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{{#Wiki_filter:Dresden Nuclear Power Station Exercise Report - 2009-03-25 Final Report - Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program 2009-07-21
{{#Wiki_filter:Dresden Nuclear Power Station Exercise Report - 2009-03-25 Final Report - Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program 2009-07-21


Exercise Report Dresden Nuclear Power Station Exercise Date: 2009-03-25 Report Date: 2009-07-21 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Federal Emergency Management Agency REP Program 536 S. Clark St. 6th floor Chicago, IL 60605 Table of Contents Chapter 1 Executive Summary Chapter 2 Introduction Chapter 3 Exercise Overview Section 3.1 EPZ Description Section 3.2 Exercise Participants Section 3.3 Exercise Timeline Chapter 4 Exercise Evaluation and Results Section 4.1 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation Section 4.2 Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated 4.2.1 Illinois Jurisdictions 4.2.1.1 State Initial Warning Point 4.2.1.2 State Emergency Operations Center/State of Illinois Response Center 4.2.1.3 Public Inquiry Phone Bank 4.2.1.4 Radiological Emergency Assessment Center 4.2.1.5 Unified Area Command - Chicagoland Speedway 4.2.1.6 Radiological Assessment Field Team 4.2.1.7 Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment at the RAFT 4.2.1.8 Field Team 1 4.2.1.9 Field Team 2 4.2.1.10 Emergency Operations Facility 4.2.1.11 Joint Information Center 4.2.1.12 Illinois State Liaison - Grundy County 4.2.1.13 Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Grundy County 4.2.1.14 Illinois State Liaison - Kendall County 4.2.1.15 Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Kendall County 4.2.1.16 Illinois State Liaison - Will County 4.2.1.17 Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Will County 4.2.1.18 Dosimetry Control Officer's Briefing - Illinois State Police District 5 Headquarters 4.2.1.19 Traffic and Access Control Point at the Illinois State Police District 5 Headquarters 4.2.1.20 Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers - Kankakee Community College 4.2.1.21 Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment -
Exercise Report Dresden Nuclear Power Station Exercise Date: 2009-03-25 Report Date: 2009-07-21 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Federal Emergency Management Agency REP Program 536 S. Clark St. 6th floor Chicago, IL 60605
Kankakee Community College 4.2.1.22 Public Registration - Kankakee Community College 4.2.1.23 Congregate Care Center - Kankakee Community College 4.2.2 Risk Jurisdictions 4.2.2.1 Grundy County - Initial Warning Point 4.2.2.2 Grundy County - Emergency Operations Center 4.2.2.3 Grundy County - Emergency Broadcast System Station -
 
WCSJ/WJDK 4.2.2.4 Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Coal City School District 4.2.2.5 Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Saratoga School District 4.2.2.6 Kendall County - Initial Warning Point 4.2.2.7 Kendall County - Emergency Operations Center 4.2.2.8 Kendall County - Traffic and Access Control Point 4.2.2.9 Kendall County - Emergency Broadcast System Station - WSPY 4.2.2.10 Will County - Initial Warning Point 4.2.2.11 Will County - Emergency Operations Center 4.2.2.12 Will County - Emergency Alert System Station -
Table of Contents Chapter 1 Executive Summary Chapter 2 Introduction Chapter 3 Exercise Overview Section 3.1 EPZ Description Section 3.2 Exercise Participants Section 3.3 Exercise Timeline Chapter 4 Exercise Evaluation and Results Section 4.1 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation Section 4.2 Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated 4.2.1 Illinois Jurisdictions 4.2.1.1 State Initial Warning Point 4.2.1.2 State Emergency Operations Center/State of Illinois Response Center 4.2.1.3 Public Inquiry Phone Bank 4.2.1.4 Radiological Emergency Assessment Center 4.2.1.5 Unified Area Command - Chicagoland Speedway 4.2.1.6 Radiological Assessment Field Team 4.2.1.7 Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment at the RAFT 4.2.1.8 Field Team 1 4.2.1.9 Field Team 2 4.2.1.10 Emergency Operations Facility 4.2.1.11 Joint Information Center 4.2.1.12 Illinois State Liaison - Grundy County 4.2.1.13 Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Grundy County 4.2.1.14 Illinois State Liaison - Kendall County 4.2.1.15 Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Kendall County 4.2.1.16 Illinois State Liaison - Will County 4.2.1.17 Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Will County 4.2.1.18 Dosimetry Control Officer's Briefing - Illinois State Police District 5 Headquarters 4.2.1.19 Traffic and Access Control Point at the Illinois State Police District 5 Headquarters 4.2.1.20 Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers - Kankakee Community College
WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ 4.2.2.13 Will County - EV-2 Interview - Troy Community Consolidated School District 30C Appendices Appendix 1 - Acronyms and Abbreviations Appendix 2 - Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders Appendix 3 - Exercise Evaluation Areas and Extent of Play Agreement Appendix 4 - Exercise Scenario and Timeline  
 
4.2.1.21 Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment -
Kankakee Community College 4.2.1.22 Public Registration - Kankakee Community College 4.2.1.23 Congregate Care Center - Kankakee Community College 4.2.2 Risk Jurisdictions 4.2.2.1 Grundy County - Initial Warning Point 4.2.2.2 Grundy County - Emergency Operations Center 4.2.2.3 Grundy County - Emergency Broadcast System Station -
WCSJ/WJDK 4.2.2.4 Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Coal City School District 4.2.2.5 Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Saratoga School District 4.2.2.6 Kendall County - Initial Warning Point 4.2.2.7 Kendall County - Emergency Operations Center 4.2.2.8 Kendall County - Traffic and Access Control Point 4.2.2.9 Kendall County - Emergency Broadcast System Station - WSPY 4.2.2.10 Will County - Initial Warning Point 4.2.2.11 Will County - Emergency Operations Center 4.2.2.12 Will County - Emergency Alert System Station -
WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ 4.2.2.13 Will County - EV-2 Interview - Troy Community Consolidated School District 30C Appendices Appendix 1 - Acronyms and Abbreviations Appendix 2 - Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders Appendix 3 - Exercise Evaluation Areas and Extent of Play Agreement Appendix 4 - Exercise Scenario and Timeline
: 1. Executive Summary On March 25, 2009, a full participation exercise was conducted in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Dresden Nuclear Power Station by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA). The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with DHS/FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) and procedures.
: 1. Executive Summary On March 25, 2009, a full participation exercise was conducted in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Dresden Nuclear Power Station by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA). The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with DHS/FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) and procedures.
The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on March 21, 2007. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on September 30, 1981.
The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on March 21, 2007. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on September 30, 1981.
The DHS/FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in this exercise. In the State of Illinois the risk counties of Grundy, Kendall, and Will participated along with the State Government. The State of Indiana did not participate in the exercise since it was not a full participation/ingestion exercise.
The DHS/FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in this exercise. In the State of Illinois the risk counties of Grundy, Kendall, and Will participated along with the State Government. The State of Indiana did not participate in the exercise since it was not a full participation/ingestion exercise.
Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork on the part of all the participants were evident during this exercise.
Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork on the part of all the participants were evident during this exercise.
This Report contains the evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of the following out-of-sequence activities: Illinois State Police Dosimetry Control Officers Briefing, Traffic Access and Control Points, Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers (EWs), Monitoring and Decontamination of EWs' Equipment, Public Registration, Congregate Care Center Interview, and Protective Actions for Schools (EV-2) Interviews. The State and local organizations except where noted in this report demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them.
This Report contains the evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of the following out-of-sequence activities: Illinois State Police Dosimetry Control Officers Briefing, Traffic Access and Control Points, Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers (EWs), Monitoring and Decontamination of EWs Equipment, Public Registration, Congregate Care Center Interview, and Protective Actions for Schools (EV-2) Interviews. The State and local organizations except where noted in this report demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them.
There was one Deficiency during this exercise identified for the State of Illinois under Criterion 2.b.2 - A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy) 1 whereby the process used and performance demonstrated by the State and Grundy County to determine and implement protective action recommendations and decisions, contributed to a delay in the notification of the public to take action. The Deficiency was resolved on July 10, 2009, as identified herein.
There was one Deficiency during this exercise identified for the State of Illinois under Criterion 2.b.2 - A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy) 1
 
whereby the process used and performance demonstrated by the State and Grundy County to determine and implement protective action recommendations and decisions, contributed to a delay in the notification of the public to take action. The Deficiency was resolved on July 10, 2009, as identified herein.
There was one Deficiency during this exercise identified for the Grundy County Emergency Operations Center, Public Information Officer under Criterion 5.b.1 - OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner whereby the process used and performance demonstrated by the State and Grundy County to determine and implement protective action recommendations and decisions, contributed to a delay in the notification of the public to take action. The Deficiency was resolved on July 1, 2009, as identified herein.
There was one Deficiency during this exercise identified for the Grundy County Emergency Operations Center, Public Information Officer under Criterion 5.b.1 - OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner whereby the process used and performance demonstrated by the State and Grundy County to determine and implement protective action recommendations and decisions, contributed to a delay in the notification of the public to take action. The Deficiency was resolved on July 1, 2009, as identified herein.
There were no Deficiencies identified during this exercise for Kendall or Will Counties.
There were no Deficiencies identified during this exercise for Kendall or Will Counties.
There were no new Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified during this exercise for the State of Illinois, Grundy, Kendall and Will Counties.
There were no new Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified during this exercise for the State of Illinois, Grundy, Kendall and Will Counties.
There were no ARCAs from previous exercises for the State of Illinois, Grundy, Kendall, and Will Counties that were required to be demonstrated during this exercise.
There were no ARCAs from previous exercises for the State of Illinois, Grundy, Kendall, and Will Counties that were required to be demonstrated during this exercise.
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: 2. Introduction On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351, and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.
: 2. Introduction On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMAs activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351, and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.
FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local governments' participation in joint exercises with licensees.
FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMAs initial and continued approval of State and local governments radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local governments participation in joint exercises with licensees.
FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
FEMAs responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
 
*Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;
RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;
*Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;
 
*Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993) and
observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;
*Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
 
-U.S. Department of Agriculture;
to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993) and
-U.S. Department of Energy;
 
-U.S. Department of Health and Human Services;
emergency planning process:
-U.S. Department of the Interior;
 
-U.S. Department of Transportation;
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-U.S. Environmental Protection Agency;
-U.S. Food and Drug Administration and 3


-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Representatives of these agencies serve on the DHS Radiological Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by DHS.
Representatives of these agencies serve on the DHS Radiological Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by DHS.
Formal submission of the RERPs for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station to DHS/FEMA by the State of Illinois and involved local jurisdictions occurred on March 31, 1981.
Formal submission of the RERPs for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station to DHS/FEMA by the State of Illinois and involved local jurisdictions occurred on March 31, 1981.
Formal approval of these RERPs was granted by FEMA on October 14, 1982, under 44 CFR 350. A REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway exercise was conducted on March 25, 2009, by FEMA to assess the capabilities of State and local offsite emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.
Formal approval of these RERPs was granted by FEMA on October 14, 1982, under 44 CFR 350.
A REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway exercise was conducted on March 25, 2009, by FEMA to assess the capabilities of State and local offsite emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.
The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluation team. Final determinations are made by the DHS/FEMA - Region V Office with FEMA Headquarters concurrence.
The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluation team. Final determinations are made by the DHS/FEMA - Region V Office with FEMA Headquarters concurrence.
The criteria utilized in the DHS/FEMA evaluation process are contained in:
The criteria utilized in the DHS/FEMA evaluation process are contained in:
*NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, November 1980;
*FEMA-REP-14, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual, September 1991 and
*FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology; Notice as published in the Federal Register Notice, Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002.
Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview, presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities, 4


Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;
which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.
 
Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions, if applicable, for each identified exercise issue and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises, if applicable, and the status of the OROs efforts to resolve them.
1991 and Notice" as published in the Federal Register Notice, Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002. Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview", presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities, 4 which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.
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Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions, if applicable, for each identified exercise issue and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises, if applicable, and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.
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: 3. Exercise Overview Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the March 25, 2009, REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. This section of the exercise report includes a description of the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone and a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.
: 3. Exercise Overview Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the March 25, 2009, REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. This section of the exercise report includes a description of the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone and a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.
3.1. EPZ Description The Dresden Nuclear Power Station is located on 953 rolling prairie acres in northeast Grundy County on the southern bank of the Illinois River. The topography of the site and its immediate environs is relatively flat, with elevations varying from 509 to 523 feet above sea level. The only significant topographic deviations in the area around the Dresden Station are the Kankakee Bluffs, 591 to 624 feet high, located just northeast of the site. Portions of the site owned by Exelon Nuclear Corporation are leased for cattle grazing and field crops. Approximately 150 acres are used for grazing. Field crop cultivation occupies about another 300 acres. Recreational activity is in the form of hunting during legally prescribed seasons, with entry controlled by the agricultural lessee. The Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station consists of a circle with the Dresden Station as the center point. The EPZ extends 10 miles outward in all directions from the Dresden Station for the plume exposure pathway planning zone and 50 miles outward for the ingestion exposure pathway planning zone. In the event of a serious accident at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, the plume exposure EPZ will be the area in which intensive efforts will be made to notify and protect residents and transient populations from exposure to radiation. This EPZ includes the following counties and municipalities: Grundy County (Illinois), and the municipalities of Carbon Hill, Coal City, Diamond, Minooka, and Morris; Will County (Illinois), and the entire municipalities of Braidwood, Channahon, Elwood, and Wilmington, portions of the municipalities of Joliet and Shorewood, and a small portion of Kendall County (Illinois).
3.1. EPZ Description The Dresden Nuclear Power Station is located on 953 rolling prairie acres in northeast Grundy County on the southern bank of the Illinois River. The topography of the site and its immediate environs is relatively flat, with elevations varying from 509 to 523 feet above sea level. The only significant topographic deviations in the area around the Dresden Station are the Kankakee Bluffs, 591 to 624 feet high, located just northeast of the site.
Portions of the site owned by Exelon Nuclear Corporation are leased for cattle grazing and field crops. Approximately 150 acres are used for grazing. Field crop cultivation occupies about another 300 acres. Recreational activity is in the form of hunting during legally prescribed seasons, with entry controlled by the agricultural lessee. The Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station consists of a circle with the Dresden Station as the center point. The EPZ extends 10 miles outward in all directions from the Dresden Station for the plume exposure pathway planning zone and 50 miles outward for the ingestion exposure pathway planning zone. In the event of a serious accident at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, the plume exposure EPZ will be the area in which intensive efforts will be made to notify and protect residents and transient populations from exposure to radiation. This EPZ includes the following counties and municipalities: Grundy County (Illinois), and the municipalities of Carbon Hill, Coal City, Diamond, Minooka, and Morris; Will County (Illinois), and the entire municipalities of Braidwood, Channahon, Elwood, and Wilmington, portions of the municipalities of Joliet and Shorewood, and a small portion of Kendall County (Illinois).
The plume EPZ is divided into a total of 16 sub-areas.
The plume EPZ is divided into a total of 16 sub-areas.
The population distribution in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the Dresden Nuclear Power 6
The population distribution in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the Dresden Nuclear Power 6
Station is relatively low. The 2000 census population for the 10-mile EPZ is divided as follows: Braceville - population 792 located nine miles South from the site; Braidwood -
Station is relatively low. The 2000 census population for the 10-mile EPZ is divided as follows: Braceville - population 792 located nine miles South from the site; Braidwood -
polulation 5203 located seven miles South Southeast from the site; Carbon Hill -
polulation 5203 located seven miles South Southeast from the site; Carbon Hill -
population 392 located three miles South Southeast from the site; Channahon -
population 392 located three miles South Southeast from the site; Channahon -
population 7344 located seven miles Northeast from the site; Coal City - population 4797 located seven miles South from the site; Diamond - population 1393 located eight miles South from the site; Elwood - population 1620 located miles miles East from the site; Minooka - population 3971 located four miles North of the site; Morris - population 11928 located eight miles West of the site; and Wilmington - population 5134 located nine miles Southeast of the site. The majority of the populations for the following jursdictions reside outside of the ten mile EPZ: Joliet - population 106221 located four miles Northeast from the site and Shorewood - population 7686 located nine miles North Northwest of the site.
population 7344 located seven miles Northeast from the site; Coal City - population 4797 located seven miles South from the site; Diamond - population 1393 located eight miles South from the site; Elwood - population 1620 located miles miles East from the site; Minooka - population 3971 located four miles North of the site; Morris - population 11928 located eight miles West of the site; and Wilmington - population 5134 located nine miles Southeast of the site. The majority of the populations for the following jursdictions reside outside of the ten mile EPZ: Joliet - population 106221 located four miles Northeast from the site and Shorewood - population 7686 located nine miles North Northwest of the site.
Outside of the Station's boundaries there is a substantial amount of industry. Adjacent to the southern boundary of the Station is the Away-From-Reactor Operations Spent Fuel Storage Facility. Four miles southeast of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station is the former Joliet Arsenal (36,000 acres), which now is comprised of two industrial areas:
Outside of the Stations boundaries there is a substantial amount of industry. Adjacent to the southern boundary of the Station is the Away-From-Reactor Operations Spent Fuel Storage Facility. Four miles southeast of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station is the former Joliet Arsenal (36,000 acres), which now is comprised of two industrial areas:
9,000 acres for a national cemetery; and 23,000 acres for the Midewin National Tallgrass Prairie. The Army is retaining the use of 4,000 acres.
9,000 acres for a national cemetery; and 23,000 acres for the Midewin National Tallgrass Prairie. The Army is retaining the use of 4,000 acres.
Within the EPZ of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station there are industrial plants, chemical production facilities, petroleum refining industries, warehousing, dry dock facilities and transportation equipment industries The majority of the remaining area in the Dresden Nuclear Power Station EPZ is used for agriculture, predominately cash grain production. South of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station is approximately twenty-seven (27) square miles of recreational and residential land. The EPZ also contains four state parks and a conservation area. These areas are served by various forms of transportation. Interstate Highway 80 passes five miles to the north of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, and Interstate Highway 55 passes four miles to the east of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. The Illinois, Des Plaines and Kankakee Rivers flow near the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. Several railroads operate on tracks running near the Dresden Nuclear Power Station EPZ, including, the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company and Amtrak which is four (4) miles east of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station; the Elgin, the Joliet and Eastern Railroad which is one and one-half (11/2) miles west of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station; the CSX Transportation Inc., which is four (4) miles northwest of the 7
Within the EPZ of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station there are industrial plants, chemical production facilities, petroleum refining industries, warehousing, dry dock facilities and transportation equipment industries The majority of the remaining area in the Dresden Nuclear Power Station EPZ is used for agriculture, predominately cash grain production. South of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station is approximately twenty-seven (27) square miles of recreational and residential land. The EPZ also contains four state parks and a conservation area. These areas are served by various forms of transportation. Interstate Highway 80 passes five miles to the north of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, and Interstate Highway 55 passes four miles to the east of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. The Illinois, Des Plaines and Kankakee Rivers flow near the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. Several railroads operate on tracks running near the Dresden Nuclear Power Station EPZ, including, the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company and Amtrak which is four (4) miles east of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station; the Elgin, the Joliet and Eastern Railroad which is one and one-half (11/2) miles west of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station; the CSX Transportation Inc., which is four (4) miles northwest of the 7
Dresden Nuclear Power Station; and the Union Pacific Railroad Company, which is seven (7) miles east of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.
Dresden Nuclear Power Station; and the Union Pacific Railroad Company, which is seven (7) miles east of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.
3.2. Exercise Participants Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Dresden Nuclear Power Station exercise:
3.2. Exercise Participants Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Dresden Nuclear Power Station exercise:
State Jurisdictions Central Management Systems Illinois Commerce Commission Illinois Department of Agriculture Illinois Department of Corrections Illinois Department of Human Services Illinois Department of Natural Resources Illinois Department of Transportation-Highways Illinois Emergency Management Agency Illinois Environmental Protection Agency Illinois Law Enforcement Alert System Illinois Liaison Officers Illinois National Guard Illinois State Attorney General Illinois State Police Mutual Aid Box Alarm System Division 15 Office of the State Fire Marshal Secretary of State Secretary of State Police Risk Jurisdictions Grundy County Administrator Grundy County Board Chair Grundy County Coal City Community Unit District #1 Grundy County Emergency Management Agency Grundy County Health Department Grundy County Highway Department Grundy County Land Use Grundy County Public Information Grundy County Regional Superintendent of Schools 8
State Jurisdictions Central Management Systems Illinois Commerce Commission Illinois Department of Agriculture Illinois Department of Corrections Illinois Department of Human Services Illinois Department of Natural Resources Illinois Department of Transportation-Highways Illinois Emergency Management Agency Illinois Environmental Protection Agency Illinois Law Enforcement Alert System Illinois Liaison Officers Illinois National Guard Illinois State Attorney General Illinois State Police Mutual Aid Box Alarm System Division 15 Office of the State Fire Marshal Secretary of State Secretary of State Police Risk Jurisdictions Grundy County Administrator Grundy County Board Chair Grundy County Coal City Community Unit District #1 Grundy County Emergency Management Agency Grundy County Health Department Grundy County Highway Department Grundy County Land Use Grundy County Public Information Grundy County Regional Superintendent of Schools 8
Grundy County Saratoga Community Consolidated School District #60C Grundy County Sheriff's Department Grundy County Solid Waste KENCOM Kendall County Board Chair Kendall County Emergency Management Agency Kendall County Health and Human Services Kendall County Highway Department Kendall County Public Information Kendall County Regional Superintendent of Schools Kendall County Sheriff's Department Morris Police Department Will County Emergency Management Agency Will County Executive Board Will County Health Department Will County Public Information Will County Sheriff's Department Will County Troy Community Consolidated School District #30C Private Jurisdictions American Red Cross Chicagoland Speedway EBS Radio Station WCSJ/WJDK EBS Radio Station WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ EBS Radio Station WSPY Exelon Nuclear Kankakee Community College Mazon School District Morris Hospital Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services 3.3. Exercise Timeline Table 1, on the following page, presents the times at which key events and activities occurred during the REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway exercise conducted on March 25, 2009, for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.
Grundy County Saratoga Community Consolidated School District #60C Grundy County Sheriff's Department Grundy County Solid Waste KENCOM Kendall County Board Chair Kendall County Emergency Management Agency Kendall County Health and Human Services Kendall County Highway Department Kendall County Public Information Kendall County Regional Superintendent of Schools Kendall County Sheriff's Department Morris Police Department Will County Emergency Management Agency Will County Executive Board Will County Health Department Will County Public Information Will County Sheriff's Department Will County Troy Community Consolidated School District #30C Private Jurisdictions American Red Cross Chicagoland Speedway EBS Radio Station WCSJ/WJDK EBS Radio Station WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ EBS Radio Station WSPY Exelon Nuclear Kankakee Community College Mazon School District Morris Hospital Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services 3.3. Exercise Timeline Table 1, on the following page, presents the times at which key events and activities occurred during the REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway exercise conducted on March 25, 2009, for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.
9 Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2009-03-25, SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL Emergency Classification Level or Event Time Utility Declared State EOC/SIRC REAC UAC - Mazon IEMA Office JIC Grundy - EOC Kendell - EOC Unusual Event N/A NA NA NA NA N/A N/A Alert 0810 0825 0824 0840 0930 0849 0849 Site Area Emergency 0943 0958 0954 1005 1004 1008 1008 General Emergency 1107 1123 1120 1135 1130 1144 1144 Simulated Rad. Release Started 1106 1123 1106 1135 1130 1144 1144 Simulated Rad. Release Terminated N/A NA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Facility Declared Operational 0905 0844 0840 0930 0922 0921 Declaration of State of Emergency 1030 N/A 1039 1018 N/A Exercise Terminated 1410 1340 1326 1325 1406 N/A Early Precautionary Actions: The State issued a Livestock Advisory; All livestock are to be sheltered and placed on stored feed and water within the 10-mile EPZ.
9
1030 1030 1135 N/A N/A N/A 1st Protective Action Recommendation:
 
1133 1128 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1st Protective Action Decision (Grundy County): N/A N/A N/A N/A 1154 N/A 1st Siren Activation (Grundy County)
Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2009-03-25, SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL Time Utility Declared UAC - Mazon IEMA State EOC/SIRC Emergency Classification Level or Grundy - EOC   Kendell - EOC Event REAC  Office JIC Unusual Event                           N/A                       NA                 NA         NA                 NA   N/A             N/A Alert                                   0810                     0825               0824       0840               0930   0849           0849 Site Area Emergency                     0943                     0958               0954       1005               1004   1008           1008 General Emergency                       1107                     1123               1120       1135               1130   1144           1144 Simulated Rad. Release Started         1106                     1123               1106       1135               1130   1144           1144 Simulated Rad. Release                 N/A                       NA               N/A       N/A               N/A   N/A             N/A Terminated Facility Declared Operational                                   0905               0844       0840               0930   0922           0921 Declaration of State of Emergency                               1030                         N/A               1039   1018           N/A Exercise Terminated                                             1410               1340       1326               1325   1406           N/A Early Precautionary Actions: The State issued a                 1030              1030      1135              N/A    N/A            N/A Livestock Advisory; All livestock are to be sheltered and placed on stored feed and water within the 10-mile EPZ.
N/A N/A N/A N/A 1158 N/A 1st EAS or EBS Message (Grundy County)
1st Protective Action Recommendation:                           1133               1128       N/A               N/A   N/A             N/A 1st Protective Action Decision (Grundy                           N/A               N/A       N/A               N/A   1154           N/A County):
N/A N/A N/A N/A 1218 N/A 2nd Protective Action Decision (Grundy County): N/A N/A N/A N/A 1201 N/A 2nd Siren Activation (Grundy County)
1st Siren Activation (Grundy County)                             N/A               N/A       N/A               N/A   1158           N/A 1st EAS or EBS Message (Grundy County)                           N/A               N/A       N/A               N/A   1218           N/A 2nd Protective Action Decision (Grundy                           N/A               N/A       N/A               N/A   1201           N/A County):
N/A N/A N/A N/A 1218 N/A 2nd EAS or EBS Message (Grundy County)
2nd Siren Activation (Grundy County)                             N/A               N/A       N/A               N/A   1218           N/A 2nd EAS or EBS Message (Grundy County)                           N/A               N/A       N/A               N/A   1218           N/A 1st Protective Action Decision:                                   NA               1220       N/A               N/A   N/A             1149 1st Siren Activation                                             NA               N/A       N/A               N/A   N/A             1206 1st EAS or EBS Message                                           NA               N/A       N/A               N/A   N/A             1210 2nd Protective Action Recommendation:                           1230               1220       N/A               N/A   N/A             N/A 2nd Protective Action Decision:                                   NA               N/A       N/A               N/A   1249           N/A 2nd Siren Activation                                             NA               N/A       N/A               N/A   1253           N/A 2nd EAS or EBS Message                                           NA               N/A       N/A               N/A   1300           N/A KI Administration Decision, Radiological                         1133               1128       1135               N/A   N/A             N/A Assessment Field Teams:
N/A N/A N/A N/A 1218 N/A 1st Protective Action Decision:
KI Administration Decision, Emergency                           1133               1128       1135               N/A   1158           1156 Workers and Immobile Populations:
NA 1220 N/A N/A N/A 1149 1st Siren Activation NA N/A N/A N/A N/A 1206 1st EAS or EBS Message NA N/A N/A N/A N/A 1210 2nd Protective Action Recommendation:
10
1230 1220 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2nd Protective Action Decision:
 
NA N/A N/A N/A 1249 N/A 2nd Siren Activation NA N/A N/A N/A 1253 N/A 2nd EAS or EBS Message NA N/A N/A N/A 1300 N/A KI Administration Decision, Radiological Assessment Field Teams:
Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2009-03-25, SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL Emergency Classification Level or Time Utility Will - EOC Event Declared Unusual Event                               N/A           N/A Alert                                       0810         0848 Site Area Emergency                         0943         1011 General Emergency                           1107         1150 Simulated Rad. Release Started               1106         1150 Simulated Rad. Release Terminated           N/A           N/A Facility Declared Operational                             0918 Declaration of State of Emergency                         1030 Exercise Terminated                                       1406 Early Precautionary Actions: The State issued a           N/A Livestock Advisory; All livestock are to be sheltered and placed on stored feed and water within the 10-mile EPZ.
1133 1128 1135 N/A N/A N/A KI Administration Decision, Emergency Workers and Immobile Populations:
1st Protective Action Recommendation:                     N/A 1st Protective Action Decision (Grundy County):           N/A 1st Siren Activation (Grundy County)                       N/A 1st EAS or EBS Message (Grundy County)                     N/A 2nd Protective Action Decision (Grundy County):           N/A 2nd Siren Activation (Grundy County)                       N/A 2nd EAS or EBS Message (Grundy County)                     N/A 1st Protective Action Decision:                           1152 1st Siren Activation                                       1157 1st EAS or EBS Message                                     1158 2nd Protective Action Recommendation:                     N/A 2nd Protective Action Decision:                           N/A 2nd Siren Activation                                       N/A 2nd EAS or EBS Message                                     N/A KI Administration Decision, Radiological Assessment       N/A Field Teams:
1133 1128 1135 N/A 1158 1156 10 Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2009-03-25, SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL Emergency Classification Level or Event Time Utility Declared Will - EOC Unusual Event N/A N/A Alert 0810 0848 Site Area Emergency 0943 1011 General Emergency 1107 1150 Simulated Rad. Release Started 1106 1150 Simulated Rad. Release Terminated N/A N/A Facility Declared Operational 0918 Declaration of State of Emergency 1030 Exercise Terminated 1406 Early Precautionary Actions: The State issued a Livestock Advisory; All livestock are to be sheltered and placed on stored feed and water within the 10-mile EPZ.N/A 1st Protective Action Recommendation:
KI Administration Decision, Emergency Workers and         1150 Immobile Populations:
N/A 1st Protective Action Decision (Grundy County):
11
N/A 1st Siren Activation (Grundy County)
: 4. Exercise Evaluation and Results Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the March 25, 2009, REP Full Participation Plume Pathway Exercises to test the off-site emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.
N/A 1st EAS or EBS Message (Grundy County)
Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on its demonstration of exercise criteria delineated in Federal Register Notice: Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent of play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.
N/A 2nd Protective Action Decision (Grundy County):
N/A 2nd Siren Activation (Grundy County)
N/A 2nd EAS or EBS Message (Grundy County)
N/A 1st Protective Action Decision:
1152 1st Siren Activation 1157 1st EAS or EBS Message 1158 2nd Protective Action Recommendation:
N/A 2nd Protective Action Decision:
N/A 2nd Siren Activation N/A 2nd EAS or EBS Message N/A KI Administration Decision, Radiological Assessment Field Teams:
N/A KI Administration Decision, Emergency Workers and Immobile Populations:
1150 11  
: 4. Exercise Evaluation and Results Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the March 25, 2009, REP Full Participation Plume Pathway Exercises to test the off-site emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on its demonstration of exercise criteria delineated in Federal Register Notice: Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent of play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.
4.1. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page(s), presents the status of all exercise criteria from Federal Register Notice: Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002, which were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following letters:
4.1. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page(s), presents the status of all exercise criteria from Federal Register Notice: Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002, which were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following letters:
exercises)
M-Met (No Deficiency or ARCA assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)
D-Deficiency assessed A-ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)
N-Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Section IV.B.)
Blank-Not scheduled for demonstration 12
 
Table 2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (3 pages)
State Public Inquiry Phone Bank          UAC - Chicagoland Speedway IL State Liason - Grundy DATE: 2009-03-25 M&DEWE - RAFT SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL State EOC/SIRC A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated State - IWP                                                      REAC                                RAFT                  FT - 1  FT - 2  EOF  JIC Emergency Operations Management Mobilization                                                              1a1 M M                                                                M                                  M                      M M M Facilities                                                                1b1 Direction and Control                                                      1c1  M                                                                M M M        M M Communications Equipment                                                  1d1 M M                                                                M M M  M M M M M Equip & Supplies to support operations                                    1e1  M                                                                M M M M M M M M Protective Action Decision Making Emergency Worker Exposure Control                                          2a1                M                                                  M Radiological Assessment and PARs                                          2b1                M                                                  M Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs                                        2b2                M                                                  M M PADs for protection of special populations                                2c1                M                                                  M Rad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway      2d1 Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and    2e1 Return Protective Action Implementation Implementation of emergency worker exposure control                        3a1                                                                                                              M M M Implementation of KI decision                                              3b1                                                                                                                M M Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs        3c1 Implementation of protective actions for Schools                          3c2 Implementation of traffic and access control                              3d1                                                                          M Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved                      3d2                                                                          M Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info  3e1 Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available                        3e2 Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions              3f1 Field Measurement and Analysis Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements                      4a1                                                                                                                              M M Field Teams obtain sufficient information                                  4a2                                                                                                        M Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately                        4a3                                                                                                        M                      M M Post plume phase field measurements and sampling                          4b1 Laboratory operations                                                      4c1 Emergency Notification and Public Info Activation of the prompt alert and notification system                    5a1                M                                                                                                                                          M Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker      5a2 Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas  5a3 Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media        5b1                M M M M                                                                                                                              M Support Operations/Facilities Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of        6a1 evacuees Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment                                  6b1                                                                                                              M Temporary care of evacuees                                                6c1 Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals          6d1 13
 
Table 2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 2/3)
IL State Rad Advisor - Grundy                                IL State Rad Advisor - Kendall                                                          DCO Briefing - ISP District 5 HQ                          DEEW - Kankakee Comm Col  M&DEWE - Kankakee Comm Col  Pub Reg - Kankakee Comm Col IL State Liaison - Kendall                                                              IL State Rad Advisor - Will                                                                                                                                                    CCC - Kankakee Comm Col DATE: 2009-03-25 IL State Liaison - Will                                                                    TACP - ISP District 5 SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL Grundy - IWP A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated Emergency Operations Management Mobilization                                                              1a1 M  M  M            M Facilities                                                                1b1 Direction and Control                                                      1c1 M M M M M Communications Equipment                                                  1d1  M  M    M      M M Equip & Supplies to support operations                                    1e1 M  M  M M M M M M Protective Action Decision Making Emergency Worker Exposure Control                                          2a1 Radiological Assessment and PARs                                          2b1 Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs                                        2b2 M                                                              M PADs for protection of special populations                                2c1                                                                                                                          M Rad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway      2d1 Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and    2e1 Return Protective Action Implementation Implementation of emergency worker exposure control                        3a1                                                                                                                                                        M M M M Implementation of KI decision                                              3b1                                                                                                                                                        M M Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs        3c1 Implementation of protective actions for Schools                          3c2 Implementation of traffic and access control                              3d1                                                                                                                                                                                            M Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved                      3d2 Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info  3e1 Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available                        3e2 Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions              3f1 Field Measurement and Analysis Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements                      4a1 Field Teams obtain sufficient information                                  4a2 Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately                        4a3 Post plume phase field measurements and sampling                          4b1 Laboratory operations                                                      4c1 Emergency Notification and Public Info Activation of the prompt alert and notification system                    5a1 M M M M M Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker      5a2 Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas  5a3 Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media        5b1 Support Operations/Facilities Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of        6a1                                                                                                                                                                                                                    M M M evacuees Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment                                  6b1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              M Temporary care of evacuees                                                6c1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          M Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals          6d1 14
 
Table 2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 3/3)
Will - EAS - WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ Grundy - EBS - WCSJ/WJDK                                                                                                                                                                                                Will - EV-2 Dresden Troy SD 30C Grundy - EV-2 Coal City SD  Grundy - EV-2 Saratoga SD DATE: 2009-03-25 SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL Kendall - EBS - WSPY A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated Grundy - EOC                                                                                      Kendall - IWP  Kendell - EOC  TACP - Kendall                                      Will - EOC Will - IWP Emergency Operations Management Mobilization                                                              1a1  M                                                                                                  M M                                                                    M M Facilities                                                                1b1 Direction and Control                                                      1c1  M        M      M Communications Equipment                                                  1d1  M M M M M M M M M M M M Equip & Supplies to support operations                                    1e1  M  M M  M M    M  M Protective Action Decision Making Emergency Worker Exposure Control                                          2a1 Radiological Assessment and PARs                                          2b1 Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs                                        2b2 M                                                                                                                    M                                                                    M PADs for protection of special populations                                2c1 M                                                                                                                    M                                                                    M Rad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway      2d1 Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and    2e1 Return Protective Action Implementation Implementation of emergency worker exposure control                        3a1  M                                        M M                                                                      M M                                                                                                                  M Implementation of KI decision                                              3b1  M                                        M M                                                                      M M                                                                                                                  M Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs        3c1  M                                                                                                                  M Implementation of protective actions for Schools                          3c2  M                                        M M                                                                      M                                                                                                                    M Implementation of traffic and access control                              3d1                                                                                                                      M M Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved                      3d2  M                                                                                                                  M Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info  3e1 Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available                        3e2 Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions              3f1 Field Measurement and Analysis Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements                      4a1 Field Teams obtain sufficient information                                  4a2 Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately                        4a3 Post plume phase field measurements and sampling                          4b1 Laboratory operations                                                      4c1 Emergency Notification and Public Info Activation of the prompt alert and notification system                    5a1 M M                                                                                                                  M                                M                                  M M Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker      5a2 Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas  5a3 Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media        5b1 M                                                                                                                    M                                                                    M Support Operations/Facilities Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of        6a1 evacuees Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment                                  6b1 Temporary care of evacuees                                                6c1 15
 
Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals 6d1 16


12 Table 2 -  Summary of Exercise Evaluation (3 pages)
4.2. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated 4.2.1. Illinois Jurisdictions 4.2.1.1. State Initial Warning Point
DATE: 2009-03-25 SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated State - IWP State EOC/SIRC State Public Inquiry Phone Bank REAC UAC - Chicagoland Speedway RAFT M&DEWE - RAFT FT - 1 FT - 2 EOF JIC IL State Liason - Grundy Emergency Operations Management Mobilization 1a1 M MMMM M MFacilities 1b1 Direction and Control 1c1MM M MM M Communications Equipment 1d1 M MM M MM M M M M Equip & Supplies to support operations 1e1MM M M M M M M MProtective Action Decision Making Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2a1MMRadiological Assessment and PARs 2b1MMDecisions for the Plume Phase -PADs 2b2MM MPADs for protection of special populations 2c1MMRad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway 2d1 Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and Return 2e1 Protective Action Implementation Implementation of emergency worker exposure control 3a1M M MImplementation of KI decision 3b1M MImplementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs 3c1Implementation of protective actions for Schools 3c2Implementation of traffic and access control 3d1MImpediments to evacuation are identified and resolved 3d2MImplementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info 3e1 Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available 3e2 Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions 3f1 Field Measurement and Analysis Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements 4a1M MField Teams obtain sufficient information 4a2MField Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately 4a3MM MPost plume phase field measurements and sampling 4b1 Laboratory operations 4c1 Emergency Notification and Public Info Activation of the prompt alert and notification system 5a1MM Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker 5a2 Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas 5a3 Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media 5b1M M M MMSupport Operations/Facilities Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of evacuees 6a1Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment 6b1MTemporary care of evacuees 6c1Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals 6d1 13 Table 2 -  Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 2/3)
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
DATE: 2009-03-25 SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated IL State Rad Advisor - Grundy IL State Liaison - Kendall IL State Rad Advisor - Kendall IL State Liaison - Will IL State Rad Advisor - Will DCO Briefing - ISP District 5 HQ TACP - ISP District 5 DEEW - Kankakee Comm Col M&DEWE - Kankakee Comm Col Pub Reg - Kankakee Comm Col CCC - Kankakee Comm Col Grundy - IWP Emergency Operations Management Mobilization 1a1 MMMM Facilities 1b1 Direction and Control 1c1 M M M M MCommunications Equipment 1d1MMMM M Equip & Supplies to support operations 1e1 MMM M M M M MProtective Action Decision Making Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2a1Radiological Assessment and PARs 2b1Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs 2b2 MMPADs for protection of special populations 2c1MRad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway 2d1 Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and Return 2e1 Protective Action Implementation Implementation of emergency worker exposure control 3a1M M M MImplementation of KI decision 3b1M MImplementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs 3c1Implementation of protective actions for Schools 3c2Implementation of traffic and access control 3d1MImpediments to evacuation are identified and resolved 3d2Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info 3e1 Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available 3e2 Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions 3f1 Field Measurement and Analysis Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements 4a1Field Teams obtain sufficient information 4a2Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately 4a3Post plume phase field measurements and sampling 4b1 Laboratory operations 4c1 Emergency Notification and Public Info Activation of the prompt alert and notification system 5a1 M M M M MActivation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker 5a2 Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas 5a3 Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media 5b1Support Operations/Facilities Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of evacuees 6a1M M MMon / decon of emergency worker equipment 6b1MTemporary care of evacuees 6c1MTransportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals 6d1 14 Table 2 -  Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 3/3)
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
DATE: 2009-03-25 SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated Grundy - EOC Grundy - EBS - WCSJ/WJDK Grundy - EV-2 Coal City SD Grundy - EV-2 Saratoga SD Kendall - IWP Kendell - EOC TACP - Kendall Kendall - EBS - WSPY Will - IWP Will - EOC Will - EAS - WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ Will - EV-2 Dresden Troy SD 30C Emergency Operations Management Mobilization 1a1 MM MM MFacilities 1b1 Direction and Control 1c1 MMMCommunications Equipment 1d1 M M M M M M M M M M M M Equip & Supplies to support operations 1e1 MM MM MMM Protective Action Decision Making Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2a1Radiological Assessment and PARs 2b1Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs 2b2 MMMPADs for protection of special populations 2c1 MMMRad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway 2d1 Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and Return 2e1 Protective Action Implementation Implementation of emergency worker exposure control 3a1 MM MM MM Implementation of KI decision 3b1 MM MM MM Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs 3c1 MMImplementation of protective actions for Schools 3c2 MM MMM Implementation of traffic and access control 3d1M MImpediments to evacuation are identified and resolved 3d2 MMImplementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info 3e1 Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available 3e2 Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions 3f1 Field Measurement and Analysis Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements 4a1Field Teams obtain sufficient information 4a2Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately 4a3Post plume phase field measurements and sampling 4b1 Laboratory operations 4c1 Emergency Notification and Public Info Activation of the prompt alert and notification system 5a1 M MMMM MActivation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker 5a2 Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas 5a3 Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media 5b1 MMMSupport Operations/Facilities Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of evacuees 6a1Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment 6b1Temporary care of evacuees 6c115 Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals 6d1 16 a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.4.2. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated 4.2.1. Illinois Jurisdictions 4.2.1.1. State Initial Warning Point MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.2. State Emergency Operations Center/State of Illinois Response Center MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: 2.b.2.
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.2. State Emergency Operations Center/State of Illinois Response Center
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: 2.b.2.
ISSUE NO.: 20-09-2b2-D-01 CRITERION: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public including KI if ORO policy.
ISSUE NO.: 20-09-2b2-D-01 CRITERION: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public including KI if ORO policy.
CONDITION: The initial release of radioactive materials from the DNPS began at 1106 hours. The peak release rates by scenario were between 1130-1145 hours, and actually occurred at 1140 hours. The meteorological data indicated a constant wind speed of 4 mph, the affected Sub-Areas needed to be evacuated as quickly as possible to protect the public from being immersed in a radioactive plume.
CONDITION: The initial release of radioactive materials from the DNPS began at 1106 hours. The peak release rates by scenario were between 1130-1145 hours, and actually occurred at 1140 hours. The meteorological data indicated a constant wind speed of 4 mph, the affected Sub-Areas needed to be evacuated as quickly as possible to protect the public from being immersed in a radioactive plume.
By 1210 hours, the plume segment which exceeded the PAGs traveled approximately 2.0 miles from the DNPS site boundary. From the time the 17 State verified the Release occurring at 1123 hours until the time Grundy County had verified receipt of the State's recommended PAR at1144 hours a total of 21 minutes had elapsed. During this time it took 11 minutes to transmit the State's PAR to the Counties. These 11 minutes contributed to the overall 71 minutes that transpired from the release occurring to the time Grundy County began notification of the General Public through broadcast by EBS Station - WCSJ/WJDK at 1218 hours.
By 1210 hours, the plume segment which exceeded the PAGs traveled approximately 2.0 miles from the DNPS site boundary. From the time the 17
 
State verified the Release occurring at 1123 hours until the time Grundy County had verified receipt of the States recommended PAR at1144 hours a total of 21 minutes had elapsed. During this time it took 11 minutes to transmit the States PAR to the Counties. These 11 minutes contributed to the overall 71 minutes that transpired from the release occurring to the time Grundy County began notification of the General Public through broadcast by EBS Station - WCSJ/WJDK at 1218 hours.
POSSIBLE CAUSE: The process used and performance demonstrated by the State and Grundy County to determine and implement protective action recommendations and decisions, contributed to a delay in the notification of the public to take action.
POSSIBLE CAUSE: The process used and performance demonstrated by the State and Grundy County to determine and implement protective action recommendations and decisions, contributed to a delay in the notification of the public to take action.


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On June 30, 2009, a telephonic conference was held between the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA), the Exelon Corporation, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region V (FEMA RV). The purpose of the call was to determine the actions to be taken to resolve the Deficiency identified under criterion 2.b.2, State Incident Response Center, during the March 25, 2009, REP Exercise.
On June 30, 2009, a telephonic conference was held between the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA), the Exelon Corporation, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region V (FEMA RV). The purpose of the call was to determine the actions to be taken to resolve the Deficiency identified under criterion 2.b.2, State Incident Response Center, during the March 25, 2009, REP Exercise.
The agreement between IEMA and FEMA RV was for IEMA to submit a letter to FEMA RV which will indicate their commitment to develop an improved process for notice to the public in the case of a radiological event at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. This process is to be developed, tested and ready for implementation no longer than 90 days for the acknowledgment of receipt by FEMA RV.
The agreement between IEMA and FEMA RV was for IEMA to submit a letter to FEMA RV which will indicate their commitment to develop an improved process for notice to the public in the case of a radiological event at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. This process is to be developed, tested and ready for implementation no longer than 90 days for the acknowledgment of receipt by FEMA RV.
18 d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a. On July 7, 2009, the commitment letter from IEMA was received at FEMA RV. After review of the IEMA letter an acknowledgement letter from FEMA RV was prepared and sent to IEMA on July 10, 2009. This letter indicated that the 90 day period would commence on July 10, 2009.
18
 
On July 7, 2009, the commitment letter from IEMA was received at FEMA RV. After review of the IEMA letter an acknowledgement letter from FEMA RV was prepared and sent to IEMA on July 10, 2009. This letter indicated that the 90 day period would commence on July 10, 2009.
The Illinois Emergency Management Agency complied with the decisions made at the June 30th conference call. The submittal of their letter committing to the development of an improved process within the 90 days period resolves the identified Deficiency for criterion 2.b.2.
The Illinois Emergency Management Agency complied with the decisions made at the June 30th conference call. The submittal of their letter committing to the development of an improved process within the 90 days period resolves the identified Deficiency for criterion 2.b.2.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.3. Public Inquiry Phone Bank MET: 5.b.1.
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.4. Radiological Emergency Assessment Center MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.b.1.
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.5. Unified Area Command - Chicagoland Speedway MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.b.1.
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.3. Public Inquiry Phone Bank
19 b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.6. Radiological Assessment Field Team MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 4.a.2, 4.a.3.
: a. MET: 5.b.1.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.7. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment at the RAFT MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.b.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.8. Field Team 1 MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.3.
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.9. Field Team 2 MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.3.
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None 20 c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.10.
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
Emergency Operations Facility MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1.
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.4. Radiological Emergency Assessment Center
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.11.
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.b.1.
Joint Information Center MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.12.
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
Illinois State Liaison - Grundy County MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.13.
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Grundy County MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1.
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.5. Unified Area Command - Chicagoland Speedway
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None 21 d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.14.
: a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.b.1.
Illinois State Liaison - Kendall County MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
19
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.15.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Kendall County MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1.
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.16.
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
Illinois State Liaison - Will County MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.17.
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.6. Radiological Assessment Field Team
Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Will County MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.e.1, 2.c.1, 5.a.1.
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 4.a.2, 4.a.3.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None 22 c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.18.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
Dosimetry Control Officer's Briefing -
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
Illinois State Police District 5 Headquarters MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.19.
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
Traffic and Access Control Point at the Illinois State Police District 5 Headquarters MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1.
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.7. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment at the RAFT
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.20.
: a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.b.1.
Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers - Kankakee Community College MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 23 a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.4.2.1.21.
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment - Kankakee Community College MET:  1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1, 6.b.1.
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.22.
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
Public Registration - Kankakee Community College MET: 1.e.1, 6.a.1.
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.8. Field Team 1
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.23.
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.3.
Congregate Care Center - Kankakee Community College MET:  1.d.1, 6.c.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2. Risk Jurisdictions 24 a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.4.2.2.1. Grundy County - Initial Warning Point MET:  1.a.1, 1.d.1.
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.2. Grundy County - Emergency Operations Center MET:  1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY:  5.b.1.
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
ISSUE NO.: 20-09-5b1-D-02 CRITERION: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E.5., 7., G.3.a, G.4.a.b.c)
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.9. Field Team 2
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.3.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None 20
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.10. Emergency Operations Facility
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.11. Joint Information Center
: a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.12. Illinois State Liaison - Grundy County
: a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.13. Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Grundy County
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None 21
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.14. Illinois State Liaison - Kendall County
: a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.15. Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Kendall County
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.16. Illinois State Liaison - Will County
: a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.17. Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Will County
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.e.1, 2.c.1, 5.a.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None 22
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.18. Dosimetry Control Officer's Briefing -
Illinois State Police District 5 Headquarters
: a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.19. Traffic and Access Control Point at the Illinois State Police District 5 Headquarters
: a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.20. Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers - Kankakee Community College
: a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 23
 
4.2.1.21. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment - Kankakee Community College
: a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1, 6.b.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.22. Public Registration - Kankakee Community College
: a. MET: 1.e.1, 6.a.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.23. Congregate Care Center - Kankakee Community College
: a. MET: 1.d.1, 6.c.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2. Risk Jurisdictions 24
 
4.2.2.1. Grundy County - Initial Warning Point
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.2. Grundy County - Emergency Operations Center
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: 5.b.1.
ISSUE NO.: 20-09-5b1-D-02 CRITERION: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E.5.,
7., G.3.a, G.4.a.b.c)
CONDITION: The initial release of radioactive materials from the DNPS began at 1106 hours. The peak release rates by scenario were between 1130-1145 hours, and actually occurred at 1140 hours. The meteorological data indicated a constant wind speed of 4 mph, the affected Sub-Areas needed to be evacuated as quickly as possible to protect the public from being immersed in a radioactive plume.
CONDITION: The initial release of radioactive materials from the DNPS began at 1106 hours. The peak release rates by scenario were between 1130-1145 hours, and actually occurred at 1140 hours. The meteorological data indicated a constant wind speed of 4 mph, the affected Sub-Areas needed to be evacuated as quickly as possible to protect the public from being immersed in a radioactive plume.
By 1210 hours, the plume segment which exceeded the PAGs traveled approximately 2.0 miles from the DNPS site boundary.
By 1210 hours, the plume segment which exceeded the PAGs traveled approximately 2.0 miles from the DNPS site boundary.
At 1144 Grundy County officials verified State NARS Message No. 3, which included a recommendation to evacuate Grundy County Sub-Areas 1 and 4.
At 1144 Grundy County officials verified State NARS Message No. 3, which included a recommendation to evacuate Grundy County Sub-Areas 1 and 4.
A total of 34 minutes transpired before initiation of the EBS message including an evacuation recommendation for the General Public. These 34 minutes contributed to the overall 71 minutes that transpired from the release 25 occurring to the time Grundy County began notification of the General Public through broadcast by EBS Station - WCSJ/WJDK at 1218 hours.
A total of 34 minutes transpired before initiation of the EBS message including an evacuation recommendation for the General Public. These 34 minutes contributed to the overall 71 minutes that transpired from the release 25
 
occurring to the time Grundy County began notification of the General Public through broadcast by EBS Station - WCSJ/WJDK at 1218 hours.
POSSIBLE CAUSE: The process used and performance demonstrated by the State and Grundy County to determine and implement protective action recommendations and decisions, contributed to a delay in the notification of the public to take action.
POSSIBLE CAUSE: The process used and performance demonstrated by the State and Grundy County to determine and implement protective action recommendations and decisions, contributed to a delay in the notification of the public to take action.


Line 171: Line 306:
The Grundy County EOC had the necessary staff pre-positioned and activated at the Grundy County EOC for this re-demonstration exercise by 0900 hours. Radio station WCSJ/WJDK was also staffed to assist in the re-demonstration.
The Grundy County EOC had the necessary staff pre-positioned and activated at the Grundy County EOC for this re-demonstration exercise by 0900 hours. Radio station WCSJ/WJDK was also staffed to assist in the re-demonstration.
The Controller (IEMA) provided a hand-out containing general information regarding the situation and the actions taken up to the point of play just prior to the re-demonstration drill commencing. This information included two previous NARS messages (State Message No.1 and No.2) which brought the situation up to an Alert condition for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.
The Controller (IEMA) provided a hand-out containing general information regarding the situation and the actions taken up to the point of play just prior to the re-demonstration drill commencing. This information included two previous NARS messages (State Message No.1 and No.2) which brought the situation up to an Alert condition for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.
26 At approximately 0915 hours, the County EOC Communications Center received notification of a change in the On-site Conditions via NARS State Message No. 3. This message was verified at 0920 hours and provided to the Grundy County EMA Director. This message identified that a General Emergency Emergency Classification Level (ECL) had been declared at the site and there was not a radioactive release. The State's Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) identified that Sub-Areas 1, 3, and 4, were to be evacuated. The EM Director and County Board Representative concurred with the State's recommendation to evacuate Sub-Areas 1 and 4 (which are in Grundy County). At 0926 hours, simulated coordination (telephone call to a State Controller) was made with the other two affected counties (Will and Kendall) for the broadcast of Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages and sounding of sirens.
26
 
At approximately 0915 hours, the County EOC Communications Center received notification of a change in the On-site Conditions via NARS State Message No. 3. This message was verified at 0920 hours and provided to the Grundy County EMA Director. This message identified that a General Emergency Emergency Classification Level (ECL) had been declared at the site and there was not a radioactive release. The States Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) identified that Sub-Areas 1, 3, and 4, were to be evacuated. The EM Director and County Board Representative concurred with the States recommendation to evacuate Sub-Areas 1 and 4 (which are in Grundy County). At 0926 hours, simulated coordination (telephone call to a State Controller) was made with the other two affected counties (Will and Kendall) for the broadcast of Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages and sounding of sirens.
The County Media Message Manager prepared the pre-scripted messages regarding the evacuations of Sub-Areas 1 and 4, to be disseminated to the public via the EBS. The completed message contained all the required elements: names of affected municipalities, evacuation routes, location of reception centers, transportation availability for those needing assistance, what to take, phone numbers to call for assistance, information on schools, and other information. The message was approved by the County Board Representative. Once approved the message was e-mailed to the radio station by the Media Message Manager. At 0938 hours, the County Board Representative read the message to the radio station (WCSJ/WJDK) over the telephone for simulated immediate live broadcast and recorded for future repeat broadcasts, ending the message at 0941 hours.
The County Media Message Manager prepared the pre-scripted messages regarding the evacuations of Sub-Areas 1 and 4, to be disseminated to the public via the EBS. The completed message contained all the required elements: names of affected municipalities, evacuation routes, location of reception centers, transportation availability for those needing assistance, what to take, phone numbers to call for assistance, information on schools, and other information. The message was approved by the County Board Representative. Once approved the message was e-mailed to the radio station by the Media Message Manager. At 0938 hours, the County Board Representative read the message to the radio station (WCSJ/WJDK) over the telephone for simulated immediate live broadcast and recorded for future repeat broadcasts, ending the message at 0941 hours.
At approximately 0949 hours, the County received NARS State Message No.
At approximately 0949 hours, the County received NARS State Message No.
4 which provided notice of a release of radioactive material and that a General Emergency ECL was still declared. This message was verified at 0952 hours and provided to the Grundy County EMA Director. The County accepted the Illinois Emergency Management Agency's recommendation to evacuate Sub-Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9 and 12. The addition of Sub-Areas 2 and 7 affect Grundy County.
4 which provided notice of a release of radioactive material and that a General Emergency ECL was still declared. This message was verified at 0952 hours and provided to the Grundy County EMA Director. The County accepted the Illinois Emergency Management Agencys recommendation to evacuate Sub-Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9 and 12. The addition of Sub-Areas 2 and 7 affect Grundy County.
The County Media Message Manager used a pre-scripted template with specific information for the affected Sub-Areas to prepare the EBS message.
The County Media Message Manager used a pre-scripted template with specific information for the affected Sub-Areas to prepare the EBS message.
27 The completed message contained all the required elements: names of affected municipalities, evacuation routes, location of reception centers, transportation availability for those needing assistance, what to take, phone numbers to call for assistance, information on schools, and other information.
27
 
The completed message contained all the required elements: names of affected municipalities, evacuation routes, location of reception centers, transportation availability for those needing assistance, what to take, phone numbers to call for assistance, information on schools, and other information.
The message was reviewed and approved by the County Board Representative. The Media Message Manager sent the message via e-mail to the radio station. At 1008 hours, the message was then read by the County Board Representative over the telephone to the radio station for simulated immediate live broadcast and recorded by the media outlet for simulated playback every 15 minutes for the first hour. Simulated coordination (telephone call to a State Controller) was made with the other two affected counties (Will and Kendall) for the broadcast of EBS messages and sounding of sirens.
The message was reviewed and approved by the County Board Representative. The Media Message Manager sent the message via e-mail to the radio station. At 1008 hours, the message was then read by the County Board Representative over the telephone to the radio station for simulated immediate live broadcast and recorded by the media outlet for simulated playback every 15 minutes for the first hour. Simulated coordination (telephone call to a State Controller) was made with the other two affected counties (Will and Kendall) for the broadcast of EBS messages and sounding of sirens.
All news releases were simulated as coordinated (faxed) with the local municipalities, Kendall and Will Counties, the IEMA Representative at the JIC and the EOF. All media communication activities were logged on the Grundy County Master Log.
All news releases were simulated as coordinated (faxed) with the local municipalities, Kendall and Will Counties, the IEMA Representative at the JIC and the EOF. All media communication activities were logged on the Grundy County Master Log.
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RADIO STATION WCSJ At 0820 hours, Radio Station WCSJ/WJDK received a test e-mail message from the Media Manager in the Grundy County EOC (GCEOC) requesting a confirmation of the message, and informing the radio station of the status of a drill. At 0828 hours, the Operations Manager for Radio Station WCSJ/WJDK submitted an e-mail response to the GCEOC Media Manager. At 0829 hours, the GCEOC Media Manager replied to the radio station's Operations Manager via e-mail.
RADIO STATION WCSJ At 0820 hours, Radio Station WCSJ/WJDK received a test e-mail message from the Media Manager in the Grundy County EOC (GCEOC) requesting a confirmation of the message, and informing the radio station of the status of a drill. At 0828 hours, the Operations Manager for Radio Station WCSJ/WJDK submitted an e-mail response to the GCEOC Media Manager. At 0829 hours, the GCEOC Media Manager replied to the radio station's Operations Manager via e-mail.
At approximately 0915 hours, the small, central broadcasting and recording booth for the radio station was staffed by another radio station employee in anticipation of receiving and simultaneously broadcasting an EBS message live while recording it for future playback.
At approximately 0915 hours, the small, central broadcasting and recording booth for the radio station was staffed by another radio station employee in anticipation of receiving and simultaneously broadcasting an EBS message live while recording it for future playback.
28 d.e.f. At 0937 hours, the central booth operator received an initial notification of the pending broadcast of an EAS message from the GCEOC by way of the illumination of a bright warning light in the booth and a follow-up telephone call from the GCEOC. The booth operator immediately activated the MP3 recorder while simulating overriding the live broadcast. At 0938 hours, GCEOC began reading the first EAS message and at 0941 hours, the message was completed and recorded. The booth operator also received an e-mail message containing the EAS message (Message Number 2) as an attachment with the time of the approval of the message in the GCEOC being 0935 hours.
28
 
At 0937 hours, the central booth operator received an initial notification of the pending broadcast of an EAS message from the GCEOC by way of the illumination of a bright warning light in the booth and a follow-up telephone call from the GCEOC. The booth operator immediately activated the MP3 recorder while simulating overriding the live broadcast. At 0938 hours, GCEOC began reading the first EAS message and at 0941 hours, the message was completed and recorded. The booth operator also received an e-mail message containing the EAS message (Message Number 2) as an attachment with the time of the approval of the message in the GCEOC being 0935 hours.
At 1007 hours, the booth operator was again notified of a pending EAS message by the illumination of a bright warning light in the booth and a follow-up telephone call from the GCEOC. At 1007 hours, the booth operator simulated broadcasting the EAS message over the airwaves while simultaneously recording the message on the MP3 recorder. The EAS message was completed at 1011 hours. The booth operator received an e-mail message with this EAS message (Message Number 3) as an attachment, and the message was approved at the GCEOC 1005 hours.
At 1007 hours, the booth operator was again notified of a pending EAS message by the illumination of a bright warning light in the booth and a follow-up telephone call from the GCEOC. At 1007 hours, the booth operator simulated broadcasting the EAS message over the airwaves while simultaneously recording the message on the MP3 recorder. The EAS message was completed at 1011 hours. The booth operator received an e-mail message with this EAS message (Message Number 3) as an attachment, and the message was approved at the GCEOC 1005 hours.
During discussions with the broadcast/recording booth operator, it was learned that training for the radio station broadcasting staff on the e-mail notification system had been conducted by the Grundy County EMA in March 2009. The booth operator provided the evaluator with copies of both EAS messages and the radio station provided the evaluator with a copy of the Grundy County Emergency Public Notification Guideline, G-SOG-20, dated May 2007. All activities described in the re-demonstration criterion were carried out in accordance with the plan and procedures.
During discussions with the broadcast/recording booth operator, it was learned that training for the radio station broadcasting staff on the e-mail notification system had been conducted by the Grundy County EMA in March 2009. The booth operator provided the evaluator with copies of both EAS messages and the radio station provided the evaluator with a copy of the Grundy County Emergency Public Notification Guideline, G-SOG-20, dated May 2007.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 29 a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.4.2.2.3. Grundy County - Emergency Broadcast System Station - WCSJ/WJDK MET: 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
All activities described in the re-demonstration criterion were carried out in accordance with the plan and procedures.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.4. Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Coal City School District MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.5. Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Saratoga School District MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.6. Kendall County - Initial Warning Point MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 29
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 30 e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.7. Kendall County - Emergency Operations Center MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
 
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.8. Kendall County - Traffic and Access Control Point MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1.
4.2.2.3. Grundy County - Emergency Broadcast System Station - WCSJ/WJDK
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.9. Kendall County - Emergency Broadcast System Station - WSPY MET: 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
: a. MET: 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.10.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
Will County - Initial Warning Point 31 a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.a.b.c.d.e.f.MET:  1.a.1, 1.d.1.
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.11.
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
Will County - Emergency Operations Center MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.12.
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.4. Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Coal City School District
Will County - Emergency Alert System Station - WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ MET: 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
: a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.13.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
Will County - EV-2 Interview - Troy Community Consolidated School District 30C MET:  1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None DEFICIENCY: None NOT DEMONSTRATED: None PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 32 APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ARC American Red Cross ARES Amateur Radio Emergency Service BC Board Chairman CBC County Board Chairman CCC Congregate Care Center CERT Civilian Emergency Response Team DAP Disaster Assistance Plans DCO Dosimetry Control Officer DDP Dosimetry Distribution Point DGS Dresden Generating Station DNPS Dresden Nuclear Power Station DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter EAL Emergency Action Level EAS Emergency Alert System EBS Emergency Broadcast System ECL Emergency Classification Level EMA Emergency Management Agency EMC Emergency Management Coordinator EMD Emergency Management Director EMS Emergency Medical Services EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency GCEMA Grundy County Emergency Management Agency GE General Emergency IEMA Illinois Emergency Management Agency IEPA Illinois Environmental Protection Agency ISP Illinois State Police ITECS Illinois Transportable Emergency Communication System IVCC Illinois Valley Community College IWP Initial Warning Point JIC Joint Information Center LD Luminescent Dosimeter NARS Nuclear Accident Reporting System NPS Nuclear Power Station NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission ORO Offsite Response Organizations PA Public Address PAD Protective Action Decision PAR Protective Action Recommendation PDP Personnel Dosimetry Packet 33 PHD Public Health Department PIO Public Information Officer PNS Prompt Notification System PRD Permanent Reading Dosimeter RA Radiological Advisor RAC Radiological Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amatuer Civil Emergency Seervices RAFT Radiological Assistance Field Team REAC Radiological Emergency Assessment Center REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness SAE Site Area Emergency SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SIRC State Incident Response Center UAC Unified Area Command 34 APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS 35 DATE: 2009-03-25, SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL LOCATION EVALUATOR AGENCY State Initial Warning Point Clayton Spangenberg ICF State Emergency Operations Center/State of Illinois Response Center Frank Cordaro Robert Duggleby ICF ICF Public Inquiry Phone Bank Clayton Spangenberg ICF Radiological Emergency Assessment Center Thomas Essig Larry Harrington ICF ICF Unified Area Command - Chicagoland Speedway James Greer Simon Guereca ICF ICF Radiological Assessment Field Team Jill Leatherman ICF Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment at the RAFT Jill Leatherman ICF Field Team 1 Dennis Wilford ICF Field Team 2 Earl Shollenberger ICF Emergency Operations Facility Richard Grundstrom ICF Joint Information Center Deborah Bell ICF Illinois State Liaison - Grundy County Edward Diaz DHS/FEMA Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Grundy County Robert Vork ICF Illinois State Liaison - Kendall County Michael Petullo ICF Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Kendall County Carl Bebrich DHS/FEMA Illinois State Liaison - Will County Robert Rospenda ICF Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Will County Richard McPeak ICF Dosimetry Control Officer's Briefing - Illinois State Police District 5 Headquarters Paul Ringheiser Jr ICF Traffic and Access Control Point at the Illinois State Police District 5 Headquarters James King DHS/FEMA Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers -
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
Kankakee Community College Richard McPeak ICF Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment - Kankakee Community College Deborah Bell Wendy Swygert ICF ICF Public Registration - Kankakee Community College Tracey Green ICF Congregate Care Center - Kankakee Community College Tracey Green ICF Grundy County - Initial Warning Point Paul Ringheiser Jr ICF Grundy County - Emergency Operations Center Edward Diaz Delwyn Kinsley Robert Vork DHS/FEMA DHS/FEMA ICF Grundy County - Emergency Broadcast System Station -
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
WCSJ/WJDK Paul Ringheiser Jr ICF Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Coal City School District
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.5. Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Saratoga School District
*Clinton Crackel DHS/FEMA Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Saratoga School District
: a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
*Clinton Crackel DHS/FEMA Kendall County - Initial Warning Point James King DHS/FEMA Kendall County - Emergency Operations Center Carl Bebrich Michael Petullo DHS/FEMA ICF Kendall County - Traffic and Access Control Point Wendy Swygert ICF Kendall County - Emergency Broadcast System Station - WSPY James King DHS/FEMA Will County - Initial Warning Point Tracey Green ICF Will County - Emergency Operations Center Richard McPeak Robert Rospenda
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
*William Sulinckas ICF ICF DHS/FEMA Will County - Emergency Alert System Station -
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ Tracey Green ICF 36 Will County - EV-2 Interview - Troy Community Consolidated School District 30C Delwyn Kinsley DHS/FEMA* Team Leader 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66}}
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.6. Kendall County - Initial Warning Point
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 30
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.7. Kendall County - Emergency Operations Center
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.8. Kendall County - Traffic and Access Control Point
: a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.9. Kendall County - Emergency Broadcast System Station - WSPY
: a. MET: 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.10. Will County - Initial Warning Point 31
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.11. Will County - Emergency Operations Center
: a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.12. Will County - Emergency Alert System Station - WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ
: a. MET: 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.13. Will County - EV-2 Interview - Troy Community Consolidated School District 30C
: a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
: b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
: c. DEFICIENCY: None
: d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
: e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
: f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 32
 
APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ARC  American Red Cross ARES  Amateur Radio Emergency Service BC    Board Chairman CBC  County Board Chairman CCC  Congregate Care Center CERT  Civilian Emergency Response Team DAP  Disaster Assistance Plans DCO  Dosimetry Control Officer DDP  Dosimetry Distribution Point DGS  Dresden Generating Station DNPS  Dresden Nuclear Power Station DRD  Direct Reading Dosimeter EAL  Emergency Action Level EAS  Emergency Alert System EBS  Emergency Broadcast System ECL  Emergency Classification Level EMA  Emergency Management Agency EMC  Emergency Management Coordinator EMD  Emergency Management Director EMS  Emergency Medical Services EOC  Emergency Operations Center EOF  Emergency Operations Facility EPA  Environmental Protection Agency EPZ  Emergency Planning Zone FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency GCEMA Grundy County Emergency Management Agency GE   General Emergency IEMA Illinois Emergency Management Agency IEPA Illinois Environmental Protection Agency ISP   Illinois State Police ITECS Illinois Transportable Emergency Communication System IVCC Illinois Valley Community College IWP   Initial Warning Point JIC   Joint Information Center LD   Luminescent Dosimeter NARS Nuclear Accident Reporting System NPS   Nuclear Power Station NRC   Nuclear Regulatory Commission ORO   Offsite Response Organizations PA   Public Address PAD   Protective Action Decision PAR   Protective Action Recommendation PDP   Personnel Dosimetry Packet 33
 
PHD   Public Health Department PIO   Public Information Officer PNS   Prompt Notification System PRD   Permanent Reading Dosimeter RA   Radiological Advisor RAC   Radiological Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amatuer Civil Emergency Seervices RAFT Radiological Assistance Field Team REAC Radiological Emergency Assessment Center REP   Radiological Emergency Preparedness SAE   Site Area Emergency SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SIRC State Incident Response Center UAC   Unified Area Command 34
 
APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS 35
 
DATE: 2009-03-25, SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL LOCATION                                                             EVALUATOR           AGENCY State Initial Warning Point                                           Clayton Spangenberg ICF State Emergency Operations Center/State of Illinois Response         Frank Cordaro       ICF Center                                                                Robert Duggleby     ICF Public Inquiry Phone Bank                                             Clayton Spangenberg ICF Radiological Emergency Assessment Center                             Thomas Essig       ICF Larry Harrington   ICF Unified Area Command - Chicagoland Speedway                           James Greer         ICF Simon Guereca       ICF Radiological Assessment Field Team                                   Jill Leatherman     ICF Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker                   Jill Leatherman    ICF Equipment at the RAFT Field Team 1                                                         Dennis Wilford     ICF Field Team 2                                                         Earl Shollenberger ICF Emergency Operations Facility                                         Richard Grundstrom ICF Joint Information Center                                             Deborah Bell       ICF Illinois State Liaison - Grundy County                               Edward Diaz         DHS/FEMA Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Grundy County                   Robert Vork         ICF Illinois State Liaison - Kendall County                               Michael Petullo     ICF Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Kendall County                 Carl Bebrich       DHS/FEMA Illinois State Liaison - Will County                                 Robert Rospenda     ICF Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Will County                     Richard McPeak     ICF Dosimetry Control Officer's Briefing - Illinois State Police District Paul Ringheiser Jr ICF 5 Headquarters Traffic and Access Control Point at the Illinois State Police         James King         DHS/FEMA District 5 Headquarters Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers -                   Richard McPeak      ICF Kankakee Community College Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker                   Deborah Bell        ICF Equipment - Kankakee Community College                               Wendy Swygert       ICF Public Registration - Kankakee Community College                     Tracey Green       ICF Congregate Care Center - Kankakee Community College                   Tracey Green       ICF Grundy County - Initial Warning Point                                 Paul Ringheiser Jr ICF Grundy County - Emergency Operations Center                           Edward Diaz         DHS/FEMA Delwyn Kinsley      DHS/FEMA Robert Vork        ICF Grundy County - Emergency Broadcast System Station -                 Paul Ringheiser Jr ICF WCSJ/WJDK Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Coal City School District           *Clinton Crackel   DHS/FEMA Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Saratoga School District             *Clinton Crackel   DHS/FEMA Kendall County - Initial Warning Point                               James King         DHS/FEMA Kendall County - Emergency Operations Center                         Carl Bebrich       DHS/FEMA Michael Petullo    ICF Kendall County - Traffic and Access Control Point                     Wendy Swygert       ICF Kendall County - Emergency Broadcast System Station - WSPY James King                     DHS/FEMA Will County - Initial Warning Point                                   Tracey Green       ICF Will County - Emergency Operations Center                             Richard McPeak     ICF Robert Rospenda     ICF
                                                                      *William Sulinckas DHS/FEMA Will County - Emergency Alert System Station -                       Tracey Green        ICF WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ 36
 
Will County - EV-2 Interview - Troy Community Consolidated Delwyn Kinsley DHS/FEMA School District 30C
* Team Leader 37
 
APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT This appendix lists the exercise criteria, which were scheduled for demonstration in the Dresden Nuclear Power Station REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise on March 25, 2009, and the off-site extent of play agreement approved by DHS/FEMA Region V on February 23, 2009.
The exercise criteria, contained in the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology; Notice, as published in the Federal Register Notice/Vol 67, dated April 25, 2002, represent a functional translation of the planning standards and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev1, Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, November 1980.
Because the exercise criteria are intended for use at all nuclear power plant sites, and because of variations among offsite plans and procedures, an extent of play agreement is prepared by the State and approved by DHS/FEMA to provide evaluators with guidance on expected actual demonstration of the criteria.
A. Exercise Criteria Listed on the following pages are the specific radiological emergency preparedness criteria scheduled for demonstration during this exercise.
38
 
STATE OF ILLINOIS EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT FOR THE DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE March 25, 2009 Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.
EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.
The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), which houses the IEMA Communications Center (Initial Warning Point), the State of Illinois Response Center (SIRC) and the Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC), will be activated. The IEMA Emergency Response Telecommunicator will implement procedures for notification of IEMA staff as defined in IEMA SOPs. The SIRC will be fully activated with a variety of State agencies. REAC will be fully activated. Rosters will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour staffing of the SIRC and REAC. The evaluator will not be allowed to remove the rosters.
An actual phone call will be made to the FEMA advising them of the situation at Dresden Station.
Follow up calls to FEMA will be simulated.
The Unified Area Command (UAC) will be activated with State district and regional personnel.
Radiological Assessment Field Team (RAFT) and mobile lab (not evaluated) will be activated in Mazon. IEMA personnel will be pre-positioned in the local area and dispatched to the County EOCs, UAC, EOF, Technical Support Center (TSC) and the JIC. FEMA will not evaluate the TSC.
The pre-positioned State staff will begin exercise play no earlier than the Alert.
Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.
The ability to direct and control emergency response activities will be demonstrated at the SIRC, REAC, the UAC and the JIC. Coordination will be demonstrated between the SIRC, the REAC, the UAC, the JIC, the EOF and the county EOCs.
Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.
IEMA will use a variety of communication systems (Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS),
telefax, commercial telephone, cellular phone, radio) to communicate with other organizations and locations.
Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.
39
 
The State of Illinois will demonstrate the use of equipment, maps and displays to support emergency operations. Dosimetry Control Officer (DCO) logs will be available from an IEMA Radiological Advisors in the County EOCs.
A DCO briefing/Traffic and Access Control (TAC) interview will be conducted by the Illinois State Police on March 24, 1 p.m., at the ISP District 5 Headquarters. During this event, the availability of dosimetry will be demonstrated. No more than 10% of ISP District 5 dosimetry kits will be inspected during the interview to confirm serial numbers.
EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.
The ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers will be demonstrated in REAC. A message will be injected in the Grundy County EOC to drive the decision to authorize exposure in excess of administrative limits.
Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.
REAC will evaluate the licensee information and complete independent dose projections based on that information and simulated field monitoring data. REAC will make an evaluation of the data and make a protective action recommendation to the SIRC.
Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).
The coordination to determine protective action recommendations (PARs) based upon available shelters, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors will be demonstrated between the SIRC and REAC. The State PAR will be transmitted to the EPZ counties via NARS.
The capability to determine which centers should be activated for monitoring, decontamination, registration reception and congregate care will be demonstrated at UAC, with input from the SIRC and REAC.
Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.
The coordination to determine protective action recommendations (PARs) based upon available shelters, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors will be demonstrated between the SIRC and REAC. The State PAR will be transmitted to the EPZ counties via NARS.
The ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to institutionalized persons will be demonstrated in REAC.
Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the OROs planning criteria.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
40
 
Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.
This will be demonstrated during the ISP DCO briefing/TAC interview that will be conducted on March 24, 1 p.m. at the ISP District 5 Headquarters. This criterion will also be demonstrated at the field team staging area.
Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.
This will be demonstrated during the ISP DCO briefing/TAC interview that will be conducted on March 24, 1 p.m. at the ISP District 5 Headquarters. This criterion will also be demonstrated at the field team staging area.
Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.
This criterion does not apply to the State of Illinois.
Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.
This criterion does not apply to the State of Illinois.
Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.
This will be demonstrated by the State through coordination between the UAC and the County EOCs, in accordance with the Dresden Station EPZ Traffic and Access Control procedures. The staffing of the State posts will be simulated during the exercise.
A TAC interview will be conducted in conjunction with the DCO briefing on March 24, 1 p.m.
(tentative) at the ISP District 5 Headquarters.
Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.
This will be demonstrated through discussions at the UAC between the Illinois State Police and Illinois Department of Transportation. A message will be injected at the UAC that will drive this demonstration. State personnel will deal with the impediment by discussing the need for equipment, and its estimated time of arrival, etc. Actual contacts with resource providers will be made and logged.
Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.
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This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.
This criterion will be demonstrated at RAFT with field teams performing radiation measurements with various monitoring equipment. Air samples will be taken with charcoal cartridges and the availability of silver zeolite cartridges will be indicated. Two field teams will be evaluated.
Evaluators may not interfere with field team activities or take teams out of play to demonstrate field measurements or air sampling. If necessary, these activities will be demonstrated following the order to return all teams to the staging area.
Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.
This criterion will be demonstrated at RAFT.
Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.
This criterion will be demonstrated by the field teams and information will be coordinated with RAFT. Samples appropriate to the area and season will be collected and transported in accordance with SOPs. Two field teams will be evaluated. Each team will take an air sample with particulate filters.
Evaluators may not interfere with field team activities or take teams out of play to demonstrate field measurements or air sampling. If necessary, these activities will be demonstrated following the order to return all teams to the staging area.
Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
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EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current DHS REP guidance.
The State's role in demonstrating this criterion is limited to transmitting the State's protective action recommendation (PAR) to the counties and monitoring the instructional messages provided to the public by the counties. This monitoring will be accomplished by IEMA representatives in the County EOCs.
Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]
Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with DHS approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.
This criterion does not apply to the State of Illinois.
Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.
This will be demonstrated at the JIC in coordination with the SIRC, REAC, UAC and the County EOCs. IEMA personnel will be present at the JIC to coordinate with the Exelon staff. Media briefings will be conducted at the JIC. A livestock advisory will be issued to the media from the JIC or the SIRC when appropriate.
A rumor control phone bank for public inquiries will be operated by the State during the exercise in a room adjacent to the SIRC.
EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.
This criterion will be demonstrated at Kankakee Community College during an out of sequence of demonstration conducted on March 24, with set up beginning at 8:30 a.m. Two portal monitors will be set up during the demonstration. Evacuee and emergency worker monitoring and decontamination will be demonstrated. The appropriate number of evacuees will be processed to meet 20% in 12 hours requirement.
Field team staff will discuss procedures for handling personal belongings and evacuee vehicles.
An evacuee vehicle will not be monitored and decontaminated.
Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles.
This criterion will be demonstrated at Kankakee Community College during an out of sequence demonstration conducted on March 24, with set up beginning at 8:30 a.m. An emergency worker vehicle will be monitored and decontaminated by field team staff.
During the exercise, at the RAFT Staging Area, field team staff will demonstrate monitoring of a field team vehicle. Decontamination of that vehicle will be simulated via an interview.
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Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines.
Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities.
This criterion will be demonstrated at Kankakee Community College during an out of sequence demonstration conducted on March 24,with set up beginning at 8:30 a.m. Local organizations responsible for operating a reception and congregate care center will be present to demonstrate this criterion.
Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.
This criterion will be demonstrated during a drill conducted at St. James Hospital in Pontiac on July 14 at 9 a.m. Duffy Ambulance Service will participate in the drill.
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GRUNDY COUNTY EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT FOR THE DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE March 25, 2009 Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.
EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.
Grundy County will fully activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Morris, Illinois. The County will implement notification procedures as defined in IPRA-Dresden. Representatives from IEMA and Exelon will staff the County EOC but will not be pre-positioned in the EOC. A roster will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour staffing of the EOC. Evaluators will not be allowed to remove the roster from the EOC.
The Grundy County Sheriffs Department will allow an evaluator to observe and evaluate the initial NARS message and notification at the Sheriffs Communications Center. The following conditions apply:
        -        Telecommunicators shift change takes place at 7 a.m. There is an exchange of information between shifts, usually from 6:50 a.m. to 7:10 a.m. Evaluators are asked not to be disruptive to this process.
        -        If major events occur or are occurring, evaluators will be asked to leave.
        -        Evaluators are expected to observe and evaluate without creating additional disruptions.
Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.
Decision making will be demonstrated at the State of Illinois Response Center (SIRC) and Grundy County EOC. Coordination of decisions and emergency activities will be demonstrated between Grundy County, the SIRC, UAC and the JIC, and between the County and municipalities within the EPZ. Coordination between Grundy County, Will County and Kendall County will be demonstrated.
Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.
Grundy County will use NARS, commercial telephone, radio and telefax to communicate with departments and agencies at other locations.
Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.
Grundy County will adequately demonstrate the ability to support operations through the use of maps, status boards and other displays as appropriate. DCO logs will be available from the IEMA 45
 
Radiological Advisor in the County EOC. The availability of dosimetry and KI will be demonstrated at the County EOC and during the school interviews.
EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.
This criterion does not apply to Grundy County.
Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.
This criterion does not apply to Grundy County.
Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).
The State of Illinois will make protective action recommendations to Grundy County officials in the County EOC. The Grundy County officials will make the final decision regarding what protective actions will be recommended to the public.
Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.
The State of Illinois will make protective action recommendations to Grundy County officials in the County EOC. The Grundy County officials will make the final decision regarding what protective actions will be recommended for special population groups.
Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the OROs planning criteria.
This criterion does not apply to Grundy County.
Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.
Grundy County will demonstrate this criterion by close coordination with the IEMA Radiological Advisor and timely dissemination and exchange of information within the County Dosimetry Control Officer network. Exercise messages will be injected which will ensure the opportunity to demonstrate this criterion in the County EOC. This criterion will also be demonstrated during the school interviews.
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Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.
When notified by the State of Illinois to distribute and administer KI, Grundy County officials will discuss the issuance of KI to emergency workers and immobile populations, as a voluntary measure, and will notify the municipalities of the State's recommendation. This criterion will also be demonstrated at the school interviews.
Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.
This will be demonstrated by Grundy County through the simulated implementation of the appropriate task assignments. The appropriate officials will coordinate transportation and receiving facilities for special populations. One of each type of special facility will be contacted during the exercise. One of each type of transportation provider (ambulance/bus) will be contacted during the exercise. The public will not be involved in the demonstration.
The Mobility Impaired List will be available for inspection in the County EOC during the exercise.
The evaluator will not be allowed to remove the list from the EOC.
Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.
Grundy County officials will demonstrate this capability through the simulated implementation of the appropriate task assignment in the County EOC. The EPZ schools and transportation providers will be contacted during the exercise.
Two school interviews will be conducted as follows:
Coal City Community Unit Dist. #1                                  March 19, 9:30 a.m.
Saratoga Community Consolidated School Dist. #60C                  March 19, 1:30 p.m.
The District Superintendent, Principal, a Teacher, the transportation coordinator (DCO), the maintenance supervisor and a bus driver will be present at the interviews.
Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.
This criterion does not apply to Grundy County. Grundy County is not responsible for staffing any of the designated traffic and access control posts.
Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.
The Grundy County EOC staff will demonstrate the capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. A message will be injected by the Controller that will drive this demonstration. County personnel will deal with the impediment by identifying the equipment needed, discussing its estimated time of arrival, etc. Actual contacts with resource providers will be made and logged.
Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.
This criterion does not apply to Grundy County.
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Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.
This criterion does not apply to Grundy County.
Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS This evaluation area does not apply to Grundy County.
EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.
Grundy County will demonstrate the capability to provide both an alert signal and an initial instructional message to populated areas throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ in a timely manner after their decision to activate the alert and notification system to implement protective action recommendations (PAR).
This capability will be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the Dresden Station EPZ Prompt Notification System as defined in IPRA-Dresden. The Prompt Notification System (outdoor warning sirens) will not be activated during the exercise.
The ability to provide instructions to the public will be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the local radio station (WCSJ/WJDK). The local radio station will be contacted during the first, and possibly the second, alert and notification sequence. An evaluator and controller will be positioned at the radio station during the exercise to monitor the initial message.
If the initial message does not contain a protective action recommendation, the evaluator and controller will stay at the radio station for a second message.
Coordination between Grundy County, Will County and Kendall County will be demonstrated.
Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]
Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.
This criterion does not apply to Grundy County.
Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.
Grundy County will demonstrate this criterion by using pre-scripted messages as indicated in IPRA-Dresden or ad hoc messages will be developed. Contact with the radio station will be 48
 
simulated for each alert and notification sequence following the sequence issuing the initial protective action recommendation.
The ability to provide information to the media will be demonstrated by Grundy County through a briefing held at the Grundy County media briefing location. If real media are not present for the briefing, the controller and observers will serve as mock media. Evaluators will not serve as mock media.
The ability to deal with rumors will be demonstrated by Grundy County through coordination between the County EOC and the JIC. The Grundy County EOC controller will inject exercise messages which will ensure the opportunity to demonstrate this criterion. County officials will investigate and address rumors. If appropriate, the rumors will be coordinated between State and County officials in the County EOC and the JIC.
County emergency broadcast messages and news releases, if issued, will be faxed to the JIC.
EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES This evaluation area does not apply to Grundy County.
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KENDALL COUNTY EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT FOR THE DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE March 25, 2009 Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.
EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.
Kendall County intends to fully activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Yorkville, Illinois. The County will implement notification procedures as defined in IPRA-Dresden.
Representatives from IEMA and Exelon will staff the County EOC but will not be pre-positioned in the EOC. A roster will be made available for review in order to demonstrate 24-hour County staffing of the EOC. The evaluator will not be allowed to remove the roster from the EOC.
An evaluator will be positioned at KENCOM (initial warning point) at the start of the exercise.
Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.
Decision making will be demonstrated at the State of Illinois Response Center (SIRC) and Kendall County EOC. Coordination of decisions and emergency activities will be demonstrated between Kendall County, the SIRC, UAC and the JIC. Coordination between Kendall County, Grundy County and Will County will be demonstrated.
Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.
Kendall County will use NARS, commercial telephone, radio and telefax to communicate with departments, organizations and agencies at other locations.
Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.
Kendall County will adequately demonstrate the ability to support operations through the use of maps, status boards and other displays as appropriate. DCO logs will be available from the IEMA Radiological Advisor in the County EOC. The availability of dosimetry and KI will be demonstrated at the County EOC and during the traffic and access control demonstration.
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EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.
This criterion does not apply to Kendall County.
Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.
This criterion does not apply to Kendall County.
Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).
The State of Illinois will make protective action recommendations to Kendall County officials in the County EOC. The Kendall County officials will make the final decision regarding what protective actions will be recommended to the public.
Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.
The State of Illinois will make protective action recommendations to Kendall County officials in the County EOC. The Kendall County officials will make the final decision regarding what protective actions will be recommended for special population groups.
Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the OROs planning criteria.
This criterion does not apply to Kendall County.
Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures.
Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.
Kendall County will demonstrate this criterion by close coordination with the IEMA Radiological Advisor and timely dissemination and exchange of information within the County Dosimetry Control Officer network. Exercise messages will be injected which will ensure the opportunity to demonstrate this criterion in the County EOC.
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This criterion will also be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstration. The DCO briefing for the Sheriffs deputy demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the Kendall County EOC.
Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.
When notified by the State of Illinois to distribute and administer KI, Kendall County officials will discuss the issuance of KI to emergency workers and immobile populations, as a voluntary measure. This criterion will also be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstration.
Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.
This will be demonstrated by Kendall County through the simulated implementation of the appropriate procedures. The appropriate officials will coordinate transportation and receiving facilities for special populations. One of each type of special facility will be contacted during the exercise.          One of each type of transportation provider (ambulance/bus) will be contacted during the exercise. The public will not be involved in the demonstration.
The Mobility Impaired List will be available for inspection in the County EOC during the exercise. The evaluator will not be allowed to remove the list from the EOC.
Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.
This criterion will be demonstrated in the Kendall County EOC.
Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.
Coordination between Kendall County agencies designated to provide traffic and access control will be exhibited in the County EOC. A Sheriffs deputy will be available during the exercise to demonstrate the staffing of one post. The post for the demonstration will be selected by Kendall County during the exercise based on exercise play. The deputy will drive to the selected post location for the demonstration. The staffing of the remaining posts will be simulated.
Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.
The Kendall County EOC staff will demonstrate the capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. A message will be injected by the controller that will drive this demonstration. County personnel will deal with the impediment by identifying the equipment needed, discussing its estimated time of arrival, etc. Actual contacts with resource providers will be made and logged.
Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.
This criterion does not apply to Kendall County.
Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, 52
 
milk and agricultural production.
This criterion does not apply to Kendall County.
Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS This evaluation area does not apply to Kendall County.
EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.
Kendall County will demonstrate the capability to provide both an alert signal and an initial instructional message to populated areas throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ in a timely manner after their decision to activate the alert and notification system to implement protective action recommendations (PAR).
This capability will be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the Dresden Station EPZ Prompt Notification System as defined in IPRA-Dresden. The Prompt Notification System (outdoor warning sirens) will not be activated during the exercise.
The ability to provide instructions to the public will be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the local radio station. The local radio station (WSPY) will be contacted during the first, and possibly the second, alert and notification sequence. An evaluator and controller will be positioned at the radio station during the exercise to monitor the initial message. If the initial message does not contain a PAR, the evaluator and controller will stay at the radio station for the second message.
Coordination between Kendall County, Grundy County and Will County will be demonstrated.
Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]
Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.
This criterion does not apply to Kendall County.
Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.
Kendall County will demonstrate this criterion by using pre-scripted messages as indicated in IPRA-Dresden. Contact with the radio station will be simulated for each alert 53
 
and notification sequence following the sequence issuing the initial protective action recommendation.
The ability to provide information to the media will be demonstrated by Kendall County through a briefing held at the Kendall County media briefing location. If real media are not present for the briefing, the controller and observers will serve as mock media.
Evaluators will not serve as mock media.
The ability to deal with rumors will be demonstrated by Kendall County through coordination between the County EOC and the JIC. The controller will inject exercise messages which will ensure the opportunity to demonstrate this criterion. County officials will investigate and address rumors. If appropriate, the rumors will be coordinated between State and County officials in the County EOC and the JIC.
County emergency broadcast messages and news releases, if issued, will be faxed to the JIC.
EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES This evaluation area does not apply to Kendall County.
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WILL COUNTY EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT FOR THE DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE March 25, 2009 Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.
EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.
Will County intends to partially activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Joliet, Illinois. The County will implement notification procedures as defined in IPRA-Dresden. The following Will County officials will staff the County EOC: County Executive, Emergency Management Director, Sheriff and PIO. Representatives from IEMA and Exelon will staff the County EOC but will not be pre-positioned in the EOC. A roster will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour staffing of the EOC. Evaluators will not be allowed to remove the roster from the EOC.
An evaluator will be positioned at the County Sheriffs Communications Center (initial warning point) at the start of the exercise.
Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.
Decision making will be demonstrated at the State of Illinois Response Center (SIRC) and Will County EOC. Coordination of decisions and emergency activities will be demonstrated between Will County, the SIRC, UAC and the JIC, and between the County and municipalities within the EPZ. Coordination between Will County, Grundy County and Kendall County will be demonstrated.
Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.
Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.
Will County will use NARS, commercial telephone, radio and telefax to communicate with departments and agencies at other locations.
Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.
Will County will demonstrate the ability to support operations through the use of maps, status boards and other displays as appropriate. DCO logs will be available from the IEMA Radiological Advisor in the Will County EOC. The availability of dosimetry and KI will be demonstrated at the school interview.
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EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.
This criterion does not apply to Will County.
Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.
This criterion does not apply to Will County.
Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).
The State of Illinois will make protective action recommendations to Will County officials in the County EOC. The Will County officials will make the final decision regarding what protective actions will be recommended to the public.
Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.
The State of Illinois will make protective action recommendations to Will County officials in the County EOC. The Will County officials will make the final decision regarding what protective actions will be recommended for special population groups.
Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the OROs planning criteria.
This criterion does not apply to Will County.
Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures.
Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.
This criterion will be demonstrated during the school interview.
Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.
This criterion will be demonstrated during the school interview.
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Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.
A school interview will be conducted with the Troy Community Consolidated School District #30C on Thursday, March 19 at 2:00 p.m.. A District Administrator, a Teacher, the transportation coordinator (DCO), the maintenance supervisor and a bus driver will be present at the interview.
Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.
This criterion does not apply to Will County.
Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.
This criterion does not apply to Will County.
Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.
This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS This evaluation area does not apply to Will County.
EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.
Will County will demonstrate the capability to provide both an alert signal and an initial instructional message to populated areas throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ in a timely manner after their decision to activate the alert and notification system to implement protective action recommendations (PAR).
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This capability will be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the Dresden Station EPZ Prompt Notification System as defined in IPRA-Dresden. The Prompt Notification System (outdoor warning sirens) will not be activated during the exercise.
The ability to provide instructions to the public will be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the local radio station (WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ). The local radio station will be contacted during the first, and possibly the second, alert and notification sequence. An evaluator and controller will be positioned at the radio station during the exercise to monitor the initial message. If the initial message does not contain a protective action recommendation, the evaluator and controller will stay at the radio station for a second message.
Coordination between Will County, Grundy County and Kendall County will be demonstrated.
Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]
Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.
This criterion does not apply to Will County.
Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.
Will County will demonstrate a portion of this criterion by using pre-scripted messages as indicated in IPRA-Dresden. Contact with the radio station will be simulated for each alert and notification sequence following the sequence issuing the initial protective action recommendation. County emergency broadcast messages will be faxed to the JIC.
Media briefings and the ability to deal with public inquiries will not be demonstrated during this exercise.
EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES This evaluation area does not apply to Will County.
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NARRATIVE
 
==SUMMARY==
 
NORMAL OPERATIONS 0800 The Operating Crew will be briefed and is expected to take the shift by 0800. They will be directed by turnover to continue operations at full power.
ALERT 0805 - 0935 Flooding affecting the plant Vital Area - ALERT, HA5 At 0805, the operating crew will receive a call from the engineer at the U2 CCSW vault room with a report of flooding in the U2 CCSW vault. 2 "8" CCSW Pump trips on overcurrent. There will be a visual report of damage to 2 "8" and "C" CCSW Pumps visible inside vault. The operating crew will also receive a message that, due to the 2 "8" CCSW Pump trip, water flow from the has been reduced to weeping from the hairline break on the discharge of the pump. There is no water exiting from the vault and there is no input to the Condensate Pump room floor or sumps.
Expected Response The Shift Manager should identify that ALERT, HA5 "Flooding affecting the plant Vital Area" is applicable. All appropriate notifications should be performed, and the Dialogic System should be activated. The Operating Crew may contemplate calling in extra personnel to assist with monitoring the control boards. Command and Control should be transferred as soon as practicable.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY 0935 -*1105 LARGE BREAK LOCA INSIDE DRYWELL w/FUEL FAILURE A large break occurs resulting in a RPV level reduction and RCS input into the Drywell.
A SCRAM occurs and all ECCS systems and isolations respond as designed with the exception of the HPCI steam supply isolation that fails open ( this is not a loss of containment as there is no pathway to the environment). RPV level will drop to less than
- 143" and recover. After the LOCA, DW radiation will rise, eventually exceeding 670 R/hr, a Loss of the Fuel barrier (FC5), which will result in a concurrent FS1.
Expected Response Multiple annunciators will alert the crew that a SCRAM has occurred on Unit 2 and a break 59
 
into the drywell is occurring. Procedural steps will be taken to restore RPV level and stabilize Drywell pressure. Manual attempts to close the HPCI steam supply isolation valves will not succeed. ADS function will be restricted as well as one loop of DW sprays.
The Shift Manager should identify that FS1 "Loss or Potential Loss of two fission product barriers" is applicable. Assuming Command and Control has been transferred from the Shift ED, the Shift Manager should provide backup and peer checking to the ED in command. PA announcements will be made and Assembly / Accountability will be initiated.
Expected Actions The situation should be transmitted to the TSC via one of the communicator in the Simulator Control Room. The Maintenance Director and/or the Operations Manager should take actions to dispatch an NLO / OSC team to investigate the pump trips and equipment failures.
Additional Information A Service Water pump will trip, prompting operating crew response. Isolation Condenser will isolate on a spurious trip. A 250vDC failure will result in lost indication to selected ECCS systems. An engineering report will be made available that will state that the currently installed charcoal adsorbers are not effective for both trains of the SBGT system. This information should makes it way to the facility RPM, who will inform appropriate personnel that the DAPAR Process Reduction Factor (PRF) is 0.4 due to failed filters.
GENERAL EMERGENCY 1105-1205 UNISOLABLE RCS LEAK OUTSIDE OF DRYWELL RELEASE IN PROGRESS HPCI room temperatures will alarm, followed quickly by radiation alarms in the same room.
The crew should identify that a break has occurred outside the drywell. Control Room indications for the HPCI Steam Supply Outboard Isolation valve (2-2301-5) will be lost due to 250vDC failure, as it is postulated that the valve has failed, causing a leak into the HPCI room. A release path exists from the RPV to the HPCI room through the HPCI steam supply to the ventilation systems to SBGT and out the U2/3 Main Chimney. Effluent readings will indicate a significant jump in release rates. DW radiation will continue to rise, peaking at
>1000 R at 1120.
Expected Actions The Operating Crew will continue to address RPV parameters and control the reactor. The Emergency Director in Command and Control should declare FG*1 "Loss of two fission product barriers with the potential loss of the third." Appropriate notifications should be made. The EOF (assuming Command and Control for PARs has been transferred) should identify that Minimum PARs are applicable, and notifications of such should be made. Note: The loss of RCS (RC2) may be included for the GE classification. The basis for RC2 states that dropping level below TAF is indicative of a LOCA. This was used as loss of 60
 
the RCS barrier at the SAE. Also, RA3 may be considered for a concurrent EAL as HPCI area rads meet the classification for this.
GENERAL EMERGENCY 1205*1235 WIND SHIFT Release In Progress The Wind will shift, changing from 190° (into 010°) to wind from 123° (into 303°).
Expected Actions The EOF should identify a change in PARs are applicable, and notifications of such should be made.
EXERCISE TERMINATION Exercise termination is scheduled for 1235, but at the discretion of the Lead Scenario Evaluator, Lead Scenario Controller, and State of Illinois with the concurrence of the Evaluator and Controller network, this time may be extended or advanced.
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OFFSITE EXERCISE TIMELINE March 25, 2009 Approx.
Time  Event/Anticipated Response 0800    Initial conditions/weather forecast message to players.
0810    An Alert is declared at Dresden Station.
0825    Exelon notifies the IEMA Telecommunicator of the ALERT via NARS.
IEMA Telecommunicator verifies the NARS message.
An IEMA Duty Officer contacts the Dresden Station Shift Engineer.
IEMA Telecommunicator notifies IEMA personnel of the ALERT per SOP.
IEMA may activate the State of Illinois Response Center (SIRC) and Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC), if appropriate.
IEMA may dispatch liaisons to the County EOCs, Unified Area Command (UAC), Radiological Assessment Field Team (RAFT) Staging Area, Joint Information Center (JIC), Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), if appropriate.
IEMA notifies Governor's Office of the ALERT. (Simulated)
IEMA Telecommunicator notifies appropriate State agencies of the ALERT.
IEMA notifies FEMA of the ALERT.
0840    IEMA Telecommunicator notifies the counties of the ALERT via NARS.
County telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.
County telecommunicators notify County officials and municipalities of the ALERT per SOP.
The counties may activate the EOCs, if appropriate.
Municipal telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.
Municipal telecommunicators notify officials of the ALERT per SOP.
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Approx.
Time  Event/Anticipated Response 0940    A SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared at Dresden Station.
0955    Exelon notifies the IEMA Telecommunicator of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY via NARS.
IEMA Telecommunicator verifies the NARS message.
REAC contacts the Dresden Station Shift Engineer.
SIRC is activated if not previously activated.
SIRC notifies the Governor's Office and requests that a representative report to the State EOC. (Simulated)
State dispatches liaisons to the County EOCs, UAC, RAFT, JIC, TSC and EOF, if not previously dispatched.
SIRC notifies FEMA of conditions. (Simulated)
IEMA notifies State agencies (Simulated):
        - Illinois State Police
        - IDOT/Division of Highways
        - IDOT/Division of Aeronautics
        - IDNR
        - Illinois National Guard
        - ICC
        - American Red Cross
        - IDPH
        - IEPA
        - IDOC
        - IDHS
        - IDOA
        - Office of the State Fire Marshal
        - others as appropriate REAC contacts Federal agencies. (Simulated)
REAC provides an update to the SIRC and County EOC Liaisons.
REAC provides an update to the JIC.
1010    IEMA notifies the counties of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY via NARS.
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County telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.
Approx.
Time  Event/Anticipated Response County telecommunicators notify County officials and municipalities of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY per SOP.
County EOCs are activated if not previously activated.
Counties implement      public notification procedures, if appropriate.
(Simulated)
Municipal telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.
Municipal telecommunicators notify officials per SOP.
Dosimetry is issued to emergency personnel, EOC staff and exposure records are completed.
1105  A GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared at Dresden Station.
1120  Exelon notifies the IEMA Telecommunicator of the GENERAL EMERGENCY via NARS. Protective actions are recommended.
IEMA Telecommunicator verifies the NARS message.
The SIRC and REAC evaluate the protective action recommendation.
A recommendation is made to the Governor. The Governor recommends that protective actions be implemented.
SIRC staff is advised of the situation.
SIRC advises UAC, the County EOC liaisons and JIC staff of the situation.
SIRC notifies FEMA of conditions. (Simulated)
REAC provides an update to the SIRC and County EOC liaisons.
REAC provides an update to the JIC.
1135    SIRC notifies the counties of the GENERAL EMERGENCY and the recommended protective actions via NARS.
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County telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.
County telecommunicators notify County officials and municipalities per SOP.
Approx.
Time  Event/Anticipated Response Counties implement public notification procedures and traffic and access control per SOPs, as applicable.
Municipal telecommunicators complete and verify and the NARS message.
Municipal telecommunicators notify EOC staff.
1205    The GENERAL EMERGENCY continues at Braidwood Station. A wind shift has occurred.
1220    Exelon notified the IEMA Telecommunicator of the wind shift via NARS.
Additional protective action are recommended.
IEMA Telecommunicator verified the NARS message.
The SIRC and REAC evaluate the protective action recommendation.
A recommendation is made to the Governor. The Governor recommended that protective actions be implemented.
SIRC staff is advised of the situation.
SIRC advises UAC, the County EOC liaisons and JIC staff of the situation.
SIRC notifies FEMA of conditions. (Simulated)
REAC provides an update to the JIC.
1235    SIRC notifies EPZ counties of the wind shift and the recommended protective actions via NARS.
County telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.
County telecommunicators advise county officials and municipalities per SOP.
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Counties implement public notification procedures and traffic and access control per SOPs, as applicable.
Municipal telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.
1300 Terminate exercise play.
66}}

Latest revision as of 03:13, 14 November 2019

2009 Dresden Final Serf from FEMA
ML092260131
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/21/2009
From:
US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:
NRC/NSIR/DPR
References
Download: ML092260131 (70)
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Text

Dresden Nuclear Power Station Exercise Report - 2009-03-25 Final Report - Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program 2009-07-21

Exercise Report Dresden Nuclear Power Station Exercise Date: 2009-03-25 Report Date: 2009-07-21 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Federal Emergency Management Agency REP Program 536 S. Clark St. 6th floor Chicago, IL 60605

Table of Contents Chapter 1 Executive Summary Chapter 2 Introduction Chapter 3 Exercise Overview Section 3.1 EPZ Description Section 3.2 Exercise Participants Section 3.3 Exercise Timeline Chapter 4 Exercise Evaluation and Results Section 4.1 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation Section 4.2 Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated 4.2.1 Illinois Jurisdictions 4.2.1.1 State Initial Warning Point 4.2.1.2 State Emergency Operations Center/State of Illinois Response Center 4.2.1.3 Public Inquiry Phone Bank 4.2.1.4 Radiological Emergency Assessment Center 4.2.1.5 Unified Area Command - Chicagoland Speedway 4.2.1.6 Radiological Assessment Field Team 4.2.1.7 Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment at the RAFT 4.2.1.8 Field Team 1 4.2.1.9 Field Team 2 4.2.1.10 Emergency Operations Facility 4.2.1.11 Joint Information Center 4.2.1.12 Illinois State Liaison - Grundy County 4.2.1.13 Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Grundy County 4.2.1.14 Illinois State Liaison - Kendall County 4.2.1.15 Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Kendall County 4.2.1.16 Illinois State Liaison - Will County 4.2.1.17 Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Will County 4.2.1.18 Dosimetry Control Officer's Briefing - Illinois State Police District 5 Headquarters 4.2.1.19 Traffic and Access Control Point at the Illinois State Police District 5 Headquarters 4.2.1.20 Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers - Kankakee Community College

4.2.1.21 Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment -

Kankakee Community College 4.2.1.22 Public Registration - Kankakee Community College 4.2.1.23 Congregate Care Center - Kankakee Community College 4.2.2 Risk Jurisdictions 4.2.2.1 Grundy County - Initial Warning Point 4.2.2.2 Grundy County - Emergency Operations Center 4.2.2.3 Grundy County - Emergency Broadcast System Station -

WCSJ/WJDK 4.2.2.4 Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Coal City School District 4.2.2.5 Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Saratoga School District 4.2.2.6 Kendall County - Initial Warning Point 4.2.2.7 Kendall County - Emergency Operations Center 4.2.2.8 Kendall County - Traffic and Access Control Point 4.2.2.9 Kendall County - Emergency Broadcast System Station - WSPY 4.2.2.10 Will County - Initial Warning Point 4.2.2.11 Will County - Emergency Operations Center 4.2.2.12 Will County - Emergency Alert System Station -

WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ 4.2.2.13 Will County - EV-2 Interview - Troy Community Consolidated School District 30C Appendices Appendix 1 - Acronyms and Abbreviations Appendix 2 - Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders Appendix 3 - Exercise Evaluation Areas and Extent of Play Agreement Appendix 4 - Exercise Scenario and Timeline

1. Executive Summary On March 25, 2009, a full participation exercise was conducted in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Dresden Nuclear Power Station by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA). The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with DHS/FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) and procedures.

The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on March 21, 2007. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on September 30, 1981.

The DHS/FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in this exercise. In the State of Illinois the risk counties of Grundy, Kendall, and Will participated along with the State Government. The State of Indiana did not participate in the exercise since it was not a full participation/ingestion exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork on the part of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This Report contains the evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of the following out-of-sequence activities: Illinois State Police Dosimetry Control Officers Briefing, Traffic Access and Control Points, Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers (EWs), Monitoring and Decontamination of EWs Equipment, Public Registration, Congregate Care Center Interview, and Protective Actions for Schools (EV-2) Interviews. The State and local organizations except where noted in this report demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them.

There was one Deficiency during this exercise identified for the State of Illinois under Criterion 2.b.2 - A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy) 1

whereby the process used and performance demonstrated by the State and Grundy County to determine and implement protective action recommendations and decisions, contributed to a delay in the notification of the public to take action. The Deficiency was resolved on July 10, 2009, as identified herein.

There was one Deficiency during this exercise identified for the Grundy County Emergency Operations Center, Public Information Officer under Criterion 5.b.1 - OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner whereby the process used and performance demonstrated by the State and Grundy County to determine and implement protective action recommendations and decisions, contributed to a delay in the notification of the public to take action. The Deficiency was resolved on July 1, 2009, as identified herein.

There were no Deficiencies identified during this exercise for Kendall or Will Counties.

There were no new Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified during this exercise for the State of Illinois, Grundy, Kendall and Will Counties.

There were no ARCAs from previous exercises for the State of Illinois, Grundy, Kendall, and Will Counties that were required to be demonstrated during this exercise.

2

2. Introduction On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMAs activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351, and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMAs initial and continued approval of State and local governments radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local governments participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMAs responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

  • Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;
  • Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;
  • Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993) and
  • Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

-U.S. Department of Agriculture;

-U.S. Department of Energy;

-U.S. Department of Health and Human Services;

-U.S. Department of the Interior;

-U.S. Department of Transportation;

-U.S. Environmental Protection Agency;

-U.S. Food and Drug Administration and 3

-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the DHS Radiological Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by DHS.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station to DHS/FEMA by the State of Illinois and involved local jurisdictions occurred on March 31, 1981.

Formal approval of these RERPs was granted by FEMA on October 14, 1982, under 44 CFR 350.

A REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway exercise was conducted on March 25, 2009, by FEMA to assess the capabilities of State and local offsite emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluation team. Final determinations are made by the DHS/FEMA - Region V Office with FEMA Headquarters concurrence.

The criteria utilized in the DHS/FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

  • NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, November 1980;
  • FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology; Notice as published in the Federal Register Notice, Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002.

Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview, presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities, 4

which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions, if applicable, for each identified exercise issue and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises, if applicable, and the status of the OROs efforts to resolve them.

5

3. Exercise Overview Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the March 25, 2009, REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. This section of the exercise report includes a description of the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone and a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

3.1. EPZ Description The Dresden Nuclear Power Station is located on 953 rolling prairie acres in northeast Grundy County on the southern bank of the Illinois River. The topography of the site and its immediate environs is relatively flat, with elevations varying from 509 to 523 feet above sea level. The only significant topographic deviations in the area around the Dresden Station are the Kankakee Bluffs, 591 to 624 feet high, located just northeast of the site.

Portions of the site owned by Exelon Nuclear Corporation are leased for cattle grazing and field crops. Approximately 150 acres are used for grazing. Field crop cultivation occupies about another 300 acres. Recreational activity is in the form of hunting during legally prescribed seasons, with entry controlled by the agricultural lessee. The Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station consists of a circle with the Dresden Station as the center point. The EPZ extends 10 miles outward in all directions from the Dresden Station for the plume exposure pathway planning zone and 50 miles outward for the ingestion exposure pathway planning zone. In the event of a serious accident at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, the plume exposure EPZ will be the area in which intensive efforts will be made to notify and protect residents and transient populations from exposure to radiation. This EPZ includes the following counties and municipalities: Grundy County (Illinois), and the municipalities of Carbon Hill, Coal City, Diamond, Minooka, and Morris; Will County (Illinois), and the entire municipalities of Braidwood, Channahon, Elwood, and Wilmington, portions of the municipalities of Joliet and Shorewood, and a small portion of Kendall County (Illinois).

The plume EPZ is divided into a total of 16 sub-areas.

The population distribution in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the Dresden Nuclear Power 6

Station is relatively low. The 2000 census population for the 10-mile EPZ is divided as follows: Braceville - population 792 located nine miles South from the site; Braidwood -

polulation 5203 located seven miles South Southeast from the site; Carbon Hill -

population 392 located three miles South Southeast from the site; Channahon -

population 7344 located seven miles Northeast from the site; Coal City - population 4797 located seven miles South from the site; Diamond - population 1393 located eight miles South from the site; Elwood - population 1620 located miles miles East from the site; Minooka - population 3971 located four miles North of the site; Morris - population 11928 located eight miles West of the site; and Wilmington - population 5134 located nine miles Southeast of the site. The majority of the populations for the following jursdictions reside outside of the ten mile EPZ: Joliet - population 106221 located four miles Northeast from the site and Shorewood - population 7686 located nine miles North Northwest of the site.

Outside of the Stations boundaries there is a substantial amount of industry. Adjacent to the southern boundary of the Station is the Away-From-Reactor Operations Spent Fuel Storage Facility. Four miles southeast of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station is the former Joliet Arsenal (36,000 acres), which now is comprised of two industrial areas:

9,000 acres for a national cemetery; and 23,000 acres for the Midewin National Tallgrass Prairie. The Army is retaining the use of 4,000 acres.

Within the EPZ of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station there are industrial plants, chemical production facilities, petroleum refining industries, warehousing, dry dock facilities and transportation equipment industries The majority of the remaining area in the Dresden Nuclear Power Station EPZ is used for agriculture, predominately cash grain production. South of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station is approximately twenty-seven (27) square miles of recreational and residential land. The EPZ also contains four state parks and a conservation area. These areas are served by various forms of transportation. Interstate Highway 80 passes five miles to the north of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, and Interstate Highway 55 passes four miles to the east of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. The Illinois, Des Plaines and Kankakee Rivers flow near the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. Several railroads operate on tracks running near the Dresden Nuclear Power Station EPZ, including, the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company and Amtrak which is four (4) miles east of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station; the Elgin, the Joliet and Eastern Railroad which is one and one-half (11/2) miles west of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station; the CSX Transportation Inc., which is four (4) miles northwest of the 7

Dresden Nuclear Power Station; and the Union Pacific Railroad Company, which is seven (7) miles east of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.

3.2. Exercise Participants Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Dresden Nuclear Power Station exercise:

State Jurisdictions Central Management Systems Illinois Commerce Commission Illinois Department of Agriculture Illinois Department of Corrections Illinois Department of Human Services Illinois Department of Natural Resources Illinois Department of Transportation-Highways Illinois Emergency Management Agency Illinois Environmental Protection Agency Illinois Law Enforcement Alert System Illinois Liaison Officers Illinois National Guard Illinois State Attorney General Illinois State Police Mutual Aid Box Alarm System Division 15 Office of the State Fire Marshal Secretary of State Secretary of State Police Risk Jurisdictions Grundy County Administrator Grundy County Board Chair Grundy County Coal City Community Unit District #1 Grundy County Emergency Management Agency Grundy County Health Department Grundy County Highway Department Grundy County Land Use Grundy County Public Information Grundy County Regional Superintendent of Schools 8

Grundy County Saratoga Community Consolidated School District #60C Grundy County Sheriff's Department Grundy County Solid Waste KENCOM Kendall County Board Chair Kendall County Emergency Management Agency Kendall County Health and Human Services Kendall County Highway Department Kendall County Public Information Kendall County Regional Superintendent of Schools Kendall County Sheriff's Department Morris Police Department Will County Emergency Management Agency Will County Executive Board Will County Health Department Will County Public Information Will County Sheriff's Department Will County Troy Community Consolidated School District #30C Private Jurisdictions American Red Cross Chicagoland Speedway EBS Radio Station WCSJ/WJDK EBS Radio Station WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ EBS Radio Station WSPY Exelon Nuclear Kankakee Community College Mazon School District Morris Hospital Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services 3.3. Exercise Timeline Table 1, on the following page, presents the times at which key events and activities occurred during the REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway exercise conducted on March 25, 2009, for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.

9

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2009-03-25, SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL Time Utility Declared UAC - Mazon IEMA State EOC/SIRC Emergency Classification Level or Grundy - EOC Kendell - EOC Event REAC Office JIC Unusual Event N/A NA NA NA NA N/A N/A Alert 0810 0825 0824 0840 0930 0849 0849 Site Area Emergency 0943 0958 0954 1005 1004 1008 1008 General Emergency 1107 1123 1120 1135 1130 1144 1144 Simulated Rad. Release Started 1106 1123 1106 1135 1130 1144 1144 Simulated Rad. Release N/A NA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Terminated Facility Declared Operational 0905 0844 0840 0930 0922 0921 Declaration of State of Emergency 1030 N/A 1039 1018 N/A Exercise Terminated 1410 1340 1326 1325 1406 N/A Early Precautionary Actions: The State issued a 1030 1030 1135 N/A N/A N/A Livestock Advisory; All livestock are to be sheltered and placed on stored feed and water within the 10-mile EPZ.

1st Protective Action Recommendation: 1133 1128 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1st Protective Action Decision (Grundy N/A N/A N/A N/A 1154 N/A County):

1st Siren Activation (Grundy County) N/A N/A N/A N/A 1158 N/A 1st EAS or EBS Message (Grundy County) N/A N/A N/A N/A 1218 N/A 2nd Protective Action Decision (Grundy N/A N/A N/A N/A 1201 N/A County):

2nd Siren Activation (Grundy County) N/A N/A N/A N/A 1218 N/A 2nd EAS or EBS Message (Grundy County) N/A N/A N/A N/A 1218 N/A 1st Protective Action Decision: NA 1220 N/A N/A N/A 1149 1st Siren Activation NA N/A N/A N/A N/A 1206 1st EAS or EBS Message NA N/A N/A N/A N/A 1210 2nd Protective Action Recommendation: 1230 1220 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2nd Protective Action Decision: NA N/A N/A N/A 1249 N/A 2nd Siren Activation NA N/A N/A N/A 1253 N/A 2nd EAS or EBS Message NA N/A N/A N/A 1300 N/A KI Administration Decision, Radiological 1133 1128 1135 N/A N/A N/A Assessment Field Teams:

KI Administration Decision, Emergency 1133 1128 1135 N/A 1158 1156 Workers and Immobile Populations:

10

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2009-03-25, SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL Emergency Classification Level or Time Utility Will - EOC Event Declared Unusual Event N/A N/A Alert 0810 0848 Site Area Emergency 0943 1011 General Emergency 1107 1150 Simulated Rad. Release Started 1106 1150 Simulated Rad. Release Terminated N/A N/A Facility Declared Operational 0918 Declaration of State of Emergency 1030 Exercise Terminated 1406 Early Precautionary Actions: The State issued a N/A Livestock Advisory; All livestock are to be sheltered and placed on stored feed and water within the 10-mile EPZ.

1st Protective Action Recommendation: N/A 1st Protective Action Decision (Grundy County): N/A 1st Siren Activation (Grundy County) N/A 1st EAS or EBS Message (Grundy County) N/A 2nd Protective Action Decision (Grundy County): N/A 2nd Siren Activation (Grundy County) N/A 2nd EAS or EBS Message (Grundy County) N/A 1st Protective Action Decision: 1152 1st Siren Activation 1157 1st EAS or EBS Message 1158 2nd Protective Action Recommendation: N/A 2nd Protective Action Decision: N/A 2nd Siren Activation N/A 2nd EAS or EBS Message N/A KI Administration Decision, Radiological Assessment N/A Field Teams:

KI Administration Decision, Emergency Workers and 1150 Immobile Populations:

11

4. Exercise Evaluation and Results Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the March 25, 2009, REP Full Participation Plume Pathway Exercises to test the off-site emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on its demonstration of exercise criteria delineated in Federal Register Notice: Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent of play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

4.1. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page(s), presents the status of all exercise criteria from Federal Register Notice: Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002, which were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following letters:

M-Met (No Deficiency or ARCA assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)

D-Deficiency assessed A-ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)

N-Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Section IV.B.)

Blank-Not scheduled for demonstration 12

Table 2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (3 pages)

State Public Inquiry Phone Bank UAC - Chicagoland Speedway IL State Liason - Grundy DATE: 2009-03-25 M&DEWE - RAFT SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL State EOC/SIRC A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated State - IWP REAC RAFT FT - 1 FT - 2 EOF JIC Emergency Operations Management Mobilization 1a1 M M M M M M M Facilities 1b1 Direction and Control 1c1 M M M M M M Communications Equipment 1d1 M M M M M M M M M M Equip & Supplies to support operations 1e1 M M M M M M M M M Protective Action Decision Making Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2a1 M M Radiological Assessment and PARs 2b1 M M Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs 2b2 M M M PADs for protection of special populations 2c1 M M Rad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway 2d1 Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and 2e1 Return Protective Action Implementation Implementation of emergency worker exposure control 3a1 M M M Implementation of KI decision 3b1 M M Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs 3c1 Implementation of protective actions for Schools 3c2 Implementation of traffic and access control 3d1 M Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved 3d2 M Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info 3e1 Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available 3e2 Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions 3f1 Field Measurement and Analysis Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements 4a1 M M Field Teams obtain sufficient information 4a2 M Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately 4a3 M M M Post plume phase field measurements and sampling 4b1 Laboratory operations 4c1 Emergency Notification and Public Info Activation of the prompt alert and notification system 5a1 M M Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker 5a2 Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas 5a3 Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media 5b1 M M M M M Support Operations/Facilities Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of 6a1 evacuees Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment 6b1 M Temporary care of evacuees 6c1 Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals 6d1 13

Table 2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 2/3)

IL State Rad Advisor - Grundy IL State Rad Advisor - Kendall DCO Briefing - ISP District 5 HQ DEEW - Kankakee Comm Col M&DEWE - Kankakee Comm Col Pub Reg - Kankakee Comm Col IL State Liaison - Kendall IL State Rad Advisor - Will CCC - Kankakee Comm Col DATE: 2009-03-25 IL State Liaison - Will TACP - ISP District 5 SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL Grundy - IWP A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated Emergency Operations Management Mobilization 1a1 M M M M Facilities 1b1 Direction and Control 1c1 M M M M M Communications Equipment 1d1 M M M M M Equip & Supplies to support operations 1e1 M M M M M M M M Protective Action Decision Making Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2a1 Radiological Assessment and PARs 2b1 Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs 2b2 M M PADs for protection of special populations 2c1 M Rad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway 2d1 Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and 2e1 Return Protective Action Implementation Implementation of emergency worker exposure control 3a1 M M M M Implementation of KI decision 3b1 M M Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs 3c1 Implementation of protective actions for Schools 3c2 Implementation of traffic and access control 3d1 M Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved 3d2 Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info 3e1 Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available 3e2 Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions 3f1 Field Measurement and Analysis Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements 4a1 Field Teams obtain sufficient information 4a2 Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately 4a3 Post plume phase field measurements and sampling 4b1 Laboratory operations 4c1 Emergency Notification and Public Info Activation of the prompt alert and notification system 5a1 M M M M M Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker 5a2 Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas 5a3 Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media 5b1 Support Operations/Facilities Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of 6a1 M M M evacuees Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment 6b1 M Temporary care of evacuees 6c1 M Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals 6d1 14

Table 2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 3/3)

Will - EAS - WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ Grundy - EBS - WCSJ/WJDK Will - EV-2 Dresden Troy SD 30C Grundy - EV-2 Coal City SD Grundy - EV-2 Saratoga SD DATE: 2009-03-25 SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL Kendall - EBS - WSPY A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated Grundy - EOC Kendall - IWP Kendell - EOC TACP - Kendall Will - EOC Will - IWP Emergency Operations Management Mobilization 1a1 M M M M M Facilities 1b1 Direction and Control 1c1 M M M Communications Equipment 1d1 M M M M M M M M M M M M Equip & Supplies to support operations 1e1 M M M M M M M Protective Action Decision Making Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2a1 Radiological Assessment and PARs 2b1 Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs 2b2 M M M PADs for protection of special populations 2c1 M M M Rad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway 2d1 Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and 2e1 Return Protective Action Implementation Implementation of emergency worker exposure control 3a1 M M M M M M Implementation of KI decision 3b1 M M M M M M Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs 3c1 M M Implementation of protective actions for Schools 3c2 M M M M M Implementation of traffic and access control 3d1 M M Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved 3d2 M M Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info 3e1 Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available 3e2 Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions 3f1 Field Measurement and Analysis Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements 4a1 Field Teams obtain sufficient information 4a2 Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately 4a3 Post plume phase field measurements and sampling 4b1 Laboratory operations 4c1 Emergency Notification and Public Info Activation of the prompt alert and notification system 5a1 M M M M M M Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker 5a2 Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas 5a3 Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media 5b1 M M M Support Operations/Facilities Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of 6a1 evacuees Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment 6b1 Temporary care of evacuees 6c1 15

Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals 6d1 16

4.2. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated 4.2.1. Illinois Jurisdictions 4.2.1.1. State Initial Warning Point

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.2. State Emergency Operations Center/State of Illinois Response Center
a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: 2.b.2.

ISSUE NO.: 20-09-2b2-D-01 CRITERION: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public including KI if ORO policy.

CONDITION: The initial release of radioactive materials from the DNPS began at 1106 hours0.0128 days <br />0.307 hours <br />0.00183 weeks <br />4.20833e-4 months <br />. The peak release rates by scenario were between 1130-1145 hours, and actually occurred at 1140 hours0.0132 days <br />0.317 hours <br />0.00188 weeks <br />4.3377e-4 months <br />. The meteorological data indicated a constant wind speed of 4 mph, the affected Sub-Areas needed to be evacuated as quickly as possible to protect the public from being immersed in a radioactive plume.

By 1210 hours0.014 days <br />0.336 hours <br />0.002 weeks <br />4.60405e-4 months <br />, the plume segment which exceeded the PAGs traveled approximately 2.0 miles from the DNPS site boundary. From the time the 17

State verified the Release occurring at 1123 hours0.013 days <br />0.312 hours <br />0.00186 weeks <br />4.273015e-4 months <br /> until the time Grundy County had verified receipt of the States recommended PAR at1144 hours a total of 21 minutes had elapsed. During this time it took 11 minutes to transmit the States PAR to the Counties. These 11 minutes contributed to the overall 71 minutes that transpired from the release occurring to the time Grundy County began notification of the General Public through broadcast by EBS Station - WCSJ/WJDK at 1218 hours0.0141 days <br />0.338 hours <br />0.00201 weeks <br />4.63449e-4 months <br />.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The process used and performance demonstrated by the State and Grundy County to determine and implement protective action recommendations and decisions, contributed to a delay in the notification of the public to take action.

REFERENCE:

NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.9 NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.f, m EFFECT: The public could have been unnecessarily exposed to additional radiation released from the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Review process and performance and make necessary changes to assure that the General Public receives PARs in a timely manner.

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN:

On June 30, 2009, a telephonic conference was held between the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA), the Exelon Corporation, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region V (FEMA RV). The purpose of the call was to determine the actions to be taken to resolve the Deficiency identified under criterion 2.b.2, State Incident Response Center, during the March 25, 2009, REP Exercise.

The agreement between IEMA and FEMA RV was for IEMA to submit a letter to FEMA RV which will indicate their commitment to develop an improved process for notice to the public in the case of a radiological event at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. This process is to be developed, tested and ready for implementation no longer than 90 days for the acknowledgment of receipt by FEMA RV.

18

On July 7, 2009, the commitment letter from IEMA was received at FEMA RV. After review of the IEMA letter an acknowledgement letter from FEMA RV was prepared and sent to IEMA on July 10, 2009. This letter indicated that the 90 day period would commence on July 10, 2009.

The Illinois Emergency Management Agency complied with the decisions made at the June 30th conference call. The submittal of their letter committing to the development of an improved process within the 90 days period resolves the identified Deficiency for criterion 2.b.2.

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.3. Public Inquiry Phone Bank
a. MET: 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.4. Radiological Emergency Assessment Center
a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.5. Unified Area Command - Chicagoland Speedway
a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.b.1.

19

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.6. Radiological Assessment Field Team
a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 4.a.2, 4.a.3.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.7. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment at the RAFT
a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.8. Field Team 1
a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.3.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.9. Field Team 2
a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.3.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None 20
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.10. Emergency Operations Facility
a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.11. Joint Information Center
a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.12. Illinois State Liaison - Grundy County
a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.13. Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Grundy County
a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None 21
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.14. Illinois State Liaison - Kendall County
a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.15. Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Kendall County
a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.16. Illinois State Liaison - Will County
a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.17. Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Will County
a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.e.1, 2.c.1, 5.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None 22
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.18. Dosimetry Control Officer's Briefing -

Illinois State Police District 5 Headquarters

a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.19. Traffic and Access Control Point at the Illinois State Police District 5 Headquarters
a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.20. Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers - Kankakee Community College
a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 23

4.2.1.21. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment - Kankakee Community College

a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1, 6.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.22. Public Registration - Kankakee Community College
a. MET: 1.e.1, 6.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.1.23. Congregate Care Center - Kankakee Community College
a. MET: 1.d.1, 6.c.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2. Risk Jurisdictions 24

4.2.2.1. Grundy County - Initial Warning Point

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.2. Grundy County - Emergency Operations Center
a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: 5.b.1.

ISSUE NO.: 20-09-5b1-D-02 CRITERION: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E.5.,

7., G.3.a, G.4.a.b.c)

CONDITION: The initial release of radioactive materials from the DNPS began at 1106 hours0.0128 days <br />0.307 hours <br />0.00183 weeks <br />4.20833e-4 months <br />. The peak release rates by scenario were between 1130-1145 hours, and actually occurred at 1140 hours0.0132 days <br />0.317 hours <br />0.00188 weeks <br />4.3377e-4 months <br />. The meteorological data indicated a constant wind speed of 4 mph, the affected Sub-Areas needed to be evacuated as quickly as possible to protect the public from being immersed in a radioactive plume.

By 1210 hours0.014 days <br />0.336 hours <br />0.002 weeks <br />4.60405e-4 months <br />, the plume segment which exceeded the PAGs traveled approximately 2.0 miles from the DNPS site boundary.

At 1144 Grundy County officials verified State NARS Message No. 3, which included a recommendation to evacuate Grundy County Sub-Areas 1 and 4.

A total of 34 minutes transpired before initiation of the EBS message including an evacuation recommendation for the General Public. These 34 minutes contributed to the overall 71 minutes that transpired from the release 25

occurring to the time Grundy County began notification of the General Public through broadcast by EBS Station - WCSJ/WJDK at 1218 hours0.0141 days <br />0.338 hours <br />0.00201 weeks <br />4.63449e-4 months <br />.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The process used and performance demonstrated by the State and Grundy County to determine and implement protective action recommendations and decisions, contributed to a delay in the notification of the public to take action.

REFERENCE:

NUREG-0654, E.5., E.7., G.3.a, G.4.a.b.c EFFECT: The public could have been unnecessarily exposed to additional radiation released from the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Review process and performance and make necessary changes to assure that the General Public receives PADs in a timely manner.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN GRUNDY COUNTY EOC The Grundy County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) successfully demonstrated its capability to provided accurate and timely information to the media and the public in the re-demonstration drill to rectify the Deficiency detected during the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Exercise conducted on March 25, 2009. The re-demonstration was held on July 1, 2009, at the Grundy County Emergency Operations Center.

The Grundy County EOC had the necessary staff pre-positioned and activated at the Grundy County EOC for this re-demonstration exercise by 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />. Radio station WCSJ/WJDK was also staffed to assist in the re-demonstration.

The Controller (IEMA) provided a hand-out containing general information regarding the situation and the actions taken up to the point of play just prior to the re-demonstration drill commencing. This information included two previous NARS messages (State Message No.1 and No.2) which brought the situation up to an Alert condition for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.

26

At approximately 0915 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.481575e-4 months <br />, the County EOC Communications Center received notification of a change in the On-site Conditions via NARS State Message No. 3. This message was verified at 0920 hours0.0106 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.5006e-4 months <br /> and provided to the Grundy County EMA Director. This message identified that a General Emergency Emergency Classification Level (ECL) had been declared at the site and there was not a radioactive release. The States Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) identified that Sub-Areas 1, 3, and 4, were to be evacuated. The EM Director and County Board Representative concurred with the States recommendation to evacuate Sub-Areas 1 and 4 (which are in Grundy County). At 0926 hours0.0107 days <br />0.257 hours <br />0.00153 weeks <br />3.52343e-4 months <br />, simulated coordination (telephone call to a State Controller) was made with the other two affected counties (Will and Kendall) for the broadcast of Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages and sounding of sirens.

The County Media Message Manager prepared the pre-scripted messages regarding the evacuations of Sub-Areas 1 and 4, to be disseminated to the public via the EBS. The completed message contained all the required elements: names of affected municipalities, evacuation routes, location of reception centers, transportation availability for those needing assistance, what to take, phone numbers to call for assistance, information on schools, and other information. The message was approved by the County Board Representative. Once approved the message was e-mailed to the radio station by the Media Message Manager. At 0938 hours0.0109 days <br />0.261 hours <br />0.00155 weeks <br />3.56909e-4 months <br />, the County Board Representative read the message to the radio station (WCSJ/WJDK) over the telephone for simulated immediate live broadcast and recorded for future repeat broadcasts, ending the message at 0941 hours0.0109 days <br />0.261 hours <br />0.00156 weeks <br />3.580505e-4 months <br />.

At approximately 0949 hours0.011 days <br />0.264 hours <br />0.00157 weeks <br />3.610945e-4 months <br />, the County received NARS State Message No.

4 which provided notice of a release of radioactive material and that a General Emergency ECL was still declared. This message was verified at 0952 hours0.011 days <br />0.264 hours <br />0.00157 weeks <br />3.62236e-4 months <br /> and provided to the Grundy County EMA Director. The County accepted the Illinois Emergency Management Agencys recommendation to evacuate Sub-Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9 and 12. The addition of Sub-Areas 2 and 7 affect Grundy County.

The County Media Message Manager used a pre-scripted template with specific information for the affected Sub-Areas to prepare the EBS message.

27

The completed message contained all the required elements: names of affected municipalities, evacuation routes, location of reception centers, transportation availability for those needing assistance, what to take, phone numbers to call for assistance, information on schools, and other information.

The message was reviewed and approved by the County Board Representative. The Media Message Manager sent the message via e-mail to the radio station. At 1008 hours0.0117 days <br />0.28 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.83544e-4 months <br />, the message was then read by the County Board Representative over the telephone to the radio station for simulated immediate live broadcast and recorded by the media outlet for simulated playback every 15 minutes for the first hour. Simulated coordination (telephone call to a State Controller) was made with the other two affected counties (Will and Kendall) for the broadcast of EBS messages and sounding of sirens.

All news releases were simulated as coordinated (faxed) with the local municipalities, Kendall and Will Counties, the IEMA Representative at the JIC and the EOF. All media communication activities were logged on the Grundy County Master Log.

There was no requirement for non-English language information to be published.

RADIO STATION WCSJ At 0820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br />, Radio Station WCSJ/WJDK received a test e-mail message from the Media Manager in the Grundy County EOC (GCEOC) requesting a confirmation of the message, and informing the radio station of the status of a drill. At 0828 hours0.00958 days <br />0.23 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15054e-4 months <br />, the Operations Manager for Radio Station WCSJ/WJDK submitted an e-mail response to the GCEOC Media Manager. At 0829 hours0.00959 days <br />0.23 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.154345e-4 months <br />, the GCEOC Media Manager replied to the radio station's Operations Manager via e-mail.

At approximately 0915 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.481575e-4 months <br />, the small, central broadcasting and recording booth for the radio station was staffed by another radio station employee in anticipation of receiving and simultaneously broadcasting an EBS message live while recording it for future playback.

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At 0937 hours0.0108 days <br />0.26 hours <br />0.00155 weeks <br />3.565285e-4 months <br />, the central booth operator received an initial notification of the pending broadcast of an EAS message from the GCEOC by way of the illumination of a bright warning light in the booth and a follow-up telephone call from the GCEOC. The booth operator immediately activated the MP3 recorder while simulating overriding the live broadcast. At 0938 hours0.0109 days <br />0.261 hours <br />0.00155 weeks <br />3.56909e-4 months <br />, GCEOC began reading the first EAS message and at 0941 hours0.0109 days <br />0.261 hours <br />0.00156 weeks <br />3.580505e-4 months <br />, the message was completed and recorded. The booth operator also received an e-mail message containing the EAS message (Message Number 2) as an attachment with the time of the approval of the message in the GCEOC being 0935 hours0.0108 days <br />0.26 hours <br />0.00155 weeks <br />3.557675e-4 months <br />.

At 1007 hours0.0117 days <br />0.28 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.831635e-4 months <br />, the booth operator was again notified of a pending EAS message by the illumination of a bright warning light in the booth and a follow-up telephone call from the GCEOC. At 1007 hours0.0117 days <br />0.28 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.831635e-4 months <br />, the booth operator simulated broadcasting the EAS message over the airwaves while simultaneously recording the message on the MP3 recorder. The EAS message was completed at 1011 hours0.0117 days <br />0.281 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.846855e-4 months <br />. The booth operator received an e-mail message with this EAS message (Message Number 3) as an attachment, and the message was approved at the GCEOC 1005 hours0.0116 days <br />0.279 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.824025e-4 months <br />.

During discussions with the broadcast/recording booth operator, it was learned that training for the radio station broadcasting staff on the e-mail notification system had been conducted by the Grundy County EMA in March 2009. The booth operator provided the evaluator with copies of both EAS messages and the radio station provided the evaluator with a copy of the Grundy County Emergency Public Notification Guideline, G-SOG-20, dated May 2007.

All activities described in the re-demonstration criterion were carried out in accordance with the plan and procedures.

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 29

4.2.2.3. Grundy County - Emergency Broadcast System Station - WCSJ/WJDK

a. MET: 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.4. Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Coal City School District
a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.5. Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Saratoga School District
a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.6. Kendall County - Initial Warning Point
a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 30
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.7. Kendall County - Emergency Operations Center
a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.8. Kendall County - Traffic and Access Control Point
a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.9. Kendall County - Emergency Broadcast System Station - WSPY
a. MET: 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.10. Will County - Initial Warning Point 31
a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.11. Will County - Emergency Operations Center
a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.12. Will County - Emergency Alert System Station - WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ
a. MET: 1.d.1, 5.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 4.2.2.13. Will County - EV-2 Interview - Troy Community Consolidated School District 30C
a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
e. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 32

APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ARC American Red Cross ARES Amateur Radio Emergency Service BC Board Chairman CBC County Board Chairman CCC Congregate Care Center CERT Civilian Emergency Response Team DAP Disaster Assistance Plans DCO Dosimetry Control Officer DDP Dosimetry Distribution Point DGS Dresden Generating Station DNPS Dresden Nuclear Power Station DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter EAL Emergency Action Level EAS Emergency Alert System EBS Emergency Broadcast System ECL Emergency Classification Level EMA Emergency Management Agency EMC Emergency Management Coordinator EMD Emergency Management Director EMS Emergency Medical Services EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency GCEMA Grundy County Emergency Management Agency GE General Emergency IEMA Illinois Emergency Management Agency IEPA Illinois Environmental Protection Agency ISP Illinois State Police ITECS Illinois Transportable Emergency Communication System IVCC Illinois Valley Community College IWP Initial Warning Point JIC Joint Information Center LD Luminescent Dosimeter NARS Nuclear Accident Reporting System NPS Nuclear Power Station NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission ORO Offsite Response Organizations PA Public Address PAD Protective Action Decision PAR Protective Action Recommendation PDP Personnel Dosimetry Packet 33

PHD Public Health Department PIO Public Information Officer PNS Prompt Notification System PRD Permanent Reading Dosimeter RA Radiological Advisor RAC Radiological Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amatuer Civil Emergency Seervices RAFT Radiological Assistance Field Team REAC Radiological Emergency Assessment Center REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness SAE Site Area Emergency SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SIRC State Incident Response Center UAC Unified Area Command 34

APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS 35

DATE: 2009-03-25, SITE: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, IL LOCATION EVALUATOR AGENCY State Initial Warning Point Clayton Spangenberg ICF State Emergency Operations Center/State of Illinois Response Frank Cordaro ICF Center Robert Duggleby ICF Public Inquiry Phone Bank Clayton Spangenberg ICF Radiological Emergency Assessment Center Thomas Essig ICF Larry Harrington ICF Unified Area Command - Chicagoland Speedway James Greer ICF Simon Guereca ICF Radiological Assessment Field Team Jill Leatherman ICF Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Jill Leatherman ICF Equipment at the RAFT Field Team 1 Dennis Wilford ICF Field Team 2 Earl Shollenberger ICF Emergency Operations Facility Richard Grundstrom ICF Joint Information Center Deborah Bell ICF Illinois State Liaison - Grundy County Edward Diaz DHS/FEMA Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Grundy County Robert Vork ICF Illinois State Liaison - Kendall County Michael Petullo ICF Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Kendall County Carl Bebrich DHS/FEMA Illinois State Liaison - Will County Robert Rospenda ICF Illinois State Radiological Advisor - Will County Richard McPeak ICF Dosimetry Control Officer's Briefing - Illinois State Police District Paul Ringheiser Jr ICF 5 Headquarters Traffic and Access Control Point at the Illinois State Police James King DHS/FEMA District 5 Headquarters Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers - Richard McPeak ICF Kankakee Community College Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Deborah Bell ICF Equipment - Kankakee Community College Wendy Swygert ICF Public Registration - Kankakee Community College Tracey Green ICF Congregate Care Center - Kankakee Community College Tracey Green ICF Grundy County - Initial Warning Point Paul Ringheiser Jr ICF Grundy County - Emergency Operations Center Edward Diaz DHS/FEMA Delwyn Kinsley DHS/FEMA Robert Vork ICF Grundy County - Emergency Broadcast System Station - Paul Ringheiser Jr ICF WCSJ/WJDK Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Coal City School District *Clinton Crackel DHS/FEMA Grundy County - EV-2 Interview - Saratoga School District *Clinton Crackel DHS/FEMA Kendall County - Initial Warning Point James King DHS/FEMA Kendall County - Emergency Operations Center Carl Bebrich DHS/FEMA Michael Petullo ICF Kendall County - Traffic and Access Control Point Wendy Swygert ICF Kendall County - Emergency Broadcast System Station - WSPY James King DHS/FEMA Will County - Initial Warning Point Tracey Green ICF Will County - Emergency Operations Center Richard McPeak ICF Robert Rospenda ICF

  • William Sulinckas DHS/FEMA Will County - Emergency Alert System Station - Tracey Green ICF WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ 36

Will County - EV-2 Interview - Troy Community Consolidated Delwyn Kinsley DHS/FEMA School District 30C

  • Team Leader 37

APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT This appendix lists the exercise criteria, which were scheduled for demonstration in the Dresden Nuclear Power Station REP Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise on March 25, 2009, and the off-site extent of play agreement approved by DHS/FEMA Region V on February 23, 2009.

The exercise criteria, contained in the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology; Notice, as published in the Federal Register Notice/Vol 67, dated April 25, 2002, represent a functional translation of the planning standards and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev1, Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, November 1980.

Because the exercise criteria are intended for use at all nuclear power plant sites, and because of variations among offsite plans and procedures, an extent of play agreement is prepared by the State and approved by DHS/FEMA to provide evaluators with guidance on expected actual demonstration of the criteria.

A. Exercise Criteria Listed on the following pages are the specific radiological emergency preparedness criteria scheduled for demonstration during this exercise.

38

STATE OF ILLINOIS EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT FOR THE DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE March 25, 2009 Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), which houses the IEMA Communications Center (Initial Warning Point), the State of Illinois Response Center (SIRC) and the Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC), will be activated. The IEMA Emergency Response Telecommunicator will implement procedures for notification of IEMA staff as defined in IEMA SOPs. The SIRC will be fully activated with a variety of State agencies. REAC will be fully activated. Rosters will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour staffing of the SIRC and REAC. The evaluator will not be allowed to remove the rosters.

An actual phone call will be made to the FEMA advising them of the situation at Dresden Station.

Follow up calls to FEMA will be simulated.

The Unified Area Command (UAC) will be activated with State district and regional personnel.

Radiological Assessment Field Team (RAFT) and mobile lab (not evaluated) will be activated in Mazon. IEMA personnel will be pre-positioned in the local area and dispatched to the County EOCs, UAC, EOF, Technical Support Center (TSC) and the JIC. FEMA will not evaluate the TSC.

The pre-positioned State staff will begin exercise play no earlier than the Alert.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

The ability to direct and control emergency response activities will be demonstrated at the SIRC, REAC, the UAC and the JIC. Coordination will be demonstrated between the SIRC, the REAC, the UAC, the JIC, the EOF and the county EOCs.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

IEMA will use a variety of communication systems (Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS),

telefax, commercial telephone, cellular phone, radio) to communicate with other organizations and locations.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

39

The State of Illinois will demonstrate the use of equipment, maps and displays to support emergency operations. Dosimetry Control Officer (DCO) logs will be available from an IEMA Radiological Advisors in the County EOCs.

A DCO briefing/Traffic and Access Control (TAC) interview will be conducted by the Illinois State Police on March 24, 1 p.m., at the ISP District 5 Headquarters. During this event, the availability of dosimetry will be demonstrated. No more than 10% of ISP District 5 dosimetry kits will be inspected during the interview to confirm serial numbers.

EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

The ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers will be demonstrated in REAC. A message will be injected in the Grundy County EOC to drive the decision to authorize exposure in excess of administrative limits.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

REAC will evaluate the licensee information and complete independent dose projections based on that information and simulated field monitoring data. REAC will make an evaluation of the data and make a protective action recommendation to the SIRC.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

The coordination to determine protective action recommendations (PARs) based upon available shelters, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors will be demonstrated between the SIRC and REAC. The State PAR will be transmitted to the EPZ counties via NARS.

The capability to determine which centers should be activated for monitoring, decontamination, registration reception and congregate care will be demonstrated at UAC, with input from the SIRC and REAC.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

The coordination to determine protective action recommendations (PARs) based upon available shelters, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors will be demonstrated between the SIRC and REAC. The State PAR will be transmitted to the EPZ counties via NARS.

The ability to make the decision to recommend the use of KI to institutionalized persons will be demonstrated in REAC.

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the OROs planning criteria.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

40

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

This will be demonstrated during the ISP DCO briefing/TAC interview that will be conducted on March 24, 1 p.m. at the ISP District 5 Headquarters. This criterion will also be demonstrated at the field team staging area.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.

This will be demonstrated during the ISP DCO briefing/TAC interview that will be conducted on March 24, 1 p.m. at the ISP District 5 Headquarters. This criterion will also be demonstrated at the field team staging area.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.

This criterion does not apply to the State of Illinois.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

This criterion does not apply to the State of Illinois.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

This will be demonstrated by the State through coordination between the UAC and the County EOCs, in accordance with the Dresden Station EPZ Traffic and Access Control procedures. The staffing of the State posts will be simulated during the exercise.

A TAC interview will be conducted in conjunction with the DCO briefing on March 24, 1 p.m.

(tentative) at the ISP District 5 Headquarters.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

This will be demonstrated through discussions at the UAC between the Illinois State Police and Illinois Department of Transportation. A message will be injected at the UAC that will drive this demonstration. State personnel will deal with the impediment by discussing the need for equipment, and its estimated time of arrival, etc. Actual contacts with resource providers will be made and logged.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

41

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.

This criterion will be demonstrated at RAFT with field teams performing radiation measurements with various monitoring equipment. Air samples will be taken with charcoal cartridges and the availability of silver zeolite cartridges will be indicated. Two field teams will be evaluated.

Evaluators may not interfere with field team activities or take teams out of play to demonstrate field measurements or air sampling. If necessary, these activities will be demonstrated following the order to return all teams to the staging area.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

This criterion will be demonstrated at RAFT.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.

This criterion will be demonstrated by the field teams and information will be coordinated with RAFT. Samples appropriate to the area and season will be collected and transported in accordance with SOPs. Two field teams will be evaluated. Each team will take an air sample with particulate filters.

Evaluators may not interfere with field team activities or take teams out of play to demonstrate field measurements or air sampling. If necessary, these activities will be demonstrated following the order to return all teams to the staging area.

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

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EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current DHS REP guidance.

The State's role in demonstrating this criterion is limited to transmitting the State's protective action recommendation (PAR) to the counties and monitoring the instructional messages provided to the public by the counties. This monitoring will be accomplished by IEMA representatives in the County EOCs.

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with DHS approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

This criterion does not apply to the State of Illinois.

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

This will be demonstrated at the JIC in coordination with the SIRC, REAC, UAC and the County EOCs. IEMA personnel will be present at the JIC to coordinate with the Exelon staff. Media briefings will be conducted at the JIC. A livestock advisory will be issued to the media from the JIC or the SIRC when appropriate.

A rumor control phone bank for public inquiries will be operated by the State during the exercise in a room adjacent to the SIRC.

EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.

This criterion will be demonstrated at Kankakee Community College during an out of sequence of demonstration conducted on March 24, with set up beginning at 8:30 a.m. Two portal monitors will be set up during the demonstration. Evacuee and emergency worker monitoring and decontamination will be demonstrated. The appropriate number of evacuees will be processed to meet 20% in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> requirement.

Field team staff will discuss procedures for handling personal belongings and evacuee vehicles.

An evacuee vehicle will not be monitored and decontaminated.

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles.

This criterion will be demonstrated at Kankakee Community College during an out of sequence demonstration conducted on March 24, with set up beginning at 8:30 a.m. An emergency worker vehicle will be monitored and decontaminated by field team staff.

During the exercise, at the RAFT Staging Area, field team staff will demonstrate monitoring of a field team vehicle. Decontamination of that vehicle will be simulated via an interview.

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Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines.

Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities.

This criterion will be demonstrated at Kankakee Community College during an out of sequence demonstration conducted on March 24,with set up beginning at 8:30 a.m. Local organizations responsible for operating a reception and congregate care center will be present to demonstrate this criterion.

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

This criterion will be demonstrated during a drill conducted at St. James Hospital in Pontiac on July 14 at 9 a.m. Duffy Ambulance Service will participate in the drill.

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GRUNDY COUNTY EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT FOR THE DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE March 25, 2009 Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

Grundy County will fully activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Morris, Illinois. The County will implement notification procedures as defined in IPRA-Dresden. Representatives from IEMA and Exelon will staff the County EOC but will not be pre-positioned in the EOC. A roster will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour staffing of the EOC. Evaluators will not be allowed to remove the roster from the EOC.

The Grundy County Sheriffs Department will allow an evaluator to observe and evaluate the initial NARS message and notification at the Sheriffs Communications Center. The following conditions apply:

- Telecommunicators shift change takes place at 7 a.m. There is an exchange of information between shifts, usually from 6:50 a.m. to 7:10 a.m. Evaluators are asked not to be disruptive to this process.

- If major events occur or are occurring, evaluators will be asked to leave.

- Evaluators are expected to observe and evaluate without creating additional disruptions.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

Decision making will be demonstrated at the State of Illinois Response Center (SIRC) and Grundy County EOC. Coordination of decisions and emergency activities will be demonstrated between Grundy County, the SIRC, UAC and the JIC, and between the County and municipalities within the EPZ. Coordination between Grundy County, Will County and Kendall County will be demonstrated.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

Grundy County will use NARS, commercial telephone, radio and telefax to communicate with departments and agencies at other locations.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

Grundy County will adequately demonstrate the ability to support operations through the use of maps, status boards and other displays as appropriate. DCO logs will be available from the IEMA 45

Radiological Advisor in the County EOC. The availability of dosimetry and KI will be demonstrated at the County EOC and during the school interviews.

EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

This criterion does not apply to Grundy County.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

This criterion does not apply to Grundy County.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

The State of Illinois will make protective action recommendations to Grundy County officials in the County EOC. The Grundy County officials will make the final decision regarding what protective actions will be recommended to the public.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

The State of Illinois will make protective action recommendations to Grundy County officials in the County EOC. The Grundy County officials will make the final decision regarding what protective actions will be recommended for special population groups.

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the OROs planning criteria.

This criterion does not apply to Grundy County.

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

Grundy County will demonstrate this criterion by close coordination with the IEMA Radiological Advisor and timely dissemination and exchange of information within the County Dosimetry Control Officer network. Exercise messages will be injected which will ensure the opportunity to demonstrate this criterion in the County EOC. This criterion will also be demonstrated during the school interviews.

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Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.

When notified by the State of Illinois to distribute and administer KI, Grundy County officials will discuss the issuance of KI to emergency workers and immobile populations, as a voluntary measure, and will notify the municipalities of the State's recommendation. This criterion will also be demonstrated at the school interviews.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.

This will be demonstrated by Grundy County through the simulated implementation of the appropriate task assignments. The appropriate officials will coordinate transportation and receiving facilities for special populations. One of each type of special facility will be contacted during the exercise. One of each type of transportation provider (ambulance/bus) will be contacted during the exercise. The public will not be involved in the demonstration.

The Mobility Impaired List will be available for inspection in the County EOC during the exercise.

The evaluator will not be allowed to remove the list from the EOC.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

Grundy County officials will demonstrate this capability through the simulated implementation of the appropriate task assignment in the County EOC. The EPZ schools and transportation providers will be contacted during the exercise.

Two school interviews will be conducted as follows:

Coal City Community Unit Dist. #1 March 19, 9:30 a.m.

Saratoga Community Consolidated School Dist. #60C March 19, 1:30 p.m.

The District Superintendent, Principal, a Teacher, the transportation coordinator (DCO), the maintenance supervisor and a bus driver will be present at the interviews.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

This criterion does not apply to Grundy County. Grundy County is not responsible for staffing any of the designated traffic and access control posts.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

The Grundy County EOC staff will demonstrate the capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. A message will be injected by the Controller that will drive this demonstration. County personnel will deal with the impediment by identifying the equipment needed, discussing its estimated time of arrival, etc. Actual contacts with resource providers will be made and logged.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

This criterion does not apply to Grundy County.

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Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.

This criterion does not apply to Grundy County.

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS This evaluation area does not apply to Grundy County.

EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

Grundy County will demonstrate the capability to provide both an alert signal and an initial instructional message to populated areas throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ in a timely manner after their decision to activate the alert and notification system to implement protective action recommendations (PAR).

This capability will be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the Dresden Station EPZ Prompt Notification System as defined in IPRA-Dresden. The Prompt Notification System (outdoor warning sirens) will not be activated during the exercise.

The ability to provide instructions to the public will be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the local radio station (WCSJ/WJDK). The local radio station will be contacted during the first, and possibly the second, alert and notification sequence. An evaluator and controller will be positioned at the radio station during the exercise to monitor the initial message.

If the initial message does not contain a protective action recommendation, the evaluator and controller will stay at the radio station for a second message.

Coordination between Grundy County, Will County and Kendall County will be demonstrated.

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

This criterion does not apply to Grundy County.

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

Grundy County will demonstrate this criterion by using pre-scripted messages as indicated in IPRA-Dresden or ad hoc messages will be developed. Contact with the radio station will be 48

simulated for each alert and notification sequence following the sequence issuing the initial protective action recommendation.

The ability to provide information to the media will be demonstrated by Grundy County through a briefing held at the Grundy County media briefing location. If real media are not present for the briefing, the controller and observers will serve as mock media. Evaluators will not serve as mock media.

The ability to deal with rumors will be demonstrated by Grundy County through coordination between the County EOC and the JIC. The Grundy County EOC controller will inject exercise messages which will ensure the opportunity to demonstrate this criterion. County officials will investigate and address rumors. If appropriate, the rumors will be coordinated between State and County officials in the County EOC and the JIC.

County emergency broadcast messages and news releases, if issued, will be faxed to the JIC.

EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES This evaluation area does not apply to Grundy County.

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KENDALL COUNTY EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT FOR THE DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE March 25, 2009 Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

Kendall County intends to fully activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Yorkville, Illinois. The County will implement notification procedures as defined in IPRA-Dresden.

Representatives from IEMA and Exelon will staff the County EOC but will not be pre-positioned in the EOC. A roster will be made available for review in order to demonstrate 24-hour County staffing of the EOC. The evaluator will not be allowed to remove the roster from the EOC.

An evaluator will be positioned at KENCOM (initial warning point) at the start of the exercise.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

Decision making will be demonstrated at the State of Illinois Response Center (SIRC) and Kendall County EOC. Coordination of decisions and emergency activities will be demonstrated between Kendall County, the SIRC, UAC and the JIC. Coordination between Kendall County, Grundy County and Will County will be demonstrated.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

Kendall County will use NARS, commercial telephone, radio and telefax to communicate with departments, organizations and agencies at other locations.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

Kendall County will adequately demonstrate the ability to support operations through the use of maps, status boards and other displays as appropriate. DCO logs will be available from the IEMA Radiological Advisor in the County EOC. The availability of dosimetry and KI will be demonstrated at the County EOC and during the traffic and access control demonstration.

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EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

This criterion does not apply to Kendall County.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

This criterion does not apply to Kendall County.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

The State of Illinois will make protective action recommendations to Kendall County officials in the County EOC. The Kendall County officials will make the final decision regarding what protective actions will be recommended to the public.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

The State of Illinois will make protective action recommendations to Kendall County officials in the County EOC. The Kendall County officials will make the final decision regarding what protective actions will be recommended for special population groups.

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the OROs planning criteria.

This criterion does not apply to Kendall County.

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures.

Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

Kendall County will demonstrate this criterion by close coordination with the IEMA Radiological Advisor and timely dissemination and exchange of information within the County Dosimetry Control Officer network. Exercise messages will be injected which will ensure the opportunity to demonstrate this criterion in the County EOC.

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This criterion will also be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstration. The DCO briefing for the Sheriffs deputy demonstrating traffic and access control will be conducted at the Kendall County EOC.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.

When notified by the State of Illinois to distribute and administer KI, Kendall County officials will discuss the issuance of KI to emergency workers and immobile populations, as a voluntary measure. This criterion will also be demonstrated during the traffic and access control demonstration.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.

This will be demonstrated by Kendall County through the simulated implementation of the appropriate procedures. The appropriate officials will coordinate transportation and receiving facilities for special populations. One of each type of special facility will be contacted during the exercise. One of each type of transportation provider (ambulance/bus) will be contacted during the exercise. The public will not be involved in the demonstration.

The Mobility Impaired List will be available for inspection in the County EOC during the exercise. The evaluator will not be allowed to remove the list from the EOC.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

This criterion will be demonstrated in the Kendall County EOC.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

Coordination between Kendall County agencies designated to provide traffic and access control will be exhibited in the County EOC. A Sheriffs deputy will be available during the exercise to demonstrate the staffing of one post. The post for the demonstration will be selected by Kendall County during the exercise based on exercise play. The deputy will drive to the selected post location for the demonstration. The staffing of the remaining posts will be simulated.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

The Kendall County EOC staff will demonstrate the capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. A message will be injected by the controller that will drive this demonstration. County personnel will deal with the impediment by identifying the equipment needed, discussing its estimated time of arrival, etc. Actual contacts with resource providers will be made and logged.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

This criterion does not apply to Kendall County.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, 52

milk and agricultural production.

This criterion does not apply to Kendall County.

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS This evaluation area does not apply to Kendall County.

EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

Kendall County will demonstrate the capability to provide both an alert signal and an initial instructional message to populated areas throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ in a timely manner after their decision to activate the alert and notification system to implement protective action recommendations (PAR).

This capability will be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the Dresden Station EPZ Prompt Notification System as defined in IPRA-Dresden. The Prompt Notification System (outdoor warning sirens) will not be activated during the exercise.

The ability to provide instructions to the public will be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the local radio station. The local radio station (WSPY) will be contacted during the first, and possibly the second, alert and notification sequence. An evaluator and controller will be positioned at the radio station during the exercise to monitor the initial message. If the initial message does not contain a PAR, the evaluator and controller will stay at the radio station for the second message.

Coordination between Kendall County, Grundy County and Will County will be demonstrated.

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

This criterion does not apply to Kendall County.

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

Kendall County will demonstrate this criterion by using pre-scripted messages as indicated in IPRA-Dresden. Contact with the radio station will be simulated for each alert 53

and notification sequence following the sequence issuing the initial protective action recommendation.

The ability to provide information to the media will be demonstrated by Kendall County through a briefing held at the Kendall County media briefing location. If real media are not present for the briefing, the controller and observers will serve as mock media.

Evaluators will not serve as mock media.

The ability to deal with rumors will be demonstrated by Kendall County through coordination between the County EOC and the JIC. The controller will inject exercise messages which will ensure the opportunity to demonstrate this criterion. County officials will investigate and address rumors. If appropriate, the rumors will be coordinated between State and County officials in the County EOC and the JIC.

County emergency broadcast messages and news releases, if issued, will be faxed to the JIC.

EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES This evaluation area does not apply to Kendall County.

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WILL COUNTY EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT FOR THE DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE March 25, 2009 Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the discretion of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA 1 - EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

Will County intends to partially activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Joliet, Illinois. The County will implement notification procedures as defined in IPRA-Dresden. The following Will County officials will staff the County EOC: County Executive, Emergency Management Director, Sheriff and PIO. Representatives from IEMA and Exelon will staff the County EOC but will not be pre-positioned in the EOC. A roster will be provided to demonstrate 24-hour staffing of the EOC. Evaluators will not be allowed to remove the roster from the EOC.

An evaluator will be positioned at the County Sheriffs Communications Center (initial warning point) at the start of the exercise.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

Decision making will be demonstrated at the State of Illinois Response Center (SIRC) and Will County EOC. Coordination of decisions and emergency activities will be demonstrated between Will County, the SIRC, UAC and the JIC, and between the County and municipalities within the EPZ. Coordination between Will County, Grundy County and Kendall County will be demonstrated.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

Will County will use NARS, commercial telephone, radio and telefax to communicate with departments and agencies at other locations.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

Will County will demonstrate the ability to support operations through the use of maps, status boards and other displays as appropriate. DCO logs will be available from the IEMA Radiological Advisor in the Will County EOC. The availability of dosimetry and KI will be demonstrated at the school interview.

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EVALUATION AREA 2 - PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

This criterion does not apply to Will County.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

This criterion does not apply to Will County.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

The State of Illinois will make protective action recommendations to Will County officials in the County EOC. The Will County officials will make the final decision regarding what protective actions will be recommended to the public.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

The State of Illinois will make protective action recommendations to Will County officials in the County EOC. The Will County officials will make the final decision regarding what protective actions will be recommended for special population groups.

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the OROs planning criteria.

This criterion does not apply to Will County.

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 3 - PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures.

Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

This criterion will be demonstrated during the school interview.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.

This criterion will be demonstrated during the school interview.

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Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

A school interview will be conducted with the Troy Community Consolidated School District #30C on Thursday, March 19 at 2:00 p.m.. A District Administrator, a Teacher, the transportation coordinator (DCO), the maintenance supervisor and a bus driver will be present at the interview.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

This criterion does not apply to Will County.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.

This criterion does not apply to Will County.

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 4 - FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS This evaluation area does not apply to Will County.

EVALUATION AREA 5 - EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

Will County will demonstrate the capability to provide both an alert signal and an initial instructional message to populated areas throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ in a timely manner after their decision to activate the alert and notification system to implement protective action recommendations (PAR).

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This capability will be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the Dresden Station EPZ Prompt Notification System as defined in IPRA-Dresden. The Prompt Notification System (outdoor warning sirens) will not be activated during the exercise.

The ability to provide instructions to the public will be demonstrated through the simulated activation of the local radio station (WJOL/WSSR/WCCQ/WRXQ). The local radio station will be contacted during the first, and possibly the second, alert and notification sequence. An evaluator and controller will be positioned at the radio station during the exercise to monitor the initial message. If the initial message does not contain a protective action recommendation, the evaluator and controller will stay at the radio station for a second message.

Coordination between Will County, Grundy County and Kendall County will be demonstrated.

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

This criterion does not apply to Will County.

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

Will County will demonstrate a portion of this criterion by using pre-scripted messages as indicated in IPRA-Dresden. Contact with the radio station will be simulated for each alert and notification sequence following the sequence issuing the initial protective action recommendation. County emergency broadcast messages will be faxed to the JIC.

Media briefings and the ability to deal with public inquiries will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 6 - SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES This evaluation area does not apply to Will County.

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NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

NORMAL OPERATIONS 0800 The Operating Crew will be briefed and is expected to take the shift by 0800. They will be directed by turnover to continue operations at full power.

ALERT 0805 - 0935 Flooding affecting the plant Vital Area - ALERT, HA5 At 0805, the operating crew will receive a call from the engineer at the U2 CCSW vault room with a report of flooding in the U2 CCSW vault. 2 "8" CCSW Pump trips on overcurrent. There will be a visual report of damage to 2 "8" and "C" CCSW Pumps visible inside vault. The operating crew will also receive a message that, due to the 2 "8" CCSW Pump trip, water flow from the has been reduced to weeping from the hairline break on the discharge of the pump. There is no water exiting from the vault and there is no input to the Condensate Pump room floor or sumps.

Expected Response The Shift Manager should identify that ALERT, HA5 "Flooding affecting the plant Vital Area" is applicable. All appropriate notifications should be performed, and the Dialogic System should be activated. The Operating Crew may contemplate calling in extra personnel to assist with monitoring the control boards. Command and Control should be transferred as soon as practicable.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY 0935 -*1105 LARGE BREAK LOCA INSIDE DRYWELL w/FUEL FAILURE A large break occurs resulting in a RPV level reduction and RCS input into the Drywell.

A SCRAM occurs and all ECCS systems and isolations respond as designed with the exception of the HPCI steam supply isolation that fails open ( this is not a loss of containment as there is no pathway to the environment). RPV level will drop to less than

- 143" and recover. After the LOCA, DW radiation will rise, eventually exceeding 670 R/hr, a Loss of the Fuel barrier (FC5), which will result in a concurrent FS1.

Expected Response Multiple annunciators will alert the crew that a SCRAM has occurred on Unit 2 and a break 59

into the drywell is occurring. Procedural steps will be taken to restore RPV level and stabilize Drywell pressure. Manual attempts to close the HPCI steam supply isolation valves will not succeed. ADS function will be restricted as well as one loop of DW sprays.

The Shift Manager should identify that FS1 "Loss or Potential Loss of two fission product barriers" is applicable. Assuming Command and Control has been transferred from the Shift ED, the Shift Manager should provide backup and peer checking to the ED in command. PA announcements will be made and Assembly / Accountability will be initiated.

Expected Actions The situation should be transmitted to the TSC via one of the communicator in the Simulator Control Room. The Maintenance Director and/or the Operations Manager should take actions to dispatch an NLO / OSC team to investigate the pump trips and equipment failures.

Additional Information A Service Water pump will trip, prompting operating crew response. Isolation Condenser will isolate on a spurious trip. A 250vDC failure will result in lost indication to selected ECCS systems. An engineering report will be made available that will state that the currently installed charcoal adsorbers are not effective for both trains of the SBGT system. This information should makes it way to the facility RPM, who will inform appropriate personnel that the DAPAR Process Reduction Factor (PRF) is 0.4 due to failed filters.

GENERAL EMERGENCY 1105-1205 UNISOLABLE RCS LEAK OUTSIDE OF DRYWELL RELEASE IN PROGRESS HPCI room temperatures will alarm, followed quickly by radiation alarms in the same room.

The crew should identify that a break has occurred outside the drywell. Control Room indications for the HPCI Steam Supply Outboard Isolation valve (2-2301-5) will be lost due to 250vDC failure, as it is postulated that the valve has failed, causing a leak into the HPCI room. A release path exists from the RPV to the HPCI room through the HPCI steam supply to the ventilation systems to SBGT and out the U2/3 Main Chimney. Effluent readings will indicate a significant jump in release rates. DW radiation will continue to rise, peaking at

>1000 R at 1120.

Expected Actions The Operating Crew will continue to address RPV parameters and control the reactor. The Emergency Director in Command and Control should declare FG*1 "Loss of two fission product barriers with the potential loss of the third." Appropriate notifications should be made. The EOF (assuming Command and Control for PARs has been transferred) should identify that Minimum PARs are applicable, and notifications of such should be made. Note: The loss of RCS (RC2) may be included for the GE classification. The basis for RC2 states that dropping level below TAF is indicative of a LOCA. This was used as loss of 60

the RCS barrier at the SAE. Also, RA3 may be considered for a concurrent EAL as HPCI area rads meet the classification for this.

GENERAL EMERGENCY 1205*1235 WIND SHIFT Release In Progress The Wind will shift, changing from 190° (into 010°) to wind from 123° (into 303°).

Expected Actions The EOF should identify a change in PARs are applicable, and notifications of such should be made.

EXERCISE TERMINATION Exercise termination is scheduled for 1235, but at the discretion of the Lead Scenario Evaluator, Lead Scenario Controller, and State of Illinois with the concurrence of the Evaluator and Controller network, this time may be extended or advanced.

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OFFSITE EXERCISE TIMELINE March 25, 2009 Approx.

Time Event/Anticipated Response 0800 Initial conditions/weather forecast message to players.

0810 An Alert is declared at Dresden Station.

0825 Exelon notifies the IEMA Telecommunicator of the ALERT via NARS.

IEMA Telecommunicator verifies the NARS message.

An IEMA Duty Officer contacts the Dresden Station Shift Engineer.

IEMA Telecommunicator notifies IEMA personnel of the ALERT per SOP.

IEMA may activate the State of Illinois Response Center (SIRC) and Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC), if appropriate.

IEMA may dispatch liaisons to the County EOCs, Unified Area Command (UAC), Radiological Assessment Field Team (RAFT) Staging Area, Joint Information Center (JIC), Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), if appropriate.

IEMA notifies Governor's Office of the ALERT. (Simulated)

IEMA Telecommunicator notifies appropriate State agencies of the ALERT.

IEMA notifies FEMA of the ALERT.

0840 IEMA Telecommunicator notifies the counties of the ALERT via NARS.

County telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.

County telecommunicators notify County officials and municipalities of the ALERT per SOP.

The counties may activate the EOCs, if appropriate.

Municipal telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.

Municipal telecommunicators notify officials of the ALERT per SOP.

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Approx.

Time Event/Anticipated Response 0940 A SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared at Dresden Station.

0955 Exelon notifies the IEMA Telecommunicator of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY via NARS.

IEMA Telecommunicator verifies the NARS message.

REAC contacts the Dresden Station Shift Engineer.

SIRC is activated if not previously activated.

SIRC notifies the Governor's Office and requests that a representative report to the State EOC. (Simulated)

State dispatches liaisons to the County EOCs, UAC, RAFT, JIC, TSC and EOF, if not previously dispatched.

SIRC notifies FEMA of conditions. (Simulated)

IEMA notifies State agencies (Simulated):

- Illinois State Police

- IDOT/Division of Highways

- IDOT/Division of Aeronautics

- IDNR

- Illinois National Guard

- ICC

- American Red Cross

- IDPH

- IEPA

- IDOC

- IDHS

- IDOA

- Office of the State Fire Marshal

- others as appropriate REAC contacts Federal agencies. (Simulated)

REAC provides an update to the SIRC and County EOC Liaisons.

REAC provides an update to the JIC.

1010 IEMA notifies the counties of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY via NARS.

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County telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.

Approx.

Time Event/Anticipated Response County telecommunicators notify County officials and municipalities of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY per SOP.

County EOCs are activated if not previously activated.

Counties implement public notification procedures, if appropriate.

(Simulated)

Municipal telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.

Municipal telecommunicators notify officials per SOP.

Dosimetry is issued to emergency personnel, EOC staff and exposure records are completed.

1105 A GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared at Dresden Station.

1120 Exelon notifies the IEMA Telecommunicator of the GENERAL EMERGENCY via NARS. Protective actions are recommended.

IEMA Telecommunicator verifies the NARS message.

The SIRC and REAC evaluate the protective action recommendation.

A recommendation is made to the Governor. The Governor recommends that protective actions be implemented.

SIRC staff is advised of the situation.

SIRC advises UAC, the County EOC liaisons and JIC staff of the situation.

SIRC notifies FEMA of conditions. (Simulated)

REAC provides an update to the SIRC and County EOC liaisons.

REAC provides an update to the JIC.

1135 SIRC notifies the counties of the GENERAL EMERGENCY and the recommended protective actions via NARS.

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County telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.

County telecommunicators notify County officials and municipalities per SOP.

Approx.

Time Event/Anticipated Response Counties implement public notification procedures and traffic and access control per SOPs, as applicable.

Municipal telecommunicators complete and verify and the NARS message.

Municipal telecommunicators notify EOC staff.

1205 The GENERAL EMERGENCY continues at Braidwood Station. A wind shift has occurred.

1220 Exelon notified the IEMA Telecommunicator of the wind shift via NARS.

Additional protective action are recommended.

IEMA Telecommunicator verified the NARS message.

The SIRC and REAC evaluate the protective action recommendation.

A recommendation is made to the Governor. The Governor recommended that protective actions be implemented.

SIRC staff is advised of the situation.

SIRC advises UAC, the County EOC liaisons and JIC staff of the situation.

SIRC notifies FEMA of conditions. (Simulated)

REAC provides an update to the JIC.

1235 SIRC notifies EPZ counties of the wind shift and the recommended protective actions via NARS.

County telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.

County telecommunicators advise county officials and municipalities per SOP.

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Counties implement public notification procedures and traffic and access control per SOPs, as applicable.

Municipal telecommunicators complete and verify the NARS message.

1300 Terminate exercise play.

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