NRC Generic Letter 1980-06: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 03/13/1980
| issue date = 03/13/1980
| title = NRC Generic Letter 1980-006: Transmittal of IE Bulletin 1980-006, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls
| title = NRC Generic Letter 1980-006: Transmittal of IE Bulletin 1980-006, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls
| author name = Keppler J G
| author name = Keppler J
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 15: Line 15:
| page count = 5
| page count = 5
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:CENTRAL FILI MAR 3 180 Docket No. 50-305 Wisconsin Public Service Corporation ATTN: Mr. E. R. Mathews Vice President Power Supply and Engineering P. 0. Box 1200 Green Bay, WI 54305 Gentlemen:
{{#Wiki_filter:CENTRAL FILI
The enclosed Bulletin 80-06 is forwarded to you for action. A written response is required.
                                MAR 3 180
Docket No. 50-305 Wisconsin Public Service Corporation ATTN: Mr. E. R. Mathews Vice President Power Supply and Engineering P. 0. Box 1200
Green Bay, WI 54305 Gentlemen:
      The enclosed Bulletin 80-06 is forwarded to you for action. A
written response is required.  If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.


If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.Sincerely, James G. Keppler Director Enclosure:  
Sincerely, James G. Keppler Director Enclosure: IE Bulletin No. 80-06 cc w/encl:
IE Bulletin No. 80-06 cc w/encl: D. C. Hintz, Plant Superintendent Mr. W. Sayles, Chief Engineer Central Files Director, NRR/DPM Director, NRR/DOR PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC RIII RIIj qBA(Heisgian/jp  
D. C. Hintz, Plant Superintendent Mr. W. Sayles, Chief Engineer Central Files Director, NRR/DPM
9p pler 3/13/80 8003266 014.
Director, NRR/DOR
PDR
Local PDR
NSIC
TIC
RIII           RIIj qBA(
Heisgian/jp     9p pler
3/13/80
                                                                8003266 014.


SSINS: 6820 Accession No.: 8002280639 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY  
SSINS: 6820
COMMISSION
                                                                  Accession No.:
OFFICE OF INSPECTION  
                                UNITED STATES                   8002280639 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
AND ENFORCEMENT
                    OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 13, 1980 IE Bulletin No. 80-06 ENGINEERED  
                            WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 13, 1980
SAFETY FEATURE (ESF) RESET CONTROLS  
                                                      IE Bulletin No. 80-06 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (ESF) RESET CONTROLS


==Description of Circumstances==
==Description of Circumstances==
:
:
On November 7, 1979, Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) reported that following initiation of Safety Injection (SI) at North Anna Power Station Unit 1, the use of the SI Reset pushbuttons alone resulted in certain ventila-tion dampers changing position from their safety or emergency mode to their normal mode. Further investigation by VEPCO and the architect-engineer resulted in discovery of circuitry which similarly affected components actuated by a Containment Depressurization Actuation (CDA, activated on Hi-Hi Containment Pressure).  
On November 7, 1979, Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) reported that following initiation of Safety Injection (SI) at North Anna Power Station Unit 1, the use of the SI Reset pushbuttons alone resulted in certain ventila- tion dampers changing position from their safety or emergency mode to their normal mode. Further investigation by VEPCO and the architect-engineer resulted in discovery of circuitry which similarly affected components actuated by a Containment Depressurization Actuation (CDA, activated on Hi-Hi Containment Pressure). The circuits in question are listed below:
The circuits in question are listed below: Component/System Problem Outside/Inside Recirculation Spray Pump Motors Pressurized Control Room Ventilation Isolation Dampers Safeguards Area Filter Dampers Containment Recirculation Cooler Fans Service Water Supply and Discharge Valves to Containment Service Water Radiation Monitoring Sample Pumps Main Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust Isolation Valves to the Containment Pump motors will not start after actuation if CDA Reset is depressed prior to starting timer running out (approx. 3 minutes)Dampers will open on SI Reset Dampers reposition to bypass filters when CDA Reset is depressed Fans will restart when CDA Reset is depressed If service water is being used as the cooling medium prior to CDA actuation, valves will reopen upon depressing CDA reset Pumps will not start after actuation if CDA reset is depressed prior to motor starting timers running out After receiving a high radiation monitor alarm on the air ejector exhaust, SI actuation would shut these valves and depressing SI Reset would reopen them IE Bulletin No. 80-06 March 13, 1980 Review of circuitry for ventilation dampers, motors, and valves reported by VEPCO resulted in discovery of similar designs in ESF-actuated components at Surry Unit 1 and Beaver Valley; where it has been found that certain equipment would return to its normal mode following the reset of an ESF signal; thus, protective actions of the affected systems could be compromised once the associated actuation signal is reset. These two plants had Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation for the architect-engineer as did the North Anna Units.The Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation and VEPCO are preparing design changes to preclude safety-related equipment from moving out of its emergency mode upon reset of an Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS).This corrective action has been found acceptable by the NRC, in that, upon reset of ESFAS, all affected equipment remains in its emergency mode.The NRC has performed reviews of selected areas of ESFAS reset action on PWR facilities and, in some cases, this review was limited to examination of logic diagrams and procedures.
            Component/System                             Problem Outside/Inside Recirculation Spray     Pump motors will not start after Pump Motors                            actuation if CDA Reset is depressed prior to starting timer running out (approx. 3 minutes)
    Pressurized Control Room                Dampers will open on SI Reset Ventilation Isolation Dampers Safeguards Area Filter Dampers          Dampers reposition to bypass filters when CDA Reset is depressed Containment Recirculation Cooler        Fans will restart when CDA Reset Fans                                    is depressed Service Water Supply and Discharge      If service water is being used as Valves to Containment                  the cooling medium prior to CDA
                                            actuation, valves will reopen upon depressing CDA reset Service Water Radiation Monitoring      Pumps will not start after Sample Pumps                            actuation if CDA reset is depressed prior to motor starting timers running out Main Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust      After receiving a high radiation Isolation Valves to the Containment    monitor alarm on the air ejector exhaust, SI actuation would shut these valves and depressing SI Reset would reopen them


It has been determined that logic diagrams may not adequately reflect as-built conditions;
IE Bulletin No. 80-06                                        March 13, 1980 Review of circuitry for ventilation dampers, motors, and valves reported by VEPCO resulted in discovery of similar designs in ESF-actuated components at Surry Unit 1 and Beaver Valley; where it has been found that certain equipment would return to its normal mode following the reset of an ESF signal; thus, protective actions of the affected systems could be compromised once the associated actuation signal is reset. These two plants had Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation for the architect-engineer as did the North Anna Units.
therefore, the requested review of drawings must be done at the schematic/elementary diagram level.There have been several communications to licensees from the NRC on ESF reset actions. For example, some of these communications have been in the form of Generic Letters issued in November, 1978 and October, 1979 on containment venting and purging during normal operation.


Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins Nos. 79-05, 05A, 05B, 06A, 06B and 08 that addressed the events at TMI-2 and NUREG-0578, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations.
The Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation and VEPCO are preparing design changes to preclude safety-related equipment from moving out of its emergency mode upon reset of an Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS).
This corrective action has been found acceptable by the NRC, in that, upon reset of ESFAS, all affected equipment remains in its emergency mode.


However, each of these communications has addressed only a limited area of the ESF's. We are requesting that the reviews undertaken for this Bulletin address all of the ESF's.Actions To Be Taken By Licensees:
The NRC has performed reviews of selected areas of ESFAS reset action on PWR
For all PWR and BWR facilities with operating licenses: 1. Review the drawings for all systems serving safety-related functions at the schematic level to determine whether or not upon the reset of an ESF actuation signal, all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode.2. Verify the actual installed instrumentation and controls at the facility are consistent with the schematics reviewed in Item 1 above by conducting a test to demonstrate that all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of the actuating signal and/or manual resetting of the various isolating or actuation signals. Provide a schedule for the performance of the testing in your response to this Bulletin.3. If any safety-related equipment does not remain in its emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal at your facility, describe proposed system modification, design change, or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem.
facilities and, in some cases, this review was limited to examination of logic diagrams and procedures. It has been determined that logic diagrams may not adequately reflect as-built conditions; therefore, the requested review of drawings must be done at the schematic/elementary diagram level.


IE Bulletin No. 80-06 March 13, 1980 4. Report in writing within 90 days, the results of your review and include a list of all devices which respond as discussed in item 3 above, actions taken or planned to assure adequate equipment control, and a schedule for implementation of corrective action. This information is requested under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f).
There have been several communications to licensees from the NRC on ESF reset actions. For example, some of these communications have been in the form of Generic Letters issued in November, 1978 and October, 1979 on containment venting and purging during normal operation. Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins Nos. 79-05, 05A, 05B, 06A, 06B and 08 that addressed the events at TMI-2 and NUREG-0578, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations. However, each of these communications has addressed only a limited area of the ESF's. We are requesting that the reviews undertaken for this Bulletin address all of the ESF's.
Accordingly, you are requested to provide within the time period specified above, written statements of the above information, signed under oath or affirmation.


Reports shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy shall be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, D.C. 20555.For all power reactor facilities with a construction permit, this Bulletin is for information only and no written response is required.Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
Actions To Be Taken By Licensees:
For all PWR and BWR facilities with operating licenses:
1.    Review the drawings for all systems serving safety-related functions at the schematic level to determine whether or not upon the reset of an ESF
      actuation signal, all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode.


1E Bulletin No. 80-06 March 13, 1980 Enclosure RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin No.80-05 Subject Vacuum Condition Resulting In Damage To Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) Holdup Tanks Date Issued 3/10/80 IssuejiTo All PWR power reactor facilities holding OLs and to those with a CP 79-01B 80-04 80-03 80-02 80-01 79-OB 79-28 79-27 79-26 Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment Analysis of a PWR Main Steam Line Break With Continued Feedwater Addition Loss of Charcoal From Standard Type II, 2 Inch, Tray Adsorber Cells Inadequate Quality Assurance for Nuclear Operability of ADS Valve Pneumatic Supply Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment Possible Malfunction of Namco Model EA 180 Limit Switches at Elevated Temperatures Loss Of Non-Class-1-E
2.  Verify the actual installed instrumentation and controls at the facility are consistent with the schematics reviewed in Item 1 above by conducting a test to demonstrate that all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of the actuating signal and/or manual resetting of the various isolating or actuation signals. Provide a schedule for the performance of the testing in your response to this Bulletin.
Instrumentation and Control Power System Bus During Operation Boron Loss From BWR Control Blades Failures of Westinghouse BFD Relays In Safety-Related Systems 2/29/80 2/8/80 2/6/80 1/21/80 1/11/80 1/14/80 12/7/79 11/30/79 11/20/79 11/2/79 All power reactor facilities with an OL All PWR reactor facilities holding OLs and to those nearing licensing All holders of Power Reactor OLs and CPs All BWR licenses with a CP or OL All BWR power reactor facilities with and OL All power reactor facilities with an OL All power reactor facilities with an OL or a CP All power reactor facilities holding OLs and to those nearing licensing All BWR power reactor facilities with an OL All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP 79-25}}
 
3.    If any safety-related equipment does not remain in its emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal at your facility, describe proposed system modification, design change, or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem.
 
IE Bulletin No. 80-06                                      March 13, 1980 4.    Report in writing within 90 days, the results of your review and include a list of all devices which respond as discussed in item 3 above, actions taken or planned to assure adequate equipment control, and a schedule for implementation of corrective action. This information is requested under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f). Accordingly, you are requested to provide within the time period specified above, written statements of the above information, signed under oath or affirmation. Reports shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy shall be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, D.C. 20555.
 
For all power reactor facilities with a construction permit, this Bulletin is for information only and no written response is required.
 
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
 
1E Bulletin No. 80-06                                           Enclosure March 13, 1980
                                  RECENTLY ISSUED
                                  IE BULLETINS
Bulletin       Subject                      Date Issued IssuejiTo No.
 
80-05         Vacuum Condition Resulting     3/10/80    All PWR power reactor In Damage To Chemical Volume             facilities holding Control System (CVCS) Holdup             OLs and to those with Tanks                                    a CP
79-01B         Environmental Qualification   2/29/80    All power reactor of Class IE Equipment                     facilities with an OL
80-04          Analysis of a PWR Main         2/8/80    All PWR reactor facilities Steam Line Break With                     holding OLs and to those Continued Feedwater                       nearing licensing Addition
80-03          Loss of Charcoal From         2/6/80    All holders of Power Standard Type II, 2 Inch,                 Reactor OLs and CPs Tray Adsorber Cells
80-02          Inadequate Quality             1/21/80    All BWR licenses with Assurance for Nuclear                     a CP or OL
80-01          Operability of ADS Valve       1/11/80    All BWR power reactor Pneumatic Supply                         facilities with and OL
79-OB          Environmental Qualification   1/14/80    All power reactor of Class IE Equipment                     facilities with an OL
79-28          Possible Malfunction of       12/7/79    All power reactor Namco Model EA 180 Limit                 facilities with an Switches at Elevated                     OL or a CP
              Temperatures
79-27          Loss Of Non-Class-1-E         11/30/79  All power reactor Instrumentation and                       facilities holding Control Power System Bus                 OLs and to those During Operation                         nearing licensing
79-26          Boron Loss From BWR           11/20/79   All BWR power reactor Control Blades                            facilities with an OL
79-25          Failures of Westinghouse      11/2/79    All power reactor BFD Relays In Safety-Related              facilities with an Systems                                  OL or CP}}


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Latest revision as of 01:52, 24 November 2019

NRC Generic Letter 1980-006: Transmittal of IE Bulletin 1980-006, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls
ML031350334
Person / Time
Site: Kewaunee Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 03/13/1980
From: James Keppler
NRC/RGN-III
To:
References
BL-80-006 GL-80-025, NUDOCS 8003260421
Download: ML031350334 (5)
v • d • e


CENTRAL FILI

MAR 3 180

Docket No. 50-305 Wisconsin Public Service Corporation ATTN: Mr. E. R. Mathews Vice President Power Supply and Engineering P. 0. Box 1200

Green Bay, WI 54305 Gentlemen:

The enclosed Bulletin 80-06 is forwarded to you for action. A

written response is required. If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely, James G. Keppler Director Enclosure: IE Bulletin No. 80-06 cc w/encl:

D. C. Hintz, Plant Superintendent Mr. W. Sayles, Chief Engineer Central Files Director, NRR/DPM

Director, NRR/DOR

PDR

Local PDR

NSIC

TIC

RIII RIIj qBA(

Heisgian/jp 9p pler

3/13/80

8003266 014.

SSINS: 6820

Accession No.:

UNITED STATES 8002280639 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 13, 1980

IE Bulletin No. 80-06 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (ESF) RESET CONTROLS

Description of Circumstances

On November 7, 1979, Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) reported that following initiation of Safety Injection (SI) at North Anna Power Station Unit 1, the use of the SI Reset pushbuttons alone resulted in certain ventila- tion dampers changing position from their safety or emergency mode to their normal mode. Further investigation by VEPCO and the architect-engineer resulted in discovery of circuitry which similarly affected components actuated by a Containment Depressurization Actuation (CDA, activated on Hi-Hi Containment Pressure). The circuits in question are listed below:

Component/System Problem Outside/Inside Recirculation Spray Pump motors will not start after Pump Motors actuation if CDA Reset is depressed prior to starting timer running out (approx. 3 minutes)

Pressurized Control Room Dampers will open on SI Reset Ventilation Isolation Dampers Safeguards Area Filter Dampers Dampers reposition to bypass filters when CDA Reset is depressed Containment Recirculation Cooler Fans will restart when CDA Reset Fans is depressed Service Water Supply and Discharge If service water is being used as Valves to Containment the cooling medium prior to CDA

actuation, valves will reopen upon depressing CDA reset Service Water Radiation Monitoring Pumps will not start after Sample Pumps actuation if CDA reset is depressed prior to motor starting timers running out Main Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust After receiving a high radiation Isolation Valves to the Containment monitor alarm on the air ejector exhaust, SI actuation would shut these valves and depressing SI Reset would reopen them

IE Bulletin No. 80-06 March 13, 1980 Review of circuitry for ventilation dampers, motors, and valves reported by VEPCO resulted in discovery of similar designs in ESF-actuated components at Surry Unit 1 and Beaver Valley; where it has been found that certain equipment would return to its normal mode following the reset of an ESF signal; thus, protective actions of the affected systems could be compromised once the associated actuation signal is reset. These two plants had Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation for the architect-engineer as did the North Anna Units.

The Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation and VEPCO are preparing design changes to preclude safety-related equipment from moving out of its emergency mode upon reset of an Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS).

This corrective action has been found acceptable by the NRC, in that, upon reset of ESFAS, all affected equipment remains in its emergency mode.

The NRC has performed reviews of selected areas of ESFAS reset action on PWR

facilities and, in some cases, this review was limited to examination of logic diagrams and procedures. It has been determined that logic diagrams may not adequately reflect as-built conditions; therefore, the requested review of drawings must be done at the schematic/elementary diagram level.

There have been several communications to licensees from the NRC on ESF reset actions. For example, some of these communications have been in the form of Generic Letters issued in November, 1978 and October, 1979 on containment venting and purging during normal operation. Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins Nos. 79-05, 05A, 05B, 06A, 06B and 08 that addressed the events at TMI-2 and NUREG-0578, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations. However, each of these communications has addressed only a limited area of the ESF's. We are requesting that the reviews undertaken for this Bulletin address all of the ESF's.

Actions To Be Taken By Licensees:

For all PWR and BWR facilities with operating licenses:

1. Review the drawings for all systems serving safety-related functions at the schematic level to determine whether or not upon the reset of an ESF

actuation signal, all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode.

2. Verify the actual installed instrumentation and controls at the facility are consistent with the schematics reviewed in Item 1 above by conducting a test to demonstrate that all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of the actuating signal and/or manual resetting of the various isolating or actuation signals. Provide a schedule for the performance of the testing in your response to this Bulletin.

3. If any safety-related equipment does not remain in its emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal at your facility, describe proposed system modification, design change, or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem.

IE Bulletin No. 80-06 March 13, 1980 4. Report in writing within 90 days, the results of your review and include a list of all devices which respond as discussed in item 3 above, actions taken or planned to assure adequate equipment control, and a schedule for implementation of corrective action. This information is requested under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f). Accordingly, you are requested to provide within the time period specified above, written statements of the above information, signed under oath or affirmation. Reports shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy shall be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, D.C. 20555.

For all power reactor facilities with a construction permit, this Bulletin is for information only and no written response is required.

Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.

1E Bulletin No. 80-06 Enclosure March 13, 1980

RECENTLY ISSUED

IE BULLETINS

Bulletin Subject Date Issued IssuejiTo No.

80-05 Vacuum Condition Resulting 3/10/80 All PWR power reactor In Damage To Chemical Volume facilities holding Control System (CVCS) Holdup OLs and to those with Tanks a CP

79-01B Environmental Qualification 2/29/80 All power reactor of Class IE Equipment facilities with an OL

80-04 Analysis of a PWR Main 2/8/80 All PWR reactor facilities Steam Line Break With holding OLs and to those Continued Feedwater nearing licensing Addition

80-03 Loss of Charcoal From 2/6/80 All holders of Power Standard Type II, 2 Inch, Reactor OLs and CPs Tray Adsorber Cells

80-02 Inadequate Quality 1/21/80 All BWR licenses with Assurance for Nuclear a CP or OL

80-01 Operability of ADS Valve 1/11/80 All BWR power reactor Pneumatic Supply facilities with and OL

79-OB Environmental Qualification 1/14/80 All power reactor of Class IE Equipment facilities with an OL

79-28 Possible Malfunction of 12/7/79 All power reactor Namco Model EA 180 Limit facilities with an Switches at Elevated OL or a CP

Temperatures

79-27 Loss Of Non-Class-1-E 11/30/79 All power reactor Instrumentation and facilities holding Control Power System Bus OLs and to those During Operation nearing licensing

79-26 Boron Loss From BWR 11/20/79 All BWR power reactor Control Blades facilities with an OL

79-25 Failures of Westinghouse 11/2/79 All power reactor BFD Relays In Safety-Related facilities with an Systems OL or CP

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