the information required' in both 6 /3.d5 and Accena1x c to eart /s satistles tne reauirement for a continaencv olan.

12 Enclosure "A" l

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a-a contingency plan prepared pursuant to 5 50.34(d) or Part 73, as applicable, without prior approval of the Comission. A licensee desiring to make such a change shall submit an applica- )

l tion for an amendment to his license pursuant to 5 50.90. The l l

licensee may make chanaes to the security olan or to the safeguards continaency olan without Drior Comission aDDroval if the changes ;

do not decrease the safeauards effectiveness of the Dlan. The licensee shall maintain records of changes to the plans made without prior Comission approval for a period of two years from the date of the change, and shall furnish to the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeouards (for enrichment and reDrocessing facilities) or to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (for nuclear I

reactors), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.C.

20555, with a copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office specified in Appendix [9] A of Part [29] 13 of this chapter, a report containing a description of each change within two months after the change i is made.

[9EVEE9PMENT-AN9-MAINTENANGE-QF-THE-pkAN ;

When-subm4tting-a-i4eensee-safeguards-sent4ngency-plan-to the-Com4ssien-for-approval,-eash-lisense-applicant-and-lisensee sha44-alse-subm44-a-dessript4Gn-Of-the-steps-that-he bas-taken-GF w(14-take-to-ensure-that,] Prior to the safeguards contingency plan being put into effect, the licensee shall have:

13 Enclosure "A"

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[(2}] (1) [ Adequate-reneurees-are-available-at-all-times-fer earrying-eut-the-plant] all ' safeguards ' capabilities specified in l

the safeguards ~ contingency' plan'available and functional, l

l (ii) detailed Procedures' developed'according to Appendix C to Part 73 available at the licensee's site, and (iii) all appropriate personnel trained to respond to safeguards incidents as outlined in the plan and specified in the detailed

- Procedures.

[(3) The-plan-will-be-reviewed-and-updated-pertedieally-te-take due-asseunt-ef-ehanging-eend4tienst-and (4} Periedie-defils-er-tests-will-be-made-te-ensure-that-safe-guards-eentingeney-Pespenses-fellew-these-set-ferth-4n-the-planr]

The licensee shall provide for the development, revision, implementation, and maintenance of his safeguards contingency j plan. To this end, the licensee shall [(444)-Prev 4 sten] provide for a review at least every 12 months of the [sesurity-system]

safeguards contingency plan by individuals independent of both l l security program management and personnel who have direct responni-I bility for implementation of the security program. The review 14 Enclosure A"

.x.f

, shall include a review and audit of [sesuptty] safeguards contingency I

l procedures and practices, an audit of the security system testing l

l and maintenance program, and a test of the safeguards system along 2

% with commitments established for response by local law enforce-5 ment authorities. The results of the review and auditt along with recommendations for improvements z shall be documented, reported to the licensee's corporate and plant management, and kept available j at the plant for inspection for a period of [five] two years.

PART 70 - SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

3. In 5 70.22 of 10 CFR Part 70, paragraph (g) is amended and a new paragraph (j) is added to read as follows:

I 70.22 Contents of applications.I (g) Each application for a license that would authorize the transport or delivery to a carrier for transport of special ,

nuclear material in an amount specified in 5 73.1(b)(2) of this chapter shall include (1) a description of the plan for physical protection of special nuclear in transit in accordance with is 73.30 through 73.36 and 73.70(g) of this chapter, including 15 Enclosure "A" L

3 ,.

l a plan for the selection, qualification and training of armed escorts, l

or the specification and design of a specially designed truck or

]

trailerasappropriate,and(2)alicenseesafeguardscontingency i

! plan for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage

relating to l i

the special nuclear material in transit. [ Append 4*-G-te-Part-73 ef-this-ehapter-sets-ferth-the-eriteria-te-be-fellowed-4n-develeping i 1&sensee-safeguards-sentingeney-plans,-] Each application for such l a license shall include the first four categories of information contained in the applicant's safeguards contingency plan. (The i

i first four categories of information, as set forth in Appendix C i i to 10 CFR Part 73, are Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Plannin- Base and Responsibility Matrix. The fifth category of information, Procedures, does not have to be submitted for approval.)

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(j) Each application for a license to possess or use at any I t

site or contiguous sites subject to control by the licensee uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the uranium-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium alone or in any combination in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium) other than a license for possession or Sabotage as used in this section has the same meaning as in j 5 73.2(p) of this chapter except that the deliberate acts are i e postulated to occur during transportation rather than at j licensed sites. j 16 Enclosure "A"

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l v,9 use of such material _in the operation of a nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, shall include, a -

licensee safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats, ;

thefts, and industrial sabotage, as defined in Part 73, relating -

to [the-speefal-awelear-matertal-and] nuclear facilities licensed i under Parts 50 or to the~ possession of special nuclear material

' licensed under Part 70 of this chapter. [and-in-his-pessessfen and-eentretr--Append 4x-G-to-Part-73-ef-this-ehapter-sets-ferth-the erfteria-te-be-fellowed-in-develeping-sueh-plansr] Each applica- '

tion for such a license shall include the first four categories of infonnation contained in the applicant's safeguards contingency plan. (The first four categories of information, as set forth in Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73, are Background, Generic Planning ;

Base, License Planning Base, and Responsibility Matrix. The fifth category of information, Procedures,'does not have to be submitted ,

forapprovald l t

i I

4. Section 70.32 of 10 CFR Part 70 is amended by adding a new ;

l paragraph (g) to read as follows:

5 70.32 Conditions of licenses. !

l 17 Enclosure "A" i

.gx. ,

n,.n P

(g) The licensee shall prepare and maintain safeguards contingency plan Procedures in accordance with Appendix C of ;

10 CFR Part 73 for effecting the actions and decisions contained )

in the Responsibility Matrix of his safeguards contingency plan. j l

The licensee shall make no change that would decrease the j safeguards effectiveness of the first four categories of infoma- !

l tion (Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, j l

and Responsibility Matrix) contained in any licensee safeguards ;

i

. contingency plan prepared pursuant to 5570.22(g),70.22(j), 1 73.30(g), or 73.40 of this chapter without the prior approval of l the Comission. A licensee desiring to make such a change shall j submit an application for an amendment to his license pursuant to f

[64-50r99-er] 5_70.34 of this chapterg [as-appropriater] The f l

licensee may make changes to the licensee safeguards contingency ;

plan without prior Comission approvil if the changes do not j l

decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the plan. The licensee .l

! shall maintain records of changes to any such plan made witho:t prior approval for a period of two years from the date of the ;

change and shall furnish to the Director of Nuclear Material l Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office specified in Appendix A of Part 73 of this chapter, a report containing a description of each change within two months after the change is made.

! 18 Enclosure "A"

,- i l

I i i

En ,

o q ,

4,a j PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

5. Paragraph 73.30(g) of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended to read as follows:

5 73.30 General requirements.

(g)(1) The 1icensee-er-his-agent shall_ prepare [ establish, l ma4 eta 4n,-and-fe44ew] a safeguards contingency plan in accordance l with the criteria set forth in Appendix C to this part. The 1

l safeguards contingency plan shall include plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and [ rad 4eleg4ea4] sabotage

related to a

5; strategic special nuclear material in transit subject to the a

' provisions of this section. [Sueh-safeguards-eent4ngeney-plans 4

i s ha 44 -be-4 n- a se erda nc e-w4 th- the- e r4 te r4 a- s et- ferth-4 n- Appe nd4 x- G I

l te-th4s-parts- "L4eensee-Safeguards-Gent 4rpeney-Plan"-as-prepesed I

l 4n-42-FR-25744,--Sweh-cent 4 agency-plans-sha44-4nelude-prev 4s4 ens l

l fer-sep4ag-w4th-threat-assessmentsi-and-respense-te-threats 3-as l

l well-as-respense-te-transpert-disablementsi-unusual-weather 3 l

! natural-d4saster-and-e4v44-disturbanee-eendit4 s ens,]

Sabotage as used in this paragraph has the same meaning as in 5 73.2(p) of this chapter except that the deliberate acts are postulated to occur during transportation rather than at a licensed site.

15 Enclosure "A" l

l

fd4awHmmNd

e1 .' . .

~

nn,

[9EVEWPMENT-AND-MAINTENANGE-GF-THE-PkAN]

[When -subu tt ting-a-lis en see-sa feg ua rds-e en ti ngen ey-pla n- te t he-Gemis sie n-fe r-a p prevalr-eae h- Meen se e-a p plica n t-a nd -lice n see

! shall-alse-submit-a-deser4ptien-ef-the-steps-that-he-has-taken er-will-take-te-ensure-that:]

l [f3}--Adequate-reseurees-are-ava41able-at-a11-times-fer earrying-ewt-the-plant]

l

[f3}--The-plan-will-be-reviewed-and-updated-periedfeally l te-take-dwe-aeeevnt-ef-ehangeing-eend46&enst-and]

[(4}--Pe r ied ie-d e flis -er-tes t s -will- be-made-te-en su re-t ha t safeguards-eentingeney-respense-fellew-these-set-ferth-in-the-planr]

By (180 days after publication in the Federal Register) each licensee subject to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section shall submit to the Commission for approval the first

! four categories of information contained in the licensee's [a]

safeguards contingency plan. [in accordance with the-ccitacia set forth in Appendix C to this-pact foc dealing with thceats, thefts,and sabotage celating to the transport of the special nucleac matecial in bis-possession and control-] (The first l

20 Enclosure "A"

L -y m i

u,>, !

four categories of information, as set forth in Appendix C to ,

I i this part, are Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, and Responsibility Matrix. The fifth category of information, Procedures, does not have to be submitted for approval.) The plan shall [be-4mplemented] become effective and be followed (when appropriate) by the licensee or his agent j

[within] 30 days after approval by the Comission or 300 days l

after (date of publication in the Federal Register), whichever j is later.

i (2) Prior to the plan becoming effective, the licensee [er his-agent] shall have:

(1) all safeguards capabilities specified in his safeguards contingency plan available and functional, (ii) detailed Procedures developed according to Appendix C to this part available at the licensee's site or agent's operations center, and (iii) all appropriate personnel trained to respond to safe-guards incidents as outlined in the plan and specified in the detailed Procedures.

21 Enclosure "A" l l

i

- s _ - _ -- . _ _ _

-. . - . . . . .. _ . ~ . . - .. _ _ _

m ,-

An' '

l e .,

l

. (3) The licensee shall provide for the implementation, l

revision, and maintenance'of'his' safeguards' contingency plan.

To this end, the licensee'shall' provide for a review at least l every twelve months of the [seeuP&ty-system]' safeguards contin-gency plan by individuals independent of both security program j

! management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. The review shall k include a review and audit of [seevrity] safeguards contingency E procedures and practices, an audit of the security system testing and maintenance program, and a test of the safeguards

!i system along with commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities. The results of the review i l and audit along t with recommendations for improvements 1 shall be documented, reported to the licensee's corporate and plant management, and kept available at the plant for inspection for ;

a period of [five] two years.

l l

6. Section 73.40 of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended to read as l follows:

5 73.40 Physical Protection: General requirements at fixed ,

l sites. !

l 22 Enclosure "A"

\

l \

l i

5% ,

7 ,

es tv,, it (a) Each licensee shall provide physical protection against industrial sabotage and against theft of special nuclear material l l

at the fixed sites where licensed activities are conducted. The provisions of a licensee's security plan as approved by the ,

Commission shall be followed by the licensee.

l (b) [By-129-days-after-publiention-ef-this-rule-4n-effee-tive-ferm] E_ach licensee subject to the requirements of 55 73.50, 73.55, and/or 73.60 shall [ submit-te-the-Gemmissien-fer-appreval] i preparea[14eensee]safeguardscontingencyplaninaccordance l with the criteria set forth in Appendix C to this part. The safeguards contingency plan shall include plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage relating to [the-speefal nuelear-materfal-and] nuclear facilities licensed under Part 50 l

l or to the possession of special nuclear material licensed under Part 70 of this chapter. [and-in-his-pessessien-and-eentreir]

[9EVEk9PMENT-AN9-MAINTENANGE-9F-THE-PEAN]

l

[When-submitting-a-licensee-safeguards-contingency pian-to-the j Eemmissien-for-approval,-each-licensee-applicant-and-licensee-shall aise-submit-a-descript4en-of-the-steps-that-he-has-taken-er-will i take-te-ensure-thatt) 23 Enclosure "A" i

l !

I

~.,

i gg ; ,

n .c -

i [(2)--Adequate-reseurses-are-available-at-aH-times-fer earrying-eut-the-planst]

i l

[f3)--Be-plan-will-be-reviewed-and-updated-periedieally te-take-due-aeseunt-ef-ehanging-eendit4enst-and]

l

[f 4)-- Pe rio di c-d rill s-e r-tes ts-wH i-be-ma de- to-ens u re-th a t l

safeguards-centingency-respenses-fellew-these-set-ferth-in-the l

planr] l By (180 davs after oublication in the Federal Register) each licensee subject to the requirements of [is-73,59 3-73,55,-and/er 73:69] this paragraph shall submit to the Commission for approval the first four categories of information contained in [a-Heensee]

the safeguards contingency plan. [4n-aeeerdanee-with-the-er4teria set-ferth-in-Appendix-G-te-tkis-part-fer-dealing-With-threats, thefts,-and-industr4al-sabetage-relating-te-the-speetal-nuelear materfal-and-nuelear-fae4Hties-44eensed-under-Parts-50-er-79-ef this-shapter-aRd-4R-his-pe550Ss4eR-aRd-GeRtrel,] (The first four categories of information, as set forth in Apoendix C to 1 this part, are Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee i l

Planning Base. and Responsibility Matrix. The fifth category l l

24 Enclosure "A" I ,

1 l

l l

25 3 , ,

sma -

of information, Procedures, does not have to be submitted for approval.)2 The plan shall [be-implemented] become effective and be,followed (when appropriate) by the licensee [within] 30 days after approval by the Commission or 300 days after (date of publication in the Federal Register), whichever is later.

(c) Prior to the plan becoming effective, the licensee shall have:

(i) all safeauards capabilities specified in his safe-guards contingency plan available and functional, (ii) detailed Procedures developed according to Aopendix C to this part available at the licensee's site, and (iii) all appropriate personnel trained to respond to safeouards incidents as outlined in the olan and specified in the detailed Procedures.

(d) The licensee shall provide for the implementation, revision, and maintenance of his safeguards contingency plan.

2 Licensees subject to 5 73.55 may modify their physical security plans to incor) orate contingency plan information specitiea in Appendix C to ) art 73. A physical security plan that contains all the information required in both 5 73.55 and Appendix C to Part 73 satisfies the requirement for a contingency plan.

25 Enclosure "A"

J.gf .-

+., .

i_To this end, the licensee shall provide for a review at least !

. l_ everytwelvemonthsofthe[seeurity-system]safeguardscontin-8 t jgencyplanbyindividualsindependentofbothsecurityprogram !

jmanagmentandpersonnelwhohavedirectresponsibilityfor l t

implementation of the security program. The review shall include. f

.a review and audit of [seeurity] safeauards contingency procedures and practices, an audit of the security system testing and

= i maintenance program, and a test of the safeguards system along l g with.comitments established for response by local law enforce-ymentauthorities. The results of the review and auditz along j i

j with recommendations for improvementsz shall be documented, l reported to the licensee's corporate and plant management, and !

lkeptavailableattheplant_forinspectionforaperiodof

![f4ve]twoyears. '

7. Paragraphs g(2) and'g(3) of 5 73.50(g) of 10 CFR Part 73 are renumbered as g(3) and g(4) respectively, paragraph g(l) is revised and renumbered as paragraph g(2), and a new paragraph g(1) is added to J i

read as follows: )

1 I

E (g) Response requirement. (1) The licensee shall have a

?!

!; safeguards cont.icgency plan for dealing with threats, thefts, a

' and [radiologica3] industrial sabotage related to the special I U

nuclear material and nuclear facilities subject to the provisions 26 Enclosure "A" l

h ,

m, ,

m-l of this section. Safeguards contingency plans shall be in )

! accordance with the criteria in Appendix C of this part, l " Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plens,._" Eas-prepesed-4n l42-FR-25744r--Gentingeney-plans-shall-ineluder-but-net-be-14mited

'lte-the-respense-requirements-4n-paragraphs-fh)(2)-through-fh)f5) i l l

l ef-this-seetienr] )

i l l [ft)](2) The licensee shall establish and document liaison j with law enforcement authorities.-

l !

l

8. Paragraphs.(h)(1) through (h)(4) of 5 73.55(h) of 10 CFR Part 73 are renumbered as (h)(2) through (h)(5) respectively and a new paragraph (h)(1) is added to read as follows s l (h) Response requirement. (1) The licensee shall [have]

l execute, when appropriate, a safeguards contingency plan for

!dealingwiththreats,and[radielegfeal]industrialsabotage related to the nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of this

!section. Safeguards contingency plans shall be in accordance with 5 the criteria in Appendix C to this part, " Licensee Safeguards 9

" Contingency Plans " [as-preposed-in-42-FR-25744---Safeguards 4

l e e n ti ng en cy-p la n s -s ha H -i ne i nde ;-bu t- ne t-be -t imi ted - te r - the requirements-in-paragraphs-th)(2)-through-fhlf5)-ef-this-sectienr]

l l

i 27 Enclosure "A" l

~

c.m

9. A new Appendix C is added to 10 CFR Part 73 to read as follows:

APPENDIX C LICENSEE SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS INTRODUCTION

[Gertain-14eensees-and-14eense-applieants-are-required-te prepare-14eensee-safeguards-sentingeney-plans-pursuant-te-66-59,34(d}y 79,22(g),-79,22(f),-73,30(g)1-er-73,40-ef-this-ehapter,] A licensee safeguards contingency plan is a documented plan to give guidance to licensee personnel in order to accomplish specific, defined objectives in the event of threats, thefts, or sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. [The-plan-shall] An acceptable safeguards contingency plan must contain (1) a predetermined set of decisions and actions to satisfy stated objectives, (2) an identification of the data, criteria, procedures, and mechanisms necessary to effect efficiently the decisions and ections, and (3) a specifi-cation of the individual, group, or organizational entity responsible for each decision and action. [1tisimportant to-note that the licensee-safeguards contingency-plans-are complementary to-any-emergency-plans developed-pursuant to 28 Enclosure "A" 4

( .. . . ..

-~a. a A p p end 4 x-E-e f- pa r t- 50-e f-t h i s-s ha p te r-a nd- te 70,22( 4 )-e f part-70-ef-this-ehapterr]

The goals of licensee safeguards contingency plans for dealing with threa'.s. thefts, and sabotage are (1) to organize the response effort at the licensee level, (2) to provide predetermined, structured responses by licensees to safeguards 1

contingencies, (3) to [4ntegrate] ensure the integration of the j licensee response with the responses by other entities, and I (4) to achieve a measurable performance in response capability.

Licensee safeguards contingency planning should result in organ-izing the licensee's resources in such a way that the participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and the responses coordinated. The responses should be timely [,] and internally consistent among themselves[v]. [and-sempatible-with Federal-respenses,]

4 It is important to note that a licensee's safeguards con-tingency plan is intended to be complementary to any emergency ,

plans developed pursuant to Appendix E of Part 50 of this chapter I or to I 70.22(i) of Part 70 of this chapter.

29 Enclosure "A" l

I l -

1 i

' _ JC

, - [':.; ;

1 , ,..

6 CONTENTS OF THE PLAN ,

1 Each licensee safeguards contingency plan shall include five I categories of information:

I 1

1. Background !

2. Generic Planning Base

3. Licensee Planning Base l l

4. Responsibility Matrix !

5. Procedures l Although the implementing procedures (the fifth category of Plan information) are the culmination of the planning process, and therefore are an integral and important part of the safeguards l

contingency plan, they entail operating details subject to frequent changes. They need not be submitted to the Commission )

i for approval, but will be inspected by NRC staff on a periodic basis. The licensee is responsible for ensuring that the imple- i menting procedures reflect the information in the Responsibility Matrix, appropriately summarized and suitably presented for j effective use by the responding entities.

j 1

The following paragraphs describe the contents of the safeguards contingency plan.

30 Enclosure "A" i

'n

} ~-rna i

I

l. Background. Under the following topics, this category of [

information shall identify and define the perceived dangers _ and incidents with which the plan will deal and the general way it ,

1 l will handle these: l

a. Perceived Danger - A statement of the perceived danger !

to the security of special nuclear material, licensee personnel.

and licensee property, including covert diversion of special nuclear material, sabotage, and overt attacks. The statement of perceived danger should conform with that promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (The statement contained in 10 CFR 73.55(a) or subsequent Commission statements will suffice.)

b. Purpose of the Plan - A discussion of the general aims and operational concepts underlying implementation of the plan.

c. Scope of the Plan - A delineation of the types of incidents covered [and-not-eevered] in the plan.

d. Definitions - A list of terms and their definitions :

used in describing operational and technical aspects of the plan.

31 Enclosure "A" l i

j. :

l l

l

, ,a 3.; ,

,; a. -

2. Generic Planning Base. Under the following topics, this category of information shall define the criteria for initiation and termination of responses to safeguards contingencies together with the specific decisions, actions, and supporting info.rmation 1

needed to bring about such responses:

a. Identification of those events that will be used for signaling the beginning or aggravation of a safeguards contingency according to how they are perceived initially by licensee's personnel. Such events may include alarms or other indications signaling penetration of a protected area, vital area, or material access area; material control or material accounting indications of material missing or unaccounted for; or threat indications--

either verbal, such as telephoned threats, or implied, such as escalating civil disturbances.

b. Definition of the specific objective to be accomplished relative to each identified event. The objective may be to obtain a level of awareness about the nature and severity of the safeguards contingency in order to prepare for further responses; to establish a level of response preparedness; or to successfully nullify or reduce any adverse safeguards consequences arising from the contingency.

32 Enclosure "A"

"f .i A nw, -

3. Licensee Planning Base. [Wnder-the-fellowing-tepfest-this]This category of information shall include the factors affecting contingency planning that are specific for each facility or means of transportation [t]. To the extent that the topics are treated in adequate detail in the licensee's approved physical security plan, they may be incorporated by cross reference to that plan. The following topics should be addressed:

a. Licensee's Organizational Structure for Contingency Responses - A delineation of the organization's chain of command and delegation of authority as these apply to safeguards con-tingencies.

b. Physical Layout - (i) Fixed Sites - A description of the physical structures and their location on the site, and a description of the site in relation to nearby town, roads, and other environmental features important to the effective coordina-tion of response operations. Particular emphasis should be placed on main and alternate entry routes for law-enforcement assistance forces and the location of control points for marshalling and coordinating response activities.

33 Enclosure "A"

..a

, u.y ,.

n.s .

(ii) Transportation - A description of the vehicles, ;

shipping routes, preplanned alternate routes, and related features. ,

c. Safeguards Systems Hardware - A description of the !

t physical security and accounting system hardware that influence l how the licensee will respond to an event. Examples of systems i to be discussed are communications, alanns, locks, seals, area !

I access, armaments, and surveillance.

d. Law Enforcement Assistance - A listing of available local law enforcement agencies and a description of their response capabilities and their criteria for response; and a discussion of working agreements or arrangements for communicating with these agencies.

e. Policy Constraints and Assumptions - A discussion of l State laws, local ordinances, and company policies and practices :

that govern licensee response to incidents. Examples that may be discussed include:

- use of deadly force

- use of employee property

- use of off-duty employees

- site security jurisdictional boundaries 34 Enclosure "A"

,c- - - --m. ,

J:g; ,

l

, ,3 ,.

,.+- .

f. Administrative and Logistical Considerations - Descriptions of licensee practices that may have an influence on the response

- to safeguards contingency events. The [dessr4ption] considerations shall include [ prev 4s4 ens] a description of the procedures that will be used for ensuring that all equipment needed to effect a successful response to a safeguards contingency will be easily accessible. in good working order, and in sufficient supply _ to provide redundancy in case of equipment failure.

4. Responsibility Matrix. This category of information consists of detailed identification of the organizational entities responsi-ble for each decision and action associated with specific responses to safeguards contingencies. [This-4 dent 4 f 4 eatf en-shah-he-dene ,

by-me a n s -e f- a-ma t r 4 x- eempe s ed-ef- a n-a rray -ef- ce H s - fe r- ea ch event,-eash-eell-eerrelat4ng-a-deefsfen-er-act4en-with-a-member er- u ni t-e f- t he-e rg an4 Ea ti en-and-cen ta 4 ning-a-ta s ki-4-e n- a deta44ed-deser4ptien-of-hew-a-deefs4en-4s-te-be-made-or-an-actfen (s-to-be-taken,] For each initiating event, a tabulation shall be made for each response entity depicting the assignment of responsi-bilities for all decisions and actions to be taken in response to the initiating' event. (Not all entities will have assigned 'I responsibilities for any given initiating event.) The tabulations 1 in the Responsibility Matrix shall provide an overall picture of l 35 Enclosure "A" i

l

\ \

l

- -, - - - - - , , ,, , - - - - , , , e -sny-

[hh .

m, v; -

the response actions and their interrelationships. Safeguards responsibilities [are] shall be assigned in a manner that precludes conflicts in duties or responsibilities that would prevent the l execution of the plan in any safeguards contingency.

5. Procedures. Inordertoaid[4mplementatien]executionof the detailed plan as developed in the [ matrix] Responsibility Matrix, )

f this category of information shall [summarine] detail the actions {

to be taken'and decisions to be made by each member or unit of the organization as planned in the [ matrix] Responsibility Matrix.

(Sec.1611, Pub. L.83-703, 68 Stat. 948, secs. 201, 204(b)(1),

Pub. L.93-438, 88 Stat 1243, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 2201, 5841, 5844).)

Dated at Washington, D.C. this _th day of 1977.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Secretary of the Commission 36 Enclosure "A" v

I

~;; ;

4, E

, 9 ,,,j '

i i

i ENCLOSURE B

SUMMARY

OF. COMMENTS "C" - REPORT JUSTIFICATION TO GA0

_J

., '. ~

e ,a ENCLOSURE B

SUMMARY

OF COMMENTS This enclosure contains a summary of the comments submitted.

Twenty-three organizations or individuals commented on the rule; fifteen of the commentators are associated with nuclear power reactors and eight !

are associated with fuel-cycle facilities. A listing of the compacis:

that submitted comments is included at the end of this enclosure (page 39). f Each company is identified by a number. This number is used below the comments to identify the origin of a particular comment. ,

The comments are categorized into five groups as follows: (1) con-tingency plan duplicates other plans, (2) contingency plan interface at the Federal level, (3) coordination and scheduling, (4) contingency plan requirements, and (5) editorial and technical comments.

The format presents an overall summary of comments for a series of comments followed by the staff's responses; the series of comments by the commentators for the overall summary then follows. In some cases the series of comments is used as the overall summary.

1 Enclosure "B"

V .-.~. .

m

1. CONTINGENCY PLAN DUPLICATES OTHER PLANS Overall Summary No. 1 - All Security-Related Plans (including the Safeguards Contingency Plan) Should be Combined into a Single Plan A series of comments in this group claims that certain areas of a licensee's physical security plan require response coordination which in essence is a contingency plan, and that other parts of a safeguards contingency plan also duplicate the security plan. Recommendations are made to combine safeguards contingency plans into a single plan for all security.

Response

The licensee may submit his safeguards contingency plan as part of an overall security-related plan as long as he assures that all requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(c), 70.22(h), 73.30(e), and Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 73, have been adequately addressed. The Standard Format and Content Guides for Safeguards Contingency Plans (Three Guides - Nuclear Power Plants, Fuel Cycle Facilities, and Transportation) that will be issued concurrently with these amendments provide guidance on the kind of information needed in a safeguards contingency plan, and also permit reference to existing information that may have been submitted in an existing physical security plan.

Contingency Planning Branch staff has reviewed all physical security plans for fuel-cycle licensees and has identified those sections (generally, Sections 5.6, 6.0, 6.3, 8.2, 8.3, 9.3, and 10) that will be supplanted by 2 Enclosure "B"

w-vbM4 information contained in the safeguards contingency plans. The results of these reviews were discussed individually with the specific licensees. '

These licensees were told that in almost all instances the description of '

response actions in the physical security plans do not meet the requirements for the Generic Planning Base and Responsibility Matrix of a licensee's safeguards contingency plan, which together address in detail the precon-ceived decisions and actions to be effected by the licensee in response to safeguards contingencies. Descriptions of response actions in current physical security plans are for the most part so generalized, brief, and void of detail as to be virtually meaningless. Therefore, they will have i to be revised and expanded extensively to satisfy the requirements of proposed' Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 73. For reactor licensees, the plans submitted in compliance with 10 CFR 73.55 contain more detailed response !

l information than that in the physical security plans for fuel-cycle l l

licensees but they still do not meet the standards of Appendix C. l The Licensee Planning Base is that part of the safeguards contingency plan which sets forth the licensee's response resources and constraints. The response resources are now described in the physical security plan and comprise the bulk of that plan. This description may be incorporated by reference into the Licensee Planning Base of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan.

1 i

i 3 Enclosure "B" l

! 4.i - ,

,g ,~ j

.n, .

Series of Comments -

(a) The application of the new proposed rule to include licensed nuclear power reactors is not necessary, and in fact, is duplicative of the ,

security plan prepared to 10 CFR Part 73.55 and also duplicates plans of fuel cycle facilities. l (2)(3)(4)(7)(10)(11)(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)(20)(22) [

t

b. The Committee (AIF) recommends that the contingency plan be included i in licensee physical security plans. Some members of the committee !

understand that the NRC Fuel Cycle and Material Safety Division has i

volunteered to identify areas for each fuel cycle licensee where the j physical security and contingency plans could overlap and where the l physical security plan should be revised.

(18) )

(c) The proposed rule duplicates the requirements of 10CFR Part 73.55 in the following areas:

(i) The general aims and operational concepts underlying implementation of the plan.

(ii) Requirements identified in the " General Planning Base" of the proposed plan are adequately covered in the security plan prepared pursuant to 10 CFR Part 73.55.

(iii) Organization of command.

4 Enclosure "B" i

l l

. ~ -

~

(iv) Description of the physical structures, their location.

(v) Description of the physical security and accounting system l

hardware.

(vi) Listing of available local law enforcement agencies.

(vii) Discussion of company policies and practices that govern licensee response to incidents.

(viii) The administrative and logistical Consideration requirements.

(ix) Security force personnel responsibilities.

(x) Avaialability of adequate resources.

(xi) Review and updating plan.

(1)

(d) Chapter 8 of NUREG-0220, " Interim Acceptance Criteria for a Physical Security Plan for Nuclear Power Plants," already calls for the develop- I ment of a plan which will effect efficiently, the decisions and actions necessary to meet the response requirements of Section 73.55.

It is stated that the discussion must contain:

1. a predetermined set of decisions and actions to satisfy the stated objective.

2. an identification of the data, criteria, procedures, and mech-anisms necessary to accomplish the following:

(i) determine whether or not a threat exists (ii) assess the extent of a threat, if any 5 Enclosure "B"

g ,

(iii) inform local law enforcement agencies and request assistance if necessary l

(iv) interpose members of the armed response force between vital l I

areas and any adversary attempting entry for purposes of industrial sabotage, and (v) prevent or dealy an act of industrial sabotage by applying a sufficient degree of force to counter that degree of.

force directed at them, including the use of deadly force l

when there is a reasonable belief that it is necessary in l self-defense or in the defense of others.

3. A specification of the individual, group, or organizational entity responsible for each decision and action."

The above information, already distributed by the staff with regard to S 73.55, and the proposed safeguards contingency plan rule are clearly duplicative.

(19)(12)

(e) We recognize that there are several provisions of the proposed amend-ment which expand the current requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 and which may represent constructive improvements to the overall effectiveness of the security plan. These are:

6 Enclosure "B"

i~~:::.

y .

>:h -

1. Coordination between the security implementing procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.

2. Coordination between applicants security procedures and federal contingency plans adopted pursuant to Section 204 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.

However, these provisions should be effectuated by minor amendments to 10 CFR 73.55 or revisions to Appendix E of 10 CFR 50, or more appro-priately to the respective regulatory guides and acceptance criteria.

(12)

(f) We urge that 10 CFR 70.22(h) and (j) be rewritten to require a single plan for all security considerations, and that the description of the contingency program be included by the submission of a revised security plan. Appendix C, if needed, should be modified to address the integrated contents of the single security plan.

(8)(23)

(g) In order to avoid duplication, the required contingency plan section of the Physical Protection Plan should be eliminated and replaced by the Contingency Plan when it is approved.

(9) l 7 Enclosure "B"

E_,,

a * ;

-w .

Overall Summary No. 2 - Integrate All Emergency Plans into a Single Plan

~

l There was only one comment in this area which conveyed the thought that .

there are too many emergency plans, i.e., radiation emergency procedures, health physics procedures, security procedures, and industrial safety procedures already in existence and that integration of these procedures into a single plan is needed rather than a separate safeguards contingency l plan.

l (6) )

i Response !

We disagree that a safeguards contingency plan is not needed since well j thought out plans in sufficient detail dealing with safeguards contin-gencies are not available. Furthermore, safeguards proced'ures and con-tingency plans are directed against thinking adversaries, whereas safety procedures and emergency preparedness plans are directed against accidents.

Contingency plans are carried out primarily by security forces; emergency plans are carried out primarily by health physics, medical, and process staffs. If safeguards fail, the objectives of contingency plans are to i recover the special nuclear material and to restore protection to the remaining material. If safety procedures fail, the objectives of emergency plans are to clean up the radioactive hazards and to restore safety. We therefore require that licensees address safeguards contin-

< gencies separately from radiological emergencies and assure that safc-guards contingency responsibilities are assigned in a manner that precludes conflicts in duties or responsibilities that would prevent the

! 8 Enclosure "B"

v...~_

i,4 3 ..

. 4 , 8 execution of the safeguards contingency plans. The Contingency Planning j Branch maintains continual coordination with NRC organizational units that l have responsibility for emergency planning to ensure compatibility of the respective plans. ;

1 i

i l

l l

1 l

9 Enclosure "B"

, ,,,-e. . - -- , . - -

6% :

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i

m .

2. CONTINGENCY PLAN INTERFACE AT THE FEDE."AL LEVEL Overall Summary No. 1 - NRC Should Coordinate Licensee Interface j with Federal Response Three comments in this area reflected that the licensee contingency plan is expected to be compatible with Federal response, and that NRC rather l than the licensee should coordinate this function.

l

Response

This comment is based on a misapprehension of the language in the proposed rule. The total framework (Federal and licensee) for safeguards contingency response planning is coordinated by NRC. If a licensee follows the Standard Format and Content of Safeguards Contingency Plans (three guides to be issued with the effective rule - Fuel Cycle Facility, Nuclear Power Reactors and Transportation) the licensee's plan will be compatible with the Federal Plan. To avoid cy possible misunderstanding, Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 73 has been revised to omit reference to the goal that licensee contingency plans be compatible with the Federal Plan. ;

1 Series of Comments (a) Primary responsibility has been placed by the Act (Energy Reorganiza- !

I tion Act of 1974, Section 204(b)(2)(B) on the Commission to formulate safeguards contingency plans and integrate the responses of all involved agencies. The proposed regulation shifts this responsibil- !

ity largely to the licensee, which would be required to formulate its 1

r 10 Enclosure "B"

, l x .

I 1

! plans in the first instance without the benefit of the Commission's ,

l l

overview of the various federal agencies involved. l (20)

(b) The Introduction of the proposed Appendix C to 10 CFR 73 would require l l

that the licensee's safeguards contingency plan be "... compatible with Federal responses." We have no knowledge of the Federal con- l tingency plan. We recommend that NRC, rather than the licensees, be responsible for assuring compatibility of a licensee's plan with the Federal Plan. ,

1 (22)

(c) The Statement of Considerations notes that "[a]t the Federal level, j responses may involve not only the NRC but also, among others, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and various organizations within the Department of Defense. An important element of safeguards contingency planning of the Commission is the coordination of these various responses."

While we believe that this is an important end, we see no reason why such coordination may not be carried out and any requirements imposed on individual licensees during the course of the NRC's review of individual facility industrial security plans.

(13) 11 Enclosure "B"

4,ns

~~ .

Overall Summary No. 2 - Contingency Plans Premature Because Licensees !

Not Aware of Federal Plan Three comments in this area stated that since the licensee was not aware of Federal level contingency plans, the licensee could not prepare a plan, l

l and therefore, the requirements for contingency plans was premature. :

l l

Response

The licensee's contingency plan can be prepared independently of the l

Federal level response plan. It is the' licensee's responsibility to l develop procedures to cope with a level of threat that the licensee is required by regulation to defeat or contain. This must be done with the licensee's own resources and local law enforcement agencies. The need to inte* ice with Federal level response plans for this is minimal and is covered in the Regulatory Guides on Standard Format and Content of Safe-guards Contingency Plans. When the licensee ~cannot defeat an incursion, then Federal-level response plans will be activated. The licensee will be apprised of this action, but does not have to depend on it to develop a detailed local contingency response plan. f Series of Comments l l

(a) One aspect of the proposed licensee safeguards contingency plan which l

appears premature is the requirement that the plan provide for res-ponses which are " compatible with the Federal level plans for res-ponding to safeguards contingencies." To our knowledge, no final decisions have been made as to the nature of the Federal level plans 12 Enclosure "B"

fl 44 j lLi '.*

l .. <, .

l l l l or, in fact, whether there will be such plans (except for the NRC's f I !

! decision not to recommend creation of a special security force within ;

l !

NRC). Thus, a regulation of this sort is premature at this time. i (15) l l

4 (b) In a number of instances the proposed regulation requires that the ]

licensee's contingency plan be compatible with the Federal level plan i 1

for responding to safeguards contingencies. The Committee members have no knowledge of such plans. We recommend that the contingency plan rule making procedure be coordinated with the adoption of the Federal level plan.

(18)

(c) Since licensees are not now cognizant of contingency plans at the Federal level, and may not be in the future because of security constraints, it is virtually impossible to prepare local contingency plans which will conform to the Federal plans.

(10)

Overall Summary No. 3 - Industry Should be Briefed on Federal Level Contingency Plans Five comments in this area stated that industry should be briefed on Federal level contingency plans that have been developed.

13 Enclosure "B"

Cd.

,4 . . ,

l

Response

The coordination and response functions of the government agencies and l . ,. ' industry will continually be made available to all responsible individ-uals, as appropriate, in order to promote an overall understanding of each ;

! participant's. role in response to a safeguards contingency. Some of this ,

l interchange of information has taken place at the NRC/ Industry workshops l held in Richmond, Virginia (4/76 and 8/77), and also at licensee briefings at the regional offices (5/77). We plan to keep responsible individuals informed of developments in this area. .

I Series of Comments ,

(a) Industry should be briefed on Federal level contingency plans that ,

have been developed. l (10)(2)(3)(12)(18) i Overall Summary No. 4 - What Statute Requires Licensee Contingency Plans?

One comment asserts that the statute does not require contingency plans at the licensee level. Only at the Federal level does the statute require contingency plans. !

l I

Response

The Energy Reorganization- Act of 1974, section 204(b)(2)(B), requires that safeguards contingency plans be developed. Related to this mandate the Commission recognizes the importance of safeguards actions by those l

14 Enclosure "B" 1

rm. .,,

itMI 4 ase .

persons who possess special nuclear material and operate certain facilities. Indeed, licensees would have the primary role in many safeguards contingencies because of their intimate connection with the materials and facilities at risk.

1 i

To provide and maintain adequate safeguards, therefore, the Commission

.must ensure that each licensee having important safeguards responsibility :

1 develops and follows a " licensee safeguards contingency plan" for respond-ing to any threat or attempt at theft or sabotage relating to his licensed facility or materials.

Series of Comments (a) The proposed regulation is so vague and indefinite that a variety of !

interpretations would result.

A portion of the proposal stated in the summary, quote: "The plans are needed to ensure a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies and are integral with other safeguards contingency planning activities being carried out as required by l statute."

Clarification is required for the following areas: ,

i. The Statute states that contingency planning is carried out j j as required by Statute. What Statute is referred to?

l i 15 Enclosure "B" l

l l

. ~ - . . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ - _ _ . . . _ _ . _ . . _ . _ . _ . _ . _ . . . _ . . _ . . . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . -

h Akd. .

e 7, . . ;

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i i

11. Federal facilties are available to a licensee or mandated >

l by Statute. ,

6

,, (1) What Federal facilities are available to a licensee? l l

I (2) What areas are mandated by Statute?

l 1 l

(11) l 1

1 1

l l

l

\

1 j

l I

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16 Enclosure "B" )

l .

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l 1

3. COORDINATION AND SCHEDULING t

, Overall Summary No.1 - Coordinate Safeguards Contingency Plan Rulemaking with Classification / Clearance Rules Comments in this area dealt with the need to keep safeguards contingency plans confidential and that, under present controls (10 CFR 2.790(d)),

plans could conceivably be disclosed. Further, they suggested that, since personnel clearances and classification of safeguards information is now under consideration which could classify contingency plans, contingency plans not be required to be submitted to NRC until NRC has resolved the personnel clearance and classification issues.

Response

We agree that classification provides better protection than 10 CFR l

2.790(d). However, 2.790(d) does provide a good degree of protection for security information. The staff does not believe that there is sufficient justification to delay the contingency plan rule for the clearance or classification rules. The schedules for these rules are not clearly defined, i.e., the clearance rule is scheduled for a Public Hearing and I the classification rules have not been presented to the Commission in proposed form as of 9/30/77.

1 Series of Comments j (a) One other comment on the proposed regulation is appropriate. In the l

Statement of Consideration accompanying the proposed regulation the i

! 17 Enclosure "B" i

h-'._

K .-

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l l

Commission states that certain portions of contingency plans for fuel cycle licensees will be classified. Wisconsin Electric Power Company, together with Northern States Power Company, on June 2,1977, filed a Petition for Rulemaking with the Commission requesting that plant I security information be classified as Restricted Data or alterna-i l tively as National Security Information. In the Matter of Protection l

of Plant Security Information, Docket No. PRM , we believe that for the reasons set forth in the Petition, the entire contingency plan for all licensees should be classified. If, in fact, the risk of theft and industrial sabotage justifies the stringent security measures which the Commission has imposed, then the detailed descrip-tion of those measures should be protected against unauthorized disclosure. The vague reference in the Statement of Considerations to classifying "certain portions" of the contingency plans for " fuel-cycle licensees" is not adequate assurance that the Wisconsin Electric security system will not be compromised.

(20)(15)

(b) The control of the information in the licensee's safeguards con-tingency plan will be important to effective safeguarding of the facility and special nuclear material contained therein; therfore, we recommend that such plans not be required to be submitted to NRC until NRC has resolved the issues of the personnel clearances and information classification that it now has under consideration.

l -(15)(18)(19)(20)(22) l l

1 18 Enclosure "B"

-d- .

up ,

(c) There could conceivably be disclosure of sensitive information not withstanding 10 CFR 2.190(d).

(19)(20)

(d) There should be some assurance from the NRC that duplication and/or distribution of the Contingency Plan by the NRC will be strictly controlled.

(11)

Overall Summary No. 2 - Schedule Inconsistencies There were three comments in this area as follows:

(a) The proposed change to Part 73.50 specifies that contingency plans be submitted by September 16, 1977. However, the preamble to the pro-posed revisions states that a period of 120 days following publica-tion of the effective rule would be allowed to prepare and submit contingency plans. The proposed change to Part 73.40 should be changed to reflect this 120 day period and additional consideration should be given to the time periods applicable to reactors which are now the subject of operating license applications.

(12)(18)(22)

Response

The date of September 16, 1977, was erroneously inserted at the Office of the Federal Register. The copy as sent to the Federal Register correctly read "[120 days after publication of this rule in effective form)". This 19 Enclosure "B"

l -~ ...J ._.- j g ,. !

gm {

error was called to the attention of the Federal Register, and a correction was published on Thursday, Jure 2, 1977 (42 FR 28147).

I

. t l

l i l Overall Summary No. 3 - Increase Time'to Implementation to 180 days l l ~

l There was only one comment in this area as follows: In proposed 73.30 and 73.40 - Revise the 120 day requirement to 180 days. Also, revise the 30 l

l l day period to 90 days, and delete the 300 day alternate requirement. ,

1 l

The internal reviews and communicatons required within the larger !

corporations can involve appreciable periods of time. In the case of I

l contingency planning, which will involve negotiations with and voluntary commitments from local political units, the length of time required for all the various parties to reach agreements will be even more extensive.

The 180 day period recommended is a minimum practical period.

The prospect of being forced into initiating an unapproved contin-gency plan, only to be required to modify it based on a subsequent approval is unappealing. As discussed in Paragraph 1, the essence of a contingency pl.an is contained in the existing physical security plan. Therefore, there appears to be no significant risk entailed in postponing formal ,

1 i compliance until the contingency plan has been mutually agreea upon between !

, the applicant and the Commission. As indicated above, the plan involves I reaching purely voluntary agreements with groups not remotely related to 20 Enclosure "B"

F -a.w ,

7p ,.

the applicant, so that the period required to achieve compliance should involve recognition of this fact.

If contingency plans do become classified information, so as to involve personnel clearances, these time estimates would be void.

(19)

Response.

The staff agrees that the length of time that a licensee should have to submit a plan be extended from 120 days to 180 days, but believes that the 30 day and 300 day requirements are reasonable and is therefore retaining this requirement.

Overall Summary No. 4 - Delay Contingency Rule Until Guides and NUREG's Issued Two comments in this area dealt with the incompleteness and new terminology in the content of Appendix C, and therefore,_ recommended that promulgation of the rule be postponed until appropriate NUREG's and Guides were issued to elaborate on what is needed.

Response

A typical fuel-cycle facility safeguards contingency plan was distributed at the workshop on safeguards contingency planning held in Richmond, I Virginia, in April 1976, and the contents and terminology were dicussed extensively with the fuel-cycle licensees at that meeting. Again, at the 21 Enclosure "B"

1

7. , ,

m,e .

NRC/ Industry meetings of August 1977 held in Richmond, Virginia, draft copies of Standard Format and Content Guides on Safeguards Contingency Planning for fuel-cycle facilities and transportation were distributed.

These guides also c.?.ntained a typical safeguards contingency plan. The Contingency Planning Branch /NMSS held other briefings for Industry at NRC Regions I and V in May 1977. The Standard Format and Content Guides will ;

be issued in final form when the effective rule is published. NRR dis-cussed contingency planning with its licesnees in February 1977. The i staff believes that these briefings and information distributed provide sufficient information for the development of contingency plans well !

before the rule becomes effective, and well before contingency plans are )

required to be submitted. j 1

Series of Comments j (a) While most of the proposed amendments are clear as to both intent and requirements, the section of the proposed Appendix C to 10 CFR 73 )

i entitled " Contents of Plan" uses phrases and terminology vastly j 2

different from that used in previous NRC regulations and regulatory guides. It is, therefore, difficult for us to understand, based upon the Federal Register notice, the oroposed content of the safeguards contingency plan. As the Commission indicates, via the Statement of Consideration, NRC does not intend to issue guidance for developing safeguards contingency plans until about the time that the rule is issued in final form; therefore, it is impossible for commentators to address the substantive aspects of the proposed regulation. From what we can understand of the proposed content, it appears that it j i

22 Enclosure "B" I

I.CZ l .. y.i ,,

+

i l would be more effective and in the public interest for NRC, rather !

than individual licensees, to develop the specified " categories of !

. information" as would be required by the proposed Appendix C. We, j therefore, recommend that:

l l

1. The proposed Appendix C be deleted from the proposed amendments. ;

t

2. NRC immediately' issue, via a NUREG report, the typical safe-guards contingency plans (referenced in the Statement of Consider-ation on page 42 FR 25745) that NRC has developed for fuel cycle plants.

3. NRC issue detailed Regulatory Guides specifying how a licensee is to develop specific safeguards contingency plans that are:

(i) compatible with the Federal Plan; l

(ii) meet specific NRC-designated objectives rather than licensee-designated objectives; (iii) address specific NRC postulated events rather than licensee-postulated events; (iv) identify how the licensee is to test the safeguards con-tingency responses.

4. The proposed amendments set forth in 42 FR 25744 be held in 1

abeyance until a reasonable period has elasped for public comment on the reports suggested in items 2. and 3. above.

(22) l 23 Enclosure "B"

v,, _ ,

M

+

,a; .

I l

(b) We are informed that "[t]he methodology for developing licensee safeguards contingency plans has been devised and evaluated, and typical plans have been drawn up for... nuclear reactors and road transportation of special nuclear material." It is further stated that "[1]icensees will receive the benefit ~ of this experience by means of regulatory guides to be issued by the time the rule is issued in effective form." We strongly object to t!!is procedure of not having the ancillary material prepared and made available to the public during the comment period on the rule. It has been our experi-ence, particularly in the application of industrial security require- l ments, that' individual NRC Staff members may attempt to impose regula-tory guides on licensees as if they were regulations. Moreover, the guidance given in these regulatory guides often brings to light interpretations of the regulations which were not apparent on their !

i face and which interpretations may lead to onerous duties imposed upon licensees. We would therefore request that the comment period be extended and no final rule be promulgated until the Commission has given a reasonable opportunity for comment on the associated regulatory guides.

(33) )

(c) The proposed regulation would seem to be premature for another reason.

The St?tement of Consideration accompanying the proposed amendment j states that a methodology for developing licensee safeguards contin-gency plans and typical plans have been drawn up. This information 24 Enclosure "B"

l

.w-4 , ;

i has not yet been communicated to licensees. It would seem appropriate for this information to be made available to licensees in connection ,

i with their consideration of the proposed amendment so that they may l have a more accurate idea of what the Commission is proposing. This r information would allow far more informed comments than the " bare i bones" of the proposed rule. !

(15) l i

i I

l i

I l

l 25 Enclosure "B"

"TL

~,g; ', ,

CONTINGENCY PLAN REQUIREMENTS i Overall Summary No. 1 - Responsibility Matrix and Procedures Summary too Detailed Several commentators expressed the opinion that the Responsibility Matrix ,

and Procedures sections of the safeguards contingency plan requires too 1 much detail of unpredictable events and that an alert, well-trained, and i experienced security personnel enforcing a comprehensive security program will ensure that timely and proper decisions are made. 1

\

Response

The staff agrees that an alert, well-trained and experienced security personnel is very important to the successful confrontation of safeguards incidents. However, the staff also believes that a well thought out contingency plan with reasonable preconceived responses is a foundation and a planning _ tool from which security personnel can be trained to real-life situations.

l Series of Comments (a) The " Responsibility Matrix" is a requirement imposed without any evaluation of its effectiveness or practicality in terms of ensuring timely and correct decision making in a dynamic situation. The resolution time of this type of matrix is not compatible with the required response time of security personnel. Alert, well trained, l

l 26 Enclosure "B"

rws &

4 9

. .. u .

i and experienced security personnel enforcing a comprehensive security ,

i program will ensure that timely and proper decisions are made. j (1)(12)(21) l (b) The proposed rule as written (in Categories 4. Responsibility Matrix and 5. Procedures)_ requires too much detail of unpredictable events. i There are an infinite number of different possible incidents that require an action scenario uniquely suited to the situations existing )

at that particular moment in time. We believe it is impossible to- ,

plan for every event that may occur and that greater reliance must be i

placed upon the competense and training of individual members of the .

security organization. In particular, the know1mlge, and judgment of i the supervisory personnel must be relied upon as is done in similar i law enforcement and/or rescue contingencies in our society. S&W therefore, recommends that the proposed rulemaking be revised to l limit safeguards planning to the following three contingencies at the I licensee level.

l l

What to do if: )

1 1. There is indication of any nature that adversary action, internal l or external, may be forthcoming,

2. There is known adversary action under way and the expectation is that outside law enforcement or rescue support will arrive prior l to it being successfully concluded, or 27 Enclosure "B" l

Ls

.. p , .

..,A m q ,

3. .There is known adversary action under way and outside support i f

may not be expected to arrive prior to successful conclusion of

. such action. ;

(5)

(c) 'Without rulemaking and comment the commission's staff has promoted the necessity of a special safeguards' contingency plan in addi- l tion to the other plans. The model safeguards plan is extensive in detail, highly proceduralized to the extent the plan's administration will be difficult, and familiarity with the document detail is a remote possiblity. l We cite as examples the " State of California Nuclear Blackmail or Nuclear i Threat Emergency Response Plan" and the " Representative Plant Safeguards Contingency Plan". The first example consists of 23 pages of definitions, )

instructions, directions, etc., with eleven attachments comprising an i additional 16 pages. The second example, the commission's model, consists of 14 pages plus and additional 103 pages containing six appendices.

I l

Licensee plans for responding to emergencies must be simple and I easily administered to assure effective implementation. A plethora of l

plans, procedures, and notification lists detracts from a clear under-standing of which action response to implement at any precise moment. Our i

Emergency Plan, approximately 22 pages, with an accompanying Emergency Procedures, consisting of 16 pages, has detail instructions covering the I

i 28 Enclosure "B" l

m.

7 ,

m ,

spectrum of emergencies from criticality accidents, reactor accidents....to civil disturbances including bomb threats.

(6) r Overall Summary No. 2 - Procedures Should Not Be Approved by Licensing l Procey ;

1 This comment refers to the detailed Procedures and requests that this not l l

be made part of the approved contingency plan. It suggests, as is done in other plans, that the detailed procedures be left up to the licensee to implement and change as necessary.

Response

The staff agrees with this comment, and the regulation has been revised to require that only the first four categories of Appendix C (Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, and Responsibility Matrix) need be submitted for approval. The fifth category, i.e., Procedures, is still a part of the finished plan but does not have to be submitted for approval. The licensee will develop this and could make changes without any notification to NRC. Tha Office of Inspection and Enforcement will i

assure that the Procedures under Category 5 of 10 CFR Part 73 has been l prepared and that it correctly reflects the contents of the Responsibility Matrix. Changes to reflect this are shown in: SS 50.34(d), 50.54(p),

70.22(g), 70.22(j), 70.32(g), 73.30(g), 73.40, and Appendix C immediately following " CONTENTS OF THE PLAN". )

. 29 Enclosure "B"

I

~; )

l 1

Series of Comments I l

(a) We note with concern that Appendix C requires the addition of detailed procedures as part of the contingency plan. Heretofore, in other safeguards regulations in Parts 70 and 73, detailed procedures l

have been required to implement the programs described by approved I plans, but these procedures have not been required to be a part of !

the approved plan. We believe that the addition of detailed proce-dures would unduly restrict the maintenance of a sound and flexible safeguards program. Procedures should be maintained to assure the l

proper implementation of the security program, but not as part of i

documentation approved by the Commission's licensing process. ;

(7)

(b) Contingency plans should be a dynamic set of procedures subject to changes and updating. Licensees should not be forced to obtain prior approval of NRC before instituting changes. Therefore, it is recom-mended that part 50.54(p) be revised to permit licensees to make changes to the contingency plan without prior approval providing a report of each change is made to NRC within two months after the change is made.

l l (10)

(c) The Contingency Plan should only contain categories of contingencies; the plant procedures should contain the implementing details. This 30 Enclosure "B"

y n, R

. - l

-,j action would allow the Contingency Plan to give an overview of the response capabilities and requirements, including interfaces with

. outside agencies, while the procedures elaborate and specify the implementation of the Contingency Plan. The procedures would follow l

the existing emergency procedure format for purpose, responsibility, '

action level, immediate actions, and subsequent actions. Such a format would parallel the Emergency Plan. The Introduction to Appendix C states that the " contingency plans are complementary to any emergency plans."

Note also that the proposed rule would make the Contingency Plan part of the license. If the procedures in the plan would be part of the license and procedure changes would be precluded without NRC approval, the ability to make procedure changes that do not decrease the effec-tiveness of the Plan are needed for operational flexibility. The operating plant staff should make the " impact on effectiveness" decision just as they make decisions relating to 10 CFR 50.59.

(11)(23)

(d) The last category requires that procedures be summarized in the plan.

It is our position that procedures should be developed and retained within the Company, available to NRC ir mection, but not be included in the security or contingency plans themselves. The inherent lack of flexibility associated with requiring NRC approval or concurrence 31 Enclosure "B"

... s with the procedural matters which constitute the day-to-day opera-i tions, is not conducive to efficient management and inhibits the overall ;

security program. Therefore, we strongly urge you to reconsider this ,

requirement in the contingency plan itself.

(21)

Overall Summary No. 4 - Statement on the perceived Danger There were four comments in this area as follows: ,

Providing a " statement of the perceived danger" requires the licensee to speculate as to what covert or overt activities are being considered by unknown individual (s) or groups. Such speculation, and documentation of this speculation serves no useful purpose. In fact, such speculation ,

could prove to be detrimental to the existing measures at a facility.

Given that the studies which preceded publication of 10 CFR 73.55 were quite extensive on that point it appears an unnecessary drain on resources already allocated to implementation of existing plans to require l

additional theorizing on threats.

'f anything this is a matter for the Commission to hypothesize. The plan should start out with a statement indicating that it is intended to satisfy the Commission.

(1)(16)(19)(21) l I

i 32 Enclosure "B"

- ~r. .

2, ' s

-4

Response

The staff agrees with the intent of this comment and is modifying the l

" Background" criteria in Appendix C to allow the statement of perceived danger to conform with that promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Overall Summary No. 5 - Rule Should Provide for Response Flexibility One comment in this area was as follows:

i It is understood that Contingency Plans will be an I&E inspection item.

Enough flexibility should be permitted in the Contingency Plans so that common sense can prevail over the written word when appropriate.

(10)

Response

The licensee will be expected to perform in accordance with the contingency plan. Any departure from the plan due to circumstances beyond the scope of the plan or deviations from the plan because of some perturbation within the context of the plan will have to be judged on a case by case basis.

Overall Summmary No. 6 - Local Law Enforcement Agency (LLEA) Response Cannot be Predetermined by Licensee i

One comment in this area stated that the "LLEA in general is not receptive

to detailed pre planned action and it is unrealistic to believe that the 33 Enclosure "B" l

~<-- . ,

" ?L ; -

~J a .

{

LLEA response can be pre determined and structured by the licensee."

(10)'

i

Response

Most LLEA's would be receptive and are willing to cooperate if they are l 1

made' aware of the need, the objectives, and the fact that a predetermined j contingency plan was developed by the licensee. One licensee has already j l

. developed a safeguards contingency plan and has obtained extensive cooper- I ation and certain commitments from the LLEA.

)

Overall Summary No. 7 - Conditions Under Which FBI Will Respond d 1

.One comment in this area stated that the "NRC should establish and publish J the conditions under which the FBI will respond to requests for assistance i l

by licensees and the degree and nature of FBI participation which can be ;

j expected." ;

i (9)

Response i The nature of FBI participation at the local level can be discussed directly between the licensee and the nearest FBI office. The participation of FBI headquarters will depend on the nature and gravity of the situation. The licensee should develop an understanding with the nearest FBI of when they should be informed; if any doubt exists, the licensee should always notify the FBI.

34 Enclosure "B"

iL. ,

l

..g. .

l 4G ' i EDITORIAL AND TECHNICAL COMMENTS !

i These coments are all "one of a kind"; therefore, an overall sumary is ;

I not presented, but the coments are quoted directly.

l Coment No.1 l In proposed 50.34(p) - Revise the reference to Appendix 0 of Part 20 to reference Appendix A of Part 73. This change would be consistent with proposed 70.32(g).

i (19) ]

Response

In safeguards matters,-the Appendix A of Pat 73 is the appropriate reference. This change has been made. !

Coment No. 2 In proposed 70.22(j) - After "... relating to the special' nuclear material,"

delete'"and nuclear' facilities licensed under Parts 50 and.70 of this l

chapter and"....Part 70 cannot govern facilities inasmuch as it deals with licensing the' possession and use of materials.

(19) i

Response

i Paragraph 70.22(j), has been revised to reflect the intent of this Comment. i j

35 Enclosure "B" l 4

l

rk / +

':< 1 m .g ,

Comment No. 3 In proposed 70.32(g) - Delete SS 50.90 or" and insert simply "S".

As discussed above, Part 70 is inappropriate with regard to facilities.

(19)

Response

Paragraph 70.32(g) has been revised in accordance with this comment.

Comment No. 4 In proposed Appendix C - Revise Item 2a. to read, "...that have been selected by the licensee to signal the beginning..." The licensee cannot assure that his choices in fact "will be" those and only those to signal the beginning of an event.

(19) ,

I

Response

A listing of events indicative of a safeguards contingency has been sug-gested by NRC staff. The licensee is free to use this list if he so j l

chooses. After months of discussions within the staff and with licensees, l l

no additional events have been suggested. However, the rule provides for I i

additional events to be included if the licensee deems that additional or !

alternative events should be considered.

i i

36 Enclosure "B"

' d M'4WM 17;?" .

n a -, .

Comment No. 5 (e) In proposed Appendix C - Delete "...and other important environmental l l

L features." in Item 3b.f. This phrase is too vague. Alternatively, the phrase may be retained if suitable criteria are added to clarify !

I the aspects of environmental features that make them "important." !

(19) l

Response

Item 3b.i has been revised to add clarifying aspects of environmental features that make them "important".

i Comment No. 6 In proposed Appendix C - After the first sentence in Item 3c insert a ,

sentence to read approximately, " Systems discussion may include hardware :

reliability or susceptability to tampering and describe provisions for i

redundancy or alternatives." In Item 3f., delete "...to provide redun- l i

dancy in case of equipment failure." <

Introducing the concept of redundancy under the heading of " Hardware" :

seems more direct and logical. I 1

(19) !

l i

Response

It is believed that the present organization is adequate and that no j

. revision to reflect this comment is necessary.

i t

! 37 Enclosure "B"

MNd .

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Comment No. 7-In proposed Appendix C - In Item (4) of Development'and Maintenance of the

. Plan, revise to read, "... tests will be made by the licensee to ensure that his safeguards contingency. responses..."

The. licensee should not be assigned responsibility for the actions or lack of action of persons not subject to licensee control.

(19) 3 t,

1 r

Response

Additional clarifications have been added to this paragraph to reflect the intent of this comment.

l l

l 38 Enclosure "B"

, . . = _ . . . - - _ - . -- .- _- -. ----

K - -

wm ,

i COMPANIES PROVIDING COMENTS ON PROPOSED CONTINGENCY PLANNING RULE i l

I

1) 31 May 1977 Omaha Public Power District i

2) 6 Jun 1977 KMC, Inc. l

3) 10 Jun 1977 Portland General Electric Company

4) 21 Jun 1977 Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc.

5) 24 Jun 1977 Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation

6) 13 Jul 1977 General Atomic Company

7) 13 Jul 1977 Edison Electric Institute

8) 14 Jul 1977 General Electric Company ;

9) 14 Jul 1977 United Nuclear Corporation

10) 14 Jul 1977 Florida Power & Light Company

11) 15 Jul 1977 GPU Service Corporation

12) 15 Jul 1977 Commonwealth Edison ,

1

13) 18 Jul 1977 Conner, Moore

Corber !

14) 18 Jul 1977 Duke Power Company l i

15) 18 Jul 1977 Wisconsin Electric Power Company

16) 18 Jul 1977 Yankee Atomic Electric Company

17) 18 Jul 1977 Northeast Utilities Service Company

18) 18 Jul 1977 Safeguards Policy Committee, Atomic Industrial Forum

19) 18 Jul 1977 Westinghouse Electric Corporation l

20) 18 Jul 1977 LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 212 22 Jul 1977 Carolina Power & Light Company 1

\

t 39 Enclosure "B" l

= 9.k IkLL

22) 25 June 1977 Nuclear Fuel Services

23) 18 July 1977 AGNS j

i i

I i

x Concerned solely with licensed nuclear power plants.

40 Enclosure "B"

.L.J3 .

. ', . i r uns v Jy s

ENCLOSURE C f

REPORT JUSTIFICATION - LICENSEE CONTINGENCY PLANS t

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ENCLOSURE'"C" s

Report Justification

, Licensee Contingency Plans ProposedSections50.34(d),70.22(g),70.22(j) 73.30(g), 73.40. and Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 73 ;

I i

A. NEED FOR THE REPORT Proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 (Section 50.34(d)),10 CFR Part ~/G I (Section .'0.22(g), 70.22(j)) and 10 CFR Part 73 (Section 73.30(g), !

i 73.40, and Appendix C), 42 FR 25744, May 19,1977, require that nuclear i power plant and certain fuel cycle facility licensees, and licensees involved in the transportation of certain quantities of special nuclear material submit a plan which describes the response to safeguards !

contingencies. .

l The need for safeguards contingency plans is addressed in the Statement f

of Consideration of 42 FR 25744. The paragraph pertaining to this can

{

be found on page 25745 (second column) and follows herewith for ease !

l of reference. )

"The responsibilities assigned to the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards by the Congressional man-

- date of section 204(b) (2)(B) of the Energy Reorganization 1

ENCLOSURE C I

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i-g , . ;

w . Act of 1974 are b2ing addressed by developing safeguards l

contingency plans at the Federal level. At the same time, '

the Commission recognizes the importance of safeguards l

actions by those persons who possess special nuclear j l material and operate'certain facilities. Indeed, licensees )

would have the primary role in many safeguards centingencies ;

because of their intimate connection with the materials j and facilities at risk. The Commission further recognizes the necessity for assuring coordinated responses to all l l

safeguards contingencies, including responses by licensees. l 4

To provide and maintain adequate safeguards, therefore, l the Commission must ensure that each licensee having important safeguards responsibility develops and follows a !

" licensee safeguards contingency plan...." l The safeguards contingency plan will be submitted to the Commission !

for approval. After the plan is approved there are no requirements i for additional reports on the plan provided it is not changed. If it r

is changed, the licensee must obtain approval 6f the change in advance :

if the change decreases the safeguards effectiveness of the plan, and, if the change does not decrease the safeguards effectiveness, the ;

1 l

l l

l 2 Enclosure "C" t

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y licensee tr.ust submit a report containing a description of each change within two months after the change is made. It is estimated that the changes that have to be submitted to fiRC will be minimal (see Section B' ,

because one part of the contingency plan, i.e. , procedures Summary, can be changed without informing the tiRC. The procedures summary is derivec ,

frem the overall plan, i.e. , Generic Planning Base and Responsibility Hatrix, and involves detailed licensee perscnnel responsibilities. It 4,-

therefore only be subject to periodic inspections at the licensee

-facility.

B. COST OF BURDEN TO RESP 0tiDEllTS AtiD NRC It is estimated that the number of licensees who will have to prepare contingency plans is 70, and are as follows: 56 nuclear power plants,13 fuel cycle facilities and one transportation compsny.

4 It is further estimated that it will take 3 man months to prepare a contingency plan with the NRC supporting documentation, j i.e., guides, and one man month to recycle the plan after initial itRC review. The total industry burden is therefore 4 man-months x 70

= 230 man months. Assuming a cost of $2500 per man month the total industry cost for the preparation of contingency plans is $700,000.

The cost of revising these plans .is estimated at 1/2 man month per year per licensee or 35 man months per year for the industry. The annual industry cost for revising these plans is therefore 587,500.

l 3 Enclosure "C"

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Costs to the NRC are determined by the effort expended by licensing to review the contingency plan. It is estimated that approximately 3 man months of effort will be expended per plan. Assuming a cost of

$2500 per man month an NRC cost of about $525,000 could be assigned to' review of contingency plans.

The cost to NRC for reviewing revisions to the plans is estimated at 1/4 man month per year per licensee or 17.5 man months per year. The annual NRC cost for reviewing revisions to these plans is therefore

$43,750.

C. ALTERNATIVE DATA SOURCES AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED There are no valid alternatives to the development of Contingency Pl.ans. Contingency plans in this case are intended to be well thought out response procedures to safeguards incidents, and the only way to generate this information is to plan and document responses

~

to typical incidents in advance.

D. VALUE/ IMPACT ASSESSMENT Benefit from the requirement that contingency plans be developed will accrue to the licensee, the NRC, and the public.

Benefit accrues to the licensee in two ways. In the first place it motivates the licensee to consider possible safeguards (security and 4 Enclosure "C"

+ g .- ., . -

+; ,

' accountability) contingencies that could arise in his operation and j the detailed reaction.and responses to neutralize these events. Tnis j puts the licensee in a posture of being prepared to decide on the proper. course of action as well as the detailed response, and mini- ,

i mizes indecisiveness in times of stress. Secondly, not only is the !

licensee (management organization) in a better posture, but all other j units of the if censee's organization beccme more aware of their responsibilities under different conditions. Further, the contingency plan requires that coordination with local law enforcement agencies l

be conducted on a more formal basis.

.I Benefit accrues to the NRC in that it has assured by a more rigorcus process that licensees have prepared themselves to handle safeguards contingencies at the local level. This provides a higher level of assurance to the NRC and the public that malevolent acts against the nuclear industry will either be defeated or contained.

These benefits defy quantificaticn.

g As discussed in B, the initial total cost or burden to respondents and NRC could approach (700,000 + 525,000) $1,225,000. Annual cost of revising and reviewing these plans is estimated at (87,500 +

43,750) ' $131.250.

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5 Enclosure "C" i

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The difficulty . encountered in attempting to quantify the benefit associated with the prepartion and review of contingency plans extends to any attempt to evaluate the value/ impact balance.

E. -CONSULTATION CUTSIDE THE NRC Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 to require the submittal'of contingency plans were published in the Federal Register on May 19,

~

,1977 (42 FR 25744). The comment period expired on July 18, 1977.

Many commentors suggested that certain parts required in the con-tingency plans duplicate the security plan presently required by 10 CFR 73. It is recognized that some of the information reported in the contingency plan may be duplicative of information in the security plan; when this occurs reference to the security plan will be permitted.

However, critical information required by the contingency plan is not available in the security plan, i.e. , portions of the Generic Planning Base, the entire Responsibility Matrix, and the entire Procedures section , and therefore is needed._ Two commentors said that the methodology developed for contingency planning is a powerful tool in preplanning actions to meet various threats.

NRC (Contingency Planning Branch of the Office of Nuclear Material l Safety 'and Safeguards) sponsored two NRC/ Industry briefings, April 1975 and August 1977, to inform and discuss with industry the implementation of the contingency plan rules. The public was also l The industry was also briefed at invited to the August 1977 meeting.

l ~

L two NRC Regional Office meetings (Region I and Region V) May 1977. i 6

Enclosure "C" l .

I

c---

n s

~ .2 . implementation of the contingency plan rules. The public was also invited to the August 1977 meeting. The industry was also briefed at two NRC Regional Office meetings (Region I and Region V) May 1977.

i : !

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( 7 Enclosure "C" i

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ENCLOSURE D VALUE/ IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON CONTINGENCY PLANS i

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' ENCLOSURE'D VALUE/ IMPACT' ASSESSMENT ON CONTINGENCY PLANS II. 'The Proposed Action i

-A. Description l

Proposed amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50, 70 and 73, 42 FR 25744, i 1

May 19, 1977, require that nuclear power plant and certain fuel cycle. facility licensees, and licensees involved in the trans-portation of certain quantities of special nuclear material submit a plan which describes the response to safeguards contingericies.

B. Need for the Proposed Action The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, section 204(b)(2)(B),

requires that contingency plans be developed at the Federal i

level. In order to assure that contingency plans of sufficient scope.and depth are available at the licensee level the staff believes that licensees should among other things address a set of events which could lead to safeguards incidents as well as j how these events would be resolved procedurally down to the

-response actions of individual employees. To provide and maintain adequate safeguards, therefore, the Commission must ensure that i

each licensee having important safeguards responsibility develops 1 Enclosure "0" 1

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l and follows a licensee safeguards contingency plan. The criteria for such a plan are included in a new Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73.

C. Value/ Impact of the Proposed Action

1. NRC operating l The requirement that a contingency plan be submitted in accordance with the Appendix of 10 CFR Part 73 will benefit the NRC in that it'will assure that licensees have, by a more rigorous process, prepared themselves to handle safe-guards contingencies at the local level. This provides a higher level of assurance to the NRC that malevolent acts against the nuclear industry will either be defeated or contained.

The impact on NRC will be the costs associated with the i

effort expended by licensing to review the contingency i plans. It is estimated that the number of contingency plans that will have to be prepared is 70, and are as i follows: 56 nuclear power plants, 13 fuel cycle facilities, and one transportation company. It is estimated that approximately 3 man-months of effort will be expended by NRC to review each plan. Assuming an NRC cost per l

r 2 Enclosure "0" l

r l

l

'1 I

man-month of $2500, the total cost for review of these l plans is about $525,000.

1 i

It is further estimated that 1/4 man-month per year per licensee or 17.5 man-months per year will be expended by l

the NRC to review revisions to these plans. The annual l 1

costs for review is therefore $43,750.

l l

2. Other Government Agencies !

Other government agencies shall minimally, if at all, be involved in the development of the needed contingency plan information from a licensee. The FBI, DOE and D00 may be involved in other contingency plans developed by the NRC. l

3. Industry Benefit accrues to the industry and the licensee in two ways. In the first place the requirement that a detailed contingency plan be developed motivates the licensee to consider possible safeguards (security and accountability) contingencies that could arise in his operation and the detailed reaction and response to neutralize these events.

This puts the licensee in a posture of being prepared to decide on the proper course of action as well as the detailed response, and minimizes indecisiveness even in times of stress. Secondly, not only is the licensee (management 1

3 Enclosure "D"

i e ad 1 . e. l

, I l organization) in a better posture, but all other units of l the licensee's organization become more aware of their responsibilities under different conditions. Further, the contingency plan requires that coordination with local law enforcement agencies be conducted on c more formal basis. I The impact on the licensees will be costs associated with the development of contingency plans. It is estimated that I it will take approximately 3 man-months to prepare a contin-gency plan with the NRC supporting documentation, i.e.,

guides, and one man-month to recycle the plan after initial NRC review. The total industry burden is therefore 4 man-months x 70 = 280 man-months. Assuming a cost of $2500 per man-month the total industry cost for the preparation of contingency plans is $700,000.

The cost of revising these plans is estimated at 1/2 man-month per year per licensee or 35 man-months per year for the industry. The. annual industry cost for revising these plans is therefore $87,500. !

4. Public I

No impact on the public can be foreseen. The public will l benefit knowing that a more rigorous approach to response l

planning has taken place, which leads to a higher level of l l i

4 Enclosure "D"

l 7 .,

,i ,

assurance that malevolent acts against the nuclear industry i- will either be defeated or contained.

l D. Decision on the Action '

The benefits to be derived clearly show that more definitive criteria are needed to provide licensee guidelines on the type of information for the development of contingency plans.

II. Technical Approach A. Technical Alternatives The proposed action is not recommending any specific technical approach, and therefore consideration of technical alternatives is not applicable.

III. Procedural Approach A. Procedural Alternatives The requirement to submit detailed contingency plans could be made by one of the following methods:

(1) Issue guides with detailed criteria and cite existing regulations in 10 CFR Part 73 under response requirements as a basis for the issuance of the guides.

(2) Issue guides with detailed criteria and revise regulations to incorporate more detailed contingency criteria.

5 Enclosure "D" l

,&-,4 .

t # l a .

i (3) Revise regulations to include all necessary information j that should be in a contingency plan. ;

i 1

B. Value/ Impact of Procedural Alternatives ;

i Under the first alternative, paragraphs 73.50(g) and 73.55(h) )

both titled " Response" could be used as a basis for developing guides dealing with the necessary contingency formats. This 1 approach would not be satisfactory, however, because these :

1 paragraphs do not cite specific informational requirements nf a j contingency plan, i.e., Generic Planning Base, Responsibility :

Matrix, and Procedures. )

I The second alternative is a more definitive approach in that specific requirements of a contingency plan would be required by i

regulation, and guides could further amplify on the detailed format for licensees to develop their own plans. It is a more ,

i consistent follow-through from regulation to guides.

1 i

i The third alternative would put too much detail in a regulation and would not provide sufficient leeway for individual varia-tions in licensee contingency plans.

C. Decision on Procedural Approach Alternative (2) is the preferred approach and should be followed for the development of contingency plans.

1

I 6 Enclosure "D"

f..Ci .

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IV. -Statutory Considerations ,

A. NRC Authority At the Federal level the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, section 204(b)(2)(B), requires that safeguards contingency ,

plans be developed. In addition, section 204(b)(1) allots to 9

the NRC the Atomic Energy Act authority for the "provo.lon and 4 maintenance of safeguards against threats, thefts, nd sabotage of ... licensed facilities, and materials." The Atok'e Energy '

Act of 1954 as amended provides ample authority for the Commis-sion to require licensees to develop their own contingen~cy plan that will interface with the Federal plan. l l

B. Need for NEPA Assessment The proposed action is not a major action, as defined by 10 CFR ;

51.5(a)(10), and does not require an environmental impact statement. !

l l

V. Relationship to Other Existing or Proposed Regulations or Policies There are no apparent potential conflicts or overlaps with other agencies. The generation of the contingency plans will involve coordination with local law enforcement agencies for fixed facilities and with several local law enforcement agencies for transportation contingency plans. Coordination with other Federal agencies will be i

done by the NRC. j i

The relationships with the " Safeguards Upgrading Program" is dis-cussed in the staff paper.

7 Enclosure "0" l

l

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.m- _j j i

VI. Summary and Conclusions i

Fulfillment of the mandate for the development of contingency plans require that the response continuum of local, State, and Federal ;

entities be completed. It will be completed if a regulation is promulgated that requires licensees to develop and implement con-i tingency plans for their licensed materials and facilities. The l

effective rule in Enclosure "A" of this package is based upon the i staff's accumulated experience in developing prototype plans and in !

correlating the development of these plans'with cooperating licensees. l Comments from the proposed rule have been taken into consideration. ;

l l

i i

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I l

i 8 Enclosure "D" i

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I ENCLOSURE E i

DRAFR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT i

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.4 ENCLOSURE "E" NRC AMENDS REGULATIONS TO REQUIRE LICENSEE .

SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require licensees to develop contingency plans for responding to attempted I sabotage of a nuclear facility or theft of nuclear materials.

Licensees covered by the amendments are involved in the processing, handling, and transportation of strategic quantities of nuclear materials or in the operation of nuclear reactors--primarily those used in the production of electricity.

I Each of these licensees already has an NRC approved plan covering j The contingency plans will augment in place physical security. systems. i' existing physical security procedures by outlining data needed and criteria to be followed in reaching decisions on what action to take in The individuals, groups

'- the event of a threat to facilities or materials.

and organizational units responsible for each decision and subsequent action also will be identified.

Safeguards contingency plans, like physical security plans, will be exempt from public disclosure.

i 1 Enclosure "E" l

l

~_~ .. - -- .- - . - - .

.J .

-a -

The licensee safeguards contingency plans will be designed to:

+

organize the response effort at the licensee level; l provide structured responses by licensees to safeguards contingencies;

~

and

- achieve a measurable performance in responsive capabilities.

Those responsible for responding to a sepcific threat situation, and the scope of that responsibility, will be identified.

Under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, the NRC is responsible for nuclear contingency planning at the Federal level. This covers coordination of responses by various Federal agencies, incuding the NRC, f the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Department of Defense to threats against commercial

. nuclear activities. NRC will also assure that licensee safeguards contin-gency plans will be integrated and coordinated with the Federal Planning effort. t l

Licensees will have 180 days from publication of the amendments to Parts 50, 70 and 73 of the regulations in the Federal Register on to submit their contingency plans for NRC staff review and approval.

l l

. 2 Enclosure "E" l

. . ..

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