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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000443/2013005]]
| number = ML14030A509
| issue date = 01/30/2014
| title = IR 05000443-13-005; 10/01/2013 - 12/31/2013; Seabrook Station, Unit 1, Routine Integrated Inspection Report
| author name = Dentel G
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB3
| addressee name = Walsh K
| addressee affiliation = NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC
| docket = 05000443
| license number = NPF-086
| contact person = DENTEL, GT
| document report number = IR-13-005
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter
| page count = 34
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000443/2013005]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
                                        NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                                      REGION I
                                      2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100
                                    KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-2713
                                        January 30, 2014
Mr. Kevin Walsh
Site Vice President
Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant
NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC
c/o Mr. Michael Ossing
P.O. Box 300
Seabrook, NH 03874
SUBJECT:        SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
                REPORT 05000443/2013005
Dear Mr. Walsh:
On December 31, 2013, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the
inspection results, which were discussed on January 17, 2014, with you and other members of
your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection no findings of significance were identified. However, a
licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed
in Section 40A7 of this report. If you contest this non-cited violation, you should provide a
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-
0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region I, the Director, Office of Enforcement,
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC
Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station.
As a result of the Safety Culture Common Language Initiative, the terminology and coding of
cross-cutting aspects were revised beginning in calendar year (CY) 2014. New cross-cutting
aspects identified in CY 2014 will be coded under the latest revision to IMC 0310. Cross-cutting
aspects identified in the last six months of 2013 using the previous terminology will be converted
to the latest revision in accordance with the cross-reference in IMC 0310. The revised cross-
cutting aspects will be evaluated for cross-cutting themes and potential substantive cross-
cutting issues in accordance with IMC 0305 starting with the CY 2014 mid-cycle assessment
review.
 
K. Walsh                                          2
In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections,
Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,
its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection
in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)
component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
(the Public Electronic Reading Room).
                                                      Sincerely,
                                                      /RA/
                                                      Glenn T. Dentel, Chief
                                                      Reactor Projects Branch 3
                                                      Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-443
License No: NPF-86
Enclosure:      Inspection Report No. 05000443/2013005
                w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl:      Distribution via ListServ
 
 
ML14030A509
                                          Non-Sensitive                            Publicly Available
    SUNSI Review
                                          Sensitive                                Non-Publicly Available
OFFICE        RI/DRP              RI/DRP
NAME mmt      PCataldo/PC          GDentel/ GTD
DATE          01/29/14            01/ 30/ 14
                                           
                                      1
              U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                  REGION I
Docket No.:  50-443
License No.: NPF-86
Report No.:  05000443/2013005
Licensee:    NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC
Facility:    Seabrook Station, Unit No.1
Location:    Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874
Dates:      October 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013
Inspectors:  P. Cataldo, Senior Resident Inspector
            C. Newport, Resident Inspector
            W. Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst
            B. Dionne, Senior Health Physicist
            J. Gilliam, Acting Resident Inspector
            D. Silk, Senior Operations Engineer
Approved by: Glenn T. Dentel, Chief
            Reactor Projects Branch 3
            Division of Reactor Projects
                                                      Enclosure
 
                                                              2
                                            TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................ 3
REPORT DETAILS .................................................................................................................... 4
1.  REACTOR SAFETY ........................................................................................................... 4
  1R01  Adverse Weather Protection .................................................................................... 4
  1R04  Equipment Alignment ............................................................................................... 5
  1R05  Fire Protection .......................................................................................................... 6
  1R06  Flood Protection Measures ...................................................................................... 6
  1R07  Heat Sink Performance ........................................................................................... 6
  1R11  Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................................ 7
  1R12  Maintenance Effectiveness ...................................................................................... 9
  1R13  Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .................................10
  1R15  Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments ....................................10
  1R18  Plant Modifications .................................................................................................11
  1R19  Post-Maintenance Testing ......................................................................................12
  1R22  Surveillance Testing ...............................................................................................12
  1EP6  Drill Evaluation .......................................................................................................13
2.  RADIATION SAFETY.........................................................................................................13
  2RS6  Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment ...............................................13
  2RS7  Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program .....................................................14
4.  OTHER ACTIVITIES ..........................................................................................................15
  4OA1  Performance Indicator Verification ..........................................................................15
  4OA2  Problem Identification and Resolution .....................................................................17
  4OA5  Other Activities ........................................................................................................20
  4OA6  Meetings, Including Exit ...........................................................................................21
  4OA7  Licensee-Identified Violation ....................................................................................21
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION...............................................................22
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION....................................................................................... A-1
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT .................................................................................................. A-1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED .................................... A-1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED....................................................................................... A-1
LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................. A-9
                                                                                                                          Enclosure
 
                                                  3
                                            SUMMARY
IR 05000443/2013005; 10/01/2013-12/31/2013; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1, Routine
Integrated Inspection Report.
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
inspections performed by regional inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe
operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor
Oversight Process, Revision 4.
No findings were identified.
Other Findings
A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by NextEra was reviewed by the
inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by NextEra have been entered into NextEras
corrective action program (CAP). This violation and corrective action tracking number are listed
in Section 4OA7 of this report.
                                                                                        Enclosure
 
                                                  4
                                          REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Seabrook operated at full power for the entire assessment period, with the exception of minor
down powers to perform scheduled turbine valve testing. Documents reviewed for each section
of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.
1.      REACTOR SAFETY
        Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 3 samples)
.1      Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
    a. Inspection Scope
        The inspectors performed a review of NextEras readiness for the onset of seasonal cold
        temperatures on November 18, 2013. The review focused on the emergency feedwater
        pump house, turbine building, and the service water (SW) cooling tower. The inspectors
        reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications
        (TSs), the seasonal readiness memorandum, and the corrective action program (CAP)
        to determine specific temperatures or other seasonal weather that could challenge these
        systems, and to ensure NextEra personnel had adequately prepared for these
        challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including NextEras seasonal
        weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors
        performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified
        issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during cold weather
        conditions.
    b. Findings
        No findings were identified.
.2      External Flooding
    a. Inspection Scope
        During the week of December 16, 2013, the inspectors performed an inspection of
        selected external flood protection measures for Seabrook Station. The inspectors
        reviewed TSs, procedures, design documents, and the UFSAR, which depicted the
        design flood levels and protection areas containing safety-related equipment to identify
        areas that may be affected by external flooding. The inspectors conducted a general
        site walkdown of external areas of the plant, including the diesel generator building,
        turbine building, and primary auxiliary building, to ensure that NextEras flood protection
        measures were in accordance with design specifications. The inspectors also reviewed
        operating procedures for mitigating external flooding during severe weather to determine
        if NextEra had established adequate measures to protect against external flooding
        events.
                                                                                          Enclosure
 
                                                5
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.3    Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed NextEras preparations for the onset of cold weather and high
      winds on November 26, 2013. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of adverse
      weather preparation procedures before the onset of and during this adverse weather
      condition. The inspectors walked down the emergency feedwater pump house and the
      SW cooling tower to ensure system availability. The inspectors verified that operator
      actions defined in NextEras adverse weather procedure maintained the readiness of
      essential systems. The inspectors discussed readiness and staff availability for adverse
      weather response with operations and work control personnel.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1    Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 4 samples)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:
        Equipment alignment of Vital Bus 11A while 11B was cross-tied to battery D and
          battery B was out of service on October 2, 2013
        B residual heat removal (RHR) return to service (RTS) on November 27, 2013
        A emergency diesel generator (EDG) jacket water heat exchanger SW outlet valve
          RTS on December 11, 2013
        A SW during replacement of the C SW pump motor on December 13, 2013
      The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the
      reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed
      applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, TSs, work orders
      (WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant
      trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system
      performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field
      walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and
      support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined
      the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of
      equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed
      whether NextEra staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into
      the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance
      characterization.
                                                                                      Enclosure
 
                                                6
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
      Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 2 samples)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material
      condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that
      NextEra controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with
      administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression
      equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire
      barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that
      station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or
      inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures.
        'A' EDG DG-F-1A-A, DG-F-2A-A, DG-F-3E-A, DG-F-3C-A, DG-F-3A-Z on
          November 14, 2013
        Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) F-1A-Z 7'/-6'/-26' on November 20, 2013
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - 1 sample)
      Internal Flooding Review
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, the site flooding analysis, and plant procedures to
      assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding. The inspectors also reviewed the CAP
      to determine if NextEra identified and corrected flooding problems and whether operator
      actions for coping with flooding were adequate. The inspectors focused on the internal
      tank farm area of the PAB to verify the adequacy of equipment seals located below the
      flood line, floor and water penetration seals, common drain lines and sumps, sump
      pumps, level alarms, control circuits, and temporary or removable flood barriers.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A - 1 sample)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the A EDG jacket water heat exchanger to determine its
      readiness and availability to perform its safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the
      design basis for the component and verified NextEras commitments to NRC Generic
      Letter 89-13. The inspectors observed actual performance tests for the heat exchangers
      and/or reviewed the results of previous inspections of the A EDG jacket water and
      similar heat exchangers. The inspectors discussed the results of the most recent
                                                                                      Enclosure
 
                                                7
      inspection with engineering staff and reviewed pictures of the as-found and as-left
      conditions. The inspectors verified that NextEra initiated appropriate corrective actions
      for identified deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the number of tubes plugged
      within the heat exchanger did not exceed the maximum amount allowed.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11 - 3 samples)
.1    Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on October 23, 2013,
      which included simulated degraded equipment and subsequent equipment failures that
      resulted in escalating degraded plant conditions that ensured implementation of
      emergency operating procedures by the operating crew, as well as implementation of
      the emergency plan. This emergency plan implementation included classification of
      specific events that warranted an Alert Event Declaration. The inspectors evaluated
      operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk
      significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating
      procedures. The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications,
      implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the
      oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified
      the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager
      and the technical specification action statements entered by the control room supervisor.
      Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify
      and document crew performance problems.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2    Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors observed general control room activities, including alarm response and
      control room shift turnovers, conducted on November 9, 2013 and December 23, 2013.
      Additionally, the inspectors observed monthly surveillance testing of the B EDG
      conducted on November 12, 2013 and December 23, 2013. The inspectors observed
      test performance to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and coordination of
      activities between work groups similarly met established expectations and standards.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
                                                                                        Enclosure
 
                                                8
.3    Licensed Operator Requalification Biennial Review
  a. Inspection Scope
      The following inspection activities were performed using NUREG-1021, Operator
      Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 9, Supplement 1, and
      Inspection Procedure Attachment 71111.11B, Licensed Operator Requalification
      Program.
      Examination Results
      The operating tests for the weeks of October 21, 2013 and October 28, 2013 were
      reviewed for quality and performance.
      On December 6, 2013 the results of the annual operating tests were reviewed to
      determine if pass fail rates were consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1021,
      "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9,
      Supplement 1, and NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, Operator Requalification
      Human Performance Significance Determination Process. The review verified that
      the failure rate (individual or crew) did not exceed 20%.
        1 out of 53 operators failed at least one section of the Annual Examination. The
          overall individual failure rate was 1.9%.
        0 out of 9 crews failed the simulator test. The crew failure rate was 0.0%.
      Written Examination Quality
      The inspectors reviewed two written examinations that were administered during the
      weeks of October 21 and 28, 2013, for qualitative and quantitative attributes as specified
      in Appendix B of Attachment 71111.11B, Licensed Operator Requalification.
      Operating Test Quality
      Twenty-two job performance measures (JPMs) and six scenarios were reviewed for
      qualitative and quantitative attributes as specified in Appendix C of 71111.11B,
      Licensed Operator Requalification Program.
      Licensee Administration of Operating Tests
      The dynamic simulator examinations and JPMs administered during the week of October
      28, 2013, were observed. These observations included facility evaluations of Shift Crew
      A and Staff Crew 1 during three dynamic simulator examinations and individual
      performance of five JPMs.
      Examination Security
      The inspector assessed whether facility staff properly safeguarded examination material.
      JPMs, scenarios, and written examinations were checked for excessive overlap of test
      items.
                                                                                      Enclosure
 
                                                9
      Remedial Training and Re-Examinations
      The remediation plans for one crew failure and one individual JPM failure from the 2011
      requalification examination were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of the remedial
      training.
      Conformance with Operator License Conditions
      Medical records for ten license holders were reviewed to assess conformance with
      license conditions.
      Proficiency watch standing records were reviewed for the third quarter of 2013.
      The reactivation plans for five senior reactor operator license holders and three reactor
      operator license holders were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of the reactivation
      process.
      Simulator Performance
      Simulator performance and fidelity was reviewed for conformance to the reference plant
      control room. A simulator deficiency report was also reviewed to ensure facility staff
      addressed identified modeling problems. Simulator test documentation was also
      reviewed.
      Problem Identification and Resolution
      A review was conducted of recent operating history documentation found in inspection
      reports, NextEras CAP, and the most recent NRC plant issues matrix. The inspectors
      also reviewed specific events from the CAP which indicated possible training
      deficiencies, to verify that they had been appropriately addressed. The senior resident
      inspector was consulted for insights regarding licensed operators performance.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12 - 3 samples)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of
      maintenance activities on structure, system, or component (SSC) performance and
      reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, CAP documents,
      maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule (MR) basis documents to ensure that
      NextEra was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope
      of the MR. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly
      scoped into the MR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2)
      performance criteria established by NextEra staff was reasonable. As applicable, for
      SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective
      actions to return these SSCs to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that NextEra
      staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and
      across MR system boundaries.
                                                                                      Enclosure
 
                                              10
        Chemical and volume control system
        Evaluation of stroke time changes on EDG SW heat exchanger outlet isolation valve,
          SW-V-16
        Evaluation of EDG entry fire door latch failures
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 4 samples)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the
      maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that NextEra performed
      the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors
      selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety
      cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that NextEra
      personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the
      assessments were accurate and complete. When NextEra performed emergent work,
      the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant
      risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results
      of the assessment with the stations probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions
      were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the TS
      requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to
      verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.
          Battery cross-tie on October 7, 2013
          B RHR pump slave relay testing on November 26, 2013
          Chemical volume and control system surveillance testing and SW system
          maintenance on December 10, 2013
          Safety Bus 5 degraded voltage relay testing and charging system maintenance on
          December 13, 2013
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 - 4 samples)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-
      conforming conditions:
        Operability of 1B 125 VDC battery on October 3, 2012
        Cooling tower SW pump P-110A oil fill cap found ajar on October 22, 2013
        Refueling water storage tank aligned to a not fully qualified seismic pipe on
          November 8, 2013
        SW-P-41A in-service test flow band incorrect on November 13, 2013
                                                                                        Enclosure
 
                                              11
      The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated
      components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the
      operability determinations to assess whether technical specification operability was
      properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that
      no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability
      and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to NextEras
      evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where
      compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors
      determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were
      properly controlled by NextEra. The inspectors determined, where appropriate,
      compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 4 samples)
.1    Temporary Modifications
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications listed below to determine whether
      the modifications affected the safety functions of systems that are important to safety.
      The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 documentation and post-modification testing
      results, as applicable, and conducted field walkdowns of the modifications to verify that
      the temporary modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and
      performance capability of the affected systems.
        1-RC-TB-451 temporary setpoint change for a pressurizer low temperature alarm
        Engineering change (EC) 278785, SW pipe support modification in support of OR16
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2    Permanent Modifications
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors evaluated the permanent modifications listed below, and verified that the
      design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems were
      not degraded by the modifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed applicable
      modification documents, including associated engineering changes, correspondence
      with the vendor, industry operating experience, environmental and seismic qualifications,
      as well as the 10 CFR 50.59 documentation and post-modification testing results, as
      applicable.
        EC 274301, Emergency Power System power supply overvoltage protection
        EC 271074, replacement of GE synchronization check relay
                                                                                      Enclosure
 
                                                12
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 5 samples)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities
      listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability
      and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the
      procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the
      maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with
      the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and
      that the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also
      witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately
      demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.
          1-RH-FCV-618 positioner replacement on October 16, 2013
          Loop B SW basin level indicator calibration on October 31, 2013
          1C battery charger maintenance and RTS on November 22, 2013
          A EDG SW heat exchanger isolation valve maintenance on November 22, 2013
          Primary air handler damper actuator rebuild on November 26, 2013
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 2 samples)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of
      selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR,
      and NextEra procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance
      criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with
      design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and
      accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test
      prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether
      the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety
      functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:
          A SW discharge valve quarterly in-service surveillance test (IST) on October 17,
          2013 (IST)
          Reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate surveillance test on October 24, 2013 (RCS
          leak rate)
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
                                                                                        Enclosure
 
                                                13
      Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample)
      Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine NextEra emergency drill on October 9,
      2013 to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the classification, notification, and
      protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed
      emergency response operations in the simulator, technical support center, and
      emergency operations facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications,
      and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with
      procedures. The inspectors also attended the station drill critique to compare inspector
      observations with those identified by NextEra staff in order to evaluate NextEras critique
      and to verify whether NextEra staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering
      them into the CAP.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
2.    RADIATION SAFETY
      Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment (71124.06 - 1 sample)
  a. Inspection Scope
      During the period December 2 to December 5, 2013, the inspectors verified that
      gaseous and liquid effluent processing systems are maintained so radioactive
      discharges are properly reduced, monitored, and released. The inspectors also verified
      the accuracy of the calculations for effluent releases and public doses.
      The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20; 10 CFR 50.35(a) TSs;
      10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A - Criterion 60 Control of Release of Radioactivity to the
      Environment and Criterion 64 Monitoring Radioactive Releases; 10 CFR 50 Appendix I
      Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operations to Meet
      the Criterion As Low as is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) for Radioactive Material
      in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents; 10 CFR 50.75(g) Reporting and
      Recordkeeping for Decommissioning Planning; 40 CFR Part 141 Maximum Contaminant
      Levels for Radionuclides; 40 CFR Part 190 Environmental Radiation Protection
      Standards for Nuclear Power Operations; RG 1.109 Calculation of Annual Doses to
      Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents; RG 1.21 Measuring, Evaluating,
      Reporting Radioactive Material in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents and Solid Waste; RG
      4.1 Radiological Environmental Monitoring for Nuclear Power Plants; RG 4.15 Quality
      Assurance for Radiological Monitoring Programs; NUREG 1301 Offsite Dose Calculation
                                                                                        Enclosure
 
                                              14
      Manual (ODCM) Guidance: Standard Radiological Effluent Controls; applicable Industry
      standards; and licensee procedures required by TSs/ODCM as criteria for determining
      compliance.
      The inspectors observed the collection and preparation of one environmental sample
      from an on-site groundwater monitoring well. The inspectors selected two SSCs (storm
      drains and spent fuel leak detection system) that could interface with ground water. The
      inspectors assessed whether NextEra has implemented a sampling and monitoring
      program sufficient to provide early detection of leakage from these SSCs to ground
      water.
      The inspectors reviewed any significant changes made by NextEra to the ODCM as the
      result of changes to the land census, long-term meteorological conditions (three year
      average), or modifications to the sampler stations since the last inspection. The
      inspectors reviewed technical justifications for any changed sampling locations to verify
      that NextEra performed the required reviews.
      The inspectors reviewed the results of the NextEra Analytical Laboratory vendors inter-
      laboratory and intra-laboratory comparison program to verify the adequacy of
      environmental sample analyses performed by the vendor laboratory. The inspectors
      assessed whether the results included the media/radionuclide mix were appropriate for
      the facility.
      Problem Identification and Resolution
      Inspectors assessed whether problems associated with the effluent monitoring and
      control program are being identified by NextEra at an appropriate threshold and are
      properly addressed for resolution in the CAP. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the
      appropriateness of the corrective actions for a selected sample of problems
      documented. One corrective action involving the Groundwater Protection Program
      (GWPP) was not completed in a timely manner and is described in Section 4OA5 of
      this report.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (71124.07 - 1 sample)
  a. Inspection Scope
      During the period December 2 to December 5, 2013, the inspectors verified that the
      radiological environmental monitoring program (REMP) quantifies the impact of
      radioactive effluent releases to the environment and sufficiently validates the integrity
      of the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent release program.
      The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20; 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A
      Criterion 60 - Control of Release of Radioactivity to the Environment; 10 CFR 50
      Appendix I Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for
      Operations to Meet the Criterion ALARA for Radioactive Material in Light-Water-Cooled
      Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents; 40 CFR Part 190 Environmental Radiation Protection
                                                                                        Enclosure
 
                                              15
      Standards for Nuclear Power Operations; 40 CFR Part 141 Maximum Contaminant
      Levels for Radionuclides; the guidance in RGs 1.23 Meteorological Measurements
      Program for Nuclear Power Plants, RG 4.1 Radiological Environmental Monitoring
      Programs for Nuclear Power Plants; RG 4.15 Quality Assurance for Radiological
      Monitoring Programs; NUREG 1301 ODCM Guidance: Standard Radiological Effluent
      Controls; applicable industry standards; and licensee procedures as criteria for
      determining compliance.
      The inspectors determined if NextEra has made significant changes to their effluent
      release points.
      Records of any abnormal gaseous or liquid tank discharges were reviewed to ensure the
      abnormal discharges were monitored by the discharge point effluent monitor. When
      discharges were made with inoperable effluent radiation monitors, or if unmonitored
      leakage occurred, the inspectors ensured that an evaluation was performed, as required.
      For unmonitored spills, leaks, or unexpected liquid or gaseous discharges, the
      inspectors ensured that an evaluation was performed to determine the type and amount
      of radioactive material that was discharged. The inspectors verified that surveys were
      performed to include consideration of hard-to-detect radionuclides. The inspectors
      determined whether or not NextEra had completed offsite notifications (State, local, and
      if appropriate, the NRC), as provided in the Groundwater Protection Initiatives
      implementing procedures.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
4.    OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
.1    Safety System Functional Failures (1 sample)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors sampled NextEras submittals for the Safety System Functional Failures
      performance indicator (PI) for the period of October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2013. To
      determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, inspectors used
      definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
      Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, and NUREG-1022, Event Reporting
      Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. The inspectors reviewed NextEras MR
      records, maintenance WOs, CRs, event reports and NRC integrated inspection reports
      to validate the accuracy of the submittals.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
                                                                                      Enclosure
 
                                                16
.2    Mitigating Systems Performance Index (2 samples)
    a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed NextEras submittal of the Mitigating Systems Performance
      Index for the following systems for the period of October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2013:
          Residual heat removal system (MS09)
          MSPI cooling water system (MS10)
      To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, the inspectors
      used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory
      Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7. The inspectors also
      reviewed NextEras condition reports, mitigating systems performance index derivation
      reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the accuracy of
      the submittals.
    b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.3    Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (1 sample)
    a. Inspection Scope
      During the period of December 2 to December 5, 2013, the inspectors sampled
      NextEras submittals for the occupational exposure control effectiveness PI for the
      period of the fourth quarter 2012 through the third quarter 2013. The inspectors used PI
      definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02,
      Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the
      accuracy of the PI data reported.
      To assess the adequacy of the licensees PI data collection and analyses, the inspectors
      discussed with radiation protection staff, the scope and breadth of its data review and
      the results of those reviews. The inspectors independently reviewed condition reports,
      electronic personal dosimetry dose alarms, dose reports, and dose assignments for any
      intakes that occurred during the time period reviewed to determine if there were
      potentially unrecognized PI occurrences.
    b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.4    Radiological Effluent Occurrences (1 sample)
      Inspection Scope
      During the period of December 2 to December 5, 2013, the inspectors sampled
      NextEras submittals for the radiological effluent TS/ODCM radiological effluent
      occurrences PI for the period from the fourth quarter 2012 through the third quarter
      2013. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy
                                                                                        Enclosure
 
                                                17
      Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,
      Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported.
      The inspectors reviewed NextEras corrective action report database and selected
      individual reports generated since this indicator was last reviewed, to identify any
      potential occurrences such as unmonitored, uncontrolled, or improperly calculated
      effluent releases that may have impacted offsite dose. The inspectors also reviewed
      NextEras methods for quantifying gaseous and liquid effluents and determining effluent
      dose.
      Findings
      No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 - 3 samples)
.1    Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities
    a. Inspection Scope
      As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the
      inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant
      status reviews to verify that NextEra entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate
      threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and
      addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive
      equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors
      performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended
      condition report screening meetings.
    b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2    Annual Sample: Review of Corrective Actions for Alkali-Silica Reaction Affected
      Structures
    a. Inspection Scope
      Between November 12 to November 14, 2013, NRC inspectors from Region I and
      a reactor engineer from the Division of License Renewal, NRR, witnessed testing
      conducted at the Ferguson Structural Engineering Laboratory (FSEL) at the University of
      Texas - Austin in support of the Seabrook Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) Project Corrective
      Action Plan. Specifically, the inspectors witnessed strength testing of anchor bolts in a
      large-scale ASR-affected concrete specimen performed in accordance with MPR Anchor
      Testing Procedure 09, Conduct Unconfined Tension Test on Expansion Anchors.
      The inspectors also observed installation of a number of anchor bolts conducted in
      accordance with MPR Anchor Testing Procedure 03, Install Hilti Kwik Bolt Expansion
      Anchors, and Procedure 12, Install Drillco Maxi-Bolt Undercut Anchors. Following the
      completion of anchor bolt testing, the inspectors witnessed the cutting of large-scale
      anchor test specimen AN-02 into four sections to investigate the depth/progression of
      observed bifurcation cracking induced by ASR expansion.
                                                                                          Enclosure
 
                                              18
  During the week of November 18, 2013, inspectors were on-site to review the results of
  the June 2013 Combined Crack Indexing (CCI) measurements. Inspectors reviewed
  and discussed with the responsible Seabrook engineers the collected data and
  engineering evaluations associated with the June 2012 six-month interval monitoring
  results. Data sheets and associated records are attachments to internal Seabrook
  document Foreign Print (FP) 100831, Revision 0, ASR Expansion Measurements.
b. Findings and Observations
  No findings were identified.
  The inspectors observed proper procedural adherence and appropriate quality
  assurance oversight of testing conducted at the FSEL facility. Testing was performed
  by graduate students and supervised by a UT-Austin research assistant. Quality control
  engineering oversight was performed by an MPR project engineer responsible for
  10 CFR 50, Appendix B, implementation and periodic audits and assessments of testing
  activities. The inspectors witnessed formal communications and independent
  reader/verifier and performer coordination by testing personnel. All test results were
  electronically recorded and overseen by FSEL and MPR supervisory personnel.
  The preliminary results of this first stage of ASR-affected specimen anchor testing (ASR-
  affected specimens fabricated on May 24, 2012 and displaying CCIs values of between
  1.0 and 1.31 mm/m) identified no significant degradation from the control anchor test
  results taken in November 2012, on specimen AN-07. Segmentation of anchor test
  specimen AN-02, which was performed to investigate the depth of the bifurcation
  cracking, identified that the surface cracks terminated approximately 8-9 inches into the
  specimen. In discussions with NextEra staff, inspectors determined that the bifurcation
  cracking was not unanticipated, based upon the specimen design (absence of through-
  wall steel bar reinforcements/stirrups). However, inspectors determined that the growth
  and depth of these types of surface cracks will continue to be monitored by NextEra for
  both impact on test specimen performance and possible implications for Seabrook
  Station ASR-affected structures.
  The June 2013 CCI data analysis and conclusions are summarized in FP 100831 and
  below:
      416 of 445 measurement lines (93%) show crack length changes of 0.002 inch or
      less compared to baseline measurements.
      17 (3%) show length changes of 0.003 inch (5 vertical and 4 horizontal on exterior
      surfaces, 8 vertical on interior wall locations.
      9 (1.6%) measurements show length changes of 0.004 inch or greater (3 vertical and
      1 horizontal exterior and 4 vertical on interior walls.
      The average maximum expansion of 0.02% or less (from the baseline measurement,
      using the combined crack index) represents 1/10th of 0.20% strain value associated
      with published expansion strain limits for a typical concrete structures.
      3 measurement lines show length changes of contraction between 0.007 and 0.008
      inch compared to the baseline. The negative change measurements appear to be
      the result of gage pin displacement.
                                                                                    Enclosure
 
                                                19
      Based upon the above data analysis, NextEra staff concluded: 1) no significant changes
      have occurred in the 26 monitored locations after 18 months of data collection; 2) the
      type of structure on site does not significantly impact the observed variations in
      measured expansion; 3) thermal effects on seasonal measurements are noticeable; and
      4) continued monitoring is warranted to assess trends.
      Inspector review of the data identified no additional issues or concerns. As noted in
      FP100831, based upon examination of eight new locations under the Phase 3 ASR
      walkdowns, four new locations were added to the six-month CCI monitoring program
      due to CCI values exceeding the 1.0 mm/m threshold. In accordance with the Structures
      Monitoring Program, EDS 36180, Revision 4, these four locations will require a structural
      evaluation to assess available margin.
.3    Semi-Annual Trend Review
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues, as required by Inspection
      Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, to identify trends that might
      indicate the existence of more significant safety issues. In this review, the inspectors
      included repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by NextEra
      outside of the CAP, such as trend reports, PIs, major equipment problem lists, system
      health reports, MR assessments, and maintenance or CAP backlogs. The inspectors
      also reviewed NextEras CAP database for the third and fourth quarters of 2013 to
      assess CRs written in various subject areas (equipment problems, human performance
      issues, etc.), as well as individual issues identified during the NRCs daily condition
      report review (Section 4OA2.1). The inspectors reviewed NextEras quarterly trend
      report for the third quarter of 2013, and selected departmental reports conducted under
      procedure PI-AA-207-1000, Station Self-Evaluation and Trending Analysis, Revision 0,
      to verify that NextEra personnel were appropriately evaluating and trending adverse
      conditions in accordance with this and other applicable procedures.
  b. Findings and Observations
      No findings were identified.
      The inspectors evaluated a sample of departments that provide input into the quarterly
      trend reports, which included maintenance and engineering departments. This review
      included a sample of issues and events that occurred over the course of the past two
      quarters to objectively determine whether issues were appropriately determined to be
      newly identified as open or continued to be tracked as open adverse trends, potential
      adverse trends, or management awareness areas. The inspectors verified that these
      issues were addressed within the scope of the CAP, or through department review and
      documentation in the quarterly trend report for overall assessment. For example, the
      inspectors noted that consistent with the occurrence of a significant service water leak
      in the third quarter associated with Strainer No. 11, NextEra had appropriately identified
      this issue under the degraded component section of the trend report based on
      exceeding a statistical control threshold. However, the inspectors noted that other
      NextEra processes had captured the underlying issues related to service water system
      challenges including associated corrective actions, and was therefore consistent with the
      trend report not warranting additional evaluation.
                                                                                        Enclosure
 
                                                20
      Additionally, based on previous issues that had been identified and tracked in the
      corrective action database, the inspectors noted an apparent trend in procedure use and
      adherence. More importantly, NextEra had appropriately captured the increase in
      human performance issues associated with procedure use and adherence as a potential
      adverse trend in their trending analysis report for increased attention.
.4    Annual Sample: Follow-up of Corrective Actions for the Loss of Bus 5 during OR15
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors performed an in-depth review of NextEras root cause analysis and
      corrective actions associated with condition report AR 1808492, loss of Bus 5 during
      clearance, which occurred during refueling outage OR15, in October 2012.
      The inspectors assessed NextEras problem identification threshold, cause analyses,
      extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness
      of corrective actions to determine whether NextEra personnel were appropriately
      identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and
      whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors
      compared the actions taken to the requirements of PI-AA-205, Condition Evaluation and
      Corrective Action and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
  b. Findings and Observations
      No findings were identified.
      The inspectors reviewed selected CAP records and did not identify any additional
      issues. The inspectors determined NextEras overall response to the issue was
      commensurate with the safety significance, was generally timely, and included
      appropriate compensatory actions. The inspectors determined that the actions taken
      were reasonable to resolve both the initial clearance deficiencies and subsequent loss of
      emergency response communication data due to other unrelated failures that occurred
      due to the loss of safety Bus 5.
      Additionally, the inspectors noted that NextEras quarterly trend reports have captured
      adverse trending related to clearance requests. This identification, as evidenced by
      exceeding a statistical threshold of condition reports associated with clearance requests
      throughout 2013, resulted in additional assessment within the CAP and the station
      trending program. The inspectors verified the additional corrective action reviews were
      appropriate for the circumstances to address the specific adverse conditions associated
      with the tagging and clearance deficiencies identified by NextEra personnel. The
      inspectors verified that the issues that caused the identification of the adverse trend
      associated with clearance requests, were not related to the original cause of the loss of
      safety Bus 5, and did not invalidate the corrective actions implemented to prevent
      recurrence.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1    Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) Report Review
  a. Inspection Scope
                                                                                        Enclosure
 
                                                21
      The inspectors reviewed the final report of the International Atomic Energy Agencys
      OSART follow-up visit to Seabrook Station that occurred on June 3 to June 7, 2013.
      The June 2013 visit was the follow-up assessment from the original review of Seabrook
      that was conducted in June 2011. The inspectors reviewed this report to ensure that
      any issues identified were consistent with NRC perspectives of NextEra performance
      and to determine if the OSART team identified any significant safety issues that required
      further NRC follow-up under the Reactor Oversight Process.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2    Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI)
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed reported groundwater monitoring results and changes to
      NextEras written program for identifying and controlling contaminated spills/leaks to
      groundwater to determine if NextEra has implemented the GPI as intended.
  b. Findings and Observations
      No Findings were identified.
      One observation was identified concerning compliance with the voluntary Nuclear
      Energy Institute GPI.
      NEI 07-07 Industry Initiative Groundwater Protection Program dated August 2007
      contains an acceptance criteria 1.1.e which states UFSAR to be updated with
      information from Hydrological Investigation Report. NextEras Fleet procedure
      EV-AA-100-1001 step 4.2 2.B c requires that Each site shall ensure that the Updated
      Safety Analysis Report is in agreement with the characteristics of the site hydrology and
      geology. (NEI 07-07 1.1 e). NextEra updated the Seabrook Station Groundwater
      Completion Report on August 22, 2012. A subsequent review was performed of the
      Hydrological Investigation Report and it was determined by the licensee that an update
      to UFSAR was needed. No update to the UFSAR has been performed (AR 01924442).
      This issue is considered minor as it does not affect safety-related SSCs nor impact any
      radiological monitoring requirements.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
      On January 17, 2014, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Kevin
      Walsh, Site Vice President, and other members of the Seabrook Station staff. The
      inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or
      documented in this report.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violation
      The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by NextEra
      and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement
      Policy for being dispositioned as a NCV.
                                                                                      Enclosure
 
                                              22
      10 CFR Part 50.65, paragraph a(4), Requirement for Monitoring the Effectiveness of
      Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, states, in part, that the licensee shall assess
      and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance
      activities. NextEra procedure WM 10.1. On-Line Maintenance, Section 3.3.1,
      requires that an evaluation of the risk impact of planned maintenance tasks be
      performed. Contrary to the above, on September 24, 2012, NextEra failed to
      adequately assess and manage the impact to plant risk during a planned
      maintenance activity. Specifically, NextEra identified during internal reviews that
      they had failed to recognize an elevated online maintenance risk level (Yellow)
      during the performance of the 1-EDE-B-1-B Battery Service Test due to incorrect
      coding in NextEras PRAX risk model program. The inspectors determined
      NextEras failure to assess and manage risk during the period when the Battery
      Service Test was reasonably within NextEras ability to foresee and correct, and was
      identified as a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than
      minor, and considered a finding, because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems
      cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone
      objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond
      to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Because this finding
      represents a violation of 10 CFR Part 50.65 Requirements for Monitoring the
      Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Section a(4), the inspectors
      used IMC 0609, Appendix K, Flowchart 1 Assessment of Risk Deficit, to analyze
      the finding. The regional Senior Reactor Analyst determined
      the incremental core damage probability (ICDP) for the surveillance period (~5-10
      minutes) to be several orders of magnitude below the 1E-6 threshold due to the short
      duration of the systems unavailability. As this finding is not related to Risk
      Management Actions only, and the ICDP Risk Deficit is not >1E-6, the inspectors
      determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green). The issue was
      entered into NextEras CAP as AR 1906782.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
                                                                                        Enclosure
 
                                              A-1
                              SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
                                  KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
K. Walsh, Site Vice President
T. Vehec, Plant General Manager
V. Brown, Senior Licensing Engineer
M. Chevalier, Radiation Protection Supervisor
J. Connolly, Site Engineering Director
K. Douglas, Maintenance Director
P. Dullea, Principal Chemist Specialist
D. Flahardy, Radiation Protection Manager
A. Giotas, Chemistry Specialist
M. Lake, Chemistry Technician
M. Leone, Operations Training Supervisor - Continuing
M. Ossing, Licensing Manager
V. Pascucci, Nuclear Oversight Manager
D. Robinson, Chemistry Manager
D. Strands, Chemistry Supervisor
M. Strum, Principal Radiological Engineer, AREVA
S. Wellhoffer, Nurse Manager RN
              LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
None
                              LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures
ON1490.06 Winter Readiness Surveillance, Revision 12
ON1090.13, Response to Natural Phenomena Affecting Plant Operations, Revision 1
OP-AA-102-1002, Seasonal Readiness, Revision 1
OS1200.03, Severe Weather Conditions, Revision 20
OS1090.09, Station Cold Weather Operations, Revision 2
Condition Reports
01879206        01904449      1918322      1888495        1634911
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40197808
Miscellaneous
Evaluation of Beyond-Design-Basis External Flooding at Protective Features Identified as
        Having Small Available Physical Margin, Revision 1
Seasonal Readiness Memo to Mano Nazar dated 9/24/13
                                                                                    Attachment
 
                                              A-2
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
OS1048.13, Vital Bus 11A Operation, Revision 8
OX1413.03, B Train RHR, Revision 10
OX1416.04A, Service Water Quarterly Pump and Discharge Valve Test and Comprehensive
      Pump Test, Revision 18
Condition Reports
01793891      01923437
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40227849      40284358
Drawings
1-NHY-310042
PID-1-SW-B20795, Service Water System Nuclear Detail, Revision 40
PID-1-SW-D20795, Service Water System Nuclear Detail, Revision 42
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
Miscellaneous
Seabrook Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Strategies, Volume I, PAB F-1A-Z 7/-6/-26
Unit No. 1 Diesel Generator Building Pre-Fire Strategies DG-F-1A-A, DG-F-2A-A, DG-F-3E-A,
      DG-F-3C-A, and DG-F-3A-Z, Revision 2
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures
Miscellaneous
BTP MEB 3.1 Determination of Rupture Locations and Dynamic Effects Associated With the
      Postulated Rupture of Piping
Calculation 9763-F-FS-01, Flooding Study for Primary Auxiliary Building - Moderate Energy
      Lines
Seabrook Station Moderate Energy Line Break Study
Drawings
1-WLD-D20216        1-WLD-D20226          1-WLD-D20229          9763-F-805669
9763-F-805793
Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance
Procedures
ES1850.017, SW Heat Exchanger Program, Revision 1
PEG-268, Heat Exchanger and NRC GL 89-13 Program, Revision 0
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40103638      40235240
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Procedures
NT 5702, Administration of Requal Program Annual Exams, Revision 23
OX1426.05, DG 1B Monthly Operability Surveillance, Revision 28
TR-AA-104, NEXTERA Energy Fleet Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program, Revision 4
TR-AA-230-1007, Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation, Revision 1
Training Group LORT Training Program Description, December 2012
                                                                                    Attachment
 
                                                A-3
Condition Reports
1699285        1702114      1714783        1752327    1830734        1833538
1841980        1879841      1889829        1915426
Miscellaneous
E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 50
Requalification Training Program Annual Examination Sample Plan 2012-2013
Simulator Examination, Demonstrative Examination on October 23, 2013, Revision 14
Simulator Action Request:
TWR01818481
Simulator-Related Test Documents:
C Feed Reg Valve Failed Closed Plant Trip, 11/28/12
Closure of All MSIVs, 8/22/13
Main Turbine Trip below P-9, 8/22/13
Manual Rx Trip, 8/22/13
Simultaneous Trip of All RCPs, 8/22/13
Steady State Operability Testing, 11/19/12
Trip of a single RCP, 8/22/13
Trip of All FW Pumps, 8/22/13
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
Procedures
MS0519.129, Bettis Air Actuator Maintenance for 1-SW-V-16 and 1-SW-V-18, Revision 0
PEG-40, Scoping Changes and Program Interfaces, Revision 5
PEG-45, Maintenance Rule Program Monitoring Activities, Revision 17
Condition Reports
1921691        1927198        1927831        1904565    1926696        1902366
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40200892        94082141
Miscellaneous
Chemical and Volume Control System Health Report
ER-AA-100-2002 Form F01, Revision 1, Maintenance Rule Functional Failure
Form 36180, Structural Monitoring Program Form 2, Revision 1
NEI-99-02, Revision 7
System Health Report (10/1-2013 - 12/31/2013) for the Fire Protection System
System Health Report (10/1-2013 - 12/31/2013) for Service Water System
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Procedures
PRA-301, MR (a)(4) Process for On-Line Maintenance Group Instruction, Revision 0
WM-AA-100-1000, Work Activity Risk Management, Revision 0
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40227849        40227820      40281251
                                                                                Attachment
 
                                              A-4
Miscellaneous
Engineering Evaluation EE-13-007, Maintenance Rule (a)(4) Fire Implementation, Revision 0
Maintenance Rule a(4) Assessment Report for Work Week 1347
Maintenance Rule a(4) Assessment Report for Work Week 1349
Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Procedures
EN-AA-203-1001, Operability Determinations / Functionality Assessments, Revisions 12 & 13
OS1006.05, RWST and SFP Silica/Activity Clean Up Operations, Revision 6
OX1416.04 Service Water Quarterly Pump and Discharge Valve Test and Comprehensive Test,
      Revision 18
Condition Reports
1755671      1909051        1918208      1918332        1919255      1920352
1920353      1920354        1914280
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40222427
Miscellaneous
SW-P-41A IST Pump Data Log
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications
Procedures
EN-AA-100, Design Change Program, Revision 1
EN-AA-100-1003, Control of Design Interfaces, Revision 1
EN-AA-205-1100, Design Change Packages, Revision 9
ES0815.004, Welding of Carbon Steel Materials (P-1 to P-1), Revision 1
LS0563.141, SWG-5 25R Synchronization Check Relay Inspection, Testing and PM, Revision 0
LS0568.21, Wiring Verification and Functional Checks, Revision 4
OS1000.01, Heatup from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown, Revision 39
OX1426.03, Emergency Power Sequencer 18 Month Operability Test, Revision 7
OX1446.02, Bus E5 and E6 18 Month Offsite Power Supply Transfer Operability Test,
      Revision 7
Condition Reports
01669517      1692863
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40233633      40233635      40040243      40090976
Miscellaneous
Calculation C-S-1-45886, Service Water Return Piping from CC-E-17-A&B Qualification,
      Revision 2
Calculation 9763-3-ED-00-23-F, Medium Voltage Protection Relay Coordination, Revision 0
EC 274301, EPS Power Supply Overvoltage Protection
EC 279413, Modifications in Support of OR16 32 SW Tee Replacement, Revision 1
EC 278785, SW Pipe Support Modifications in Support of OR16, Revision 2
Engineering Change (EC) 272542, 1-RC-TB-451 Temporary Setpoint Change
                                                                                Attachment
 
                                              A-5
FP 36550, Environmental and Seismic Qualification Dedication Test Procedure and Test Report
      for GE Relay P/N 12SLJ21A1A, Revision 0
UFSAR 8.3.1.1.e.b
Westinghouse Comparator Calculations
Drawings
310108
801815S, Sheet 1 of 2, Support No. 1815-SG-51, Revision 1
1-NHY-310102, Sheet A52, Control Wiring Diagram 4160V Bus 1-E5 RAT Incoming Line,
      Revision 3
1-NHY-310102, Sheet A53a, 4160V Bus 1-E5 PTs Three Line Diagram, Revision 14
1-NHY-310231, Sheet 11c, Miscellaneous Relays 4.16kV Switchgear Bus 1-EDE-SWG-5,
      Revision 7
SK-274863-2001
Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing
Procedures
IS1672.211, 1-SW-L-6139 Service Water Cooling Tower Basin Water Level Loop B Calibration,
      Revision 9
OX1413.01, A Train RHR Quarterly Flow and Valve Stroke Test and 18 Month Valve Stroke
      Observation, Revision 18
OX1456.81, Operability Testing of IST Valves, Revision 18
Condition Reports
1915871        1897370      1916203        1916204      1908426      1926696
1927845        1921678      1921938
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40177013      40177017      40270845      40037987    40267058    40273297
40221056      40200892      40284268        40238117
Drawings
1-NHY-310107, Sheet D88a, 125 VDC Bus 11C 1-SWG-11C Three Line Diagram, Revision 11
1-NHY-310107, Sheet D88b, 1-SWG-11C Battery Charger Supply 1-BC-1C Schematic
      Diagram, Revision 2
1-NHY-503956, SW to DG WTR Jacket Hx Logic Diagram, Revision 6
Foreign Print (FP) 92380, Fisher Butterfly Valve
G25163, 16 Type 7620 Valve Bettis T-316-SR2 Rotary Actuator, Revision H
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
Procedures
OX1416.06 Service Water Discharge Valves Quarterly Test and 18 Month Position Verification,
      Revision 9
Condition Reports
01913220      01916357      1914416
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
40222447
                                                                                Attachment
 
                                              A-6
Miscellaneous
Containment Sump A and B level trends
Unidentified Leak Rate trends
Section 2RS6: Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Procedures
CD0904.11, Split and Cross Check Analysis, Revision 5
CDI-015, Sampling of Groundwater Monitoring Wells, Revision 3
CP 8.1, Verification of Analytical Systems Performance, Revision 23
CS0908.01, Off-site Dose Assessment, Revision 15
CS0910.11, Wide Range Gas Monitor Sampling, Revision 1
CS0917.02, Gaseous Effluent Releases, Revision 13
CS0917.03, Unmonitored Plant Releases, Revision 10
CS0917.04, Monitoring Plant Systems for Radioactivity, Revision 1
CX0917.01, Liquid Effluent Releases, Revision 20
Condition Reports
01634121      01876200        01876873      01876972    01876868    01898430
01891531      01924442        01924764
Miscellaneous
GEW Permit 13-150 Containment Purge, 4/4/13
GEW Permit 13-165 Continuous Plant Vent Releases, 4/9/13
HPOG 38 Dry Fuel Storage - Monitoring Plan for Kr-85 Release, August 14, 2013
HPSTID Number 13-005, Calculated Radiological Conditions Caused by the Release of Kr-85
  during Dry Fuel Storage Campaign, August 14, 2013
LEW Permit 13-198 ASDA, 4/25/13
LEW Permit 13-149 Waste Test Tank B, 4/2/13
LEW Permit 13-194 Steam Generator Blowdown Flash Tank 4/10/13
LEW Permit 13-181 Turbine Building Sump, 4/3/13
SB Inter Laboratory Radiochemistry QC Report 2012
Seabrook 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No. 120306-667, March 6, 2013
Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No. 120831-715, August 31, 2012
Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No. 120726-698, July 26, 2012
Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No. 121127-742, November 27, 2012
Teledyne Brown Engineering Laboratory, CARR No.121109-744, November 9, 2012
Section 2RS7: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Procedures
CD05-01-01, YSI 556 MPS Operations Manual, Revision 3
CDI-015, Sampling Groundwater Monitoring Wells, Revision 3
EV-AA-100-1000, Groundwater Protection Program Communications/Notification Plan,
  Revision 4
EV-AA-100-1001, Fleet Groundwater Protection Program Implementing Guideline, Revision 2
LI-AA-102-1001, Regulatory Reporting, Revision 0
NARC 3-1.1, Periodic and Special Regulatory Reports, Revision 148
ON1244.01, Spill Response, Revision 24
OP 4.1, Effluent Surveillance Program, Revision 24
                                                                              Attachment
 
                                            A-7
Condition Reports
01891529      01891530      01891531      01891515
Miscellaneous
Seabrook 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures
CS0917.02, Gaseous Effluent Releases, Revision 14
CX0917.01, Liquid Effluent Releases, Revision 20
HD0958.33, Performance of Radiation Protection Supervisory Plant Walkdowns, Revision 6
JD0999.910, Reporting Key Performance Indicators per NEI 99-02, Revision 6
NAP-206, NRC Performance Indicators, Revision 6
Audits, Self-Assessments, and Surveillances
Quick Hit Assessment Report 1914767, HP Performance Indicator Verification, November 1,
        2013
Condition Reports
01856230
Miscellaneous
CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence
        KPIs, November 14, 2013
CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence
        KPIs, October 2, 2013
CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence
        KPIs, September 4, 2013
CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence
        KPIs, August 12, 2013
CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence
        KPIs, July 3, 2013
CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence
        KPIs, June 6, 2013
CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence
        KPIs, May 7, 2013
CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence
        KPIs, April 5, 2013
CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence
        KPIs, March 8, 2013
CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence
        KPIs, February 7, 2013
CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence
        KPIs, January 14, 2013
CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence
        KPIs, December 5, 2012
CHL-219 Reactor Coolant Specific Activity and RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrence
        KPIs, November 13, 2012
CS0908.01 Form A, Dose Calculation for Liquid Effluent Release, Permit Number 13-395
CS0908.01 Form A, Dose Calculation for Liquid Effluent Release, Permit Number 13-106
                                                                                Attachment
 
                                            A-8
CS0908.01 Form A, Dose Calculation for Liquid Effluent Release, Permit Number 13-096
CS0908.01 Form F, Radioactive Effluent Dose Assessment Report, November 14, 2013
JD0999.910, Figure 1, Occupational Exposure Occurrence, October 10, 2013
JD0999.910, Figure 1, Occupational Exposure Occurrence, July 10, 2013
JD0999.910, Figure 1, Occupational Exposure Occurrence, April 4, 2013
LIC-13037, Documentation Supporting the Seabrook Station NRC 3rd Quarter 2013
      Performance Indicator Submittal
LIC-13036, Documentation Supporting the Seabrook Station NRC 2nd Quarter 2013
      Performance Indicator Submittal
LIC-13017, Documentation Supporting the Seabrook Station NRC 1st Quarter 2013
      Performance Indicator Submittal
LIC-13003, Documentation Supporting the Seabrook Station NRC 4th Quarter 2012
      Performance Indicator Submittal
MSPI Derivation Reports
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution
Procedures
OP-AA-101-1000, Clearance and Tagging, Revision 9
PI-AA-204, Condition Evaluation and Corrective Action, Revision 23
Miscellaneous
Engineering Department Trend Report Input
Maintenance Department Trend Report Input
Operations Department Trend Report Input
Performance Improvement Weekly Updates (various)
Seabrook Station Self-Evaluation and Trending Analysis Report for 3rd Quarter 2013
System Health Report, EDE 4.16kV (10/1/13 - 12/31/13)
                                                                                  Attachment
 
                              A-9
                      LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
ALARA as low as is reasonably achievable
AR    action request
ASR  Alkali-Silica Reaction
CAP  corrective action program
CCI  Combined Crack Indexing
CFR  Code of Federal Regulations
CR    condition report
CY    CY calendar year
EC    engineering change
EDG  emergency diesel generator
FP    Foreign Print
FSEL  Ferguson Structural Engineering Laboratory
GPI  groundwater protection initiative
GW    groundwater
GWPP  groundwater protection program
IMC  Inspection Manual Chapter
JPM  job performance measures
LER  licensee event report
MR    Maintenance Rule
NCV  non-cited violation
NRC  Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ODCM  offsite dose calculation manual
PAB  Primary Auxiliary Building
PARS  Publicly Available Records
PI    performance indicator
RCS  reactor coolant system
REMP  Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
RG    Regulatory Guide
RHR  residual heat removal
SDP  significance determination process
SSC  structure, system, or component
SW    service water
TS    Technical Specification
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI  unresolved item
WO    work order
                                                        Attachment
}}

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