ML20127H171: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000216/2003015]]
| number = ML20127H171
| issue date = 04/05/1985
| title = Insp Rept 50-416/85-06 on 850216-0315.Violation & Deviation Noted:Inadequate Procedure for Calibr Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrument & Failure to Submit Annual Repts on ECCS Outages as Committed in FSAR
| author name = Butcher R, Caldwell J, Panciera V
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000416
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.K.3.17, TASK-TM
| document report number = 50-416-85-06, 50-416-85-6, GL-83-28, IEB-81-01, IEB-81-1, NUDOCS 8505210242
| package number = ML20127H069
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 9
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000416/1985006]]
 
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    .
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            >n E E                                          UNITED STATES                                                      j
                  !6q#o
        -/_                                  NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                      '
      ["              p                                      REGloN ll
      g              g j                            101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
      *                t                              ATLANTA, G EORGI A 30323
        \...../
t
      Report-No.: '50-416/85-06
      Licensee: Mississippi Power. and Light Company
                        Jackson, MS 39205
      Docket No.: -50-416                                                                  License No.:      NPF-29
      Facility Name: Grand Gulf
      Inspection Conducted            February 16 - Mar h 15, 1985
                                              "
      Inspectors:                                            _
                        R. C.:B        r
                                                        [/                                            Date Signed
                                                    *
                        J.
                                                                                                                      ~
                                                                                                        Date Signed
.                              Caldw
                                                                rf
      Approved by:          . [] ) / na h
                                      t
                                                                                                                    hef,
                          V. W.'Panc'ibr6 Cnief                                                        Date Vigned
                          Project Section 28
                        Division of Reactor Projects
                                                              SUMMARY
      Scope: This routine inspection entailed 285 inspector-hours at the site in the
                                          ~
      areas of Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance' Observation, Surveillance
      Observation, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown, Reportable Occur-
      rences, Operating Reactor Events, Independent Inspection, and Bulletins.
      Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no apparent violations or deviations were
      identified in seven areas; one apparent violation and one deviation were found in
      one area.
        8505210242 850405
        PDR      ADOCK 05000416
        0                        PDR
                                    _
                                              . . .        .            . . _ . . - . - - .              . - . . . .    - . - .
 
  T- .
  Y
                                              REPORT DETAILS
        1.    Licensee Employees Contacted
            *J. E. Cross, General Manager
              C. R. Hutchinson, Manager, Plant Maintenance
              R. 'F. Rogers, General Manager, Technical Assistant
            *J..D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator
            *M. J. Wright, Manager, Plant Operations
              L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Superintendent
              D. Cupstid, Start-up Supervisor
            *L. G. Temple, Assistant, I&C Superintendent
              R. V. Moomaw, I&C Superintendent
            *B. Harris, Compliance Coordinator
            *J. L. Robertson, Operations Superintendent
'
              Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security
  .          force members, and office personnel.
      ,
          . *Attended exit interview
      2.      Exit Interview
              The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 15, 1985, with
              those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The 1icensee did not identify
                                                                    ~
              as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed -by the
              inspectors during this inspection.
              The licensee had no comment on the following inspection findings:
              a.    Violation (50-416/85-06-01), Inadequate procedure for calibrating
                    reactor vessel water level instrument    paragraph 11.
              b.    Deviation (50-416/85-06-02), Failure to submit annual reports on ECCS
                    outages    paragraph 11.
              c.    Unresolved    Item (50-416/85-06-03),    Post trip review procedure
                    adequacy    paragraph 1 .
,
      3.      Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
              (Closed) Violation 50-416/84-42-01; Failure to check the standby service
              water basin syphon line filled and vented.        The inspector reviewed the
              licensee's corrective actions and found them to be acceptable.          The
              temporary information tags installed next to the basin level instruments are
              sufficient until permanent tags can be installed per Design Change Package
            -
              84-247. This item is closed.
              (Closed) Violation 50 416/84-42-02; Failure to recognize and document the
!
              entry into Technical Specification (TS) action statement. The inspector
 
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                                                  2
              reviewed the changes to the licensee's procedures and found them acceptable.
              Proper implementation of -these procedures will prevent further occurrences
              of' failure to recognize and document the entry into TS action statements.
              This item is closed.
              (Closed) Violation 50-416/84-42-03; Failure to' provide proper documentation
              during procedure performance. The inspector has reviewed the documentation
              associated with the corrective actions taken by the licensee and found them
              acceptable. . The memoranda and letters issued by the licensee to plant
              personnel indicates increased sensitivity in the area of failure to follow
            ' procedures and make it clear _ that the plant management will not tolerate
              further procedural noncompliances. This item is closed.
        4.    Unresolved Items *
              See paragraph 11 for the unresolved item.
        5.    Operational Safety Verification (71707)
              The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall
    '
              plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
              Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the
              plant operating staff.
              The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that it was
              visited at least daily when an inspector was on site. Observations included
              instrument readings, setpoints and recordings status of operating systems;
              tags and clearances on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms;
              adherence _to limiting conditions for operation; temporary alterations in
              effect; . daily journals and data sheet entries; control room manning; and
              access controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal
            discussions with operators and their supervisors.
            Weekly, when onsite, a selected ESF system is confirmed operable. The
              confirmation is made by verifying the following: Accessible valve flow path
              alignment; power supply breaker and fuse status; major component leakage,
,            lubrication, cooling and general condition; and instrumentation.
            General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions
            of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside
              areas - were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifica-
              tions; shift turnover; sampling program; housekeeping and general plant
              conditions; fire protection equipment; control of activities in progress;
              radiation protection controls; physical security; problem identification
              systems; and containment isolation.
        *An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to
        determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
 
_
    ,-
                                                3
          While reviewing the' licensee's Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) equipment-
          status with the plant in the shutdown condition (Mode 4), the inspectors-had
          a concern regarding the adequacy of Technical Specification (TS)
          requirements. It appeared to the inspectors that equipment lineup .and
          operational requirements were less than that required by Standard TS. The
          inspectors have discussed their concerns with the licensee and the licensee
          has issued ETS position statements and night orders to address these
          . concerns. The inspectors have requested the region staff to review these_
          concerns and develope a regional position. This is Inspector Followup Item
          (IFI) 50/416 85-06-05.
          In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
      6.  Maintenance Observation (62703)
          During the report period, the inspector observed -selected maintenance
          activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for
          adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical
  .        Specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the
          actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and
          adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
          In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
      7.  Surveillance Observation (61726)
          The inspector observed the performance of selected surveillcnces.          The
          observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,
          conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument
          calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal
          from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and
          review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.
          In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
      8.  ESF System Walkdown (71710)
          A complete walkdown was conducted on the accessible portions of the
          combustible gas control system. The walkdown consisted of an inspection and
          verification, where possible, of the required system valve alignment,
          including valve power available and valve locking, where required;
            instrumentation valved in and functioning; electrical and instrumentation
          cabinets free from debris, loose materials, jumpers and evidence of rodents;
          and system free from other degrading conditions.
i          In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
:
      9.  Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)
.
          The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if
I
          the information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The determination
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                  : included adequacy ,df _ event description. and corrective : action taken or
                    planned, existence of - potential generic problems and the relative safety '
        ,          significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and. discussions with
                    plant personnel ' as appropriate,were conducted for the reports indicated by
                -an asterisk. The : LERs -were--reviewed using the guidance of the general
                  . policy .and : procedure for NRC enforcement. actions. - The following LERs are
                  closed.
                        .LER No.            Report Date              4
                                                                              Event
                          85-003          February 18, 1985        Failu're to perform dose
                                                                  -equivalent analysis following
                                                                  reactor scrams.
                        *84-057=        - January 18, 1985        Reactor scram on reactor low
                                                                  : water level.
                        *85-004          February 26, 1985        Reactor scram on reactor' low
                                                                  water level.
      *
                        *85-002          February 26, 1985        Reactor scram on reactor low
                                                                                  -
                                                                                              -
                                                                  water level.
                        *84-056          January 18,.1985          Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
                                                                  (RCIC)    system  containment
                                                                  isolation.
                          84-035        August 24, 1985          . Inadequate radioactive gaseous
                                                                  waste surveillance.
                  The event of LER 85-004 was discussed in IE Report 85-03.
                                                              ~
                'The event of LER 85-002 was discussed in IE Report 85-03 and is tracked by
                  violation 50-416/85-03-01.
                  The event of LER 84-056 was discussed in IE Report 85-03 and is tracked as
                  IFI 50-416/85-03-04.
ll                The event of LER 84-057 was discussed in IE Report 85-03.
!:        .
                  A part 21 report, Reportable Deficiency 85/01, was reported to the NRC in a
                  letter Ldated February 18, 1985. An air filter bowl on the air supply line
.
    '
              . to the diesel generator engine control panel was subject to possible-
,.                failure. This item was discussed in'IE Report 85-03 and is an Inspector
                  Followup Item (50-416/85-06-04) for tracking purposes. 'The licensee has
'
                  replaced the subject bowls. This reportable deficiency is closed.
              -In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
              '
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p~ !.; - -  '
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                    _;. '                                                                                '
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          _
'
                                                                        '
        _-                                                        5'
      '
              ~7 10. l Operating l Reactor Events' (93702)
      -
                        : Thefinspectors reviewed. activities associated with-the below listed reactor
                          scrams. ;The review ' included determination .of. cause, . safety ~ significance,
                                                                              -
                          performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action. The inspectors-
                          examined :. instrument recordings, computer printouts, . operations journal
                          entries,-'sc' ram reports, and~.had discussions with operations maintenance and
                        fengineering support' personnel as appropriate.
                          Scram No. 19
                          At 6:51 a.m. on February 10, 1985,- the reactor scrammed as operations was
                          attempting to switch from Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) B.to SJAE A due to
                          decreasing condenser vacuum as a result of fouling of the B SJAE inter -
                                      .
r                        ' condenser.      Reactor power had been reduced- to approximately 49% in
                          preparation for swapping.the SJAEs. Main condenser vacuum as indicated on
                                                                                          -
                        'the P680 panel was 26.5 inches of Hg prior to the event. The steam supply
                        :to the B SJAE was throttled closed . in. order to increase the steam flow .to
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                          the A SJAE. The valve .from the condenser to the A SJAE (N62-F003A) was
                                  -
                          observed to-have dual : indication and didn't appear to respond to local or
                          -remote open signals.
                        . An. operator was sent to manually.open the N62-F003A valve while another
                          operator: was sent ~ to clear a red tag on N62-F003B :so the valve could be
    .                      closed. During this time, the condenser vacuum had decreased to the turbine
                          trip setpoint and a turbine trip. occurred. Valve F0038 had-previously been
                        ' tagged open for troubleshooting under Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 150587.
                        ' The MWO addressed the closing of ' F003B: due to a low flow signal when
                          adequate flow appeared to be present. The licensee has determined that the
                                                                                      .
                          present steam supply piping to the SJAEs is underdesigned and a design
                          change is planned to be incorporated during the present outage. -It appears
                        ' that valve F003A would . not respond because it had tripped on thermal-
                          overload -due- to excessive cycling on low steam flow caused by undersized -
                          piping. .The turbine trip initiated a reactor scram and reactor. feedwater
                          limited reactor water level decrease to 4.5 inches.
                        - At 8:04 a.m. on February 10, 1985,- the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)
                        ;were slow closed using-the test switch in an attempt to limit the cooldown
                          rate. When the MSIVs reached the closed position, the associated emergency
                          handswitches were moved to the close-position, MSIVs F028A, F028C, and F0220
                          reopened. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to close the valves and
                          they were declared inoperable. The cause of:the failure to remain closed
                        'was determined to be the solenoid _ valve (ASCO) HTX8323-20V) which is called
                        -the main pilot control valve. The licensee conducted some in house testing
                          which indicated that the solenoid valve failure may be temperature related.
                          ASCO and GE were sent seven solenoid valves for further testing (Three from
                          Unit 1 that had failed to function). The licensee then installed all new
                          solenoid valves on .the eight MSIVs in order to continue startup testing.
                          The newly installed valves were similar to those removed except the removed
                          solenoid valves had a'15.4 watt coil on one end and a 6 watt coil on 'the
                          other=end while the new solenoid valves had a 10 watt coil on one end and a
                          6 ' watt coil ion the opposite end and the part number had been revised to
                          HTX8323A20V. In a letter to the NRC dated February 14, 1985, the licensee
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  h                proposed'the ifollowing stroking . requirements to verify MSIV operation for
                  . restart:
                    a.    Verify operability of MSIVs prior-to restart.
                    b.    Verify ' operability.to MSIVs at approximately 600 psig reactor pressure,
    ,
              -
                    c.    Verify operability of MSIVs prior to exceeding 25% power.
                    d.    Verify . operability Lof L MSIVs- daily - for the first week,' every'other day
                          for the' next two weeks and weekly thereafter until : solenoids are -
                          replaced with environmentally qualified models.
                                                          _
                    e.    Monitor an inboard and an; outboard MSIV solenoid-temperature with a
                          thermocouple to assess ambient temperature conditions.
                  . Subsequently, on February 13, 1985, the licensee was in startup with reactor
                  . power at 16% when a reactor scram occurred.' During preparations for restart
  .              :on February 15, 1985, the licensee discovered leaks in the main condensers
                  :and'the MSIV stroking program noted above was not completed.. The condenser
                  -leakage problem. forced the licensee to enter a maintenance. outage:and is not
                    scheduled to end until .the end of. March. Due to the outage, the licensee
                    has ' expedited the installation of replacement solenoid valves that are
                    environmentally qualified. The replacement valves are not fully certified
                    for the seismic range for the Grand Gulf facility so the licensee is testing
                    valves at Wy'le Laboratories in Huntsville, Alabama, which is expected to be
                    completed prior to startupf rom f  this : outage. The GE/ASCO testing of the
                    removed valves has duplicated the failure . to function when soaked at
          '
                    temperatures in the' 180*F range but no. cause of the failure has been
                  determined. This failure has been duplicated'only on those test valves that
                    had ' failed when installed at Grand Gulf. Based on the known data,' an IE
                    Information Notice 85-17 was released to inform other users of this known
                    failure.
                  The new valves are ASCO NP8323A20E and are presently being installed.
                  Design Change Package' (DCP) 84/3084 has been initiated to replace the
                  ! installed ASCO' valves, with environmentally qualified valves with the
                  qualifying statement that all seismic concerns 'shall be resolved prior to
                  plant restart.
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                  The inspectors will continue to' monitor the licensee's actions in this area.
L:          11.    Independent Inspection (92704)
i
:.-                The inspectors reviewed a letter from L. F. Dale, Mississippi Power and
                    Light (MP&L) to H. R. Denton, USNRC (AECM 85/0040) dated February 22, 1985,
L
                  which stated that while reviewing the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR),
                  the~ licensee discovered that Section 18.1.30.5 committed them to provide the
.
                  NRC with an annual report of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) outages.
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                  The letter went on to say that NUREG 0737, Item II.K.3.17 only required one
                  report covering five years of operation and MP&L would wait five years from
 
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                    )  ~
                        ~ the date fof ' commercial ~ operation to provide the NRC with this report. The
                          ' inspectors found this letter to be incomplete in several areas.        The
                            ifcensee did not state that they had failed to provide the NRC with the last
                          three annual . reports as committed. The -inspectors also discovered that the
                            licensee committed to provide the annual reports on ECCS~ outages in a letter
                          dated June :12,1981 from L. F. Dale ~to H. R. Denton. Based on this letter,
                          the' NRCL closed -TMI action item II.K.3.17 of NUREG 0737 as stated in the
                        * Safety Evaluation Report (SER)' on page 22-26, item 17. . Additionally, the
                      -inspectors reviewed II.K.3.17 and determined that the five year requirement
                                                                                                    .
                          applied:specifically to operational plants and applicants for an operating
                          license', of which MP&L was- at the time, would submit a plan . for ~ data -
                          collection. MP&L's plan for' data collection was to provide the 'NRC with
      ,              -annual. report.s'of ECCS outages. .This plan was found acceptable to the NRC
      '
                          ascstated in the SER. The failure of MP&L to submit the annual reports of
                          ECCS outages as committed in. the FSAR,- Section 18.1.30.5 and letter dated
                        ; June 12, 1981, is a deviation (50-416/85-06-02).
                    '
                      . At 10:09 a.m. on February 14, 1985, the reactor was in hot shutdown with
                          reactor vessel water level at.36 inches when an inadvertent level 1 signal
                          (-150 inches) caused an actuation of the Division II Emergency Safeguards
          '
                        : Features (ESF). Reactor pressure was -375 psig and reactor temperature was
                          373*F.  No injection of water occurred due to reactor pressure and all
                          systems functioned as designed.      The false low reactor water level signal
                      iwas 1due to technicians valving in level transmitter 821-LT-R009B. The
                          technicians were . doing a calibration per Loop Calibration ' Instruction
                          07-S-53-B21-2 which did not specify the method to valve the instrument back
                          in service. . They correctly went to General ' Maintenance Instruction (GMI)
                          07 S-13-1 which was to be utilized anytime a specific valve sequence was not
                          specified in a~ procedure.- The' licensee was aware of the problem of pressure,
                          transients affecting other rea~ctor vessel water level instruments utilizing
                          the same reference leg when' valving in water level instruments per            *
                          GMI 07-5-13-1 but had failed to ' correct 07-S-53-B21-2. The failure to
                          correct 07-S-53-B21-2 resulted in an inadequate procedure which caused an
                          inadvertent ESF' actuation and is a violation (50-416/85-06-01).
                          In IE Report 50-416/85-02, paragraph 12, the licensee had committed to
'
                          review all Design Change Packages (DCPs) and Design Change Requests (DCRs)
'
                          applicable. to safety related equipment by February 28, 1985, to ensure no
    '
                          other DCPs or DCRs were misidentified as non-safety related. This was
                          tracked as IFI 50-416/85-02-04. The licensee is now in an extended outage
                          due'to condenser leakage problems and the inspectors agreed to revising the
                          above commitment to prior to startup from the current outage. Region II
,
                        management concurred in the revised date.
              '
[                    - The inspectors reviewed Administrative Procedure (AP) 01-S-06-26, Rev. 3,
:
                          Post Trip Analysis, for completeness to ascertain the proper functioning of
L                        safety related and other important equipment prior to restart. The
!                        inspector had questions concerning certain equipment, i.e., division 3
                        diesel generator, ' division 3 standby service water, and also the inspectors
                          questioned -the post- trip documentation adequacy. The licensee is presently
                          revising AP 01-S-06-26. This will be an Unresolved Item pending review of
 
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p              .
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        .
                                                              8
                        the ~ revi sed ! document. ~ This area of concern is addressed in Generic Letter
  .
                  '
                      ~ 83-28 which has not been inspected at this facility.    (50-416/85-06-03)
                '12.    Bulletins
                        Closed IE8 81-01, Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers-
                        The . licensee submitted responses to IEB 81-01 for Grand Gulf 1 to NRC-
                        Region'II in letters dated May 1,1981, October ~27,1981, April 21,1982,-
                        June 4, 1982, August ~ 10, 1984, and September 25, 1984.' The May 1 and
    ,                L0ctober 27,1981 letters contained schedules for completion of inspections
                        required by IEB 81-01. _ The April 21, 1982 letter summarized'the results of >
                        the inspection of mechanical -snubber installed onsite and further stated
                        that no INC snubbers had been installed in Unit 1. The letter-stated that
                        six snubbers had recorded conditions characterized as. excessive noise during
                        stroking or above average force to complete stroke. The June 4, 1982 letter
                        slightly amended the. section of the April 21, 1982 letter pertaining to
                        results of. inspections of mechanical snubbers.
  .
                        On August 10, 1984, the licensee submitted the results of tests performed on
                        the six ' problems- snubbers discussed in the April 21, 1982 letter. Four of
                        these snubbers were tested and found satisfactory. The remaining two were
                        found to be marginal. However, these two snubbers were sent to~PSA, the
                        vendor, for additional testing. -The results of the PSA tests were
                        summarized in the September 25, 1984 letter. These snubbers were tested and-
                        found to be satisfactory by PSA. 'The results of . the licensee'.s preservice
                        snubber inspection / testing program were inspected by the NRC Region II staff
            '
                        on April 30 to May 4,1984, Report Number 50-416/84-15, anti July 16-20,
              *
                      -1984, Report Number. 50-416/84-29.      Based on these inspections, and .the
                      . Region II staff's review of the Itcensee's responses, IEB 81-01 is closed.
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L.
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