ML15139A082

Comment (15) of Kevin Kamps on Behalf of Beyond Nuclear Opposing Draft Guidance Regarding the Alternate Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule

ML15139A082
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	05/12/2015
From:	Kamps K Beyond Nuclear
To:	Division of Administrative Services
References
80FR13449 00015, NRC-2014-0137
Download: ML15139A082 (410)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:Page 1 of 2 RULF~ .IE PUBLIC SUBMISSION 701 15 A 11: 51 As of: 5/13/15 12:07 PM Received: May 12, 2015 Status: PendingPost Tracking No. ljz-8ite-d89a Comments Due: May 12, 2015 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2014-0137 -D-FI\!-D Technical Basis for Regulatory Guidance on the Alternate PTS Rule Comment On: NRC-2014-0137-0001 Draft Guidance Regarding the Alternate Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule Document: NRC-2014-0137-DRAFT-0014 Comment on FR Doc # 2015-05754 3/>, X-/Submitter Information Name: Kevin Kamps Address: Beyond Nuclear 6930 Carroll Avenue, Suite 400 Takoma Park, MD, 20912 Email: kevin@beyondnuclear.org General Comment

Dear NRC,

Please see the attached files: 1. August 8, 2005: REQUEST FOR HEARING AND PETITION TO INTERVENE, submitted to the U.S. NRC ASLB, by attorney Terry Lodge, on behalf of Don't Waste Michigan and NIRS, in opposition to Palisades' 20-year license extension (specifically, the first contention, beginning on page 4, regarding "The license renewal application is untimely and incomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement").

2. September 16, 2005: PETITIONERS COMBINED REPLY TO NRC STAFF AND NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY ANSWERS, submitted to the U.S. NRC ASLB, by attorney Terry Lodge, on behalf of Don't Waste Michigan and NIRS, in opposition to Palisades' 20-year license extension (pages 2 to 23 are regarding Contention 1, The license renewal application is untimely and incomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement).

3. Petitioners' Appendix of Evidence (129 pages), which accompanied its September 16, 2005 Reply.4. November 3, 2005: Transcript of oral argument pre-hearing before the NRC ASLBP, re: 20-year license extension for Palisades.

Theering was held in South Haven, Michigan. (See, specifically, the portions https.://www.fdms.gov/fdms-web-agencycompnent/contents reamerobjectld=0900006481 add28d&for... 05/13/2015 Page 2 of 2 pertaining to PTS risks, including pages 34-80 (pages 17-63 of 206 on PDF counter), and following, as articulated by attorney Terry Lodge on behalf of intervening groups NIRS and Don't Waste MI.)Please accept the numerous challenges and criticisms contained within these documents, in the current context of Entergy Nuclear's July 2014 License Amendment Request for 1 OCFR50.61 a regulatory relief, as public comments in your DG-1299 and NUREG-2163 proceeding. At the time, in 2005, 10CFR50.61 was the ruling regulatory regime. The concerns raised by attorney Terry Lodge on behalf of intervening groups NIRS and Don't Waste MI at the time, are all the more poignant now, that an even less conservative alternate fracture toughness rule (1OCFR50.61 a) is the context for this proceeding on DG-1299 and NUREG-2163. Thank you for considering our public comments.Sincerely, Kevin Kamps, Beyond Nuclear (and Don't Waste Michigan, board member representing the Kalamazoo Chapter)Attachments Sept 2005 Combined Reply Appendix 8 8 2005 petition 9 16 2005 Combined Reply 11 3 2005 transcript https://www. fdms.gov/fdms-web-agency/component/contentstreamer?objectld=090000648 1 add28d&for... 05/13/2015 RAý5 (O5z2(DOCKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. September 22, 2005 (3:47pm)OFFICE OF SECRETARY BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD RULEMAKINGS AND.ADJUDICATIONS STAFF In the Matter of NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC (Palisades Nuclear Plant)))))Docket No. 50-255-LR ASLBP No. 05-842-03-LR CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.I hereby certify that copies of the "PETITIONERS' Appendix of Evidence In Support of Contentions" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served with copies by U.S. First Class mail this 16th day of September, 2005: Office of the Secretary ATTN: Docketing and Service Mail Stop: O-16C1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication Mail Stop O-16C1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Dr. Anthony Baratta Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop: T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Dr. Nicholas G. Trikouros Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop: T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Ann Marshall Young Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop: T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Kary Love, Esq.Executive Business Center 348 Waverly Road, Suite 2 Holland, MI 49423 Paul Gunter Nuclear Information & Resource Service 1424 16' Street, NW Suite 404 Washington, DC 20036 Chuck Jordan Chairman Green Party of Van Buren County 50521 3 4 th Avenue Bangor, M1 49013 Alice Hirt Western Michigan Environmental Action Co.1415 Wealthy Street, SE Suite 280 Grand Rapids, MI 49506 Michael Keegan Co-Chair Don't Waste Michigan 2213 Riverside Drive, NE Grand Rapids, MI 49505 Maynard Kaufman Michigan Land Trustees 25485 County Road 681 Bangor, MI 49013 Ternpt4Le C ey- 037 .I .Ism Terry Lodge, Esq..316 N. Michigan St. Suite 520*Toledo, OH 43624-1627 'David R. Lewis, Esq.* Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP 2300 N Street, N.W. -Washington, DC 20037-1128 Jonathan Rogoff, Esq.Vice President, Counsel, & Secretary Nuclear Management Company, LLC 700 First Street Hudson, WI 54016 Susan Uttal, Esq.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop: O-15D21 Washington, D.C. 20555/s/Terry J. Lodge PG Terry J. Lodge EX-HIBIT I A ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. .20545 January 27, 1970 Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg Chairman U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545

Subject:

REPORT ON PALISADES PLANT

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

At a Special Meeting, January 23-24, 1970, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards completed its review of the application by Consumers Power Company for authorization to operate the Palisades Plant at power levels up to 2200 MWt. This project was also considered at the 113th ACRS meeting, September 4-6, 1969,:the 115th ACRS meeting, November 6-8, 1969, and the 116th ACRS meeting, December 11-13, 1969.Subcommittee meetings were held on July.31, 1969, at the site, and on October 29, 1969, December 3, 1969, and January 22, 1970, .in-Washington, D. C. During its review, the Committee had the benefit of discussions with representatives of Consumers Power Company, Combustion Engineering, Inc., Bechtel Corporation, the AEC Regulatory Staff, and their consultants. The Committee also had the benefit of the documents listed. The Committee reported to you on the construction of this plant in-its letter dated January 18, 1967.The site for the Palisades Plant consists of 487 acres on the eastern shore of Lake Michigan in Covert Township, approximately four and one-half miles south of South Haven, Michigan. The minimum exclusion radius for the site is 2300 feet:and the nearest population center of more than 25,000residents consists-of the cities of Benton-Harbor and St. Joseph, Michigan, which are approximately 16 miles south-of the site.The nuclear steam supply system;for the' Palisades Plant is'the first of the Combustion Engineering line'currently licensed for construction. A feature of the Palisades reactor is the omission of the-thermal shield.Studies were made by the applicant tb show that omission of the shield would not adversely affect the flow characteristics within the reactor vessel -or alter the thermal 'stresses in the walls of the vessel in a maniner detrimental to'safe operation of the plant.' 'Surveillance specimens in the vessel will be used to monitor the radiation damage during the life of the plant. If these specimens reveal changes that affect the safety of the plant, the reactor vessel will be annealed to reduce I Its Honorable Glenn January 27, 1970 radiation damage effects. The results of annealing will be confirmed by tests on additional surveillance specimens 1 rovided for this purpose.Prior to accumulation of a peak fluence of 10 nvt (> 1 flev) on the reactor vessel wall, the Regulatory Staff should reevaluate the continued suitability of the currently proposed startup, cooldown, and operating conditions. The secondary containment is a reinforced concrete structure consisting of a cylindrical portion prestressed in both the vertical and circumferential directions, a dome roof prestressed in three directions, and a flat non-prestressed base. Before operation, it will-be pressurized and extensive measurements will be made of gross deformations and of strains in the linear, reinforcement, and concrete, and the pattern and size of cracks in the concrete will be observed and measured. The applicant has proposed suitable acceptance criteria for the pressure test, and the ACRS recommends that the Regulatory Staff review and assess the results of this test prior to operation at significant power.The prestressing tendons in the containment consist of ninety, one-quarter-inch diameter wires. They are not grouted or bonded, and are protected from corrosion by grease pumped into the tendon sheaths. The applicant has proposed that selected tendons be inspected periodically for broken wires, loss of prestress, and corrosion. If degradation is detected, the inspection can be extended to the remaining tendons, all of which are accessible. The applicant is performing studies to determine the appropriate number and interval for tendon inspection. This matter should be resolved in a manner satisfactory to the Regulatory Staff.The core is calculated to have a slightly negative moderator coefficient at full power operation at beginning-of-life, but uncertainties in the calculations are such that the existence of a positive moderator coeffi-cient cannot be precluded. The applicant has stated that the moderator coefficient will not exceed +0.5 x 10- a k/k/*F at beginning-of-life, computed from start-up test data on a conservative basis. The applicant also plans to perform tests to verify that divergent azimuthal xenon oscillations cannot occur in this reactor. The Committee recommends that the Regulatory Staff follow the measurements and analyses required to establish the value of the moderator coefficient. The meteorological observation program conducted at the site subsequent to the Committee's report to you on January 18, 1967, indicated the need for the addition of iodine removal equipment to the containment for use in the unlikely event of a loss-of-coolant accident. The applicant proposed to install means for adding sodium hydroxide to-the water in the containment spray system. However, because of uncertainties regarding the generation of hydrogen and the effects of other materials resulting Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg-3-January 27, 1970 from-the reaction.of this alkaline solution with the relatively large amounts of aluminum in the containment, this spray additive will not be used unless it can be shown by further studies that the use of sodium hydroxide-is clearly acceptable. In'addition,*the applicant will carry out-studies of iodine removal by borated water sprays without sodium hydroxide. If the-results of these studies are not acceptable, a different iodine removal system satisfactory to the Regulatory Staff.will be-installed at the first refueling outage. A report on the applicant's plans will be submitted to the AEC within six months following issuance of a provisional operation license. The Committee believes that this procedure is satisfactory for operation at power levels not exceeding 2200 MWt.The applicant has stated that if fewer than four primary coolant pumps are operating, the reactor overpower trip settings will be reduced such that the safety of the reactor is assured in the absence of automatic changes in the thermal margin tr-ip settings.The Committee believes that, for transients having a high probability of occurrence, and for which action of a protective system or other.engineered safety feature is vital to the public health and :safety,'an exceedingly high probability of successful action is needed. Common failure modes must be considered'in ascertaining an-acceptable level of protection. Studies are to be made on further means of preventing common failure modes from negating scram action, and of design features to make tolerable the consequences of failure to scram during anticipated transients. The applicant should consider the results of such studies and incorporate appropriate provisions in the Palisades Plant.The Committee recommends that attention be given to the long-term ability of vital components, such as electrical equipment and cables, to withstand the environment of the containment in the unlikely event of a loss-of-coolant accident. This matter is applicable to all large, water-cooled power reactors.Continuing research and engineering studies are expected to lead to enhancement of the safety of water-cooled reactors in other areas than those mentioned: for example, by determination of the extent of the generation of hydrogen by radiolysis and from other sources, and development of means to control the concentration of hydrogen in the containment, in the unlikely event of a loss-of-coolant accident; by development of instrumentation for inservice monitoring of the pressure vessel and other parts of the primary system for vibration and detection of loose parts in the system; and by evaluation of the consequences of water contamination by structural materials and coatings in a loss-of-coolant accident. As solutions to these problems develop and are evaluated Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg-4-January 27, 1970 by the Regulatory Staff, appropriate action should be taken by the applicant on a reasonable time scale.The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards believes that, if due regard is given to the items mentioned above, and subject to satisfactory completion of construction and pre-operational testing, there is reasonable assurance that the Palisades Plant can be operated at power levels up to 2200 MWt without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.Sincerely yours,/s/ Joseph M. Hendrie Joseph ti. Hendrie Chairman

References:

1. Final Safety Analysis Report for the Palisades Plant 2. Amendments No. 9-19 to license application NRC STAFF PRESENTATION TO THE ACRS

SUBJECT:

PALISADES PRESSURED THERMAL SHOCK DATE: DECEMBER 9, 1994 PRESENTER: BARRY J. ELLIOT SENIOR MATERIALS -ENGINEER.MATERIALS AND CHEMICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH DIVISIONMOF ENGINEERING* OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (301) 504-2709 10 CRF 50.61 RT.Ti EVALUATION RTPTs SCREENING CRITERIA PER 10 CFR 50.61-270 OF FOR AXIAL WELDS AND PLATES-300 OF FOR CIRCUMFERENTIAL WELDS RTPTs VALUE = I + M + ARTP TS I = INITIAL REFERENCE TEMPERATURE (RTNDT) OF THE UNIRRADIATED MATERIAL.-MEASURED VALUES MUST BE USED IF AVAILABLE.-IF GENERIC VALUE NOT AVAILABLE, GENERIC MEAN VALUES MUST BE USED M = MARGIN TO COVER UNCERTAINTIES IN THE VALUES OF INITIAL RTNDT, COPPER AND NICKEL CONTENTS, FLUENCE AND THE CALCULATION PROCEDURES. ARTPTS =MEAN VALUE OF THE ADJUSTMENT IN REFERENCE TEMPERATURE CAUSED BY IRRADIATION AND IS A FUNCTION OF NEUTRON FLUENCE, PERCENT COPPER AND PERCENT NICKEL-CALCULATED USING SURVEILLANCE DATA-IF SURVEILLANCE DATA IS UNAVAILABLE, THE ADJUSTMENT IN REFERENCE TEMPERATURE MAY BE CALCULATED FROM TABLES USING THE BEST-ESTIMATE PERCENT COPPER AND NICKEL PALISADES PTS SINCE THE SURVEILLANCE WELD MATERIAL IN NOT THE SAME AS THE BELTLINE WELDS, THE DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF RADIATION USING INDUSTRY DATA PALISADES IS LICENSEE MUST NUCLEAR THE STAFF MET WITH THE LICENSEE ON MARCH 9, 1994 TO DISCUSS THE LICENSEES PROGRAM FOR FURTHER EVALUATION OF THE CRITICAL WELDS IN THEIR RPV THE LICENSEE PLANNED TO:-GATHER ADDITIONAL MATERIALS PROPERTIES DATA FROM ITS RETIRED STEAM GENERATORS (WELDS FABRICATED.. USING W5214 AND 34B009 WELD WIRE)-INSTITUTE AN AUGMENTED SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM THATlWOULD CONTAIN THE-LIMITING WELD METAL-EVALUATE ANNEALING OF THE REACTOR VESSEL-CONSIDER INSTITUTING AN "ULTRA LOW" LEAKAGE FUEL STRATEGY S GA W c 5214/SGES 6' DIA.6' OIA. PALISADES PTS cont.STAFF ISSUED AN INTERIM SER ON JULY 12, 1.994 AND ISSUED A COMMISSION PAPER AND NUREG:REPORT ON RPVs ON OCTOBER 28, 1994. THESE DOCUMENTS STATED:-BASED ON PREVIOUS NUCLEAR INDUSTRY DATA THE PALISADES REACTOR VESSEL WAS PROJECTED TO REACH THE PTS SCREENING CRITERIA'IN2004, PRIOR TO EOL, 2007-STAFF SER NOTED THAT THE PTS EVALUATION COULD CHANGE BASED ON THE INFORMATION TO BEACQUIRED FROM-THE:SG WELDS, ON NOVEMBER 1 THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE STAFF BY TELEPHONE THAT THE CHEMISTRY DATA FROM THE W5214 WELDS INDICATED HIGHER-COPPER CONTENTS THAN PREVIOUSLY ASSUMED.-EVALUATION OF THE STEAM GENERATOR WELD MATERIAL ALSO INDICATED-A HIGHER INITIAL RTNDT VALUE THAN THE MEAN GENERIC VALUE.ON NOVEMBER 18 THE LICENSEE SUBMITTED THEIR ASSESSMENT,' OF THE IMPACT OF THESE NEW DATA ON THE RTPTs VALUE. THIS ASSESSMENT INDICATES THAT.PALISADES REACTOR VESSEL WOULD REACH THE PTS SCREENING CRITERIAIN 1999 STAFF MET WITH THE LICENSEE ON NOVEMBER 21, 1994 TO DISCUSS THE NEW INFORMATION. STAFF REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SENT TO LICENSEE ON NOVEMBER 30, 1994.STAFF EVALUATION IS SCHEDULED TO BE COMPLETED BY JANUARY 31, 1995. PALISADES PTS cont.THE STAFF IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING THE LICENSEE'S NOVEMBER 18 SUBMITTAL. CRITICAL AREA BEING ASSESSED INCLUDE:-EFFECT OF THERMAL AGING, HEAT TREATMENT AND TEST METHOD ON UNIRRADIATED REFERENCE TEMPEiRATURE-BEST' ESTIMATE CHEMICALCOMPOSITION FROM STEAM GENERATOR-AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY DATA DEPENDING UPON HOW THE NEW DATA ARE USED IN THE ANALYSIS THE PTS SCREENING LIMIT COULD BE REACHED BEFORE 1999 STAFF WILL RECEIVE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM RES CONTRACTOR, ORNL GENERIC IMPLICATIONS OF NEW DATA REVIEW OF OTHER RPVs WITH PALISADES WELD MATERIAL (i.e. W5214 or 34B009 WELD METAL)-OTHER PLANTS STILL SATISFY PTS SCREENING CRITERIA AND UPPER SHELF ENERGY CRITERIA-LOWER FLUENCE OR USE OF ACTUAL SURVEILLANCE DATA OTHER PLANTS THAT ARE PROJECTED TO BE NEAR THE PTS SCREENING CRITERIA BEFORE END-OF-LIFE ARE BEING ASSESSED-SENSITIVITIES BEING STUDIED-PROACTIVE MEASURES MAY BE APPROPRIATE The New York Times > Premium Archive > Cheap and Abundant Power May Shutter So... Page I of 4 NYlimes:-H, !or- Simte -Archive EXHIBIT 1 C NYTimes: lI-om.e -Site..In..dex -Arý ive -Help Welcome, kevin8869 -Memb Go to a Section G.o Site Search: [TTT '- Go This page is print-ready, and this article will remain available for 90 days. Instructions._for Saving About this.Service Purchase Histpor I `f NAN A-IA L DESK./Cheap and Abundant Power May Shutter Some Reactors By MATTHEW L. WALD (NYT) 1518 words Published: April 14, 1992 Nuclear plants that provide 10 percent of the nation's nuclear power may be closed this decade because their operating costs are too high to compete against a rising tide of cheap surplus electricity, experts say.More than 100 plants under construction were abandoned in the 1970's and 80's because of their cost.But the idea that an operating nuclear plant is not competitive with other sources of electricity violates the fundamental logic of nuclear power, which is that planitsý may"be expensive to build:but are cheap to run."It used to be that everyone said, once you built it, there wasn't any question that .costs were lower," said Victor Gilinsky, an energy consuIltant and former member~of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."Nocv they are more expensive to run thýan other plants."' Aging Steam Generators In the next few years, at least 10 utilities will need to replace steam generators, which are giant heat exchangers that have shown a tendency to rust and crack, said Gary R. Doughty, an expert on plant life extension with the Nielseh Wurster Group, a consulting firm in Hartford. The job generally runs about$150 million for each reactor.Other utilities face .questions about the condition of their reactor vessels, the great steel pots that hold the fuel. Years of bombardment by neutrons, the subatomic particles that sustain a chain reaction, are known to make metal more brittle, but the extent fthe problem is not clear.Some utilities that operate a single reactor may be tempted to pull the plug, he said, because that would allow elimination' of an entire division.In Rowe, Mass., the owners of the 32-yearold, Yankee;Rowe reactor decided in February that the plant was too ýmall and too old to justify the investment needed to keep it in service, given the general power surplus in its region. Southern California Edison reached a similar judgment recently about its 24-year-old San Onofre I plant near San Clemente, although the plant has not yet been shut. And last year the Sacramento Municipal Utility District decided to shut the Rancho Seco plant as uneconomic at the age of 15. Others around the country were retired in earlier years. some at even younger ages.With only a handful of additional plants likely to be finished and no new ones on order, the result could be an accelerated march to the extinction of nuclear power in the United States. Currently, 108 are The New York Times > Premium Archive > Cheap and Abundant Power Ma' Shutter So... Page 2 operating, producing about 20 percent of the nation's electricity. Some of those. however, are doing very well, in 1991. 25 plants set records for themselves in the number of kilowatt-hours produced.John F. Ahearne, a former member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and now the director of Sigma Xi, the Scientific Research Society, said that plants that were not economic were more likely to be shut now than they would have been a few years ago. In the last 10 years, he said. the utilities have come to be dominated by business managers, replacing what he called "technologists." or "people who were committed to nuclear power because they thought it was just a good thing for this country." The Bottom Line In the view of the business managers, he said, "the role of a utility is to make money." They are the people who canceled over-budget reactor construction projects in the 1980's. he said, and they are willing to shut plants now if there are cheaper alternatives. The price of oil, which is currently low, plays a small role in keeping the electricity market highly competitive, especially in places like New York, which uses oil for about 20 percent of electricity generation. But nationally, electricity made from oil is less than 5 percent of total generation. Natural gas plays a far larger role, because it represents about 10 percent of the utilities' fuel use nationally, and about half the generators recently completed or under construction use natural gas. On the basis of energy content, natural gas prices have been substantially below oil prices recently.In addition, overall demand for power has been driven down by recession and by conservation measures, with utilities often subsidizing customers' installation of light bulbs, motors and other devices that will do the same work with less power. Price May Rise Some experts believe that as the economy turns around, the demand for power will rise and hence its price. In addition, requirements of the new Clean Air Act will raise the cost of coal-fired power. and if the United States institutes a carbon tax in the next few years to stave off global warming, that would make nuclear power more competitive, too.Experts are not sure how many nuclear plants will shut in this decade. The chainnran of the Nuclear Regtilatory Commission, Ivan Selin, said in a telephone interview that three or four were vulnerable soon. Mr. Aheamne said it could be 10 by the end of the decade.Mr. Selin said it was unlikely that any utility would decide to close a plant that was running smoothly and was not in immediate need of any big investment. But if a plant required a large investment, he said, "that could push it over the brink." In that category he put the Consumers Power Company's Palisades plant, near South Haven, Mich., which opened in 1971, where the pressure vessel may now be brittle, the same weakness that was suspected at Yankee Rowe. Consumers Power's Big Rock Point plant, in Charlevoix, Mich.. opened in 1965, which has no known significant flaws but is by far the smallest still operating, and Rochester Gas and Electric's Robert E. Ginna plant. near Rochester, which opened in 1970 and faces the expensive replacement of its steam generators. All those plants are old and fairly small. Mr. Selin said it was far from clear whether the problem would extend into the large plants that entered service in the mid-1970's. But it might, he said in a telephone interview."There are two ways of looking at it," Mr. Selin said. "You can say each is different, and there is no trend, or you can say there's an underlying trend here. The financial people are beginning to worry The New York Times > Premium Archive > Cheap aand Abundant Power May Shutter So... Page 3 of 4 about an underlying trend." In fact. Lehman Brothers organized a conference for utility investors last month oh the question of whether old plants Were still economic. It drew two dozen investment managers.The Utility Data Institute, a firm in Washington.that charts operating costs, reported recently that in 1990 fuel, operating and maintenance expenses at nuclear plants came to $21.89 for one thousand kilowatt-hours produced, about as much electricity as a typical household uses in two months. At a coal plant, the fuel, operating and maintenance cost for the same amount of energy was $20.24. The coal : cost was up slightly in 1990 and the nuclear cost down compared with 1989. but nuclear has exceeded coal for the last several years.Those figures are an average for all nuclear plants, meaning that some are significantly higher.Relicensing a Question The old reactors have a variety of factors working against them.Mr. Doughty ofNielsen Wurster pointed out that a plant that was nearing the expiration of its 40-year operating license and needed major investments would have to face the economics of amortizing the expenses over the few remaining years of operation. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has established a policy for granting license extensions, but no plant has yet applied and no one is sure how easy it will be to get one.Carl A. Goldstein, a spokesman for the U.S. Council for Energy Awareness, the nuclear industry's public relations arm, said that more plants would probably be found to be uneconomic, but that the point at which a plant should be written off could not be defined until the Nuclear Regulatory Commission made clearer what would be required for a plant to be re-licensed. And nuclear economics could improve, he said, because plant operating and maintenance expenses could decline.Mr. Doughty said that investing new money still made good sense for most plants. but that he feared that reactors with 6,000 megawatts of capacity, or about 6 percent of the nation's total nuclear capacity, would shut in the next few years. Reason to Stay Open How much is ultimately closed may depend on how state rate regulators handle the costs, said Peter Bradford, the chairman of the Public Service Commission in New York and also a former member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Mr. Bradford, a speaker at the Lehman Brothers session, said a utility with a large investment in a reactor might seek to keep it running so it could continue to collect depreciation. even if cheaper power were available elsewhere. That. lie said, would create a conflict between the interest of customers, who would want the plant closed, and the interest of the utility, which would want to let it run. The solution, he said, would be to allow utilities to write off plants that had become economically obsolete, and collect the investment from customers."Otherwise, the utility doesn't have the incentive to make the right decision," he said.Photo: Utlities may be tempted to pull the plug on existing nuclear plants as they become too expensive to operate. Owners of the 32-year-old Yankee Rowe reactor in Rowe. Mass., closed it in February because the plant was too small and too old to justify the investment needed to keep it in service.(Associated Press) (pg. D25) Table: "Nuclear Plant Retirements" Plant, location Years in operation The New York Timnes > Premium Archive > Cheap and Abundant Power May Shutter So... Page 4 o1 4 Size. in megawatts San Onofre 1, San Clemente, Calif. 1968-1992 or 1993 436 Yankee Rowe, Rowe, Mass. 1961-1991 175 Rancho Seco. Sacramcnto, Calif. 1975-1989 918 Fort St. Vrain. Platteville. Colo.1979-1989 330 La Crosse, Genoa. Wis. 1969-1988 50 Dresden 1, Morris. II1. 1959-1978 207 Humn'boldt Bay. Eureka, Calif. 1962-1976 65 Shippingport. Shippingport. Pa. 1957-1982 60 Indian Point 1, Buchanan, N.Y. 1962-1980 265 Peach Bottom 1, Peach Bottom, Pa. 1966-1974 40 Fermi i. Newport.Mich. 1963-1972 61 Elk River, Elk River, Minn. 1962-1968 22 CVTR, Puerto Rico 1962-1967 17 Pathfinder. Sioux Falls, S.D. 1964-1967 59 Piqua, Piqua. Ohio 1962-1967 59 Hallam. Hallam, Neb.1962-1964 75 Graph: "At What Cost" shows average cost, in cents per kilowatt hour, for fuel. operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants. 1982-1990. The cost at the most economical nuclear plant was 1.21 cents per kilowatt-hour in 1990. The highest cost was more than 5 cents. (Source: Utility Data Institute) (pg. D25)Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company I Privacy Policy I Home I Search I Corrections I Help I Back to rop EXHIBIT I D The Aging of Nuclear Power Plants: A Citizen's Guide to Causes and Effects Nuclear Information and Resource Service The Aging of Nuclear Power Plants: A Citizen's Guide to Causes and Effects by James Riccio and Stephanie Murphy Copyright 1988 by Nuclear Information and Resource Service 1424 16th Street NW, Suite 601, Washington, DC 20036 (202) 323-0002 IV. Embrittlement of Reactor Pressure Vessels and Reactor Pressure Vessel SuTplorts in Pressurized Water Reactors..Irradiation , eembrittlement of the reactor pressure vessels (RPVs)may be the single most important factor in determining the.operating" life of a PWR. The design of pressure vessels-is generally the same for allPWRs ' Combustion Engineering. (CE). and Babock'and Wilcox-(B&W) manufacture their own vessels.while Westinghouse either purchases its vessels from CE, B&W, Chicago Bridge.and'Iron or, Rotterdamr Dockyard Company. Regardless; of the manufacturer,`PWR vessels are generally constructed from eight inch thick steel plates, formed and welded to create the vessel structure. The major age-related mechanism associated-with this component is embrittlement. Embrittlement is the loss of ductility, i.e., the ability of the pressure vessel metals to withstand stress without cracking. It is. caused by neutron bombardment of the vessel metals and is contingent upon the amount of copper and .nickel in thei.metal and the extent of neutron* exposure .or fluence. As the metal in the reactor pressure :vessel is bombarded with radiation,*high-energy atomic particles pass through: the.steel wall; In doing. so, these atoms collide with atoms in the metal.and knock them out of.,position. Over time this results in a loss of.ductility. In an unirradiated vessel the metal loses its ductility at about 40 degrees Fahrenheit. As the vessel becomes embrittled, the temperature .at which it loses its ductility rises. This change in the mechanicaliproperties of the metal from'ductile to.-brittle is characterized as'the "reference temperature for nil ductility transition" or, 'RTdt'., Thus 'as' the reactor 'ages and: the pressure vessel is exposed to 'more radiation, .the RTndt can shift from its original 40 de rees F to as much as 280-290 degrees F or. more in extreme cases.8 Embrittlement.is of evengrater concern to those plants constructed prior to 1972.sA cordng-to"theial Shock experts from the .Electric Power "Research

Institute- (EPRI), 'records show that there is copper in the dwalls of older vessels. Theodore Marston, who works on thermal:shock for-.EPRI,.

stated that," (w)e used a lot of auto stock (.for'the vessel metal), when you melt i" you can't get'all the wire 6uft." 'The use. of.'copper was .also extensive in-the welds "f' the vessel- walls-in.older reactors.Copper coated wire was 'routinely used to weld together -the .large plates which make up the RPV. The NRC's director of safety technology stated that. "the copper..was.used:to.-prevent-rust, someone probably got a:$10 prize for the suggestion." 4 9.t The' significance of reactor-pressure:vessel embrittlement and the 19 concomitant shift in RTndt is the increased susceptibility to pressurized thermal shock (PTS). Pressurized thermal shock occurs when the reactor pressure vessel is severely overcooled. RPV technical specifications generally limit cool down to a rate of 100 degrees F. per hour. However, during, an overcooling event the vessel may experience a drop in temperature of several hundred degrees per hour. This extreme drop in temperature of the vessel creates thermal stresses through the RPV wall. As the RPV is overcooled, there is a drop in the pressure of the primary coolant loop. This rapid decrease in the pressure of the primary coolant causes the high pressure injection pumps in the emergency core cooling system to automatically inject coolant into the primary loop. As the injection of coolant repressurizes the RPV, the vessel is subjected to pressure stresses. The stresses placed on the reactor pressure vessel by overcooling and repressurization cause pressurized thermal shock.5 0 Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) can be initiated by a host of mishaps including: instrumentation and control system malfunctions; small-break loss-of-coolant accidents; main steam line breaks; feed water pipe breaks; and steam generator tube ruptures. Any of these incidents can initiate a PTS event, but as long as the fracture resistance of the reactor pressure vessel remains high, i.e. the RTndt remains low, such transients are not likely to cause the RPV to-fail. After the fracture resistance of the. RPV is reduced through neutron bombardment, however, severe overcooling accompanied by repressurizhtion could cause flaws in the inner surface of the RPV to propagate into a crack which breaches the-vessel wall.5 1 For failure-of the reactor pressure vessel to occur several factors must be present: (1) the vessel must have a flaw of sufficient size to propagate; (2) the vessel material must be susceptible to irradiation embrittlement due to copper and nickel content; (3).the vessel must be sufficiently irradiated to cause a decrease in ductility, represented by an increase in the RTndt value; (4) an event must initiate a severe overcooling transient with repressurization; and (5) the resulting crackmust be of such a size and location that the RPV's ability to-maintain core cooling is-affected. This type of failure is beyond the design basis of PWRs: the safety systems, including the emergency core cooling system and-the containment, are not designed to withstand cracks in the pressure vessel. Without the reactor pressure vessel surrounding the radioactive fuel, it would be impossible to sufficiently cool the reactor core and a meltdown would ensue.52 Pressurized thermal shock is a safety issue for every, pressurized water reactor. PTS is of lesser concern-for boiling water reactors because radiation embrittlement is not as severe a problem with BWR vessels. This is due to the greater amount of water between the reactor core and the vessel walls in BWRs. The 20 additional water absorbs a greater amount of neutrons so that fewer bombard the walls of the RPV. The walls of a BWR vessel are also thinner than that of a PWR. Therefore, there is less of a temperature differential between the inner and outer walls of the vessel during a cooldown and thus less stress.5 3 While every PWR vessel is susceptible to pressurized thermal shock, those designed by Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) are inherently more susceptible to accidents.,that can initiate PTS. This is primarily due to the unique design of the B&W steam'generators. B&W reactors use once through steam generators, or OTSGs (see Appendix D). OTSGs differ from .other PWR 'steam generators in that the-generator tubes are only partially covered with water and contain a smaller volume. This makes the B&W-reactor much more sensitive to changes in feed water flow-changes in the flow* can cause large rapid changes in the temperature of --the reactor. As a consequence, incidents which interrupt feed water flow present more severe challenges to. the safety systems than would -be experienced in other PWRs. The result is an increased incidence of -overcooling events in- B&W reactors and an increased probability of pressurized thermal shock.5 4.On December 26, 1985, a severe overcooling event occurred at a B&W facility near Sacremento, California. -A loss of power to the"non-safety" integrated control- system at the Rancho Seco facility caused a reduction in the main feed water flow to the steam generators. Coolant level in-the steam generators decreased, reactor temperature and pressure increased

and the reactor.scrammed.

Feed water valves controlled by the integrated control system could not be operated and remained open.- A rapid and severe overcooling event ensued and was exacerbated by the start up of the auxiliary feed-water system which'sprayed even colder water directly onto the steam generator tubes. The reactor temperature dropped 180 degrees iF in 24 minutes,- easily violating the technical specification limits of 100degrees/hour. 'Additionally, the recommended pressure/temperature limits for pressurized thermal shock were exceeded,':-although the RTndt limit was not.ý5 5 If the overcooling event had been more severe or the-reactor pressure vessel morP e'mbrittled,-. the RTndt -limit may have been reached and the.vessel could have ruptured precipitating-a meltdown. Equally as disturbing-as the accident itself is the fact that the failures and':consequences of the event were essentially the same as those previously experienced at Rancho Seco and other- plants designed by B&W. In-fact, many of-the safety. problems experienced-during.*the transient were identical to those supposedly resolved by the:"short-term" modifications imposed on B&W plants -by the:NRC in the wake:of the Three Mile Island accident.5 6-In May 1979, after the TMI accident; the NRC shut down every B&W 21 facility, including Rancho Seco. The Commission ordered that procedures and training be implemented to assure that steam generator levels could be maintained if the integrated control system failed. Approximately a month later, the NRC staff concluded that "the licensee has developed adequate procedures and operator training to control AFW (auxiliary feedwater) flow to the steam generators to specific values independent of the ICS, should a failure of the ICS occur, and therefore, is in compliance with this part of the order."'5 7 However, on December 26, 1985, the staff's conclusions were proven incorrect when operators at Rancho Seco were unable to control the feedwater flow to the steam generators. The NRC's reaction was to conduct a year-long review of problems that were supposedly resolved six and a half years earlier.The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has vacillated on the issue of pressurized thermal shock for over ten years now. As early as 1977, test samples placed in B&W reactors were indicating that embrittlement was progressing at a faster rate than had been expected. RTndt limits had been originally set at 200 degrees Fahrenheit. However, as these limits were reached in the early to mid 1980s, the NRC began developing new limits within the framework of the PTS rule.In a briefing to its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards in 1982, the NRC staff considered RTndt limits of 230 and 250 degrees F for longitudinal and circumferential welds respectively. However, by 1985, the NRC sought to amend its regulations on pressurized thermal shock. The proposed amendments would establish an RTndt below which the risk from a PTS event is considered acceptable. These new reference temperatures established limits of 270 degrees F. for plate materials and axial welds and 300 degrees F. for circumferential welds.5 8 The Commission attempted to gloss over the fact that an increase in the RTndt translated into a decreased margin of safety. The NRC press release said the rule constituted "further protection from pressurized thermal shock." At least one expert was not buying the NRC's line. Demetrios Basdekas, an NRC safety engineer and long time critic of the Commission's handling of the PTS issue, opposed the new rule on the grounds that the reference temperatures were unrealistically high.Dissatisfied with the NRC's handling of the PTS issue, Basdekas made his opinion known in a letter to the New York Times. The letter stated that while," (t)he Nuclear Regulatory Commission is charged with ensuring that nuclear plants are operated 'with adequate protection' of the public health and safety. .bureaucratic foot dragging and preoccupation with public relations and financial problems of the industry are contributing to a shortsighted view -that technical problems can wait or do not exist.5 22 Basdekas contended that the new PTS rule was flawed in that it failed to recognize control system failures as a possible initiator of accidents that could challenge the pressure vessel.The NRC was not only failing to acknowledge Basdekas' contentions but plant operating experience as well. On March 20, 1978, the B&W designed Rancho Seco nuclear power plant experienced a PTS event precipitated by a control system failure. While replacing a light bulb in the integrated control system, an operator dropped the bulb into the control panel shorting out the control room instrumentation which eventually led to an overcooling of .the reactor accompanied by repressurization of the vessel. The event is believed to-represent the most severe and prolonged overcooling event to date with a change in temperature of 300 degrees F. per hour.6 0 Basdekas was able to convince the NRC that control system failures were an unresolved safety issue., but the commission continued to ignore these failures in their calculations on pressurized thermal shock.In response to the NRC's ambivalence,- Basdekas wrote the Commissioners suggesting an independent panel review the PTS issue. The nuclear safety engineer stated that,.our understanding and treatment of both the systems/process and materials/mechanics aspects of this issue remain wanting. I also believe that the agency and the public would benefit from the opportunity of an independent panel of experts to contribute to your decision making. ...I might..not have accomplished a great deal beyond receivingpunishment and intimidation, but I am satisfied that I have stayed away from what appears to, be increasingly in vogue within the agency to literallygive the store away.61 Basdekas further explained the prevailing attitude within the NRC when asked by the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, Rep., Morris.K. Udall (D-Ariz.), to comment on NRC responses to the Committee on the topic of pressurized thermal shock. Basdekas stated that: A satisfactory resolution, however, cannot be achieved under currently prevailing attitudes within the NRC. On one hand the NRC left it up..to the utilities operating the plants -chosen for evaluation to provide design and operational information on a voluntary basis, and on a schedule of their convenience, while internally establishing an arbitrary.schedule forproducing a"resolution" document and withdrawing previously allocated resources while engaging in a variety of prohibited personnel actions and abuse of authority to intimidate and impede if not silence those voicing concern or disagreement. 6 2-23 The NRC adopted the PTS rule in July 1935. In less than si:c months from the date of its adoption, control system failure had precipitated a severe overcooling event at the Rancho Seco facility (discussed above). Yet the NRC still failed to acknowledge control system failures in their analysis of embrittlement and pressurized thermal shock.The NRC has continued its research on the PTS issue, focusing on methods to calculate and mitigate embrittlement of reactor vessels. To cope with the most severely embrittled reactors, the NRC has allowed some plants to redesign the configuration of the fuel rods so that fewer neutrons bombard the pressure vessel wall. The NRC has also released for comment a second revision of a regulatory guide (1.99) which specifies how utilities are to calculate the extent of embrittlement and the limits for operating with embrittled pressure vessels. The revision is an improvement in that it takes into consideration the copper and nickel content of the RPV materials. However, a major source of uncertainty still exists due to the limited accuracy and the variable range of the data base (a comparison of embrittlement limits under each revision of regulatory guide 1.99 is provided for each plant in appendix E). 6 The NRC has attempted to put the PTS issue behind it, but the problem of embrittlement has been recurring like a bad dream. New questions involve the reactor pressure vessel supports. These hold the pressure vessel in place and, depending upon the design, can be exposed to substantial amounts of radiation. There are five major types of RPV supports, four of which are used in PWRs.The major factor in determining embrittlement of the supports is their exposure to reactor core beltline neutron flux. Two types of supports are directly exposed to irradiation from this area of the reactor, the neutron shield tank supports and the column supports. These two types of supports are used in 90% of the operating PWRs in the United States.6 4 The danger of embrittlement of the structural steel supports is the possibility that the neutron bombardment has so irradiated the metal that it cracks under the stress of the combined loads it was designed to bear. In the NRC jargon this is known as catastrophic brittle failure. This type of accident is beyond the design basis for safety systems and could result in total loss of reactor cooling capability. For catastrophic brittle failure to occur three conditions must be present: (1) there must be a flaw of critical size; (2) there must be a sufficient load on the support to create critical stress at the crack tip of the flaw;and (3) the temperature must be low enough to promote a cleavage fracture at the crack.6 5 It appears that the NRC is once again attempting to finesse the issue of embrittlement. In May of 1975 it was discovered that the 24 asymmetric loads placed on reactor pressure vessel supports because of postulated loss-of-coolant-accidents were not taken into consideration in the design of the supports for the reactors at North Anna units 1 and 2. This underestimation of the potential burden on the RPV supports, coined the "North Anna syndrome," prompted the NRC to require all PWRs to reevaluate the loads placed on the structures. It was discovered that the additional load resulting from a double ended-rupture of the reactor coolant piping, also known as a guillotine break, was equal to the combined loads the structures were thought to support.6 6 The Commission responded to this issue in April of 1986 by exempting guillotine breaks from consideration. The NRC has stated that:.the dynamic effects associated with postulated pipe ruptures of primary coolant loop piping in pressurized water reactors may be excluded from design basis when analyses demonstrate the probability of rupturing such piping is extremely low under design " basis conditions. 7 The NRC bases this exemption on the "leak-before-break" theory.In essence the NRC is saying that the additional load placed on the RPV support in the event of a guillotine break need not be taken into consideration because the pipes will leak before they break. However, as previously noted, leak-before-break is neither an "established law", nor should it be the, "sole basis for continued safe operation." Another factor contributing to the issue of embrittlement of RPV supports is the accelerated shift in RTndt of the support materials. Data from the test reactor at the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has shown a greater than expected rate of embrittlement for steel that has been exposed to low temperature irradiation. A letter from the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) to Victor Stello, NRC Executive Director for Operations, stated that the RTndt of steel, "irradiated slowly at 120 degrees can rise much more rapidly with exposure to fast neutrons than would be expected from the available experimental work obtained in test reactors.", 6 8 The ACRS requested that Stello look into the implications of the ORNL findings on embrittlement and the impact on the NRC's plans to extend reactor life past the 40 year license. Stello's response stated that," (t)he ORNL summary coincides with our evaluation that the neutron shield tanks and support structures do not appear to pose any safety problems." However, close examination of the report reveals that the ORNL did not conclusively state that embrittlement was not a problem. In fact 25 the raport found that, "plant specific data are r izd -for an accurate evaluation of the potential for L7W v7ase! support failure. ,,69 The ACRS was understandably "c(ncerned and pe-ipecxed" by Mr.Stallo's response. Interpretation of the data revealed that structural steel supports are experiencing 2 to 3 times the embrittlement as might have been predicted. However, Mr. Stello failed to draw any inferences from this information. The ACRS stated that they could, "see no reason to be sanguine about the safety of operating nuclear power plants with the largest, heaviest component in the primary system supported on a structure, parts of which are fully brittle. This is unsafe by any type of analysis."' 7 0 The NRC's final word on embrittlement of RPV supports is still out as the staff seeks further documentation. In the meantime, support reliability has been judged to be adequate. It escapes comprehension how the supports could be found adequate without inspecting them or determining the extent of actual embrittlement. 26 EX~iFI~T 1 E Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMIVMISSION Title: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Joint Subcommittees: Materials and Metallurgy Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment Docket Number: Location: Date: (not applicable) Rockville, Maryland Wednesday, December 1, 2004 Work Order No.: NRC-114 Pages 1-137 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433 15 1 rationale. 2 MR. ERICKSONKIRK: Yes. What we do find 3 on the graph on the lower right-hand side is that the 4 flaws that are driving the through-wall cracking 5 frequency fully 90 percent of them are fairly small 6 flaws and that's the observation. 7 DR. WALLIS: Because there aren't very 8 many big ones? Is that what it is? It's more 9 probable that you would have a small flaw under the 10 surface?11 MR. ERICKSONKIRK: Absolutely. There's a 12 very low probability of having big flaws and even if 13 you increase the big flaw probability by credible, or 14 even incredible factors, it wouldn't matter much. I 15 apologize for that. You are absolutely correct. The 16 first rational was erroneous. 17 DR. WALLIS: This flaw distribution is 18 based on rather skimpy evidence. This is one of the 19 areas where -- I mean, heat transfer Dittus-Boelter if 20 you believe that. It's based on data points. But the 21 floor distribution in these walls is based on a few 22 examinations. Isn't it?23 MR. ERICKSONKIRK: A few examinations but 24 infinitely more than we had the first time.25 DR. WALLIS: It's much better than you had NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433 ,n, QT R..POR,'-,'n

i. .234-4433

-. -~n-raW `- -16 1 the first time.2 MR. ERICKSONKIRK: Much better than we had 3 the first time. I think as a laboratory geek at heart 4 I have to admit I would really like to have more data 5 on this and I don't think there's anybody in the 6 technical community that would disagree with this.7 But I think it's also important to 8 recognize that the flaw distribution doesn't rest on 9 experimental evidence alone. Certainly we started 10 with -- excuse me. We start with experimental 11 evidence both from destructive and nondestructive 12 evaluations but that's then also bolstered by --13 DR. WALLIS: But those were of individual 14 reactor vessels.15 MR. ERICKSONKIRK: That's right.16 DR. WALLIS: But there are a hundred 17 reactor vessels. I don't know how convincing it is 18 that the flaw distribution that you measured in a 19 couple of vessels which were taken apart is typical of 20 all other vessels.21 MR. ERICKSONKIRK: No. I think it would 22 be unfair to say that a single experimental 23 distribution derived from two vessels could be just 24 looked at and thought to be representative of the.25 other vessels.NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS .-11 .AkIIr% A% NW EXHIBIT 1 F PALISADES COULD REACH ITS PTS SCREENING LIMIT EARLIER THAN EXPECTED Consumers Powers' Palisades may reach its PTS screening limit, a key indicator of reactor vessel brittle-ness. next year--eight years earlier than NRC staff reported to the commission as recently as late October-according to testimony at a December 8 commission meeting.Consumers Power advised NRC on November 18 that new information on reactor vessel integrity showed that the critical PTS limit likely will be reached by 1999, five years earlier than an NRC staff analysis in late October showed. Jack Strosnider of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's (NRR) Division of Engineering told Commissioners Kenneth Rogers and Gail de Planque that information developed even more recently by testing of material from the plant's decommissioned steam generators may have pushed.up the date-perhaps to as early as next year. NRC staff said they hope to produce a new evaluation of Palisades data by the end of January.According to NRC regulations, a plant that has reached its PTS (pressurized thermal shock) screening limits may not operate unless the licensee presents additional information to justify the safety of the decision.A Consumers Power executive who observed the meeting expressed disappointment that the new information showed the Palisades reactor vessel might reach the limits earlier than previously thought. The purpose of the testin" was to justify operation to the end of the plant's original operating license in 2007.The inability of Yankee Atomic Electric Co. to provide sufficient information about the integrity of Yankee's reactor vessel, together with economic issues, prompted the Yankee to shut that unit permanently in 1992.As recently as October 28. when NRC staff issued Secy 94-267, "Status of Reactor Pressure Vessel Issues," the agency projected that Palisades would reach its PTS screening criteria in 2004. On November 18, Consumers Power submitted a revised evaluation of the PTS issue that indicated the vessel would reach the critical level in 1999.Analysis of the critical beltline welds, along the axis of the reactor vessel, depends a lot on exactly what proportion of copper is present in the weld wires used to join the metal plates. Analysis of the metallurgy of the welds continues apace at Palisades, a nuclear engineer for the company told Inside N.R.C.In a separate development at the meeting, NRC staff told the commissioners that they would, if necessary, compel ABB Combustion Engineering to divulge data on reactor vessel weld integrity that the vendor seeks to keep confidential. The clash over the data from the Combustion Engineering Reactor Vessel Owners Group-data owned by ABB C-E-attracted attention from Commissioner Rogers, who told staff, including Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula-tion (NRR) chief William Russell, that "I Would like to be kept informed of the discussions with the industry group (led by ABB C-E)."I think the commissioners would be interested (in updates on the matter)," Rogers continued. "What are the proprietary aspects here that they are concerned about? I would hope that we could get over that hurdle." Russell told Rogers that the basis for ABB C-E's request that the data be kept confidential is that it contains information on how C-E reactor vessel welds were carried out-"using the methods of twenty to thirty years ago that are no longer used." Russell said he was hopeful that the agency and the company would come to a voluntary agreement on the issue.At the end of the meeting. Rogers repeated his call for the data to be made public. "I hope we'll be successful, ultimately, in filling out that data set." NRC wants to include the data in a database called the Reactor Vessel Integrity Data Base, or RVID.RVID summarizes the properties of reactor pressure vessel materials for all plants; it is based on docketed information and is scheduled for public availability in the first quarter of 1995.tNSitIDEN.H.C. -D~'teember

12. 1 J9J.4 13 EXHIBIT 1 G David Jaffe -Palisades phone call Page 1 David Jaffe -Palisades Dhone call Paae 1 H From: Stephanie Coffin To: Hoffman, Stephen Date: 11/24/04 3:05PM

Subject:

Palisades phone call We had a phonecall with them Monday.They no longer plan on submitting an exemption to apply "Master Curve" at their facility.Instead, they will be managing it in accordance with the May 27, 2004 guidance from Reyes to the Commissioners. They are following Point Beach and Beaver Valley closely.I gave them feedback especially about the flux reduction requirements of the current rule and suggested they review the Point Beach submittal and our associated SER with Open Items, and to check for applicability to their plant.FYI for Matt and Barry and Nell: If they see that the new PTS rule will not be published in time for them (they currently exceed the screening criteria in 2014 -I don't know if we agree with that), they will submit the Master Curve exemption in 2007.Stephanie CC: Duvigneaud, Dylanne; Elliot, Barry; Mitchell, Matthew; Ray, Nihar; Stang, John

at'look On Life Extension SPECIAL REPORT TO THE READERS OF NUCLEONICS WEEK...INSIDE N.R.C.,AND NUCLEARFTEL A Mthe nuclear industry tries to hang on in an in- tute (NEI.The organization-born March 16 when creasingly competitive marketphaci, considerations of four U.S. nuclear trade groups consolidatedý-is ema-extending plant lifetimes beyond their allotted 40 years 'blemiatic of the squeeze nuclear utilities face. paring.sometimes seem an academic exercise. Yet whether down and cutting costs as they navigate the uncertain. the US. will have nuclea pwer as a future energy ties economic competitiveness has thrust on the indus-.option-regardless of the cost or avallability of other 'try. Ultimately, the decisiontoseek li'censereiiewil..- options-depends in large degree on license renewal -"will be an economic decision uiitf'ies and life cycle management decisions being made today. into account many factors,' said Peters... The licens of 49 of the 110 nuclear units in the US: *. ".'There may be people who, outof sheer stubborn-... are set to expire in the coming two decades, by 2014 -ness,, continue to pursue license renewal-:-6d NRC.(though some could be further delayed by recaptuming '.1 may let them-but whether it wil be viable for these.*their constructi6n period and dding it to the license -plants to continue after 30 years is questionablew said.period)* Will utilities irefurbish and recertify them as Jim Riccio,an attorney with Washington, D.C.-based safe to produce power beyond their current 40-year -Public Citizen4 a Ralph Nader lobby. RcCodioubts that icenses? Oi-i1l they beshuttered one by* one as their any of the U.S. nuclear units will even get to the ends df licenses ran 6ut with someforced into premature shut- their licenses "It won't be the antinuclear-forces t"at.".down? force them to'cl6se, but the people who do their ledger.books,". he said, adding, Economic and sfty cdnsid-" NRC Chairman. Ivan Selin, counts license renewal .erations willshut these plants*down.' ."' .*as the "number one topic' before the commission. He is..optimistic that at least some utilities will apply to extend-' Only 46% of electric utility executiies expertto*the operating lives of their plants. "Inteiest is higher .see operating licenses exiended formost plants ac.nowthan.t has been for two years. rm certain that ... diing to a survey rdeased by the Washiniton'Iner- .many reactors will come in for license renewal," he " ..national Energy Group in January. Odds remaid in asserted... ..'" favor of most units continuing to operate throughthe,,-Selin says the NRC is on the verge of coming out *. first 40 years, the executives said. But only 37% 6f-re' with a rule thatwill. iniake the.process of applying for. spondents believed there would be iies.... e..e. 6f plint life ektefiiiozisimple, cheap, and predictable: "I -nuclear power in the U.S. "Pivately, CEOs tk aýoiit.feel good ab6ut theilicen6e renewal process we're de'-: someday turning over title of [nuclear] .plantsr-even.,.i veloping-though my .satisfaction is tainted by the fact :.the best ran ones-to the governmeWt,'.said the reort, that we should have got things right the first time.,' "1:.'994 Electric Utility Outlook."' 'Among government and industry expe-ts, the NRC .Those utilities that set their sights on plt'life &ex" chiefs may be a lone Voicdf optimism. A recent ' tension wil have to brave uncharted tri."toryAfeW, by the Edison Electric Institute concluded that.-fa years ago, the path ajpeared relatively my hfo.ad.from life e'nesioin being .tequestion-;L0.st-related, The industry would devlop pilot license reatel sub.-'premature shutdowns are likely to beain'issue for Utili- --mittals for a lead BWR and a lead FWR, which wouuld " ties as early as this year (Nuclebnics Week. 17 March,j;. pave the way for other utilities to follow with'reneiv". .1). ... .. "--. i .applications. But the process has takefi imn ed " Even traditional boosters of nuclear energy eipress 'turns. Yankee Rowe's experience as a lead PWR led.serious doubtsabout how manyw-if any-plants will 'ultimately to its shutdown, and the other utilities hv" see life beyond their 40th birthdays. "I'm relatively sure -hung back.some plants will go in for license renewal, although it- Competition has changed the landscape of the "ec-." all depends on load gr&ovth at the time they g6 in,' said utility industry entirely in two years. Economic .Scott Peters, a spokesmafi for the Nu6lear Energy'Insti-decisions to seek license renewal will be made on i-* .* -I plant-by-plant basis, industry experts say. Few generali-"zations can be drawn to predict likely candidates-some utilities view their nuclear units as albatrosses, others embrace them as assets. The price of other energy sources in a given region, the philosophy of state regu-lators, public perceptions about nuclear power in a county or state, the numberof units a utility is operat-ing, and the age, condition, and operating history of each plant-not to mention the cost and degree of hassle involved in meeting NRC's forthcoming rule-will all influence the life extension decision.Key players and issues to watch include:* , VirginiaPower, the only utility to announce plans to apply for life extension. It surprised industry peers and NRC by unveiling plans to initially seek five-year license renewals-instead of 20 years--for Surry and North Anna.The Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group, which plans to submit a license renewal application on one of its FWRs by 1997. Duke Power's Oconee-1 is one of the top candidates for their submission.

• Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., which has spent$15-milon on a combined life cycle management and license renewal program. The company may decide to apply to extend the Calvert Cliffs licenses for 20 years..NRC's rule rewrite, ordered by the commission-ers in February.

Will the new rule provide the cheap, simple, predictable application basis Selin has prom-ised? And how will utilities implement it?@ Other nations' experience. Electricite de France (EDF) has taken the lead in grappling with many of the aging issues that U.S. utilities must evaluate in the tech-nical assessments of their plants. EDF has developed a list of 18 essential components. In Sweden, the clash between politics and performance once agairn is coming to a head, where power opponents want to see lifetimes limited on plants considered by U.S. analsts.to be among the best performers in the world.VIRGINIA POWER TAKES THE BULL BY THE HORNS Virginia Power Co;.could be the first utility to test NRC'spromise of a simpler and cheaper approach to license renewaL The company unveiled plans in Febru-ary to file an application early in 0995to renew the oper-at.g licenses for the Surry and North Anna nuclear stitions for five years (inside N.RC., 21 Feb., 1).V'iginIa Powee'i nuclear units are 'very competi-tiv'e" said William Stewart, president-nuclear. 'Our production costs are excellenL Our units were built in the 1970s, so the [capital] cost was low.' Stewart char-acterizes the decision as one that could make the utility even more competitive. 'We're not in a scramble here,'he said.'We'rejust looking ahead.Stewart said the five-year life extension initiative has received the support of Wall Street utility analysts, whom he briefed on the plan in February. Their re-sponsewas farvorble. The feeling was that a five-year.. renewal is feasible. .Reduci~; Esbar.Costs. Company officials concede the decision to pursue five-year license reniwals is 'an economic rather than an operational'. 6n.e, primaril driven by the current..clUmate of economic competitiveness. Martin Bowling, manager of the utility's nuclear licensing programs, said that renewing the licenses at its two duahl-nit nuclear stations by five years would lower 'busbar'costs-the amount it costs to produce electricity at the point it leaves the plant; including capital costs, taxes, fuel, and operations and maintenance costs.In 1992, Virginia Power's busbar costs were 2.84 cents per kilowatt-hour.(KWH) at Surry and 3.42 cents/KWH at North Anna. Overall busbai costs for nuclear generation are 3.1 cents/KWH, Stewart said.Costs would be lowered by changing depreciation rates and reducing near-term decommissioning trust collections. Lower costs would help hold down future.rate increases and keep the utility competitive, Bowling explained. In their economIcanalysis, utility officials calculated that; as a near-term effect. "depreciation. expense is reduced each year, $21-million the first year and up to $49-milion by 2011.' 7-.Virginia Power has replaced steam generators at-three of the four units and plans to replace the steam generators at North Anna-2 in;1996 at a 1996 dollar" equivalent to the $120-million spent last year to replace.the steam generators in unit 1..Stewart said the company has spent morne than $5--million to date on license renewal work, most of it on...technical analyses under the old NRC rule; Surry-1-began opeati.ng in December 1972 and its license ex-.pires in May 2012; Surry-2 started up inMay.1973 and.* its license expires in January 2013. North Anna-l -started operating in June 1978 and its license expires in April 2018; unit 2 began operations in December 1980 and its license expires in August 2020.*. Company officials recently proposed a streamlined* .integrated plant assessment (IPA) process to NRC -staffers. They say the technical analyses under their.IPA would be done no differently whether they.were. applying for a five-year extension or a 20-year one. Util-ity plans call for submitting a license renewal apýlica-tion during the first quarter of 1995, but that could 'change if NRC's revised license renewal rule is not out.yet, Stewart noted. -.Assuming Virginia Power's license renewal applica-tion proceeds on track, the utility should provide a case study on how NRC will have utilities show compliance

• ~i ~I -Pa"e 2 01OOK ON LVE ]C'ENSION-Nudeanics Week. March 31; Inside N.R.C.. April 4; Nudceariha, April 11, 1991 a 10sn w#. .-.I .. ... " .-...

reliance on the rmaintenance rule, completing the re-views needed for a license renewal application is not going to be a piece of cake. There will be considerable documentation required.Thermal fatigue monitoring'of the pmriary system is an example of how life extension work provides short--term and long-term benefits, Dbroshuk said. Engineers analyzed all the Class I piping, for instance, and created a computerized data bank that not only is used toftrack aging mechanisms like fatigue, .but can be used in op.erations. 'We've been able to provide an analysis of the plant-and respond to transients that see during a startup and allow them to continue on without doing holds and analysis,' an engineer on the team said.A priority of die life cycle management program has been evaluating the reactor pressure vessel. Calvert Cliffs-I is cur-ently going to exceed NRC's pressurized thermal shock (PTS) screening criteria between 2004 and 2006. Unit 2..ws built using lower-copper weld material, so it doesn't have the same problem.There are plant-specific differences that make us: believe unit I's embrittlement is much less than NRC's correlation would predict,' said Marvin Bowman, an engineer on the life cycle management team. "These include fabrication process differences, heat treatment differences, materials differences, weld materials, weld fluxes that were used.-they're all part of that embrittlement process." BG&E officials submitted the technical evaluation to NRC last November and are expecting to receive NRC's review by this summer. 'We think we have a very sound technical basis for continued operation of unit 1'Doroshuk said."We'ye done substantial flux reduction and we can do much more aggressive flux reduction if we have to, involving radical fuel management," Bowman added.The"conclusion of BG&E's plant assessment activi-.ties to date: 'We've found that, materially, the plant should last for 60 years,. Doroshuk said. 'We haven't found the show-stopper--even in the reactor vessel'REACTOR VESSEL INTEGRiTY, COSTS, CRUCIAL TO LTFE EXTENSION Coping with reactor vessel embrittlement is a prior- vative danger signals of growing embrittlement, set in ity for managing planr life exiension, as several U.S. 10 CFR 50 and its Appendix G. Utilities have a number reactors likely will face the problem after about 40 of ways to cope with embrittlement as operating life-years of operation .time progresses, including flux reduction through fuel PWR vessels are more susceptible than BWRs' be- management, such as installing neutron absorbers on cause'the PWR vessels are narrower and contain less the core periphery. Utilities can also analyze their yes-coolant, so more neutrons reach the vessel walls. Most sels' metal to prove they won't hpprpach the NRC crite-PWRvessels in the U.S. are made of steel known as ria within their operatinglives, and monitor the accu-A533-B alloy, an alloy of iron, carbon, and manganese racy of those analyses by regularly removing and test-".with some nickel In a number of older vessels, the ing specimens of vessel material, which are kept inside.welds joining the vessel's curved plates contain some the vessels in capsules.copper. As neutrons from the corestrike the ste.l, they change the crystalline structure of theA533-B alloy. As" vessel lifetime is lengthened, arateof The weld material is especially affected, with the neu- embrittlement which was no concern for 40 years of trons disrupting the crystal lattice, creating dumps of o Operation may become a barrier to reaching 60 yeirs, coppe-atoms and vacancies in the matrix. Tis process "and utilities that did.not previously have to be con-..makes the steel more brittle. * .- -cerned about PTS are having to look again: "..-.NRC h i -io'n-on*" The brittleness is measured in two ways: the' :: :the status of their vessels withregad to PTS ihnd upper upper shelf energy loss and the ieference temperature. shelf energy. From this informafiori, the agency has at nil ductility tempeiraure (RT-NDT).The loss of duc-. deduced a list of especially vulnerable re"actoirs that Lis tility can leave the metal vulnerable to ductile fractures. fluctuated from aromnd one to six reactors, as utilids a tearing that can take place in seconds or minutes, and -take measures to alte the rate of embrittlement.L. to pressurized thermal shock (PTS).lie latter could -Calvert Cliffs, Duquesne Light Co.'s Beaver Valley, and occur i& during an accident, coolant is Suddenly re- -Consumer Powers Palisades have beei mentioned as'stored to an overheated vessel. ;ad it could causean:.: particularly vulnei-able. While oppIiuons within'NRC ard" abrupt fracture of the metal.:Reactor opeirators must":. the industry appear tb'ýaiy, the utilities generally hold show NRC that their vessels are proof against both " thatfurther analysis of the metallurgy of their reactors'types of faHure. will prove that the vesg s d rSl-l last to the ends of their Because ductility loss is cumulative, operators plot license periods.-. the time it will take their vesel to ieach the RT-NDT. -According to thehlatest NRC list, seven units'.vessels and upper shelf criteria that NRC selected as a conser-' likely will enc6uiinter PTS concerns before the ends of OU.LOOK ON LE .ENSlON-Nuc e.nkc Week, Mar,' 31; -akd. N.April 4; Nuc*..'.el.-ril

• 2, 1991 PAP- 9 01994 MAGraw-HW Inwc. Reprodudionforbdw witho.ut e ,s , iermio,.

Ir i REACTOR VESSELS WITH PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK (PTS) CONCERNS Estimated Year PTS Screening License Expiration Criteria will be Reached Date per NUREG 1350 Plant Name Palisades Fort Calhoun Calvert Cliffs-1 Point Beach-2 Point Beach-i Beaver Valley-1 1997-2005 2013>2005>2013>2010 2014 PTS CONCERNS BEYOND CURRENT END-OF-LICENSE LIFE Zion-1 Oconee-2 Surry-1 Salem-1 Zion-2 Ginna Diablo Canyon-i Cook-I Farley-1.St. Luce-I 2011 2019>2012 2020 2023 2026 2034 2037>2050>2050 03/14/2007 06/07/2008 07/31/2014 03/08/2013 10/05/2010 01/29/2016 12/26/2008 10/06/2013 05/25/2012 09/25/2008 12/26/2008 04/25V2006 04/23/2008 03/25/2009 06/25/2007 03/01/2016 Source: ARC their licenses, and nine other units' vssels iill fall in the category after their current licenses expire (see table).Annealing: The Last Ditch Utilities that look soon enough can alter the rate of embrittlement early in a vessel's life, but for older reac-tors the standard methods may not be able to change the rate enough.That can leave utilities facing an ex-pensive problem for life extension. YAEC chose to close Yankee because the pro.vng the vessel's stage of embrittlement was too expensive-and NRC's requirements for that proof too open-ended--to be justified economically for a 185-MW reactor.One option is to replace the vessel, which has never been done and is estimated to cost as much as S100-million. Another choice being viewed with increasing favor by reactor owners is annealing the vessel, or heat-ing it to the point where the crystalline structure of the steel is paiy orfufly restored to its origina fracture resistance. Estimates for annealing range around $10-million.Annealing is a routine process in metallurgy and has been extensively modeled, but it ii complicated by vessel radioactivity. For. U.S. vessels, it would involve heating the beltline weld, and in some cases the axial welds or some vessel plates, to about 850 degrees F for about a week. The longer the heat is applied, the more complete the restoration of the metal's crystalline struc-ture. Theoretically, heating the vessel for as much as two weeks could restore the metal 1009.Different annealing specialists offer different esti-mates of how long the repair done by an annealing job would last Some estimate annealing could restore a vessel to service for five or six years, while others say field experience indicates 60 to 70 years. Researchers say more study is needed.-Alan Hiser of the mateials engineering branch of NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), said that the level of restoration of embrittlement due to* annealing, and the rate of re-embrittlement, is depen-dent on a number of factors. If the material is a weld, rather than a plate, the annealing repair will be less effective and the re-embrittlement rate faster. The* chemistry of the material is crucial, as well-steels or welds containing nickel or copper are more subject to both embrittlement and re-embrittlement. Hiser emphasized that the difference between the reactor operating temperature-around 550 degrees F-axid the temperature of annealing (850 degrees) has an important effect. The greater the difference between the two temperatures, the more successful the anneal-ing will be and the longer its effects will last NRC has funded research on annealing that was carried out by.I Pae 20 0OUýiLOK ON LIFE EXTENSION-Nuc.Ie-dme Week. March 31; Imld. N.R.C., April 4; Nuc1earFu4e, April 21, 1991 DOE at Oak Ridge. and Hiser's views also take into can restore as much as 100% of the damage due to neu-account research performed by Westinghouse on be- tron flux, depending on the fctors mentioned. 'From half of EPRI, the U;S. Navy, and Russian annealing the data we've seen so far, it appears that (after anneal-specialists. ing) you get the same embritlement rate you got in.-Hiser said that most studies have considered anneal-,. tiflly,' he said.ing for 168 hours, or one week.On thebasis of 168 The American Society. of Testing & Materials' Stan-hours and 850 degrees, Hiser said that anannealing'job dard E509-86 model posits that re-emnbrittlemenit-occurs YANKEE EFFORT FOUNDERED ON VESSEL Zc',s doe. not bring all m en plans to fulflilmelet. to maintain that uniformity.-Homer Ultimately, Yankee's unique design proved to be its undoing. On February 26, 1992-41 months after At the time, it seemed logical. Yankee Atomic YAEC received DOE's proposed contrict for the five-Electric Co.'s (YAEC) Yankee was byfar theoldest year lead plant effort--theYAECboard voted PWR operating in the U.S. Though small and unique permanently close the unit. Yankee had been"volun. in design, ithad Agood operatingrecord andYAEC tarily" shut down the previous October after the wanted to extend the operating license that was td' NRC staff recommended that it be laid up until ques-expire in 2000. -tic s regarding the degree of embrittlement of its'When DOE and the Electric Power Research reactor pressure vessel (RPV) could be resolved.Institute (EPRI) were looking for candidates to test never were. " ..the license extension waters, the 185-MW Yankee got the nod for PWRs, despite EPRI's expressed Yankee's RPV design made it virtually imposr-reservations about using older, smaller plants as iible--or it least extremely impensive-, o answer license extension guinea pigp and despite the fact- the questions NRC'and intervenors had posed. The'that Virginia Poweir had already done extensive jun.- 'RPV's configuration severely limited ins ecoion of tial screening of possible lidense extension road- .. the beltlindeweld region. Yankee's vessel consists of blocks for Surry-1, anh824-MW PWR of a more co-in. '..a rolled 0.109-inch-thick stidnlesi steel sheet welded'mon design. in several locations.-but not.dompletely bofided.-io The issues.were timing and money'. Surry's ii-.. the shell..That incomplete bond made ultrasonic" cerise wouldn't expireuntil 2012. The Yankee plant. 'inspection of the welds vety difficult, because the was YAEC's only asset Therefore, YAEC had no " 'gap' betweeb thie cladding and the Vessel shell choice but to go forward with license extension,.. hindered the ultrisonic instriuments' ability to accu.even if it wasn't chosenias a lead plant. 'We were rately identify and size weld flaws,..going to file a license extension' application,' said .Yankee's RV aso has a thermal shield justinside. YAEC's Bill Szymýcfak, a membeirof theYanke'e the vesseilwall. The proximityof the shield to the, license extension'team. "There iwas sentimentat the vessel shell restricts the accessibility to the beltline time that (the lead plan) should hv' beenSurry .*regionadi'estrictsinsj~ectionsofcriticalwelds. To but we were going to be in the queue an ay. position'instruments for inspection, the thermal*"As a single-ass& company, rpgardless of whit .shield would have to be destroyed and remonved,:." anyone else was doing, we were going forward,' unless inw tools were manufacui-ed to make the$iS2ýýkT-ddid. HZIiifiYAEC befdi--ttie-NRC f- --eld--2aEsibleYAEC sttil '-..a license extension at the same time the pilot plants. inspection equipment,'but that cost a lot and the were going through would have been a -complkat-economics of saving Yankee-which already wasn't*" ing factor,"he said.. ..selling electricity it a compýtitive price in recession-DOE arid EPRI were, in fact, very concerned. ravaged New England-.just didn't add up.about maintaning a uniform front on license renewal " YAEC even briefly considered replacing the RPV.before the NRC. When' YAEC signed on islead .Though DOE'S Sandia National Laboratories con-PWR, a provision in its cbntract with DOE and EPRI .luded that the replacemeht was "technically achiev-.required that its licensing submittals be "suffidently able," th.e ileisionon replacement was ultimately an consistent' with those filed by Noi'thern States economic one.. It was estimated that RPV replace-.Power Co. foi the-lead BWR. Mohticello, that NRC. merit could be paid off ovier 20 years with a ramte in-wouldn't be able to 'leveriage onepLaiht against the acrease of 1/2 to -.1cent per KWH for the first year, other.'. " .-." .which would drop to 0.1 cent the last year. Of 'If YAEC had Meled 'a icdns6 extension applicati-n. coursethat payback scenario assumed license ex-as a third party, it would not have been constrained OUrL.OOK ON IFE EX1ENSION-Nuleriwles Week, March 31; Insidi N.R.C., Apr,4; NuclerFud, April 11 1991 Page 21 at the same rate as before annealing, but that embrittlement restarts from a point of greater ductil-ity-a "lateral shift" in the embrittlement curve. Rus-sian experience in annealing 13 reactor vessels has verified the lateral shift approach to analyzing re-embrittlement, Hiser said. Even if an annealing job does not repair all flux damage, he said. "You will al-ways end up better (after an annealing), but there's no significant impact on the rate of embrittlement." However, each reactor vessel responds to fluence according to the particular circumstances of its construction, including the type of material used in the steel and the welds. The rate of fluence accumulation before and after annealing will also have an effect, Hiser said.' "Assuming the same rate of fluence accumulation of the vessel and 100% recovery (from embriftlement), the vessel should be good for the same period as before you annealed,* Hiser said.Hiser's views on annealing and re-embrittlement are based on more than a decade of research on the topic in the U.S., where sample coupons have been tested many times for embrittlement rates and response to annealing, and on full-vessel annealing in Russia.Westinghouse has moved strongly into the nascent field. David Howell, manager of engineering services for the vendor, said, 'Mhe nuclear industry needs this program for life extension and to meet license require-ments, plus we see annealing as a sales opportunity.' Westinghouse has raised more than $2-million of $4-million it is seeking from the industry to conduct an annealing demonstration at the never-completed Marble Hill reactor in Indiana. Westinghouse plans to use indirect gas-fired heating to raise the vessel's tern-perature. Extensive monitoring will be designed to answer critical engineering questions, such as how the process affects nozzles and pipes attached to the vessel.Westinghouse faces competition from a team formed of Framatome subsidiary B&W Nuclear Technologies, MPR Associates Inc. of Alexandria, Va., and a- consor-tium called Russian Annealing Moht. The moht, o'r consortium, is formed of Moscow's Kurchatov Institute; vendor Gidropress; Cnitrmash; and other Russian orga-nizations, which has annealed 13 vessels in Russia.MPR Associates principals Bill Schmidt-and Noman Cole praise the Russian technology, which relies on electric resistance heating, as simple and reliable.Schmidt said that Electricite de France (EDF) special-ists who met with his company said that they were concerned that the Westinghouse process could not be licensed in France because, of the dangers of working with natural gas.U.S. annealing specialists visited Novovoronezh in 1992 to witness the annealing of a VVER-440 vessel.The Russian approach is different, the specialists say, because Russian vessels are made of ring forgings, so the circumferential weld area to be annealed is only.about three feet wide. U.S. reactors, which are longer and have axial welds, would have to be annealed in a band about 12 feet wide. Also, some U.S. reactors would require annealing on plate sections.MPR's Cole said that the recovery in RT-NDT at Novovoronezh was greater than 80%. While Russian annealing specialists haverachieved recovery of 100% in that index of PTS vulnerability from some annealing-projects, they guarantee recovery of 80% from their annealing process.Keith Wichman, annealing specialist with NRC's researrh arm, agreed.Russian annealing projects have achieved recovery rates over 90%. That level of recov-ery is equivalent to full recovery for his purposes, Wichman said, adding that above 90% recovery, distinc-tions are meaningless. No full-scale armealing project is now on the drawing boards at an operating U.S. reactor, despite the optimism of the annealing vendors. Utilities have rea-son to be cautious, since the first utility to anneal al-most certainly will have to pay extra to defray the costs of licensing the process and the extra costs associated with the learning curve on the techinology. In any event, the first U.S. annealing likely will not take place before the turn of the century, since other methods of lowering embrittlement rates will work until then. Jack Hanson, an annealing specialist at Palisades, said his utility's decision on annealing would be gov.-erned by the economics of the process when license renewal is evaluated years from now. Hanson added that the most important factdr in that calculation will be the price of natural gas-the strongest competitor to nuclear power plants.NRC DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW RULE ANGERS STATES In addition to the safety reviews, NRC will require an environmental review as part of. the license renewal process. NRC's proposed amendments to tailor the existing environmental review rule (10 CFR Part 51) to the license renewal process have come under attack by.states for what they view as an attempt by NRC to pre-empt their traditional review of need for generating capacity and alternate energy sources.The amendments include a draft Generic Environ-mental Impact Statement (GEIS), published in Septeni-ber 1991, in which NRC decided to treat the issues of need for power and alternative energy sources in the same way they are handled in an operating license review. While the agency performs a detailed analysis Page 12 otn1LOOK ON UFE MENSION-Nude n.ci Week. March 31; Insda N.R.C., April 4; NuclearFuel, April 11, 1991 EXHIBIT I I consumers Power PMEWENG PROGRESS Genral Offlces 1"S Wan Parntil Road. Jacksn, MI 49201

• 1517l 788.S050 May 17, 1990 Nuclear RegulAtory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 -LICENSE DPR-20 -PALISADES PLANT -COMPLIANCE WITH PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK REGULATION 10CFR50.61 AND REGULATORY GUIDE 1.99 REVISION 2 (TAC NO. 39970)Consumers Power Company (CPC) submittal on April 3. 1989 provided a revised report on reactor vessel fluence for Cycles I -8. Attached is the vessel fluence reduction report describing the effect of incorporating lovwleakage fuel management for the Cycle 9 core loading pattern. In this proposed Cycle 9 design, 16 thrice-burned fuel assemblies with zircaloy-clad hafnium absorber rods will be used at the selected core peripheral locations to protect the vessel axial welds from neutron fast flux E)1.O MeV. Remaining core peri-pheral locations will be loaded with twice-burned fuel assemblies.

All once-burned and fresh fuel assemblies will be inside the core away from the peripheral locations. This report reflects results based upon the development of in-house methodo-logy utilizing the DOT 4.3 discrete ordinates transport code and Reactor Engineering Analyses performed during the period of 1987-1990. It concludes that the PTS screening criteria will be exceeded at the axial welds in September. 2001. as opposed to the previously reported exceed date of March, 2002. The difference reflects an improvement in vessel flux reduction in Cycle 9 relative to Cycle 8 and slightly higher vessel flux levels calculated by the refined in-housa transport methodology relative to, the Westinghouse methodology previously utilized. Thus, the previously 0C0590-0016-NLO2 ,u '.-4 o'Y )nr/ý IF In Nuclear Regulatory Commission Palisades Nuclear Plant Thermal Shock Reg IOCFR50.61/Reg Guide 1.99 Rev 2 May 17, 1990 derived conclusion that the flux reductions achieved in the Cycle 8 and 9 core loading patterns are, by themselves, insufficient to allow plant operation to the current expected end of life in 2011 remains valid. Further measures, eg, greater flux reduction, Regulatory Guide 1.154 analysis, vessel shielding etc, are necessary to allow plant operation to the nominal end of plant life and beyond.Richard W Smedley Staff Licensing Engineer CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC NRC Resident Inspector -Palisades t0C0590-0016-NLO2 ANALYSIS OF THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL FAST EUTROWI FLUEMCE AND PRESSURIZED TEIRMAL SUOCK REAERUNCE TEHPERATURES FOR THE PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT May 1990 Performed by the Reactor Engineering Department Palisades Nuclear Plant Consumers Power Company! a .TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PACE*.0 INTRODUCTION 1 2.0

SUMMARY

3 3.0 METHODOLOGY B 3.1 OVERVIEW 8 3.2 FUEL MANACEMENT 8 3.3 GEOMETRY 9 3.4 MATERIAL CROSS SECTIONS 10 3.5 NEUTRON SOURCE 10 3.6 BURNUP CORRECTIONS 1I 3.7 NEUTRON TRANSPORT ANALYSIS 12 3.8 VESSEL FLUENCE CALCULATIONS 12 3.9 FLUENCE LIMITS/REFERENCE TEMPERATURE CALCULATIONS 12 4.0 RESULTS 32 4.1 COMPARISON TO MEASURED DATA 32 4.2 FLUX/FLUENCE DISTRIBUTION 32 4.3 CALCULATIONAL UNCERTAINTY 33 4.4 ADJUSTED REFERENCE TEMPERATURES AND 33 SCREENINC LIMITS 5.0 DISCUSSION 45 5.1 IMPACT OF RESULTS 45 5.2 ADDITIONAL FLUX REDUCTION 45 5.3 REFINED FLUX MEASUREMENT 46 5.4 OTHER PTS ACTIVITIES 47 M10490-0055A-0P03 i

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Consumers Power Company-previously submitted-to the NRC a report describing Cycle 8 (luence reduction measures for the Palisades Nuclear Plant reactor pressure vessel.[IlI It was committed that.an additional. fluence report reflecting Cycle 9 fuel management and extrapolated to nominal plant end-of-life would be submitted to the NRC. The information contained herein is intended to address-the fluence re-evaluastion and reduction program as previ-ousLy committed to and to describe the methodology utilized for determining vessel incident fast fluxes and fluence levels.In order to accurately calculate pressure vessel fluence levels, in-house methodology was developed.utilizing the DOT.4.3 discrete ordinates transport code as the base model.. Training in the use of DOT 4.3 and associated cross section libraries and support codes was obtained from Combustion Engineering. The scope of the training included code usage and model development as well as results evaluations. In-house methodology of flux calculations was further refined via consultation with Westinghouse Electric Company, Radiation and Systems Analysis-Nuclear Technology Division. Westinghouse determined that Consumers Power's neutron transport methodology represented state-of-the-art practice consistent with Westinghouse methodology (2,81.The modeling of the vessel and fluence analysis was performed using DOT 4.3 and the SAILOR cross-section library. Cycles I through 7 core loading patterns were typical of out-in fuel management in that the fresh fuel was placed on the core periphery. This approach results in the maximum overall core neutron leakage and flux to the reactor pressure vessel. The Cycle 8 core vas loaded with thrice burned fuel assemblies with stainless steel shielding rods located near the axial weld locations. In the previously submitted report (11, flux reductions of a factor of two were achieved at the axial weld locations from the Cycle 8 loading pattern. The design goal for Cycle 9 was to meet or exceed the flux reductions achieved in Cycle 8. The proposed Cycle 9 load.ing pattern consists of thrice burned fuel assemblies with hafnium absorbers located at the same core peripheral Locations that utilized stainless steel shielding rods in M10490-0055A-0P03 I'll Cycle 8. The remaining core peripheral locations will be loaded WiLh LWiCe burned fuel assemblies. All of the new fuel assemblies will be located wiLhin the core interior.In this report. cycle-specific calculations have been performed for Cycles I throu&h 9. Results presented address the accumulated vessel flu.ence through the end of Cycle 7 as well as the flux reductions obtained-for. the Cycle 8 (currently in operation) and Cycle 9 (under design) low leakage loading paL-terns. Vessel fluence limits based on the IOCFRSO.61PTS screening criteria and both the 1OCFR 50.61 and Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, reference temperature correlations are calculated based on the vessel material chemis-tries. Vessel lifetimes are calculated relative to the fluence limits assuming the flux-reduction fuel management for Cycle 9 and beyond utilizing the Regula-tory Cuide 1.99, Revision 2 reference temperature correlations. In addition, details are provided about the in-house methodoloay'and data 131 and the status of Consumers' in-house flux reduction and measurement program.M10490-OOSSA-OP03

2.0 SUIHARY

Neutron transport calculations were performed using'the DOT 4.3 computer code and SAILOR cross section library.- The 2D R.-6.neutron fluxes (E>1.0 KeV) were computed using:DOT"4.3 with consideration of axial flux peaking.. For each of Cycles I through 9,.cycle specific DOT-runs have been.made. For.Cycles I through 7 on-line core.monitoring energy :generation data and actual cycle operational history data wereýutilized for.-vessel flux and fluence calcula-tions; calculations for Cycles 8 and 9 utilized predictive core simulator data. A comparison'between calculated and measured fluxes at the W-290 wall capsule location, analyzed at the end of Cycle.5, was made, .It:was found that the calculated:fluxes were about .4% higher than.the measured values,.thus assuring reasonable flux predictions for the models.Flux levels for Cycle 8 were compared with-that of Westinghouse methodology (1). The in-house model indicates a positive bias in the flux calculations relative to the Westinghouse methodology and-this bias varied with the azimuthal -locations. Maximum variation was on the order of about .122 at 45 location 131. ,.. *Pressure vessel fluence limits based on the PTS screening criteria of IOCFR5O.61were calculated using the reference temperatut:(Rl) correlations of both lOCFR5O;61-and:Regulatory Cuide.-l99# lev.2 using the vessel chemistries provided in Reference

4. The results are summarized in Table.2.1 and show the dramatic reduction in the vessel weld fluence limits with the use of the Regulatory Cuide 1.99 RT correlation.

With the pending issuance. of a revised 1OCFRS0.61 incorporating the Regulatory Culde. 1.99, Rev:2 RT correlation, the more restrictive Regulatory'Cuide fluence limits utilized-in this study.--Core loading patterns for Cycles 8 and 9.'are designed to provided substantial flux reduction at-the axial 'veld locations:in comparison to previous cycles.The associated flux reductions for the primary vessel materials are-shown in Table 2.2. Fast flux (E>l.O HeY) reductions of more than 502 were obtained at the axial weld locations for Cycles 8 and 9 in comparison with Cycle 7. For.Cycle 8, at the circumferential weld and base metal (peak) locations, about 20%MI 0490-005SA-0P03 4 flux reduction was obtained. However, for Cycle 9 the flux reductions are on the order of 48% at these locations. Vessel lifetimes based on when the PTS screening criteria are met were deter-mined for fuel management schemes with flux reduction for Cycles 8, 9, and beyond. Operation beyond end of Cycle 8 (September 1990) was assumed to occur at 75% capacity. With no flux reduction utilized, the PTS screening criteria would be exceeded at the axial welds in.1995; utilizing Cycle 8 flux reduc-tions, this would be extended to 2000. With flux reduction incorporated in Cycle 9 and beyond, the PT3 limit would be exceeded at the axial welds again, but not until about September, 2001. These predicted dates are far short of the assumed nominal plant operating license expiration date of Karch, 2011.While the flux reduction obtained in Cycles 8 and 9 substantially reduced the axial weld flux levels, the reduction is insufficient to remain within the PTS screening criteria through the minimia plant. life (nominal end of operating license). Some additional flux reduction will be possible through more aSgres-sive low-Leakage fuel management in Cycle 10 and beyond. However, in order to allow plant operation at least until the nominal license expiration date, additional PTS-addressing measures will have to be implemented (eg, Regulatory Guide 1.154 analysisi. vessel shielding, etc). Activities are currently under-way with the Combustion Engineering Owners' Group in the areas of additional vessel surveillance data and modet development for a Regulatory-Culde 1.154 analysis; initial conceptual discussions are underway with other vendors for incorporation of weld specific vessel shielding in Cycle 10.An ox-vessel dosimetry program was developed by Westinghouse and hardware installation was completed during the end of Cycle 7 refueling outage. This program would supplement the existing surveillance program. In addition to the ex-vessel program, Combustion Engineering will install an In-vessel dosimetry capsule at the W-290 capsuli holder vacated following Cycle S. These in-vessel and ex-vessel dosimetry programs will provide measured data for use in vessel wall and vessel, support fluence evalujitions. -U--*5 r7 W. .°7 Updates on vessel fluence levels and adjusted reference temperatures viii be provided to the NIC as actual operational data Including vessel dosimetry Information is obtained. In additionp developments in fuel managementt vessel materials information, vessel shielding and other PTSorelated areas that substantially impact the vessel lifetime vwil be reported as required in 1OCFR50.6l.- .-1., M104U90-OOSA-OP03 Ira*.~. ..'.* ~ .*'h -.a. .MP.a'" 3.0 HMEHODOLOCY

3.1 Overview

The pressure vessel fast neu.tron fluence level's (1)1.0 eV) were calculated utilizing available historical and predictive fuel cycle information. The primary analytical model was based on a two dimensional (RpO) discrete ordinates code DOT 4.3 representation (51 of the Palisades reactor vessel configuration. The representation includes a model of the core/vessel ecome-* try, the neutron source distributionp and nuclear Interactions as represented by cross section data. Measurement datiwas available for comparison from an analysis of radiometric dosimeters Irradiat'ed In the 11-290 vessel wall surveil-lance capsule 161, which was removed it the and of Cycle 5. The measured fast* neutron flux as calculated from the measured activities using reactor power history, dosimetry cross sections and basic nuclear data was used to compare the DOT calculated neutron fluxeslfor Cyclis I through 5.. Individual DOT calculations for remaining Cycles 6 through'.9 were also made. To-daee' fluence levels were calculated and end-of-Hise.fluenc' levels were extrapolated based upon anticipated capacity factors for the rmaining life of the Palisades Plant.3.2. Fuel Management S...7 Palisades followed a standard out-in fueling scheme through Cycle 7 (Figure 3.1). In this scheme, only fresh fuel wes placed around the core periphery,. This approach results in the maximum overall core neutron leakage and fast flux to the reactor.vessel, but minimizes power peaking and generally-* ." * *provides the greates*.theaL margin..Utilization of.the Resulatory"Cuid. 1499 Rev 2, reference temperatuke correla-.. ions for comparison to the l*0CES0.6*l TS screening-criteria determined that the axial welds would be responsible for limltinj the life of the Palisades reactor vessel. It was decided to alter thi fuel management strategy to' - .,.: :. ... ,... *

• S 9 distribute the power away from these critical weld' locations for Cycle 8 operation.

A low leakage loading pattern was adopted to improve the neutron economy and to reduce the fluence 'levels at the axial welds.A total of 16 thrice-burned stainless steel shielded assemblies were installed at the core periphery. In addition, eight twice burned assemblies were placed on the core periphery. The remaining 24 peripheral locations were filled'lith fresh fuel.assemblies (figure 3.2). With this arrangement, it was anticipated that the.reduced power.In the peripheral assemblies vouldreduce the primary source of.fast neutrons reaching the reactor vessel axial'velds. Design-of the Cycle 9 core is based upon 52 fresh, 60 once-, 76 twice-, and 16'thrice-burned fuel assemblies. All thrici brned'assemblies will have zircaloy;ý- clad hafnium rods placed in eight guide tube locations. These assemblies will be placed on the edge of-the core near critical weld locations (figure 3.3).Hafnium is an effective absorber primarily for neutrons in the thermal througtA epithermal energy ranges. It is anticipated that the power in these thrice-burned fuel assemblies will be greatly reduced alongwith the neucron source., Therefore# there will be fewer neutrons reaching the vessel at the critical weld locations.

3.3 Ceometry

The Palisades reactor exhibits one-eighth.(1/8) core symmetry, thus only a zero to 45 degree sector has been included ii the DOT model (Figure 3.4)0 In 'this figure two surveillance capsules attached to 'the Inner vessie vall are shown.A plan view of the Palisades .apsule arrIanjeint Li shown LnFg ure" 3.5, with specific surveillance capsules dimensions sihotmida Figure 3.6. "Flgure'3.ý5: shows that fourobf the:45 degree sectors do not have any capsules. Two other-* .: -, -' .... , ...1 7 sectors have one accelerated (attached to core support barrel).and one"wal capsule. The remaining two sectors have two ves'el-wall capsules at the 10"-'.and 20" locations.The utilized DOT model contains two vall capsuls a't the" 10" and 20 locations. This model utilizes 99 radial and 98 :azimuthal inter-vals for.a total of.9702.meshes in polar (.R O)geometry. 'Fine mesh detail. has been utilized asnecessary in setting up the .geoery.model-toaccurately represent the.reactor core, shroud, bypasi flow, core supportbarrel, inlet.... ..i0490.00 ..OP03...............""" ...;" ." ." 'I I tsio 10 flow, surveillance capsules# vessel clad and the vessel wall regions. A total of 15 outer assemblies have been modeled to represent the detailed core; the total model mesh extends to just outside the vessel In' the reactor cavity area.Various regions of the DOT model are represented in such a way that their volumes are close to that of the physical volumes of the reactor internals.

3.4 Material

Cross Sections The DOT model analysis employed a P3 expansion of the scattering cross see-tions. The microscopic cross sections used in the analysis were obtained from the SAILOR cross section library. Macroscopic cross sections were calculated for each region in the model using the computer code CIP. Plant specific material compositions and the corresponding atomic densities were used for this analysis.3.5 Neutron Source Assembly-wise radial power distributions were obtained from the Palisades incore monitoring system (INCA) for Cycles I through 71 fuel vendor-generated discrete PDQ bundle power data were used for Cycles 8 and 9. Average energy generated by fuel assemblies was obtained from the exposure data and the heavy metal weight of the assemblies to calculate cycle average assembly powers.Figures 3.7 through 3.15 exhibit the fifteen (15) outer peripheral normalized bundle powers for Cycles, I through 9. Cycle 8 actual assembly power data to date is adequately modeled by utilizing the predictive core simulator informa-tion. Local pin power distributions were derived from discrete PDQ model calculations. The local pin power distributions and the average assembly powers were combined to determine core normalized pin power distributions. Axial peaking was accounted for by applying the bundle specific axial peaking factors to the-normalized pin powers of the fifteen modeled fuel assemblies. This approach. conservatively. dafines the axial variation of the vessel incident neutron/source. Aial power information was obtained from INCA core mohitoring-data for Cycles 1 through 7 and 3D XTO core simulator models for Cycles 8 and 9. The core power distributions were Initially calcul'ated in Cartesian (xy)geometry from the original data sources. The Cartesian geometry was converted to a polar (R.e) geometry using an algorithm that maintained equivalent average source strength over the affected surface area between coordinate systems.* ' ..* " .... ..". " ..* ,*"" : '... , ." " ." " -.. : L . a 3.6 Burnup Corrections As the fuel starts to deplete in the core.-during plant operation, exposure of the individual fuel assemblies increases and a-build up of plutonium isotopes occurs. Plutonium isotopes have higher.u ,(neutrons/fission) and K (energy/fission) values and exhibit fission spectra shifted towards the higher energies (harder spectra) than uranium isotopes..:Thecontributions of the-Individual isotopes U235, U238, Pu239 and Pu2Al to the-core neutron source-have been* .accounted for in the present set of flux calculations. Since the fission spectra and effective neutron yield differs for'the above isotopes,. the core..neutron source and the vessel wall flux will generally increase with the fuel depletion for-given peripheral assembly power levels. This:is especially.. important for the twice and~thrice burned fuel at the core periphery for.Cycles 8 and 9. Composite fission spectra for each of Cycles I through.9 have there-.. fore been developed. Individual Isotopic fission-spectra were obtained from ENDF-B/V for the uranium and plutonium isotopes. The spectra were collapsed to 47 energy groups similar to the SAILOR'Library.[71. Theexposure dependent neutron source for each cycle was then determined by weighting. the individual group-wise neutron yields with the corresponding exposure dependent isotopic fission fractions based on the cycle average'exposure of five-peripheral assemblies. Only 19 groups abovel MeY have been employed in the DOT model for the fast fluxýcalcalations, Cycle 'specific flesion.spectra-are shown in Table 3.1 in comparlson with the SAILOR Libraryfission spectra. Fission spectra are normalized to'one (1) neutroa in the;47-groups, similar to the SAILOR Library.From Table 3.1, it can be noted that high energy neutron groups have higher yields for Cycles 8 and 9, compared to the previous seven cycles.In the DOT model, cycle-specifIc uIK ratios for fifteen (15) fuel assemblies were obtained from CASMO lattice depletion code data for a standard Palisades fuel type, utilizing -middle-of-cycle exposure-values. The effect-of neutron* yield and energy generated In these assemblies were incorporated in the neutron source. These effects are more Important on the fast flux at the reactor vessel for Cycles 8 and 9 as compared to previous Cycles I through 7.'- .HIO490-0055A-OP03 ." , " .,. * *-. *,' .*. -.* ...** ......'" "rgk". ' .' ' .. I III'* '*" " -" v' -.*.**~j4*~**12 ; ..;' " .~~~....... .. ...-;* -R+.r.-'.

• .. .. ..3.7 Neutron Transport Ana&l'ysis 4., The spatial distribution of neutron flux In -the reactor was calculated using the~ DOT 4.3 computer code. The DOT program solves the Saltzman transport equation in tvoý-dlmenuilonal geome~try us'Ing the method of discrete ordinates.

Thr odr cttrng(3And S8 Angular quadratures were used. The cycle-by-cycle 'neutron flux distribution's were calculated using the cycle-dependent neutron sources And material compositions... .3.8 Vessel Fluence Calculations

• . : Fluence levels of a given cycle were obtainedi by 'multiplying the flux at the clad-base metal interface by the effective ful power seconds at 2530 ?NT11 for.that cycle... Accumul-*ei fl'encv.u.at..tha'EOC.

"'.re:c a .ated..b-y. 'adding the fluence for All the Cycles I through So7 Further estrapoladii~on tend-of-life fluence is based upon.'t-ie timat'...hat.ths 'plant-w-1.eiate.at.75%."*, .capaciy a 8at.th" ca"cuated'fluencerate the -f" f h 'Cycle. 9-.. proposed core loading scheme*. " * -3.9 Fluence Limits/Reference Temperature Calculatios. .30'. Target fluence limits for' press i la vesel veds and bac semetal's are calculated using the eOCM5nsO.6correliation fotr uT'aln .the vesseld -material PTS screening criteria The reference tempnsu urature. corerlation Is given as::. .I + + ..* ... .* ........ .,.j" I e

• l O
• 7
• 3 OoIi) 0' 7..4'..*J~.9.....~* p.4 r.I,* J..s 41..I" Uneret RTp 7 3 is the adjusted reference temperature for pressurized thermal.shock cnuiderations

('F) 13 I is the initial reference temperature ('F)M is the margin term (F)Cu, N4i are the copper and nickel content (in weight percent), respectively f is the accumulated fluence (E>1.0 1eV)) in units -of 10 1 9 n/cm 2* The corresponding,*(luence limits are determined by solving the RT correlation" for the fluence values' Initial-reference temperature and chemistry information

• and corresponding .fluence limits are shown in Table 3.2.Target (luence'limits for. pressure vessel welds and base metals are also calculated using Regulatory Cuide.1.99, Rev 2 referenqe temperature correlation and the lOCFR50.61 P7T screening criteria..

The adjusted reference temperature for each material in the beltline is given ass ART .InitiAl RTNDT..* aTT. K Margin or ART I I

• NI4 ARTMDT where: &R~j~ .) 1(cf 0.2 6B 1 0 lot 'f)a I, H and f have the same meaning as above. -the chemistry" factfoi, CF ('F)depends on the content of copper and nickel in the.belt line This factor is provided In Regulatory Cuide-1.99, layv2. The correslpondin fluence limits are determined by solving the.IT correlation for the fluince value and are shown-in Table 3.3.For each. Cycles 1 through 9, fluence values were obtained for the base metal, and axial and circumferential weld materials.

Using the parameters of Table 3.3 and the accumulated fluence at the and of each cyclep the coriesponding adjusted reference temperatures were calculated. L..- ,04.T-- ý ---l .--.. -, -: .....-, ," ....". .' J2 4.0 RESULTS 4.1 Comparison to Measured'Data The W-290 surveillance capsule was removed at the end-of-Cycle 5 and was analyzed by Westinghouse (6). The measured average flux at the W-290 capsule was corrected for a discrepancy in the power Irridiation history data (Figure 4.1) versus that utilized In Reference

6. The corrected measured flux at the W-290 capsule was 6.73x101O n/cm 2-uec. DOT calculations for Cycles I through 5 provide a cycle-energy averaged flux at the W-290 locations of 7.02x1010 n/cm 2-sec (31, 4Z higher that the measured value. It was also noted that the lead factors obtained for Cycles I through S from DOT calculations were fairly constant (between 1.24-1.27).

These facts indicate that calculated flux values from the in-house DOT results can be directly used for reasonable end-of-life fluence calculations. It should be noted that these results are a slight improvement over the DOT calculations utilized in Reference 1, which exhibited a *1lZ bias relative to the measured W-290 fluxes.4.2 Flux/Fluence Distribution For Cycles I through 9, the maximum fast flux occurs at the azimuthal interval between 16'44"-17* at the clad-base metal interface (Table 4.1). Flux distri-butions for Cycles 3 through 7 are very similar. Comparison of flux distribu-tion between different cycles is presented in figures 4.2 and 4.3. These figures confirm that the maximum flux occurs around 17'. Wall capsules at 10*and 20" exhibit an attenuating effect In their immediate vicinities, but do not affect the peak fluxes. For Cycles I though 7, a second'peak occurs around the 32" azimuthal location. For Cycles 8 and 9p this peak is eliminated as a result of the implementation of low leakage fuel management schemes. Substan-.tial flux reduction for the low leakage fuel management schemes relative to the high neutron leakage loading patterns is apparent. Radial flux distributions-at the 0, 17 and 30 degree azimuthal locations for Cycles 7 (representative of previous cycles), 8 and 9 are presented in Appendix 7.1..mi0490-OO55a-opO3

t :

33 Accumulated fast, fluence distributions at the end of Cycle 9 and FOL at the clad-base metal -interface is shown in Figure 4.4. Based upon Reg. Cuide 1.99, Revision 2, fluence limits corresponding to base metal, axial, and circumferen-tiaL welds are-also presented in Figure 4.4. From this figure it. can be noted thatithe [luence values at-the axial welds at 0' and 30' are limiting the life of the Palisades reactor pressure vessel...Table 4.2 summarizes the cycle specific fluence (Q4) and accumulated fast fluence (10) at the clad-base metal interface for each of Cycles 1 through 9.For the selected azimuthal locations: 0' (axial weld location), 17" (maximium of peak at base metal), 30' (axial weld location) and 45', effective full power years (AEFPY) for each cycle and the accumulated EFPY's are also presented. Table 4.3 provides the fluence limit violation dates with Cycle 9 fluence rates for plant operations beyond the end of Cycle 8 date of September, 1990.4.3 Calculational Uncertainty A number of factors contribute to the uncertainty in the projected peak fast fluence at the reactor vessel wall. These factors are due to the conversion of measured activity data to fluxes, uncertainties in material composition, neutron-cross sections, power distributions, as-built core/vessel dimensicns and cycle-by-cycle variation in the fast flux lead factors. An uncertainty of.+/-25% is estimated in the calculated vessel wall fluence, typical of current neutron transport methodology uncertainties. The calculated

• 4% flux bias relative to actual W-290 measured fluxes indicates that vessel wall flux predictions are reasonable given the inherent uncertainty in the methodology.

4.4 Adjusted

Reference Temperaturas and Screening Limits Adjusted reference temperatures (ARTs) as a function of effective full power years (EFPYs) corresponding to the fluence values at the end of Cycle I through 9 and projected to plant EOL, have been plotted in Figure 4.5. PTS screening limits for each of the beitline materials are provided. This figure m10490-0055a-opO3 0 suggests that the axial welds are the Limiting material for the Palisades reactor pressure vessel relative to PTS limits. Table 4.4 provides the summary of PTS adjusted reference temperatures for base metal, axial and circumferen-Lial weld materials. Note that for the licensed end-of-life date of March, 2011, ARTs for the axial welds at 30 degrees exceed the PTS screening limit of 270"F.mi6490-OOS55-opO3 -o-45 5.0 DISCUSSION

5.1 Impact

of Results Modifications to the Cycles 8 and 9 loading patterns substantially reduce the'flux at the critical weld locations and delays exceeding thePTS screening criteria to about September 2001, as opposed to in 1995 if no flux'reduction measures are taken. The fLux reductionii insufficient, however, to allow operation of the plant within the PTS scr4ening criteria until the minimum expected plant life, corresponding to the expiration of the pending (ull term operating license in March, 2011.In-house flux calculations have a positive bias with respect to Westinghouse model (13,.mainly due to the slightly Larger core sizi in'the in-house mode'l.The bias ranges from .0.5 at 0' and Increases to about +11.7 at the 450 location. In additlon, more realiStici plant-specific design and operacional data have been utilized in the in-house model. This approach therefore does not depend very heavily on assumptions used for the flux calculations, but relies on the plant specific parameters. In order..to maximize vessel lifetime#"further measures must be isken in 'the areas of greater flux reduction,. Re Cuide 1.154'analysis'to properly define, the real Palisades PTS risk, ind'possible vessel annealins/shle1ldingactions 'to reduce the accumulated vessel .embrittlemsint rates 5.2 Additional Flux Reduction The most straightforward method of reducing the vessel fast flux level is reduction of the source itselfq which has been initially addressed with the incorporation of low-leakage fuel uanagement and stainless steel shield rods In Cycle Aand thrice burned fuel with hafnium absorbers for Cycle 9. While flux reduction gains are proedicedfor Cycle 9s some further reductions are believed to be obtainable viI fuefl mNagement 'alone, Cycle 9 iill be the first cycle with the new steam genersators installed. The new' enerators are expected to provide substantially higher prims coo0laint flow than'the'current generators. 46 The increased flow, which can be quantified accurately during Cycle 9 opera-tion, will provide additional core operating thermal margin and thus allow higher power peaking limits to be utilized in developing the Cycle 10 Loading pattern. The higher peaking will provide additional fuel management flexibility and support more aggressive low-leakage fuel management for further reductions in vessel wall fluxes.Additionally, Cycle 9 will be the first cycle to incorporate a new high thermal performance (HTP) spacer grid design in the fresh reload fuel. Insertion of a second reload of fuel with the HTP spacers in Cycle 10, along with development of a Palisades-specific DNB correlation for the HTP fuel, will provide addi-tional allowable peaking factor increases to be utilized in Cycle 10.A third area design to allow greater fuel management flexibility in the Cycle 10 core design will be the installation, utilization, and optimization of a new full core power monitoring system beginning in Cycle 9. This monitoring system will allow the Cycle 10 loading pattern design to utilize 1/4 core symmetry, as opposed to current 1/8 core symmetry utilized in Cycles 1-9t and will provide more options for reducing power and flux levels in peripheral fuel assemblies. Discussions have been held with NSSS vendors on the possibility of installing critical material irea neutron shields. A shield between the fuel and the vessel wall would act to reflect, slow down, or absorb high-energy neutrons before they could reach the vessel wall. Stainless steel shielding pads could be designed to mount near the core support barrel to maximize the attenuation of the high energy neutrons of concern. The possibility exists to use other hybrid materials which are better neutron shielding then stainless steel and therefore provide further neutron flux reduction beyond that attainable with low leakage fuel management alone. It is estimated that internal Vessel shielding could reduce the flux at the critical axial weld locations a minimum of 25Z.5.3 Refined Flux Measurement In order to benchmark vessel fluence calculationsp an upgraded vessel dosimetry program has been'initiated to supplement the existing surveillance capsule program. An ex-vessel, dosimetry program was developed by Westinghouse and hardware installation occurred during the and of Cycle 7 refueling outage. The H10490-005A-OP03 si .47 dosimetry installed will provide detailed azimuthal and' aiial mapping of the 270-360 degree vessel quadrant, with gradient chains installed in the other three quadrants to prov.ide accurate axial andcross-quadranLmappins. it is intended to exchange this dosimetry at the end of Cycle 8 with similar sets:of.dosimeters for the Cycle 9 irradiation period. The dosimetry will provide measured data for use in vessel wall and supports fluence evaluations. In addition to the ex-vessel program, Combustion Engineering has been contracted to fabricate and install a replacement In-vessel dosimetry capsule to be inserted into the W-290 capsule holder vacated following Cycle 5. installation will occur during the next refueling outage (Fall 1990). When installed, this capsule "vill provide an excellent through-wall correlation with the ex-vessel dosimetry installed in the same quadrant.In addition to implementing the supplemental dosimetry program, efforts will be made to extend the DOT model up to the reactor cavity area to analyze the ex-vessel dosimeters. A further enhancement planned to the DOT model will be to synthesize a 3-D model for flux calculations to remove some of the inherent conservatism in the calculations due to utilization of the bundle-specific peak axial power over the entire core axial height.5.4 Other PTS Activities Planned flux reduction measures do not appear to fully solve the vessel fluence issue relative tu rTS. Consumers Power Company is pursuing & methodology through the Combustion Engineering Owners Croup (CEOG) to augment plant data by correlating surveillance material and data from other plants to Palisades vessel materials. Such data could allow Palisades to reduce operating restric-tions caused by Regulatory Cuide 1.99, Rev 2/10CFR50.61 default margin terms and initial reference temperatures for generic weld material in absence of actual Charpy weld test specimen data.A detailed risk evaluation based on Regulatory Cuede 1.154 analysis is also being pursued through ClOG. Such analysis will identify and summarize the potential risk of a PTS event occurring. This risk would be based on the known H10490-0055A-0P03 48 operating activities. or transients uhich could lead to a PTS event. The program is being undertaken in a phased approach with the currently in-progress Phase I dealing with generic model development only. The analysis, if actually needed, would be completed at least three years prior to the predicted exceed date of the PTS screening criteria.H10490-0055A-0P03 o,'** .... b'9

6.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from R W Smedley (CPCo) to NRCp "Docket 50-255 -License DPR-20 -Palisades Plant -Compliance with Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule IOCFR5O.61 and Regulatory Culde 1.99 Revision 2 -Fluence Reduction Status (TAC No. 59970)," April 3, 1989.2. Letter from J C Hoebel (Westinghouse) to I A.Klavon (CPCo) "Interim Report of Westinghouse Review of Consumers Power PTS Calculations," August 29, 1989.3. Engineering "Analysis Package for PTS study, Reactor Engineering Depart-ment, Palisades Plant (1987-90).

4. Letter from K W Berry to MRC, "Response to Request for Additional Informa-tion -Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTB) Rule IOCFR50,61," August 7, 1986.5. RSIC Computer Code Collection DOT IV Version 4.3 (Report No, CC-429).6. WCAP -10637, Analysis of Capsules T-330 and W-290 from the Consumers Power Company Palisades Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program, M K Kunka and C A Cheneyp September#

1984.7. RSIC Library Collection SAILOR DLC-76.8. Telecopy of E.P. Lipincott (Westinghouse) to O.P. Jolly (CPCo), "Final Report on Westinghouse Review of Consumers Power PTS Calculations," April 209 1990.I H10490-0055A-0P03 EXHIBIT I J UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION WASHINGTON, D.C..20555-0001 May 19, 1995 NRC GENERIC LETTER 92-01, REVISION 1, SUPPLEMENT 1: REACTOR VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY Addressees All holders of operating licenses (except those licenses that have been amended to possession-only status) or construction permits for nuclear power reactors.Purpose The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is.issuing this supplement to Generic Letter (GL) 92-01, Revision 1, to requiie that all addressees identify, collect and report any new data pertinent to analysis of stiuctural'integrity of their reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) and to assess the impact of that data On their RPV integrity analyses relative to the requirements of Section 50.60 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50,60), 10 CFR 50.61, Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50, (which encompass pressurized thermal shock (PTS) and upper shelf energy (USE) evaluations) and any potential impact on low temperature overpressure (LTOP) limits or pressure-temperature (P-T) limits.Background The staff issued GL 92-01, Revision 1 "Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity," on March 6, 1992, to obtain information necessary.to assess compliance with requirements regarding RPV integrity in view of ceiftain cnceins raised in its review of RPV integrity for the Yankee Nuclear Power'Statibfi.'All licensees submitted the information requested by July 2, 1992. Following receipt and review of.licensee supplements responding to requests for additional information, the stdff completed itsrieview of licensee responses to GL 92-01, Revision 1, in the fall of 1994. Thi'staff issued NUREG 1511, "Reactor Vessel Status Report," summarizing keyaspeets ihe'.work in December 1994 [Ref. 1].The staff has recently revie.ed data relevaint to the PTS evaluations of several plants.These reviews showed that licensees may not have considered all pertinent data in their responses to GL 92-01, Revision 1, or in their RPV integrity evaluations. It has now become apparent to the staff that no single organization has all the data relevant to RPV integrity evaluations. A major complicating element in this regard is that proprietary considerati(ns have inhibited effective sharing of information. It has been demonstrated that some RPV integrity evaluations are very sensitive to consideration of new data. For example, under certain conditions, changing the mean copper content for the limiting vessel beltline material by a few hundredths weight percent can change the predicted date for reaching the PTS screening criteria of 10 CFR 50.61 by several years. In addition, changes in estimates of mean copper content can affect the validity of PTS evaluations based on surveillance data. The staff will be considering the impact of these findings in plant-specific evaluations and in its longer-term reassessment of 10 CFR 50.61. PTS is a concern only for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) because boiling water reactors (BWRs) operate with a large inventory of water at saturated steam conditions and, therefore, are not subject to PTS.However, in addition to concerns regarding PTS evaluations, consideration of additional, unreviewed RPV data can also affect evaluations for USE, P-T limits, and LTOP limits.These evaluations pertain to both PWRs and BWRs, except for LTOP limits, which apply only to PWRs. The staff recognizes that addressees have previously submitted data pertinent to these evaluations as required by the regulations and in responses to GL 92-01, Revision 1, and QL 88-11.Based on currently available information, the staff believes that the near- term focus for RPV integrity will be the Palisades RPV which is predicted to reach the PTS screening criteria by late 1999, before any other plant. However, because of the importance of RPV integrity and the potential impact of additional, unreviewed data on existing RPV evaluations, the staff believes that this issue needs to be resolved on an expedited basis.Although the issues raised in this GL supplement were highlighted by concerns pertaining to PTS analyses, licensees should consider the effect of the reexamination of RPV data on all aspects of RPV structural integrity. Regulatory Requirements As required by 10 CFR 50.60(a), licensees for all light water nuclear power reactors must meet fracture toughness requirements and maintain a material surveillance program for the reactor coolant pressure boundary. These requirements are set forth in Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50. 10 CFR 50.60(b) provides that proposed alternatives to the requirements of Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50 may be used when an exemption is granted under 10 CFR 50.12. 10 CFR 50.61 provides fracture toughness requirements for protecting PWRs against PTS events. Licensees and permit holders have also made commitments in response to GL 88-1l, "NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and Its Impact on Plant Operations," to use the methodology in Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials," to predict the effects of irradiation as required by Paragraph V.A of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50.Discussion The staff focused its examination of the GL 92-01, Revision 1, data and other docketed below or the appropriate NRR project manager./s/'d by RPZimmerman Roy P. Zimmerman Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical contacts: Edwin M. Hackett (301) 415-2751 Keith R. Wichman (301) 415-2757 Lead project manager: Daniel G. McDonald (301) 415-1408 Attachments:

1. References

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Generic Letters (NUDOCS Accession Number 9505090312)

ATTACHMENT 1 GL 92-01, Rev. 1, Supp.May 19, 1995 References [1] NUREG-I 51 , "Reactor Pressure Vessel Status Report," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, December, 1994.[2] Letter from Elinor Adensam, USNRC, to Kurt Haas, Consumers Power Company forwarding, "Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to the Evaluation of the Pressurized Thermal Shock Screening Criteria, Consumers Power Company, Palisades Plant, Docket No. 50-255", April 12, 1995. lip" oEXHIBIT I K October 28, 1994 POLICY ISSUE SECY-94-267 (Information) FOR: The Commissioners FROM: James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

STATUS OF REACTOR PRESSURE-VESSEL ISSUES PURPOSE: To provide an update of the status of plants with'regardtoA"pendix.G,"Fracture Toughness Requirements," to Part 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) and 10 CFR 50.61, "Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events." BACKGROUND:. In SECY-93-048, the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) stated that it was performing detailed reviews of licensee'responses to Generic Letter (GL) 92-01, "Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity,.10 CFR 50.54(f)." As part of this review, the staff has assessed the.upper-shelfenergies (USEs), transition temperatures, and reference temperature for pressurized thermal shock RT(p P) or adjusted reference temperatures (ARTs) for'all domestic commerciaY nuclear power plants. Appendix Gto 1O0CFR Part 50 requires licensees (1) to operate their reactor vessels with pressure-temperature limits that are dependenton the amount' of indrease.in the transition temperature resulting from neutron radiation, and' (2) to maintain the Charpy USE throughout the life of the vessel of no less than 41 Joules (50 ft-lb), unless it is demonstrated that lower values of USE will provide margins of safety against fracture equivalent to those required by Appendix G of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler. and,Pressure Vessel Codes (ASME) Code-. The analyses submitted by licensees to"demonstrate margins of safety equivalent to thoserequired-by Appendix G of the ASME Code are called equivalent margins analyses. '7he increase in the transition temperatures affects the RT, values for pressurized water reactors (PWRs)that are calculated in accorJance with-10 CFR-50.61 and the ART that is calculated in'determining the pressure-temperature limits for. both PWRs and boiling water reactors (BWRs). : *NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE IN 10 WORKING DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS PAPER Contact: B. Elliot, NRR/DE/EMCB 504-2709 Plant Name: Palisades Docket Number: 50-255 NSSS Vendor: Combustion Engineering Vessel Manufacturer: Combustion Engineering Edition of ASME Code for Design: Winter 1965 Addenda to 1965 ASME Code Date of Commercial Operation: December 31, 1971 Date of License Expiration: March 14, 2007 RTpt, for the Limiting Beltline Material: Limiting Beltline Material: Axial welds, heat W5214 10 Fluence at EOL: 1.gIEIg n/cm 2 Initial RTT: -56F Method of Determining Chemistry Factor: Chemistry data per Paragraph C.1.1 of RG 1.99, Rev. 2 Increase in RTNoT at EOL: 265"F Margin: 66 F RT at EOL: 275"F Dafes at which PTS Screening Limit will be exceeded: 2004 USE for the Limiting Beltline Material: Limiting Beltline Material: Plate 0-3804-1, heat C-1308 1/4T Fluence at EOL: 1.615E19 n/cm 2 Initial USE: 72 ft-lb Percent Drop at EOL: 31%USE at EOL: 50 ft-lb Date USE Screening Limit will be Exceeded: After EOL Bases for Accepting the USE at EOL: Chemistry data per Paragraph C.1.2"of RG 1.99, Rev. 2

REFERENCES:

July 3, 1992, letter from G. B. Slade (CPCo) to USNRC Document Control Desk,

Subject:

Palisades Plant--Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity-- Response to Generic Letter 92-01, Revision 1 February 23, 1994, letter from D.W. Rogers (CPCo) to USNRC August 31, 1990, letter from G.B. Slade (CPCo) to USNRC July 12, 1994, letter from A. Hsia (NRC) to CPCo EXHIBIT 1 L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Items of Interest-Week Ending November 4, 1994 SECY-94-267, "Status of Reactor Pressure Vessel Issues" In Commission Paper SECY-94-267, "Status of Reactor Pressure Vessel Issues," the staff indicated that the Palisades reactor pressure vessel would reach the pressurized thermal shock (PTS) screening criteria in the year 2004. We also indicated that the licensee was gathering additional materials properties data from its retired steam generators (the welds in the retired steam generators were fabricated using the same materials as used in the fabrication of the limiting Palisades reactor vessel beltline welds) and the results of these tests could change the date when the plant-wi-1 -ch-the.-PTS...screening During telephone conversations.with the licensee on November I and 2, 1994',-., the staffwas informed of preliminary data from the retired steam generators that indicates the Palisades reactor pressure vessel could reach the PTS-screening criteria earlier than 2004. The licensee is continuing to evaluate the new data 'and to gather additional materials properties from its retired steam generators. If the preliminary data are confirmed, the plant would reach the"PTS..screening criteria at the next outage in May 1995.,,.A meeting between the staff and the licensee has been tentatively scheduldd'fo. .November 18, 1994, to discuss the test results. EXHiIBIT I Mi MATERIALS ISSUES IN PALISADES PTS EVALUATION PRESENTED TO NSRRC SUBCOMMITTEE ON MATERIALS AND ENGINEERING January 24., 1995 IMichael E. Mayfield, Chief Electrical, Materials and Mechanical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering Technology, RES U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.64 ~6~ SAA~'A~bk~1~.C- (-.S INTRODUCTION

• Materials Research Program Providing Direct Support to NRR on Current Regulatory Issues, Including o Palisades PTS Evaluation o BWR Core Shroud Cracking* Both Issues Have Generic Implications o Research Program Adjusted to Address Those Implications
• Presentations Will Summarize the Issues and the Research Programs 1 BACKGROUND

-- PALISADES PTS EVALUATION

• 10 CFR 50.61 Fracture toughness requirements for protection against pressureized thermal shock events o Includes embrittlement screening criteria -- RTprs-270°F for axial welds and plates-300'F for circumferential welds o If 'criteria are to be exceeded, flux reduction and plant specific analyses may be:required RTs =- + M + ARTis I ' 'Initial reference temperature (RTNDT) of the unirradiated material S M'easured values must be used if available.If plani specific v*6lues not'available, generic mean must be used M" Margin to coveIr uncertainties

'ARTpTs = Mean Value of shift in reference temperature due to neutron irradiation A function of fluence, and chemical composition (copper and nickel)2 PALISADES PTS* Palisades surveillance data not same as beltline weld material-Requires use of industry generic data* Licensee took actions to provide representative data-Gathered additional material properties from welds in retired steam generators -Instituted an augmented surveillance program-Evaluated annealing of the reactor vessel-Considered instituting an "ultra low" leakage fuel strategy &*4 (w/0 Staff SER dated July 12, 1994 and NUREG-1 511 Palisades vessel projected to reach PTS screening criteria in 2004 -- prior to EOL in 2007 Noted that evaluation could change based on information from SG welds 3 6' DIA.6' DIA.4 PALISADES PTS* November 1, 1994, licensee informed staff that data from SG welds-Indicated higher copper contents than previously assumed Indicated higher initial RTMDT than mean generic value-Licensee assessment indicated reaching PTS screening criteria in 1999* Staff's assessment on-going-Depending on how the new data are evaluated, PTS screening criteria could be reached before 1999 S C P, 62Z--1* RES providing support to NRR in resolving issues raised by licensee-Thermal embrittlement of SG welds cause of higher initial RTNDT-Averaging of chemistry values-Effects of post-weld heat treatments on physical properties -Statistical analyses )f chemistry and initial property data 5 RESEARCH EFFORT ON PALISADES ISSUES RES staff and contractors involved in providing independent assessment of data and analysis methods O* Thermal Embrittlement -Literature survey-Evaluation of data from Power Reactor Embrittlement Data Base-Evaluation of mechanisms of thermal embrittlement -Combined effects of thermal aging and neutron flux-Examination of mechanical properties data related to Palisades-Drop-Weight Specimen fabrication techniques

• Chemical Composition

-Analysis of generic data-~Fabrication techniques -- single arc versus tandem arc-Data weighting-Coil-weighted averaging-Recommendations on data treatment 6 THERMAL EMBRITTLEMENT e Palisades SG RTNOT tests indicate an initial value of -20°F compared to generic mean of -56 0 F-Cited thermal embrittlement as likely cause-10 EFPY at approximately 5001F-Presented results from Belgian paper -- suggests 70TF shifts possible-Inconsistent with "common wisdon"-RES effort to look at available data and known mechanisms

• Literature survey* Review of PR-EDB o Evaluation of Belgian data 7 BASE METAL 0 I.I-.C3 125 ISO 100 75 -50 25 25-50 lot A2128, A3028 I PENSE A,50 2 POTAPOVS 12 DEVAN 3 SERPAN 2 13.14,15 D 4 SERPAN 1 16 KUSSHA 5 STEELE 6 LOWE 713 7 5 RUCE '855 UL 80 60 40 L)2 D 20 0 A5338 0 7 HASEGAWA 14 12 18 LOWE2 9 DRUCE '86 t0 10 DEVAN 9 11I PENSE , i ill~ l , , , ,ll~ i , , Il l~l I t 1 ,,Ill1 0-20 1 I I 2III I _ I I I I II J......... ....... , I I I I II ... ......... ..102 10 104 AGING TIME (h)106 1 0 8 WELD METALS 150 126 too 75 2" 50 I-02.25 I1111111 1 1 1111111 1 1 1 111111 , ~ ~ ~ I I!!I SERPAN Ij 2 LOWE 3 ORUCE '85 4 KUSSMAUt.6.6 DEYAH 7 GERARD 2L)*'8.9 SERVER- pAI 70-109 30 04 06-02 so I I11111 I 11111 I III 111 I I111111 LA I I Ill, 80 70 6o 60 40 30 20 I0 0-10-20 U 0 I-I-02 01--25 "-50 I0 Il 102 AGI1G TIME (h)105 t0o 10 Plot of Residual vs. Effective Full Power Year for Weld Materials per 177 Data Points (U U'a, so 60 40 20 0-20-40-60 0 00 0 oP 0 0 0% .0 00 0Go 00 0 00 CO 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 a UUT I I I 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 EFPY [year]7 a 9 10 11 PLot of Residual vs. Effective Full Power Year for Weld Materials per PR-EDB 240 200 0 160 120 0 aoo 40 of 0 D a 0 0 0 80 S0 o 0 0 Q--00 0 0 $"" 0._00 00 00 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 EFPY [year]12 DOEL I UNIRRADIATED CONTROLS AGED VS UNAGED 160 140 120 t00 3 (D I~i z LaJ 80 60'40 -20 0 L-fSO-1O0 -50 0 50 100 ISO 200 TEMPERATURE (0C) ..13 CONCLUSIONS ON THERMAL EMBRITTLEMENT
• Thermal embrittlement not likely source of higher RTNDT* Statistical variablity more likely--20'F value is within +2a of generic mean 14 PALISADES CHEMICAL COMPOSITION ISSUE* Key issue is how to weight new data from SG welds* Several proposals are being considered 0 Cannot provide more details until staff discussions are completed and SER issued 15 CHEMISTRY CONTENT ISSUES* Palisades SG data a Weld fabrication procedure* Six different coils used in fabricating welds* How does chemical variability relate to wire coil composition

-Statistical treatment of data 16 RESULTS FROM MIDLAND UNIT 1 RPV' " ';"' 1 17 Z W X ORNL-DWG 92-i-823A y z BLOC)( IDENT.AND LOCATION 1 7 1-8 1-9 110 1-1 ---- 1 I.0. TRAVEL (6-BLOCKS) 19 I U OVERALL COPPER CONTENT IN MIDLAND WELDS SHOWS WIDE VARIATION REGION Beltline.SECTION 9 11 13 15 31 34 COPPER (WT %)0.22 to 0.34 0.16 to 0.34 0.21 to 0.32 0.22 to 0.33 0.37 to 0.46 0.38 to 0.42 Nozile ,W LL Clrv Z-ý c:cx, 61-od-20 RESEARCH PLAN TO ADDRESS THE GENERIC ISSUES* Evaluating the effects material chemistry and radiation environment on irradiation embrittlement of RPV steels o Examine samples from two representative RPV welds at ORNL o Examine samples of thermally aged samples from retired SG shells o Evaluate variability in chemistry and mechanical properties both along the weld and through the thickness o Develop generic guidance on estimating chemistry and properties variability

• Evaluate the combined effects of thermal aging and neutron irradiation o Thorough assessment of technical literature o Review and assessment of foreign positions on thermal aging o Detailed metallurgical assessment of thermally aged materials o Evaluate thermal aging, heat treatments, and flux effects on neutron embrittlement 21 SCHEDULE FY 0 0.0 0* FY 0 0 FY 0 0 1995 Determine the variability of chemistry in representative RPV welds Assessment of technical literature and foreign positions on thermal aging Initiate metallurgical assessment of thermally aged materials Continue irradiations of RPV materials 1996 Complete report on irradiation effects on old-fabrication practice plate material Establish generic guidance for estimating material chemistry and properties variability 1997 Complete report on irradiation effects in the Midland weld Complete determination of effects of thermal aging on RPV materials from SGs 22

SUMMARY

• PTS continues to be a significant issue for PWRs* Palisades PTS evaluation highlights uncertainty in initial properties and in embrittlement estimates* Research program addressing the key factors 23 EXHIBIT 2 A NUREG/CR-2907 BNL--NUREG--51581 Vol. 14 Mrnýadioactive Materials Reletased rom Nuclear Power Plants.1. .0 , nnual Report 1993'I...............................a.pared by lichler, K. Doty, K. Lucadamo r.." 1 ..ookhaven National Laboratory epared for 1. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

-:.. .:...... '....: a r -,~ *0-~.~9601290279 951231-CR-2907R D e)- Cf-)fd (,if

1.0 Introducrion

1.1 Prpo This report, prepared annually for the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. presents measured data on radioactive materials in effluenrts released from licensed commercial reactor power plants. These data were reported by licensees for plant operations during 1993.This information supplements earlier annual reports issued by the former Atomic Energy Commission and Nuclear Regulatory Commission.' 1.2 Scpc Releases of radioactive materials are governed by 10 CFR Part 20 and 50 and by limits established in the Technical Specificatioris for each facility. The requirement for reporting effluent releases by nuclear power plant operators Is described in 10 CFR 50.36a. Through its Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission maintains a knowledge of radioactive releases from licensed nuclear reactors to ensure that they are within regulatory requirements. This report summarizes data from the licensed nuclear power plants that were declared by the utilities to be in commercial operation as of December 31. 1993.Data are included for several licensed facilities which are permanently or indefinitely shut down (Browns Ferry I & 3. Brunswick

1. Dresden 1, Fort St. Vrain. Humboldt Bay. Indian Point 1. LaCrosse, Rancho Seco 1. San Onofre 1. Three Mile Island 2. Trojan 1. Yankee Rowe 1)and Shoreham which was never in commercial operation.

1.3 Soure

ofDa The information included in this report was obtained from data reported by the licensees. Individual licensee reports are available in the NRC Public Document Room. Gelman Building. 2120 L Street, Washington. D.C. 20555 and in local Public Document Rooms located near each licensed facility. Licensee reports varied in the format and extent of information provided.Data from prior years used in the comparison tables were obtained from the previous annual summaries.

2.0 Tabulated

2Data 2.1 Airborne and Liquid Effluents Tables I through 4 list for each reactor, the measured quantities of total noble gases and of 1- 131 and particulates (with half lives greater than 8 days) released in effluents to the atmosphere during each of the years 1974 through 1993. Tables 5 and 6 list the total measured quantities of tritium released In liquid effluents in each of the years. Tables 7 and 8 list the mixed fission and activation products not including noble gases. tritium and alpha released in liquid effluents in each of the years.Previous reports In this series are listed on page ii and iil. ?3k" 6 f Illm1--- r zP BT --Pr--I.IOTA I7 1479 107 -I Art=-.za C-29 I Azrnsas One 2 8s2averI1I 1=2 BZ2wcd I BraidI'ood 3yroz I=Cala 1.6=Iwba I C=+/-W= 2 com mncbc Pmk I.Doi6a d- 66kI 1=ay-12l Rrr-' 3 13zISBe~se I DabloCý I=2 Josph &L Fsxley I Joseph U. Faricy2 Fcn Ca~hourt I.lzmaitn Pamz M*2 MCGIat I mlfsumt 3 North Aza M*2 Ocmmee M& 3 P21 Veide I Palo Vere 2 Palo Vere'Prmeaglazid 1&2 Rab 5= I* H. a. pzblwsz2 SI2 SanODuf I S=~ Onafr 2-3 Scqiaoyuh 18a* South TC=$St. LudIg I 5L Uscý2 Sury ia Thx= MIle 1-1-4 2 1man.51 4.S0EvP02 2.IZZ. -, 2^40SE+2 2.SAE-=2 1.=-*C2 2.12E.02 4.42Z.O2!- 7E,01 2J89E*O- 2.44E.,2 11.60S.CO 1.OE#02 3.49Ee02-9.597--6 3ME8Z.1 1.4O-A.2.W6*(= ^-74E-= -5.7SE.M 4.96-&+,= S14ECr- 4.9 IE.G2' 1.OOE.O3 5.64E+01 I a2E4O 2.8GE*4I 6.24E.02 1=+0 -.7=4r S. IIMýLW.06.21 1.54E.O 1.X.O2 1.9SW.O 2.71K.1*9SE5*O2 2.SOS=- 2.M..0 1.9~O -242. CS,+ 1.7 2-"4E-0O3 5XE( 4ASZ.3 .6.67E+03 3-94Z,03 34W.- 3M+ 5.29E.W 4.79E-01 7.94E+01 3.i2E*- -3..71E.a2 %..1=-4= .7E. 2.7SE.2 '2.41t.(Sha.w Wit Other Un2 12.3G 1. 1S44 4-T7E-kr 'G.42E-.n 9.24E+0O1 2.77E02 '. AM+02 2-5+2 2J46LF-2.3.0 2JE 2.19E-02 1.r/E.0( 3.6-M.& LS3E*. 3.1=#E.(U

2. 18.ý 2. 16E'02ISM 2~C6~.c2 1:09E.'02 I.9E4.~ 2.38E.02 1.84E.~2 4.6OE.~433E.03 7.56~L23E..03 8.8S~'O2 1.~2r.o2 1.99E*02 S.63z4o1..

1.14E*~3-1E*C- 4.12ZEO2 3MSE.02.. 3.17E*=3.D8E-M0 34ME.Wn 4.OSE.03' 3-0OE.W 1.72E.- 343 0 1JSE.02 2.87540 I.Sa05*02 1.499+0M 1.495402 S.105.*0 4.36E.O01 9.6.2E+00 5.585*01 8. A.0 8.5502 6-94E+02. 9-"E+=0 1.42S.02 4.54F-01 1.005-01 1350 4.495*02 N/D a 4555-0 4.D0E-02 2-%.96*0 3.815*4 4.005*03 =.39443 -.715403'551E*02 6.2:.0 NIV N/D 4.46E-= .7.247#M.2.M5*0 2-=+3 7.12r,+=7.625*012 1.47E-02;N/R 3.715*02 i .M 5.715*02 1.615*0 5.7*2 3.545*02 1.26.0.2.3*2 1.795.-0 2.Sz*'M 8.2*2 5.025*( 5-39E*02&.62E.(= 6.005*02 SAM0*=a.335*0 6.465*01 7.43E-01 1.885*2 9.515*01 2.405-02 4.935*0 7.22-40 2.O8E.0&.42E.(= 5.255*02 2.2.5.2.97502 5.4!E*02-1.575*01&.92--.w 2-U.38*0 1=33401 2.42S*02 1.285*0 .28502 .75U2 323*2 .150-*~ ..1S5-01 24 4.425+= 7.82C*0 4.08E+02 7.47E*02 3.575*W. .2.255.02 531FEO2 9.105*03.1.O.2 4.83E*C-2 1.99E+0 1.92*02 *1.5SE.0 349*1 25.+01 7.11E-00 3.9 15.0 3JzE401 7.851 6.105-04 S.- S- M.85 N/ -ef/VD N/D 3.050 315*2 1.59E*03 6.6M5*01 L24E*02 1.035*02 2.005*02 3.465*02 3.775401l 3.75-cZ04. NID=24.345.0 NIR- Not P;cgc NID Not D~acc3be Lup T- -* 2TY'7r 1004 , 1101 .L2!a 1=3 L3 I= op IfI 122-1 100 C" iC0I Az1rlmrIM O= I Azrz1Saa One 2 Bea VauI:y Ila Brackood I B3i-khdmid 2 a~y= I a Cakc~wor 1&Catzwta 2.C.7stmJ Rtavu3 JascP.?. L Farley I jcscp~i M.L Fancy 2 Fan Calhours I P- F-GInm. -kddam f~ci Ingliza Point M2 Indbn Point 3 MCGLUM I Nhfflstarie 3 Northi AW.a I=Ocolies 12a 3 pall aes P41 Ver~tde I PalO vcr a PalO Verde 3 P= B~each la P:=sWuJad Ian H. E b.bia 2 Sal= I Sal=i 2 am Ord&- I 22n Onofra 2-3 South T'~s I Sauri, To= 2.St. La.u I St. Lucie 2 sumw I 7br-Nc M sie d 2 Thr h1E islad 3.09t*4=IMEO-02 2.O6!.(= 5.72E,<M 2.B1Z.02 1.37Mý3 4.20E-02 1.402-1.07z.oa 4.13E+02 3.56-.0 2.35E.CM 4.SS-.<=&.66r.O3 1.14Z.O3 1.79E"0O2 (.74+401 4.28E-a2 5.02z.Oa 1.67E-02.4. 12F-01 44r- 4.4SE.M 7.ZS!,. 7=#840 I.18Z402 3.64SC.02 1.19.c2 3.644<102 6 1.97F.03.Z.CSFE+01 2.44SE.0 d.98E402 8SIE432 7.14E.c2 e-37..02 a..'"E # C &cSE.02 1.94F.02 2.22Ei'3.57E#(M 3.649.=2S8.03 3.17t.03 2.48E-=2 1632.2 Z*=o S.67Z*= 3.40E*02 2.ZOZ+02 2.&IE..0 2.67-.02 2.4.&E42 4.40E.02 5 "20 4-09E-02 8.312E-k 4.912..02 2.74E+02 5.UE*02 8.502.0 2.44-M20 5.582-02 6.50E.=2 I.GIE.O3 IME2-03 9.9&,2.=8.932E42 S.M9.= .220 8.242.-= 2.3EE+0 7M2E.01 3M.532-. 4.45E.4= 2.972-.02 3.=32-02 4AW.45. 2.97Ek02 1. md-02 1.I02.03 8.74E44= 2.582-03 S.11E+02 3.44E.*0 5.10E.02.3.S0E-01 2.39E4=2 1..t72.02 4.23E.02 9=35*= 9.e882*0 S.16E-02 6.992-02 7.352-.02 7.53E.02 8.082*02 &72-4.02 2.332-02 1.2820 1.74E*02 3.47-E02 3.92v2*4M =3.21-0.182.03 4.812-03 9.89E.CM 4.852*02 3.432*02-3.4.32.02 1.432*03 3.23-0E+2 1.582*03 4.49E.CM 3.262-0 1.0M-+03 4.71Z*0=3.53E.=2 1.772*0 3.762-.02 4.832-03 2.=.220&.45E.=2 S.382*42 4.342i.0 3.892*42 4.39E-02 432.s42a 3.04E*02 M/D N/fl MiD 7.37E*a2 5582*42 9.34"-1 1.38844=2.22E-0= 3Z12*02 S.872-02 3.40E-=2 4.402*02.1.722*02 3.232*02 6.20r.+=S.282-03 3.732*02 2.94F,.= 3.512*02 1.84E-02 3ZO.30- 1.182*0 4.022*0 4.582*0 4.922102 4.=+202 4.5824.0 4.9-"Z+02 1.662*02 -2202*01 2.56E;42 5.412*02 i.90E.02 1.489403 1 -%*C*03 83&.36-1.24E.03 1.342*03 2.49C-0=4.282*02 8.32+01 I.192*02 RID' NHID H/D HID N/fl HID 4.392*2 '5.l602*0 5.732-02 3.512-02 3=.2202 Mi.=1-0 2.912-02 4.322-0&sm2-02 4.232c02 S.292-2 4.232*02 2.59t-0= 3.562*02 SAM72*= &97E-0=.1.94F,643 1.GE4003 7. 102.02 I.022.0 2.32-9 024 206201 N/I3 WD X

• HIDl NiD HIDl&.44E902 3.79E4=2 2.439.0M 4.=4=+0 4.5=+02 5.282+0 7.74E4=2 I. M#+03 HID 3.3w.;=2 I-TTE-01~3.5302 5.=-(M0 4.S1E.02 2.98E-=2 3.08E.02 4252*02- 5.529;CM 9.8-2 8.052.4m 1.1*3 2.06E-4=1.7",E-03 8-6E.36-3.882*2 .13.0 322.8&+2 4.132-02 8.112*02 5.042-cl 4.232*2 8.0 32.02 3.B4E*02 549.89 M 3.802*0 1.8 12.0 I.222*0 1.03E.03 6.182-01 9.=.<a0 7.0*2 8.85E2*02 2.132-02 1.77E-0=8.632*02 COO.=00 9.012Z* 5.3r.4.50Z-=2 ".Ci-0 2.302*02 2.%5E#(=*2.17E2-02 2.722*02 4 Z 06. 3.882-02 4.332-0 3.882*02 1.CSS*82 3=.=3.0 3.962*02 5.162+02 9.232*02 6.932-0 9.98*M01 1.102,4A3 8.092*01l 2.102-*a*HID N10 N/ln M/fl N/fl H/fl 4.162-02 4.642*02 4.722*02 4.BG2-0 2.42E401 7.44E.40 3.94E-02 8A.48-0*2.4=+*02 3A=32*0 2.5*2 5.0min0 3.002+01 4520 9.89E-02 9.7W,=0 2.I02-03 a&OSE+0 6.41E+02 a8.382*82 2.972-02M S.00*401 1.34E-01 3.092*02 331=40m 9.212+02 3.082*02 1.77E.02 3439"*1 2.38E*W 4.=.,(= 4.7, SE+=1.35W,04 2.22E-03 HIDl 1.873+02 2.852*02 5.112*02.6.702*02 4.102*02 4.!532*02 7.09EA02 327E.02 3.59EC0=4.49E4=2 4.059*02 4.642*02 I.83201 LAM=+0 7.292*0 2.i42*0 5i.382-02 3.642-0 3.792*02 6-%.+M* 6.09c-01 6.6UM0 3.882-02 1112*42 2.272-03 1.2-&=3 'S.822*0 8=.=0*0 643c-2 .02m 3.53E402*

-6.082*0 3.C3E4= 4.422E02 1.422*31520 9.272*01a 1.082*0 I ..303 1.132.02 3.86_-02 S.oI402 2.48.*=, 1.1922 2.02.IZ.<U 1.1 03 8.532+02 1.eEE203 1.44.-43 3.9*2 3.17E*-02 3.452-02 6.215*02 6.122-42 2302.,. 4.7,-oE. 4.6E=83, 7.42E*M 2.7 M -WEMl2.75P.+M 4052.02 2.842-02 4.082*02= 4.002.4=2.782.,2 .3=E+02 2.7=2-C2 4.0-M2*02 2.84E.<2 4.062*02 4.0=0202 3.7=4M 73.62-. 7.-.52-2 .4.320 8.132*02 6.082*02&7"2*02 8.15E24 W 4.94E+02 1.11*-03 9.13,=-, 9.74E-141.97c'4= 3.7=+.=2 2.10-0E2 3-29,*2 5.612E+-1.00-3 1.48.-03 5.492-03 9.76Z406 8.30.-04 6.19E2.3 3.53-4,3 2.43E+02 1.732*0 3.7m.=0 3.122*02 2.192-02 I.s92*02 1.92-0 5.832*02 5.802*02 1.132*02 1.132*02 2.182-02 2.532*02 4.732.01 1332.03 2282*02 1332.02-Incuddwt Thm Wite W-An 2 tota M/D ; riot Dete:salbL Table 6 UqLiqonct i~cmapmh By yew kinud 1tdo =4dAc6dyud PeudUca :(C=Ii Pressurize Water Reactors Ei=1UL ia~ ~2Z5 i~Z5 iSfl J~za 122D I=8 12M2 Arkaruias One I Arkansaas One 2 Ecavw--Valley 1 h2 Braittwood I Bradwood 2 Byron Ida Calla.By* i Calven C Mf 182 Ca~utawb Catawba 2 Comoanche Peake Donald C. Cook 1&2 Crystal Rtver 3 DWAS-BCSMe I Ditablo Canyon 382 Joseph btMazk7 I Joseph W MFLIey 2 ran CalLihuri PL .Qlia%Haddam Neck Harm I Uxtian Poin 182 Indian PC= 3 Ke"wnee Mame Yankee Mc~utre I Mc~uit=2 Millstone 2 Millstone 3 North Anna 182 Oconee 12.8 3 Palisades Palo Verde I Palo Verde 2..Palo Varde 3 Point beach M82 Prairie 1.6mn 182 Rancho Sec I H. B. Robinson 2 Salem I Stl1n 2 San Onofre I San Onobre 2-3 Seabrook I Sequayah 182 South Tccas I South Tccas2 St.Ltlc~cI St.Luc* 2 Surrn I Surry 182 ThrecMile Isand I Three M&l IWand 2 TM1 2/Epicw 7lqa I 6.502E00 3.1)E-20 1.31E.01 4.50E00 " 6.05E00 3.09E200 3.42E00 7.SOE*00 5.80E*00 4.30E240*1.302*+00 4.M13200 2.5ý-5.90E.00 3.70E.00 1.70E-01' 6.52E-01 2.93E-01 1.21E-0I 1.04E-01 1.44E-01 1.472-01 6.09F,-02-1.44E+00 1.182*00 3.482.00 6.13E+00 7.802*00 4.53E400 2.68E+00 5.262.00 2.2 4Eý00 2.60E-01 '1.87E400 1.5=+W0 1.48E+00' 2.582*00 1.37200 1.862*00 1.90E+00 '6.83"10*1.54E-02 2.962-'02 4.162-01' 1.462.-01 1.29E-01 1.072-01 1.502.-01 2.60E-02 9.01E-02 4.28E-02 2.072.01.: 7.92E-01 2.19E-01 .0.5.39E-01 1.03E-01 5.866E-02" 6.182-02 1.31E-0l 5.9.4E-0 2.69E-02 ."290F2* 2.30200 -3.60E-01 5-502-01 3.63E-01 5.95E-01 2.452-03: 5.332-01' .1.75E-01 2.03E-01 i.002-0) "4.20E-01 6.90E-01 6.47E-02, 6.07E-02 8.63E-02 1.96E-02 3.85E202 6.172-01 2.202+00 1.20E*00 1.30F-01 1.71E.00 9.50F,-01 8.67E-01 2.76E-01 7.12E-01 6.93E-02 4.20.00" 4.93E-,O < 4.98E400" .02,-0 1.99-00 1.942-*0'0 1.262400 5.67E+00 2.41E*00.ShownWt OtherUnit 1.03:00. '4'.02.01.: 2.90E*00 2.62E,00 5.46E-01" 4.00E-01" 7.20E-01 2.83E-00 1.26E"00 6.99".01 8.94,-01 6.17-.01 8.15'-01 1.522*00* .4.00E"00 3.21200 < 2.842E+00 4.42E-01 1.04E-01 4.63E-01 2.97E-01 .,4.36E-01 7.032-01-"' 3.94E-01 1.752*00 , 2.oo0-02 2.60E-01 o ".620 2.79*00 4.872+:00 2.8 1 :+0 4.182*00 1.39,,01.- .' 2~.68E-01 -5.89E-4-I 1.0=4"00 6.76E-0 1.32I2*00 1.902*00 5.05E*00 7.932*00 3.62E*01" 6.512-CO' 9.242-ý01 1-",4E;00 I.7SE-k)0 1.04E*00 5.902*0 3.45E*00 4.402-01 9.292-i02 ..9.65E-02 1.28,-01 8.73E,203 3.316M,-02 I.27.-01 2.0o0-01 3.242400'" L.50,-00 6.86--01' 7 -" 0 .2.95E+00< 1.00E-01 4.50E-01'. 1.00E-01 " 320E2'- 4.94E2-03 9.002-k03 1.32E2-02 9.12M-03 2.232-03< 1.00E-0C2 ND : "/ " N/IL "f' " N/MD ' 3.78603" 5.922-01 2.16E-01 2.502E*0 4.5E0-01 3.502-01 3:29E,01-" 1.78E-01 "2.99201 '--3.5-01 -1.84E+00 1.20E.*0 1.0oo-02 2.6882 I 3.98+00 -- 2.852*00 2.502*00 '3.22E-00!'.3.89E-01" 1.51E.*00 3.21E-00 S.002-0 1.2,2*00 '7.4300-" 9.842"00

• 118.*01 1.102*01 1:12E;01"'

3.42;00 2.15E*00-" ... ... " " " :" :6 -01 5.75E-o2 2.042-02 1.93E-01 *41.802-01 4.022*,00 5.44E-01 5.43E-01 1.992.-01 1.87E+00 7.8612*00 5.812*00'1.43F,00 7.48E-02 1.272*00 3.162-02 2.8-01"1 8.23E-01 2.972*00 2.85F*00N/R' il 2.78200 9.822*00 41.6112*00.5.80E*00 2..802*0:- 2.67*00 "2.3 ý-00" .3.072*0 1.24E-04-3.802+00 9.272*00 3.37E2.0) -6.55E-01 2A412*00 2536W0 3.85z*60 .,.6.112;00 6.682-00 1.30E*00 7.00.-02 1.00E201-1.94EZ--' -6.242.01 4.910 f. 1.83i-01 -8.89-02'" 5.29E-W2'3.922-01f 3.31-.01i 1.4502ý"" 0 4.252-05 NID NID N/fD 2.7*.00" 4.19*00" 7.07T-OI 5.552-01 7.8-013 9.942-01 8..56-01 2.99,*00 4.37E-01 1.47..00 1.45E+01 8.12,E-02 9.032,-05 N/D 3. 10E-01 NIR -Not Pzpwred N/fl -Not Detectable Tahbl 8 fL'qcd E~amaa Ccumatac By Year mk .F-s aind Activoclem Prouct 10k Pessumu Waer. Reactoa Fpr-'Lg 12ad 12108 -.35+/-5 +/-5.1=2 1001 I.=2 16"3 Arkansaus One I Arkansas. One 2 Beavcr Valley Ida Brniwacol I-Brmjdwood 2 Byron ma2 Callaway I Calvert ClJft 1&2 Ca~awva I Cawt.a 2 Comanche Peak I Donald C. Cock 1 &2 Crystal R.,Me 3 DavwBesse I Diablo Canyon 1&2 Joseph M. Farley I Joseph bl. Faziey 2 Fort Calhoun I R. E. Glnna'Haddam neck Hari I Indian Point 2&2 Indian Pcmt 3 Kmwun~e Maine Yankee McGuire I2 Mlllstone 2 Millsutexi 3 North Anna 162 Oconee 1.2A 3 Pallades Palo Verde 1 Palo Verde 2 Palo Verde 3 Point Beach 1M2 Prate Island 1&2 lRanco Sew I i-K B. Robinso 2 Salem I-Sal- 2 San Onofre I San Onafre 2-3 Seabrook I South T"m I South Tms 2 St Luce I St. Lucie 2 SuEMM I Surry 1&2 Thres Mile IWand I Thre Mile 2 IM1 2/Epicar T2cjan 4. 1 OE-WO 3.53E-MO 5.09E+00 2.45ECO0 2.48E.O0 4.36E.O0 3.43E.00 1.652.-CO 2.03E-01 1.13E-01 1.19E-0l 6.69E-01 5.OO-02 1.63E-01 4.05E.-O 2.48E.00 1.07.-03 4.97E-03 3.83F.02 4.922-01 1.64E.-OO 2.3813C00 1.79E0-C 5. 292-CO0 1.26E-O 3.82E-01 6.53E-01 3.82E-01 6.53E-01 1.19E2400 2.26E-60 3.34E-01 2.OOE0O0 2.34E-01 2,51E2.0 8.12E-01 9.55E-01 1.89E-01 1.852-01 6.15E-02 6.51E-02 1.16E-02 3.20E0-C I.IIE 1 2.861340 6.34E-02 6.72"-02 1.02E-01 5.09E-02 8.63E-02. 3.77-02 8.22-02 4.63E-02 2.91E+.-O 2.88E-0 1 8.37E-02 2.031-01 1.69M-01 5.222E-0 6.47E-02 5.8892B-2.63E-02 8.44E-02 3.101-01 4.262-02 9.08E.01 1.85E-00 3.61E.0C 6.02E20C 1.26E.-.O 4.18E-01 1.95E-01 3.47E-011.35.-66 5.33E-01 1.291306O 8.62E2-. 3.12E-02 2.99"-C1 8.81E-016.21E-01 7.73E-01 1.571.+-C 1.51E*CO 6.21E-01 7.73E-01 1.57E20O 3.55E,00 4.602.0 4.492.-CO 4.072.-CO 3.022-+O0 5.40E+0C 4.51E.-0O 5.072.C 9.41E-01 1.33.W00 1.58E+-CO 4.16E+00 3.02Z+00 3.68.-2 5.833E-02 1.408-Cl 9.23E-=2 N/D N/D N/D M/D N/D N/D 1.2213+0l 1.90E.OC 1.60E-Cl 7.55E-C1 1.91F-02 2.75E-02 6.01-01 6.04.-02 6.3313-01 7.39&-03 1.45E-03 5.78.-04 3.90E-01 9.41E-02 2.861"1C 7.36E-01 3.31E.00 2.88E*0 4.352.00 3.3320 2.75E+00 2.802.CO, 6.122,CO0 4.07E-0 2.74E-C 7.79E2C 8.51E-01 8.42E-01 1.30E.01 1.12EC01 8.2015-1 5.37E-C1 3.23E+0C 1.452.CO0 1.865-01 4.6613-01 1.93E+00 2.72E200 2.,3C+00 5.95E-01 1.93E2.C 2.75E-00 2.432.00 5.42E-C1 4,54-+00 7.09l-01 3.26E-01 4.88"-01 9.73E.-0 8.55E.C 5.17E.00 3.4115-02 6.302-03 1.41E-02 4.41Z-02 6.46E-"4 1.77E-04 1.87E-04 1.16E-04 NID ---3.49E-01 4.653-01 2.64E-01 2.09-C01 4.46E-00 1.02E-01 8.57E-00 3.04E.-CO 1.40E-CO 2.64E,-,O 5.42E-01 5.42E-01 4.44E-01 2.31E-01 1.682-01 2.00E-0 7.97E-02 8.53E-02 3.08E-01 3.432-02 6.87E-01 8.04.-02 2.84 E.-CO 3.22E-01 5.012-Cl 3.49E-01 2.57E240O 2.572F-0O 8.899400 3.15ECO 4.32E-01 3.109-CWO 3.432-02 N/D HIfD N/D 9.581-02 2.55F,0-5.79E-03 9.64E-01 3.211300 3.23£.00 7.11F,-01 1.16 ,0 4.48"1-C 2.24"l-0 2.64E-01 2.59E-0C 7.55E-Cl 2.41E2-C 4.582-02 1.12"-..2.01E-011 2.04E.-00 2.132.CO0 2.652.-O0 2.52E-01 5.45,-01 2.552-C 2.502CE*O 2.13E2CO 2.52=.CO 2.13E2-O 6.35E2-C 1.18E.-00 1.01E-02 3.86E-02 2.072.,CO 1.42E2C00 3.42E-01 9.782-01 3.422-01 9.78E-01 1.19F-02 8.06E-01 1.612.-CO 2.36E-01 6.191-01 1.84E-C1 1.411-01 1.612-CO 2.80E2O0 1.12E20.0 3.59E.-C 2.73E.CO0 1.85E-C00 3.14E-01 3.41E.20 I.OIE22-C 5.232-01 1.012.-Cl 5.23201 6.70E-01 4.102E-C 1.59E-02 4.54E-03 1.59E-MCO 1.44.-EO0 3.812-01 4.62,-01 3.81E-01 4.6513,-0 1.57E-01 3.99E-01 1.03E+,CO .1.12EC0 7.31.-02 7.34E-02 5.6213-01 8.12E-02 3.90E-02 2.42E-01 6.38E-01 5.921-01 2.832-Cl 1.54E-MO 1.06C.-01 5.942.-C 1. 16 .M-3.82=-.WC 3.752-03 NID N/D N/D 5.58E-02 1.73"-1 2.15-.03 2.82E-01 3.112.-C 3.58.-CO0 6.87E-01 9.192-C1 1.09E-04 3.542-01 1.17E-02 2.62-C01 2.53F,-01 1.3-,E4001.612-02 3.152,-04 7.47E-02 8.29E-02 8.05E-011 1.50"-01 7.31E-01 3.09E-01 2.06E-Cl 2.872-Cl 2.00E.CO0 2.C002.-CO 8.76E2CO 2.47E.-0C 6.752-C1 3.1 12.C 7.75E-03.N/D N/D HID 1.1E.-02 1.302-Cl 2.082-04 3.603-01 3.00.-O0 3.14E.00 4.03E-01 2.02E-01 2.21E-03 1.22.-CO 7.09,W00 5.722.-C 7.68E-01 3.56E-01 2-16E-02 1.77E-04 1.80E-01 1.84E-01 8.471-01 2.14E-01 1.9013-01 2.08",,,.0 1.52E-0 1 7.432-01 6.621-01 1.302.-CO 2.862-01 2.35E-011 4.132-Cl 1.04E2.0 1.042.-CO 2.062Ct.2.991.CO0 3.202.-Cl 2.402,4OO 2.14-02 1. N/D H/P N/D 5.89E-02 1.852-01 2.04E-04 2.362-01 2.312400 4.22E-01 9.94E-02 1.22E-01 1.4E2.CO0 5.08E,.00 3.612400 3.98E-01 3.092-C1 6.08E-01 2.84E+00 3.5E.02 83ME-05 1.63E+.C 1.102-01 7.44"-01 1.77E-01 1.77E-01 5.902-01 3.42E-01 1.73E-01 3.14F,-01 1.532.-CO 2.13E-01 6.42E-02 2.512"Cl 3.27F,-l 3.272,01 2.14E-CC 2.42E.-O 4.98E-01 2.58E+-O 3.882-03 N/D N/D H/D 4.29E-01 6.66E-C1 4.831-04 2.20E-01 3.27EC+00 3.632.C00 3.79E-01 1.032-01 1.19E-01 2.12.+00 1.74E.-C 5.12E-01 5.12E-01 2.23E-01 8.27E-02 2.60E-02 1.22E-04 1.75F,.O0 3.962-02!4.77E-01 4.772-C I 1.262.-CO 4.01E-02 1.55E.-CO 4.472-01 4.47E-01 4.18E-01 5.37E-01 5.30E-01 5.21E-02 9.85E-01 7.60E-02 1.122-01 5.19F-01 1.37E-01 8.36E-01 7.791-02 7.24E-01 1.072-01 1.203-l01 1.62"-01 2.,52-01 2.85E-01 1. ISE--00 2.2413-0O 4.832-C1 4.702-C1 1.40E-02 NID H/D N/D 2.32E-01 1.9513-01 3.921-04 5.47E-02.* 3.21E2.-C 3.65E,.-1.14E+-00 2.94E-01 9.181-02-1.52E+-CO 5.73E-01 2.94E-01 7.55E-01 6.79E-01 1.93E-01 2.08E-02 8.822-02 7.68E-04 1.06E-01 1.61E-C1 1.44E-01 3.80E-02 8.95&-02 Thi nurnberis a coazcs tonthat reportedinl the 1990rpe-included with Three Mile [-land 2 total NID -Not Detectable -h Table 2 Abtorme =UEm C~medso BY Yewr Flocki and Acttvadna Gomm Crota Comics Prwsu-,=ed wate Reactors EZ-AL.MA ..147q I=Z 12fl I QzA 1 i m I=~ 2 AzrcansSOne I Arlcmns*.I One 2 Beaner Valley 16a Braiwod I Buigwwood 2 Callaway I Calyr C.liff 3&2 Catawba I Catawba. 2 Ccnairhe Peak I Donald C- Cook 1 &2 Davu-esase I Diablo Canyon M&2 Joseph M. Farley I Joseph M. Faziey 2 Fort Calhoun I R.E. Ginia Haddamn Neck HIarts I .Indian Point ma~Indian Point3 Kewatince-Maine yanmee Moccuac I Milsonea 2 Milstone 3 North Anna 1&2 Oconee 12A 3 PaIllsadciI Palo Vere 1 Palo Verde 2 Palo Vere3 Point Beech'1&2 Prairi Island m&Rancho Seca I H. B. Robinon 2 Sa1kn 2 San Ondr I San Onofre 2-3 Seabrook I Sequoayh 1&2 South Texas I SouthTexas 2 St. I lI St. Lucie 2 Swn-r I Surry 1&2 Three Wie Island I Three Mile Is1-An 2 M&1I2/f~pici 1.96E.02 1.03E+03 5.69E.03 1.39E-04 7.5OE-03 8.51E.03 3.S0E.04 3.73E-03 2.10E*03 9.83L.02 4.53E+63 9.37E-03 4.35E+03 9.78P-+03 1.34Es.0 I.07E.OO 4.73E.01 '3.90E.02 1.75E.03 0.64E.01 8.06E.O2 1.31E.02 I.95E.02 7.72E+03 9.40E-03 2.23E*04 2.76F.+04 1.02E.04 2.96E.03 2.1SE.03 B.OOE.03 9.75E+03 2.64E+00 9.75E+02 3.80E+03 ;4.SSEi.04 1.09E+04 3.76E+03 5.42Em0 3.88E.03 3.35E-03 .6.86E-03 7.25E*04 3.BSE.04 3.96E-04 6.85E.03 1.27E-03 -.2.l0C.O3 -I.68E+03 -c 3.35E+03 I.0IE+03 "S.3E02 32SE+02 3.38E-03-'.3.53E+03 3.IS.-0*3 1.92-04 .2.21E-02 .3.81E-04 2.20E.04.2.60E.'O 3.54E*03 8.47E.02 3.OSE.02 4.29E+402 1.94E+03 3.81E.O3 .1.36E+03 7.06E+W 2.97E.C2 1=22E63 3.46E.02 8.79E-M 7-57E.02 1.04E*04 5.52E.03 3.20E*03 9.72E+02 .7.62E. B.SIE*02. 5.46E*02 I.95E*O3 7.12P*M 7.OOE.OO 4.80E.02 4.32E.0l '3.12E-63 2.14E.03 5.53E.O. 2.68E+03 1483E+03 7.54E+02 2.76E.03 8.20E+03 1.16Ee.04 I.G0E.04 1.41E04 -9.03E+03 9.38E+03 .9.13E+03 7.27E.03 9.58E+03-Shown wuit Other Unit .8.09E+02 .2.47E.402 1.1I1E.03 6.57E+03 2.58E.O3 5.60E.02 3.35E#03 2.45E.03 1.40E.03 -2.43E*03 4.44E.02 I.SEM.~ .1.22E-02 1.ISE.02 1.66E#= < =E+0~.2 6.36E.03 4.09E.03 1.30E+03 3.57E.O3 1.55E-03 2.9E.3-W 4.072.03 3.23E.0 1-53E.03 5.07E+61 1.58E-01t~.A 1.6SE-03, 1.60E.03 I .60E.03 1.S72.03 2.28E.03 7.5.4E.02 3.59E.03 1.33E+03 2.24E*03 9.09E#03 9.06E4=3 1.51.0 E*I20 ..920 6.2aE.03 3.50E+.03 5.30E-03 4.3.4E.03 2=."2.0 1-4E( 15]-644.9-143.6E.04 ".3E0 4.792.04 1'.92E#04 1.63E.04 2.4 1E.04 2.40E.0.,c 1.OOE.00 2.61E+03 2-99E+01 5.99E+01 %23E.02 6.84E.01 1.40E+02-3.00E+03 7.38203 3.OOE*.03 9.74E.03 .4.45E-04 i.9 12.03 I.13E+.03 5.16E.2 .9.682*0 6.41E.( .2 6i.I2.402 9.93P-.02 7.SSE-03 3.62E+02 2.17E.03 '.74E403 6.732.02 1.26E.03..6.972*02 2.60E.62 '4.65E+01 5.472.02 2.76E+02 1.18E+GiZ 'i.27E.2 '2.'002#03 --7.IOE.03 B.BIE03 1.58E#W .1372.03 1.48E+03 68a92.02 2.312.03 I.172. 6.40E. 2' .4.762.02 8.94E.02 -W2E0 .S8 ..2 5.132*02 I.75E-02 2.93E -M 1 .00E-62 'IS62.0I 1.02E.01 '2.492*02 '7.82E+61 i.062*03 2.3.4E+02 1.252.02.1.12.3 .16*02- .~ *. .7742.0 6.092*02 1. 11 E-03 7.442.02 1.782*03 1..I4E*W **1.812.0 6.37E*02 1.052*03 :4'.17E.0= B.S1E.01. 1.06E401 6.40E+00 7.432*03 3.01E#03 9.03E*03 5.74E+03 3.92F.403 1.72E+03 2 .54E4" 2.93.4 1.54204 --12.30E*04 2.,3,.04--6.E6E,3 -8.04E+03 1.912.04 i.,,04' 4.36E.0 1.7 6.17+03 "JAM". 2.1 IE'04" 9.1 2 .' E. , "-2.76E#03 1.6 , "-i.s5,.o4 .... 4.64E-03o.-s5.81E-02 U.SATW&73E+00 9.97E+06 "4.72E+04 2.882E02 -489..0- 'I64E-02 9.026F*M 7.66E+0= .4.45.03 3.262,*0 9.472*02 410."I 02 1.2424.0 9.032EC2 2.16E.0.4 1.25.E03:. 5.882,02 5.49.0 "," 2.012.01 2.29E*02*Changes to the entries fcrrojan far 1976- 1967 reprwei+/- wryonswhich wuc upwm and xpp -Ine the TmjaJulyDecernba, 1990 Mee~t and Waste Miposal Report. .,-ý tos tche crtrim for MaimeYankie far g M9718 eepaaatz aom" whidih wnmm"zeporined anid explaled hI thec Maine Yankeo etoteln . 'raM. 2 Ahtme ===is C~oinazls By Tomr 7iamdo aand Accvnam G0se (Total Coiesl Pressunied Wazer Reactcn Arkansa.3 One I Arkansa One 2 Bcave- Valley I W B-dwood I Bmud'mood 2 Byron 1&2 Ca.la-ay I Cahmn ChUff 1&2 Catawba I Catawba 2 Comanche Peak I Donald C. Cook 1&2Rlvst3 Dzaia-Bese I Diablo Canyorn 1W Joseph M. Farley I Joseph M. Farcly 2 Fort Calhoun I RF .Ginna Haddama Neck Hams I Indan Point 3 Kewaunec-Maine Yankee McGuire I McGuire 2 Mlstone 2 Mfstone3 North Anna 132 Oconee 12A 3 Palisades Palo Verde I Palo Verde 2 Palo Verde 3 Feint Beach 1&2 Prairie sand I32 Pancho Seco I H. B. Robinson 2 Salem I Sal=m 2 San Onofre I San Onofr 2-3 Seabrook I saquoyah 332 South Temes I South Teas 2 St. Lucle 1 SL Luc!e2 " Sumomcer I Surry Three MUe Island I Thre MWe Island 2 T1. 2/2pl;ewr 12.14 12ORs .1255 !*a7 Ian3 12.Q3 .1253 1213. 12 2.90E-03 3.26E-03 1.1 6E.03 8.10E-03. 1.71E03 3.26E.02 8.91E.03 3.4E2-03 2.06E-02 3.92E0)1 7.57E204 2.25E-02 2.81E-01 1.24E203 2.16E-03 9.41E-01 4.19E-01 3.82E-.01 6.89E202 5.70E.03 1.56,.03 1.W62+03 2.33E+03 2.76E203 1.57E,02 1. 17E2.03 5.07E+02 8.16Z+02 7.22E-02 3.282-03 3.15E,2+3.15.E02 2.79E+02 2.00E.02 1.67E.03 3.83E-03 3.98E-03 2.77E+02 6.36E.02 5.19E-03 7.65E-03 1.36E-03 1.36E.23 i.30,'O03 2.902E03 4.55E.03 2.4 1E.03 2.41 E,03 3.I06.03 4.94E.03 3.29E-02 8.75E-02 2.58E202 1.15E+02 1.96E.03 3.05E+,03 2.76E-03 1.10E-03 3.41E.03 4.54E-03 5.02E-02 3.I8E-.02 5.09E-04 3.80E-02 1.092.O2 3.78E-02 5.86E-02 5.72ME=2 2.32E+03 7.14E,02 3.27E,02 3.35E,021.70E+03 1.28E-03 1.30E203 9.60E02 9.92E-01 3.99E-03 8.63E.02 1.94E+03 7.22E+02 5.92E+02 1.602,02 1.52E-03 1.48E.03 5.68E+ 4M.23E20 7.85E2.2 .642-02 2.96-402 "4.06E-42 2.099.M 1.77+02 5.17E0 I 5.3 13.02 7.52E-03 2.76E+03 2.339.03 3.5E,203 2.55E.03 1.71E+04 1.71E203 2.25E-03 1.15E-03 3.78E.03 1.88E+03 2.05E+03 4.688+03 2.27E+02 8.77E-01 1.88+E03 1.54E+03 !.93E-3 1.82E+03 3.102.,2 3.141302-4.04E.01 -4.97E.01 < 6.55E-01 -3.19E-01 c 2.91E+01 6.,521#01 1.54E-02 4.41E202 1.07E.3 8.34E20 9.19E#01 2.02E+01 2.28ME03 1.93E*03 1.05E*03 2.04C.03 1.95E#03 7.19E+02 2.28MEv3 1.93E203 1.05E+03 2.04E203 1.95E*03 7.19E2024.002.02 1,02.,02 3.97E202 6.34E-02 2.46E+02 2.39E*01 1.05E+02 8.44E.01 2.961-02 1.76E.04 8.0E5203 5.71E#03 1.OSE0+3 4.83E+02 1.448.03 2.282-4 2.35-204 2.43E.04 1.05E+04 2.59E.04 8.97E203 2.84E.01 3.68E..3 1.73;-.02 1.75+*03 2.43E2.03 1.=2.022.67E+03 1.272+03 1.94E,03 6.41E2025.47E+03 197E+03 4.29E.02 2.52F.-02 1 16S+02 8.34E+02 9.30E+01 3.162*02 2.78E201 4.82E+01 8.08E+01 1.50IE01 7.58E.01 4.596,.01 3.03E-01 8.772-01 1.42E-01 1.732+0 3.83E-03 "*4,67.03 9.30E-01 2.16E-02 1.526M03 2.00Z443 4.90E-01' 2.146+03 6.59E+02 7.701+02 1.04E+03 2.791.301 1.95E,1 1.682,-03 1.39E203 3.64E-03 5.29EM02 1.39E443 1.81-E03 1.159,03 8.56E202 1.06E+03 1.182+03 7.306+01 8.62E401 3.836-3 4.116-.02 9.812.0, 2.996-03 9.0Z.=4.00E+04 2.53E+04 8256-03 2.186-04 5.12E203 2.4&E+03 N/D 6.68E+03 4.576E-3 1.21E+00 NID 2.25E.02 3.85E+03 8.646-02 4.452,02 1. 1620, 3.53E2(4 5.089-04 3.336=04 6.216-03 1.426-03 4.532-03 7.68E+03 9.559-03 9.982,,3 8.60E-03 9.16E.03 2.22.203 1.642"01 1.402+02 1.39E201 &.346-02 3.32E+02 1.822+03 6.95E+03 2.079+03 1.99E2+3 3.082+02 3.66E+02 1.37E-02 3.82Z-01 1.082+0 3.80E403 7.89E+02 1.872+03 2.10E+03 2.07"+02 N/D 2.802-01 HID 4.401-01 NID 3.99E-01 " "+. " 8.98E+02 1.10E+03 9.42E+02 24-W-02 4.25F,02 5.94E+.02 7.00E-02 1.89E+02 8.17E201 1.42E2+03 1.02Ev03 1.24E.03 9.02E+02 6.72E-02 5.33E-02 5.33E.02 9.06Em02 1.88+E02 7.31E.03 1.09E203 5.63E-0L 8.722+01 3.38E+01 4.59E(02 5.95E302 1.462+03 5.96E2-0 2.23E+03 6.262+G2 2.31E.00 9.46E-22 5.18+E*02 5.18E202 2.89E+03 2.1124.02 9.522+02 8.84E+03 1.21E-02 7.08E+02" 6.76E2+0 1.20E+03 8.03E+00 2.202-01 7.20E+00 3.13E+02 1.49E+02 1.80E203 1. 16E+03 1.072+*02 6.072,03 1.72EW02 1.09-.02 8.19C+02 5.34E-02 7.5113-02 4.513602 6.662+02 N/D.04 4.95E.02 1.59E-03 1.49E-02 5.24E+03 5.28E.03 1.04E-.2 1.36.-.02 2.57E-03 4.01O+02 4.01E+02 5.89E+03 8.10E+001 1.41E+03 1.16E*03 4.62E+01 1.09E.02 3.56E42 3.5seO20 5.142+02 6.112+03 8.62E+02 1.41E+03 6.05E.01 1.81E+00 1.13E+03 4.49E+02 4.49E*02 3.89E+02 1.25E+02 2.24E+03 3.45E+03 6.26E+01 2.912+03 5.29E+=2 4.382+022 2.00F.+01 3.60E+01 NID 2.26E+00 3.66E+02 1.92E+02 2.492.03 2.922*01 1.42F60 8.55E+01 4.672+01 2.05E+03 4.90E+02 4.34E+02 3.543+01 1.66,+02 8.93E+02 1.7CE-03 1.55E+02 7.71E+01 3.772E+02 4.03E+02 5.87E+03 4.28E*02 4.28E-02 1.76E.03 2.04E.02 7.867.02 3.62E+01 2.46E.00 6.822-02 2.68E+01 1.513E.02 5.41F-02 2.79E+00 1.36E.03 5.1252+03 2.15E+01 1.60-+00 4.01E+02 4.05E+02 6.362+02 1.13E.32 1.232+03 3.29E+03 7.462+01 2.222+03 2.01E+02 4.35E,01 5.06EO+t 2.54E-01 6.932-02 7.59E+00 6.75r,+0 2.68E+02 4.12E+03 1.412a03 9.13E-01 2.07E+02 2.892402 6.2"E-+02 3.30O2+0 6.59E602 3.382+02 1.6 1E+0I 5.73E+02 5.81E-05 2.0 2.072+02 12231 1.79E,01 5.211+01 5.!62.+02 3.49E+02 1.222+02 8.082+02 2.14E202 6.482-02 6.48E+02 1.92E+02 2.06E+03 3.482.+02 2.14E+00 2.61E201 9.26E-00 1.40E+02 2.08E203 3.49E-02 1.68E.03 4.172+01 3.67Z-01 4.50E+01 4.84E-(2 4.842402 1.322+01 3.00E+0l 6.58,-02 9.291301 5.799-02 2.626-0 1.97E-02 1.0tE+01 3.68E-01 N/D 3.992E02 1.12E-03 3.42E-22 4.202.+02 1.54+03- .1.092-01 7.71E-401 2.42E201 1.79E#01 2.81E+02 8.62E.01 2.4313+02 4.15E201 4.411-02.4E 5.342+01*Chasnges to the cita-ea for Trojan for 1976- 1967 am re mm~ which wer r~eported an~d cepltatinan the Trojan .1uiy.Dccba 1990 Ewmuct and Wastel" co-- Chan ta the muleS for Maine Yankee ior 1977- 1988 am = nan which we. reported and eqhitned in Main Yankee repoz ?llei Scmsartnua3 MUucat and Rcleas Reports or 770131'- 9'01231- Dcilmet Date 92/01/08.& I Included wu.h Three Mae sland 2 toml NID -Not Detectable EXHIBIT 2 B ATTACHMENT 2 NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT GASEOUS EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES January -December 2001 3 pages follow TABLE HP 10.5-2 PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLU~ENT REPORT GASEOUS EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES January 1. 2001 to December 31. 2001 Est Total A. FISSION AND ACTIVATION GASES Units 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr Error %1. Total release Ci 3.01E+00 2.92E+00 2.21E-02 0.00 2. Average release rate for 5.6 period uCi/sec 3.B8E-01 3.72E-01 2.78E-03 0.00 3. Percent of annual avg EC x 1.67E-04 1.84E-04 1.16E-06 0.00 B. IODINES_1. Total Iodine

• Ci 5.52E-04 3.85E-04 5.69E-05 0.00 2. Average release rate for 10.3 period pCi/sec 7.09E-05 4.90E-05 7.16E-06 0.00 3. Percent of annual avg EC 2 3.93E-65 3.52E-05 7.62E-06 0.00 C. PARTICULATES

1. Partlculates with half-life> 8 days C1 2.80E-06 2.36E-05 7.72E-06 7.09E-06 2. Average release rate for 18.0 period pCi/sec 3.59E'07 3.01E-06 9.71E-07 8.92E-07 3. Percent of annual avg EC I 8.47E-06 1.92E-05 2.38E-05 2.12E-05 4. Gross alpha radioactivity Ci 5.17E-67 2.01E-06 3.72E-06 2.07E-06 0. TRITIUM 1. Total Release Cl 4.81E+00 1.53E*01 5.27E+00 4.93E+00 2. Average release rate for period pCi/sec 6.18E-01 1.95E+00 6.63E-01 6.20E-01 3. Percent of annual avg EC 2 1.31E-03 4.15E-03 1.41E-03 1.32E-03 E.1. Beta Airdose at Site Boundary Due to Noble Gases (ODCM App A III.C) mrads 2.13E-04 2.14E-04 1.56E-06 0.00 2. PercentIimit 2.13E-03 2.14E-03 1.56E-05 0.00 3. Gamma Airdose at Site Boundary Due to Noble Gases (OCM App A III.C) mrads 7.25E-05 7.82E-05 5.26E-07 0.00 4. Percent limit % 1.45E-03 1.56E-03 1.05E-05 0.00 F.1. Maximum Organ Dose to Public Based on Critical Receptors (ODCM App A III.D) mrem 5.64E-03 1.62E-02 5.47E-03 4.98E-03 2. Percent of limit % 7.52E-02 2.16E-01 7.29E-02 6.64E-02*NMOE: Data is reported for 1-131 and 1-1332 only.

TABLE HP 10.5-2 PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT REPORT GASEOUS-EFFLUENTS January 1, 2001:to December 31. 2001 1. FISSION GASES Units 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr Argon-41 Ci 7.33E-04 <LLD <LLD <LLD.. Krypton-85 Ci <LLD <LLD -<LLD <LLD Krypton-85m Ci. <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD.Krypton-87 Ci 2.31E-04 <LLD <LLD <LLD Krypton-88 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Xenon-131m Ci 4.29E-03 6.11E-03 <LLD <LLD Xenon-133 Ci 3.00E+0O 2.83E+00 2.21E-02 <LLD Xenon-133m Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Xenon-135 -Ci 2.-21E-03 8.53E-02 <LLD <LLD Xenon-135m Ci 4.44E-03 9.41E-04 <LLD <LLD Xenon-138 Ci -<LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Total for Period Ci 3.01E+00 2.92E+00 2.21E-02 <LLD 2. IODINES -Iodine-131. -Ci -2.22E-04 2:28E-04 5.69E-05 <LLD Iodine-132 Ci -<LLD 1.OOE-03 <LLD <LLD Iodine-133 Ci --3.30E-04 1.57E-04 -<LLD <LLD Iodine-134-Ci LD- <LLD- -<LD. <LD <LLD Iodine-135 Ci <LLD': <LLD <LLD <LLD Total for Period Ci 5.52E-04 1.39E-03 5.69E-05 <LLD TABLE HP 10.5-2 PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT REPORT 3. PARTICULATES* Units 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr Chromium-51 Ci <LLD 1.BOE-06 <LLD <LLD Cobalt-58 Ci <LLD 1.47E-05 <LLD <LLD Iron-59 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Cobalt-60 Ci <LLD 4.16E-07 <LLD 1.82E-06 Zinc-65 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Strontium-89 Ci 9.75E-07 8.25E-07 9.95E-07 7.95E-07 Strontium-90 Ci 4.80E-07 5.15E-07 4.95E-07 4.65E-07 Niobium-95 Ci <LLD 3.92E-07 <LLD <LLD Zirconium-95 Ci <LLD 5.57E-07 <LLD <LLD Ruthenium-103 Ci <LLD 1.29E-07 <LLD <LLD Cesium-137 Ci <LLD 7.92E-07 1.51E-06 <LLD Cerium-144 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Net unidentified beta Ci 1.34E-06 3.51E-06 4.72E-06 4.01E-06 Total 2.80E-06 2.36E-05 7.72E-06 7.09E-06*Particulates with half-lives > 8 days. EXHIBIT 2 C ATTACHMENT 3 NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT'.LIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES January -December 2001 2 pig-es follow ' TABLE HP 10.5-3 PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT REPORT LIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF ALL RELEASES January 1. 2001 to December 31. 2001 A. FISSION AND ACTIVATION Est Total PRODUCTS Units 1st Qt'r 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr Error %1. Total release (not including tritium, gases.alpha) Ci 2.81E-06 2.45E-04 0.000 3.68E-05 2. Average release rate for 26.0 period iCilmi 7.35E-14 9.68E-12 NIA 3.79E-12 3. Percent of EC % 1.29E-05 6.02E-04 N/A 3.91E-04 B.'TRITIUM

1. Total Release Ci 2.73E+01 9.87E+01 6.80E-03 3.70E+01 2. Average diluted concentration during period PCi/m1 7.15E-07 3.90E-06 6.36E-10 3.82E-06 4.01 3. Percent of EC % 7.15E-02 3.90E-01 6.36E-05 3.82E-01 C. DISSOLVED AND ENTRAINED GASES 1. Total Release Ci 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2..Average diluted concentration during period .pCI/me N/A N/A NIA N/A N/A 3. Percent of EC %. NIA N/A N/A N/A D.GROSS ALPHA RADIOACTIVITY (Total Release)C1 7.45E-08 2.13E-06 0.000 1.65E-07 E. VOLUME OF WASTE RELEASED (Prior to Dilution)

Liters 1.02E+05 3.78E+05 0.000 1.70E+05 F. VOLUME OF DILUTION WATER USED DURING PERIOD Liters 3.82E+10 2.53E+10 1.07E+10 9.68E+09 G. MAXIMUM DOSE COMMITMENT -WHOLEBODY mrem 3.B8E-05 2.55E-04 3.35E-08 3.89E-04 Percent of 0004 App A III.H limit 2.54E-03 1.70E-02 2.23E-06 2.59E-02 H. MAXIMUM DOSE COMMITMENT -ORGAN mrem 3.70E-05 2.15E-04 3.35E-08 4.80E-04 Percent of COCH App.A III.H limit 7.40E-04 4.30E-03 6.70E-07 9.60E-03-I-TABLE -P 10.5-3 PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT REPORT LIQUID EFFLUENTS January 1. 2001 to December 31. 2001 1. NUCLIDES RELEASED Units Ist Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr Manganese-54 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Cobalt-58 Ci <LLD 2.23E-05 <LLD <LLD Iron-59 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Cobalt-60 Ci <LLD 3.44E-05 <LLD <LLD Zirconium-95 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Strontium-89 Ci 3.57E-07 1.02E-06 <LLD 5.44E-07 Strontium-90 Ci 2.45E-06 1.97E-06 <LLD 1.62E-06 Silver-lOrm Ci <LLD 1.28E-04 <LLD <LLD Iodine-131 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD .<LLD Cesium-134 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Cesium-137 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD 3.46E-05 Niobium-95 Ci <LLD, <LLD <LLD <LLD Silver-110m Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Antimony-125 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Net unidentified beta Ci <LLD 5.72E-05 <LLD <LLD Fission & Activation Product Total Ci 2.81E-06 2.45E-04 0.00 3.68E-05 Tritium. Ci .2.73E+01 9.87E+01 6.80E-03 3.70E+01 Grand Total Ci 2.73E+01 9.87E+01 6.80E-03 3.70E+01. EXHIBIT 2 D; -.:. -, A ATTACHMENT 2 Nuclear Management Company, LLC Palisades Plant Do'cket 50-255 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT GASEOUS EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES January -Deceurmber 2002 , f 3 Pages Follow TABLE HP 10.5-2 PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT REPORT GASEOUS EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES January 1, 2002 to December31, 2002 Est Total A. FISSION & ACTIVATION GASES Units 1st Qtr 2 nd Qtr Yd Qtr 4"h QIr Error %1. TOTAL RELEASE Ci 5.01E-01 3.20E+00 1.65E+00 3.26E+01 2. Average release rate for Period uCilsec 6.44E-02 4.07E-01 2.08E-01 4.10E+00 8.41 3. Percent of annual ave EC % 2.90E-05 1.71E-04 8.49E-05 1.71E-03 B. IODINES 1. Total Iodine

• Ci 2.611E-04 4.55E-04 6.81E-04 1.20E-03 2. Average release rate for Period uCi/sec 3.35E-05 5.79E-05 8.57E-05 1.50E-04 9.88 3. Percent of annual ave EC % 1.60E-05 2.98E-05 4.31E-05 1.31E-04 C. PARTICULATES

1. Particulates with half-life

>than 8 days Ci 1.94E-04 4.88E-06 2.82E-06 8.32E-07 2. Average release rate for 15.97 Period uCilsec 2.50E-05 6.21E-07 3.55E-07 1.05E-07 3. Percent of annual ave EC % 6.OOE-05 2.22E-05 1.27E-05 3.75E-06 4. Gross Alpha radioactivity Ci 8.23E-07 1.75E-06 1.42E-06 7.17E-07 D. TRITIUM 1. Total release Ci 4.87E1+00 4.73E+00 4.7913+00 5.23E1+00 2. Average release rate for Period uCi/sec 6.26E-01 6.02E-01 6.03E-01 6.5813-01 3. Percent of annual ave EC % 1.33E-03 1.28E-03 1.28E-03 1.40E-03 E. SITE BOUNDARY DOSE 1. Beta Airdose at Site Boundary Due to Noble Gases mrads 3.55E-05 2.321-04 1.38E-04 2.33E-03 2. (ODCM App A I3E.C)2. Percent limit % 3.55E-04 2.32E-03 1.38E-03 2.33E-02 3. Gamma Airdose at Site Boundary Due to Noble Gases (ODCM App A IT.C) mrads 1.22E-05 7.45E-05 3.17E-05 7.68E-04 4. Percent limit % 3.10E-04 1.49E-03 6.34E-04 1.54E-02 F. ORGAN DOSE .... _, 1. Maximum Organ Dose to Public Based on Critical Receptors (ODCM App A IIJ.D) mrem 5.70E-03 5.36E-03 5.66E-03 1.94E-02 2. Percent limit % 7.60E-02 7.15E-02 7.55E-02 2.59E-01__L

• NOTE: Data is reported for 1-131 and 1-133 only.

TABLE HP 10.5-2.PALISADES PLAN"T RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT REPORT GASEOUS EFFLUENTS January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002 1. FISSION GASES Units .Qtr 2"'Qtr 3"t Qtr 4L Qtr Argon-41 Ci -<LLD <LLD <LLD 8.68E-04 Krypton-85 Ci <LLD 9.20E-02 3.56E-01 3.93E-01 Krypton-85m Ci <LLD : <LLD 9.85E-05 2.72E-04 -Xenon-131m , Ci <LLD. .1.27E-03: 6.54E-03 5.08E-03 Xenon-133 Ci 4.97E 3.10E+00 1.28E+00 3.22E+01 Xenon-135 Ci 1.46E-03, .2.19E-03. 2.55E-03 2.65E-03.Xenon-135m Ci 2.72E-03. 3.72E-03 4.65E-03 5.36E-03 Total for Period Ci .5.01E-01 3.20E-+00 1.65E+00 3.26E+01.2. IODINES Units 1Vt Qtr

• 2 nd Qtr 3rrd Qtr 4" Qt-Iodine-131 Ci 8.1 11-05 1.61E-04 2.32E-04 9.30E-04 Iodine-132 Ci. :<LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD.Iodine-133 .Ci. -.80E-04 2.94E-04 4.49E-04 2.65E-04'Iodine-134 Ci <LLD <LL) <LLD <LL)Iodine-135 Ci <LUD <LLD <LLD <LLD Total for Period Ci 2.61E-04 4.55E-04 6.81E-04 1.20E-03 I Ityl TABLE HP 10.5-2 PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT REPORT GASEOUS EFFLUENTS January 1, 2002 to December 31,2002*PARTICULATES Units 1" Qtr 2 nd Qtr 3rrd Qtr 4 Qtr Chromium-51 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Cobalt-58 Ci 1.06E-04 <LLD <LLD <LLD Cobalt-60 Ci 8.35E-05 <LLD <LLD .<LLD Cobalt-57 Ci 6.53E-07 <LLD <LLD <LLD Zinc-65 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Strontium-89 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Strontium-90 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Cesium-134 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Cesium-137 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Net unidentified beta Ci 2.45E-06 4.88E-06 2.82E-06 8.32E-07 Total for Period Ci 1.94E-04 4.88E-06 2.82E-06 8.32E-07* Particulates with half-lives

> 8 days EXHIBIT 2 E ATTACHMENT 3 Nuclear Management Company, LLC Palisades Plant Docket 50-255.RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT LIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES January -December 2002 2 Pages Follow TABLE HP 10.5-3 PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT REPORT LIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002 X. FISSION & ACTIVATION Est Total PRODUCrS Units Ist Qtr 2ýd Qtr 4th Qtr Error %1. Total release (not including tritium, gases, alpha) Ci 9.59E-05 0.000 1.83E-04 7.48E-07 2. Average release rate for Period uCi/ml 2.45E-12 N/A 4.93E-12 1.89E-14 17.31 3. Percent of EC % 3.13E-04 N/A 2.90E-04 3.78E-06 B. TRITIUM 1. Total Release Ci 4.17E+01 4.09E-02 4.90E+l01 7.27E+O0 2. Average diluted concentration during period uCi/ml 1.06E-06 1.03E-09 1.32E-06 1.84E-06 4.01 3. Percent of EC % 1.06E-01 1.03E-04 1.32E-01 1.84E-01 C.-DISSOLVED & ENTRAINED CASES 1. Total Release Ci 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 N/A 2. Average diluted concentration during period uCi/mI N/A N/A N/A NIA 3. Percent of EC % N/A N/A N/A N/A D. GROSS ALPHA RADIOACTIVITY (Total Relcase) Ci 3.09E-08 0.000 2.74E-06 3.74E-07 I. VOLUME OF WASTE RELEASED (Prior to Dillution) Liters 1.93E+05 0.000 2.10E+05 2.20E+05 F. VOLUME OF DILLUTMONNWATER USED DURING PERIOD Liters 3.92E+10 3.97E+10 3.71E+10 3.95E+10 G. MAXIMUM DOSE COMMIT'TMENT-WHOLE BODY mrem 8.47E-05 5.36E-08 1.73E-04 9.72E-05 Percent of ODCM App A Ill. H limit % 5.651-03 3.57E-06 1.151-02 6.482-03 H. MAXIMUM DOSE COMMITMENT -ORGAN mrem 1.13E-04 5.36E-08 2.55E-04 9.69E-05 Percent of ODCM App A IIr. H limit % 2.26E-03 1.07E-06 5.10E-03 1.94E-03 TABLE HP 10.5-3 PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT REPORT LIQUID EFFLUENTS January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002 NUCLIDES RELEASED Units I$I Qtr 2 nd Qtr 3rd Qzr 4h Qtr Manganese-54 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Cobalt-58 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Cobalt-60 Ci 4.15E-05 <LLD 1.12E-04 <LLD Zirconium-95 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD ýLLD Silver-] 10m Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Strontium-89 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Strontium-90 Ci 6.95E-07 <LLD 7.35E-07 7.48E-07 Cesium-134 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Cesium-137 Ci <LLD <LLD 6.87E-05 <LLD Iodine-131 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Antimony-125 Ci .<LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Net unidentified beta Ci 5.37E-05 <LLD <LLD <LLD Fission & Activation Products Total Ci 9.59E-05 0.00 1.83E-04 7A8E-07 Tritium Ci 4.17E+01 4.09E-02 4.90E+01 7.27E+01 Grand Total Ci 4.17E+01 4.09E-02 4.90E+01 "7.27E+01 EXHIBIT 2 F ATTACHMENT 2 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT GASEOUS EFFLUENTS -'SUMMATION OF RELEASES JANUARY -DECEMBER 2003..p., .-* * *1*3 Pages Follow TABLE HP 10.5-2 PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT REPORT GASEOUS EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003 Est Total A. FISSION & ACTIVATION Units S1" Qtr 2 fd Qtr 3' Qtr 4"' Qtr Error %GASES 1. Total Release Ci 6.07E+01 3.05E+00 4.96E-01 7.42E-01 2. Average release rate for Period uCi/sec 7.81E+00 3.88E-01 6.23E-02 9.33E-02 5.57 3. Percent of annual ave EC % 3.27E-03 1.48E-04 2.82E-05 4.15E-05 B. IODINES 1. Total Iodine

• Ci 1.86E-03 8.78E-04 4.00E-04 3.53E-04 2. Average release rate for Period uCi/sec 2.39E-04 1.121-04 5.04E-05 4.44E-05 8.46 3. Percent of annual ave EC % 2.15E-04 1.02E-04 2.181-05 1.90E-05_C. PARTICULATES

1. Particulates with half-life

>than 8 days Ci 8.28E-04 1.32E-04 1.42E-06 4.38E-07 2. Average release rate for 7.89 Period uCilsec 1.06E-04 1.68E-05 1.79E-07 5.51E-08 I _I 3. Percent ofannual ave EC 5.28E-05 2.03E-05 6.34E-06 1.97E-06 4. Gross ALPHA Radioactivity Ci 4.20E-07 6.16E-07 5.86E-07 4.56E-07 D. TRITIUM 1. Total release Ci 5.39E+00 6.43E+00 5.25E+00 5.16E+00 2. Average release rate for Period .uCi/sec 6.93E-01 8.182-01 6.602-01 6.49E-01 3. Percent of annual ave EC % 1.47E-03 1.74E-03 1.40E-03 1.38E-03 E. SITE BOUNDARY DOSE I. Beta Airdose at Site Boundary Due to Noble mrads 4.36E-03 2.642-04 3.78E-05 5.32E-05 Gases (ODCM App A IIC)2. Percent limit % 4.36E-02 2.64E-03 3.78E-04 5.32E-04 3. Gamma Airdose at Site Boundary Due to Noble Gases (ODCM App A Ill.C) mrads 1.44E-03 5.41E-05 1.12E-05 1.78E-05 4. Percent limit % 2.88E-02 1.08E-03 2.24E-04 3.56E-04 F. ORGAN DOSE 1. Maximum Organ Dose to Public Based on Critical Receptors (ODCM App A mrem 3.09E-02 1.55E-02 5.66E-03 5.52E-03 1Il.D)2. Percent limit % 4.12E-01 2.07E-01 7.55E-02 7.36E-02* NOTE: Data is reported for 1-131 and 1-133 only. TABLE HP 10.5-2 PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT REPORT GASEOUS EFFLUENTS January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003 1. FISSION GASES Units 1 Qtr' 2 nd Qtr 3td Qtr 4" Qtr Krypton-85 Ci 8.33E-01 7.75E-01 4.34E-02 1.26E-02 Krypton-87 Ci !<LLD <LLD 2.50E-04 <LLD Krypton-E8 ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Xenon-131m Ci 1.14E-02 9.13E-02 <LLD <LLD Xenon.133 Ci 5.98E+01 2.18E+00 4.47E-01 7.24E-01 Xenon-133m Ci <LLD 5.84E-04 <LLD <LLD Xenon-135 Ci 9.55E-02 1.81E-03 1.54E-03 1.65E-03 Xenon-135m Ci 2.94E-03 2.24E-03 3.32E-03 3.63E-03 Xenon-138 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Total for Period Ci 6.07E+OI 3.05E+00 4.96E-01 7.42E-01 2. IODINES Units l"Qlr- 2"d Qir:-i 3Y-Qzr 4* 4Qr Iodine-131 Ci " .51E.03 7.23E-04 1.03E-04 8.95E-05 Iodine-132 Ci '- 1.06E-05 1.34E-04 <LLD <LLD Iodine-133 Ci 3.46E-04 1.55E-04 2.97E-04 2.63E-04 Iodine-135 Ci 4.65E-06 <LLD <LLD <LLD Total for Period 1Ci 1.87E-03 1.01E-03 4.00E-04 3.53E-04 TABLE HP 10.5-2 PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT REPORT GASEOUS EFFLUENTS January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003 3. PARTICULATES* Units Is Qtr 2 Vd Qtr 3"d Qtr 4'h Qtr Chromium-5I Ci 2.86E-04 <LLD <LLD <LLD Manganese-54 Ci 1.88E-05 <LLD <LLD <LLD Cobalt-58 Ci 3.62E-04 1.17E-04 <LLD <LLD Cobalt-60 Ci 4.14E-05 9.38E-06 <LLD <LLD Niobium-95 Ci 5.47E-05 1.80E-06 <LLD <LLD Ruthenium-103 Ci 8.88E-06 <LLD <LLD <LLD Strontium-89 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Strontium-90 Ci <LLD 2.40E-07 6.70E-07 3.75E-07 Ccsium-134 Ci 8.49E-08 <LLD <LLD <LLD Ccsium-137 Ci 9.57E-07 <LLD <LLD <LLD Zirconium-95 Ci 5.17E-05 1.1 IE-06 <LLD <LLD Cobalt-57 Ci <LLD 1.46E-07 <LLD <LLD Net unidentified beta Ci 3.33E-06 2.42E-06 7.50E-07 6.30E-08 Total for Period Ci 8.28E-04 1.32E-04 1.42E-06 4.38E-07* Particulates with half-lives > 8 days EXHIBIT 2 G ATTACHMENT 3 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT LIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES JANUARY- DECEMBER 2003 2 Pages Follow TABLE HP 10.5-3 PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT REPORT LIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES January 1, 2003 to December 31,2003 A. FISSION & ACTIVATION Est Total PRODUCTS Units 1 s Qtr 2 nd Qtr 3 d Qtr 4th Qtr Error%1. Total release (not including tritium, gases, alpha) Ci 2.09E-04 5.40E-04 0.000 1.45E-03 2. Average release rate for Period uCi/ml 8.25E-12 1.60E-11 N/A 3.75E-11 14.16 3. Percent of EC % 7.37E-04 8.89E-04 NIA" 2.42E-03 B. TRITIUM .._*1. Total Release Ci 5.87E+01 9.21E+01 5.57E-02 4.67E+01 2. Average diluted concentration during period uCi/ml 2.32E-06 2.72E-06 1.39E-09 1.21E-06 3. Percent of EC

• _% 2.32E-01 2.72E-01 1.39E-04 1.21E-01 .4.01 C. DISSOLVED

& ENTRAINED GASES 1. Total Release Ci 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2. Average diluted concentration " .N/A during period -uCi/l N/A N/A /A N/A 3. Percent of EC N/A N/A" N/A N/A D. GROSS ALPHA RADIOACTIVITY (Total Release) Ci <LLD 8.30E-07 0.000 <LLD E. VOLUME OF WASTE RELEASED (Prior to Dillutian) Liters 1.79E+05 -3.49E+05 0.000 1.79E+05 F. VOLUME OF DILLUTION VATER USED DURING PERIOD Liters 2.53E+10 3.38E+10 4.01E+10 3.86E+10 G. MAXIMUM DOSE COMMrITrMENT-.WHOLE BODY mrem 2.49E-04 3.92E-04 7.3 1E-08 6.49E-04 Percent or ODCM App A 111. H limit % 1.66E-02' 2.61E-02 4.87E-06 4.33E-02 H. MAXIMUM DOSE COMMITMENT-ORGAN mrem 3.05-04 5.02E-04 7.31E-0S 1.04E-03 Percent of ODCM App A 111. H limit _ 6.1 0E-03 I -00E-02 .I46E-06 2.08E-02 TABLE HP 10.5-3 PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT REPORT LIQUID EFFLUENTS January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003 NUCLIDES RELEASED Units lst.Qtr 2 nd Qtr .3r Qtr 4"h Qtr Manganese-54 Ci <LLD 2.35E-05 <LLD <LLD Cobalt-58 Ci <LLD 1.20E-04 <LLD 3.31E-04 Cobalt-60 Ci 1.16E-04 1.03E-04 <LLD 6.38E-04 Zirconium-95 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Silver-11Oin Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Strontium-89 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Strontium-90 Ci 2.86E-06 I.03E-05 <LLD 2.86E-05 Cesium- 134 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD 7.5 1 E-05 Cesium-137 Ci 3.76E-05 1.37E-04 <LLD 1.84E-04 Iodine-131 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD Antimony-125 Ci <LLD 9.76E-05 <LLD <LLD Net unidentified beta Ci 5.22E-05 4.91 E-05 <LLD 1.91E-04 Fission & Activation Products Total Ci 2.09E-04 5.40E-04 0.0 1.45E-03 Tritium Ci 5.87E+01 9.21E+01 5.57E-02 4.67E+01 Grand Total Ci 5.87E+01 9.21E+01 5.57E-02 4.67E+01 EXHIBIT 2 H inventory of adionuclides for the Great Lakes Nuclear Task Force International j oint Commission December 1997 International Joint Commission United States and Canada United States Government Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)10 CFR 835 (1995) Occupational Radiation Protection .40 CFR 51 (1993) Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of inplementation Plans, as amended UNSCEAR (1977)Sources, Effects and Risks of Radioactivity; Report to the UN General Assembly with Appendices; United Nations, New York.UNSCEAR (1982)Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation; Report to the UN General Assembly with Appendices; United Nations, New York..UNSCEAR (1983)Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation; Report to the UN General Assembly with Appendices; United Nations, New York.UNSCEAR (1993)Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation; Report to the UN General Assembly with .I Appendices.; United Nations, New York.Wahlgren, M.A., Robbins, J.A., and Edgington, D.N. (1980)Plutonium in the Great Lakes. In: Transuranic Elements in the Environment, W.C. Hanson (ed.);United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. pp. 659-683.Yan, N.D., Mackie, G.L., and Boomer, D. (1989)Chemical and biological effects correlates of metal levels in crustacean zooplankton from Canadian Shield Lakes: a multivariate analysis; Sci. Total Environ. 87/88: 419-458. This generic letter supplement only requires information from the addressees under the provisions of Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 50.54(0. Therefore, the staff has not performed a backfit analysis. The information required will enable the NRC staff to determine whether licensees are complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.60, 10 CFR 50.61, Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50 and any associated license conditions, and licensee commitments related to GL 88-1 Vand GL 92-01, Revision 1. The staff is not establishing a new position for such compliance in this generic letter supplement. Therefore, this generic letter supplement does not constitute a backfit and no documented evaluation or backfit analysis need be prepared.Federal Register Notification A notice of opportunity for public comment was not published in the Federal Register because the NRC needs to receive the responses to the generic letter in an expeditious manner. However, comments on the technical issue(s) addressed by this generic letter may be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555.Papenrork Reduction Act Statement The information collections contained in this request are covered by the Office of Management and Budget clearance number 3150-0011, which expires July 31, 1997. The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 600 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needs, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for.reducing this burden, to the Information and Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear.Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., 20555-0001, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-1 0202, (3150-0011), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 20503.Compliance with the following request for information is voluntary..The information would assist the NRC in evaluating the cost of-complying with this GL supplement. (1) the licensee staff time and costs to perform requested record reviews and developing plans for inspections; (2) the licensee staff time and costs to prepare the requested reports and documentation; (3) the additional short-term costs incurred as a result of the inspection findings such as the cost of the corrective actions or the costs of down time; and (4) an estimate.of the additional long-term costs that will be incurred as a result of implementing commitments such as the estimated costs of conducting future inspections and repairs.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical contacts listed JIM-relevant data;(3) a detenrnination of the need for use of the ratio procedure in accordance with the established Position 2.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, for those licensees that use surveillance data to provide a basis for the RPV integrity evaluation; and (4) a written report providing any newly acquired data as specified above and (1) the results of any necessary revisions to the evaluation of RPV integrity in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.60, 10 CFR 50.61, Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50, and any potential impact on the LTOP or P-T limits in the technical specifications or (2) a certification that previously submitted evaluations remain valid. Revised evaluations and certifications should include consideration of Position 2.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, as applicable, and any new data.Required Response All addressees are required to submit the following written responses providing the information described above: (1) within 90 days from the date of this generic letter, a written response to part (1) of the information requirement specified above; and (2) within 6 months from the date of this generic letter, a written response to parts (2), (3), and (4) of the information requirement above.Address the required written reports to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, under oath or affirmation under the provisions of Section 182a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 50.54(f). In addition, submit a copy to the appropriate regional administrator. The NRC recognizes the potential difficulties (number and types of sources, age of records, proprietary data, etc.) that licensees may encounter while ascertaining whether they have all of the data pertinent to the evaluation of their RPVs. For this reason, 90 days is allowed for the initial response.The information obtained from the licensees as a result of Revision I to GL 92-01 has been entered into a computerized reactor vessel integrity database (RVID), which will be made publicly available in the third quarter of 1995. The NRC intends to hold a public meeting on this GL supplement within 30 days of its issuance and a public workshop on RPV integrity, addressing the RVID and other RPV integrity issues, in the third quarter of 1995.Related Generic Communications (1) NRC Generic Letter 92-01, Revision 1, "Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity," March 6, 1992.(2) NRC Generic Letter 88-11, "NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and Its Impact on Plant Operations," July 12, 1988.Backfit Discussion NRC Staff Generic Evaluation of RPV Structural Integrity Data for PTS Events The staff is assessing the generic implications of chemical composition variability with regard to the current methodology for ensuring protection against PTS events for PWRs.The staff considers that the larger variability observed in recent reviews could be applicable to other reactor vessels and may, therefore, reduce the margins of safety.provided by the PTS screening criteria. The staff will evaluate this concern as part of its review of plant-specific evaluations and longer-term reassessment of the PTS rule.To provide assurance that all PWRs will maintain adequate protection against PTS events while the PTS rule is being reassessed, the staff has assessed all of the PWR RPVs using generic values of chemistry and increased margin terms to account for potentially larger chemical composition variability. It should be noted that such analyses are considered conservative evaluations, that were performed to determine .whether an immediate safety concern exists for this issue and whether there is adequate time to perform a more rigorous assessment of the issue. As stated in the previous section, based upon currently available information, the staff believes that the Palisades vessel will exceed the PTS screening criteria before any other PWR. However, because of the importance of RPV.integrity and the potential impact of additional, unreviewed data on RPV evaluations, the staff believes that this issue needs to be resolved on an expedited basis.Consideration of All Data Relevant to Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity As described previously, another result of recent reviews was that the staff became concerned that licensees might not necessarily have all of the data pertinent to the evaluation of the structural integrity of their RPVs. This is particularly true where the RPV fabricator holds, or has held, the'applicable data to be proprietary in nature. Such data include, but are not limited to: chemical composition, heat treatment, plate and forging manufalcturing process records, RPV fabrication records, all mechanical property data (tensile, impact, fracture toughness), and surveillance data. Sources of data that licensees should reexamine include material test reports from the steel producer, weld wire manufacturer, RPV fabricator, independent testing laboratories and nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) vendor. Licensees are encouraged to work closely with their respective vessel owners groups and NSSS vendor groups to ensure that all sources of information pertinent to the analysis of the structuial integrity of their RPVS have been considered. The information submitted in response to th.is generic letter should be considered to be public information. Required Information. Addressees are required to provide the following information: (1) a description of those actions taken or planned to, locate all data relevant to the determination of RPV integrity, or an explanation of why the existing data base is considered complete as previously submitted; .(2) an assessment of any change in best-estimate chemistry based on consideration of all infornation on the two key aspects of RPV structural integrity of primary concern to the NRC: PTS and USE. With respect to USE, licensees of all plants were able to demonstrate compliance with the Appendix G requirements either through consideration of applicable data or through equivalent margins analyses. With regard to PTS, only two plants (Beaver Valley I and Palisades) were projected to exceed the PTS screening criteria of 10 CFR 50.61 before the end of operating life (EOL). As stated previously, based on data and analyses submitted for GL 92-01, Revision 1, and other recent reviews (e.g, Ref. 2), the staff has determined that not all licensees were aware of all the information pertinent to the analysis of the structural integrity of their RPVs. In addition, recent reviews have indicated larger-than-expected variabilities in weld chemical composition, which have, in turn, highlighted the extreme sensitivity of RPV embrittlement estimates to small changes in the chemical composition of beltline materials. Recent NRC Staff Evaluations of RPV Structural Integrity Data for PTS Events The staff issued a safety evaluation report to the licensee for Palisades on the variability of reactor vessel weld properties for the Palisades reactor vessel on April 12, 1995 [Ref.2]. The staff agreed with the licensee's best-estimate analysis of the chemical composition of the reactor vessel welds and concluded that continued operation through Cycle 14 (late 1999) was acceptable. As discussed previously, while performing the evaluation, the staff noted larger variability in the chemical composition of the welds compared to that assumed for the development of the PTS rule. The staff evaluated the implications of this larger variability on the PTS rule generic margins for the Palisades vessel using the same analytic methods as those used in formulating the rule. The staff has reviewed the other PWR vessels and, based upon currently available information, believes that the Palisades vessel will reach the PTS screening criteria by late 1999, before any other PWR.On March 27 and 28, 1995, the staff reviewed the Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering proprietary RPV data-base. The most significant information reviewed concerned the Kewaunee RPV. The particular concern was the impact of data generated subsequent to the response to GL 92-01, Revision 1, on the plant's PTS evaluation. The staff met with the licensee for Kewaunee (April 13, 1995) to discuss issues related to consideration of all appropriate chemical composition data in addition to the applicable surveillance program data. In that meeting, the licensee presented its plant-specific surveillance program results and some new information related to the chemical composition variability in the RPV welds. Based upon this information, the licensee believes that the Kewaunee vessel will not exceed the PTS screening criteria before EOL.The staff has not completed its review of the new information on the Kewaunee vessel.However, based on the new vessel specific surveillance data, chemical composition data and the greater margin to the PTS screening criteria (300°F for the limiting Kewaunee circumferential weld compared to 270°F for the limiting Palisades axial weld), the staff believes that the Kewaunee vessel will not exceed the PTS screening criteria before the Palisades vessel. A key aspect of the Kewaunee review is the determination of the need for use of the ratio procedure in accordance with the established Position 2.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, by licensees using surveillance data. .2~ (7/74-~c~1'- 4cr./'~~ 5 1 1 a ~'EXHIUBIT 3 A§ '('3/4A /fý I Ves s .'(Cie wmC r5/oe,6)AeJ .5fk7r # A I L K?4 ove'r t"~e- , 12c o' -()tc rera~e ~Ai/ t~~CIA. jr /er&, qecwyeýýhpý Ar t/e r wsF@ -s oil .......... oF ..-. _.,o , aelye-A/l,1,c-Výr 'I LId (I/u S( A/i --W rove_/I caSA 4 s C- i Aý-ZAb A-ro,- #,._73-r, e el- -0 ur~ F .\A& C, I ý41 i7-*A t 5!rtM$/ 4 S(/'IreY c7 i O'v ý-('.. /e/2 w ./9(-, /asw ý )J,- cl4 cb~ cr-C~n CIOe pA 2 (ýa/ u () fho.t~~d-) A/ti ca h:1 le' -0r 5.-S.V/-%j2e. e -tAe& dQý5 i ,'ca.° ..I ) EXHIBIT 3 B UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of Nuclear Management Company, LLC Docket No. 50-255 Palisades Nuclear Power Station Regarding Renewal of Facility Operating License No. DPR-20 for an Additional 20 Year Period DECLARATION OF Dr. Ross Landsman, Retired U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Safety Engineer and Palisades Dry Cask Storage Inspector Under the penalty of perjury, I, Ross Landsman, declare that the following statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief: 1. My name is Ross Landsman. I am a retired U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III Nuclear Safety Engineer and Palisades Dry Cask Storage Inspector. I live at.9234 North Lowell, Skokie, Illinois.2. NRC Region III, where I formerly worked before recently retiring, has requested assistance from NRC Headquarters division of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), in coordination with the division of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) Spent (sic) Fuel Project Office (SFPO),-in order to resolve questions involving the licensing basis for the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant and the appropriateness of the licensing basis to the seismic design of the Palisades ISFSI.I 3. On August 4, 2004, on behalf of the NRC, I completed an inspection of design and operational activities associated with the new y constructed Palisades ISFSI pad. The results of this inspection were documented inWNRC Inspection Report No.07200007/2004-002 (DNMS). As a result, I identified two issues, characterized as violations by me in .the draft report but changdd to unresolved items (URI) by my boss in the final report to allow Palisades to go ahead 'and load fuel instead of stopping them even though it was not safe. These two issues were associated with the licensee's translation of the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) from the reactor site to the ISFSI pad (URI 072007/2004-002-1) and its assessment of the sub-surface bearing stability beneath the ISFS1 pad (URI 0720007/2004-002-2). After the final report was issued, I wrote a Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) on this issue but the agency (the NRC) would not accept it based on the fact that there was no issue to disagree about since the NRC has not made a decision on my issues yet because they changed them from violations to unresolved items. I informed them that they did make a decision and let Palisades load casks over my objections. They turned me down again because I was retiring and officially couldn't brother them any more, but the point is, the pad is not safe to hold any loaded casks.4. During an inspection of the 2004 ISFSI installation, I reviewed the licensee's seismic calculations associated with the ISFSI pad and the irradiated fuel canisters. I determined that the licensee performed the ISFSI pad SSE calculations assuming a seismic horizontal acceleration of 0.2g in the free-field and at the ISFSI pad ground surface elevation of 623 feet. The licensee stated its understanding that the seismic horizontal acceleration value of 0.2g was approved by the NRC at the time of initial reactor plant licensing. The licensee further stated its understanding that the 0.2g horizontal acceleration value was applicable for SSE seismic calculations associated with any location and at any elevation on the plant site. I noted that the licensee performed a soil-structure interaction, seismic assessment for the ISFSI pad using the SSE seismic horizontal acceleration of 0.2g. The soil-structure interaction assessment results indicated that the irradiated fuel canisters would experience 0.25g horizontal acceleration during an SSE. The irradiated fuel canister seismic horizontal acceleration design limit is 0.25g.5. While reviewing the licensee's calculations, I noted significant differences between the elevation and subsurface soil composition of ihe reactor plant and the 2004 ISFSI pad.Specifically, the reactor containment building was constructed, following the removal of the soil/sands overburden, at a ground surface elevaiion of 590 feet on compacted glacial till. The 2004 ISFSI pad was constructed, without the removal of the soils/sands overburden, at a ground surface elevation of 625 feet on sands that the licensee mechanically compacted. The licensee estimated that the compacted glacial till soil layer, at the location of the 2004 ISFSI pad, was at an elevation of 560 to 570 feet.6. Based upon the subsurface soil composition and elevation differences between the reactor plant site and the 2004 ISFSI site, I determined that the licensee's application of the 0.2g horizontal acceleration value that the ISFSI site was non-conservative. Specifically, the inspectors noted that the calculated SSE seismic horizontal acceleration would likely be larger at the ISFSI compared to the reactor plant site due to the increased site elevation and the approximately 50 to 60 feet of mechanically compacted sands present on top of the compacted glacial till material at the ISFSI site. In addition, I concluded that the soil-structure interaction calculation results were non-conservative, which if revised to incorporate a larger horizoftal acceleration vsalue based on the increased ISFSI. pad elevation and the soil profile differences, would likely result in a seismic horizontal acceleration value in excess of the irradiated fuel canister design limit.7. Additionally, correspondence between the. NRC and the licensee, dated December 1966, telephone call between R. Maccary (Atomic Energy Commission, AEC) and H.Wahl (Bechtel for the licensee), indicates that the NRC considered SSE to be defined as having a horizontal acceleration, at the bedrock, of 0.1 5g with an amplification factor of 1.25, producing a 0.2g ground acceleration. This demonstrates the NRC's understanding 2

13. Revision 0 of the Final Safety Analysis Report indicated that a 0.2g surface acceleration was used for the SSE. Licensee calculations of the seismic adequacy of those structures housing safety-related components were all performed at the grade elevation of 590 feet. Thiswas also the ground surface elevation since the overburden of sand dunes was removed prior to construction.

14. NRR and NMSS have been requested by NRC Region III to respond to each of the following questions:

a. During initial licensing of the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, did the NRC anchor the horizontal acceleration for seismic evaluations at the "ground surface" of the reactor building, elevation 590 feet and on top of the compacted glacial till, or the"ground surface" of the general plant site, any elevation and with any combination of soil structures intervening between the "ground surface" and the underlying bedrock?b. During Initial licensing of the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, did the NRC consider that the seismic horizontal acceleration would be amplified from its value at the bedrock to the value used at the "ground" surface due to the type and thickness of the intervening soil between the bedrock and the "ground surface"?c. Does the NRC expect, based upon the regulations in I OCFR72.212(b)(2)(i)(B) and IOCFR72.212(b)(3), a licensee to incorporate new information and technology into its assessment of the continued appropriateness and re-application of the previous reactor plant seismic siting and design criteria for the design and construction of an ISFSI pad?d. Irrespective of the previous answers, should the NRC require the licensee to demonstrate that the irradiated fuel canister seismic design is appropriate, using ISFSI pad-specific seismic data, given that the calculated ISFSI horizontal acceleration is at the canister design limit without consideration of the increases expected due to the site-specific soil:profile and elevation?

15. Regarding intra-NRC coordination on these questions, NRC Region III staff spoke with NRR staff and others on April 29, 2005. NRR agreed to accept this issue as a Task Interface Agreement and to respond to this request 30 days after receipt, but at least prior to the next dry cask loading campaign, because the pad is not safe to hold the irradiated fuel. The Task Force Agreement Number is 2005-06.16. Upon request, I would be happy to identify the more than one dozen references referred to in the preparation of this declaration.

/s/ Dr. Ross Landsman[Signature] Date: 9-15-2005 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY In the Matter of Docket No. 50-255 NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY PALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Regarding the Renewal of Facility Operating License No. August 8, 2005 DPR-20 for a 20-Year Period REQUEST FOR HEARING AND PETITION TO INTERVENE Now come the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (hereinafter "NIRS"), West Michigan Environmental Action Council (hereinafter "WMEAC"), Don't Waste Michigan (hereinafter "DWM"), the Green Party of Van Buren County (hereinafter "Green Party"), the Michigan Land Trustees (all collectively known as Petitioners-Intervenors), and Ann Aliotta, Katherine Beck, Lee Burdick, Bruce Cutean, W. Ronald Elmore, Jane Gardner, Barbara Geisler, Karen Heavrin, Janine Heisel, Mary Lou Hession, Alice Hirt, Lauretta Holmes, Chuck Jordan, Judy Kamps, Gary Karch, Maynard Kaufman, Nelly Kurzmann, Nan Lewis, Michael Martin, Maria Ochs, Elizabeth Paxson, Ken Richards, Margaret Roche, Pamela S. Rups, James 0. Schlobohm, Sally P. Schlobohm, Catherine Sugas, Elizabeth M. Sugas, Robin Tinholt, Barbara Trumbull, and Sally Zigmond (collectively known as Member-Intervenors) and hereby make their REQUEST FOR A HEARING and PETITION TO INTERVENE in the captioned matter, pursuant to the Federal Register Notice of June 08, 2005 [Volume 70, Number 109, Page 33533-33535] and in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR § 2.714 and § 2.309.In support of their Request and Petition, said Intervenors further state as follows: 1. Nuclear Information and Resource Service is a nonprofit corporation with over 6000 members, a number of whom live in the Great Lakes Region of the United States, including over 100 in Michigan and 50 of whom make their residences within fifty (50) miles of the Palisades Nuclear Generating Station (hereinafter"Palisades"). The central office of NIRS is located at 1424 1 6 th Street NW, Suite 404, Washington, DC 20036.2. Western Michigan Environmental Action Council is a nonprofit, tax-exempt environmental organization started in the mid-1960's. It has 1500 members, most of whom live in Michigan, and an estimated 400 to 500 live within 50 miles of the Palisades nuclear plant.3. Don't Waste Michigan is a nonprofit organization begun in the 1980's with about 25 members, nearly all of whom live in Michigan, and of which an estimated 5 currently live within 50 miles of the Palisades nuclear plant.4. The Green Party of Van Buren County is a political party and association of persons which came into being around environmental issues. It has a membership of approximately 15 members, all of whom are residents of Van Buren County, Michigan, and all of whom reside within 50 miles of the Palisades nuclear plant.5. Michigan Land Trustees (website www.michiganlandtrust.org) was founded in 1976. It is an association of 60 to 70 individuals and families dedicated to preserving and protecting farm land in Michigan. Most of its members reside in southwest Michigan, at least 15 of whom live within the 50-mile zone around the Palisades nuclear reactor.6. Members of these organizations who live or have property and family within the 50-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) including the immediate area around the Palisades Nuclear Generating Station which is sited in Covert, Michigan have requested Nuclear Information and Resource Service, West Michigan Environmental Action Council, Don't Waste Michigan, the Green Party of Van Buren County and the Michigan Land Trustees (hereinafter "Petitioners") to represent them and their respective interests in this proceeding.

6. The Declarations of individuals Ann Aliotta, Katherine Beck, Lee Burdick, Bruce Cutean, W. Ronald Elmore, Jane Gardner, Barbara Geisler, Karen Heavrin, Janine Heisel, Mary Lou Hession, Lauretta Holmes, Chuck Jordan, Judy Kamps, Gary Karch, Maynard Kaufman, Nelly Kurzmann, Nan Lewis, Michael Martin, Maria Ochs, Elizabeth Paxson, Ken Richards, Margaret Roche, Pamela S. Rups, James 0. Schlobohm, Sally P. Schlobohm, Catherine Sugas, Elizabeth M. Sugas, Robin Tinholt, Barbara Trumbull, and Sally Zigmond are annexed to this Request and Petition, with each individual declarant identifying his or her affiliation with the petitioning organizations.

7. Petitioners-Intervenors, as organizational intervenors, believe that their members' interests will not be adequately represented without this action to intervene, and without the opportunity to participate as full parties in this proceeding.

if the Palisades Nuclear Generating Station license is renewed without resolving the Petitioners'-Itervenors' safety concerns and environmental issues, this nuclear generating station may operate unsafely and pose an unacceptable risk to the environment, thereby jeopardizing the health and welfare of the respective Petitioners'- Intervenors' members who live, recreate and have businesses within the vicinity of the nuclear power reactor.PETITIONERS' CONTENTIONS TECHNICAL/HEALTH/SAFETY ANALYSIS CONTENTIONS

1. The license renewal application is untimely and incomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement.

The Petitioners allege that the Palisades license renewal application is fundamentally deficient because it does not adequately address technical and safety issues arising out of the embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel and unresolved Pressure Thermal Shock ("PTS") concerns that might reasonably result in the failure of the reactor pressure vessel ("RPV"). The Palisades nuclear power station is identified as prone to early embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel, which is a vital safety component. As noted in the opinion of Petitioners' expert on embrittlement, Mr. Demetrios Basdekas, retired from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the longer Palisades operates, the more embrittled its RPV becomes, with decreasing safety margins in the event of the initiation of emergency operation procedures. Therefore, a hearing on the public health and safety effects of a prospective additional twenty years of operation, given the present and prospective embrittlement trend of the RPV is imperative to protecting the interests of those members of the petitioning organization who are affected by this proceeding.

2. Excessive radioactive and toxic chemical contamination in local drinking water due to emissions from Palisades nuclear power plant as part of its daily, "routine" operations.

The radioactive and toxic chemical emissions from the Palisades nuclear power plant into the waters of Lake Michigan contaminate the recently-installed drinking water supply intake for the City of South Haven, built just offshore from Van Buren State Park and just downstream from the Palisades reactor, due to the direction of the flow of Lake Michigan's waters and the very close proximity of the Palisades reactor to the South Haven drinking water supply intake.U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration models confirm the direction of water flow in Lake Michigan toward the intake. Petitioners-Intervenors hope to produce public records of toxics and radiation testing of the water source to evidence this public health problem.ENVIRON1ENTAL CONTENTIONS

3. The Palisades reactor has no place to store its overflowing irradiated nuclear fuel inventory within NRC regulations.

The indoor irradiated fuel storage pool reached capacity in 1993. But the outdoor dry cask storage pads at Palisades, both the older one nearer Lake Michigan and the newer one further inland, are in violation of NRC earthquake regulations. 10 CFR § 72.212(b) (2)(i) (B) requires that: Cask storage pads and areas have been designed to adequately support the static and dynamic loads of the stored casks, considering potential amplification of earthquakes through soil-structure interaction, and soil liquefaction potential or other soil instability due to vibratory ground motion. .According to Petitioners' anticipated expert, Dr. Ross Landsman, former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III dry cask storage inspector, the older pad violates the liquefaction portion of this regulation, and the new pad violates the amplification portion of the regulation. Petitioners contend that neither the older nor new dry cask storage pads at the Palisades plant were designed in consideration of the factors contained in the cited regulation.

4. The unloadable, unmovable dry storage cask #4 at Palisades.

In 1993, Consumers Power (now Consumers Energy) assured a federal district judge that if it encountered problems with loaded dry casks at Palisades, it would simply reverse the loading procedure and return the high-level radioactive waste to the storage pools. But the fourth cask loaded at Palisades, in June 1994, was shortly thereafter admitted by Consumers Power to be defective, having faulty welds. However, eleven years on, Consumers has yet to unload the defective cask, because it cannot. Petitioners state that Consumers perpetrated a fraud upon the court and the public, with the complicit support by the NRC, and has critically undermined its credibility as to any pledges about the safety of dry cask storage.The significance of this problem with cask #4 is considerable. For example, the configuration of the 18 to 19 dry casks currently stored on the older pad nearer Lake Michigan is such that the casks furthest back cannot be moved or unloaded until all other casks in front of them have been moved out of the way first. This configur-ation increases the risks, making it very difficult to address emergencies involving certain casks in the configuration in a timely manner.

5. There is no permanent repository for the nuclear waste which would be generated at Palisades after 2010.Any waste generated at Palisades after 2010 would be excess to the capacity of the proposed national dump at Yucca Mountain, Nevada according to U.S. Department of Energy projections in its Yucca Mountain Final Environmental Impact Statement (Feb. 2002), as revealed in Tables A-7 and A-8 on pages A-15 and A-16 of Appendix A.In fact, the waste generated at Palisades from 1971 to 2010 may also be excess to Yucca, in that the proposed dump maynever open. The State of Nevada maintains that NRC's "Nuclear Waste Confidence Decision" is erroneous, in that it biases NRC to favor the Yucca Mountain dump license lest it be proven wrong in its assurance to the public that a high-level radioactive waste geologic repository will open in the U.S. by 2025. Because so much uncertainty surrounds the Yucca Mountain dump proposal, as well as other high-level radioactive waste proposals, Petitioners-Intervenors contend that waste generated at Palisades during the 20 year license extension could very well be stored at Palisades indefinitely, a scenario inadequately addressed by the applicant and NRC.6. Intensifying sand erosion and avalanche risk around dry cask storage pads.The more casks loaded on the storage pads at Palisades, the more risk of erosion to the sand supporting the pads, given the large weight of the casks themselves (well over 100 tons each), weather related erosion of the sanddunes, as well as the erosion that will occur due to more severe weather impacts from the global climate crisis and climate de-stabilization.

Arresting erosion at both pads is important to safety and radiation containment over the long haul, given the proximity of the waters of Lake Michigan. The State of Michigan and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have designated the sand dunes upon which the older pad is located -so close to the waters of Lake Michigan -as a high-risk erosion zone.The Lake Michigan dunes are subject to "blow outs" where entire dunes are blown out during wind storms and lighting strikes. See F.Nori, P. Sholtz, and M. Bretz (Department of Physics, The University of Michigan), "Sound-Producing Sand Avalanches," Scientific American Vol. 277, No. 3 (September 1997). At Warren Dunes, some 35 miles south of Palisades, sand blowouts have been estimated to travel as much a one-quarter mile per day, exposing 5,000-year-old trees that have long since turned to charcoal. "Some chilling facts about Dunes history," http://www.nwitimes.com/articles/2005/07/25/news/region/0256d4c429632 b30862570460062843b.txt The Palisades dunes could, in a wind storm or lightning strike, shift, blow and cover the dry cask storage area. As weather patterns intensify (as anticipated) this potential for erosion will increase.Additionally, the dunes and shore line are geologically prone to sand avalanche. A sand avalanche coupled with a seismic event could compromise the integrity of one or more casks at Palisades.

7. Non-radiological persistent toxic burdens to area water sources.The impact of 20 additional years of pollution by toxics disclosed but not adequately controlled under requirements of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System will directly affect water quality of nearby sources, including Lake Michigan.

In 2000, for example, Palisades was found to be in "continuing noncompliance" for its apparent multiple misuses of Betz Clam-Trol in Lake Michigan for the dispersion of mussels and clams affecting the water intakes.See http://www.epa.gov/region5/water/weca/reports/mi4qtrOl.txt NPDES violations also contradicts the spirit, intention and explicit recommendation of The International Joint Commission. In its"Ninth Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality," the Commission's Recommendation

1. 16 (at p. 42) urges that "[g]overnments monitor toxic chemicals used in large quantities at nuclear power plants, identify radioactive forms of the toxic chemicals and analyze their impact on the Great Lakes ecosystem." MISCELLANEOUS CONTENTIONS

8. Increased embrittlement of re-used fuel rods as buffers to reduce embrittlement of RPV walls.To mitigate the prospect of increased embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), the Palisades operator uses previously-irradiated fuel to create a buffer next to the RPV wall.The second-use of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor core tends to weaken and damage the cladding on the fuel rods, making future waste handling, storage, and ultimate disposal -whether on-site at Palisades, in transport, and at future storage or dump sites-problematic.

It poses an elevated risk for the safety of Palisades workers and the general public. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Energy ("DOE") depends on the integrity of the fuel cladding as a means of preventing or minimizing the chances of unanticipated fissioning in storage casks or other units -in effect, as a means of delaying radiation releases into the groundwater at the Private Fuel Storage (Utah) and Yucca Mountain (Nevada) sites.8. Environmental justice denied by the continuing operations of Palisades. Palisades nuclear generating station is a the source of environmental justice violations. Located within a predominantly African-American and low-income township, Palisades provides woefully inadequate tax revenues to the host community, considering the large adverse impacts and risks the reactor inflicts. Palisades' African-American employees have traditionally been stuck in the dirtiest and most dangerous jobs at the reactor, with little to no prospects for promotion. Some of Palisades' African American employees have also experienced death threats at the work place, including nooses hung in their lockers or in public places to symbolize lynching, an attempt to silence their public statements for workplace justice.Palisades' license extension application also has inadequately addressed the adverse impacts that 20 additional years of operations and waste generation would have on the traditional land uses, spiritual, cultural, and religious practices, and treaty rights of various federally-recognized tribes in the vicinity of the plant and beyond, as well as effects upon non-federally recognized tribes governed by international law. Only three tribes were contacted by the NRC by August 8th, 2005, and invited to participate in the license extension proceedings, which effectively excluded a number of tribes within the 50-mile zone around the reactor. For this reason alone, the August 8, 2005 deadline for requesting a hearing to intervene against the Palisades license extension should be extended, until all tribes within the 50-mile zone and beyond, which have ties to the power plant site and its environs, are contacted. Also, Palisades' license extension application inadequately addresses the adverse socio-economic impacts of a catastrophic radiation release due to reactor core embrittlement leading to core rupture, as they would be found among the low-income Latin American agricultura l workforce of the Palisades area. Too, possible synergistic effects of such catastrophic radiation releases combined with the toxic chemical exposures these low income Latin-American agricultural workers already suffer on the job have not been evaluated. Finally, there is an unacceptable lack of Spanish language emergency evacuation instructions and notifications to serve the Spanish speaking Latino population within 50 miles of the Palisades reactor, especially migrant agricultural workers.9. Chronic emergency unpreparedness within EPZ.Emergency responders in the 50 mile zone around the Palisades nuclear reactor are inadequately trained and inadequately equipped to respond to a major radioactivity release during an accident or attack at the plant.Even with its shiny new fire trucks, Covert, Michigan does not have the staffing, equipage, training nor preparedness for a major radiological emergency. Covert's best, good as it is, is still no match for a chernobyl style fire. The remainder of the emergency planning zone is occupied by rural, volunteer fire departments, which have even less equipment and resources with which to work. Radiation monitors and radiation-protective gear are in short supply or unheard of. Isolation wards for radioactively contaminated victims (so they don't harm the doctors and nurses and other patients) are very rare or non-existent at most, probably all, hospitals within 50 miles.10. Economic damage in Palisades region in event of accident or attack on the power plant causing severe radiation release.Given that a severe radiation release from Palisades due to accident or attack would significantly damage the economic base of western Michigan, not only within the 50 mile zone around the reactor, but even beyond it, due to crops and products that would have to be destroyed, as well as the lingering stigma attached to western Michigan agricultural products after such a release, a Severe Accident Mitigation Analysis must be performed, publicized and circulated for public review and comment as a precondition to considering whether or not to grant a license extension.

11. Threats of terrorist attack and sabotage against the Palisades nuclear power plant.Located on the shoreline of Lake Michigan, the source of drinking water, fish, recreation, and other economic value to tens of millions of people downstream, Palisades represents a target for potentially catastrophic terrorist attack or sabotage intended to release large amounts of radioactivity into the Great Lakes basin.Palisades represents a radioactive bull's eye on the shore of 20% of the planet's surface fresh water, the Great Lakes. The operating reactor (containing many billions of curies of radioactivity) and high-level waste storage pool (containing tens to hundreds of millions of curies) are vulnerable to such attack, as are the outdoor dry storage casks, so highly visible stored in plain sight.12.Respectfully submitted for the Petitioners,/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry Lodge, Esq.Ohio Sup. Ct. #0029271 316 N. Michigan St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43624-1627 (419) 255-7552 Fax (419) 255-5852 tjlodge50@yahoo.com Kary Love, Esq.Executive Business Center 348 Waverly Road, Suite 2, Holland MI 49423 (616) 399-4408 Fax (616) 399-0868 Co-Counsel for all Petitioners-Intervenors and Member-Intervenors CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE/TRANSMISSION I hereby certify that the foregoing Request for Hearing and Petition to Intervene, along with five (5) Notices of Appearance, was sent this 8th day of August, 2005 via email only to the following:

Office of the Secretary United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff Email to Office of the Secretary

HEARINGDOCKET@nrc.gov Office of General Counsel United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Email OGCMailcenter@nrc.gov And that the same was sent via first-class mail on the 9 th of August, 2005 to: Jonathan Rogoff, Esq.Vice President Counsel & Secretary Nuclear Management Company LLC 700 First Street Hudson, WI 54016/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY In the Matter of Docket No. 50-255 NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY PALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Regarding the Renewal of Facility Operating License No. August 8, 2005 DPR-20 for a 20-Year Period NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF PAUL GUNTER Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b), Paul Gunter hereby enters an appearance on behalf of Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) and provides the following information:

1. I am Director of the Reactor Watchdog Project for Nuclear Information and Resource Service at 1424 1 6 th Street NW, Suite 404, Washington, DC 20036, Tel. 202 328 0002 and my email address is<pgunter@nirs.org>.

2. I have been appointed by NIRS to jointly represent the organization and its members in this proceeding.

/s/ Paul Gunter Paul Gunter 8/8/2005 Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY In the Matter of Docket No. 50-255 NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY PALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Regarding the Renewal of Facility Operating License No. August 8, 2005 DPR-20 for a 20-Year Period NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF MICHAEL KEEGAN FOR DON'T WASTE MICHIGAN Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b), Michael Keegan hereby enters an appearance on behalf of Don't Waste Michigan (DWM), and provides the following information:

1. I am Co-Chair of the board of Don't Waste Michigan at 2213 Riverside Drive, NE, Grand Rapids, MI 49505, phone (734) 735-6373 and my email address is <mkeeganj@comcast.net>.

2. I have been appointed by DWM to jointly represent the organization and its members in this proceeding.

/s/ Michael Keegan Michael Keegan 8/8/2005 Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY In the Matter of Docket No. 50-255 NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY PALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Regarding the Renewal of Facility Operating License No. August 8, 2005 DPR-20 for a 20-Year Period NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF ALICE HIRT FOR WESTERN MICHIGAN ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION COUNCIL Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b), Alice Hirt hereby enters an appearance on behalf of the Western Michigan Environmental Action Council (WMEAC), and provides the following information:

1. I am a member of WMEAC, the office of which is located at 1415 Wealthy Street, SE, Suite 280, Grand Rapids, MI 49506, phone (616) 335-3405 and my email address is <alicehirt@charter.net>.

2. I have been appointed by WMEAC to jointly represent the organization and its members in this proceeding.

/s/ Alice Hirt Alice Hirt 8/8/2005 Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY In the Matter of Docket No. 50-255 NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY PALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Regarding the Renewal of Facility Operating License No. August 8, 2005 DPR-20 for a 20-Year Period NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF CHUCK JORDAN FOR GREEN PARTY OF VAN BUREN COUNTY, MICHIGAN Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b), Chuck Jordan hereby enters an appearance on behalf of the Green Party of Van Buren County, Michigan, and provides the following information:

1. I am the Chairman of the Green Party of Van Buren County, the office of which is located at 50521 34th Avenue Bangor, MI 49013, phone (home) 269.427.8339 (cell) 269.271.2038, email <jordanc@btc-bci.com>.2. I have been appointed by the Green party to jointly represent the organization and its members in this proceeding.

/s/ Chuck Jordan Chuck Jordan 8/8/2005 Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY In the Matter of Docket No. 50-255 NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY PALISADES NUCLEARGENERATING STATION Regarding the Renewal of Facility Operating License No. August 8, 2005 DPR-20 for a 20-Year Period NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF MAYNARD KAUFMAN FOR MICHIGAN LAND TRUSTEES Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b), Maynard Kaufman hereby enters an appearance on behalf of the Michigan Land Trustees and provides the following information: I am a member of the Michigan Land Trustees. My office is located at my home, 25485 County Road 681, Bangor, MI 49013.2. I have been appointed by the Michigan Land Trustees to jointly represent the organization and its members in this proceeding. /s/ Maynard Kaufman Maynard Kaufman 8/8/2005 Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board)In the Matter of) Docket No. 50-255-LR NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY PALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING ) ASLBP No. 05-842-03-LR STATION)Regarding the Renewal of Facility Operating License No. DPR-20 for a 20-Year Period ) September 16, 2005 PETITIONERS' COMBINED REPLY TO NRC STAFF AND NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY ANSWERS Now come the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, et al., Petitioners-Intervenors herein (and hereinafter referred to as "Petitioners"), by and through counsel, and respond to the "NRC Staff Answer Opposing Petition to Intervene and Request for Hearing" (hereinafter referred to "Staff Answer"), and to the "Nuclear Management Company's Answer to the August 8, 2005 Request for Hearing and Petition to Intervene" (hereinafter referred to as "NMC Answer"). Petitioner respond in opposition to those portions of the respective Answers which deny the admissibility of Petitioners' proffered contentions. ARGUMENT Preliminary Note As To Standing Issues Nuclear Management Company raises no objections to the standing of the sundry Intervenors. NMC Answer p. 2. The Staff quibbles, not about the standing of the Intervenors, but only that the Organizational Intervenors have failed to demonstrate that they have-I-organizational standing. Staff Answer pp. 7-8. Because they are assured that some combination of their numbers has standing to raise the pending contentions, the Petitioners/Intervenors will make no further arguments on the standing issue, but instead will defer to the Board to render a final determination. Response as to Contention No. 1 (The license renewal application is untimely and incomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement) NMC and NRC staff have argued that Contention 1 regarding the Application's proposed management of the embrittlement of the Palisades reactor pressure vessel is inadmissible because the Contention (i) fails to challenge the Application and demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute on a material issue of fact or law; (ii) fails to provide a factual basis to support any dispute with the application, and; (iii) improperly challenges Commission regulation. These assertions are incorrect.

1) The embrittlement contention is within the scope of the proceeding The extended operation of the Palisades nuclear steam supply system falls squarely under 10 CFR § 54.21 and § 54.29(a) which focuses on the management of aging of certain systems, structures, and components and the review of time-limited aging evaluations.

A genuine dispute exists within the Application that is germane to the health and safety of the petitioners who live, work and recreate out to 50 miles from the Palisades nuclear power station in Covert, Michigan.The Palisades Reactor Pressure Vessel is the subject component. There is no safety redundancy to this single largest component in the Palisades nuclear steam supply system.Palisades is arguably one of the most embrittled reactor pressure vessels, if not the most embrittled vessel, in the United States. The nuclear steam supply system for Palisades was the first of the Combustion Engineering line licensed for construction. Documentation as early as 1970 identifies Surveillance specimens in the vessel will be used to monitor the radiation damage during the life of the plant. If these specimens reveal changes that affect the safety of the plant, the reactor vessel will be annealed to reduce radiation damage effects. The results of annealing will be confirmed by tests on additional surveillance specimens provide for this purpose. Prior to the accumulation of a peak fluence of 10 E 19 nvt (>1 Mev) on the rector vessel wall, the Regulatory Staff should reevaluate the continued suitability of the currently proposed startup, cool down, and operating conditions. 1 Exhibit 1-A. All exhibits are found in "Petitioners' Appendix of Evidence in Support of Contentions" (Pet. App.), a copy of which is provided with this response in hard copy to the ASLB and the parties.The Petitioners have been able to establish that the licensee could not provide surveillance materials for critical weld material in the Palisades vessel beltline welds in 1994.2 See Exhibit 1-B.A commitment was made for the Palisades plant as early as 1970 to make actual physical efforts by annealing the vessel to restore ductility should any "radiation damage" affecting plant safety be discovered. In fact, calculations later recognized by NRC staff concluded that the Palisades vessel could have surpassed its Pressure Thermal Shock ("PTS")limits as early as 1995. Repeated Palisades re-analyses have produced a widening range of resulting estimates for exceeding vessel embrittlement limits with a very broad range of uncertainty (as much as +/- 25%) with as many PTS values for the severely-embrittled reactor vessel. Palisades has neared the maximum-embrittlement goalposts time and again over the years, 3 but each time they have been moved back following rejiggering of the assumptions and'Report on Palisades Plant, Letter from Joseph Hendrie (ACRS) to Glen Seaborg, Chair AEC, January 27, 1970.2 Palisades Thermal Shock, NRC Staff Presentation to the ACRS, Viewgraphs, December 09, 1994, p.3.3"For example that is sort of a summary of the regulatory framework that applies to annealing. With regard to Palisades, we completed an evaluation in April of 1995 in which we concluded that they would reach the screening criteria. At least they were okay until 1999. That evaluation was consistent with the 50.61, the Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule. The current license for Palisades expires in 2007 so they would fall somewhat short of the current operating license with regard to the life of the vessel." calculations. In 1995, fox example, the NRC staff noted that the "Palisades RPV... is predicted to reach the PTS screening criteria by late 1999, before any other plant." NRC Generic Letter 92-01, Revision 1, Supplement 1: Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity (May 19, 1995) (Exhibit 1-J). The most recently-recognized estimates project that the current PTS criteria will be exceeded in 2014, which is early in the proposed 20-year license extension period.The Applicant asserts that NRC approved methodology was used to perform neutron fluence calculations consistent with Regulatory Guide § 1.190 and described in WCAP-15353,"Palisades Reactor Pressure Vessel Fluence Evaluation." The Applicant argues that "at the appropriate time, prior to exceeding the PTS screening criteria, Palisades will select the optimum alternative to manage PTS in accordance with NRC regulations, and will make the applicable submittals to obtain NRC review and approval."' 4 The Applicant argues that with respect to addressing technical issues relating to neutron irradiation embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel that the Applicant adopts the third measure set forth in 10 CFR §54.21(c)(1) to disposition the issue -i.e., adequate management of the effects of neutron irradiation embrittlement -for the period of extended operation. The content of technical information of an application is set forth in 10 CFR § 54.21 to include a review of systems, structures and components subject to an aging management review to include the reactor vessel, the core shroud and component supports. 10 CFR §54.21 (c)(1) stipulates an evaluation of time-limited aging analyses where the applicant must demonstrate (i) the analyses remain valid for the period of extended operation; (ii) the analyses"Briefing on Annealing Demonstration Project," NRC Public Meeting, August 27, 1996.4"Application for Renewed Operating License for Palisades Nuclear Generating Station," Nuclear Management Company, March 22, 2005, ADAMS Accession Number ML050940446, p. 4-15. have been projected to the end of the period of extended operation; (iii) the effects of aging on the intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of operation. Under the current rule (10 CFR § 50.61), three courses of action can be taken to manage aging of the reactor vessel: 1) The operator shall implement flux reduction programs that are reasonably practicable to avoid exceeding the PTS screening criteria;2) For those plants where no "reasonable flux reduction program will prevent RTpts from exceeding the PTS screening criterion" the operator can take a look at plant-specific evaluation of plant systems, thermal hydraulics, reactor vessel design, etc. This analysis must be submitted at least three years before RTpts is projected to exceed the PTS screening criteria; or;3) Anneal the pressure vessel as provided under 10 CFR § 50.66, or the annealing rule and Regulatory Guide § 1.162, which provides guidance on how to implement the annealing rule.There is a requirement that a licensee that desires to anneal the reactor vessel must submit a thermal annealing report 3 years before actually performing the annealing. This thermal report has four major sections in it. One is an operating plan basically identifying how annealing is to be performed. The Petitioners do not agree that the current rule necessarily affords an either/or choice to be made by the company, as with choosing from a Whitman's Sampler box of candy, but rather, that it contemplates a combination of efforts in concert to achieve the largest margins of safety. The Petitioners further suggest that the operative words in 10 CFR § 50.61(b)(4) [where there is "no reasonably practicable flux reduction program" to prevent exceeding the PTS criteria] require, not only consideration of the financial interests of the utility, but that the regulation is heavily weighted in the direction of considering public safety. Hence the Petitioners dispute licensee's assertion in the Application ( page 4-10) that: The flux to the reactor vessel would have to be reduced by an additional factor of 3 in order to reach March 24, 2031. Some additional flux reduction could conceivably be achieved by installation of additional shield assemblies and/or flux suppression devices (e.g. hafnium inserts). Flux reduction of the magnitude required at Palisades would require far more extraordinary measures, such as the installation of neutron shields on the exterior of the core support barrel. It is unlikely that a plant modification of this magnitude would be cost-effective. (Emphasis added)It is highly likely that NMC would pursue alternative solutions rather than rely on flux reduction to extend the reactor vessel life. Other alternatives that would be considered would include completion of the safety analysis as specified in 10 CFR § 50.61 (b)(4), and thermal annealing treatment as specified in 10 CFR § 50.61(b)(7). Any alternative that NMC may propose in the future to extend the life of the Palisades reactor vessel would, of necessity, be discussed thoroughly with the NRC and would be subject to formal NRC review and approval before it could be implemented. The ultimate method used to manage PTS for extended plant operation would be governed by NRC regulations independently from the license renewal process." 5 The Petitioners also dispute that part of the Application where the licensee states (p. 4-15) in its Analysis that "The current pressure/temperature analyses are valid beyond the current operating license period, but not to the end of the period of extended operation. These analyses are estimated to expire in 2014."' The licensee admits in its Application that it seeks to limit an aging management strategy as required in 10 CFR § 54.21(c)(1)(iii) and adopt a subset of the established management strategies as established by 10 CFR § 50.61 for fracture toughness requirements to protect against pressurized thermal shock events based on 5/d., p. 4-10.6 Id., p. 4-15. economic considerations to the licensee. It does so, however, without adequately demonstrating that the proposed alternatives can confidently address and mitigate advancing embrittlement and the associated higher Pressure Thermal Shock values any better than the licensee's admitted inability to reduce, cost-effectively, an increasing safety-significant risk to the public through flux reduction programs. Petitioners argue that all of these management strategies are in place to provide reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be protected, first and foremost, and that they are not mere options to be predicated on consideration of the company's financial bottom line.Petitioners submit that an effective and reliable management plan for a twenty-year extension must begin with the incorporation of all NRC management strategies as outlined under 10 CFR § 50.61, including fluence reduction efforts, not just the company's perceived cost-effective ones. This is particularly germane to Palisades, as the NRC staff has recognized through a broad set of calculations and associated uncertainties in determining the actual severity of the embrittlement that the vessel might have exceeded the PTS criterion as early as 1995 or might, according to later questionable estimations, exceed as late as 2014. That would be three (3) years into the 20-year license extension period sought by NMC.The Applicant has already abandoned a previous commitment to anneal the severely embrittled Palisades pressure vessel, discussed infra. Petitioners are unsure whether the Applicant abandoned its previous commitment to anneal the Palisades reactor pressure vessel because of economic considerations, or because of operational issues and risks associated with re-embrittlement of annealed beltline welds. NMC instead now relies on a complex re-analysis to assure safety margins in the physically-deteriorating reactor pressure vessel. The requisite labyrinth of computer models that has resulted has been subjected to much healthy skepticism from the NRC's own Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. In light of these problems, petitioners suggest that it is unreasonable for the Applicant to forego Flux Reduction programs for the extension period which might reasonably reduce the risk to public health and safety from a Pressure Thermal Shock accident potentially occurring during the same license extension period without demonstrating with a high degree of confidence that alternative approaches, including the option of annealing the vessel, can adequately preserve required public safety margins in the extension period.Instead, the Application seeks less costly and undemonstrated efforts for the extension period by vaguely proposing to alternately;

1) incorporate another embrittlement and PTS re-analysis which is recognized by significant uncertainties that potentially seek to merely pencil whip a worsening safety issue with narrowing safety margins for the proposed extension period or;2) resort to a yet-to-be demonstrated effective annealing of the reactor pressure vessel, a process which the same operator had already previously committed to in 1995 and abandoned in 1997.The applicant's statement that it can abandon actual physical and operational measures to reduce the neutron fluence affecting embrittlement of the pressure vessel raises an undue public risk from a Pressure Thermal Shock event.Therefore, the Petitioners suggest that under current established management strategy Palisades may have already exceeded the current PTS criteria or if not, will exceed the criteria early in the proposed license renewal period (viz., 2014). It is therefore unreasonable and unacceptable for the Application to foreclose options within its established management strategy for economic reasons without first being required to demonstrate with confidence that the proposed alternatives adequately provide for the public's protection from this significant ongoing and potentially worsening age-associated safety issue.

Petitioners are particularly concerned that safety focused measures such as Flux Reduction Programs at Palisades fall victim to the economic imperative to keep the reactor operating even at unacceptably reduced margins of safety rather than make much-need investments. This controversy is an historical problem at Palisades. The New York Times reported April 12, 1992 on a comment by then-NRC Chairman Ivan Selin on the vulnerability of Palisades to early closure because of embrittlement: Mr. Selin said it was unlikely that any utility would decide to close a plant that was running smoothly and was not in immediate need of any big investment. But if a plant required a large investment, he said, 'that could push it over the brink.' In that category he put the Consumers Power Company's Palisades plant, near South Haven, Mich., which opened in 1971, where the reactor pressure vessel may now be brittle, the same weakness that was suspected at Yankee Rowe. .. .Exhibit 1-C.There is a grave issue of law here: whether the economically-dictated priorities of Palisades, or the health and safety concerns of the Petitioners, conform to NRC regulations. A Licensing Board should not address the merits of a contention when determining its admissibility. Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 541 (1986); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), ALAB-868, 25 NRC 912, 933 (1987); What is required is that an intervenor state the reasons for its concern. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Aliens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980).The Petitioners have stated reasons for their concern. The Board should conclude that the Application is deficient and should be rejected."Cheap and Abundant Power May Shutter Some Reactors," Matt Wald, New York Times, April 14, 1992.

2) There are many factual disputes affecting public health and safety Palisades Nuclear Power Station is a Combustion Engineering Pressurized Water Reactor identified as one of the earlier reactor vessels of greater concern whose current 40-year license expires in 2011 after being granted a four-year recapture period.As NIRS has pointed out in its earlier publication, "The Aging of Nuclear Power Plants, A Citizen's Guide to Causes and Effects": Irradiation embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) may be the single most important factor in determining the operating life of a Pressurized Water Reactor.The design of pressure vessels is generally the same for all PWRs generally constructed from 8 inch thick steel plates, formed and welded to create the vessel structure.

The major age-related mechanism associated with this component is embrittlement. Embrittlement is the loss of ductility, i.e, the ability of the pressure vessel metals to withstand stress without cracking. It is caused by neutron bombardment of the vessel metal and is contingent upon the amount of copper and nickel in the metal and the extent of neutron exposure or fluence. As the metal in the reactor pressure vessel is bombarded with radiation, high-energy atomic particles pass through the steel wall. In doing so, these atoms collide with atoms in the metal and knock them out of position. Over time this results in the loss of ductility. In an unirradiated vessel the metal loses its ductility at about 40 degrees Fahrenheit. As the vessel becomes embrittled, the temperature at which it loses its ductility rises. This change in the mechanical properties of the metal from ductile to brittle is characterized as the 'reference temperature for nil ductility transition' or RTndt.Thus as the reactor ages and the pressure vessel is exposed to more radiation, the RTndt can shift from its original 40 degree F to as much as 280-290 degrees F or more in extreme cases.8 From Exhibit 1-D.The embrittlement of the all-important reactor pressure vessel, which has no redundant safety feature in a nuclear power station, is of even greater concern to those plants constructed prior to 1972. Palisades was issued its construction license in 1967. According to thermal shock experts within Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), there is an 8 The Aging of Nuclear Power Plants: A Citizen's Guide to Causes and Effects, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 1988, Chapter IV, " Embrittlement of Reactor Pressure Vessels and Reactor Pressure Vessel Supports in Pressurized Water Reactors," p. 19. indeterminate amount of susceptible copper in the metal walls of these older vessels and in the weld material used, to join the vessel plates.The significance of embrittlement of the vessel component and the shift in RTndt is the increased susceptibility to pressurized thermal shock (PTS). Pressurized thermal shock occurs when the reactor pressure vessel is severely overcooled. RPV technical specifications generally limit the cool down to a rate of 1000 F per hour. During an overcooling event (i.e., pipe break) the vessel may experience a drop in temperature of several hundred degrees per hour. This extreme drop in temperature can send a thermal shock through the vessel wall. As the vessel is overcooled there is a drop in the pressure of the primary coolant loop. This rapid decrease in the pressure of primary coolant cause the high pressure injection pumps in the Emergency Core Cooling System to automatically inject coolant into the primary loop. As the injection of coolant repressurizes the RPV, the vessel is subject to pressure stresses. The stresses placed on the RPV by overcooling and repressurization cause the Pressure Thermal Shock.Pressure Thermal Shock can be initiated by numerous accidents, including: control system malfunctions, small, medium and large break loss of coolant accidents including main steam line break, feed water pipe break, and steam generator tube ruptures. Any of these events can initiate a PTS event, but as long as the fracture resistance of the reactor pressure vessel material and welds remains high, i.e., RTndt values remain low, such transients are considered unlikely to cause vessel failure. However, the reduction of fracture resistance within the RPV wall and weld materials, severe overcooling accompanied by repressurization can cause pre-existing flaws in the inner surface of the RPV to propagate into cracks which can go through the vessel wall resulting in the associated uncontrollable loss of coolant water over the reactor core. For failure of the RPV to occur a number of factors must be present: 1) the vessel must have a flaw of sufficient size to propagate and a typical vessel can have thousands of varied-sized flaws;2) the vessel material must be susceptible to irradiation embrittlement due to copper and nickel content;3) the vessel must be sufficiently irradiated to cause a decrease in ductility, represented by an increase in the RTndt value;4) an event must initiate a severe overcooling transient with repressurization;

5) the resulting crack must be of such size and location that the RPV's ability to maintain core cooling is affected.Petitioners believe it more likely than not that some or all of these factors are present at Palisades, as they articulate below. Petitioners believe they have provided quite sufficient information to establish the existence of a genuine dispute with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact, as required by 10 CFR § 2.309(f)(1

)(v) (formerly § 2.714(b)(2)(iii)). See Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-9121, 33 NRC 419, 422-24 (1991), appeal dismissed, CLI-92-3, 35 NRC 63 (1992); Arizona Public Service Co.(Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), CLI-91-12, 34 NRC 149, 155-56 (1991); Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-02-4, 55 NRC 49, 64-68 (2002).A. Significant flaws are likely to exist on the surface of the Palisades reactor pressure vessel wall and considerable uncertainty exists to dispute assumptions with regard to the extent that these flaws can contribute to making PTS events increasingly risk-significant. The Petitioners have significant safety-related concerns with regard to the uncertainty that exists with the analyzed flaw distribution in the Palisades reactor pressure vessel. As documented in transcripts as recent as 2004, the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards shares in those concerns and disputed flaw distribution assumptions: Dr. Wallis [ACRS]: This flaw distribution is based on rather skimpy evidence.This is one of the areas where---I mean, heat transfer Dittus-Boelter if you believe that.It's based on data points. But the flow [sic "flaw"] distribution in these walls is based on a few examinations. Isn't it?Mr Ericksonkirk [NRC RES]: A few examinations but infinitely more than we had the first time.Dr. Wallis: It's much better than you had the first time.Mr. Ericksonkirk: Much better than we had the first time. I think as a laboratory geek at heart I have to admit I would really like to have more data on this and I don't think there's anybody in the technical community that would disagree with this. But I think that it's also important to recognize that the flaw distribution doesn't rest on experimental evidence alone. Certainly we started with -excuse me. We start with experimental evidence both from destructive and nondestructive evaluations but that's then also bolstered by --Dr. Wallis: But those are individual reactors' vessels.Mr. Ericksonkirk: That's right.Dr. Wallis: But there are a hundred reactor vessels. I don't know how convincing it is that the flaw distribution that you might measure in a couple of vessels which were taken apart is typical of all other vessels.Mr. Ericksonkirk: No. I think it would be unfair to say that a single experimental distribution derived from two vessels could be just looked at and thought to be representative of the other vessels.'Excerpted from Exhibit 1-E.B. The Petitioners urge that Palisades reactor pressure vessel is susceptible to irradiation embrittlement due at least to its copper/nickel/phosphorus content and dispute assumptions that regard the viability of reactor vessel sampling of susceptible materials and the associated RTndt /RTpts assumptions specific to Palisades reactor pressure vessel.Palisades does not have representative samples of susceptible materials for surveillance requirements of its reactor pressure vessel, including the weld material in the Official Transcript of NRC Proceeding, ACRS Joint Subcommittees: Materials and Metallurgy Thermal Hydraulic Phenomenon Reliability and Probablistic Risk Assessment Meeting, December 01, 2004, p. 15 line 1 7-p. 16, line 25. vulnerable beltline welds. Palisades' assumptions on the material contaminants in the vessel and weld materials are based on questionable extrapolations of generic industry data and materials taken from weld material in Palisades' discarded steam generator which arguably did not experience the same level of adverse operational conditions as those degrading the reactor vessel beltline welds.Further, adequate analysis of the Palisades beltline welds has been problematic due to uncertainties in determining the copper, nickel and phosphorous content of the susceptible materials. In 1994, NRC staff at one point clashed with ABB Combustion Engineering staff who had refused to divulge data on reactor vessel weld integrity that the vendor on proprietary grounds that the company wanted to keep confidential. NRC said that it might need to compel CE to release the data.1 0 Exhibit 1-F.C. Petitioners dispute the viability of NMC assumptions regarding the degree to which Palisades pressure vessel materials have been degraded due to radiation-induced embrittlement and suggest that significant uncertainty exists with regard to the degraded state of the vessel, represented by an increase in its RTndt and RTpts values, for them to be accurately used as a reference point for an additional twenty-year extension. The Applicant has over the years set forth many re-evaluations of the Palisades Rtndt and RTpts values with a wide range of findings and uncertainty as to bring into question the viability of the degree of embrittlement of the Palisades reactor pressure vessel in its current condition to withstand a PTS event. The petitioners dispute the Applicants' claim that "The current pressure/temperature analyses are valid beyond the current operating license period, but not to the end of the period of extended operation. These analyses are estimated to expire in 2014."11 0 Palisades Could Reach Its PTS Screening Limit Earlier Than Expected," Inside NRC, December 12, 1994, p. 13.1 Palisades Application, p. 4-15 Petitioners are aware of NRC communications which raise this dispute with regard to the NMC assertions that they do not exceed PTS screening criteria until 2014: From: Stephanie Coffin To: Hoffman, Stephen Date: 11/24/04 3:05PM

Subject:

Palisades phone call We had a phone call with them Monday.They no longer plan on submitting an exemption to apply "Master Curve" at their facility.Instead, they will be managing it in accordance with the May 27, 2004 guidance from Reyes to the Commissioners. They are following Point Beach and Beaver Valley closely.I gave them feedback especially about the flux reduction requirements of the current rule and suggested they review the Point Beach submittal and our associated SER with Open Items, and to check for applicability to their plant.FYI for Matt and Barry and Neil: If they see that the new PTS rule will not be published in time for them (they currently exceed the screening criteria in 2014 -I don't know if we agree with that), they will submit the Master Curve exemption in 2007.Stephanie CC: Duvigneaud, Dylanne; Elliot, Barry; Mitchell, Matthew; Ray, Nihar; Stang, John 1 2 Exhibit 1 -G. Petitioners contend that at best, whether or not Palisades has exceeded its RTpts remains inconclusive and at worst RTpts were exceeded as early as 1995 or 2001. As such, the petitioners dispute that the licensee has established an accurate and reliable reference temperature point for Palisades pressure vessel RTndt and RTpts values as a basis for extending Palisades operations for an additional 20-year period.D. The petitioners contend that a significant dispute exists with regard to NMC assumptions on the low probability of an event to initiate a severe overcooling transient with repressurization such that the resulting crack will be of such size and location as to make the probability of a significant Palisades vessel fracture acceptably small S 2 Notes from NRC Telephone Call, "Palisades phone call," 11/24/2004, ML043340206. NMC relies heavily upon assumptions that the probability of an initiating event is acceptably small, as do other pressurized water reactor operators. Given the associated uncertainty with the actual degradation of the Palisades reactor pressure vessel, the Petitioners submit that to take any comfort that the "big one" is not going to occur is uncomfortably remniscent of the lack of an effective governmental response to the inadequate levees around New Orleans based on the improbability of conditions leading to the Gulf Coast city encountering a hurricane greater than Category Ill.This type of accident is beyond the design basis of Palisades Nuclear Power Station, namely its safety systems, including the emergency core cooling system and the containment, which are not designed to withstand cracks in the pressure vessel resulting in the inability to sufficiently cool the reactor core and reactor core damage.3) The petitioners dispute the Applicant's assertion that it can optionally anneal the embrittled vessel, given the lack of a demonstrated effective annealing process for any irradiated commercial reactor pressure vessels and the applicant's abandonment of a prior commitment for annealing the Palisades reactor pressure vessel that make the abandonment of Flux Reduction efforts for economic considerations unreasonable Annealing, while a routine process in metallurgy, is acknowledged to be complicated by reactor pressure vessel radioactivity. For Palisades it would involve heating the beltline weld and perhaps the axial welds or some vessel plates to about 8500 F for approximately a week or more. Even then, early estimates as to how long an annealing repair will last is a matter of debate and depend on a number of factors. Alan Hiser, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was attributed to say "If the material is a weld, rather than a plate, the annealing repair will be less effective and the re-embrittlement faster. The chemistry of the material is crucial, as well -- steels or welds containing nickel or copper are more subject to embrittlement and re-embrittlement."' 3 Exhibit 1-H.Palisades has previously announced plans to anneal the reactor pressure vessel but has taken no action. On January.5, 1995, Consumers Power Company informed its employees that the Palisades reactor would reach its PTS screening criteria limit as early as 1996. Consumers Power then announced plans to anneal the Palisades vessel by the year 2000.14 Palisades operators met with the NRC Commission Chairman on May 11, 1995 regarding its planned annealing operation." 5 While the Applicant refers to annealing of the pressure vessel to mitigate the severely embrittled component as an option it can take up at the "appropriate time," in fact, the Applicant withdrew its original request for further NRC staff review of its Preliminary Thermal Annealing Report as the company disclosed that it no longer had plans to anneal the embrittled vessel in 1998.16 NRC and the nuclear industry had an opportunity to test the annealing process on the irradiated decommissioned Yankee Rowe nuclear reactor pressure vessel but took no such action, instead Yankee Atomic Corporation used the badly embrittled vessel as a nuclear waste container for burial in Barnwell, South Carolina. While the NRC and industry have referred to the Yankee Atomic vessel as atypical of other commercial vessels, a valuable opportunity to test the annealing process on an irradiated specimen was a lost opportunity for"1 Outlook for Life Extension, Special Report to the Readers of Nucleonics Week, Inside NRC and NuclearFuel," April 11, 1991 p. 10.4 "Consumers May Anneal Palisades' Vessel-A U.S. First," Nucleonics Week, January 12, 1995, p. 1.Meeting Summary between the Chairman and Consumers Power Co., US NRC, Microfiche Address 84015:231-84015:231." Consumers Energy Co. (formerly Consumers Power Co.) Withdraws Request for Further Staff Review of Preliminary Thermal Annealing Report, April 24, 1997, US NRC PDR, Microform Addresses: 92745:358-92745:359. the entire industry. As a result, there is no experience with annealing severely-embrittled commercial power reactors in the United States which, coupled with the Applicant's abandonment of Flux Reduction Programs and the unreliability of the Applicant's past safety analysis, renders the Application deficient and deserving of rejection.

4) The Petitioners argue that Contention 1 on the Palisades embrittlement and PTS issue is not an improperly challenge to Commission rulings The Petitioners have valid and proper concerns regarding consistent, thorough and viable analysis and documentation of Pressure Thermal Shock values calculated by both the industry and the NRC for Palisades, which is arguably one of the most embrittled reactors in the United States. Since 1981, the Palisades pressure vessel has been at the forefront of the embrittlement controversy and associated safety concerns for a Pressure Thermal Shock accident.The Palisades nuclear power station pressure vessel has been analyzed and re-analyzed by NRC and projected to exceed its Pressure Thermal Shock Screening Criteria in numerous time frames:> April 03, 1989, Consumers Power provided a revised report on reactor vessel fluence for operational cycles 1 through 8 in association with its vessel fluence reduction report. "It concludes that the PTS screening criteria will be exceeded at the axial welds in September 2001 as opposed to the previously reported exceed date of March 2002.17 Exhibit 1-1.Consumers Power Company (Now CMS) acknowledges a calculational uncertainty of + / -25%in estimating the calculated vessel wall fluence, this is said to be typical of current neutron transport methodology uncertainties.

Consumers reported: '7 Compliance with Pressurized Thermal Shock Regulation 10CFR50.61 and Regulatory Guide 1.99 Revision 2 (TAC No. 59970), Consumers Power, May 17, 1990, p. 1. A number of factors contribute to the uncertainty in the projected peak fast fluence at the reactor vessel wall. These factors are due to the conversion of measured activity data to fluxes, uncertainties in material composition, neutron cross sections, power distributions, as-built core/vessel dimensions and cycle-by-cycle variation in the fast flux lead factors.1 8> In the October 28, 1994 revision of NRC's "Status of Reactor Pressure Vessel Issues" (SECY 94-267) reports the staff indicated that the Palisades Pressure Vessel would reach the pressurized thermal shock (PTS) screening criteria in the year 2004.19> In a revision in November 1994, NRC staff reported that:[T]he staff was informed of preliminary data from the retired steam generators that indicates the Palisades reactor pressure vessel could reach the PTS screening criteria earlier than 2004. The licensee is continuing to evaluate the new data and to gather additional materials properties from its retired steam generators. If the preliminary data are confirmed, the plant would reach the PTS screen criteria at the next outage in May 1995.20> On January 24, 1995 in a NRC meeting on "Materials Issues in Palisades PTS Evaluation," the Palisades PTS criteria is again referenced and revised in staff view graphs stating: "November 1, 1994, licensee informed staff that data from SG [steam generators] welds -Indicated higher copper contents than previously assumed -Indicated higher RTndt than mean generic value- Licensee assessment indicated reaching PTS screening criteria in 1999. 021> On November 24, 2004, a documented NRC telephone conversation further enlightens the ongoing uncertainty and inconsistency of estimating a still elusive timetable for exceeding the public safety-related criteria: From: Stephanie Coffin 8 1d., p. 33.q "Status of Reactor Pressure Vessel Issues," SECY-94-267, US NRC, October 28, 1994 (Exhibit 1-K).2-"ltems of Interest," Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Week Ending November 04, 1994 (Exhibit 1-L)..21 "Materials Issues in Palisades PTS Evaluation," Presented to NSRRC Subcommittee on Materials and Engineering, US NRC, January 24, 1995 (Exhibit 1-M). To: Hoffman, Stephen Date: 11/24/04 3:05PM

Subject:

Palisades phone call We had a phone call with them Monday.They no longer plan on submitting an exemption to apply "Master Curve" at their facility.Instead, they will be managing it in accordance with the May 27, 2004 guidance from Reyes to the Commissioners. They are following Point Beach and Beaver Valley closely.I gave them feedback especially about the flux reduction requirements of the current rule and suggested they review the Point Beach submittal and our associated SER with Open Items, and to check for applicability to their plant.FYI for Matt and Barry and Neil: If they see that the new PTS rule will not be published in time for them (they currently exceed the screening criteria in 2014 -I don't know if we agree with that), they will submit the Master Curve exemption in 2007.Stephanie CC: Duvigneaud, Dylanne; Elliot, Barry; Mitchell, Matthew; Ray, Nihar; Stang, John" 2 2[The petitioners note that the referenced May 27, 2004 communication from Reyes to the Commissioners regarding Palisades management plan is not available to the public through NRC ADAMS.]Palisades values for exceeding the PTS criteria have been extremely fluid, back and forth, with significant disparity in the year that the criteria is exceeded. The lack of consistent reliable analyses of the rate and level of embrittlement, complicated by the lack of viable Palisades-specific in-vessel sampling materials, together with dependence on generic industry data, demonstrate the unreliability of data used to establish Palisades' compliance with the screening criteria and subsequent effective mitigation actions for the license extension period.22 Notes from NRC Telephone Call, "Palisades phone call," 11/24/2004, ML043340206, Exhibit 1-G. This contention arises from evidence contained within the NRC's Staff contacts with the affected utility. The bases for a contention need not originate with the petitioner. Petitioners here properly may base their contention on NRC Staff letters to an applicant, so long as there is an adequate explanation of how alleged deficiencies support its contention and that there is additional information in support. Louisiana Energy Services L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-91-41, 34 NRC 332, 338-339 (1991). See Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-92-23, 36 NRC 120, 136 (1992), appeal granted in part and remanded, CLI-93-3, 37 NRC 135 (1993).5) The significant uncertainty represents a dispute of fact that undermines confidence in Palisades treatment of PTS values for the License Renewal Process The Palisades nuclear power station one of four U.S. reactor sites participating in the development of models for developing the technical basis for the revision of the PTS Rule. A review of transcripts of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Joint Subcommittees Materials and Metallurgy and Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena and Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment reveals substantial and significant uncertainties with regard to capturing and bounding public safety risk associated with ongoing operations further complicated by the twenty year license extension in three major technical areas: probabilistic fracture mechanics, thermal hydraulics and probabilistic risk assessment. NRC staff went to the ACRS in November 2004, seeking a letter of endorsement of the staff effort to revise the current PTS rule. The revised PTS screening criteria is incomplete and fraught with uncertainty. According to the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, in its Conclusions and Recommendations on NUREG-1809 "Thermal-Hydraulic Evaluation of Pressure Thermal Shock "should be substantially revised." 2 3 There are numerous citations in the ACRS transcripts that underscore the uncertainty that prompted the ACRS' call for the substantial revision of the technical basis for on Thermal-Hydraulic Evaluation of Pressure Thermal Shock.5) There is a lack of transparency and an incomplete record of NRC processes and documents which potentially affect the Palisades License Renewal Process with regard to how the Revision of the PTS Rule may affect the outcome of the Application The NRC has not provided sufficient transparency and completeness of the public record germane to the processes with potential implications for the Palisades license extension. The Petitioners are not able to thoroughly review current NRC efforts to revise its Pressure Thermal Shock Rule. NRC has not made all of its germane safety documentation, albeit draft documents, available for public review. Two key examples are: 1) "Technical Basis for Revision of Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Screening Limit in the PTS Rule (10 CFR 50.61): Summary Report," NUREG-1 806, Draft for Peer Review Panel and ACRS Review, November 2, 2004; and 2) "Thermal Hydraulic Evaluation of Pressurized Thermal Shock," NUREG- 1809, Draft, February, 2005.Whether or not a basis for contentions has been established must be decided by considering the contentions in the context of the entire record of the case up to the time the contentions are filed. Thus, when an application for a license amendment is itself incomplete,Pressure Thermal Shock (PTS) Evaluation Project: Technical Basis for Revision of the PTS Screening Criterion in the PTS Rule," March 11, 2005, Graham Wallis, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, US NRC, p. 1., NRC ADAMS ML 050730177. the standard for the admission of contentions is lowered, because it is easier for petitioners to have reasons for believing that the application has not demonstrated the safety of the proposed procedures for which an amendment is sought. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-45, 14 NRC 853 (1981). Petitioners urge that this contention should be deemed admissible at a lower standard precisely because there is undisclosed information which can be explored adequately for its relevance to the Application at a hearing.With respect to their Contention No. 1, Petitioners have demonstrated many factual conundrums which must be resolved by means of a merit hearing. All that is required for a contention to be acceptable for litigation is that it be specific and have a basis. Whether or not the contention is true is left to litigation on the merits in the licensing proceeding. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), ALAB-722, 17 NRC 546, 551 n.5 (1983), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Aliens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-806, 21 NRC 1183, 1193 n.39 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 694 (1985). The factual support necessary to show that a genuine dispute exists need not be in formal evidentiary form, nor be as strong as that necessary to withstand a summary disposition motion. What is required is "a minimal showing that material facts are in dispute, thereby demonstrating that an 'inquiry in depth' is appropriate." Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43, 51 (1994) (citing Final Rule, Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings --Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 54 Fed. Reg. 33,168, 33,171 (Aug. 11, 1989), quoting Connecticut Bankers Association

v. Board of Governors, 627 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir.1980).

Response as to Contention No. 2 (Excessive radioactive and toxic chemical contamination in local drinking water due to emissions from Palisades nuclear power plant as part of its daily, "routine" operations) NMC states (Answer p. 14) that this contention "is inadmissible because (i) the substance of the assertions (alleged radioactive and chemical emissions from the plant) are outside the scope of this proceeding, and (ii) the assertions are vague and unsupported by factual basis." The Staff likewise challenges (Staff Answer p. 14) this contention as "...vague and lacking in the required supporting information ... " The NRC goes on to state (Answer p.14) that Petitioners failed "to provide the specific factual information necessary to provide a valid basis for any safety claim ..." Petitioners provide considerable information below, but it should be noted that the NRC has had in its possession these very documents for years, even decades. NRC staff also challenges this contention as being "generalized and unsupported arguments," but the information supplied below turns away that assertion. The NRC staff's failures to address these concerns is a violation of the agency's own mandate and mission to protect public health and safety and the environment. NMC says (Answer p. 15) that "radioactive and chemical emissions from the plant are not issues related -to the management of aging or time-limited aging analyses." On the contrary, such emissions are age-related, in that deteriorating and degrading reactor systems, including the Palisades reactor's fuel rods, pipes, tanks, and valves, will increase the amounts of toxic chemicals and radioactivity released into the Lake Michigan ecosystem over time due to increased leaks and malfunctions. Not only do "routine" releases thus increase, but so does the risk of more severe incidents and accidents as the reactor ages.NMC (Answer p. 15) seeks to dismiss the validity of this contention by stating"[r]adiation exposure to the public during the renewal term is a Category 1 issue determined to be small, based on a generic finding that radiation doses to the public will continue at current levels associated with normal operations." However, as stated above, releases of toxic chemicals and radioactivity over time can be expected to increase due to more leakage and malfunctioning of age-deteriorated and degraded equipment and systems. In addition, the recent report published by the National Academies of Science (NAS) Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR VII, published June 2005 and entitled "Health Effects from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation") found that exposure to even low levels of ionizing radiation has a negative impact on human health. See http://www.nap.edu /books/030909156X/html. The significance of the NAS BEIR VII Report's findings and relevance to ascertaining the implications of 20 more years of radioactivity emissions from Palisades is unmistakable. The NRC's previous conclusion that the impact to public health is minimal or trivial must be re-evaluated in light of the recently published NAS BEIR VII report.NMC urges that the contention is "inadmissible because it is vague and unsupported by any factual basis, "that it "fails to identify what toxic and radioactive substances allegedly are released during the plant's 'routine' operations, and in what respect any such emissions are allegedly 'excessive.' "Specifically, the radioactive releases from the Palisades nuclear power plant into the environment of the Great Lakes Basin that are of most concern include radioactive hydrogen (tritium), radioactive noble gases (such as xenon and krypton, which relatively quickly transform into biologically active radioactive substances such as cesium and strontium), as well as fission products, activation products, and transuranics that find their way into the environment after escaping the reactor or the irradiated fuel.Documentation recording such releases at Palisades includes the "Radioactive Materials Released from Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG/CR-2907, BNL-NUREG-51581, Vol. 14, Annual Report 1993, prepared by J. Tichler, K. Doty, and K. Lucadamo, Brookhaven National Laboratory, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, covering the years 1974 to 1993, and documenting reported annual emissions of such liquid and airborne effluents from Palisades as tritium, mixed fission and activation products. See Exhibit 2-A.The following figures were reported for emissions from the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant: From Table 2, pages 8 to 10 Airborne Effluents Comparison By Year/Fission and Activation Gases (Total Curies)1974: <1.OOE+00 1975: 2.61 E+03 1976: 2.99E+01 1977: 5.99E+01 1978: 3.23E+02 1979: 6.84E+01 1980: 1.40E+02 1981: 3.OOE+03 1982: 7.38E+03 1983: 3.OOE+03 1984: 2.84E+01 1985: 3.68E+03 1986: 1.73E+02 1987: 1.75E+03 1988: 2.43E+03 1989: 1.52E+02 1990: 1.21E+02 1991: 6.26E+01 1992: 7.46E+01 1993: 9.29E+01 From Table 6, pages 20 to 22 Liquid Effluents, Comparison By Year/Tritium (Curies)1974: 8.10E+00 1975: 4.16E+01 1976: 9.63E+00 1977: 5.58E+01 1978: 1.01E+02 1979: 1.26E+02 1980: 7.47E+01 1981: 2.78E+02 1982: 1.79E+02 1983: 2.35E+02 1984:6.95E+01 1985: 4.29E+02 1986: 6.32E+01 1987: 1.19E+02 1988: 2.83E+02 1989: 8.06E+01 1990: 1.49E+02 1991: 5.52E+01 1992: 8.09E+01 1993: 2.1OE+02 From Table 8, pages 26 to 28 Liquid Effluents, Comparison By Year/Mixed Fission and Activation Products (Curies)1974: 5.90E+00 1975: 3.45E+00 1976: 4.40E-01 1977: 9.29E-02 1978: 9.65E-02 1979: 1.28E-01 1980: 8.73E-03 1981: 3.31E-02 1982: 1.27E-01 1983: 7.48E-02 1984: 3.68E-02 1985: 5.83E-02 1986: 1.40E-01 1987: 9.23E-02 1988: 3.43E-02 1989: 3.75E-03 1990: 7.75E-03 1991: 1.14E-02 1992: 3.88E-03 1993: 1.40E-02 Similarly, the Palisades effluent release reports for 1994 to 2000 could be similarly examined in detail. The following reports for 2001 to 2003 clearly show that emissions have continued. In fact, annual reports for 2004 to the present day would show that emissions continue still. Radioactivity emissions into the air, water, and soil are inevitable at Palisades nuclear power plant, and would continue from 2011 to 2031 if allowed.Palisades' ""RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: GASEOUS EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2001" ATTACHMENT 2 reports the following: FISSION & ACTIVATION GASES, Total Release: 1 Qtr: 3.01 E+00 Ci 2 nd Qtr: 2.92E+00 Ci 3 rd Qtr: 2.21E-02 Ci 4 th Qtr: 0.00 Specific radionuclides are listed individually. See Exhibit 2-B. In ATTACHMENT 3, "RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: LIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2001" the total release of fission and activation products (not including tritium, gases, and alpha emitters) was reported as: 1 st Qtr: 2.81 E-06 Ci 2 nd Qtr: 2.45E-04 Ci 3rd Qtr: 0.000 Ci 4th Qtr: 3.68E-05 Ci Again, individual nuclides released are identified there. See Exhibit 2-C.Palisades' ""RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: GASEOUS EFFLUENTS-SUMMATION OF RELEASES: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2002" ATTACHMENT 2 reports the following: FISSION & ACTIVATION GASES, Total Release: 1 s Qtr: 5.01E-01 Ci 2 nd Qtr: 3.20E+00 Ci 3 rd Qtr: 1.65E+00 Ci 4th Qtr: 3.26E+01 Specific radionuclides are listed individually. See Exhibit 2-D.In ATTACHMENT 3, "RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: LIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2002" the total release of fission and activation products (not including tritium, gases, and alpha emitters) was reported as: Is' Qtr: 9.59E-05 Ci 2 nd Qtr: 0.000 Ci 3 rd Qtr: 1.83E-04 Ci 4th Qtr: 7.48E-07 Ci Again, individual nuclides released are identified there. See Exhibit 2-E.Similarly, Palisades' "RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: GASEOUS EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2003" ATTACHMENT 2 reports the following: FISSION & ACTIVATION GASES, Total Release: I Qtr: 6.07E+01 Ci 2 nd Qtr: 3.p5E+00 Ci 3rd Qtr: 4.96E-01 Ci 4 th Qtr: 7.42E-01 Individual fission gases identified as being released in various amounts from Palisades include: krypton-85, 87, and 88; Xenon-131m, 133, 135m, 138; individual lodines identified as being released in various amounts from Palisades include: Iodine 131,132, 133, 135;Particulates with half-lives greater than 8 days include: Chromium-51; Manganese-54; Cobalt-58; Cobalt-60; Niobium-95; Ruthenium-103; Strontium-89; Strontium-90; Cesium-134; Cesium-137; Zirconium-95; Cobalt-57; as well as net identified beta emitters. See Exhibit 2-F.In ATTACHMENT 3, "RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: LIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2003" the total release of fission and activation products (not including tritium, gases, and alpha emitters) was reported as: 1 " Qtr: 2.09E-04 Ci 2 nd Qtr: 5.40E-04 Ci 3 rd Qtr: 0.000 Ci 4th Qtr: 1.45E-03 Ci Again, individual nuclides released are identified there. See Exhibit 2G.As the NAS BEIR VII Report found, even so-called "low" level radiation exposure has a negative, adverse impact on human health.Petitioners challenge the methodology upon which all of these annual reports are based. On September 13, 2005 Kevin Kamps of NIRS spoke by phone with a worker at the City of South Haven, Michigan's Water Filtration Plant. The City of South Haven's Water Filtration Plant supplies drinking water to customers in the City and townships of Casco, Covert and South Haven. This plant supplies water to nearly 3,400 customers located in these areas.The water comes from Lake Michigan, a surface water source, through an intake pipe located about a mile offshore from South Beach in the City of South Haven, just several miles north and downstream (given the prevailing direction of flow in Lake Michigan) from the Palisades nuclear power plant, which emits radioactivity into the waters of Lake Michigan daily. The lake water is treated, settled, filtered and disinfected as it goes through the Water Filtration Plant, but radioactivity is not removed by any of these processes. The worker at the Water Filtration Plant explained that while he does collect samples of Lake Michigan water on a daily and monthly basis to test for radiation, he turns those samples over to the Palisades nuclear power plant, which then performs the testing itself (and/or through subcontrators). This fox-guarding-the-henhouse transfer of the water samples back into the hands of the Palisades nuclear power plant represents an unacceptable methodology, given its vulnerability to falsification by Palisades personnel, which would be in the interest of Palisades, to under-report radioactivity levels in the source of drinking water for nearby communities. Genuinely independent radiation monitoring must be performed, without the risk of falsification by the very company that stands to benefit from low reports of radiation in the water NMC states (NMC Answer p. 16) that "...Petitioners... failed to provide any 'alleged facts' or 'expert opinion that supports the contention.' "To the contrary, Petitioners have consulted with Dr. John Robbins, a Great Lakes limnologist recently retired from the U.S.Chamber of Commerce, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Adminstration (NOAA), Great Lakes Environmental Research Laboratory (GLERL) in Ann Arbor, Michigan (where, among other things, he specialized in analyzing radioactivity in the Great Lakes, being referenced in such publications as the International Joint Commission's Nuclear Task Force's December 1997 "Inventory of Radionuclides for the Great Lakes," namely, the report he co-authored in 1980 entitled "Plutonium in the Great Lakes," which appeared in "Transuranic Elements in the Environment," edited by W.C. Hanson, published by the U.S. Dept. of Energy, see specifically pages 659 to 683 of that report, referenced on page 98 of the IJC report). See Exhibit 2-H. Dr. Robbins has established that the predominant current flow is from south to north in Lake Michigan near the Palisades nuclear reactor. Therefore, not only the new intake built just offshore from Palisades, but the old intake at South Beach in South Haven are directly in line for radioactive and toxic chemical contamination. Dr. Robbins believes that it is not implausible, on average, for those water intakes to serve as radioactivity receptors from the emissions into Lake Michigan at Palisades. Thus, the drinking water for South Haven, Casco, and Covert could very well be contaminated with radioactivity from Palisades, which, even at so-called low levels, would have an adverse impact on human health, as found by the NAS BEIR VII Report.To confirm the direction of Lake Michigan water flow in the vicinity of Palisades, Dr.Robbins referred us to Dr. Dave Schwab, who still works at NOAA's GLERL. Dr. Schwab is one of the top experts on the direction of flow of Lake Michigan's waters. Dr. Schwab confirms that the prevailing direction of Lake Michigan water flow is from south to north, the very direction of flow that would carry radioactivity and toxic chemicals released by Palisades into the drinking water intakes for South Haven, Casco, and Covert. Dr. Schwab pointed to the following field data to support this finding: Gerald Miller, Michael McCormick, James Saylor Great Lakes Environmental Research Lab 2205 Commonwealth Blvd.Ann Arbor, MI 48105 Phone: 734/741-2119, 734/741-2277, 734/741-2118 FAX: 734/741-2055 Email: michael.mccormick@noaa.gov GLERL Vector Averaging Current Meter (VACM) Moorings 10/1999-06/2000 Manufacturer: EG&G Header Line: N Lat (dec. deg), W. Lon (dec. deg), VACM Depth (m), Inst. No., Year Deployed, Mooring Name Explanation of Columns in the Data Set YEAR Year (UT)DOY Day of year (UT)TIME Universal time (UT -Hours and minutes HHMM)E Eastward component of mean horizontal current (cm/s)N Northward component of mean horizontal current (cm/s)WT Water Temperature (deg C)Data Sources: Inst Depth File Name Mooring Lat (N) Lon (W) No. Dates VACM/Water Op #VO1-1999-12M.txt VO1-99 41 48.89' 86 40.80' 556 No Data 12/20m S1999294.01 V01-1999-19M.txt V01-99 41 48.89' 86 40.80' 265 10/20/99-06/15/00 19/20m S1999294.01 V03-1999-14M.txt V03-99 41 58.17' 86 57.34' 569 10/20/99-06/15/00 14/62m S1999293.03 V03-1999-61M.txt V03-99 41 58.17' 86 57.34' 348 10/20/99-06/15/00 61/62m S 1999293.03 V04-1999-1OM.txt V04-99 41 54.85' 86 40.74' 347 10/20/99-06/15/00 10/18m S1999294.02 (A)V04-1 999-1 7M.txt V04-99 (A)V05-1999-12M.txt V05-99 V05-1999-39M.txt V05-99 V06-1999-13M.txt V06-99 V06-1 999-60M.txt V06-99 V07-1999-11 M.txt V07-99 V07-1999-58M.txt V07-99 (B)V08-1999-09M.txt V08-99 V08-1999-56M.txt V08-99 V09-1999-11 M.txt V09-99 V09-1999-18M.txt V09-99 V1 0-1999-1OM.txt Vi 0-99 V1 0-1 999-27M.txt V1 0-99 V11-1999-1OM.txt V11-99 V1 1-1999-37M.txt V1 1-99 V12-1999-11M.txt V12-99 V1 2-1999-58M.txt V1 2-99 V1 3-1999-13M.txt V13-99 V1 3-1999-20M.txt V1 3-99 41 54.85' 86 40.74' 354 10/20/99-06/15/00 17/18m S1999294.02 41 57.95' 86 44.82' 572 10/20/99-06/15/00 12/40m 31999293.05 41 57.95' 86 44.82' 551 10/20/99-06/15/00 39/40m 31999293.05 4200.53' 8647.90' 274 10/20/99-06/14/00 13/61m S1999293.04 42 00.53' 86 47.90' 311 10/20/99-06/14/00 60/61m $1999293.04 4207.41' 8641.19' 574 No Data 11/59m 31999299.01 4207.41' 8641.19' 319 10/26/99-06/14/00 58/59m S1999299.01 42 15.18' 86 39.87' 279 10/26/99-06/13/00 42 15.18' 86 39.87' 568 10/26/99-06/13/00 42 14.51' 86 25.19' 573 10/27/99-06/14/00 42 14.51' 86 25.19' 352 10/27/99-06/14/00 42 15.83' 86 27.90' 553 10/27/99-06/14/00 42 15.83' 86 27.90' 277 10/27/99-06/14/00 42 17.20' 86 31.35' 555 10/27/99-06/14/00 42 17.20' 86 31.35' 280 10/27/99-06/13/00 42 20.27' 86 38.08' 583 10/27/99-06/13/00 42 20.27' 86 38.09' 349 10/27/99-06/13/00 42 20.04' 86 21.65' 577 10/19/99-04/25/00 42 20.04' 86 21.65' 576 10/19/99-04/25/00 09/57m 56/57m 11/19m 18/19m 10/28m 27/28m 10/38m 37/38m 11/59m 58/59m 13/21 m 20/21 m S1999299.02 S1999299.02 31999300.05 31999300.05 S1999300.04 31999300.04 31999300.03 31999300.03 31999300.02 31999300.02 31999292.01 31999292.01

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(A) Water temperature only (B) Current velocity data ends 10/26/99, water temperature to end.Missing data denoted by -999.0 Manufacturers specifications:

Velocity: Threshold 2.5 cm/s Rotor Constant 34.6 cm/rev Temperature: Accuracy +-0.1C Compass: Accuracy +-5 deg See http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/eegle/data/1999-00/moormiller/vacm.meta.txt for a better laid out format, and also see http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/eegle/data/objects/obj_1 8.V1 3.4.html Station V-1 3 is the closest to Palisades, and thus the most relevant to questions of Lake Michigan water flow direction in the vicinity of the reactor. Dr. Schwab has mostly addressed the macro level of water flow in Lake Michigan, but is now delving into the issue of micro level of water flow. Thus, he will address locales of tight scope, such as the immediate vicinity of the Palisades reactor, so close as it is to one operational and one potential source of drinking water for the residents (and large numbers of visitors, given the tourism of the Lakeshore region) in South Haven, Casco, and Covert.Additionally, Dr. Rosalie Bertell, GNSH, with the International Institute of Concern for Public Health, has provided consultation to Petitioners. Dr. Bertell has also served as a longtime National Advisory Board member of NIRS. Dr. Bertell has served on the Nuclear Task Force of the International Joint Commission, where she helped in the publication of the"Inventory of Radionuclides for the Great Lakes," (Dec. 1997), as well as the 1999 "Report on Bioaccumulation of Elements to Accompany the Inventory of Radionuclides in the Great Lakes Basin." Dr. Bertell has worked professionally in Environmental Epidemiology since 1968, served on the Advisory Boards for the Great Lakes Health Effects Program of Health Canada, and the Ontario Environmental Assessment Board and has been a member of the IJC Science Advisory Board. She has published a "Handbook for Estimating the Health Effects of Exposure to Ionizing Radiation" and the popular non-fiction book "No Immediate Danger: Prognosis for a Radioactive Earth," together with more than 100 other publications. She has provided consultation to Petitioners on the issue of performing water sampling near Palisades in order to correct the methodological flaw mentioned earlier of Palisades handling the water samples before they are actually tested by an independent institution. Dr. Bertell referred Petitioners to Dr. Hari Sharm in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, a nuclear chemist who can test for radioactivity and toxic chemicals in Lake Michigan water samples for Petitioners. Dr. Sharm has expressed an interest in helping to carry out this vital work and is assisting Petitioners in the process of developing a methodology for carrying out this independent assessment on the radiation and toxic chemicals being emitted by the Palisades nuclear power plant into the drinking water source, Lake Michigan, for the residents and visitors in South Haven, Casco, and Covert.The basis-with-reasonable-specificity standard requires that an intervenor include in a safety contention a statement of the reason for his contention. This statement must either allege with particularity that an applicant is not complying with a specified regulation, or allege with particularity the existence and detail of a substantial safety issue on which the regulations are silent. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1656 (1982), citing 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758). While NRC regulations have not yet changed to accommodate the conclusions of BEIR VII, this major scientific pronouncement compels a rethinking of the exposure of the public to routine radiation emissions from Palisades through their water supply. A substantial safety issue is exposed in this contention, and it must be admitted for the inquiry of a contested hearing.Response as to Contention No. 3 (The Palisades reactor has no place to store its overflowing irradiated nuclear fuel inventory within NRC regulations) The Staff argue that "[t]his proposed contention lacks basis and support... [and] fails to establish that a genuine dispute exists on a material issue of law or fact .... Staff Answer p. 15. The Nuclear Management Company maintains that the contention is "...inadmissible because it is not supported by a basis demonstrating the existence of a genuine material dispute." NMC Answer p. 16. In a way, the Petitioners agree; there is no material dispute over the facts, but the facts compel the conclusion that Palisades' dry cask storage arrangements violate NRC regulations. Specifically, the material facts prove -and exceed the threshold showing that must be made here -that neither the old nor the more recent, "new" concrete pads holding dry casks at Palisades conform with longstanding NRC requirements for earthquake stability standards. As the attached Affidavit of Dr. Ross Landsman, formerly of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff, depicts, both pads were built on compacted sand and other subsurface materials, dozens of feet above bedrock and well above the ground elevation of the nearby nuclear power plant. Dr. Landsman, who has decades of experience and a direct oversight role in the inspection of dry cask storage at Palisades when he worked at NRC Region III during the critical period of dry cask storage installation and operation from 1993 to 2005, has concluded from his personal knowledge of the subsoil conditions that the older pad nearer the lake is in violation of NRC liquefaction regulations under 10 CFR Part 72.212(b)(2)(i)(B) 2 4 , while the newer pad further inland is in violation of NRC amplification regulations under the same regulations. Neither the older nor newer dry cask storage pads at the Palisades plant were designed in consideration of the factors contained in the cited regulation. See Landsman Affidavit, ¶ ¶ 3-13.25 Either violation, then, violates 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3). 2 6 This means that the cask storage pads have violated NRC regulations since they were constructed, and absent enforcement will continue to violate NRC regulations during a 20-year license 2 4[[The general licensee shall perform written evaluations, prior to use, that establish that]: Cask storage pads and areas have been designed to adequately support the static and dynamic loads of the stored casks, considering potential amplification of earthquakes through soil-structure interaction, and soil liquefaction potential or other soil instability due to vibratory ground motion.25The Landsman Affidavit appears in electronic form annexed hereto and also in hard copy at pp.App. 3-a through 3-d of the "Petitioners' Appendix of Evidence in Support of Contentions." 2 6[The general licensee shall]: Review the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) referenced in the Certificate of Compliance and the related NRC Safety Evaluation Report, prior to use of the general license, to determine whether or not the reactor site parameters, including analyses of earthquake intensity and tornado missiles, are enveloped by the cask design bases considered in these reports. The results of this review must be documented in the evaluation made in paragraph (b)(2) of this section. extension and beyond.The NRC, unfortunately, considers the older pad nearer the lake to be in compliance with regulations and allows NMC to store high-level radioactive waste there, while the NRC is supposedly still trying to resolve through ongoing inspection, investigation, and analysis the status of the newer pad, which is situated further inland from Lake Michigan. However, during this alleged period of ongoing investigation, the NRC is allowing NMC to store waste on the new pad despite the unresolved safety concerns. Dr. Landsman's understanding is that the newer pad was built big enough to accommodate all the dry casks currently stored on the older pad nearer the lake, because, despite public pronouncements to the contrary by Consumers Energy, Nuclear Management Company, and the NRC, the older pad clearly violates regulations, which means that the 18 to 19 casks currently stored on the older pad 2 7 must be moved to the newer pad. The problem is, moving the casks from the older pad to the newer one is analogous to jumping from the frying pan into the fire.Dr. Landsman sought repeatedly while he worked for the NRC to see this unresolved safety issue corrected. Now, however, four casks are being stored on the newer pad. In addition, plans have been in place for additional casks to be loaded and stored on the newer pad in the near future, perhaps as early as fall 2005.While the NRC staff inveighs (Staff Answer p. 16) that "[p]etitioners lack the requisite 2 7 Including the unloadable, unmovable cask #4 at Palisades, loaded in June 1994 and shortly thereafter admitted by Consumers Power to be defective, having faulty welds. Now, eleven years on, Consumers has yet to unload the defective cask, because it technically cannot do so safely. And the configuration of the 18 to 19 dry casks currently stored on the older pad nearer Lake Michigan is such that the casks furthest back cannot be moved or unloaded until all other casks in front of them have been moved out of the way first. This situation increases the risks, making it very difficult to address emergencies involving certain casks in the configuration in a timely manner.Although Petitioners/Intervenors are withdrawing their Contention No. 7 concerning dry cask #4 as a separate contention (see infra), Palisades' noncompliance with earthquake standards has elevated portents for this particular vessel of high-level radioactive waste. basis and support for their claim, highlighted by the fact that they have not produced any affidavits or other evidence as to the opinion of their 'anticipated expert'," the NRC had the benefit for years of Petitioners' expert's warnings and has done little to nothing about it, contrary to the agency's mission and mandate to protect public health and safety and the environment. NMC states (NMC Answer p. 19) that "Contention 3 is not supported by a basis demonstrating a genuine issue." Actually, it is the dry cask storage pads, and the very deadly high-level radioactive waste they hold, that is not supported by a base that is safe and secure from earthquake dangers. NMC further urges (Answer p. 19) that "[t]he results of the licensee analysis showed that the [older] pad could support the casks safely. The results are documented in a letter to the NRC dated July 27, 1994." NMC additionally cites the NRC's September 20, 1994 "Independent NRC Staff Final Safety Assessment of the Dry Storage Facility at Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Site" as further proof of issue resolution. NMC likewise points out a June 5, 1995 NRC Information Notice (95-28, "Emplacement of Support Pads for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations at Reactor Sites," p. 3) as proof that all is fine at the older pad nearer the lake.But both the Staff and NMC somehow have failed to disclose the contents of a letter written by Dr. Landsman while at NRC Region III as a safety engineer and dry cask storage inspector overseeing Palisades, to the then-Commission Chairman, Ivan Selin, on February 17, 1994, warning that:[I]f you use NRC-approved casks under Subpart K [of 10 CFR Part 72], the regulations are silent about the foundation material or the pad. Actually, it's the consequences that might occur from an earthquake that I'm concerned about. The casks can either fall into Lake Michigan or be buried in the loose sand because of liquefaction .... It is apparent to me that NMSS [sic] doesn't realize the catastrophic consequences of their continued reliance on their current ideology. (Emphasis added)Dr. Landsman has never received a meaningful response to this warning and would attest under oath at the hearing of this contention that his safety concerns about the older pad, which involve violations of NRC regulations and violations of public health and safety and environmental protection -remain inadequately addressed and unresolved to this day.The NRC staff (Staff Answer p. 16) asserts that "[t]his part of the Commission's regulations has no relation to license renewal." NMC states (Answer p. 16) that "[t]his contention is beyond the scope of 10 CFR Part 54, because the dry cask storage pads are part of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ('ISFSI') facility which is distinct from -and licensed separately from -the Palisades nuclear power plant." Both responses are disingen-uous. It is impossible to disconnect the dry cask storage pad problems from the proposed license extension. If both dry cask storage pads violate NRC safety regulations and are barred from use, then where, exactly, would NMC store its bulging inventory of irradiated nuclear fuel?And where would the 22 to 23 dry casks already loaded and stored on those defective pads at Palisades be moved to? These are not rhetorical questions; the answers are integral to the 20 year license extension proposal, given that high-level radioactive waste is an inevitable byproduct of electricity production at the Palisades nuclear reactor.NRC staff also claim (Staff Answer p. 16) that this contention impermissibly attacks NRC regulations, specifically the GElS on reactor license extension as well as the "Nuclear Waste Confidence Rule." But, truth be told, at present there is no place for the wastes generated during a 20 year license extension at Palisades to be stored without violating NRC regulations. The NRC's "Nuclear Waste Confidence Decision" places false confidence in the availability of a geologic repository in the U.S. by the year 2025, and biases the NRC in favor of approving a license for the proposed Yucca Mountain, Nevada dumpsite (the only one under consideration). It also, by implication, biases the NRC in favor of approving a 20-year license extension at Palisades. NMC dismisses this contention (NMC Answer p. 18) by stating "... it is a challenge...to the generic findings in the GElS and Appendix B to Part 51." NMC further cites a Commission ruling on license extension at Oconee which states that "[t]he Commission's generic determinations governing onsite waste storage preclude the Petitioners from attempting to introduce such waste issues into this adjudication." But there was not firm evidence of regulatory violation concerning onsite waste storage in the Oconee proceeding. Presumably when the NRC establishes generic findings regarding on-site waste storage it assumes either that its safety regulations are being met at the particular nuclear plant in question, or else that it plans to take enforcement action against any violations of its regulations. But, Petitioners here have articulated evidence that tends to prove in a compelling fashion that both of the dry cask storage pads at Palisades are in violation of NRC earthquake regulations. This begs the question, why is NRC allowing high-level radioactive waste storage on pads at Palisades that are in violation of NRC earthquake regulations? At page 17 of its Answer, NMC states as fact something which is wholly false: that"[b]oth site specific and general licenses are issued for a maximum of 20 years, not 40 years as for nuclear power plants." Yet, late last year, the NRC Commissioners, by a 2 to 1 split decision (with NRC Chairman Nils Diaz voting against the proposal), approved a 40 year license extension at the Surry Nuclear Power Plant ISFSI in Virginia, the oldest ISFSI in the U.S. So while the initial license may be granted for an initial 20 year period, NRC has indeed granted a license extension for an ISFSI for 40 years. This potentially monumental safety error could well be relicensed. On page 18 of its Answer, NMC misconstrues Petitioners' contention, perhaps to mislead the Board. NMC states "[t]he regulations do not require licensees to explore the aging of components for a facility not covered by this license renewal proceeding. ..". It is not the aging of the pads that is at the heart of this contention (although pad deterioration over time is a significant safety issue that must be addressed as well), but rather the fact that both ISFSI pads at Palisades have continuously violated NRC earthquake regulations since the day they were built.At the August 28, 2005 NRC public meeting in South Haven concerning the proposed 20 year license extension at Palisades, neither NRC nor Nuclear Management Company officials could give the number of dry casks already loaded on the two pads at Palisades. Even if the Staff and NMC don't ascribe the requisite seriousness to these issues -given the deadly nature of high-level radioactive waste -the Board must.All that is required for a contention to be acceptable for litigation is that it be specific and have a basis. Whether or not the contention is true is left to litigation on the merits in the licensing proceeding. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-28, 30 NRC 271, 282 (1989), aff'd on other ,qrounds, ALAB-940, 32 NRC 225 (1990);Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-91-19, 33 NRC 397, 411 (1991), appeal denied, CLI-91-12, 34 NRC 149 (1991). Here, the facts alleged, coupled with the expert opinions proffered, easily meet those requirements. A Licensing Board should not address the merits of a contention when determining its admissibility. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1654 (1982), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Aliens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-1, 19 NRC 29, 34 (1984); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 617 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986). The petitioner simply must provide sufficient information to establish the existence of a genuine dispute with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. 10 CFR § 2.309(f)(1)(v) (formerly 2.714(b)(2)(iii)). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-35, 34 NRC 163, 166, 169-170, 175-76 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-39, 34 NRC 273, 279 (1991); Louisiana Energy Services, L.P.(Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-91-41, 34 NRC 332, 338 (1991); Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-28, 36 NRC 202, 214 (1992); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-3, 37 NRC 135, 142 (1993); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 205 (1993); Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43, 51 (1994). Certainly, Petitioners have in respect to this contention shown material facts which implicate serious issues of regulatory law. The ASLB, given the strong facial showing Petitioners have made, cannot inquire more deeply into the merits of the contention, but instead must admit it for hearing.The standard for a safety contention in operating license cases (Petitioners recognize this is not an operating license case) is relatively loose; a contention about a matter not covered by a specific rule need only allege that the matter poses a significant safety problem[10 CFR § 50.57(a)(3)] for finding of reasonable assurance of operation without endangering the health and safety of the public. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1946 (1982). Here, of course, the contention alleges in compelling fashion the continuous violations of specific regulations. As it appears they would easily meet the operating license standard for a safety issue, the panel must admit their contention for the continuation of that operating license for 20 years beyond its expiration. Because as a matter of fact, Petitioners have met -and exceeded -the pleading requirements for this contention, the Board must, as a matter of law, proceed to hear it on the merits.Response as to Contention No. 7 (Non-radiological persistent toxic burdens to area water sources)NRC staff claim (Answer p. 22) that this contention "lacks specificity and support." Below is the actual NPDES report summarizing a number of areas in which Palisades is not in compliance with its National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit requirements, specifically in continuing non-compliance concerning the toxic chemical Betz Clam-Trol. NPDES NUMBER GRANT LIMIT VIOLATION ENFORCEMENT STATUS INSTANCE OF NONCOMPLIANCE RNC DATE ENFORCEMENT ACTION DATE STATUS DATE COMMENTS****** *******************

OCPCO-PALISADES POWER PIT NON-COMPLIANT COVERT M10001457

• • • FINAL***

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SUMMARY

SECTION .......... PH 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCE TRO-DISCHARGE TIME 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCE OXIDANTS, TOTAL RESIDUAL 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCE BETZ CLAM-TROL CT-2 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCE BETZ CLAM-TROL CT-4 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCE"Continuing Noncompliance" indicates that the violation cited in the above summary was not the first time such a violation had occurred, so that violations on limits of releases of persistent toxic chemicals from Palisades nuclear power plant into the waters of Lake Michigan appears to be an unfortunate, and harmful, pattern. As late as 2003 and 2004, the formal NPDES reports on the use of Clam-Trol at Palisades were mere recitations of the 2000 reporting data.See http://www.epa.gov/region5/water/weca/reports/mi2qtrO4.pdf (for 2004), and http://www.epa.gov/region5/water/weca/reports/mi2qtrO3.pdf (for 2003).Thus, NMC's claim (Answer p. 26) that Petitioners' reference provides "no basis for Petitioners' allegation or 'apparent multiple misuses of Betz Clam-Trol"' is false, for "continuing noncompliance" indicates a pattern extending over time.The NRC staff states (Answer p. 22) that "it is not within the [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission's jurisdiction to make any determination as to the adequacy of such permits [such as NPDES permits] in protecting the environment." Yet the scope of 10 CFR Part 54 (set out at §54.4) encompasses "(a) Plant systems, structures, and components ... [including] (2) All nonsafety-related systems, structures, and components whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in paragraphs (a)(1) (i), (ii), or (iii)of this section." Presumably, maintaining unclogged water intakes at Palisades fall within this scoping parameter. If so, then NPDES noncompliance is a relevant issue because NMC is not being truthful about the measures it is taking concerning the perennial clogging problem caused by zebra mussels in Lake Michigan. This disregard for compliance with regulations, not to mention indifference to the environmental health of Lake Michigan and the public health impacts of persistent toxic chemicals released as part of reactor operations does not comport with the NRC's supposed mandate and mission to protect public health and the environment. Palisades' ongoing releases of persistent toxic chemicals into Lake Michigan is a violation of the letter and spirit of the "Ninth Biennial Report On Great Lakes Water Quality" by the International Joint Commission, the binational U.S.-Canadian federal governmental agency whose mandate and mission is protecting and preserving the Great Lakes. At page 35 of that IJC report, it states: Specific Persistent Toxic Substances: The Commission reiterates from its Sixth Biennial Report that, under the Agreement, (Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978) 'the overall strategy or aim regarding persistent toxic substances is virtual elimination, and the tactic or method to be used to achieve that aim is through zero input or discharge of those substances created as a result of human activity.' This is both necessary and reasonable. 'Persistent toxic substances are too dangerous to the biosphere and to humans to permit their release in any quantity.' Twenty additional years of such toxic chemical emissions from Palisades into Lake Michigan -especially if they are too inconvenient to report -will have a significant adverse impact on human and ecosystem health.There regulations requirement that an intervenor supply the bases on which the intervenor intends to rely. Georgia Power Company (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-22, 40 NRC 37, 39 (1994).Nonreporting of important, and required, information about toxic releases obscures any meaningful evaluation of the functioning of nonsafety features of Palisades which will be necessary to plant operations during the license extension period. This contention should be admitted.Response as to Contention No. 8 (Environmental justice denied by the continuing operations of Palisades) NMC states (NMC Answer p. 28) that Petitioners J...fail to challenge the Application and to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute on a material issue of fact or law..." and "fail[s] to provide an adequate factual basis to support any dispute with the Application." NMC states that "...none of Petitioners' claims address the 'essence of an environmental justice claim' arising under NEPA in a NRC licensing proceeding -i.e., 'disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental effects' on minority and low-income populations that may be different from the impacts on the general population." Petitioners dispute these conclusions. The heart of the contention is that Palisades' 20-year license extension could very well adversely affect minority and low-income populations in disproportionately high ways not faced by the general population in the area, in particular upon Native Americans. NMC cites (NMC Answer p. 30) NRC pleading rules requiring that contentions "must include references to specific portions of.. .the applicant's environmental report.. .that the petitioner disputes and the supporting reasons for each dispute." Petitioners take greatest issue with NMC's Environmental Report, Section 2.10, entitled "Historic and Archaeological Resources." The Environmental Report gives very short shrift to historic and archaeological resources. The potential for Native American burial sites, or other Native sites such as former villages or encampments, at or near Palisades is not mentioned anywhere in the Environmental Report.Petitioners submit that the conclusion "no significant historical or archaeological resources were known to occur in the study area" is unsupported by the "Attachment C.Cultural Resources Correspondence" found in the Report. There are just two letters, one from Consumers/NMC to the Michigan State Historic Preservation Office, the second from the Department of the Interior to the Atomic Energy Commission. Respecting the February 11, 2005 letter from Dan Malone at NMC and Stephen Wawro at Consumers to Ms. Martha MacFarlane-Faes at the Michigan State Historic Preservation Office (MSHPO), the first paragraph reveals that MSHPO has "concern pertaining to possible, unreported archaeological properties on, or within the vicinity of, the Palisades site." Yet NMC fails to include any documentation spelling out these concerns from MSHPO in the companies' Environmental Report, other than the brief mention that concerns exist.Also in the letter, Malone and Wawro state in conclusory fashion that 20 more years of nuclear activities at the site will not disturb the land, and "Therefore, NMC and Consumers do not believe a survey of the project area is necessary, as Federal and state agencies have confirmed on multiple occasions that no historic properties, archeological or architectural, are known to exist on, or in the immediate vicinity of the Palisades site." However, Petitioners fear that 20 more years of operations at Palisades risks a large-scale radiological accident. Even if no accident were to occur, the daily operations of Palisades nuclear power plant releases "low" levels (and sometimes, not-so-low levels) of radioactivity into the air, water, and soil. It also generates high-level radioactive waste, large quantities of which have already been stored at Palisades for nearly 40 years, and ever-growing quantities of which will continue to be stored on-site for at least several decades to come, even if dumps targeted at Native American lands out West (sacred Western Shoshone Indian treaty land at Yucca Mountain, Nevada; the Skull Valley Goshute Indian Reservation in Utah) are opened.Since the actual opening of such dumps is ever more doubtful, this means that Palisades' high-level radioactive waste could remain on-site indefinitely into the future. The "routine" or"accidental" radioactive contamination caused by 20 additional years of operations at Palisades would be a significant adverse impact upon Native American burial or other sites located there. Such sites are considered sacred and religiously significant in the cultures of many Native American tribes, so befouling these sites with radioactive or toxic chemical contamination or heavy industrial usage could qualify as a desecration under the terms of the federal Native American Freedom of Religion Act.Certainly this qualifies as a disproportionate, highly adverse impact on Native Americans, that, for example, European-Americans do not face from 20 more years of operations at Palisades. There most likely are not European-American sacred burial grounds at the Palisades site, nor former village sites (also considered sacred and worthy of great respect by Native cultures) there. But there is certainly the potential, and perhaps the likelihood, that burial sites or former encampment, habitation, or village sites exist on the Palisades property. Lea Foushee, a Native American woman at the North American Water Office in Minnesota, has explained to Petitioners that beautiful vistas were often chosen as burial sites by Native Americans since time immemorial. Palisades certainly overlooks a beautiful vista to the west, overlooking Lake Michigan. Native American cultures in Michigan also regard the westward direction as the one people travel when they pass away, passing through the "Western Door," making it even more likely that burial sites exist at or near Palisades. Traditional Grand River Band of the Odawa Indians storyteller Larry Plamondon also has told Petitioners that rivers and creeks were often chosen as habitation sites by Native Americans since time immemorial. The Palisades nuclear power plant is bounded not only by the lakeshore to the west, but by the Brandywine Creek to the immediate south, as well as an even larger creek to the immediate north in Van Buren State Park. The possibility for significant Native American archaeological resources on the Palisades site is very real, and should not be so flippantly dismissed by NMC. It is irresponsible that NMC and Consumers would state so strongly that no "survey of the project area is necessary" when it, and federal and state agencies, appear to have done little if any such surveying in the past.The only documentation NMC and Consumers give in their Environmental Report to support their claims is a letter dated April 7, 1972 from the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (the predecessor to today's NRC). In that letter, DOI states "It does not appear that the existing plant should directly affect any existing or proposed unit of the National Park System, nor any site eligible for registration as a national historic, natural or environmental education landmark; however, the final statement should contain evidence of consultation with the State Historic Preservation Officer concerning the effects of the power station on places on or being considered for nomination to the National Register of Historic Places." This statement seems potentially irrelevant to such issues as Native American burial sites, former village sites, etc. located on the power plant site or along the transmission line corridor. It's interesting that consultation with the Michigan State Historic Preservation Officer is mentioned, because from Petitioner Kevin Kamps' (of NIRS) recent contact with Ms. Martha MacFarlane-Faes at MSHPO by phone on August 30, 2005, it apears that very little consultation had taken place between her office and the companies involved. In fact, she admitted that the "ball may have been dropped" on these important matters. The MSHPO's files on this matter do not put to rest the question as to whether or not Native American archaeological resources at the Palisades site could be in harm's way if a 20 year license extension were granted. It's clear that the companies, Consumers and NMC, as well as the state and federal agencies, have allowed this license extension proceeding to progress to this advanced stage without adequately addressing the potential impacts to Native American sites, rights, and values.The U.S. federal and State of Michigan agencies also have not adequately consulted with the impacted tribes in a meaningful, government-to-government manner, as is required under treaty, law, and regulation. In its February 2005 letter to the Michigan State Historic Preservation Office, NMC and Consumers also mention that: "A May 19, 1972 letter from the Michigan State Liaison Officer for Historic Protection to the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] confirmed the DOI's determination and stated that Palisades would not 'adversely affect known historical or archaeological resources of the State of Michigan.' " They go on to state that a"Terrestrial Ecological Survey" conducted 26 years ago by a private contractor paid by Consumers "found no significant historical or archaeological resources were known to occur on the Palisades site" and that these findings were confirmed by the Director of the Michigan Department of State's Michigan History Division, which verified that "no significant historical or archaeological sites had been found in the immediate area of Palisades." We question how "significant" and "immediate" were and are defined by these profit-driven private companies, and by these state agencies? Are Native American sites such as burials or villages considered significant, especially 25 to 40 years ago, when many of these reports referred to were published? It seems imperative that an updated, comprehensive, independent site survey be conducted before Palisades is granted a license to perform nuclear and other activities on this site for another 20 years.It appears from the lack of supporting documentation that neither the AEC nor the DOI ever did a careful survey of the Palisades site or adjoining transmission lines. NMC and Consumers seem unconcerned about the potential for unknown Native American burial sites or other cultural resources. Yet, given the presence of creeks just north and just south of the Palisades nuclear power plant site, it seems all the more likely that Native American villages or encampments might have been located there. And given the forested, large dunes surrounding the Palisades nuclear power plant, it seems possible that even burial sites might be located there, especially considering the great beauty of the area, and the remarkable view to the west over Lake Michigan. One definition for "palisade," after all, is "a line of bold cliffs." (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary) It very well may be that the hundred-year-old Palisades Park summer community with 200 cottages immediately south of the Palisades nuclear power plant took its name from the "cliffs," or tall forested sand dunes, on the site. Certainly Palisades nuclear plant took its name from the Palisades Park community, much to the chagrin of the residents, many of whom have opposed the nuclear reactor since before it was built in the late 1960s.NMC and Consumers state in the 2005 letter that adequate protections are in place to safeguard cultural resources on the site. They write "Examples of activities requiring an Environmental Review include disturbance of 1 or more acres of previously undisturbed

land, any earth change within 600 feet of water, wetland and waterway activities, and structural interference with landforms, lakes and streams, among others." But, given the decades of, apparent lack of concern, perhaps it should not be surprising that such "protections" actually contain huge loopholes.

For example, a good deal of Palisades nuclear power plant property -including much of the forested dunes -almost certainly is more than 600 feet from Lake Michigan. Thus, even such "protections" could still allow for overlooking or ignoring burial sites during construction projects. The nuclear companies state repeatedly throughout the Environmental Report that "NMC does not plan to undertake any major refurbishment activities," an admission that itself has dire implications, given the deteriorated state of the reactor and its safety systems. But then again, Consumers never envisioned in the early 1970s that it would need to install dozens of 20 foot tall, 132 ton concrete and steel silos to store high-level radioactive waste just 150 yards from the waters of Lake Michigan. And yet, 20 years later, that is exactly what they did. So who knows, really, what projects the companies will need or want to perform on the site over the course of the next 20 years?In addition to the ever growing stockpile of high-level radioactive waste stored on-site, in 2008 the so-called "low" level radioactive waste dump where Palisades has sent large quantities of atomic trash for decades will no longer accept such wastes from Palisades. It is very possible that Palisades would thus expand on-site "storage" for "low" level radioactive wastes, as well, some of which is actually intensely radioactive, despite the euphemistic name.Lastly, NMC and Consumers state in the last paragraph of their letter that it, and a copy of the response to it from the Michigan Historic Preservation Office, would be included in the Environmental Report. No such response is included. It is disconcerting, given the dearth of supporting documentation (Consumers Power Company's 1979 "Terrestrial Ecological Survey-Palisades Plant Site" is referenced in the Environmental Report, but a copy of this survey - seemingly the only actual site survey ever conducted, or at least mentioned in the Environmental Report or documents provided by MSHPO, is not included). Brian D. Conway of the State of Michigan Historic Preservation Office wrote a letter on March 14, 2005 to James Holthaus at Palisades Nuclear Power Plant stating "...we have reviewed your comments and concur with the recommendations outlined in your [Feb. 11, 2005] letter...". This begs the question, who dropped the ball? NMC/Consumers, or MSHPO?Or both? It's encouraging that MSHPO has expressed concerns, apparently, in the past. But it's discouraging that NRC-imposed deadlines such as the August 8'h deadline for intervening/requesting hearings and the August 2 2 nd deadline for environmental scoping comments have come and gone, with no action regarding the potential for Native American impacts from this proposal being adequately addressed by the companies nor by the federal or state agencies.Given the sovereignty of these tribes and bands, and the treaty rights that exist between them and the United States federal government, the NRC has a government-to-government responsibility to meaningfully consult with these tribes and bands on such significant federal actions as granting the Palisades reactor an additional 20 years of operations. An independent, comprehensive archaeological survey must be conducted before NRC grants a 20-year license extension to assure that Native American archaeological sites are not negatively impacted by future Palisades reactor operations. Such impacts as harm to lake sturgeon -sacred to some Great Lakes tribes -must also be evaluated. It is interesting and telling that NMC's Environmental Report assigns no "importance" to lake sturgeon (in Table 2.3-1, Page 2-47), despite its State of Michigan "threatened" status, and its sacred status in the cultures and traditions of various Great Lakes Native American Tribes, and its importance to the natural history of Lake Michigan as an ancient indigenous species in the ecosystem. This is an indication that NMC/Consumers is not acknowledging or addressing environmental justice impacts of 20 more years of operations at Palisades on Native Americans. Quite recently, a Native American cultural site came to the attention of local tribal officials who did not know about it before. An August 12, 2005 article in the Grand Rapids Press ("Sense of adventure: Historic sites will highlight a new Black River paddling pathway")had an accompanying map showing a Native American site of historical significance southeast of South Haven on the Black River, just south of 1 2 th Street, east of M-43, and west of 6 6 th Street/County Road 687. This is well within the ten mile zone from the Palisades reactor, perhaps even within seven miles. Dave Lemberg, director of the Great Lakes Center for Maritime Studies at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, played an important role in selecting the historic sites that would be featured along the water trail for canoes and kayakers described in the article. He and other historical and archaeological experts -but most importantly tribal officials and traditional elders -must be meaningfully consulted to ensure an independent site survey at and around Palisades to protect Native American cultural resources there.The NRC Staff, in its challenge to this contention, inexplicably ignores Petitioners' arguments about the potential for disproportionately high adverse impacts on Native American cultural resources on the Palisades site that have never been identified. Tom Goldtooth, executive director of Indigenous Environmental Network in Minnesota, and Winona LaDuke, executive director of Honor the Earth, are long-time advisors to NIRS on such matters and can serve as expert witnesses on these Native American environmental justice contentions. Technical perfection is not an essential element of contention pleading. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-3, 53 NRC 84, 99 (2001). The sounder practice is to decide issues on their merits, not to avoid them on technicalities. Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Plant), LBP-79-20, 10 NRC 108, 116117 (1979).WITHDRAWN CONTENTIONS Petitioners hereby give notice of the withdrawal of the following contentions from consideration: Contention No. 5 (no permanent repository for the nuclear waste which would be generated at Palisades after 2010)Contention No. 6 (Intensifying sand erosion and avalanche risk around dry cask storage pads)Contention No. 828 (Increased embrittlement of re-used fuel rods as buffers to reduce embrittlement of RPV walls)2 9 Contention No. 9 (Chronic emergency unpreparedness within EPZ)Contention No. 10 (Economic damage in Palisades region in event of accident or attack on the power plant causing severe radiation release)Contention No. 11 (Threats of terrorist attack and sabotage against the Palisades nuclear power plant)Respectfully submitted for the Petitioners, 2 8 This Contention was mislabeled as No. 8 in the original Petition inasmuch as there was a separate Contention also numbered 6, but for consistency of reference is defined in this section as being No. 8.2 9 This Contention is being withdrawn in the belief that the gravamen of it can be addressed within Contention No. 1 raised by the Petitioners, "The license renewal application is untimely and incomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement." /s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry Lodge, Esq.Ohio Sup. Ct. #0029271 316 N. Michigan St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43624-1627 (419) 255-7552 Fax (419) 255-5852 tjlodge50@yahoo.com Kary Love, Esq.Executive Business Center 348 Waverly Road, Suite 2, Holland MI 49423 (616) 399-4408 Fax (616) 399-0868 Co-Counsel for all Petitioners-Intervenors and Member-Intervenors UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC (Palisades Nuclear Plant)))))))Docket No.ASLBP No.50-255-LR 05-842-03-LR CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the "PETITIONERS' COMBINED REPLY TO NRC STAFF AND NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY ANSWERS" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following through deposit in the NRC's internal mail system, with copies by electronic mail, as indicated by an asterisk, by U.S. mail, first class, as indicated by double asterisk, with copies by electronic mail, or by U.S. mail, first class, as indicated by triple asterisk, and that paper copies only of "PETITIONERS' APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF CONTENTIONS" were delivered all parties at the following mailling addresses; all on this 16th day of September, 2005: Office of the Secretary* ATTN: Docketing and Service Mail Stop: O-16C1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 (E-mail: HEARINGDOCKET@nrc.gov) Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication Mail Stop O-16C1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Dr. Anthony Baratta*Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop: T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 (E-mail: ajb5@nrc.gov) Dr. Nicholas G. Trikouros* Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop: T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 (E-mail: n.trikouros@att.net) Ann Marshall Young*Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop: T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 (E-mail: amy@nrc.gov) Kary Love, Esq.**Executive Business Center 348 Waverly Road, Suite 2 Holland, MI 49423 (E-mail: karylove@yahoo.com) Paul Gunter**Director Nuclear Information & Resource Service 1424 1 6 th Street, NW Suite 404 Washington, DC 20036 (E-mail: pgunter@nirs.org) Chuck Jordan**Chairman Green Party of Van Buren County 50521 3 4 th Avenue Bangor, MI 49013 (E-mail: jordanc@btc-bci.com) Alice Hirt**Western Michigan Environmental Action Co.1415 Wealthy Street, SE Suite 280 Grand Rapids, MI 49506 (E-mail: alicehirt@charter.net) Michael Keegan**Co-Chair Don't Waste Michigan 2213 Riverside Drive, NE Grand Rapids, MI 49505 (E-mail: mkeeganj@comcast.net) Maynard Kaufman*** Michigan Land Trustees 25485 County Road 681 Bangor, MI 49013 David R. Lewis, Esq.**Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP 2300 N Street, N.W.Washington, DC 20037-1128 (E-mail: david.lewis@pillsburylaw.com) Jonathan Rogoff, Esq.**Vice President, Counsel, & Secretary Nuclear Management Company, LLC 700 First Street Hudson, WI 54016 (E-mail: jonathan.rogoff@nmcco.com) Susan Uttal, Esq.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop: O-15D21 Washington, D.C. 20555 (E-mail Address: slu@nrc.gov) /s/ Terry J. Lodqe Terry J. Lodge I ..Offi al Transcriptof PrOceedings .-o NUCLEA REGULATORY COMMISSION6,cr November 8, 2005 (10:00am)OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF Title Plisade Generation-Station License Renewal Docket Number: 50-255-LR; ASLBP No.: 05-842-03-LR Location: South Haven, Michigan C)Date: Thursday', November 3, 2005 ,I Work Order No.: NRC-693 Pages 19-222 NEAL R. -GRosS AND Co.;. .INC.Court Repoirters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 2344433-J itiW94LA-TE-A V-a. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA K-I 4- + + + +BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board+ + + + +NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY PALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Regarding License the Renewal of Facility Operating No. DPR-20 for a 20-Year Period Docket No. 50-255-LR ASLB No. 05-842-03-LR THURSDAY NOVEMBER 3, 2005 ki+ + + + +1555 PHOENIX ROAD SOUTH HAVEN, MICHIGAN+ + + + +The above-entitled matter commenced pursuant to Notice before Ann Marshall Young, Dr. Anthony Baratta, Dr.Nicholas Trikouros, Administrative Judges.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 PRESENT: For the Office of Commission Appellate: Administrative Judges: Ann Marshall Young Dr. Anthony Baratta Dr. Nicholas Trikouros NRC STAFF: Michael J. Morgan -Project Manager Susan Uttal Michael Spencer Counsel for NMC, Applicant: Paul A. Gaukler David R. Lewis Counsel for the Petitioner/Intervenor: Terry Lodge Kary Love Paul Gunter Debra Wolf -Law Clerk NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 I-N-D-E-X K_/Exhibit No.2 Description May 27, 2004 memo from the Executive Director of Operations Page 130 K>K>NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 I PROCEEDINGS 2 (9:00 A.M.)3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: My name is Ann 4 Marshall Young. I am the Chair of the Licensing Board for 5 this proceeding, and I'm going to ask -- I'm the legal 6 judge on the Board. I'm going to ask my colleagues to 7 introduce themselves and then I'd like to ask all the 8 parties to introduce yourselves and who you have with you.9 Dr. Baratta?10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I'm Anthony Baratta, 11 I'm one of the technical judges.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Nick Trikouros, 13 technical judge.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And we have our law 15 clerk, Debra Wolf, over here. Let's start with the NRC.16 MS. UTTAL: Thank you, your Honor. Susan 17 Uttal, the NRC, representing the NRC Staff. To my 1s immediate right is Michael Spencer. He's with OGC but he 19 is not entering an appearance in this case. To his right 20 is Michael Morgan who is the project manager for renewal on 21 the safety side. And behind me is Robert Schaaf who is the 22 project manager on the environmental side.23 MR. LEWIS: I'm David Lewis, and with me is Mr.24 Paul Gaukler. We're with the law firm Pillsbury, Winthrop, 25 Shaw & Pittman, representing Nuclear Management Company in NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 23 I this proceeding. 2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: All right. And Mr.3 Lodge?4 MR. LODGE: Thank you. I'm Terry Lodge, and 5 seated with me is Kary Love who is a Michigan attorney who 6 is not entering an appearance but will be assisting me.7 Also with me is Paul Gunter who is one of the named 8 designees of one of the organizational Petitioners that 9 would be the Nuclear Information Resource Service, and 10 Alice Hirt who is another named designee here I believe on 11 behalf of Don't Waste Michigan. We are expecting a couple 12 of the other actual personal representatives but we are 13 prepared to proceed.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Before we 15 get started, are there any preliminary matters from anyone?16 Okay. Let me tell you what our plan of action is and we'll 17 proceed from there. We thought the most appropriate thing is to do would be to start with any argument that the parties 19 might have on the motions to strike. Then we would move 20 into hearing argument on the contentions one by one.21 We will have the most questions for all of you 22 on Contention 1, and so we'll start with that and then 23 proceed as appropriate through the day. If we have any 24 short periods and we know that there will be less time 25 required for argument on any particular point, we can NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433""":- 24 I change the order. But unless something like that happens, K-/2 that would be the order that we would plan to go with.3 On the motions, we can either take a short 4 amount of time or a long amount of time depending upon what 5 all of you would like to do. The way we are approaching 6 this is to consider the motions as effectively asking us 7 not to consider anything in the Petitioner's reply that 8 does not focus on the matters raised in the answers. And 9 we would do that based on case law to that effect.10 If all of you are in agreement with that 11 approach and don't wish to make any further argument, there 12 is no need to do so. That would be the way that we would 13 handle the objections essentially raised in the motions.14 If any of you would like to make any argument that we 15 should go further than that or do anything different than 16 that, we're glad to hear your argument on that. What we 17 would probably get into, if we take that route, we'd be 18 looking at the actual reply in comparison to the answers 19 and have you argue to us which portions should or should 20 not be considered. 21 Let me just, I think the first motion was filed 22 by -- would you prefer I just, I call you NMC? As a party 23 to NMC?24 MR. LEWIS: NMC is fine, Judge Young.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, why don't we start NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.'." .* -. ..... ..- ..... .... : : ... .... 25 I with you, Mr. Lewis?2 MR. LEWIS: I guess I need a clarification of 3 what your contemplated ruling is. If by -- we argued in 4 our answer that the contentions did not have bases and did 5 not address the portions in the applications that were 6 deficient. We think that that information had to be in the 7 original contention and if it is submitted in the reply, it S required a showing that there was good cause and the other 9 lateness factors have been met.10 So, we not think it's appropriate in a reply to 11 submit an answer that says yes, we have no basis in the 12 original contention but here's 50 pages of bases.13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.14 MR. LEWIS: And so, our position is that in our 15 legal arguments where we say they haven't discussed the 16 application, they haven't provided the basis, they don't 17 dispute what's wrong with our programs, not appropriate to 18 then cure that in a reply, that the reply should be a legal 19 explanation of why their original contention was 20 appropriate and not a cure. And we believe that is 21 consistent with what the Commission directed in the LES 22 decision.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: That is, and I guess 24 the only thing that I would add is that in your answer, for 25 example, you did include some argument in effect about what NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 26 I you did, in effect going beyond saying there is no basis or 2 there is no genuine issue, et cetera. You actually talk 3 about what you did and you raise, you make reference to 4 certain NRC regulations. What the Commission has said is 5 that the replies must be narrowly focused on what's raised 6 in the answer. So, if we without argument find that 7 anything in the reply focuses on what is raised in the 8 answer, we would be likely to consider that but we would 9 not consider anything in the nature that you discussed that 10 would be in effect filling in blanks that you asserted were 11 present in the original contention. 12 Now, there may be, drawing that line may not be 13 completely black and white in all instances, but that would 14 be the approach that we would take. And so, if you want to 15 make any argument, we're glad to listen to it.16 MR. LEWIS: Let me just add that, in our 17 answer, we pointed to the sections in our application that 18 addressed embrittlement, not to address the merits of the 19 embrittlement issue but to show that the application 20 included discussions that simply had not been addressed or 21 challenged in the original petition. So, it was not our 22 intent to address the merits of the issues but simply to 23 indicate that in fact this was a topic that was addressed 24 at some length in the application and it simply hadn't been 25 disputed.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 27 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: And you're referring K_/2 to, for example, in your reply to I guess would be page 11 3 and 12, for example on Contention 1 where you state, well, 4 let me just pick the statement on page 12. The application 5 also identifies the steps that NMC gives and will be taking 6 to ensure protection against -- as an example.7 MR. LEWIS: Yes. In other words, it is a 8 legitimate contention to say an applicant hasn't addressed 9 the topic if there is nothing in the application. But 10 where in fact the application addresses the topic, then the 11 contention has to explain why that is an insufficient 12 response. And so, what we were pointing out is, yes, our 13 application had addressed this topic and it was essentially 14 unchallenged in the original petition.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But now, you do get 16 into some argument on the meaning of 10 CFR Section 50.61, 17 for example, and also I think, primarily that one, that's 18 the central one on 54.21(c)i also. So, I mean, if it's 19 not, if our explanation is not clear enough to you, we'll 20 be glad to hear argument from you on it. I guess you can't 21 completely cut off any reply at all.22 MR. LEWIS: Oh, I agree with that.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And obviously, one way* 24 that a party or participant could reply would be to say no, 25 we did state a basis and this is what the basis was. But NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 28 I when you get into arguments about the meanings of 2 regulations and that sort of thing, it's not as black and 3 white as I think you may have been suggesting earlier. And 4 obviously the reason for the Commission even to have 5 addressed this and to have talked about replies need to 6 focus on the matters raised in the answer is that it is not 7 always completely black and white. We understand the 8 principle that you're talking about and I think probably 9 all counsel do.10 Do you want to make any further argument based 11 on what we've said?12 MR. LEWIS: No, I just have to rest on the 13 pleadings and that we're ready if there are specific K>14 portions of the reply that you have questions about and 15 think may need to be addressed. I'm going to need to 16 address those during the argument as well.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Ms. Uttal?18 MS. UTTAL: Yes. I just have three things that 19 I want to raise. First of all, the Petitioners --20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Excuse me. Could you 21 talk a little more to the microphone? 22 MS. UTTAL: I'm sorry.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And get closer to it, 24 both for us and the court reporter.25 MS. UTTAL: The Petitioners in their reply have NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 29 I a discussion about, that there is no prejudice to the other 2 parties. The Commission does not consider prejudice to be 3 a factor and is not in the LES case. It's compliance with 4 the regulations that is the factor. Secondly, and I think 5 I pointed this out in my brief, they rely on outdated cases 6 such as the North Anna case that had been basically 7 overturned by two subsequent changes in the rules.8 And my third thing is something new. The 9 declaration filed by Dr. Landsman, Dr. Landsman is a former 10 employee of the NRC, recent employee. And as such, he is 11 barred by federal law, I think it's 18 USC 207, from 12 testifying. There are exceptions for expert witnesses but 13 the exception only goes to facts and observations. Dr.14 Landsman cannot give his opinion on anything.15 I checked this out with our ethics advisor in 16 OGC and I believe he also talked to Dr. Landsman about it, 17 so he's aware of it. Unfortunately, there were portions of 18 his declaration that contain opinion. And I have prepared 19 a redacted version where I've done a strikeout of what we 20 consider to be his opinion which I'd like to give to the 21 Board and to the other parties.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, let me just 23 address this issue of striking and redacting. I mean, in 24 modern legal practice, you don't strike things from the 25 record in terms of removing them from the record. The NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* , .,, ,. .... [...- .* .,- .... . 30 I record is there. We may not consider them, but if there 2 were an appeal, the only you can maintain a record is not 3 to black out portions of it.4 MS. UTTAL: Well, I didn't black it out.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, redacting a 6 document and substituting it, I don't think would be 7 appropriate. S MS. UTTAL: What I've done it is a strikeout so 9 you can read it, what the words are. But I think that the 10 board should be aware of what the problems areas are and 11 what cannot be considered and what he cannot testify to.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You can certainly 13 submit that and we'll include that in the record.14 MS. UTTAL: Okay..15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And again, thank you 16 for bringing the statute to our attention. But again, I 17 think in our consideration of all the parties' arguments on is the contentions, it should be clear what we have considered 19 and what we haven't considered, and we will not consider 20 anything that is not focused on what has been raised in the 21 answers. That's what we have been directed to do in case 22 law, and that's how we plan to approach it.23 Did you have anything further, Ms. Uttal?24 MS. UTTAL: That's it. Nothing else, your 25 Honor.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 31 K>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. And so, if you want to, I don't exactly have a good -- maybe you could help out by getting things from him. And we'll just make that an exhibit. And could you give enough for us and then one for the court reporter, and we could make that an exhibit to the transcript. Now, Mr.' Lodge, what would you like to say on this? Would you like to have any further argument or is our explanation --MR. LODGE: I appreciate your explanation. I would like to make a couple of observations. ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.MR. LODGE: Number one, I wonder if I could request that we defer discussion on the Landsman declaration until we actually discuss that particular contention because I think that's a more appropriate point in time. And also, it will give us an opportunity --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Can you -- I think someone is not able to hear you.MR. LODGE: Pardon me. It will give us an opportunity to digest the strikeout version of this declaration. And I at least want to examine the possibility of resolving that matter if it is acceptable to the Petitioners. Secondly, I will confess that I have practiced I NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433., .. ....".. . 32 I before the NRC several times over the years, but not in a 2 license renewal proceeding involving the revised 3 regulations. I would like to say for the record that we 4 understood the rules basically to require the contentions 5 to be a succinct statement of our contentions, of our 6 points. And we did take the responsive pleadings to be 7 analogous to a Civil Rule 12 motion to, essentially a 8 procedural attack on the method pleadings which then 9 contained in the case of NMC and the Staff, contained 10 argument going into matters of evidence and substance 11 beyond the mere procedural attack to which we then 12 responded in detail.13 It was and remains our position that we were KJ 14 fleshing out at best or worst the originally articulated 15 contentions. And in effect, I believe your Honor may have 16 identified that as being the process we went through. We 17 were responding to that sort of secondary more substantive 18 side of the motions to strike. Thank you. That's all I 19 have.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. I guess maybe 21 we can make it a little bit more clear how we're going to 22 approach this. I think the inclination would probably be 23 where you provided additional, and I'm not sure that it is 24 that similar to a Rule 12 situation but where you would 25 provide additional evidence if you will that that would NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 33 I generally be the sort of thing that I think the Commission 2 has said we would not consider in deciding whether to admit 3 a contention. 4 If on the other hand you made argument in 5 response to the example I gave before on the interpretation 6 of a regulation that would be relevant to the contention 7 that you raised in the first place, that might be another 8 sort of situation. If as we go through the contentions 9 anybody wants to raise, and I guess we would expect you to 10 raise specific points that you think we should or should 11 not consider, that would be fine. And if you want to make 12 your argument about the Landsman document, I don't see any 13 problem with doing that when we get to that contention. 14 Anyone else? All right. Okay, anything 15 further on the motions? And so, basically what we're 16 saying is what our approach will be and we would not intend 17 to make a formal ruling on the motions given the i8 explanation that we've provided. We're not going to strike 19 the entire reply. We're going to consider it in the manner 20 that you've described. And as we go to the contentions, 21 you can make any additional argument you wish to make on 22 that.23 All right. I guess also, as we go through 24 argument on the contentions, we would start with the 25 Petitioners and then go to NMC and then the Staff. And NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433..... . 34 I then, if we have any further argument, we will have a lot 2 of questions I think and we want to make sure that everyone 3 gets out their points. We would ask that you not just 4 repeat what you have written in your pleadings and address 5 the concerns that's explained after that. And I'll tell 6 you in advance, we will probably be interrupting to ask 7 questions as we go.8 Any questions or anything further before we 9 move on to Contention 1? All right. Mr. Lodge, actually 10 if you could just give me one second?11 All right, go ahead.12 MR. LODGE: Before getting into the substance 13 of things, I would like to indicate, if it is acceptable to 14 the panel, I think this is more a request, that from time 15 to time, I hope you will indulge me in consulting with some 16 of the Petitioners. A lot of our drafting and filings were 17 essentially done and accomplished in a committee type of 18 fashion which I'm sure is probably true with the other 19 parties. In any event, I hope you will indulge my need 20 from time to time to interrupt. 21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: That's fine.22 MR. LODGE: Our first contention respecting 23 embrittlement is noteworthy in that it is the type of 24 contention that was identified by the Commission itself in 25 the Turkey Point decision that was referenced by this panel NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. .. .......... .... 35 I in its initial, I believe the initial scheduling order, the 2 CLI-01-17 Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 decision wherein the 3 panel discusses Part 54, 10 CFR Part 54, and specifically 4 mentions among adverse aging effects metal fatigue, 5 erosion, corrosion, thermal and radiation embrittlement. 6 The gist of our contention is actually quite 7 simple: that the longer the Palisades nuclear reactor is 8 allowed to operate with the occasional necessary use of 9 fast shutdown types of technologies, the greater the risk 10 that embrittlement is an ongoing degenerative process, and 11 ultimately the enhanced possibility that a pressure thermal 12 shock will occur that causes a rapture of the reactor 13 vessel itself. We believe that this is an admissible 14' contention because of the obvious fact that we're talking 15 about a 34-year-old, I believe, or a 34-year-operation 16 record that has among other things left Palisades as unique 17 in the Byzantine part of the nuclear industry as a plant 18 that must be watched and must be closely and carefully 19 considered for its embrittlement potential. 20 As was indicated in our possibly forbidden 21 reply on the contentions, we note a distinct history of 22 'all over the map' computations using multiple computer 23 programs. We understand that there is no longer available 24 real time metal samples, so-called surveillance capsules or 25 coupons that are available to be removed from the reactor NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 36 I vessel upon refueling and to be analyzed for the 2 embrittlement characteristics that they may or may not 3 portray. We understand that that is probably the case 4 since the ninth refueling which was well back into the 5 1990's.6 We understand that the --7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Excuse me. Ma'am, I'm 8 sorry, but you're really going to have to leave that in a 9 stationary position. I think that --10 MS. CAREY: And you say the microphones are on?11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: They should be on, 12 yes.13 MS. CAREY: Thank you.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Mr. Strasma, is 15 that --16 MR. STRASMA: Yes, stationary position. As 17 long as it's not distracting, it's fine.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. I think moving 19 around may be a little bit too distracting. Go ahead, Mr.20 Lodge, I'm sorry.21 MR. LODGE: Thank you. We understand from our 22 review of the Palisades embrittlement history that the 23 anticipated estimated dates at which there would be a 24 critical problem with the reactor vessel range from 1995 to 25 the present utility projection of 2014 which of course is NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.............................................. ,......°.,-..* 37 I several years into the projected 20-year extension period.2 In other words, if a 19-year chunk of time during which it 3 has been projected and anticipated, estimated or guessed, 4 that there would be the potential for a severe crisis under 5 the right circumstances from pressure thermal shock.6 We, in short, believe that (a) the subject 7 matter jurisdiction if you will of this panel clearly 8 encompasses this particular aging degenerative problem; and 9 secondly, that the data as summarized in our originally 10 filed contentions but certainly as amplified in our reply 11 shows that this issue must be subjected to hearing. As I 12 say, we anticipate from the public domain documents that we 13 have reviewed prior to even filing the contentions, that 14 the history is so mixed, so troubled, and frankly, 15 technically controversial, that the Palisades plant has to 16 be put under a microscope as a poster child for the 17 embrittlement problem.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let me just ask you, 19 obviously it would have been good to have the, from your 20 standpoint, to have the additional information that you 21 provided in the reply in the original contention. But just 22 looking at the original contention, do you want to make any 23 further argument on it alone as meeting the contention 24 admissibility standards in 10 CFR 2.309(f)?25 MR. LODGE: Beyond the reply that we made in NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433~~~~~~........-. .. .. ...................... .... .*. * ... " 3S I the motion to strike, I don't believe so.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.3 MR. LODGE: Is your Honor getting at a 4 particular point?5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: No. I mean, you did 6 make arguments on that and we've understood them basically. 7 As I understand your argument, well, for example, on the 8 issue that Mr. Lewis raised a minute ago, that I believe 9 you said in your reply that you're alleging a failure to 10 include information rather than -- let's see. Your 11 response to the claim that you haven't included references 12 to specific portions of the application was, as I 13 understood it, that your belief is that the application 14 fails to contain information on a relevant matter. And the 15 critical fact that you're alleging to support your 16 contention is the identification of the Palisades Plant as 17 prone to early embrittlement. Am I understanding that 18 correctly? 19 MR. LODGE: Yes. Yes, correct.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Could I ask a 21 question with regards to the -- 309(f)2 requires you to 22 provide a brief explanation of the basis for your 23 contention. Could you, in reference to your original 24 filing, point to where that statement adheres in Contention 25 1?NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 319 I MR. LODGE: Well, I reread this with an eye to 2 that, your Honor, in responding to the motion to strike. I 3 think that the basis is the implied in that the 4 embrittlement issue is of course explained and discussed at 5 length in the application, and we believe that, as I've 6 indicated, that the law clearly, the law on the subject 7 clearly envisions that embrittlement is a type of 8 degenerative process that's within the scope of the 9 proceeding. If you're saying, if you're questioning us, 10 did you use the word 'here is our basis', no, we did not.11 I believe that it is implicit and we were anticipating with 12 the expertise of this panel would probably acknowledge that 13 it is the type of problem that is covered in the 14 application and therefore can be challenged. 15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay.16 Unfortunately, well, because of Turkey Point, isn't the 17 Board constrained though from filling in, so to speak? You 18 know, you used the word implied in what you just said, and 19 I think in light of Turkey Point, there is some language in 20 there that says that the Board could not fill in 21 information. Could you reply to that? I'm struggling, you 22 can see what I mean.23 MR. LODGE: I have seen, and I know the wording 24 you're referring to, I think that, frankly, that the 25 Commission's statement in that regard certainly sets no KN NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 40 I objective standard unless it is that this panel is to read 2 the contention and decide if it articulates what we call a 3 justiciable issue.4 I think that, I guess I'm filling in, I think 5 that the Commission-expects that the panel is going to 6 exercise a certain amount of discretion, and also to start 7 from a certain operative framework, i.e., the presumptions 8 that the panel is aware of the contents of the application 9 and essentially measures the contention alongside of what 10 the application states on the subject. I guess our 11 position as Petitioners is that it's not filling in but, 12 because otherwise, you're talking about this panel being 13 constrained to make a rote determination that a checklist 14 has been followed or not and the contention is allowed in 15 or not. And I believe that the policy of the NRC 16 historically has been, when possible, to make 17 determinations based upon merits, not upon simply 18 procedural defects and deficiency. 19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Could you -- did you 20 have anything to add?21 MR. LODGE: No, thank you.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Could you address the 23 Staff's argument that the statements you make in support of 24 your contention are generic? You said earlier that --25 MR. LODGE: Right.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* ... -...;.. 41 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You referred to what 2 made the Palisades unique and you're alleging that the 3 identification is prone to early embrittlement. 4 MR. LODGE: Right.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But the Staff is 6 arguing that what you have provided is generic and applies 7 to, in effect applies to all plants.8 MR. LODGE: I believe what your Honor is 9 referring to is the more embrittled a plant becomes -- the 10 longer it operates, the more embrittled it becomes. That 11 is generically true. The issue is whether there are 12 decreasing safety margins in the event of initiation of 13 emergency operating procedures which can be kind of a 14 generic truism. But I don't think the Utility nor the 15 Staff are admitting that that is a generic truism by a long 16 shot.17 And please forgive me, I'm not trying to say i8 that the panel is quibbling over a sentence structure, but 19 we succinctly point out that our expert opinion is that 20 that is true as to Palisades. So, yes, it's plucking from 21 the land of generic truisms a statement that is then 22 applied to Palisades. And we do believe that that 23 adequately articulates an admissible contention, that the 24 longer it operates, the more dangerous it is, and that an 25 expert has analyzed the facts, an expert that presumably at NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433"" " *'" :"""" --" ".... ' " ... ......" " " i ". ' .. 42 I this point is familiar enough with the plant has made that 2 statement, offered that opinion as to Palisades. 3 This plant does not have a thermal shield and 4 we also believe that that is one of the facts that makes 5 Palisades truly unique, as I say a poster child for the 6 embrittlement problem.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I guess what I would S like you to focus on, I mean, what I took, reading your 9 contention and the basis or the support, I'm reading your 10 contention as being the bolded, let's see, the bolded 11 statement after the number one, and then the support for it 12 being the paragraph that follows that.13 MR. LODGE: Right.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And when I look at 15 that, the thing that strikes me as the unique thing that 16 you're alleging is that the Palisades Plant has been 17 identified as prone to early embrittlement. 18 MR. LODGE: Right.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And you raise the 20 issue of timely by reference to, by use of the word 21 untimely and continuing crises.22 MR. LODGE: Correct.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, could you address 24 that a little bit more? I mean, maybe I'm overlooking 25 something, but the uniqueness that you appear to be NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.* . 43 I alleging is the early, being identified as prone to early 2 embrittlement presumably 3 and in comparison to other plants.4 MR. LODGE: Yes. Several questions there.5 Please let me organize my thoughts. Number one, while the 6 assertions may appear to be generic, the response and the 7 numerous Staff meetings, pardon me, conferences with the 8 Utility, between Staff and Utility engineers and other 9 experts has been very plant specific. It may have, the 10 result of how the embrittlement problem is handled at 11 Palisades might have replicability within the industry.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I'm really not, I 13 don't necessarily see any problem with -- if you raise some 14 facts that may be true for other plants, that is not 15 necessarily a reason to throw out a contention. What I'm 16 trying to get you to focus on though is the one thing that 17 you allege that, appears to be alleging that Palisades is 18 different is the reference to the timing and the being 19 prone to early embrittlement. And the Staff is arguing, as 20 I understand it, that that in addition to the other things 21 that you're talking is generic.22 MR. LODGE: And of course --23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: What is the 24 significance of it being prone to early embrittlement? 25 MR. LODGE: May I discuss things briefly NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 44 I please?2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.3 MR. LODGE: Thank you.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But just before you 5 confer any further, let me ask another question that I was 6 going to ask, and you might refer to the first one in this 7 context. NMC talks about, under 54.21, that it intends to 8 demonstrate that the effects of aging on the intended 9 functions will be adequately managed for the period of 10 extended operation, and then gets into a discussion of 11 50.61 in addition. In your reply, you made reference to 12 50.61 as well.13 And so, what I'm trying to get you to focus on 14 is in that context and in the context of your alleging that 15 the Palisades Plant is prone to early embrittlement, what 16 is important about your allegation or your allegations that 17 makes this an issue that should be admitted for litigation? 18 What is unique in response to the Staff's argument?19 MR. LODGE: Thank you.20 (Whereupon, Mr. Lodge confers with 21 the other Petitioners.) 22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Another way to look at 23 this, Mr. Lodge, another way to look at this --24 MR. LODGE: Yes?25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I know you've referred KN NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433: ..= .., .. . 45 I to some types of evidence that were this contention -- you 2 would present, but obviously if this contention were to be 3 admitted, it wouldn't make sense for you to just come and 4 give a lesson on what are the effects of embrittlement 5 generally. 6 MR. LODGE: Right. Yes. I agree wholly with 7 you on that point, your Honor. Pardon me.8 One of the unique factors about Palisades is 9 that it has been lost to the shifting sand dunes of time.10 The mix of copper and nickel in the reactor vessel --11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let me stop you, okay?12 MR. LODGE: Okay.13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Because I do not want, 14 by my question, to invite you to provide additional facts.15 MR. LODGE: Right.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: What I'm trying to get 17 you to do is provide a legal argument in the context of the 18 contention admissibility standards and in the context of 19 the contention and basis or support that you provided in 20 your original petition to respond to the Staff's concern 21 about everything being alleged in the contention and in the 22 support for it being generic. In other words, I don't want 23 you to just give me additional facts that weren't there 24 originally. But looking at your original contention, the 25 thing I see that stands out as sounding as though it's NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 46 I unique is the identification of the Palisades Power Station 2 as being prone to early embrittlement. 3 MR. LODGE: One moment.4 (Whereupon, Mr. Lodge confers with 5 the other Petitioners.) 6 MR. LODGE: From the application, we believe 7 that the copper and nickel content, and I understand your 8 hesitation that I venture into that, is higher than other 9 plants which makes the Palisades reactor vessel unique.10 Furthermore, as to the 10 CFR 50.61 issue, the alternatives 11 that are portrayed in the application are not exactly 12 properly explained by the Utility. The Utility 13 references --14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Now, again, I don't 15 want by my questions to invite you to say things that you 16 might have said in your original contention. What I'm 17 trying to get you to focus on is your original contention IS and how the original contention raises issues that should 19 be admitted through litigation. And one of the things that 20 the Commission said in Turkey Point was that the purpose of 21 the -- hold on just a second. "The hearing should serve 22 the purpose for which they are intended to adjudicate 23 genuine substantive safety environmental issues placed in 24 contention by qualified intervenors. While intervenors 25 need not be technical experts, they must knowledgeably NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. .. ..... .......*. ... ...*

• 47 I provide some threshold level of factual basis for their 2 contention." 3 Now, you have identified an expert who is 4 retired from the NRC, and presumably that expert would be 5 able to say things other than just give us a lesson on the 6 dangers of embrittlement.

The only thing I read in your 7 contention, and not to say that the other facts that you've 8 alleged aren't sufficient to support a contention on their 9 own, but the thing that you have identified as unique is 10 identification of the plant as being prone to early 11 embrittlement. 12 Why is that an issue that is substantive enough 13 that we should admit a contention on it? Without getting 14 into specific facts, why is that issue, one, how does that 15 raise a substantive that makes this contention admissible? 16 MR. LODGE: Excuse us.17 (Whereupon, Mr. Lodge confers with 18 the other Petitioners.) 19 MR. LODGE: What your Honor is getting at, I 20 gather, is that we have articulated an expert opinion, a 21 conclusion without the underlying factual basis.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: No.23 MR. LODGE: No? I'm sorry.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Are you referring 25 to, I mean, the rule that your clients have spelled out in NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. .. .. ... ...... .........

• . .....: /. .-

48 I here, is this sufficient information --2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: No, no. What I'm 3 getting at is if we were to admit this contention --4 MR. LODGE: Right.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You have an expert, 6 the expert can talk about what happened at the Palisades 7 Plant.8 MR. LODGE: Right.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. What's the 10 impact of that? What difference does that make considering 11 the standard that, if we look at, for example, 10 CFR 12 2.309(f) Subsection 4, "You must demonstrate that the issue 13 raised in the contention is material to the findings the 14 NRC must make to support the action that's involved in the 15 proceeding." 16 Now, the findings that we must make are defined 17 at 10 CFR 54.29, Standards for Issuance of a Renewed is License.. "A renewed license may be issued by the 19 Commission up to the full term authorized by 54.31 if the 20 Commission finds that actions have been identified and have 21 been or will be taken with respect to the matters 22 identified in paragraphs (a)l and (a)2 of this section such 23 that there is a reasonable assurance that the activities f -....24 authorized by the renewed license will continue to be 25 conducted in accordance with the current licensing basis NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 , .. ....... .-. 49 I and at any changes made," and so forth. And then it refers KJ 2 to certain matters which are managing the effects of aging 3 during the period of extended operation on the 4 functionality of structures and components that have been 5 identified to require review under 54.21(a)1 which is 6 referred to by NMC in their answer.7 So, I'm asking you not to discuss the facts but 8 what's the legal impact of whatever facts you would present 9 in support of your contention were it to be admitted?10 Because we don't just, I mean, if we were to admit it, we 11 wouldn't just decide based on what we think. We would look 12 to the rule that governs what are the standards for renewal 13 of a license in determining what the significance of those 14 facts were and whether they demonstrated that the license 15 should not, I would assume your argument would be, should 16 not be granted. And what we would look to in determining 17 whether NMC has shown that it should be granted or whether 18 you have shown that it shouldn't be granted is 54.29 and 19 the standards set forth there.20 In addition to that, NMC has made arguments 21 based on 50.61 in terms of what it plans to do. So, I'm 22 really asking you to focus your argument on the legal 23 impact of the facts that you have alleged and how that is 24 substantive, how that is material to the findings that we 25 need to make.NR)NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 50 I MR. LODGE: Among the findings that the Board 2 has to make are that the timing of aging analyses offered 3 by the utility company are adequate essentially to protect 4 the public health and safety.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, now, I really 6 want you to focus on the actual standard which is 54.29.7 That, we don't just say, we don't just make a general 8 finding on the public health and safety.9 MR. LODGE: Right. If you'll indulge me for a 10 moment, within that finding is that the earlier analyses 11 that are rendered by NMC will remain valid for the 20-year 12 extension period. We don't believe that the application 13 provides that kind of assurance. Certainly the history 14 doesn't. But even the facts as articulated in the 15 application show that Palisades' management plan is behind 16 the curve, if you will, in terms of getting a grasp on the 17 embrittlement problem --18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Now, you're 19 getting back into the facts. And what I'd really like you 20 to do is look at the facts that you've alleged in support 21 of your contention and the fact that you are alleging that 22 this plant is identified as prone to early embrittlement. 23 How does that relate to the findings that we need to make?24 How does that relate to whether or not a renewed license 25 should be granted, whether or not the effects of aging are NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 51 I going to be managed for the term, for the extended term of 2 the license?3 MR. LODGE: Are you saying if the panel accepts 4 for purposes of argument that it is prone to early 5 embrittlement --6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.7 MR. LODGE: Then, well, if it's prone to early 8 embrittlement, it means that it underscores our contention 9 that Palisades is unique, that Palisades is in essence 10 cutting edge, and that the very close scrutiny needs to be 11 given to the analysis offered by the Utility as to how it's 12 going to manage that problem during the 20-year period of 13 license extension. 14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And you're saying that 15 that analysis is inadequate? 16 MR. LODGE: Yes.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Because, why?18 MR. LODGE: Well, if I say why, that gets into 19 the factual --20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, why in the 21 context of the standards that we must follow in making a 22 determination in 54.29?23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: What is it that's 24 unique about it that makes this the appropriate form for 25 litigation of that issue? Because I, at least that's the NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 52 I question that I'm trying to get answered.2 MR. LODGE: Is what your Honor is asking what 3 does the contention say is unique?4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Well, I don't want 5 to climb on Judge Young's issue. I have my own questions 6 with respect to that. I was just trying maybe to give you 7 something to think about.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You would be arguing 9 presumably, if this contention were admitted, okay, you'd 10 be presenting facts to illustrate how Palisades is prone to 11 early embrittlement. 12 MR. LODGE: Right.13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And then, you would 14 presumably make some legal argument as to the relevance of 15 that to the standards that we need to apply in determining 16 whether NMC has shown that the renewed license should be 17 issued based on actions having been identified that have 18 been or will be taken with respect to managing the effects 19 of aging during the period of extended operation, et 20 cetera. Now, what would your legal argument be assuming 21 that you have shown that Palisades Plant is prone to early 22 embrittlement and taking into account the legal argument 23 made by NMC that under 50.61, they will be submitting 24 information to show, they will be providing information to 25 the NRC three years in advance of the projected date that NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433................................... ,......... 53 I the plant will exceed the PTS criterion? 2 So, what legal argument would you make to say 3 these facts show that the standard defined in Section 54.29 4 has not been met by NMC with regard to the Palisades Plant?5 You couldn't just rely on the facts and say it shows it --6 so you need to demonstrate to us that the legal standard 7 set in 54.29 which refers back to 54.21 I believe which is 8 cited by NMC in its argument, what legal argument would you 9 make to support denying the renewed license based on the 10 standards in 54.29? Do you need a copy of that to look at?11 MR. LODGE: If you have it, please.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And if you want to 13 look also at 54.21 and 50.61?14 MR. LODGE: Right. We have that, thank you.15 Our legal argument would be to pose the question: How can 16 the Utility presume to say that they will have a plan three 17 years ahead of its implementation based on the fact that 18 the Utility cannot demonstrate at this point that it 19 understands, has it arms around the problem of 20 embrittlement? Our legal question is what's going to 21 change between now and that indeterminate point in the 22 future whereby the utility can demonstrate that it finally 23 does have a grasp?24 As I've indicated, the facts are going to show 25 some very deleterious problems that tend to undermine the NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 S."...[_ .. .. 54 credibility of projections. And we're at a loss to 2 understand how the Utility has explained in this 3 application that it's going to be able to come up with 4 credible science and engineering based projections on which 5 to base its three-year advance notice.6 The embrittlement problem in some hasn't been 7 managed to date. And if history is any indicator, it's not 8 going to, the Utility is not postulating any means by which 9 it proposes to really manage the problem. It's just saying 10 we'll be fine, we'll give you three years advance notice, 11 we'll select among the options and come up with some sort 12 of combined strategy. They really haven't articulated what 13 that management strategy is. They have explained in the 14 application what their options are.15 We already, and I know, I just want to give you 16 a for instance. We know that they say annealing is in 17 there and it's one of the things we could do. But we also 18 happen to know off the record between us that they aren't 19 going to anneal, possibly because of the cost of doing so.20 We don't know. But the point is the Utility is actually 21 saying we plan to have a plan.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And so, you're arguing 23 that that does not constitute an action that's been 24 identified that has been or will be taken --25 MR. LODGE: Exactly.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* '."z *'"" ". .... :.. .:-.... I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- with respect to 2 managing the effects of aging during the period of extended 3 operation? 4 MR. LODGE: Yes. Yes, your Honor.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: But what is the 6 basis for that not being an action though? I mean, if I 7 say that I'm going to do something that I have identified 8 an action, what is the legal basis for that not being an 9 action I guess is what I'm saying.10 MR. LODGE: We would have no case if the 11 Utility could credibly argue that it has managed the 12 embrittlement problem today. We don't believe the Utility 13 can make that argument. This is an evolving analysis.14 What you're watching, and again, I'm not going to plough 15 deeply into the facts, but if you're looking at a 16 circumstance where the original anticipated danger, you 17 know, red lights, bells going off date was 1995, yet now is it's 2014, that's a generation estimate.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But let's say, let's 20 just assume for the sake of argument that there haven't 21 been any problems up to this point, because you don't 22 really allege that in your contention. What you allege is 23 that it's subject to, or it's been identified as being ( 24 prone to early embrittlement. 25 MR. LODGE: Right.NJ NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 56 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And then, in response 2 to that, NMC has said, well, what we're going to do is 3 we're going to do what 50.61 requires and we're going to do 4 that, we're going to provide the information three years 5 before the PTS criterion is exceeded which I believe, I 6 don't think there is any dispute that that would be 2014.7 MR. LODGE: Right.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, I think what Judge 9 Baratta is asking is how is identifying the action of 10 providing information to the NRC, and I guess it would be 11 2011 with regard to what they're going to do in 2014, how 12 should that be evaluated under 54.29?13 MR. LODGE: I would just make the observation 14 first that 2011 is the expiration year for the current 15 license. So, 2014 is three years into the extension 16 period. So, the fact that the Utility is saying at the end 17 of our current license we'll provide you with a plan, the IS Utility has not demonstrated the capability of managing the 19 embrittlement to date and is essentially in its application 20 saying --21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But what I ask you, 22 let's assume that it has. Let's assume that it has. Is 23 there anything wrong with saying we're going to tell you in 24 2011 what we're going to do in 2014?25 MR. LODGE: Assuming the Utility has managed it NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 57 I to date?I 2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.3 MR. LODGE: Or that there simply has not been a 4 crisis to date?5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let's assume there is 6 no problem to date. Let's assume what you have alleged, 7 that it's been identified as being prone to early 8 embrittlement. 9 MR. LODGE: All right.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: That's the unique 11 situation that you allege here to support your contention 12 that the application is untimely and incomplete for failure 13 to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement. 14 MR. LODGE: We are alleging that the Utility 15 itself has identified a proneness to early embrittlement. 16 We're taking public domain facts and essentially saying 17 that that is not enough. As I was saying, the plan to have IS a plan, the fact that the Utility has not yet 19 articulated --20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Why is the plan to 21 have a plan not enough?22 MR. LODGE: Because the Utility carries the 23 burden of demonstrating, of running the problem to earth, 24 of having actual facts instead of multiple inconsistent 25 projections about the embrittlement problem in order to NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. : .: ..... .. , .../ ' .. .." .... ... ....... 58 I have a plan. And they do not, they cannot articulate that 2 at this point.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: This question is 4 for Mr. Lodge and Mr. Lewis, but please feel free to chime 5 in. You state in your reply that, and I'll read it for 6 you, "Flux reduction of the magnitude required at Palisades 7 would require far more extraordinary measures such as the 8 installation of neutron shields on the exterior of the core 9 support barrel. It is unlikely that a plant modification 10 of this magnitude would be cost effective." That's quoting 11 from the application. And then you go on to say --12 MR. LODGE: What page are you in, sir?13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Page 6 of your --14 reply. You go on to say that "The Petitioners submit that 15 an effective and reliable management plan for a 20-year 16 extension must begin with the incorporation of all NRC 17 management strategies as outlined in 50.61 including 18 fluence reduction efforts, not just the company's perceived 19 cost effective ones.0 And you just mentioned a few moments 20 ago a comment regarding annealing and cost.21 It appears that your interpretation of 50.61 is 22 such that cost should not be a consideration or should be a 23 minimal consideration. I'd like to understand more about 24 that and I'd like to hear what others have to say as well.25 MR. LODGE: Well, our understanding of the NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 59 I Atomic Energy Act is that sheer economics are not an 2 appropriate rationale when the issue is to protect the 3 public health and safety.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: The word 5 practicable in 50.61 is included. In fact it says 6 reasonably practicable, if I remember correctly. 7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You say on page 9, if 8 you don't mind my sort of amplifying on that, you say on 9 page 9 of your reply, "There is a grave issue of law here, 10 whether the economically dictated priority of Palisades or 11 the health and safety concerns of the Petitioners conform 12 to NRC regulations.* Which regulations -- I assume that 13 you're referring to 50.61?14 MR. LODGE: Yes. Correct.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And the licensing 16 renewal regulations. And I think the term reasonably 17 practicable is where the --18 MR. LODGE: Can you tell me please what 19 subsection that is in?20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: That is in 50.61.21 MR. LEWIS: (B)3 and (b)4.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. (B)3 is where 23 it first appears and then (b)4. I mean, in effect, what we 24 have here is that as explained in NMC's answer, what they 25 plan to do and what they rely on is their action that would NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 60 I demonstrate that they will adequately manage the effects of 2 aging during the extended period of operation under any 3 renewed license is that they will comply with 50.61. And 4 it seems like you're raising an issue, one, as to whether 5 the plan to have a plan meets the license renewal criteria, 6 but also you're raising a question about what reasonably 7 practicable means and whether cost concerns can be taken 8 into account in looking at what's reasonably practicable. 9 Is that --10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Yes. I mean, in 11 essence, they have not identified what will be in their 12 plan, but they have in at least one instance in the 13 application identified what will not be in the plan. And 14 what will not be in the plan or at least what is unlikely 15 in their own words to be in the plan is the addition of 16 neutrons shields on the core support barrel. You seem to 17 be taking exception to that interpretation of 50.61 that 18 allows them to make that assertion. I'd like to understand 19 more about that interpretation of 50.61.20 MR. LODGE: Please give me a moment.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Would it be useful to 22 take a break at this point and give you some time to --23 MR. LODGE: That would be fine. Thank you.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Then, let's 25 take a ten-minute break, 15 minutes. Come back at 10:30.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433*. .....* ... 61 I (Off the record.)2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Should I repeat 3 the question I asked prior to the break?4 MR. LODGE: If you'd like.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: The question dealt 6 with the statement in the application regarding the, that 7 it was not cost beneficial to install the modification --8 MR. LODGE: Correct.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: -- that would be 10 sufficient to mitigate the consequences of the 11 embrittlement, namely, neutron absorption plates on the 12 core support barrel. And I was asking the question 13 regarding your interpretation of 50.61 in which you 14 indicated that such considerations are not to be made.15 MR. LODGE: I agree somewhat that 50.61 and the 16 reasonably practicable wording in the 50.61 would certainly 17 seem to allow some consideration to be given to economics. 18 And we, therefore, I believe agree that, yes, that's within 19 the panoply of options. However, 50.61 is rather, in our 20 estimation as Petitioners, ahead of the game. The Utility 21 has the burden of demonstrating that they have a right to a 22 license extension. The 2014 date that we've been talking 23 about is a date that's been moved back four or five times.24 The Utility has never demonstrated before and we believe 25 it's going to have great difficulty demonstrating presently NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* .. ..........*.. .... 62 I the basis, the justification even for the 2014 date.2 The fact issue for hearing is establishing the 3 early embrittlement, when it began or where it is or what 4 degree embrittlement has set in at Palisades. That isn't 5 the Petitioners' burden at hearing. We believe that, 6 again, the plan to make a plan is the argument looking 7 through the application. The Utility has essentially made 8 the statement that it's probably unlikely that we're going 9 to do a technological fix or correction, the shields, the 10 core barrel, which is a signal now to the Licensing Board 11 that there is at least that option off the table in all 12 likelihood. 13 We believe that since the Utility is not going 14 to be able to establish a date certain, can't establish it 15 now, that the Utility is going to have to explain that at 16 hearing. That is the issue of fact. Our arguments about 17 50.61 are essentially academic until the license extension 18 has been determined to be grantable. 19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Are there any 20 other comments regarding the use of cost effective 21 arguments? 22 MR. LEWIS: We believe that reasonably 23 practicable implies consideration of cost, and what is 24 practical necessarily includes what can you do and how does 25 it cost and is it reasonable. Reasonably practicable has NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433... , ... .. .. 63 I been used in other context by the NRC to include 2 consideration of economics. There is a Seabrook case, 3 ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33 where the --4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You've cited that, 5 right? I think you have already --6 MR. LEWIS: I'm not sure we have.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Could you give that 8 citation again please?9 MR. LEWIS: It's Public Service Company of New 10 Hampshire, Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2, ALAB-422, 6 NRC 11 33, 1977. Now, that's a case where the Appeal Board was 12 considering whether certain mitigation measures, not for 13 pressurized thermal shock but just to mitigate 14 environmental impacts was reasonably practicable and 15 indicated that standard, you know, let's just say in 16 consideration of costs.17 In addition, when the Commission was 18 establishing the pressurized thermal shock rules, there 19 were a number of SOCE papers that led up to it which 20 considered what were reasonably practicable measures for 21 reducing flux reduction. The SOCE paper is SOCE paper 22 8379, February 25th, 1983. It was actually cited in the 23 statement of consideration for the pressurized thermal 24 shock rule and this is replete with references to the 25 consideration of how much different options would cost.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433...,. .... ..., 64 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: What's the citation 2 for the SOC?3 MR. LEWIS: It's 49 Federal Register at 4500.4 I don't know what the first page of the Federal Register is 5 but it's at page 4500.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Thank you. Thanks.7 MR. LEWIS: So, we think clearly reasonably 8 practicable requires consideration of economic. And we 9 believe that Petitioners just submitted that also. We 10 would agree.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Do you consider 12 annealing also too costly at this point?13 MR. LEWIS: No, it's one of the options under 14 the rules, both the pressurized thermal shock rule and the 15 annealing rule three years before you exceed the screening 16 criteria and you have to submit an analysis if you want to 17 operate past that screening criteria. And you need to 18 submit a nealing plant if you want to anneal. Those are 19 both options that are identified in our license renewal 20 application as part of our program. And so, we intend to 21 follow the regulations and make those submittals and 22 determinations at that time.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So, you're not 24 ruling out the issuance of an annealing report three years 25 prior to 2014?NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 65 I MR. LEWIS: No, we're not.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Do you want to add 3 anything on that?4 MR. LODGE: I would just like to stress that, 5 again, we don't vociferously at this point disagree that 6 reasonably practicable includes economic balancing. The 7 point is look at the regulatory environment right now.8 There is no NRC rule on PTS. There is not a binding one.9 There's one that has been under discussion and is out there 10 and is being revised. But there is not a standard that 11 this Board can apply and you're faced with an applicant 12 that's saying, reading between the lines, we can't tell you 13 very accurately that there is embrittlement, only the 14 degree of embrittlement, we can tell you there is 15 embrittlement. And that's why we are very skeptical, 16 looking very askance at this 2014 date because it's about 17 as established as the earlier screening dates were.Is So, who is to say in 2011 that the then 19 projected date isn't 2032?20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You made a statement 21 earlier that what they have is a plan to make a plan. And 22 I think you were arguing that that doesn't meet the 23 standards for license renewal.24 MR. LODGE: Right.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Can you point me to, NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 66 I or sort of spell out for me your argument on that? What 2 authority? I mean, we need to make any findings that we 3 make based on the standards set forth in the rules.4 MR. LODGE: Sure.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, could you tell me 6 what authority you would rely on in those rules or 7 elsewhere to support your argument that a plan to make a 8 plan, taking all your other arguments and your facts as 9 alleged to be true? How does that, what impact does that 10 have on the findings that we would need to make ultimately, 11 the legal conclusions that we would need to draw 12 ultimately? 13 MR. LODGE: Well, the requirements in the 14 54.21(c)l as to the analyses that must be demonstrated by 15 the applicant, and I would say that the --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I think what NMC is 17 relying on is 54.21(c)l(iii), that they are going to 18 demonstrate --19 MR. LODGE: Right. Right.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- through the 21 information to be provided to the NRC.22 MR. LODGE: That's correct.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: That the effects of 24 aging on the intended functions will be adequately managed 25 for the period of extended operation. NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 67 I MR. LODGE: That's correct.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And what's your 3 argument on that and with regard to the standards of 54.29?4 MR. LODGE: That the Utility historically has 5 not, and again, I'm sort of delving into facts a moment, 6 that the history up to this point, up to the time of the 7 hearing in effect is that the Utility has not demonstrated 8 any ability to manage the embrittlement problem and we 9 believe the issue of fact is that the Utility has to 10 demonstrate what's changed, how firm is the 2014 date, 11 based upon what as opposed to the past.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And if the 2014 date 13 is correct, what's your argument?14 MR. LODGE: That's the issue of fact that would 15 have to be decided and adjudicated by the Board.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let's say we find that 17 that date is correct just for the sake of argument, what is 18 your argument as to how that affects the legal conclusions 19 that we would need to draw? And I guess what I'm getting 20 to, you say, you characterize the argument of NMC as being 21 a plan to make a plan?22 MR. LODGE: Correct.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: What's wrong with 24 that, under the legal standards of 54.21 and 54.29?25 MR. LODGE: What's wrong with what? The NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 68 I uncertainty in our estimation is the, is the issue of fact.2 If you're saying what's wrong with a plan to make a plan 3 the requirement by the Board is to find there is a 4 demonstration that the effects of aging will be adequately 5 managed in the renewal term.6 In essence, you will be making a finding that, 7 that they might be managed in the renewal term but there 8 will not be the requisite degree of certainty that they 9 will be, you will be granting an open season type of 10 license.11 You'll be allowing the utility to continue 12 operating under the current ages of no PTS standard, no, 13 it's under revision and the ad hoc generation long setting 14 and resetting of the date that the screening criteria are 15 breached or surpassed. 16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: From a regulatory 17 standpoint, you seem to apply that this is ad hoc but the 18 regulations, specifically the EDS regulations and NMC 19 statement that they will comply with those, I don't quite 20 understand where the uncertainty comes in. I mean, that 21 rule, EDS rule does allow some, different courses of 22 action.23 MR. LODGE: Right.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: But they're all very 25 specifically described. NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433......... .... 69 I MR. LODGE: Right.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: And their indication 3 is that they will comply with the rule. How is that any 4 different than, for example, statements which they might 5 make with respect to say complying with Appendix B criteria 6 or a quality control system? Or complying with Part 20 for 7 the dose?8 MR. LODGE: All the utility is saying by 9 promising to comply with the regulation is that whatever 10 requirements we have to follow in, let's say 2011, we will.11 And we'll postulate our 50.61 option and our choices.12 We'll make our decision then.13 The issue of fact is what will have changed 14 from the point in time that the Board and the Commission 15 issue a license extension until --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let me stop you there.17 Don't assume what the Board's going to do.18 MR. LODGE: No, no. I'm saying, for purposes 19 of discussion that --20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: If the Board were to 21 grant the renewal license then --22 MR. LODGE: I can correct, I mean no disrespect 23 at all.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Now continue 25 your --NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 70 I MR. LODGE: That was kind of implicit in my 2 point of argument. The problem is is that the issue of 3 fact here is, is a gaping issue of fact. And that's why we 4 believe that it is up to the Board to establish whether or 5 not the embrittlement management history warrants and 6 conjectures by the utility as to the near term, whether 7 that warrants a license extension. 8 Not, I think it is this, the panel cannot 9 simply pass on the adequacy by saying, well they've 10 committed to following the regs that might be in effect at 11 that time. We don't even know if there will be a PTS 12 revision, a final one even by then.13 So, in essence, we think that the issue in one 14 respect is that the utility is requesting continuation of 15 the status quo. They've already said we aren't going to 16 make a technological fix in all likelihood, so we're going 17 to continue to rely on the paucity of data and the 18 proliferation of computer projections and inferences. 19 And maybe occasionally we can get some data on 20 embrittlement problems at other reactors and maybe we will 21 use surveillance capsules that have some stepped up 22 accelerated embrittlement features to them. All of which 23 we'll use to try to figure this out. But they cannot 24 explain that they have figured it out, that there's 25 certainty that they are working essentially from a rather NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* .°.. ... .. 71 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 hard science and a hard engineering basis.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So what you're saying is that the licensee may demonstrate the effects of, that the effects of aging on the embrittlement issue will, that the licensee can demonstrate that it may be adequately managed but not that it will be adequately managed?MR. LODGE: Correct.ADMIN. LAW JU argument is and then that MR. LODGE: Y ADMIN. LAW JU have any questions for hi, ADMIN. LAW JU]coming back after I --ADMIN. LAW JUl DGE YOUNG: es.DGE YOUNG: M?DGE BARATT, That's what your All right.Do youI'd like to reserve DGE YOUNG: We may have more.Okay.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I think there are more questions. ADMIN. LAW ADMIN. LAW JUDGE JUDGE YOUNG: You want to ask now?TRIKOUROS: I do have one question --MR. LODGE: ADMIN. LAW statement that NMC has embrittlement effect.Yes, sir.JUDGE TRIKOUROS: -- regarding your (, not properly managed the Can you elaborate on that?The, I NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433-..,.-i .". * .-..- :.i " '...'..... ..-"---.. ."* *. " " 72 mean certainly they haven't introduced flux reduction 2 programs where, what have they not done?3 MR. LODGE: They've never established and 4 apparently cannot establish the precise mix of copper and 5 nickel, that data is lost to time.6 The surveillance coupons or capsules were used 7 up, we believe, as of the ninth refueling which was in the 8 early 1990's. I'm sorry. And in essence they are delaying 9 the, they're using fuel bundles to try to reduce the 10 irradiation effects on the reactor pressure vessel.11 I don't know, so far as I understand, those are 12 at least three of the facets that we question in terms of 13 management practices. 14 I, perhaps I should frame it as we, it's the 15 petitioner's contention that the problem, yes, there are 16 management measures being taken. But, once again, there's 17 a, it's guess work, it's based upon paucity of information. 18 There's an argument in fact that, based upon 19 one of the conclusions the Board could reach is that based 20 upon the history that the only certain way of meeting the 21 standard is for replacement of the RPV.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: In light of 50.61 23 though --24 MR. LODGE: Right.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: The way, does not, NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* "" " " .... .'. . 73 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 doesn't that dictate the way that you can manage the effects of embrittlement? MR. LODGE: Indeed it does. And as I indicated earlier, we don't particularly dispute the reasonably practicable wording but I think that that is, that's a determination that gets made, is allowed to be made only after the 54.29 determination is made.The utilities previously pledged, in about 1996, that they would nail the reactor vessel and have not done so. We don't know why, but that again is one of the facets of this that would be explored we believe at a fact hearing.But yes, sir, you're correct, 50.61 says what it says. And it does allow for the selection, the outlining and selection of options. But that is not a determination that's being made right now.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: All right. Well let's take this a step further then though. The determination now is whether or not they will manage the effects of aging?MR. LODGE: Right.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: That's 54.20, ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: 21.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: 21. 54.21.60.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well actually, 54.29.<-I NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. 74 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay. 54.21 and 54.29 require. Now I guess I'm still at a loss to understand why a statement that I will comply with the apple requirements for PTS screening criteria which is 50.61 is not satisfy that I will manage, the statement I will manage the detrimental effects of aging.Because again if I use your argument that a statement that I will comply with the regulations is insufficient to demonstrate that I've taken an action which will deal with the detrimental effects then any statement that I will comply with any other part of the regulations would come into question as well.And seems that to lead to an illogical conclusion. In other words, I'm trying to get back to the issue of, we have to, when we're all said and done on this license renewal, we have to come to a conclusion that they've met the regulations. And the regulations are 54.21 and 54.29, require that they have a plan.MR. LODGE: Um-hum.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay. And how, what is it that, in the regulations that says a statement that I will comply with the regulations is not a plan?You know what, where in all of the, you know, the part 50 would that not satisfy?NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 75 I MR. LODGE: I think that what the utility is 2 actually saying is we intend to comply, we think, with the 3 regs that might be in affect at the time.4 The company's operating from a lack of actual 5 data based upon surveillance capsules or coupons. We 6 believe that the standards in part 54 require a much higher 7 degree of actual knowledge, actionable knowledge than that.8 And that, again, to state that you intend to 9 make decisions seems to abrogate what this Board's, the 10 scope of this Board's responsibility is. That in essence, 11 I mean I take that to suggest that why couldn't just 12 ongoing regulatory powers of the NRC address this 13 embrittlement problem.14 Well, there is not an external NRC defined 15 standard and the utility keeps moving its own goal posts 16 back based upon what amounts, in some respects, to 17 speculative inference, not hard data.18 I, it's the petitioner's position that at some 19 point and especially when they're making projections now, 20 several years into the anticipated 20 year extension period 21 that it, the buck has to stop, the determination has to be 22 made here, in 2005 or '06 as to exactly what are they 23 operating from when they say 2014, when they, when there's 24 any representation made as to the decision.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Well, let me take NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 76 I that point that you just made though. If you're taking 2 issue with their statement, which they are currently 3 operating on, under, that PTS is not a problem, isn't that 4 a challenge to the existing licensing basis and therefore 5 is specifically excluded from this license renewal hearing?6 MR. LODGE: No, sir. Because they're making a 7 representation to the Commission that we believe we're 8 going to be able to manage this and here's how.9 When you examine the basis for their 10 assumptions, it starts to come apart, the wheels start to 11 fall off. But that's the basis under which they're 12 currently operating. 13 It's the basis under which they propose to 14 continue operating until 2014, perhaps.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: See, my problem is 16 I'm bound by what the Commission said in Turkey Point, 17 okay.18 MR. LODGE: Right.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I mean that's --20 MR. LODGE: Yes.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: -- you know, 22 anything that we do has to be consistent with that. That's 23 our governing, one of our governing case logs. And one of 24 those, the aspects is I can't challenge the existing 25 licensing basis in a license renewal here.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 77 I And it sounds like that's what you're doing.2 MR. LODGE: Well.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Could you explain to 4 me how that isn't?5 MR. LODGE: Sir, the Turkey Point also says, 6 left unmitigated, the effects of aging can overstress 7 equipment, unacceptably reduce safety margins and lead to 8 reduction of required plant functions, including the 9 capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in the 10 shut down condition. 11 And, and that's in the same paragraph that 12 mentions embrittlement as a, certainly a legitimate topic 13 as an adverse aging effect.14 That's why we believe, yes, it is a current 15 operating circumstance but the utility is also telling you 16 that we're going to maintain the status quo for the rest of 17 our current license and perhaps even into the license 18 extension period.19 It is up to this Board to examine the adequacy 20 of that proposition as a management plan.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay. I think I 22 understand now what you're saying. Thank you.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Your assertion 24 that there had been different analyses leading to different 25 conclusions over time, all of these, I assume, have been NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* .... .i". " -!* i. .' .' : 78 I done with approved methods under the auspices of the 2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission or is that, is there 3 something missing there?4 These are just different analyses with using 5 different methods?6 MR. LODGE: I don't know if the NRC has 7 promulgated a very clear guideline for what are approved 8 methods.9 I guess I'm not prepared to answer that unless 10 you have, can help me a little bit.I1 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well within the 12 allowances of say regulatory guides, specific regulatory 13 guides that identify methods. I'm trying to understand if 14 what you said regarding the various analyses is implying 15 something that we should be considering of this was a new 16 part of the normal plant licensing basis.17 MR. LODGE: Um-hum. One moment, please. In 18 our reply to the motions to strike we point to, repeatedly 19 to an NRC staff memo that suggests that the staff itself 20 does not necessarily concur with the 2014 date.21 So the question of whether or not these are, 22 the deliberations that have been ongoing since the late 23 '80's or even earlier are an acceptable practice, which I 24 take to be your question.25 Pardon me. We questioned whether or not an NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. ., .... 79 I appropriate confidence level has been established through 2 all of that, all of the computations and projections. The, 3 again, the problem is that there's a PTS revision out there 4 that is not yet promulgated into formal policy.5 This is very much an ad hoc circumstance 6 dealing with a plant that has unique engineered and lack of 7 engineered features, if you will, the radiation shield.S And incidently, it, I actually suppose maybe 9 the answer to your question, sir, is that maybe it is, it's 10 up to the Board to make the determination because of the ad 11 hoc nature of this ongoing technical dialogue that has been 12 going on now for a generation as to whether for another 13 generation it's going to be adequate to provide the 14 assurances that the Board has to find the utility to have 15 made.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I was unaware that 17 2014 was in question. At least from all of the reading IS that I have done, I could not see the 2014 was in question.19 MR. LODGE: We actually recount the contents of 20 a staff memo at page 15 of our reply to the motion to 21 strike. I think it's mentioned, one or two times later.22 It's mentioned at page 20.23 It's also in our, yeah, it's in our appendix of 24 evidence that was provided to the actual memo, as an 25 exhibit, accompanying the same response.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 so I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Do you --2 MR. LODGE: Yes?3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Do you have anything 4 further you want to add?5 MR. LODGE: No, sir. Or no, ma'am. Sorry.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: All right.7 MR. LODGE: Sorry.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: If there are no more 9 questions now, should we move, all right. Let's move on to 10 you, Mr. Lewis and/or Mr. Gaukler.11 MR. LEWIS: Thank you. Let me start by 12 addressing the assertion I heard a number of times that 13 we're working under ad hoc standards. And I think I heard 14 petitioner say at one point that there's no rule on 15 pressurized thermal shock, that there's no standard, that 16 everything's under revision.17 It is true that there is an NRC effort under 18 way to consider revising the pressurized thermal shock rule 19 and about a half of what the petitioners cite in their 20 reply are ACRS statements that relate to potential changes 21 in the future of the pressurized thermal shock rule.22 But we're not relying, in our license renewal 23 application, et al., on a potential revision to the rule.24 There is a current rule and that's at 10-CFR-50.61 and 25 there's current interpreting guidance in Reg Guide 1.9 that NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 81 I explains how you apply the rule.2 And we are applying and being judged under the 3 current standard, not on any potential future revision. So 4 this is not an ad hoc approach.5 We are demonstrating that we're managing aging 6 in accordance with Very precise, current regulations. The 7 number of questions about the significance of the early 8 embrittlement assertion that is in the petitioner's reply, 9 let me try and address that and make a number of points.10 First is that the plant's not unique. There 11 are other plants that will reach the screening criterion 12 before the period of extended operations. So this is 13 not --14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry. I thought 15 I had turned that off. Go ahead.16 MR. LEWIS: We're not the only plant that has 17 this circumstance. And there was a May 27th, 2004 1i memorandum from the executive director of operations to the 19 Commission that identified how the license regulations 20 would apply to plants that would exceed the screening 21 criterion before the period of --22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Repeat that statement, 23 please?24 MR. LEWIS: There was a May 27th, 2004 25 memorandum from the executive director of operations to the NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433....- 82 I Commission that explained how the license regulations would 2 apply to a plant that would exceed the screening criterion 3 before the period of extended operations had expired.4 In other words, would not be able to show that 5 they would meet the screening criterion for the entire 6 extra 20 years of operations. And that memorandum 7 identified other plants that were in the same circumstance. 8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: With, just to, on the 9 prone to early embrittlement, that, as compared to the 10 other plants is this Palisades earlier or you're saying 11 it's not, I mean, there's, there would seem to be a 12 difference between three years into a term and say 18 or 19 13 years into a term, is there?14 MR. LEWIS: I don't know the answer to that 15 question. I don't know when the other plants would expire.16 With respect to early embrittlement, 54.21(c)i 17 gives three methods for managing a time limit aging 18 analysis. One is to show the current analysis extends 19 through the period of operation. 20 The second one is to revise the analysis to 21 make it extend. And the third is to establish a program to 22 manage aging.23 The petitioners have suggested we're just 24 saying we're going to comply with the rules. That's not 25 really correct.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 83 I The pressurized thermal shock regulation is a 2 regulation that tells you exactly what you have to do at 3 every step of the way. It says, here's exactly how you 4 determine what your reference temperature for -- transition 5 is and if you're going to exceed it, here's exactly what 6 you're going to do.7 So to a certain extent we are saying we're 8 following the rule. But we're saying we're following the 9 rule because it tells us what you do at each step to ensure 10 that the plant is safe.11 And by saying that we meet each of these steps 12 that are specifically required by the rule, we are in fact 13 showing that there is no safety issue in the period of 14 extended operation. Because the rules do allow you to 15 operate in exceedance of the screening criterion without a 16 further NRC approval, either of annealing or further 17 analysis three years, you know, to be submitted three years is before the screening criterion has exceeded, demonstrating 19 that pressurized thermal shock is not a safety concern.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Could I, I'd just 21 like to interrupt you. I just want to ask a quick question 22 because we had some discussion about this, on the point of, 23 if you exceed, if your calculations show that you are going 24 to exceed it and, hypothetically at this point, okay, that 25 you do some new calculations and you're still going to NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.......*.. ... . 84 1 exceed it at some point, be it 2014, 2016 or whatever.2 And you then had to come in under the rule to 3 request continued operation. Would that result in a 4 modification to your tech specs and as a result a, you'd 5 have to apply for a license modification? 6 And I'd like to ask that both of NMC and also 7 the staff.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And I guess going 9 along with that, if it would then that would mean that 10 there would be the right to a hearing because you would be 11 essentially proposing to amend your license.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: That was my next 13 question to.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Is that a situation? 15 MR. LEWIS: Yes.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Is that the situation? 17 MR. LEWIS: I would like to, I'll give you what 18 I believe the answer is but I would like to consult later 19 on and if I've said something wrong I will come back.20 But I believe that that revision would change 21 your pressure temperature curves that I think are part of 22 your tech specs and as a result, I believe there would be a 23 need for a license amendment. 24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Just. Did we want to 25 take a break at this point and see if the staff agrees with NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* ... ..., .% . 85 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 that? I mean, not take a break but switch over to the staff at this time.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: If you don't mind.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Yes.MS. UTTAL: I'm trying to find out right now.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.MS. UTTAL: I don't know if we have an --MR. LEWIS: Shall I proceed or?ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: If we can get an answer from the staff quickly, otherwise --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Or we could come back to this in two minutes, or whatever you'd like to do.MS. UTTAL: It will take us a couple of minutes.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. We'll, do you want to take a break?ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Why don't we give you about five minutes and you can consult and then we'll get the answer to that. Okay? Is that all right?MR. LODGE: May I just for record purposes do something to get something accomplished here for you. Mr.Trikouros the memo I was referring to is Exhibit I-G in the appendix of evidence that we provided along with our reply to the motions to, the combined reply to the motions to strike.I NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 86l It's a memo from Stephanie Coffin to Stephen 2 Hoffman who are NRC staff people, dated 11/24/2004. 3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Can, I'm sorry, 4 can, I'm having trouble. Could you --5 MR. LODGE: I'm very sorry. My apologies. 6 It's Exhibit I-G, a memorandum, an internal NRC memorandum 7 from Stephanie Coffin, C-o-f-f-i-n to Stephen Hoffman dated S November 24th of 2004.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Let's take 10 a five minute break. Looks like we might be able to get 11 that information. 12 (Off the record.)K 13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Yes, thank you. Okay.14 Let's get started.15 MS. UTTAL: There's no direct requirement in 16 that, in 50.66 but if you --17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: In, I'm sorry?IS MS. UTTAL: In 50.66.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: 61?20 MS. UTTAL: 61, excuse me. But if you have to 21 change the analysis and change the dates, this would 22 require several things.23 You'd probably have to change the power* 24 distribution limits which would affect the safety limits.25 You would have to change the level of power, the license NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* " " : : " " " ... .* .; " ..* * * .... -" "' -"* * :,,. .*. ....

• 87 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 i8 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 condition that delineates the power level that the plant operates on and if there are any new material property, any new material property data, then you would have to do a tech spec change for all those things.So that it is likely that a license amendment or several license amendments would be required on that data.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Which would involve a notice and opportunity to request a hearing on those at that point, right?MS. UTTAL: Yes.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.MR. LEWIS: And Judge, I'm, I did ask and consult my understanding what I said was correct about changing the pressure temperature groups and the license which are based on RDNDT.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And so you're saying that that would involve --MR. LEWIS: There would be a license amendment also.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. Okay. Before you continue on, let me just as another question for you to put in the mix.Basically what, well let me back up. Clearly the no regulation can be challenged in an adjudication NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 88 I proceeding, there are other avenues to petition for rule-2 making and so forth.3 And clearly during, during the time that a 4 plant is licensed, if they follow 50.61, then that takes 5 care of the issues addressed under 50.61 during that period 6 of licenseship.

7 What's at issue in this proceeding is whether a 8 new, a renewed license should be issued for an additional 9 period of licenseship for 20 years.10 And as I understand at least part of the 11 argument of the petitioner's, what you're proposing in 12 saying that you will, in 2011 I think it would be, provide 13 information to the NRC as to whether you'll be annealing or 14 whether you are going to be doing a recalculation which I 15 think everyone now agrees would involve a, the necessity 16 for a license amendment and a new hearing.17 But apart from that, what you're saying is that 18 at that point, in 2011, you would provide that information 19 to the NRC as to what you propose to do in 2014 and that's 20 been characterized as a plan to make a plan.21 And the argument is that the plan to make a 22 plan would not demonstrate that the effects of aging would 23 be adequately managed throughout the term of the renewed 24 license.25 Which is sort of a different issue than whether NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* " .: .'. *-.- ." " ..'" " -" ' *.. ......... 89 I you will be complying with 50.61 by not providing that/2 information until 2011.3 That issue is whether, assuming the 4 contention's admitted, the licensed, the renewed license 5 that, which you seek for 20 years should be granted based 6 on your demonstration that the effects of aging will be 7 managed during, throughout the entire term.8 And from what I understand you saying, you're 9 not sure what information you'll be providing in 2011. And 10 so it's really not known what will take place after, 11 starting in 2014.12 Can you address that argument? And I think it 13 also gets into the, to whether that's a sufficient action, 14 identification of an action that will be taken, that has 15 been or will be taken.16 And as I understand your argument, you're 17 saying that the action that will be taken is that you will 18 tell the NRC in 2011 what you intend to do in 2014?19 MR. LEWIS: That's correct. I would take a 20 little issue with saying this is just a plan to make a 21 plan. I mean, this is a program and we've described the 22 steps that we would do.23 What we have not stated is what would be the 24 technical solution in 2014. What we have described is, the 25 reasonably available options that we could pursue and I NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433............... o.................... ... *.....o.. 90 believe that's all that was required by the rules.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: It's all that's 3 required by 50.61.4 MR. LEWIS: I believe it's all --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But in terms of --6 MR. LEWIS: -- that's required by --7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- in terms of 54.21 8 and 54.29, demonstrating that the effects of aging will be 9 adequately managed during the extended period of operation. 10 In other words, during the whole 20 years that you're 11 sinking.12 That I think raises a different question which 13 is not quite so simply resolved by saying we will comply 14 with 50.61 by telling the NRC at that point which of these 15 two options we we're saying at this point we might take.16 MR. LEWIS: I understand your question, Judge 17 on, I would say several things. First I would refer you 18 back to the May 27th, 2004 memorandum from the EDO to the 19 Commissioners. 20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Do you have a copy of 21 that with you?22 MR. LEWIS: I do have a copy of it with me.23 Can I find it at a --24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Sure.25 MR. LEWIS: -- on break?NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* ' ."- * : ' 'i '. " ' ."" " " -" ..". 9'I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Sure.2 MR. LEWIS: In describing what would be an 3 adequate program under 50.21(c)3, that memorandum 4 specifically refers to the fact that these reports are only 5 required to be submitted three years before the screening 6 criterion is exceeded.7 Second one is an adequate program I think 8 should be judged in, you know, what protects the public 9 health and safety. Here you have a hard limit screening 10 criterion that cannot be exceeded without a Commission 11 approval, so there really is no safety issue.12 And there's a requirement for a determination 13 later that these, whatever the technical solution is has to 14 be effective. 15 So this is a program that ensures safety. And 16 if it's a program that assures safety, I would submit to 17 you that it is an adequate program under 54.21(c)1.III. is ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, so are you 19 saying if you get to 2011 and you, for example, may have 20 decided that you're not going to do the annealing, you 21 proposing as an alternative that you'll do a recalculation 22 and, and am I correct in assuming as part of that, that if 23 you cannot show that you can extend that date to X date 24 that you will no longer operate after X date?25 MR. LEWIS: You're asking me what is the safety NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433." ' " * " " .'" -" .." ". * * .' ." " ' "" " '. .'* ..." '. ": ... ..-", ." .." ' ' " 92 I analysis that would be submitted in 2011? If we could 2 extend the screening, not extend that screening criterion, 3 if we could extend our RTPTS by further flux reduction 4 measures or modifications or better defined methods of 5 calculating fluids, you know, those are all permissible and 6 they extend the, when the screening criterion is exceeded.7 The analysis that is permitted by 50.61, I 8 believe is more in the nature of a fracture or -- analysis 9 that shows there's a lot of conservatism in the pressurized 10 thermal shock rule and you could come in with analysis that 11 showed that in fact that your reference temperature 12 measured by other methods is better than that is predicted 13 by the PTS rule.14 Or you could do other types of analyses to show 15 that even exceeding this, the screening criterion that 16 there's no safety issue.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, but the issue 18 I'm trying to get you to address is, that would either show 19 that you could continue operations safely or theoretically 20 it might show that you could not.21 MR. LEWIS: And --22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: In which case you 23 would agree to shut down, basically. (. 24 MR. LEWIS: Not just agree to shut down, we 25 would not be permitted to operate.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433........... ....... .......:............. 93 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. Okay.2 MR. LEWIS: We could not operate past the 3 screening criterion without NRC approval. So it's --4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. Okay. So, 5 however we want to put it, you would, you could not break 6 past that point. So I guess the point I'm trying to get 7 you to address is, at this time, you don't know what that 8 calculation would show.9 You're saying, basically you're saying you have 10 a program but the part of the program that's at issue in 1I this contention is that part in which you say in 2011 we'll 12 tell the NRC we'll provide information to the NRC whether 13 we will do the annealing or whether we'll do this 14 calculation. 15 And at this point, you don't know whether any 16 calculation that you would do, should you go in that route, 17 would take you throughout the 20 year term, is that 18 correct?19 MR. LEWIS: I believe that's correct. I think 20 there's a lot of confidence that these options are 21 available. I think there's --22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well I'm not --23 MR. LEWIS: -- annealing is possible.( 24 Annealing has been demonstrated in other countries. It's 25 been demonstrated in Russia and Eastern Europe.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 94 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. But what I'm 2 trying to get you to address is the sort of essence of what 3 the petitioners are saying in saying that it's a plan to 4 make a plan. That you don't really know at this point what 5 will occur after 2014 and yet you're asking for a license 6 for 20 years, starting in 2011.7 And so I guess the question of whether your 8 intent to provide the information to the NRC in 2011, how 9 that really does jibe with the requirement that you have to 10 identify actions. I don't know. I mean, in a, the 11 argument that action implies more than later telling the 12 NRC what you will do and managing the effects of aging 13 during the extended, period of extended operation. 14 Now I understand the memo that you referred to, 15 which I haven'.t read, obviously would be something that we 16 could refer to for guidance and that would be entitled to 17 some differences as, just as any policy type statement or a 18 similar document would be entitled to.19 But apart from that, just in the normal, plain 20 English understanding of the terms, managing the effects of 21 aging during the, during the period of extended operation I 22 think suggests something more than saying how you would, 23 what, that you will later give the NRC information on what 24 you will do three years later than that.25 And when that's, but that's year one and year NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 95 I three of a proposed 20 year term of operation. I mean, I 2 think you can see what I'm saying. That, I think the 3 normal understanding of those words implies more than 4 telling the NRC something later, doesn't it?5 MR. LEWIS: No, I would respectfully disagree.6 I believe that actions are one of the measures and steps 7 that you're going to take to make sure that this aging S mechanism, embrittlement is being managed in a way that 9 protects the public health and safety.10 And we are saying that we will continue to 11 apply the screening criterion and we will no operate past 12 the screening criterion without meeting the submittals and 13 getting NRC approvals. And these submittals, you know, do 14 address options that are permissible under the, NRC 15 regulations and are reasonably available. 16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But isn't there 17 reasonable interpretation of the rules that says you need Is to say at this point what you will do to ensure you can 19 operated the entire 20 years?20 MR. LEWIS: I don't think it would be a 21 reasonable interpretation because it would be saying that 22 the current regulations which assure a public health and 23 safety in the current terms somehow aren't good enough for 24 the renewal term when it's the same effect that's being 25 managed in both.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* .. .'.. .., ..- .*. 96 I If the, if this structure in 50.61 and 50.66 2 which is the annealing rule, is, protects public health and 3 safety in the current term as it does, as you must accept 4 you know, by, you know, accepting the NRC regulations. 5 There's also an acceptable approach and program 6 to implement during the period of extended operations. 7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I think you're, in 8 terms of 50.61 and following that, during a period when 9 you're already licensed, there's no question you'd follow 10 that.11 But what I'm trying to get you to look at is 12 not just following 50.61 during a period when you're 13 licensed but the different question of the determination of 14 whether you should be granted an additional 20 years in a 15 renewed license when the standards for that suggest perhaps 16 something more substantive than saying we will say later 17 how we're going to handle something. 18 And I guess the other concern I have is, we're 19 talking about a context that's probably, if not the, 20 certainly an extremely significant aging issue which the 21 Commission has over and over said is the very type of issue 22 that licensed renewals are to address.23 Back in 1991, the Commission talked about the 24 types of measures that needed to be demonstrated with 25 regard to pressurized thermal shock, for example.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 97 I And talked about situations needing to be 2 analyzed for the period of extended operation as a basis 3 for determining any additional aging management actions 4 that may be required for license renewal.5 I mean, in Turkey Point the Commission talks 6 about detailed, let's see if I can find this, detailed, I 7 can't find the exact language it was talking about, but 8 detailed plans for how the effects of aging are going to be 9 managed.10 Now, the Commission did, in a footnote in 11 Turkey Point, talk about some aging related issues being 12 adequately dealt with by regulatory processes. Which 13 therefore might not need to be subject to further review 14 during the license renewal proceeding. 15 But the example they gave in footnote two were 16 structures and components were that already must be 17 replaced at mandated specified time periods. And isn't 18 pressurized thermal shock relating to the reactor vessel of 19 a fundamentally different sort than the example given by 20 the Commission at that point?21 I mean, isn't this the exact type of issue that 22 is within the scope of licensed renewal?23 MR. LEWIS: Well I agree that embrittlement's 24 within the scope of license renewal. I simply disagree 25 that in order to establish an acceptable program that NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.......... ...... 98 I manages aging a way that protects public health and safety 2 that it's necessary to provide a technical solution out of 3 several available options at this juncture.4 The regulations allow you to submit those 5 programs and proposals three years before you even reach 6 the screening criterion because, quite frankly that's the 7 more appropriate time to do it.S You have better data.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.10 MR. LEWIS: You're much more able to determine 11 what is, I --12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But wouldn't you need 13 to show us, I mean if your analysis -is correct, pressurized 14 thermal shock and embrittlement are aging issues that are 15 within the scope of review in a license renewal proceeding. 16 And yet, you can address them by saying we 17 will tell you what we're going to do when the time comes, 18 namely three years before we exceed the PTS criterion, if 19 I'm saying that right.20 I mean would, doesn't that sort of give with 21 one hand take away with another?22 MR. LEWIS: Well, Judge, it is more than that.23 I mean there is a program of surveillance and, you know, 24 calculating when the screening criterion will be exceeded 25 and --NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433........ *.. ... ,. ..' .. 99 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.2 MR. LEWIS: -- implement flux reduction 3 measures. I mean this is --4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But --5 MR. LEWIS: -- parcel of the whole program.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But as to a situation 7 which you said was not unique, namely that a plant would 8 reach that point of exceeding the criterion, what you, what 9 I hear you saying is that even though aging of the reactor 10 pressure vessel is a legitimate issue within the scope of 11 license renewal that as to that period, starting at the 12 point that the criterion is exceeded, that that period can 13 adequately be addressed by an applicant by saying we will 14 follow 50.61.15 And three years before that date we'll deal 16 with it by telling the NRC what we're going do to at that 17 point. And I'm not following how we --18 MR. LEWIS: Judge?19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- reach any other 20 result?21 MR. LEWIS: Judge, I would say this is not 22 unique and it's not the only example of how regulatory 23 established programs manage aging, environmental 24 qualification presents a very similar example. There is --25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But let's stay on NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.'. .: ' ......* , ., *- : .. 100 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 this --MR. LEWIS: I could --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let's, before you, no, before you get into other examples, let's stay on this one.That, isn't, wouldn't it be possible for any plant to do exactly what you're doing and argue that that takes it out what could be an admissible contention on the issue of aging of the reactor vessel?I mean, how else, what other result could there be on this particular issue? This particular issue of aging?MR. LEWIS: What I would say is a very important factor in this is that the regulations don't permit you to operate exceeding the screening criterion. So this isn't a matter of just saying trust us, we'll do something right and it never gets looked at again.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But if it doesn't --MR. LEWIS: This is a hard limit that prevents operation past the screening criterion without NRC approval and therefore prohibits you from ever being in a situation that --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But I don't, I don't think --MR. LEWIS: -- endangers the public health and safety.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433*. .~* ..* ... 101 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I don't think you're 2 answering my question. My question is this, the Commission 3 has said that these types of aging issues are the only 4 thing that are relevant in a license renewal proceeding. 5 And aging of the reactor vessel is clearly a 6 significant aging issue that's within the scope and you 7 agree with that. But what you seem to be saying is that, 8 what you're saying with regard to the Palisades plant, that 9 your identification of the action that will be taken to 10 manage the effects of aging during the period of extended 11 operation, in other words, during the entire 20 years, is 12 that three years before you exceed the criterion in 2011, 13 you'll tell the NRC which course of action you intend to 14 follow.15 And at that point, you'll provide the 16 calculation, if that's the road you intend to follow.17 What I'm not seeing is how any contention could 18 ever be admitted on aging of the reactor vessel and 19 pressurized thermal shock if all an applicant has to do is 20 say we will follow 50.61 in the future. That's what I'm 21 not seeing because it seems like you let it in but as soon 22 as you let it in it's out by what you've identified as 23 something that should be considered a sufficient action.24 And what the allegation in this contention is, 25 and I'm just speaking of the original contention, is that NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 102*1 K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the application is. not complete because it doesn't address the continuing issue of embrittlement. And that this plant has been identified as prone to early embrittlement. I'm not seeing how any contention could ever come in if a licensee simply says we're going to comply with 50.61 by providing information three years before we are now projected to meat the, or exceed the PTS criterion. So if you could address that issue, I would appreciate it. Thanks.MR. LEWIS: The reports that are submitted three years before the screening criterion are, is exceeded is one part of the program. And there are other aspects of the program --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. But those, we're just -- it's pass --MR. LEWIS: I'm saying you can have contentions that address them, they haven't been challenged in this proceeding. But, you know, of the program that can be The only issue reports have to come in.the rules say that those years before and that is si there are aspects, other aspect challenged with a proper basis.is when do these additional And what I am saying is those, eports only have to come in three ufficient to protect the public NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 103 I health and safety --2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Assuming you've 3 already got a license.4 MR. LEWIS: -- because you can't operate, you 5 know, beyond the screening criterion without approval.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well it's, but that's 7 assuming you already have a license. If you've already got 8 the license, clearly all you have to do is follow 50.61.9 And all you have to do under that, after you've 10 done the surveillance and fluence reduction and all the II other things that you can do, when you get to the point 12 where you know you're going to exceed or the current 13 calculations say you're going to exceed the criterion on X 14 date.15 Then in that situation, you're saying all you 16 have to do in order to show that you should be granted a 17 new license for 20 years, even though those 20 years might 18 go well beyond the date at which you are projected to 19 exceed the criterion, that all you have to do it say we 20 will provide information to the NRC three years in advance 21 of our projected date.22 MR. LEWIS: I am saying that a contention that 23 asserts that these, that you have to make a demonstration 24 now on how you would address the situation is a challenge 25 to the rule, it is not a permissible contention in this NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 104 I proceeding. 2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But why would you 3 need to assume that the things that you would need to 4 demonstrate, at this point let's say, taking the 5 petitioner's argument, that the things that you would need 6 to demonstrate at this point to show that you will 7 adequately manage the effects of aging would be exactly the 8 same type of information or the exact same extent of 9 information, let's say that you would need to provide the 1o NRC three years in advance.11 I mean, couldn't there be, wouldn't, couldn't 12 there be an argument made that even though you might not 13 provide the complete calculation that you would provide 14 later with benefit of state of the art information and so 15 forth, that you would at least need to show something to 16 demonstrate that you actually will manage the effects of 17 aging during the entire period of extended operation, IS rather than just saying, well, if we don't, then we won't 19 operate anymore?20 But then. the question arises then why are you 21 asking for a 20 year license now and saying that the only 22 demonstration you have to provide is we'll tell the NRC in, 23 three years before we exceed the criterion? 24 MR. LEWIS: Because with respect to this 25 pressurized thermal shock issue and how this matters, there NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.o.. ....* ,.. '... ...'!. *. ... .. .. ..: 105 I really is not a difference between the license renewal term 2 and the present term. And the current term embodies those 3 measures and actions that are necessary to protect the 4 public health and safety and -- on basis to distinguish the 5 license renewal term.6 I believe that the provisions of the current 7 rule, you know are indicative of what protects the public S health and safety and must be accepted as sufficient. 9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well then you seem to 10 be agreeing with the staff that this is outside the scope 11 of license renewal because this is one of those things that 12 falls under footnote two?13 MR. LEWIS: No. Again, I think there are, as I 14 said there are a number of other aspects of the 15 embrittlement issue that are addressed by different 16 programmatic steps, they just haven't been challenged in 17 this case.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. But --19 MR. LEWIS: But I'm saying, the portion I'm 20 saying is not a legitimate issue is the assertion that you 21 have to submit an annealing plan now, nine years before the 22 screening criterion is exceeded.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, but that's not 24 the question.25 MR. LEWIS: And commit to annealing now.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 106 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But that's not what, 2 that's not the situation I posed to you to consider which 3 is that you might not need to submit everything that you 4 would need to submit three years prior to exceeding the 5 criterion, but that you would need to demonstrate something 6 more than just saying you're going to comply with the rule.7 Now, you raise another point and that is you're 8 saying other parts, other aspects of embrittlement could be 9 challenged. But really the most significant one, isn't it, 10 the point at which you are expected to exceed the 11 criterion? That's the most critical point in the --12 MR. LEWIS: I'm going to accept that it's the 13 most critical because you can't operate past that term, as 14 far as protection of the public health and safety --15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Doesn't that make it 16 the most critical?17 MR. LEWIS: -- that's certainly, without --18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: The fact that you 19 can't operate past that time, doesn't that make it the most 20 critical?21 MR. LEWIS: What it means is that in fact there 22 is no safety issue because you can't operate that, past 23 that limit and before you can continue to operate, you will 24 have to submit to the NRC a solution which will be approved 25 at that time.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 107 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: All right. Let me 2 pose a slightly different, came at it from a slightly 3 different aspect.4 Suppose, hypothetically that you own a plant 5 that based on your calculations and such is good for 6 another 50 years and you're coming in for a 20 year renewal 7 and that you won't, you calculate you won't exceed the PTS 8 criteria and you say that and you say that you'll just 9 comply with 50.61.10 Couldn't an intervenor in that case use the 11 same argument that they're using to challenge that 12 statement, that you don't have a specific plan to deal with 13 it? If we accept this that an action to comply with the 14 regulations at some future date is not an action?15 MR. LEWIS: I think the intervenor, if you have 16 an analysis that shows that you won't meet the screening 17 criterion for 50 years, the intervenor could challenge that 18 analysis. They can only challenge the analysis on grounds 19 that it doesn't comply with the NRC regulations that govern 20 how the analysis is done.21 For example, the method of calculating what the 22 reference temperature of PTS is, is established in an 23 equation and it provides a number of parameters and you 24 have to determine the chemistry factor of the samples as 25 one of the inputs to that, the calculation. NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 108 I A contention that says you've got to do 2 something else beyond what's in that formula would 3 challenge the rules.4 And for example, the intervenors in their reply 5 refer to uncertainties in the flaw distribution on the 6 vessel and they refer to uncertainty in the frequency of 7 over-cooling events.8 Those assertions are irrelevant because the 9 current PTS --10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Irrelevant or II relevant?12 MR. LEWIS: Irrelevant. 13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Thanks.14 MR. LEWIS: Because the current PTS rule and 15 the calculation assumes the worst case flaw and assumes 16 that over-pressure event, over-cooling event will occur and 17 gives this equation which kind of establishes the screening 18 criteria, which if you're below, you're safe.19 So those kind of assertions would not be 20 legitimate contentions. But one that says you do have the 21 wrong chemistry factor for some specific reason, you know, 22 would be a good contention. Or one that says you've got 23 the wrong fluence estimated with a real technical basis 24 would be a good contention. 25 So yes, there are ways that, simply saying, you NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 109 I know, we're going to follow the regulations on estimating 2 when the screening criterion will be exceeded is not immune 3 from challenge. 4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But what you're 5 talking about and what you say is not unique. You don't 6 know that where during 20 year periods all the various 7 plants would fall. But what you are saying is not unique 8 is that plants would exceed the PTS criterion during the 9 term.10 And in your situation, it's three years into 11 the term. And what you're saying is that with regard to 12 that situation, which is sort of the last, the last thing 13 that comes in a succession of events, you're saying that, 14 saying that the company will notify, provide information to 15 the NRC down the road is sufficient. 16 MR. LEWIS: When it's coupled with the 17 requirement that you cannot operate with the screening 18 criterion being exceeded, you know, without an approval of 19 these measures by the Commission, yes, that's sufficiently 20 protective of the public health and safety.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So I guess there could 22 be a couple of different ways of looking at this. The 23 license renewal rule says that the license can be issued up 24 to the full term, if the Commission finds et cetera, et 25 cetera.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 110 I So you could just say, well, right now we can 2 only show that we're going to operate up to, up through, up 3 to 2014, sometime in 2014. So we want a renewed license 4 for that period.5 Alternatively, I think what I'd heard earlier 6 is that if you reach, if at the point of having to provide 7 that information, 2011 in your case, you decide that 8 instead of annealing you're going to do a recalculation 9 and, well, you're going to do a recalculation. 10 What you're saying is at that point there would 11 be another right to a hearing to challenge how, to 12 challenge your calculation at that point? If it extended 13 the date further on down the line?14 MR. LEWIS: I think it depends on what you mean 15 by a recalculation. 16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well.17 MR. LEWIS: The reference temperature PTS is 18 determined under the rule by a very specific formula and 19 it's based on, you know, specific data entries and one of 20 them is fluence.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well I mean doing a 22 calculation --23 MR. LEWIS: If we --24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- with new 25 information. NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 III I MR. LEWIS: Yes. But for example, we could, if 2 it were possible to further reduce fluence, you know, we 3 could extend the screening criterion, that wouldn't be a 4 license amendment, that would simply be operating under the 5 current rule.6 The, what would require approval is the 7 analysis that would be required if you were going to exceed 8 the screening criterion, if your reference temperature for 9 -- transition is, at any point, in excess of the screening 10 criterion. 11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So what you're saying 12 is if you discover some additional means of reducing 13 fluence that you don't know about now, and then you provide 14 that information in 2011, such that that would extend the 15 date, the 2014 date to a later date, then there wouldn't 16 need to be a hearing.17 If you couldn't further reduce fluence, that 18 would involve the types of power distribution limits, power 19 level of operation, there, the information that we talked 20 about earlier, that those things would involve a licensed 21 amendment such that there would be a right to a hearing at 22 that point, right?23 MR. LEWIS: Yes. If you submit analysis that 24 shows that it's safe to operate even thought the screening 25 criterion is exceeded.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 112 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So are there any other 2 things that would fall within the same categories, further 3 reducing the fluence, such that there would not be the 4 right to a hearing at that point?5 MR. LEWIS: The reference temperature of 6 pressurized thermal shock is determined by an equation in 7 50.61(c), 50.61(c) and the, it is a factor of the 8 unirradiated reference temperature for -- temperature of 9 the material, the chemistry factor of the material and the 10 fluence that material has received.11 Any one of those three inputs, if there was new 12 information, you know, could affect when the screening 13 criterion will be exceeded.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: The fluence in the 15 chemistry and what was the first one?16 MR. LEWIS: The initial unirradiated reference 17 temperature for the material.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Could that change?19 Doesn't sound like it could but maybe I'm, I don't --20 MR. LEWIS: I don't know how it would --21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.22 MR. LEWIS: I'm sorry. You're asking now a 23 technical question that I don't know the answer to.* 24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You and me both. I 25 guess what I'm getting at is, if we're talking about NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 113 I changes in the chemistry or further reducing the fluence, 2 that would seem to me, especially if there's no right to a 3 hearing on that later, that would seem to me to be the type 4 of thing that, while you might not provide information in 5 the level of detail that 50.61 would require you provide 6 three years prior to the exceeding date, 2014 in this case, 7 that you should be able to provide some information on 8 that, at this point, sufficient to demonstrate that you 9 will adequately manage the effects of aging during the 10 period of extended operation, more than just saying that 11 we're going to tell the NRC that information three years 12 before that date.13 Does that make sense? Doesn't that make sense?14 MR. LEWIS: No. And I'm not sure that's even 15 possible. We have, we are, we applied the equation in 16 50.61(c) to determine what the reference temperature --17 transition is.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. But you said 19 you could, you could further reduce fluence, why wouldn't 20 you be able to have --21 MR. LEWIS: I'm talking, you know--22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- some knowledge of 23 that --24 MR. LEWIS: -- theoretically, I mean, you're 25 asking is there anything you can do. None of those thing NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 114 (2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10.11 12 13 14 15 16 17 is 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 K-, we've identified would be reasonably practical. ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.MR. LEWIS: I mean, quite frankly I think you would deal before you would try and do so.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Yes. I think that's what you application actually says?MR. LEWIS: Yes, it does.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Because, does it?Because that's the very first paragraph --MR. LEWIS: Yes.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: -- in the, in that.MR. LEWIS: And I was just responding earlier to --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Yes.MR. LEWIS: -- when the Judge said could you, you know, could you extend the --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.MR. LEWIS: -- calculations. I mean you can't buy Herculean efforts. But there's no proposal to.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. So basically --MR. LEWIS: And we have a calculation and it's out to 2014 and we said that is what it is.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So basically what you're saying is that it's, it's reasonable to assume that if you decided to do anything other than anneal that that NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 ( 115 I would involve changes of the sort that would require the 2 right to a hearing aE that point, is that right?3 MR. LEWIS: I believe that's right. And I 4 think what I was reacting to was your earlier statement 5 that one of the options is simply to recalculate the RTPTS.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.7 MR. LEWIS: With the safety analysis that's 8 required in 50.61(b)4 I believe, is not just a 9 recalculation of the RTPTS, it's an analysis that says you 10 can continue to operate even though you're exceeding the 11 screening criterion for the following reasons.12 And one might be a probabilistic fracture 13 mechanics analysis that says it's still safe. It's not 14 just, you know, I've just sharpened my pencil and I've 15 added, you know, a couple more years to my calculation. 16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. I guess later I 17 want to hear more from the petitioners on that as to why, 18 if there would be a right to a hearing at that point, how 19 that impacts your contention. 20 Unless you want to say something quickly, 21 briefly right now?22 MR. LODGE: A hearing --23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I mean that may --24 MR. LODGE: -- a hearing in 2014?25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I guess if NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 116 I you're proposing to, the information would need to be 2 provided in 2011.3 MR. LODGE: Right.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And if they're 5 proposing to do anything other than anneal, then that would 6 involve the proposal to amend the license such that there 7 would be a right to a hearing at that point. Am I right, S Ms. Uttal?9 MS. UTTAL: It depends on what the new analyses 10 touches upon.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But based on --12 MS. UTTAL: Whether it's change --13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- what Mr. Lewis just 14 said, it sounds as though --15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: It's highly unlikely 16 that it wouldn't require.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.is MS. UTTAL: Okay. But, of course I have no 19 technical knowledge --20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I mean, we can't say 21 for certain, but.22 MS. UTTAL: -- of anything. Yes. But the, the 23 aspects that I spoke about before, if any of those are 24 changed then there would be a license amendment required.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. And you may NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 117 I want to consult on that. But I'm just wondering what that 2 does to the, this contention and to your interests in the 3 subject matter of this contention, based on what you said 4 earlier.5 MR. LODGE: We're prepared to respond now.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Go ahead. I 7 mean, do you mind, Mr. Lewis?8 MR. LEWIS: No. I do have other points in the 9 argument I want to come back to later.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Sure. We do want to 11 come back to you.12 MR. LODGE: Right.13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But I just thought if 14 we'd gotten to a point that might provide some resolution, 15 maybe we could just, go ahead.16 MR. LODGE: The regulation 50.61(b) subsection 17 6 only requires that the utility apply to, if they're about 18 to exceed the criterion, that they essentially communicate 19 with the director of NRR, not, in other words, it's a sub-20 licensing, it's less than license modification. 21 I understand that the counter to that is, well, 22 there will be some effects for the licensing parameters. 23 My concern is, number one, if this panel finds that this is 24 not currently a -- issue, isn't there a -- problem for 25 intervenors in 2011 or '14 or '16 or whenever to try to get NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 118 I around.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You mean that they 3 wouldn't have the right to a hearing then based on --4 MR. LODGE: They wouldn't be able to, they 5 wouldn't be able to raise the type of challenge to the 6 adequacy of the basis at that point. They wouldn't be able 7 to --8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: The adequacy of the?9 MR. LODGE: They wouldn't be able to attack the 10 lack of hard engineering or scientific knowledge about the 11 state of embrittlement. 12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well I guess, when you 13 raise that, I mean, the problem you've got is that you 14 didn't do that in the initial contention. You provided 15 additional information subsequent to that.16 And it used to be that we always allowed 17 amendments to petitions to flush out contentions. But 18 we're operating under new rules now which you understand 19 and obviously the whole basis of our integrity as a board 20 is that we rule based on the law and regulations, not on 21 our personal viewpoints or influence or whatever.22 And so under the current rules, the Commission 23 has said that you have to submit the contentions full blown 24 at the outset and that the only thing that you can include 25 in a reply is information that's specifically focused on NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 119 I issues raised in the answer.2 So I'm not sure that your statement about what 3 petitioners can or cannot do at this point --4 MR. LODGE: At a future point.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: With -- at a future 6 point based on what's happening now with regard to data and 7 so forth would be affected at all. I mean it, because you, 8 because in your initial contention you didn't make 9 reference to those. Did not make reference to those.10 And it, you know, you don't have to, you don't 11 have to give an answer right away. And if it's anything 12 other than a quick answer, maybe we should just go back to 13 Mr. Lewis --14 MR. LODGE: All right.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- at this point and 16 then later --17 MR. LODGE: Let's do that.Is ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. We'll probably 19 have to break for lunch before you come back in any event.20 So maybe we could finish up with Mr. Lewis, then break for 21 lunch and then continue on with the staff.22 And then obviously as I said before, we don't 23 expect that the other contentions will take anywhere near 24 this amount of time. But we did want to focus on this one 25 because it does deal with an aging issue, a significant NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 120 I aging issue that we think deserves the time to consider it 2 fully.3 Go ahead, Mr. Lewis.4 MR. LEWIS: Just to address a number of other 5 points. One is with respect and -- issue. The petitioners 6 asserted that, and this is a variation of the issue that 7 Judge Trikouros raised that you have to do whatever you can 8 without regard to cost.9 They've also asserted that you have to maintain 10 the largest margin possible below the PTS screening 11 criterion. And I would submit that that's simply 12 inconsistent with the pressurized thermal shock rule that 13 the Commission has in fact explained that the pressurized 14 thermal shock screening criterion is not a safety limit, 15 it's a trip wire which triggers a plant specific safety 16 analysis.17 It defines which licensees need to do that 18 analysis and when it should be done. And I'm citing 56 19 Federal Register 22.300 at page 22,302. This statement's 20 also in the Yankee Atomic case, CLI91-1134NRC3 at page --21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry. At, the 22 last one, repeat again?23 MR. LEWIS: Yankee Atomic case CLI91-1124NRC3 24 at page 10. Similarly the NRC has said in promulgating the 25 pressurized thermal shock rule that generic PTS studies NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433" .. ." .i ' .. ... .. 121 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23already performed provide reasonable assurance that operation of PWR pressure vessels with RTNDT values below the screening criterion does not result in undue risk to the public health and safety. That's 50 Federal Register 29937 at 29939.And finally, the PTS rule establishes a screening criterion with conservative margin to allow for uncertainties below which the Commission has concluded that PTS risk is acceptable for any PWR 50 Federal Reg, 50 Federal Register 29937 at 29941.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So let me understand. You're defining safety margin or margin of safety differently. The, on the one side, the petitioners are saying that the margin of safety is above the RTPT or the screening criterion. You're saying that even if I were at the screening criterion, there's a margin of safety that's built into that point.MR. LEWIS: Absolutely right. And the Commission has unequivocally said as long as you're below that screening risk is acceptable. In fact, they said the risk may be acceptable without that screening criterion, but that's what requires further analysis.The petitioners have said a number of times 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 122 I that we've demonstrated an inability to manage the 2 embrittlement to date and therefore what we're saying is 3 all subject to questions. 4 They have not provided any basis for that 5 assertion and in fact that wasn't even part of the original 6 contention. 7 But if you do consider it, I would submit that 8 there is no basis. In fact, the changes in our RTPTS 9 demonstrate that we have managed the issue. And there are 10 a number of things that have changed the date over time.11 One is that the chemistry factor that is 12 applied in the equation is under the NRC regulations 13 determined by the mean of the average of industry data for 14 the way it weld with the same heat.15 In other words, in determining what the 16 chemistry factor is, you don't just look at your own 17 specimen, you look at the specimens that are obtained by 18 other licensees and you do an average of what are the 19 chemistry factor and you apply that. And that is 20 prescribed by the regulations. 21 There is an NRC database that has the day that 22 that should be used. And when additional data is collected 23 and there was additional data that was collected when 24 Palisades did some additional analyses of steam generator 25 welds, it affects the average, that is affects the PT, the NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 123 I RTPTS. So that could lower the PTS and did in the past.2 In addition, the company has been extremely 3 aggressive in reducing flux over the life of the plan is to 4 reduce the fluence by a factor of three, an enormous 5 amount.6 It has been very effective that fluence 7 reduction methods. And has, you know, spent a very large 8 sum doing so and has applied a lot of state of the art 9 methods.10 That has move the reference temperature back 11 up. And in addition there are also some refinements to how 12 fluence was calculated. 13 So the fact that there has been different 14 estimates of when the screening criterion would be exceeded 15 at different times, in no way suggests that we are unable 16 to manage the embrittlement issue. It simply means that 17 over time there have been different changes including very 18 effective fluence reduction. 19 And the extent that the intervenors are saying 20 at one time it looked like it was going to be 1995 and now 21 it's 2014, you know, their implication is, you know, there 22 must be something wrong. I would submit to you that what 23 it means is that we've been very effective at reducing flux 24 in managing this issue. And if intervenors want to suggest 25 that, in effect, there is a problem with our management of NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 124 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 embrittlement, they need more than to point to different dates, they need to go back to the very, very many submittals that are on the docket, including NRC safety evaluations that address how we have done the calculations at different point.Our current projection of, that the screening criterion will be exceeded in 2014 is based on an NRC safety evaluation which is on the docket, in Adams, on November 14th, 2000 safety evaluation which approved our method of calculating fluence and approved the chemical properties, the chemical factors that we're using in calculating when, what our RTPTS is.So there is a wealth of information that you could book to the challenge is they wanted to come look, with a basis.That's simply asserting the numbers must have changed and therefore the company can't do its business is not a valid basis.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Is, just to get back to what you were saying earlier. I think you said earlier that you thought it was extremely unlikely that you would, that that would change again, didn't you?MR. LEWIS: Yes.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. So, but just to make sure I understand, if it did, if you got new NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 125 I information about the low temperatures in the chemistry and 2 the, or the new fluence reduction methods that that would 3 not lead to a hearing, am I right?4 MR. LEWIS: I'm not aware of any further data 5 that's going to change the chemistry factor. I mean there 6 are a number of utilities that have weld wire with the same 7 heat and the chemical composition of those weld wires has 8 been examined and they're in a database and the rules say 9 that you use best estimates, which are based on the mean of 10 this industry data to determine what the chemistry factor 11 is for your weld wire.12 So that's what's been done. So, you know, is 13 it possible, theoretically that somebody could find a lot 14 more weld wire that's never been examined and isn't in the 15 industry database and it could affect the calculation, yes.16 But I don't know of any basis that that would occur.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: That, looking at the 18 three factors, the only one that could change and I agree 19 with you that in all probability down all the weld wire, so 20 you know the chemistry, originally there was some 21 information on the RTT for the material, so that's null.22 And the, that's leaves of the three factors, 23 the fluence, estimate of the fluence of the vessel is about 24 the only one that could be, could change at this point in 25 time, with any, that would be the most likely of the three.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 126 I Not saying that it is likely, but of the three, 2 it would be the most likely.3 If you were to do that though, but say that 4 some methods out there that you have which leads you to a 5 different estimate of the fluence, okay, it would have to 6 be a pretty dramatic reduction in the fluence to get you 7 from you know, not talking factors of two or three, I'm 8 talking maybe --9 MR. LEWIS: I think it would have to be, yes, 10 it would be an instance to get you all the way out, I mean, 11 it would be a very significant fluence reduction. I mean I 12 think you'd have to --13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: "All the way out" 14 meaning?15 MR. LEWIS: Another factor of three?16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: 20 years.17 MR. LEWIS: I think you'd have to reduce your 18 fluence by a further factor of three to get out to the end 19 of the period of extended --20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: And that type of a 21 recalculation isn't likely based on the state of the art --22 MR. LEWIS: I can certainly see nothing that's 23 indicated that I believe that are current methodology which 24 was approved in that November 14th, 2000 SAR, really is 25 state of the art at this juncture.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 127 1 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Is it possible that 2 rather than one that took you all the way out, took you a 3 year to and then a year or two more and so forth?4 I mean, I guess what, what they're concerned 5 about is that they want an opportunity to raise questions 6 about anything that could have an impact.7 MR. LEWIS: Judge, all I can say is that we 8 don't have a proposal to, you know, revise our fluence 9 prediction method. We, we stated in our application we 10 have a current calculation and it's good to 2014 and it, it 11 is based on the chemical content of the weld wire and the 12 fluence prediction method that was approved by the NRC as 13 part of our current licensing basis in the November 14, 14 2000 SAR.15 And we've said that three years before that 16 screening criterion is exceeded we will have to either 17 submit an annealing report or a further analysis. But 18 we're not going to be able to operate, you know, past that 19 screening criterion without being, you know, without NRC 20 approval.21 That is the proposal, I mean that's what in our 22 application and I guess you're asking is could things 23 change later and is there any possibility, I, yes, but it's 24 not part of our proposal and it's not part of what we 25 addressed in our application. NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 128 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: It's not part of 2 your management plan as, or is that, your license 3 application. 4 MR. LEWIS: Yes. Yes.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But you could 6 understand that, you said that would take you to 2014, you 7 could understand that while there might be a right to a 8 hearing with regard to any decision to let you continue 9 operating without those changes, that should there be any 10 changes, major or minor that would just extend the 11 period to --12 MR. LEWIS: Judge, I'm --13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- a time that --14 MR. LEWIS: That's not an issue that can be 15 addressed in the hearing at this juncture either. I mean 16 there is no proposal, there is no revisions --17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well I understand 18 that, I understand that. But what I'm trying to get at is 19 the issue of what we're supposed to determine is whether 20 you demonstrated that you will adequately manage the 21 effects of aging for the, for the extended term.22 And the concerns that are raised in contention 23 one have to do with whether you've done that since what 24 you're saying is we'll provide this information later.25 If there is a right to a hearing later, on NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 129 I anything that would allow you to operate past 2014, then to 2 some degree, as a practical matter, let's say, it sort of 3 mitigates the concern.4 Whereas if there are changes that could be made 5 that would not lead to the right to a hearing, it doesn't 6 provide the same type of mitigation of the concern as a 7 practical matter, whatever legal significance it may or may 8 not have.9 You understand what I'm getting at?10 MR. LEWIS: No, I do understand, Judge.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Do you have 12 anything more?13 MR. LEWIS: I do have other points. If --14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: If you want --15 MR. LEWIS: I probably have four or five and 16 it's probably another, you know, 20 minutes.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Maybe we should take a 18 break, would you rather go on and finish yours?19 MR. LEWIS: No. I think, I suspect that it's 20 probably appropriate time for a break.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: What do you think?22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: A break is fine with 23 me.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, be back at 1:30?25 (Off the record.)NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* .. .-' ..'. "" -"..7 ..* ... " ... ... -V...... : ..*. ... 130 I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Mr. Lewis, go 2 ahead.3 MR. LEWIS: Judge, just for the record we've 4 passed out a copy to each of the judges, to the, wires for 5 each of the parties and to the reporter a copy of the May 6 2 7 th, 2004 memorandum from the Executive Director of 7 Operations, the one we discussed earlier.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. And this will be 9 Exhibit 2 for the court reporter. Thank you 10 MR. LEWIS: Proceeding there were a number of 11 statements by the Petitioners that Palisades no longer has 12 specimens and does not have samples.13 Just to correct those statements there are 14 still capsules in the representative surveillance program 15 with base metal and with weld material. I believe there's 16 three capsules left. The, I think what would have been the 17 more correct statement is that the weld material in those 18 capsules is no longer considered representative of the 19 critical welds because of changes in standards and changes 20 in recognition of what that critical weld is over time.21 But the assertions that we no longer have a 22 representative surveillance specimen for weld material in 23 our program is really irrelevant to the PTS issue for, for 24 this reason.25 The NRC rules do not require that the reference NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 131 I temperature for neal ductility transition be based on 2 surveillance materials. 3 50.61C establishes the equation that's used to 4 predict what the RT and DT is.5 50.61 C1 talks about the unirradiated reference 6 temperature for the material and says if a measure of value 7 of that RT and DT, which stands for unirradiated, is not 8 available a generic mean for the class of material may be 9 used and 50.61 Cl ii gives the generic mean to be used for 10 welds. It's minus 56 degrees for the Palisades weld so 11 it's specified in the rules.12 50.61 Cl iii A through B give the standard 13 deviations that are then used to account for the margin of 14 uncertainty. They're specified in the rule.15 50.61 Cl iv-A establishes the chemistry factor 16 that is to be used. And it establishes several permissible 17 methods. One is to use the best estimate values which are 1i the means of measure values for weld wire with the same 19 weld wire heat numbers as the critical welds.20 As I explained earlier there is an industry 21 database with the chemistry factors for the welds that have 22 the same weld wire heat number.23 So in every step of the equation 50.61 Cl 24 specifies the parameters to use in the absence of a 25 surveillance specimen.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 132 I And that's exactly what we're doing. This is a 2 very conservative approach.3 There was a statement that Palisades has higher 4 copper content in its weld than other plants. I believe 5 that's incorrect. I think we're in the middle of the road 6 and I don't know of any basis for the Petitioners 7 assertion. Certainly it was, no basis was given in either 8 their original petition or their reply.9 Finally there was an assertion that our 10 prediction of exceeding the screening criterion in 2014 11 cannot be counted on because of a statement in an NRC staff 12 email by Stephen Hoffman and the assertion in that email 13 was simply that we had indicated that we would exceed the 14 screening criterion in 2014 and the statement was I don't 15 know whether we agree with that.16 That does not undercut our assertion. It's 17 simply a statement by a member of the staff doesn't know is whether that's right or wrong. So I submit that does not 19 provide a basis to contradict our estimate.20 And as I mentioned earlier our current 21 prediction of when the screening critieria will be exceeded 22 is based on the method of fluids and the chemistry factors 23 that were approved by the NRC in the November 1 4 th, 2000 24 SAR.25 So the only thing we applied is our approved NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 133 I methodology is in making that statement. 2 By that I would add that the accuracy of that 3 assessment was never mentioned in the original petition and 4 I think was, is one of the areas where it's simply a brand 5 new allegation that's appearing for the first time in the 6 reply.7 That's all I have.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Any 9 questions for him before we move on. Okay. Ms. Uttal.10 MS. UTTAL: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.11 It's --12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And actually before you 13 start let me ask you to in your remarks please focus on the 14 footnote to, in Turkey point in your argument about whether 15 or not this contention is within the scope.16 You seem to be basing it on footnote two in 17 Turkey point --IS MS. UTTAL: I don't know if I have that with me.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: That was the one that I 20 read where they said that some aging related issues are 21 adequately dealt with by regulatory processes and need not 22 be subject to further review during the license renewal 23 proceeding. 24 An example might be those structures and 25 components that already must be replaced at mandated NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433., ..... .... .. . 134 I specified time periods.2 MS. UTTAL: That's the footnote?3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Uh-huh.4 MS. UTTAL: Well, I guess I should have, we 5 should have been more precise in our brief. I mean what 6 is, what is out of scope is anything having to do with 7 current licensing basis. So that compliance with 50.61 8 would be out of scope.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But that, I mean in 10 several places the Commission talks about PTS and I mean 11 certainly this is an aging issue. So unless you rest it on 12 footnote two I don't, I don't really quite understand your 13 argument.14 Because I mean what would not fall within that?15 I mean isn't virtually everything that could conceivably be 16 related to aging also currently regulated? I mean that 17 seems to be a pretty wide sweeping argument.18 MS. UTTAL: I think that in terms of what can be 19 attacked in, in license renewal would be the adequacy of 20 the TLAA.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. And the 22 management of --23 MS. UTTAL: The management of, of aging issues.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.25 MS. UTTAL: But what can't be attacked is the, NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 135 I is this Turkey point, the current licensing basis.2 Judge, I don't have Turkey point with me and 3 it's probably a failing on my part not to have reread IT 4 before I got here so. I don't know if --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, let me read you 6 what I'm, in sum, this is, I don't know which page it's 7 from but in sum our license renewal safety review seeks to 8 mitigate the "detrimental effects of aging resulting from 9 operation beyond the initial license term citing 60 Federal 10 Register at 22463.11 To that effect our rules focus the renewal 12 review on plant systems, structures and components for 13 which current regulatory activities and requirements may 14 not be and that's emphasis of the Commission, be sufficient 15 to manage the effects of aging in the period of extended 16 operation. 17 And then there's footnote two which states: 18 some aging related issues are adequately dealt with by 19 regulatory processes and need not be subject to further 20 review during the license renewal proceeding. 21 An example might be those structures and 22 components that already must be replaced at mandated 23 specified time periods.24 MS. UTTAL: Okay, well, there's no requirement 25 that this one be replaced at, at mandatory specified time NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 136 I limits. But there is a regulatory scheme for dealing with 2 the embrittlement of the vessel and that's in 50.61.3 So I guess it's kind of a hybrid. I mean part 4 of is current licensing basis and part of it is, is an 5 aging issue.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, can you give me 7 an example of, of something that would be subject to aging S that would not be covered in the current licensing basis?9 MS. UTTAL: Would you have a copy of Turkey 10 point?11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Yeah. We have a copy 12 of Turkey point if you'd like to look at it.13 MS. UTTAL: Yeah.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Thank you.15 MS. UTTAL: If we could get back to it after 16 I've a time --17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.18 MS. UTTAL: -- a chance to look at it. It is 19 the staff's position that compliance with 50.61 is 20 sufficient to meet the TLAA and to meet part 54.21 The licensee has indicated that they will 22 comply with it. They put a program in place that shows 23 the, the steps that they will take and it's our position 24 that nothing more is required under part 54 other than 25 demonstrating compliance with 50.61.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 137 1 They can't operate if they're out of 2 compliance. And 50.61 in addition to having all the 3 specifications of, of how you would do the analysis and 4 things like that also has a requirement that if there are 5 any changes in anything that, that has to be reported and a 6 new analysis has to be done. That's 50.61 IBI --7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. Well, let me S ask you the same question I asked Mr. Lewis and that is, 9 that would essentially mean it seems that while aging 10 issues are the only types of issues that can be raised in, 11 and non, non generic environmental issues that can be 12 raised in a license renewal proceeding that when you're 13 talking about PTS and embrittlement and you've got a 14 situation where a plant is projected to exceed the PTS 15 critierian within the license renewal term, which I'm told 16 is not unusual, that the way to exclude a contention under 17 your argument would simply be to say we will provide that is information three years before the date we projected, see 19 the criterion. 20 And that would under your argument 21 automatically exclude any contention --22 MS. UTTAL: Now there, there --23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- related to that.24 Related to --25 MS. UTTAL: Well, probably other contentions NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 138 1 that can be formulated. And I don't want to be in a 2 position of giving ammunition to people about contentions. 3 But I suppose someone can say compliance with 50.61 is not 4 sufficient under 54. I mean this is the staff's position.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: It --6 MS. UTTAL: But we see that as --7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Not sufficient, what 8 do you mean not sufficient? 9 MS. UTTAL: I'm, that there was some, as you 10 were postulating before that there's something else that 11 must be done other than compliance with 50.61 which is not 12 the staff's position.13 The staff's position is, compliance with 50.61 14 is sufficient to meet part 54. But I guess that a 15 contention could be formulated that would say compliance 16 with 50.61 is not enough to meet part 54.17 But that's not the contention here.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, in effect, in 19 effect it really is in the sense that what the contention 20 says is that the license renewal application is untimely 21 but incomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis 22 of embrittlement. 23 And that the, in essence what we have here is a 24 situation where the alliation is that, that Palisades is 25 prone to early embrittlement and that the application does NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 139 I not address the continuing crisis of embrittment. 2 The, the defense to that as it were is well, 3 yes, we do because we address it in 50.61. But the 4 contention is that it's not addressed and, and the, the 5 argument as I understand it is 50.61 under what, what NMC 6 has, has proposed under 50.61 is a plan to make a plan.7 And that that does not address --8 MS. UTTAL: Well, I don't agree that it's a plan 9 to make a plan. They've shown, they've shown that they 10 will comply with 50.61. 50.61 has certain requirements. 11 The requirements are that three years before 12 you'll reach the criterion that you tell, that you send 13 your plan in, you send your SE in or tell us that, that 14 you're going to aneal and you, and you comply with the 15 reporting requirements. 16 But I think that the, that in, in posing your 17 question you're reading a lot into this contention that's Is just not there.19 I mean they say that the application is 20 fundamentally deficient because it does not adequately 21 address technical and safety issues arising out of 22 embrittalment etcetera etcetera.23 So where is it, where is it insufficient, what 24 page, what section. Why is it insufficient. What would, 25 you know, what is, what is the allegation. NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 140 I Then they allege that Palisades is prone, has 2 been identified as pone to early embrittlement. Where is 3 it identified? Who identified it? What's the basis for 4 making --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Is there really any 6 dispute about that though? I mean is there? Every, I mean 7 it's, it's pretty well recognized by everyone here that the 8 date projected to exceed the criterion is 2014.9 MS. UTTAL: That's true but, you know, the basis 10 for saying it's prone to early embrittlement may be because 11 it's older than a lot of the other plants. I mean the, the 12 statement without, without any support is, is not 13 admissible as a part of the contention. 14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, now --15 MS. UTTAL: And that --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- let's back up for a 17 second. The contention as I understand it is the bolded, 18 the bolded sentence at the --19 MS. UTTAL: Right. And the other stuff is the 20 basis.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. And so --22 MS. UTTAL: That --23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And so what you seem 24 to be arguing is that the basis needs to have a basis.25 MS. UTTAL: No. What I, what I'm arguing is is NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 141 I that the basis, the contention doesn't meet the contention 2 pleading requirements. And the basis do not, there's 3 nothing in the contention that gives us the factual basis 4 which is required or the basis for this expert's opinion.5 We don't, I don't know what he's an expert in.6 He could, he could have been in, in the CIO's office for 7 all I know. I mean there's no, there's no facts that he's, 8 that this expert is basing his opinion on.9 The, the statement itself is not enough. I'm 1o not saying that the basis needs a basis. I'm saying that 11 the contention and its basis have to meet the contention 12 rule. It has to have facts, expert opinion. It has to be 13 shown to be material etcetera.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Then so it's your 15 belief that this does not rise above a mere allegation 16 which the Commission has specifically highlighted as not 17 being admissible in, I forget which ruling it was but they, 18 they said that our admissibility rules are strict.19 MS. UTTAL: By design.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: By design?21 MS. UTTAL: Yes. This, this contention is, is 22 insufficient under our contention pleading rules and should 23 not --24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let me see, I'd like to 25 see if you could help me with that a little bit. Let's go NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* -" " " -"-" * ~.... .. '.. *.......... .-: "" ,..... 142 I through the, the admissibility criteria under 2309F.2 First the need to provide a specific statement 3 of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. 4 I don't think you dispute that part. Let me 5 get your, right.6 MS. UTTAL: I don't, I don't see it there, no.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry, what?8 MS. UTTAL: I don't see anything addressing 9 that.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: In your, in your?11 MS. UTTAL: In my pleading.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.13 MS. UTTAL: Okay.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. So then we 15 assume that it does do that.16 Provide a brief explanation of the basis for 17 the contention. 18 You're arguing that this brief explanation has 19 not been provided?20 MS. UTTAL: Well, it's, it's very brief but.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: It is very brief 22 there's no doubt about that.23 MS. UTTAL: I mean there's no --24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Could you, could you 25 NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 , ..... .. , .., ... ... * . 143 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MS. UTTAL: There's no requirement of how long the brief one has to do.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Could you be specific as to what sentence provides that brief explanation of the basis?MS. UTTAL: Well, they don't cite where their problem is with the, the licensee's application. ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, let's save --MS. UTTAL: They just say the general --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- that for when we got to the part --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: There's another one --MS. UTTAL: Okay. They, they, they make a basic generic statement that the prone to early embrittlement. ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But isn't that a fairly significant statement to make in the context of a license renewal where they're asked where the, what's being sought is a 20 year license renewal and the, and there's an allegation effect that the, that the plant has been identified as prone to early embrittlement to support a contention that says that the application is incomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis of --MS. UTTAL: But it --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- embrittlement --NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433....-.. 144 I MS. UTTAL: It's, it's not sufficient because 2 it has, it doesn't have any support. It's just a statement 3 with no support showing the basis for this, now I'm getting 4 the basis to the basis.5 But, but to, to say that, that this basis is 6 sufficient because it's, it's, the basis doesn't address 7 the fact that there are no facts or expert opinion --8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, any fact --9 MS. UTTAL: -- to support --10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- in a, in a 11 contention or in a basis for a contention is alleged, 12 right? I mean it not, it's not proven.13 MS. UTTAL: Yeah, because it's a contention but 14 there are, there are no facts here. There's nothing here.15 These are general statements that it's prone to early 16 embrittlement. No --17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Isn't that, isn't that 18 an alleged fact?19 MS. UTTAL: Not without support. i could say 20 the moon is made out of green cheese. I mean it, it, I'd 21 have to prove that somehow or at least show where I got my 22 information from.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Well, my question 24 there on that is I've looked at the, those sentences and, 25 and what I'm having trouble with and that's why I asked Mr.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 145 1 -- there is, is how does that act a, a foundation of a 2 theory or process or a principle according to which the 3 hypotheses is, is based.4 In other words the hypotheses is that the 5 application is untimely and incomplete because it doesn't 6 address embrittlement. And, and the statement that the 7 Palsadies Nuclear Power Station is identified as prone to 8 early embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel.9 How does that support or provide a foundation 10 for the hypotheses that the license renewal application is 11 untimely and incomplete? 12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I think her --13 MS. UTTAL: I don't think --14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- argument is does 15 it.16 MS. UTTAL: I don't think it does because 17 there's nothing in the basis that shows that this 18 application is untimely. And in fact the licensee has 19 addressed embrittment in the application so the, the, the 20 contention itself is incorrect. 21 I mean there, there can be no denying that 22 embrittment is, is addressed in the license application. So 23 this, this statement to begin with is incorrect. 24 Therefore I don't see where there's any support 25 for what they say the contention is.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 146 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. That's your 2 position on, on subsection two. You're arguing that it's 3 not within the scope of the, of the license renewal 4 proceeding for the reasons you gave earlier.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I'd like to explore 6 that further.7 MS. UTTAL: Well, let me the read the Turkey 8 point and then.9 ADMIN. LAW.JUDGE BARATTA: Okay. Go ahead, 10 sorry.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Demonstrate that the 12 issue raised in the contention is material to the findings 13 the NRC must make to support the action involved in the 14 proceeding which takes us to 5429.15 I think your, I think you argue that it's not, 16 let's see. You may not raise a question about that one.17 MS. UTTAL: I can't get them all.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You raise a question 19 about whether an genuine issue, a genuine dispute exists on 20 a material issue of law or fact.21 MS. UTTAL: Right. Again the, the contention 22 says that they failed to address embrittlement. And they 23 have addressed embrittlement. Therefore there is no 24 material issue because they're, they're incorrect in their 25 initial supposition. NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 147 I Initial thesis is wrong.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: What about the part of 3 the initial thesis that alleges that it's incomplete and, 4 and raises the timeliness issue in conjunction with the 5 allegation that the plant's been identified as prone to 6 early embrittlement? 7 MS. UTTAL: This, there is nothing, first of all 8 there's no explanation about what they mean is untimely.9 If I see that, something that says the license renewal 10 application is untimely that means it's filed late.11 There's nothing about that in, in the support for this 12 contention. And incomplete not because they didn't 13 adequately address the continuing crisis of embrittlement. 14 But incomplete for failure to address it. And there is no 15 failure to address here.16 And then again the, the statements made in the 17 basis are without support. There are no facts to support 18 them. There's no opinion to support them. They don't 19 point to anything specific sources. They're supposed to 20 provide a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert 21 opinion which supports the requestors petition, the 22 reguestors position on the issue and how much the 23 petitioner intends to rely together with references to the 24 specific sources and documents on which the requestor 25 intends to rely to support its position. There's none of NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 148 I that in there. So they completely failed on five.2 And if they fail to meet one of the criterion 3 in 2.309 then the contention is inadmissible. And I think 4 they've --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: No doubt, you're right.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: On, on 309 step six, 7 okay. I heard did you say that you feel their, their 8 statement is that it's incomplete for failure to address is 9 wrong?10 MS. UTTAL: Yes, because they've addressed 11 embrittlement in their TLAA. In addition to, to that 12 problem they're supposed to provide, the intervenors, are 13 supposed to provide references to specific portions of the 14 application including the applicant's environmental and 15 safety report that the Petitioner disputes and the 16 supporting reasons for each dispute or if the Petitioner 17 believes that the application fails to contain information 18 on a relevant matter as required by law the identification 19 of each failure and supporting reasons for the Petitioner's 20 belief.21 Well, as to pointing at specific portions of 22 the application that they completely failed to do that and, 23 in, well, it's a requirement under, under --24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Well, there's only, 25 there's only one page in the application that it could be NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* ..,,', :: .,...... : .. .... *<. ." ... 149 I referring to though I mean. That was, I thought that 2 was --3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay --4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Yes, that's why I, 5 you know, to me they did.6 MS. UTTAL: I've, I've been, I've been asked to 7 show why, why --8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Yeah, I understand, I 9 understand --10 MS. UTTAL: -- it doesn't comply with our, with 11 our regulations. 12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, now I believe 13 that the reply to that though was that their argument is 14 that this, this involves a failure, a failure of the 15 application. That the application is incomplete. And that 16 it's incomplete because it doesn't address the continuing 17 crisis of embrittlement and, and they tie that to the 1S allegation of fact that it's been identified as prone, 19 being prone to early embrittlement. 20 There is case law that says a petitioner, a 21 petitioner must provide documents, expert opinion or at 22 least a fact based argument.23 And there's also case law that says the 24 contention rule should not be used a fortress to deny 25 intervention that what you need is enough to indicate that NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 150 I further inquiry is appropriate. That what you need is 2 indication that the purpose of the contention rule which I 3 think was quoted in Turkey point.4 Basically something to indicate that the 5 petitioners are qualified, able to litigate the issue that 6 they raise.7 So what we have here is we have an allegation 8 that the application is incomplete for failure to address 9 the continuing crisis of embrittlement supported by this 10 factual allegation about early embrittlement and the 11 identification of an expert who used to work with the NRC.12 So on the face of that it would seem that that 13 provides something to indicate that further inquiry might 14 be appropriate. 15 Under, under the case law that I've just cited 16 to you, and I understand it's your position that they 17 haven't met any, haven't met these things and, and that 18 there should, but what I'm trying to get you to address is 19 the general issue that they've raised.20 The brief statement, very brief, but, but it's 21 a concise and brief statement of, of their concern.22 They're supporting it with the reference to an expert who 23 used to work at the NRC. Whose obviously I, I think it's, 24 can be assumed that they're not going to bring a financial 25 expert in.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 151 I So let's get past that point.2 What I hear you saying is that not only have 3 they not satisfy some of the technical requirements of the 4 contention and admissibility rule but that this is not even 5 a significant issue that, that's within the scope of 6 license renewal.7 And you sort of start to lose me there --8 MS. UTTAL: Okay.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- at least.10 MS. UTTAL: Even, put aside the issue about 11 outside the scope. And let's just talk about the 12 contention itself because I disagree very strongly with all 13 due respect with what you've said. There is, this is --14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I'm asking you 15 questions so.16 MS. UTTAL: Oh, okay.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You don't need to agree is or disagree because you can attack everything I'm saying as 19 question and --20 MS. UTTAL: Okay. Well -- well, this contention 21 as it was submitted in, in the, the first pleading does not 22 contain what is expected, what the Commission expects to 23 see in contentions. 24 It contains a lot or a few unsupported 25 statements. The statement that it's identified as prone to NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. .'....-. ... .. " ... .. ." .... .... .... ... ...: ..

• 152 I early embrittlement is not supported.

It is not up to the 2 Board or even any of the other parties to come in and, and 3 fill in the blanks of who said it and whether it's general 4 knowledge and, and things like that. Then --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But if you look at the, 6 let's stop right there.7 If you look at the case law that says a 8 document, documents, expert opinion or at least a fact 9 based argument.10 I mean in a license renewal proceeding where 11 there's an allegation of a plant being prone to early 12 embrittlement doesn't that at least raise your antenna a 13 little bit --14 MS. UTTAL: What --15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- that, that is, that 16 this might be, might warrant further inquiry? And then 17 when you read on and you see we've got an expert who used 18 to work at the NRC.19 I mean doesn't that even cause you to wonder 20 whether there might be cause for further inquiry?21 MS. UTTAL: Judge, I think the issue is the 92 burden is on the Petitioner to provide a sufficient --23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.24 MS. UTTAL: -- a sufficient contention --25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But what I'm asking NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 153 I you to do is answer the question I just asked. Based on 2 what's here like I said I don't know who Demitrios Bezdekas 3 is and what his expertise and what his connection with this 4 plant is. So I can't comment on whether he has any 5 expertise and whether this very general statement has any 6 meaning.7 And I don't think the, the Board can read into 8 it that just because he worked at the NRC that he's an 9 expert in this particular field that we're talking about 10 here because there's no support provided.11 And the general statement that it's prone to 12 early embrittlement without more is not enough to raise 13 this, this proposed contention to the level that's required 14 by our stringent pleading rules to allow it to be admitted.15 Now the, the quotes that, that you quoted from 16 the cases are general, are general quotes and, yes, there 17 are cases where you don't rely on technicalities. Some of 18 the cases that were cited by the Petitioners point that 19 out.20 But when they're talking about technicalities 21 let's say in the Sequoia Fuels case. In the Sequoia Fuels 22 case the technicality was that a another intervenor had 23 copied the contentions from the first intervenor, had not 24 copied the basis in. So the Board allowed them to amend, 25 to put the basis in.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 154 I That was felt to be a technical thing. There 2 was another one where they failed to sign the pleading and 3 that was felt to be technical. 4 In here there's a complete failure to comply or 5 almost complete I guess, it's not complete but almost 6 complete failure to comply with our pleading requirements. 7 And I don't think that we can pull it up and make it a good 8 contention by, by reading things into it that are just not 9 there.10 ADMIN. LAW ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I have a 11 question. The, the, again I'm back on the reasonably 12 practical able question.13 The applicant said that they were not going to 14 make a modification as we discussed earlier because it was 15 not reasonably practical able.16 How, do you, does the NRC do an evaluation of 17 that and make a determination that indeed that is not 18 reasonably practical able?19 MS. UTTAL: I'm not sure we have the person here 20 that can answer that question because it would be done by 21 the, the people that are reviewing the, the request, done 22 by the people that are reviewing the request under 50.61 23 not the people that are reviewing the license renewal 24 because they have not made that, that, they have not sent 25 their program in as we know because we've been discussing NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433-.. ......... .. .. ..... .... .....' : .. 155 I it.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.3 MS. UTTAL: But I do agree that it involves a, a 4 cost benefit analysis and considering safety --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Right. And we have 6 this May 2 7 1h letter which indicates that the first thing 7 to do is the flux reduction program. That's reasonably 8 practical able. And if that program doesn't prevent the 9 problem then you move on to the, the other two areas that 10 are identified in here.11 Right now as I see it the, there's only one 12 statement in the application that says it's very costly 13 and, and let's move on. And so that's where I am right 14 now.15 MS. UTTAL: I think I lost you. I'm going to 16 assume that the staff checks the figures because I've seen 17 things like SAMA analysis where they do cost versus SAMA 18 severe accident mitigation alternatives where they, they 19 measure the cost versus the, the benefit in deciding 20 whether it's worth while to do the SAMA.21 So maybe that they do something like that. And 22 the staff looks at the analysis. But that's a guess I 23 don't know for sure.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: And again this all 25 comes back for me to the question of reasonable assurance NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. ..-".. *.. ,.. , .*. ... 156 I under, under 54.29.2 MS. UTTAL: Uh-huh.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Whether or not you 4 can simply put 50.61 and that, and that's reasonable 5 assurance. 6 The May 2 7 1h letter does say that.7 MS. UTTAL: And that is the staff's position.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: And we have that 9 but.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I'd like, I'd like to 11 just ask a couple questions relating to the concept of cost 12 and benefit.13 Are there places in the regulations that you're 14 aware of where cost and safety are specifically balanced?15 MS. UTTAL: No, I'm just, I'm just saying I was 16 aware when they do a SAMA analysis that they do some kind 17 of analysis like that.IS ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: So, so you're not 19 familiar with other parts of the regulation whether they 20 might be done?21 MS. UTTAL: Well, I think there's a cost benefit 22 analysis that's done in the environmental area.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: But not in the 24 safety, right?25 MS. UTTAL: I don't know offhand, I'm sorry. I NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 157 I don't know if this is exactly on point but in, in the 2 environmental area cost benefit analysis specifically 3 excluded except for the SAMAs that --4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: No, I was looking --5 MS. UTTAL: -- answer your question at all --6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I was wondering if 7 in the, in the safety area whether there was any, whether 8 it be in part 50 or some other part of the --9 MS. UTTAL: I, I just don't know, I'm sorry.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: The, with the 11 exception of Appendix K the prescriptiveness of this 50.61 12 the only other place I can think of that I've seen that 13 type of prescriptive requirement is in and is in Appendix 14 K.15 Is this, am I wrong in that or are there, or is 16 that frequently done where they, they really lay out in 17 detail what you have to do as opposed to providing more 18 general requirements which you then develop a methodology 19 as to how to meet those?20 MS. UTTAL: I know in decommissioning funding 21 they lay out a formula that you have to follow but that's, 22 you're probably asking from a technical basis for saying --23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Well, even, even in* t'24 the decommission funding, what I'm trying to get at is, is 25 it, it doesn't seem like this is typical. It seems like NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 t .....* ..... .: .." ..... ....7 - 158 I this is very prescriptive. 2 MS. UTTAL: Yes.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: The way to put it.4 And that that's not typical of most of the regulations. 5 MS. UTTAL: I, you, you're probably correct 6 because in a lot, and if you read the, the SRP's in various 7 areas things are, are told this is the way we'd like to see 8 it but if the licensee comes in with a different method and 9 as long as it meets the regulatory criteria then, then 10 that's acceptable. 11 I think that a lot of our regulations are 12 becoming performance based./-13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: This, this one 14 definitely isn't though. This is not a performance 15 based --16 MS. UTTAL: Well, you have to meet certain 17 criteria, certain, you have to meet the criterion and they is tell you how you're going to get there. What you have to 19 do.20 I, I would have to ask the staff about, I'm 21 looking here.22 Well, in terms of 50.61 there's this specific 23 three year time period and that's so that there's 24 sufficient time to review the plan to make sure that it's, 25 it's sufficient. NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 159 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Sufficient to what?2 MS. UTTAL: You don't, to meet, to, so that they 3 will be able to meet the criterion when they finally, so 4 they will not go over the criterion when they, when they 5 finally reach that year.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So that they'll be able 7 to manage the effects of aging?8 MS. UTTAL: Yes, exactly. And there are a few 9 other regulations that involve these kind of time limits.10 Again the decommissioning funding one is one.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: So my point being is, 12 is that, could that possibly, because of prescriptiveness 13 of the regulation could that possibly be something that 14 would fall under that note two that was mentioned earlier 15 in Turkey point?16 MS. UTTAL: I don't, I'll have to think about 17 that.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay. That's fair.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Any more questions. 20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I want to discuss 21 margin of safety but I don't know if I should do it now or 22 later.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I think so. Do you 24 have anything more that you want to argue unless we have 25 questions? NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 160 I MS. UTTAL: No, I think that most everything has 2 been covered.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I'd like to just 4 take a few minutes to make sure I understand if there's a 5 consensus on what margin of safety means.6 When I read the Petitioners documentation I 7 seem to see the definition of margin of safety as being 8 having a, a temperature that's, that's above or below if 9 you will the screening criterion. And that the margin of 10 safety is that temperature difference from the screening 11 criterion. 12 I, when I, when I hear the applicant's 13 arguments I, I hear a, that the margin of safety is 14 actually embedded at the point of the screening criterion. 15 That even if you were there there's a margin of safety 16 that, that's, that's built into that number.17 Am I, am I reading incorrectly or is there two 18 different, are there two different margins of safety here 19 that I'm hearing?20 MR. LODGE: Probably. The --21 MR. LEWIS: The, sorry.22 MR. LODGE: Sorry.23 MR. LEWIS: You're certainly correct in our view 24 and we cited the NRC's statement of consideration where 25 they indicated that the margin of safety was inherent in NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 161 I the screening criterion and as long as you're below the 2 screening criterion the risk is acceptable to those safety 3 issue.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: That's your 5 definition? 6 MR. LEWIS: And that's based on the statement of 7 consideration and explaining the rule.8 MR. LODGE: We believe that the margin of safety 9 also implicates the concept of confidence levels. I mean 10 is there a 90 percent degree of confidence in that margin, 11 a 25 percent. So, yes, the numerical temperature is a 12 beginning point.13 But the, the degree with which you can rely on 14 that level is significant. 15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay. Could you 16 explain that a little bit more. I didn't, because the, 17 the, I understand what you're referring to about confidence 18 level.19 MR. LODGE: We question the degree of confidence 20 that can be ascribed given the lack of knowledge about the, 21 the mystery metal that the reactor vessel is made of. The, 22 the mix of copper and nickel.23 The, rather than relying on generic industry S.24 standards that may or may not have much direct relevance to 25 the facts at Palisades. K_>NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 162 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I, I thought I heard 2 earlier that the, the regulation prescribes what you're 3 supposed to do in that case. And that that'swhat was 4 done.5 MR. LODGE: Insofar as --6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: In so far as the 7 composition of the material when you don't have the actual 8 material for that particular weld then you are to use 9 values that are contained in the table. And that's 10 dictated by the regulations. 11 MR. LODGE: One moment please.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: 50.61 C1 it's small 13 Roman numeral iii, is that what you're?14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Three.15 MR. LODGE: Yes. The, we think that the Exhibit 16 2 has, offers a very useful interpretation of what the 17 expectations are of a licensee. And it particularly 18 addresses the 50.61 C1 iii option. The, on the first page 19 it indicates that the third option, which is the C1 iii, if 20 the licensee demonstrates that the effects of aging on the 21 intended functions and systems will be adequately managed 22 for the period of extended operation, which of course is 20 23 years.24 On the second page it states that the license, 25 is that, the second full paragraph --NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 163 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Excuse me, the second 2 full paragraph of?3 MR. LODGE: The second page, pardon me. Page 4 two of the May 2 7 th 2004 --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: May 2 7 th, letter, okay.6 MR. LODGE: The, the Exhibit 2.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay, say that again.S MR. LODGE: I'm sorry. The, the first sentence 9 of the second full paragraph page two indicates that the 10 license renewal applicant that chooses the C1 iii option 11 must provide an assessment of the current licensing basis 12 TLAA for, for pressure thermal shock, a discussion of flux 13 reduction program, you can read it. I'm, I'm not going to 14 go through all that.15 And identify the viable options that exist for 16 managing the aging effect in the future.17 What you've heard, what we've heard today from 18 the applicant is their plan is we'll get you a plan 19 sometime in the future and plan D the plan to provide a 20 plan, plan B is we'll shut down if we exceed the criterion. 21 Then on page three at the top, the first full 22 paragraph it indicates if a reactor vessel is projected to 23 exceed the PTS screening criteria B3 50.61 B3 requires the 24 licensee to implement a flux reduction program that is 25 reasonably practical able to avoid exceeding the PTS NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 164 I screening criteria.2 The operative word in that sentence to us is 3 implement a flux reduction program not plan to provide a 4 scheme to implement. 5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: But you're, the 6 second sentence though goes on if the program does not 7 prevent which evidently they've concluded that it's not S reasonably practical able to do then, then the licensee can 9 choose between other options.10 MR. LODGE: Correct, sir. That's --11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: And that's what they 12 said they're going to do.13 MR. LODGE: Well, I, I guess I don't follow 14 your, your logic there. And I --15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Well -~16 MR. LODGE; Well, in the, in the application 17 they state at page 4-10 the flux to the reactor vessel is would have to be reduced by an additional factor of three 19 in order to reach March 24, 2031.20 Mr. Lewis has acknowledged that they're not 21 going to be able to achieve that with current technological 22 capabilities. So --23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: So there's, there's 24 no dispute that it's not reasonably practical able to do 25 that.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 165 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. LODGE: Correct. And in fact all they're saying, all the, all the utility is saying to you today is we can get we think to 2014 three, seventeen years short of 2031.And so the two options that are specified, your Honor, in, in that sentence you just referred to, are annealing --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Uh-huh.MR. LODGE: -- or providing safety analysis to determine what modifications are necessary to prevent failure of the reactor vessel.It appears to be taken in context, it appears to us, that that is to be done now. If they, they've admitted now today, 2005, they can't otherwise achieve the flux reduction by a factor of three.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: But I, what I'm getting hung up on is, is I don't understand how that, that doesn't meet, you know, the, first off this letter although it, it should be given deference is not binding.MR. LODGE: I understand, sure, sure.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay. I mean it's not --MR. LODGE: Certainly. ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: -- it is not a regulation. NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433..< ..- -.' .. -....." ...... ... ." " ' ." " " 166 I MR. LODGE: Right.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: All right.3 MR. LODGE: But it's, this --4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: So we're all clear on 5 that.6 MR. LODGE: Correct.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: But it should be 8 given deference and I'd like to, I would like to explore 9 your, what you're saying because I, I'm having trouble 10 seeing that.11 MR. LODGE: Well --12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Can I ask a question to 13 see if I understand it.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Sure. And if he can 15 help --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Let me see if I 17 understand what you're saying.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: All right.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You're saying that what 20 this letter says on page two is that the selection of which 21 of the other two options they're going to follow needs to 22 be done at this point and that then later details of the 23 approach selected are to be submitted at least three years 24 before the projected date?25 MR. LODGE: Yes, your Honor.. And --NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 167 I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And you, I guess notice 2 that, I would assume that you're basing that on the 3 sentence that says details of the approach selected are 4 required to be submitted at least three years before 5 implying that.6 MR. LODGE: And also the second sentence of that 7 same paragraph, your Honor, that says, if the flux 8 reduction program does not prevent the reactor vessel from 9 exceeding the PTS screening criterion at the end of life.10 And now is that the projected 2031 end of life?if Because we know today, we know now, that the utility admits 12 that they cannot provide that confidence level. And, and 13 it says the licensee can choose between the two options.14 And, and annealing appears arguably to be off the table so 15 the other analysis --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Off the table?17 MR. LODGE: Not, not an option.i8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But haven't they said 19 they --20 MR. LODGE: They said they --21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: That's the second 22 time you've said that. I'm, I don't, I specifically asked 23 that question and I was told that it is not off the table.24 So I don't understand --25 MR. LODGE: Well, there was a rather resolute NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 168 I assertion made by the utility approximately eight or nine 2 years ago, 1996 or 7 their intention to perform a nealing.3 And it hasn't happened. No step toward it beyond some 4 public assertion to that effect has been made.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Well, there is a 6 very clear statement on page 4-10 of the license 7 application. 8 MR. LODGE: Right.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: And it says other 10 alternatives that would be considered would include 11 completion of safety analysis as specified in 50.61 B4 and 12 thermal and nealing treatment as specified in 50.61 B7.13 And I, i get back to looking at the letter that 14 we're talking about. It says license renewal applicant 15 that chooses to use C13 option for managing must provide an 16 assessment of the current licensing basis which it seemed 17 like they did.18 They said hey, you know, we're, we can't meet 19 it beyond 2014 a discussion with flux reduction program 20 which is in the beginning section there that they began a 21 low leakage core etcetera and they, they still ran out of 22 room in 2014.23 And then it goes on, the letter says that an 24 identification viable options exist for managing the aging 25 effect in the future which seems to be what they did in NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 169 I that part I started out with a few minutes ago.2 So I guess I have trouble understanding why, 3 what they're required to do in this letter or what the 4 staff letter to the chairman said isn't what they're doing 5 which seemed to be what you were saying a few minutes ago.6 MR. LODGE: Well, the Petitioner's position is 7 that we know today that the utility is not going to be able 8 to implement a flux reduction program that can avoid 9 exceeding the, the PTS screening criteria through 2031.10 And that the, essentially the utility is saying 11 if assuming things don't change we'll be making some 12 proposal by 2011.13 We return to our arguments made earlier today 14 that what data, what degree of, of confidence, what, what 15 science, what engineering that is based on relatively firm 16 facts can the utility produce then that they can't produce 17 now.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: But we only have the 19 regulations to go by.20 MR. LODGE: Right.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: That we are required 22 to follow and I don't see the basis for your claim that 23 they're not doing that particularly in light of this 24 letter.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: This letter is not NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 170 I a regulation and it wouldn't be surprised to be that the 2 timing issue is left out of here that it's trying to make 3 its, whatever point it's trying to make so I, I wouldn't 4 read it as a regulation. I don't think it was meant for 5 that purpose.6 And there is a three year requirement then that 7 is in 50.61. So --8 MR. LODGE: Well, that sentence beginning, and I 9 understand this is, this is an interpretation, an 10 enlightened interpretation but, but it's a take.11 But it says that the license, the license 12 renewal applicant that chooses the C-13 option must provide 13 an assessment of the current licensing basis, discussion of 14 the flux reduction program implemented, implemented not 15 planned to be explained later, in accordance with 50.61 B3 16 and an identification of the options that exist for 17 managing.18 Yes, they've identified what the options might 19 be but they have not specified, discussed the flux 20 reduction program implemented in accordance with 50.61 B3.21 MR. LEWIS: May I address that point. The 22 application does specifically address the flux reduction 23 program that's been implemented in the second paragraph in 24 4.2 and specifically the core redesign which went from a --25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Are you referring to NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433... , .- 171 I where it says Palisades began the use of a low leakage core 2 design?3 MR. LEWIS: Yes.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: That's again on page.5 4-10 of the --6 MR. LEWIS: That's correct, I mean we've 7 implemented an ultra low leakage core which took a 8 considerable time and engineering analysis and effort to 9 redesign the core so that new assemblies are, the inside 10 the core instead of around the periphery to further reduce 11 flux by using third and fourth cycle assemblies in the 12 periphery. 13 And further by putting shielding simply, each 14 shielding assemblies in front of each of the six critical 15 axial welds. It's described in the FSAR and in many 16 documents, the shielding assemblies are assemblies where 17 the first four rows are steel tubes, the assemblies are 15 IS by 15 rods.19 On the other side there's another four rows of 20 steel tubes in the middle are basically depleted uranium 21 tubes. Those assemblies shield each of the critical axial 22 welds.23 It's a very aggressive and extensive flux 24 reduction program that has been implemented. 25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I, I think there's NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 S. .. ., .;.... ?.. '.... -.:- * . 172 I no doubt that there's been a, a, the implementation of a 2 flux reduction program. Not, not an issue in my mind.3 MR. LEWIS: Right.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: And it says clearly 5 in the application. Howevet, the, the, this issue of 6 reasonably practical able efforts is still, is still out 7 there in terms of additional modifications. Who makes the 8 determination as to what is reasonably practical able and 9 trying to balance that with the comments of the Petitioners 10 that economic factors are perhaps being cavalierly 11 brutalized. 12 That's where I was coming from before. I 13 still, we still don't have closure on that.14 MR. LEWIS: There, there are two elements of 15 that. It's, it's those measures that are reasonably 16 practical to avoid exceeding the screening criterion during 17 the period of extended operation or during the, before the 1i end of life.19 So in order to raise a genuine issue here I 20 would submit that the intervenors would have to show that 21 there is some measure that we haven't considered that is 22 both cost effective and capable of getting you all the way 23 out to the period of extended operation and they certainly 24 have not done that.25 MR. LODGE: We, 50.61 B3 requires the licensee NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 173 1 to implement, implement a flux reduction program reasonably 2 practical to avoid exceeding the PTS screening criteria.3 The utility can get the plant as far as 2014 not 2031.4 And we believe that there has to be a plan, a 5 plan to fail, a plan to shut down at 2014 or at such point 6 as the criterion is exceeded is not a plan to manage.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: We started out with you 8 answering a question. Do you, or do we need to follow up 9 on that any more at this point or?10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: No. I think, I 11 think we have an answer to the question.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. So you're, you 13 can also respond to any of the other arguments --14 MR. LODGE: Thank you.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- of the other two 16 parties.17 MR. LODGE: I did want to bring the panel's --18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Did you have something 19 else you wanted to say first?20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I never quite got the 21 answer to my question about the uncertainty. That's what I 22 was trying to get out originally. 23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Do you want to?24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I, I just, it, it, 25 you made that, that statement several times but from what NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 174 I we've heard I, I gathered that, you know, again that these 2 regulations were prescriptive as to what you have to do if 3 you don't have this or you have that.4 So how, how does the, how you, what's the basis 5 for your statement that the uncertainties are unknown if 6 the regulations tell you you've got to do something? 7 And specifically the regulations tell you you 8 have to do something with respect to the makeup of the weld 9 material if you don't have the weld material.10 MR. LODGE: One moment please. I wonder if we 11 might have a five minute break in order to formulate it.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.13 (Off the record.)14 MR. LODGE: Sorry, not trying, not trying to be 15 cute or misleading with the response.16 But it's very difficult to answer your question 17 Dr. Baratta, without understanding whether or not it's 18 backed up by data from original actual irradiated material 19 as opposed to accelerated aging samples of as, as opposed 20 to computer projections. 21 The representations that Mr. Lewis made about 22 the capsules were that, did, did not indicate they were 23 actual bits of metal of the same material that the RPV at 24 Palisades was actually constructed from.25 A 1992 NRC interim safety evaluation that we NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433-: .. ... .....-.. .." ... .. " ...' .. " *. . 175 I don't have extra copies of that I will certainly provide 2 the, the panel as well as a 1991 letter from Consumers 3 Power to the NRC indicate that Consumers Power, and I'm 4 reading from the 1991 letter, Consumers Power Company does 5 not have chemistry measurements for the Palisades vessel 6 specific belt line welds nor does it have a surveillance 7 specimen made with the same material and heat of wire.8 Consumers Power Company does have copper and 9 nickel measurements for the actual vessel belt line 10 material.11 In the staff, the, the interim safety 12 evaluation dated 1992 the staff concludes the surveillance 13 plate material was removed from plates that are in the 14 Palisades belt line, however, the surveillance weld 15 material is not from a Palisades belt line weld hence it 16 has no value in determining the effect of neutron 17 irradiation on the Palisades belt line welds.18 We believe that there are significant 19 uncertainties that, that pose the issue, that pose the 20 issue of fact that we believe should be heard by the panel.21 Issues of, of public confidence in the margin 22 of safety are not obviated simply because regulations are 23 being followed in some fashion.24 We differ of course with whether or not the 25 regulations are, are truly being followed that 50.61 NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 176 I according to the executive director for operations it 2 appears to me that the details of the approach selected are 3 what, are the subject of that three year notice.4 But that the, the, the plan and the 5 implementation of the plan begins at an earlier point 6 outside of that three year time period. And we believe 7 that the only meaningful way that that regulation can be 8 interpreted is that in, because, because the utility does 9 not provide confidence that it can implement a flux 10 reduction program out to 2031 but only to 2014 and that if 11 they don't make it they will shut down is not a plan. It 12 is, it is a failure. And the Petitioners believe that that 13 has to be, the subject has to become then the subject of 14 hearing.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Before you go on and 16 this may give you something to focus on in your remaining 17 argument. But I want to make sure I ask you this before, 18 before you go on from contention one.19 First a simple question, maybe not a simple 20 answer. But you've provided a lot more with your reply 21 than you did in your original contention. And we've 22 discussed what we'll consider and what we won't consider.23 But why did you not provide that at the outset?24 Can you, I mean just explain that. What, what the 25 situation was. What your reasons were.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 177 1 And then if you could also in your remaining 2 time expand a little bit on if there were a hearing what 3 you would anticipate litigating. 4 And also if you could address that in the 5 context of there being the right to a hearing at a later 6 point if anything proposed would involve the types of 7 issues that were discussed before that would require an 8 amendment to the license.9 And we heard discussed the things that would 10 and the things that might not or would not.11 I just want to make sure that, that you address 12 those sort of basics --13 MR. LODGE: All right.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- in addition to 15 anything else.16 MR. LODGE: Well, the, I guess the --17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And I should say, I'm 18 sorry, I did interrupt you again.19 But for you and all, and the other parties as 20 well, I don't think anything that any of us say should be 21 taken to indicate that, you know, we have made a decision 22 one way or the other, that we see things one way or the 23 other.24 But obviously we do see the issues being 25 significant enough to, to warrant full discussion and it's NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 I 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 178 in that context that, that I ask these questions and the others that we've asked as well.MR. LODGE: As a grassroots intervention comprised of volunteers it is a logistical difficulty to come up with the type of response that we ultimately replied with at the beginning of the process.We took our interpretations at the face value of, of the NRC regulations to mean that a short, a, a brief concise statement would probably be a preferable item for the Board to consider.And also we were mindful of the Turkey point observation that to trigger full adjudicatory hearing Petitioners must be able to "proffer at least some minimal factual and legal argument in support of their contentions". That cites to a Duke Energy Corporation case.We believed that part, the law of parsimity was perhaps preferable in terms of setting up the outlines of what the intervention would be.I confess to some misunderstanding of exactly what the expectations were and we, as I say, put our contentions together as a committee involving many many dozens of volunteer hours in assessing a great deal of public domain material.I don't know how responsive that is to your NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433... ... ..A 179 I first question. As to --2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Did you, did you have, 3 I presume that you did have access to the expert you've 4 cited?5 MR. LODGE: Yes. oh, yes.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.7 MR. LODGE: And we consulted with him 8 actively --9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.10 MR. LODGE: -- in the weeks before, correct.11 Your second question was essentially what would 12 we anticipate educing or, or contending evidentiarily at a 13 hearing on this issue.14 Well, obviously we would attempt to through the 15 discovery process as well as the adjudication try to 16 establish, pin down exactly what efforts to the extent that 17 there are, have been deliberations that are a matter of is public record, to get to the bottom of the embrittlement 19 computations. 20 We would also expect to establish the 21 uncertainties that we've talked about today by way of 22 proving them as indisputable or maybe disputed but, but 23 fact.24 And furthermore presumably if the Board were to 25 admit this contention then the Board is considering whether NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433..... ... ....' ISO I or not 2014 projection of exceeding the criterion is 2 acceptable from a regulatory standpoint. 3 So we would certainly be attempting to make the 4 argument that it is not and that a plan in, announced, 5 enumerated in 2011 is not an adequate regulatory, doesn't 6 address the regulation. 7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And which regulation S are you referring to?9 MR. LODGE: 50.61. Essentially along the lines 10 of, of the Exhibit 2 discussion. 11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: The Exhibit 2 12 discussion being that 50.61 is a, is a, is a way to resolve 13 the 54.29 --14 MR. LODGE: In, in 21 C iii, C-13 --15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- and 51 and 21 --16 MR. LODGE: Yes, your Honor.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- issues?18 MR. LODGE: Yes. Finally you asked and I don't 19 want to, pardon me if I'm not couching this.20 You essentially asked if, if, what's, what's 21 the problem in just waiting until a plan is promulgated and 22 objecting to it then, i.e. 2011.23 Number one there might be a change in the 24 regulation, might by that time. Number two that's a 25 independent decision that we believe is, it's an ongoing NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* -.--: .... ...... .. .... ........ 181 I licensing type of determination. 2 I believe that the scope of an objection which 3 could be raised at that time as I hinted this morning, may 4 not allow a litigation of the adequacy of the, of the 5 decision, the underlying basis for the ultimate decision 6 that's made may not, we may not be able to reach through 7 that proceeding to get to the, the underlying computations 8 of, calculations, margins of error discussions, that sort 9 of thing.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry, I didn't 11 follow you.12 MR.LODGE: Well --13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You made references to 14 the decision and, and --15 MR. LODGE: When, all right --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- when you were 17 talking about the decision --i8 MR. LODGE: In 2000, let's say --19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- decision --20 MR. LODGE: -- the decision we would anticipate 21 presently to be made in 2011 by the utility. The election 22 of, of options.23 We, I'm, I'm not, I don't believe having 24 litigated before the NRC before in ongoing licensing 25 proceedings we do not believe that from a legal standpoint NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 182 I it would be possible to get to this issue of --2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Which issue?3 MR. LODGE: The issue of, of adequacy of the 4 solution, the resolution proposed by the, by the company 5 in, in that type of proceeding. 6 The, the basis, as I understand the NRC regs 7 for that type of proceeding and I'm by no means expert and 8 I didn't review them today or yesterday, it would appear to 9 me that all that need be proven by the NRC and/or utility 10 is that we've considered various technical criteria and 11 here's our resolution, our proposed resolution. 12 It, it is difficult to get behind or into the 13 basis of the computations at that point because it's a, 14 it's a narrow selection of alternatives as opposed to 15 laying out a long term plan to manage embrittlement which 16 is the scope of the 20 year proceeding. 17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, let me, let say 18 something and then anybody can correct me to the extent 19 that they think I'm wrong.20 If there were a, a situation where the plant or 21 the company is, were to proposed to amend its license then 22 the standard that comes in at that point is essentially the 23 same standard as for the initial grant of initial license 24 of showing that whatever you propose to do is, is in 25 keeping with the safety and security and I can't remember NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 183 I the exact language. But it's actually a broader standard 2 than the license renewal standard as I understand it.3 Now anyone can speak to that.4 Mr. Lewis, do you want to speak to that?5 MR. LEWIS: I really don't understand the, the 6 assertion that, you know, subsequent proceeding challenging 7 for example the efficacy of annealing that, the efficacy of S annealing would not be able to be looked at.9 I mean I just don't understand the legal 10 argument, I'm sorry, your Honor.I] ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: There would be a, there 12 would be an application to amend the license and in that 13 application the applicant, and again feel free to add, 14 correct, whatever, the application, the applicant would 15 have to demonstrate that what they were proposing to do 16 was, met the, the general standard for safety and the 17 protection of the public.18 And they would have to back that up and, and 19 there would be notification to the public and the public 20 would have the right to petition for a hearing to challenge 21 anything that was said in the application. 22 'Now that's sort of a summary but.23 MR. LODGE: Well, I think that, what would 24 actually be afoot here is the NRC would render a proposed, 25 or a decision or a proposed decision which then could be NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 184 I challenged by someone petitioning for a hearing.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Actually that's not 3 generally the way it occurs in my understanding and again 4 subject to correction. 5 But generally what happens with a license 6 amendment is that there's an application to amend the 7 license and before the staff may or may not make a decision S before any ultimate decision is made and any adjudication 9 that may be granted based on an inadmissable contention. 10 If a, if a contention is admitted then the 11 applicant would have the burden of showing with respect to 12 the issue in the admitted contention that their application 13 of, meets the standard, the same standard for issuance of 14 an initial license mainly, mainly safety and the protection 15 of the public. And I'm not using the precise language.16 But I'd ask counsel for the other parties have 17 I misstated anything or left anything out in your view?18 MS. UTTAL: You're correct that when a license 19 amendment comes in it's noticed with an opportunity for a 20 hearing. But if there's no significant hazards then the 21 amendment may be granted prior to the hearing or prior to 22 the, to the finishing of the hearing.23 But if not then you'll wait until, until 24 everything --25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 185 I MS. UTTAL: -- is resolved. Once the federal 2 registry notice is published then they would have 60 days 3 to get their application, their intervention, petition and 4 contentions in.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You would not be 6 challenging any action that the NRC took. The NRC, what 7 the staff does on a separate track whether they made a no 8 significant hazards determination or, or had not made a 9 determination by the time this, the, the adjudication 10 proceeding were underway.11 The issue is not whether what the NRC has done 12 is correct. The issue is whether the license amendment 13 sought by the applicant should be granted.14 MR. LODGE: Well, your Honor, we're not clear 15 sitting here in 2005 what the license amendment 16 implications of selection of an alternative would be.17 Because obviously among other things the alternative has 18 not been chosen.19 And what I was hearing by way of discussions 20 before the lunch break was, well, there might be 21 implications for changing the operating, the previncable 22 operating temperature or some other feature.23 That is a very indirect way to get at the heart 24 of the issue which is the adequacy of the, the computations 25 underlying the selection of that alternative. NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 186 I If, if it would help the panel I wonder if we 2 might request to maybe respond briefly on this tomorrow if 3 we're, if we meet tomorrow.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I think we probably 5 will meet tomorrow. Yeah, I don't see any problem with 6 that, do you? Okay.7 Okay. Well, why don't you finish up whatever 8 argument you want to make today and then we can move on 9 and, and do as much of the other contentions. 10 MR. LODGE: I have one last observation --11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: We're, we're going to 12 let him respond tomorrow then, right?13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Yes, if he, and then if 14 you --15 MR. LODGE: I just have --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- want to add 17 anything tomorrow --18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Oh, all right, all 19 right.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- I can, as well.21 But I mean, I didn't mean to imply that you couldn't 22 also --23 MR. LODGE: There's one additional response I'd 24 like to make today. I, as I understand it, please correct 25 me if I'm wrong.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* ........ ,.. ... ."" '.: ..'....- *..b '- .[ -. '. t " "- " " "" .. 187 I Tomorrow my intention would be to, to elucidate 2 a little bit more our objection if you will to the 3 possible, having to wait and see in 2011, okay.4 My one final observation today is that it's 5 unfortunate that the NRC staff doesn't recognize Mr.6 Bezdekas' qualifications. He was the, one of the in-house 7 engineering experts who identified Palisades as being one 8 of the embrittled plants as early as 1981 according to a 9 not man apart for instance the earth article we've read 10 that is based on upon a number of hard news sources in the 11 American Physical Society.12 Mr. Bezdekas identified, was one who identified 13 in the first ten years of operation the Palisades plant as 14 having early earmarks or hallmarks of an embrittlement, 15 serious embrittlement problem among 14 other, 13 other 16 reactors.17 And I think that his qualifications would be 18 readily discernable possibly in information that's not a 19 matter of public domain information but available to the 20 NRC staff as it was evaluating how to respond to the 21 contention. 22 Thank you.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. All right.24 Let's move on to , it's ten to two. If anyone 25 wants to take a minute to reorganize their papers to the NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433................................... ........."". .."........ 188 I appropriate point, actually, it might be good to hear from 2 the, hear from all of you as to whether proceeding in the 3 order, the numbered order as they were submitted is the 4 best way to do it, or whether another order might be 5 appropriate, doing some of them together.6 For example, it's been suggested maybe there's 7 a relation between 2 and 7. Anything, anybody have any --S MR. LEWIS: I would suggest we just go in 9 numbered order, your Honor.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Go ahead, then, 11 on Number 2. And I guess, I guess with regard to all these 12 remaining contentions, I think it would be helpful if you 13 focused a good, at least a good part of your argument on 14 the, particularly the next three; 2, 3 and 7, on the scope 15 issues in light of the Commission's Turkey Point decision 16 and subsequent case law on scope, because I think you have 17 a harder row to hoe with these on the scope issue.18 MR. LODGE: Well, with respect to Contention 19 Number 2, we believe that the, our assertion, of course, is 20 that the natural process, if you will, of aging of the 21 reactor systems, including pipes, the plumbing, 22 essentially, and the inner and outer loops, is going to 23 increase routine licensed releases of radiation, and 24 possibly other toxic material.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But, the thing is, N(NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* " ." .." " ... ... ..A " .. ..-.:. ' *" .." .*

• 189 I you, to be within scope you need to allege that there's 2 something related to managing the actual effects of aging 3 or the time limited aging analyses, if you're talking about 4 the two being, it would have to address that directly.

And 5 I think the arguments to be made are that these issues are, 6 if they haven't been pretty specifically identified as not 7 within the scope, I think it's pretty clear that you need 8 to have something that's directly related to aging in order 9 to be within the scope.10 MR. LODGE: As we understand it, the drinking 11 water supply intake for the City of South Haven is not 12 currently operating as that; but within approximately a 13 decade, it will be turned on and will be integrated into 14 the local portable water supply system. And our contention 15 is that there is no management plan that takes into account 16 the potential for incremental radiation and toxic chemical 17 leakage from the plant, given that we believe that National 18 Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration models confirm 19 the water flow in Lake Michigan toward that intake pipe.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Hasn't, didn't the 21 Commission in Turkey Point, though --22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Yeah, that's what 23 I'm looking for, I thought, the problem I, excuse me for 24 interrupting, but the problem that I had with this one is 25 that it was so close to what the Commission ruled on in NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 190 I Turkey Point, that it has to be already outside the scope.2 That's --3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: There was a contention 4 in Turkey Point that alleged that aquatic resources at 5 Biscayne National Park will become contaminated with 6 radioactive material, chemical waste and herbicides during 7 the license renewal term, and consequently will endanger 8 those who consumer aquatic food from the area.9 And, the second one had to do with allegations 10 that severe and unusual challenges to the safe storage of 11 high level radioactive spent fuel, whether in spent fuel 12 pools or at dry cask storage, presented a problem. And the 13 Commission found that both were outside the scope of a 14 license renewal proceeding. 15 And again, you know, our job is to be 16 independent adjudicators and base our decision on the law, 17 on the alleged facts; and doing that, make sure that we are 18 fair to all parties. In other words, we don't sway in 19 favor of any party, we base our decision on the law and the 20 regulations. And in these instances, the Commission has 21 been pretty clear in what it said, in case law precedent 22 that's based on the license renewal regulations. 23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Why doesn't -- I 24 guess in Turkey Point, the Commission said that the issues 25 raised in Contention 1, which is the one dealing with a NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* : ~~~~.... .".. ... .. ..... * .....*..* ....... ......... 191 I similar topic, raises only topics that are -- Part 51 is 2 generic Category 1 issues, and the contention therefore 3 grants as no dispute material to the NRC's license renewal 4 decision on Turkey Point, and therefore it's not liticable. 5 And if I could understand what, how yours differs from 6 that --7 MR. LODGE: Differs factually in that we're 8 talking about a water line intake that would be a component 9 of a portable public water supply versus more indirect 10 seepage pollution into bodies of water.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Is there a Category 2 12 issue that identifies that as, basically for environmental 13 issues, if they're Category 1, they're generic; if they're 14 Category 2 then you, that would, might warrant a hearing if 15 there's a contention this otherwise meets the admissibility 16 standards. 17 MR. LODGE: Well, we believe it's a plan-18 specific, I mean, it's a very fact-specific circumstance, 19 specific to the Palisades Plant in that, as I say, it's, 20 yes, we understand that, the Category 1 and Category 2 21 differentiation. Yes, it's very site-specific in that the 22 water intake is less than a mile from the shore, and it is 23 oriented in the explicit direction of the Palisades Plant.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry, repeat that 25 again.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 192 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 MR. LODGE: The pipe is less than a mile offshore and aimed, if you will, oriented in the direction of the Palisades Nuclear Plant; and as well, the, what we understand to be the currents of Lake Michigan have a tendency to flow in the direction of the intake pipe.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Issues involving impacts -- impacts --MR. LEWIS: 51.53.(c)4, I believe;Category 2 issues are at 51.53(c), and they're all listed 10 in --11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Appendix B, aren't they?MR. LEWIS: Appendix B, I think Table B-I.51.53(c) --ADMIN. LAW B talks about JUDGE YOUNG: The beginning of impacts of -- Table B-i, summary of Appendix findings Plants.Category on -- issues for license renewal Nuclear Power Impacts of refurbishment on surface water quality, 1; impacts of refurbishment on surface water use, water use conflicts, ground use, impacts of refurbishment on ground water use and quality, generic issue, and their various types of ground water quality degradation. The ones that are, that are not generic are listed as ground water use conflicts, portable and surface water and D watering plants that use greater than 100 NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 193 I gallons per minute, ground water use conflicts plants using 2 cooling towers withdrawing makeup water from a small river, 3 ground water use conflicts -- wells, ground water quality 4 degradation cooling ponds at inland sights, those are the 5 ground use water and quality ones that would be site-6 specific.7 And as I understand the reasoning, the ones 8 that are identified as generic that they would be generic 9 to all plants, and so they are dealt with on that generic 10 basis. So, I guess my question would be, what authority 11 would you have that, you're saying that they're unique 12 aspects, but what legal authority would you have that this 13 could be argued to be within the scope, because of. any 14 unique aspects, if not found in Appendix B or 51, any part 15 of 51, I guess, 51.53 was the one that Mr. Lewis mentioned. 16 MR. LODGE: I would need a few minutes to 17 review the regs to possibly be able to respond to that.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, the question 19 relates to 2, 3 and 7, and then on 8 the environmental 20 justice, there may be some other questions. Have you read 21 the case law about environmental justice and the policy 22 statement on environmental justice?23 MR. LODGE: Yes.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. You want to 25 take a break and then we'll come back and start going NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 194 I through these after you've had a chance to look at it?2 MR. LODGE: All right.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay, let's come back 4 at 4:00, we'll go for another hour or so, and then 5:30 we 5 start the Limited Appearance Statements. 6 (Off the record.)7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Mr. Lodge, go ahead.8 MR. LODGE: What was the pending point in our 9 discussion? 10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, the scope. The 11 scope issue is a significant one --12 MR. LODGE: The scope on the water intake 13 issue.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.15 MR. LODGE: We believe that the, that this is a 16 Category 2 issue in two possible respects, and in looking 17 at the Appendix B of Part 51, one of them, one reason is 18 that we believe that the lake is comprised in part of 19 ground water, but there is a ground water use conflict 20 involving a portable water supply, which is, shows as a 21 Category 2 matter of concern.22 Further, I would point out that one of the 23 other facts specific to this controversy is that when the 24 water intake was planned and approved and constructed by 25 South Haven, it was presumably based upon the belief that NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 195 I the plant, that Palisades, would not be operating in the, 2 at the end of the period of ten years from now. And --3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Could I just ask you, 4 do you know whether the plant uses more than 100 --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Gallons per minute.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- gallons per minute?7 MR. LODGE: No, I do not.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Because that 9 determines whether it's one or two.10 MR. LODGE: Right.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: What, it's my 12 reading of, and please, somebody, if this is an incorrect 13 reading, when we talk about a conflict, what we talk about 14 is, the plant and some other entity are using a water 15 source for the same purposes, and as a result causing the 16 other entity to be denied use of that water.17 In other words, if we're both, the example 18 that's given in Turkey Point is the plant's using it for 19 whatever reason, for irrigation, okay?20 MR. LODGE: Right.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: And somebody else is 22 using it for irrigation, and then there's a drain on the 23 source so that there's a competition going on there, as 24 opposed to what you were alleging in the contention which 25 is, it's not a competition, it's a contamination issue.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 196 I MR. LODGE: Right.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: The conflict here is 3 two entities trying to use the same water for the same 4 purpose and because of, there's not enough, you can't get 5 there from here. And that's why there's distinction 6 between less than 100 and greater than 100. So, it's not 7 clear to me how that would move your contention stated into 8 a Category 2, versus a Category 1, in other words, become a 9 plant-specific issue, a generic issue.10 MR. LODGE: Right.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: And my, if anybody, 12 the staff of the applicant, if I'm misquoting what it, the 13 regulations are saying --14 MS. UTTAL: That's correct, you're, you are 15 correct.16 MR. LODGE: May I articular what we believe the 17 second part of .Appendix B? That might apply here.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Sure, yeah, please.19 MR. LODGE: It is under the socioeconomic's 20 section of the appendix, and is entitled, "Public Services 21 and Public Utilities", describes as a Category 2, an 22 increased problem with water shortages at some sites may 23 lead to impacts of moderate significance on public water 24 supply availability. As I was indicating, at the time that 25 the water intake was conceived and constructed, it was NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 197 (2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 anticipated, the public record indicated that the plant was going to be operating, I guess, through 2011.And we believe that this is actually a late, a later developing controversy as a result, because of the fact that the plant may now be operating through 2031. In other words, it was conjectured that the plant would not be operating and would not be posing a risk of contamination at the time that the water intake would go into service as a portable water supply source.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: What was the socioeconomic, what section of the regulations is that, I missed it.MR. LODGE: It's in Appendix --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: It's in this next one.MR. LODGE: Yeah, it's in Appendix B, right, the following page.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: It was that page.This one, I think.MR. LODGE: It says, Public Utilities. ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: No, no, I'm sorry, it's this one here I think you're talking about, the third one down?MR. LODGE: Yes.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay, but --MR. LODGE: We anticipate that there might be a NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433....... 198 I different view on the community's part as to the safety and 2 security of their water supply as a result of an extended 3 operation. 4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: So what you're 5 interpreting as the reference to water shortages as, are 6 you implying that that, water, a shortage of clean water or 7 something, is that what you're implying that that means?8 MR. LODGE: That the South Haven community may 9 view it as an undesirable and unanticipated contamination 10 source.11 MS. UTTAL: Judge; I believe that that section, 12 the staff tells me, relates to the use of water by the 13 staff of the plant, by the addition of however many more 14 people are working there, not use of other entities.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, why don't you go 16 ahead and make your argument, and then we'll just move on 17 and hear the arguments of the, of the NMC and the staff.IS MR. LODGE: The argument on this point?19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Yes, Number 2.20 MR. LODGE: I believe we've essentially made 21 it, that the, it falls within the scope because it is a 22 site-specific type of problem and matter of public, 23 portable water supply concern.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Do you want to address 25 the other --NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 199 I MR. LODGE: May we address them separately? 2 You're -- with the other contentions? 3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I wasn't going to say 4 the other two contentions --5 MR. LODGE: Oh, sorry.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I was going to say the 7 other arguments about the vagueness and lack of 8 specificity. 9 MR. LODGE: The BEIRS VII report, we believe, 10 changes the parameters. The BEIRS VII report was co-11 sponsored among other entities by the Nuclear Regulatory 12 Commission, and it's conclusion suggests very strongly that 13 there is not a safe level of radiation when you're talking 14 about human exposure.15 We believe that that figures into the 16 assessment of this particular threat to the public water 17 supply. We believe that --18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But does -- how does 19 that bring, how would, are you saying that would somehow 20 bring it within the scope, or --21 MR. LODGE: We think that in a practical sense 22 that the municipality of South Haven, the citizens of South 23 Haven and any other users of the municipal water supply, 24 are, once they're better educated about the, about the 25 findings of the BEIRS VII study, may well reject the use of NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 200 I that particular part of the system to draw water from Lake 2 Michigan.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: The question I had 4 asked, and I don't want to, you can make that argument, 5 but, was, my question related to the specificity and the 6 arguments that your contention and basis were vague, and I 7 don't, I know you didn't mention the BEIRS VII report in 8 the original contention. 9 You, basically the allegation you make, 10 assuming scope, is that due to the direction of the flow 11 and the close proximity to the drinking water intake, that 12 there would be contamination. And then you say you hope to 13 produce public records of toxics and radiation testing.14 MR. LODGE: Which we, some of which we provided 15 in the reply to the contentions. 16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And again, you know, 17 your other, a strict requirement that's been made stricter 18 19 MR. LODGE: Correct.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But those are the 21 requirements that govern, so I don't want you to rely on 22 what you provided in your reply and assume that we're going 23 to consider that --24 MR. LODGE: Correct, I understand. 25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Because -- say what NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 201 I we're going to do on those types of issues.2 MR. LODGE: Getting current data on the 3 radioactive content of the water in and around the intake, 4 it's not possible at the present time because of it's 5 current use. It is owned by Pacific Gas and Electric and 6 is a natural gas facility, and we don't have permission, 7 nor is there public domain data available, but we don't 8 have permission to obtain any kind of raw data, any kinds 9 of samples that we could provide data to the panel with, 10 and the parties.11 We have no further argument on this contention. 12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Mr. Lewis?13 MR. LEWIS: Thank you. Petitioner has offered 14 this contention as a safety issue. They divided their 15 contention from the safety issues and environmental issues 16 and this is one they listed as a safety issue, which I 17 assume means that they're challenging the required showing 18 in Part 54 as opposed to the Environmental Review. Clearly 19 this is not a contention that has anything to do with the 20 management of aging.21 Petitioner's saying, well, contamination can 22 result from leaky systems, but they do absolutely nothing 23 to identify any error in our integrated plan assessment, 24 they don't identify any component within the scope of the 25 rule that may leak, or any inadequacy in any of the aging NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433..... -...". .. .:. .." ' .... 202 I management programs. So, they clearly do not raise an 2 issue within the scope of Consumer Part 54.3 With respect to the environmental issues that 4 are within the scope of this proceeding, it clearly falls 5 within none of those. The better place to look for, one of 6 the issues that can be raised is 50.51.(c)3, those define 7 specifically the issues that have to be addressed by an 8 applicant --9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: 50.51 or 51 --10 MR. LEWIS: Sorry, 51.53.(c)3, excuse me --11 1OC4-51.53.(c)3 raises the environmental issues that have 12 to be examined in the license renewal procedure. And, the 13 contention that the Petitioners are raising does not fall 14 within the scope of any of those issues.15 Petitioner's have referred to two issues now 16 for the first time. They've referred to the, an issue 17 concerning ground water use conflict, which is addressed in 18 51.53.(c)3C, that issue has to do with whether a plant is 19 withdrawing groundwater, and groundwater does not mean 20 surface water, groundwater means water in the aquafirs, 21 whether they are pumping so much water that they are 22 depressing the aquafirs, and they're creating a zone of 23 influence that then prevents other people from withdrawing 24 water from wells. That's clearly nothing to do with the 25 assertion of how the contamination of intake for a water NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433~~~~~~~~. ........... ..-....... .. .....*. .. *. -.. 203 I supply system.2 The second reference they made is to 3 socioeconomic impacts on public utilities with water 4 shortages. That issue is defined more specifically in 5 51.53(c)3I, the issue has to do is whether license renewal 6 is going to cause such a population increase because of a 7 large refurbishment task force that has to come on to 8 refurbish the plant. They can get a great influx of 9 workers and the local water supply can't serve those 10 increased number of workers and their families and whatever 11 secondary increases in population might result from a large 12 increase in the workforce. 13 51.53(c)3I specifically refers to the impacts 14 from the population increase. This has nothing to do with 15 a contamination of the water supply system, so neither of 16 those Category 2 issues encompass this contention. 17 Petitioner has suggested that, this site-specific aspect so 18 they can raise it, but a Petitioner cannot raise a Category 19 1 issue as the issues that the NRC has resolved generically 20 just by saying, there's some site-specific aspect.21 The Category 1 issues are resolved by rule, and 22 therefore they can only be reopened by a petition for a 23 waiver of those rules, and certainly the Petitioners have 24 made, filed no such petition in this proceeding. The 25 Petitioner has also referred to the BEIRS VII report, I'm NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433'. : .... ....' ..*. .,. ...-. ."i ; ,. i ...* .* * "'", ., ."... .... .. 204 I not sure what their assertion of the significance of that 2 report is.3 The releases from the plant are governed by 4 Part 20, there's been no showing, this really goes to 5 basis, this is outside the scope, but there's been no 6 showing that there's any releases in excess of the Part 20 7 limits, and that alone is a basis for denying this 8 contention. 9 The only assertion that I've heard recently 10 about the BEIRS VII report from the public interest groups 11 is that it's reaffirmed the appropriateness of the linear 12 no threshold hypotheses for establishing radiation 13 protection standards. The Part 20 limits are, in fact, 14 based on the linear no threshold hypothesis, so there's no 15 inconsistency between the BEIRS VII report that I'm aware 16 of and the NRC's current regulations. If there were, that 17 would require away from the ruling, the Part 20 regulations 18 are certainly not subject to attack in this proceeding, 19 absent permission from the Commission. 20 Finally, I do want to clear up about the intake 21 that the Petitioners seem to be referring to. I think 22 there may be some confusion from what it's, what's been 23 referenced. The current intake for the South Haven water 24 supply system is, operational I think it's about four miles 25 north of the plant and about a mile out to the lake.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433...0 ...*. 205 I That intake is subject to sampling of the 2 Palisades REMP program, the Radiological Environmental 3 Monitoring Program. The Petitioners say, well, that's like 4 the fox guarding the henhouse, but this is an NRC mandated, 5 NRC inspected program, and there's no basis for suggesting 6 that the ongoing laundering of that current intake is in 7 any way inadequate. 8 There is a new plant that was built adjacent to 9 Palisades, it's the Covert Generating Plant, I think is the 10 name of it. It's a, I believe it's a combined cycle plant, 11 and it built a new intake for that plant. My understanding 12 is the city of South Haven asked the Covert Generating 13 Company, which is an LLC, to design the intake so that it 14 could be used in the future to supply old water to a new 15 public water supply system if one is built.16 But that is not currently the case, so it has 17 the capacity, I think the pumps have the capability to 1S provide intake, provide a water supply, new water treatment 19 facility in the future. But currently it's not serving in 20 that capacity, it's only providing water to the Covert 21 Generating Plant.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Is the plant use, does 23 the plant use more than 100 gallons per minute or less? Do 24 you know?25 MR. LEWIS: Does Palisades withdraw ground NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 206 1 water at more than 100 gallons per minute?2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Mm-hmm.3 MR. LEWIS: I'm told no; I'm sorry, I wasn't 4 ready for that question.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Well, that 6 distinguishes under the ground water use and quality which 7 are generic and which, you say no they, it does not --8 MR. LEWIS: That issue will be addressed in our 9 environmental report. It is a Category 2 issue, we will 10 explain --11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Category 2?12 MR. LEWIS: Yes, that ground water conflict 13 issue is a Category 2 issue, and therefore our 14 environmental report has to explain why it's applicable or 15 not.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Why it's what?17 MR. LEWIS: Applicable or not to our plant. A 18 number of the Category 2 issues are not necessarily 19 applicable to each plant.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well actually, if it's 21 less than 100 gallons per minute, it's a Category 1 issue.22 MR. LEWIS: It's really a Category 2 issue, but 23 what the generic environmental impact statement determined 24 is if plants are drawing less than 100 gallons per minute, 25 there should be no significant environmental impact. We NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 207!2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 don't know what old plants are, therefore we require each applicant, in their environmental report, to explain if they are above this limit. If there is, there's a further assessment, if they're not, then everything is within the scope of the GEIS.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And, just one other, you referred to 51.53(c)3 --MR. LEWIS: I, capital I.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right, and then, but what I was looking at, under C3, small Roman Numeral 2.MR. LEWIS: Have I missed a Roman 2, yes, I'm sorry, it's 51.53(c)3, small double i, I missed the small double i.ADMIN. LAW MR. LEWIS: ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And then --Big capital I.JUDGE YOUNG: And then B or I, you said I?MR. LEWIS: I.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Big, large I?MR. LEWIS: Large I. Too many sub-secti that regulation. ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So you don't fa under any of the --MR. LEWIS: The specific provision I was referring to in 51.53(c)3ii, big capital I is the ons in 11 NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433....' ... 208 I statement, "Additionally, applicant should provide an 2 assessment of the impact of population increases 3 attributable to the proposed action on public water 4 supply". That is the issue that is a Category 2 issue, and 5 again, it has nothing to do with a contamination scenario, 6 it has to do is, is there going to be a large population 7 increase from a great increase in the workforce at the 8 plant, that then taxes the local public services.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Anything 10 further?11 MR. LEWIS: No.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Ms. Uttal?13 MS. UTTAL: Staff has nothing to add.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Anything 15 further from you on this one?16 MR. LODGE: No, your Honor.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Then let's go IS onto Number 3, which is the fuel storage, storage pads --19 MR. LODGE: Yes.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- issue. Which is, I 21 believe, also comparable to the second contention and 22 Turkey Point, that we wanted to hear from you on.23 MR. LODGE: Very good. I believe that from a 24 drafting standpoint, based on it's face, this particular 25 contention has fewer problems than we have discussed, NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* ..* ... ...,. ... 209 I expecting other contentions. Our contention is that, I 2 believe I understand that the objection is going to be that 3 this is a separately regulated type of facility.4 We believe that this is a structure on-site, 5 under the exclusive control of the utility company, and I'm 6 talking about the concrete pads, on which dry casks are 7 located, that is certainly something that poses a potential 8 problem because of the passage of time. And with the 9 passage of time comes the increasing possibility of an 10 earthquake. 11 What you have, of course, is a second floor NRC 12 technical person --13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Back up for a second.14 MR. LODGE: Yes.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let me hear that, you 16 just made a statement that, that I thought was going to end 17 one way, and it ended with increasing possibility of -- I is thought you were going to end it by referring to increasing 19 aging somehow, but you ended it by saying, increasing 20 possibility of earthquakes. Is that what you said?21 MR. LODGE: Yes, it is.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay, so I guess --23 MR. LODGE: The gist of Dr. Landsman's 24 objection as articulated while he was an official at the 25 NRC, was that there is not an adequate safety margin in the NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.... .. .. .. ... 210 I design and construction of the second concrete pad, in 2 particular. 3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Which, and again, I 4 don't want to cut you off --5 MR. LODGE: Right.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- but I am for a 7 moment, and then you can start up again, but if it's an 8 aging issue, then it may be relevant in a license renewal 9 context.10 MR. LODGE: Correct.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: If there's another 12 issue, it may be a serious issue for which there may be 13 other avenues of challenge, but they wouldn't fall Within a 14 license renewal proceeding if they didn't relate to aging 15 or it didn't, weren't a site-specific environmental issue.16 MR. LODGE: Sure.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, that's why I 18 interrupted in the first place, because I wasn't sure how 19 the increased possibility of an earthquake by virtue of 20 passage of time would fall within either of those.21 MR. LODGE: I understand that. Let me finish 22 the thought here.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.24 MR. LODGE: Perhaps it will help.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: If you want to start KN NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.,.... .... -.. .. 211 I over again, I apologize. 2 MR. LODGE: No, that's all right.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I'm interrupting your 4 train of thought.5 MR. LODGE: The surge pads are part of a 6 continuum of waste, spent fuel management at the site. The 7 spent fuel pool at Palisades was full to capacity by 1993, 8 which necessitated the resort to the use of dry cask on-9 site storage. That prospect appears inevitably that dry 10 casks will continue to be used in an on-site storage factor 11 into the renewal period, probably, possibly, let's just put 12 it at that, possibly for the entirety of the 20-year 13 period.14 I think functionally there is very little 15 distinction that can be made between the spent fuel 16 facility and the dry cask storage facility in terms of the 17 fact that there's a musical chairs type of process that 18 occurs when there is a periodic refueling. There will be 19 periodic refuelings of the plant during the 20 year 20 extension period, of course; there will be additional 21 motion movement of, after the five year holding period in 22 the spent fuel pool, of spent fuel into dry casks that will 23 be erected on the second pad.24 The second pad is not the only focus of our 25 concern, but for purposes of discussion it is particularly NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 212 I important, because Dr. Landsman, while an NRC employee, 2 identified and, in a public record type of fashion, 3 registered objections to the conformants of that pad's 4 construction design with, and location, with earthquake 5 safety regulations. 6 We believe that since this is a structure, on-7 site, and I understand, and the Petitioners understand 8 well, that there's a separate licensor, if you will, that 9 has allowed the use of the pads to hold dry storage casks.10 But we're not talking about the casks, we're talking about 11 the structures, the dry, pardon me, the concrete pads 12 themselves. 13 We believe that it is within the scope, as 14 delineated in Turkey Point, spent fuel is within the scope, 15 arguably, subject matter jurisdiction, if you will, of, the 16 Commission mentioned that in the Turkey Point decision, we 17 believe that this is simply another stage of the spent fuel 18 storage process.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: How would the spent 20 fuel come in? You're, I think you're saying this is an 21 environmental contention, how would that, if you were to 22 allege that, how would that come into, how would it be 23 within the scope?24 MR. LODGE: Well, spent fuel, the spent fuel 25 pool is something that the panel can consider the NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 S. ......... 213 I management capability of NMC in, for the license extension 2 period. We believe that part of that management entails 3 emptying the spent fuel and moving it elsewhere on-site.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Are you, when you're 5 talking about management, are you talking about management 6 effects of aging? And if not, are you talking about any 7 site-specific environmental issue?8 MR. LODGE: It is a site-specific environmental 9 issue, we believe.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And, can you help me 11 by pointing me to --12 MR. LODGE: Once again, 51.53.13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- resources --14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I guess I'd like to 15 understand, when you do that, again, going to Turkey Point, 16 the, in that instance, the intervener maintained before the 17 License Board that the possibility of catastrophic 18 hurricanes justified this plant-specific contention on 19 spent fuel accidents. If I substituted catastrophic 20 hurricanes, if I substituted the word catastrophic 21 earthquakes, what would be the difference? 22 Because it just seems like the two are so 23 parallel and the Commission already rejected it, then, you 24 know, what is unique about your contention that 25 differentiates it from the one in Turkey Point, which was NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 214 I rejected?2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And I think what we're 3 looking at here is, you know, there may be serious issues 4 raised, but the question for us has to be, and is limited 5 to, whether it falls within the scope of this proceeding in 6 addition to meeting the other requirements, but if it's not 7 within the scope of this proceeding, then any remedy would 8 be through the main, the other two would be the 22.06 and 9 the rule making under 28.02, I think it is, I'm not sure.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: 28.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: 22.06 and then 22.80 12 or something, let's see. 22.06 or 28.02, either one. I 13 think the Commission discussed those recently in a decision 14 in the Millstone case that was issued just last week.15 MR. LODGE: The characteristics of the sand at 16 the Palisades site, is such that it's been referred to by 17 geologists as singing sand. It, dunes can move very 18 quickly, erosion over the period of the license extension 19 is a very unpredictable phenomenon that has not been 20 quantified adequately in the application at all.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, again, I'm sorry 22 to keep interrupting you, but I really want to try to get 23 us focused on this, you may be raising a very serious 24 issue, I don't know. You may be raising a very serious 25 issue that needs to be addressed, and certainly everybody KJ NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 215 I knows that what happens with -- has a big effect on the 2 management of high level waste and spent fuel, but all we 3 have jurisdiction over here are things that would be, 4 relate to aging issues or site-specific environmental 5 issues that would not be generic issues under Appendix B of 6 51.53, Appendix B 51, Part 51.7 So, we need to, I guess, go through the same 8 process that we did for the last one in terms of, just 9 saying that it's site-specific, or talking about the 10 dangers of the sand movement is a little general in terms 11 of giving us the assistance we need to see how this would 12 fall within or not, the scope of the license renewal 13 proceeding. 14 MR. LODGE: May I have a moment, please?15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Particularly in light 16 of Turkey Point. And you might want .to look under Uranium 17 Fuel Cycle and Waste Management Section of the Appendix B.18 Part 51, sub-Part A, Appendix B, yeah.19 MR. LODGE: The erosion potential is a function 20 of time. I would point out that one of the circumstances, 21 the circumstances enumerated in the Landsman declaration, 22 and I understand that that came in as part of the reply to 23 contentions, but the Landsman declaration points out that 24 the, a major problem with the second pad in particular, 25 neither was constructed in contact with bedrock, and in NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 216 I fact, there's a, perhaps a 100 or even 150 feet of sand 2 that, in the case of the second pad, was mechanically 3 tamped down, pressure tamped, to make a foundation for the 4 construction of the pads.5 Concrete ages over time, erosion can change the 6 distribution of stress from the great weight of the casks 7 themselves over time. Even in the absence of an 8 earthquake, there can be changes in short in the 9 structure's capability to adequately hold the great weight 10 of the dry casks.11 We believe that it falls within the scope of 12 Turkey Point in this way that in the decision it says, 13 "Left unmitigated, the effects of aging can overstress 14 equipment, unacceptably reduce safety margins, and lead to 15 reduction of required plant functions, including the 16 capability to shut down the reactor", whatever, "and 17 otherwise prevent or mitigate the consequences", basically 18 to make it impossible to mitigate consequences of accidents 19 with a potential for off-site exposures. So, we believe 20 that it is within the scope.21 And finally, we've not, admittedly have not 22 filed a motion for this, but certainly have been 23 considering the possibility of a 10-CFR-2.758 request for a 24 waiver based upon the exception, the exceptional 25 circumstance here, where you have what we believe to be, NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433... ....', " " .... .. .-. ..., ."" ... ... : ... .." ..' ." 217 I and suggest prima facie, is an authoritative expert opinion 2 that was rendered while the employee was an employee of the 3 NRC, and which still is, the controversy exists as an 4 unresolved issue, that is to say that the potentially 5 defective designer construction of the pads persists as a 6 problem today.7 We've learned from a federal register notice 8 that permission has been granted to the utility to load 9 seven additional dry storage casks on the second pad during 10 the month of October, I don't know if that's actually 11 happened, but the prospect is very distinct. And the 12 Commission, as a regulator, has appeared to have committed 13 itself in the face of an unresolved issue with effects for 14 a public health safety with index.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, which rule is, 16 you're asking for an exemption from a particular rule?17 MR. LODGE: From, if indeed the panel were to 18 find that this issue, on it's face falls outside the scope 19 of, I guess, Part 54, that we would, we would respectfully 20 request that a waiver be considered to allow the issue in.21 I will, tonight, look at, follow the panel's suggestion and 22 I'll look up the Millstone discussion. I'm very curious to 23 see that.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. And actually, 25 what's, I'll just tell you briefly that, what appears to be NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 218 1 the bottom line on this, apart from pointing to the 2 alternate routes of 22.06 and 28.02, the Commission says 3 that you have to meet all four factors of, let's see -- if 4 someone could help me with the exemption, what's the 5 section, 2 --6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: 758.7 MR. LEWIS: Not any more.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: 2.758 -- pardon?9 MR. LEWIS: 2.390 now, I can't remember. It's 10 changed.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I know. Let's see, 12 3.09(c) I think maybe. 3.09(c), let's look at that.-13 MS. WOLF: That's non-timely filings.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: No, that's non-timely 15 filings, I'm sorry, the exemption rule, the rule that 16 governs exemption of. rules.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: It's 2.335.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: 335, okay, okay, what 19 the Commission points out is that in order to grant an 20 exemption or waiver, you must meet four factors, all four.21 The rule's strict application would not serve the purposes 22 for which it was adopted; the movement has alleged special 23 circumstances that were not considered either explicitly or 24 by necessary implication as a rule-making proceeding 25 leading to the rule sought to be waived, and we're talking NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 219 I about the license renewal, scope rule.2 Three, the circumstances are unique to the 3 facility rather than common to a large class of facilities, 4 and by waiver of the regulations necessary to reach a 5 significant safety problem. And then, the, I believe the 6 Commission ends up its discussion by referring to the 28.02 7 alternative brief that could be taken, and you probably do S need to read that if he's give it to you.9 MR. LODGE: Absolutely will.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: If you need a copy we 11 can --12 MR. LODGE: That would be, that would be great, 13 thank you.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Because that, that 15 case involved a certified question to the Commission, 16 suggesting that the Commission might consider whether a 17 waiver was appropriate in that case.18 MR. LODGE: Is, I mean, was the Commission --19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: They're responding to 20 the Board's certifications. 21 MR. LODGE: Okay, all right. Thank you.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, if you want to 23 address that tomorrow --24 MR. LODGE: Yes.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: That's fine, but it NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 220 I sounds as though what you're saying is that unless we 2 somehow found this to be a site-specific issue, that would 3 bring it under some Category 2 --4 MR. LODGE: Right.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- and exclude it from 6 all the Category 1 issues, that you would ask to have the, 7 an exemption from the rule.8 MR. LODGE: That is correct.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Do you have anything 10 else to say on this point?11 MR. LODGE: No, not at this point, thank you.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Mr. Lewis?13 MR. LEWIS: Thank you, your Honor. The Turkey 14 Point decision is squarely on point. I agree with Judge 15 Baratta, it couldn't be closer unless it had referred to an 16 earthquake instead of hurricane. The storage of spent fuel 17 on-site is a Category 1 issue, and in fact the Category 1 18 determination was that spent fuel could be stored safely 19 and without environmental impact during the period of 20 extended operation. So it's absolutely clearly barred in 21 this proceeding absent a waiver, and there has been no 22 request for a waiver in this proceeding. 23 The Petitioners raised this as an environmental 24 issue, and that's why the Turkey Point decision applies, 25 but it's also clearly not a safety issue under Part 54, the NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 221 I contingent has absolutely nothing to do with aging 2 management, and it does not relate to any component within 3 the scope of the rule. Those components are defined in 4 54.4, and it's just, it does not fall within any of those 5 provisions because it is a separately licensed facility.6 Just one last point, I did hear Petitioners 7 refer to erosion being time-related. To the best of my 8 recollection erosion isn't mentioned anywhere in the 9 original petition, the reply, or Dr. Landsman's affidavit. 10 The issue had to do with liquefaction and amplification II from earthquakes, and so my belief, based on a quick check, 12 is that this is a brand new assertion that's just popping 13 up for the first time in the pre-hearing conference. 14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Anything further?15 MR. LEWIS: That's --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Ms. Uttal?17 MS. UTTAL: I have nothing to add, your Honor.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay, it is almost ten 19 to 5:00, do you think that that's enough time to get into 7 20 or do you want to save 7 and 8 for tomorrow and take a 21 little bit longer break before the Limited Appearance 22 Statements? 23 MR. LODGE: I would request that, your Honor.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Any objection? 25 MR. LEWIS: Not --NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 222 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: All right, then we'll come back tomorrow and finish 7 and 8 along with your additional comments on Contention 1 and Contention

3. And, we will reconvene here at 5:30 to hear Limited Appearance Statements, and all, counsel for all the parties are welcome to stay up here, the only thing I would ask is, Mr.Lewis, if you wouldn't mind moving one direction or another since the, or at least we, somehow get the podium for the Limited Appearance Speakers.MR. LEWIS: I'll have to move into the --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Yes, so that we can maybe pull that forward and be able to see and hear everybody.

Okay, thank you.(Whereupon at 4:48 p.m., the meeting was adjourned.) NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of: Name of Proceeding: Nuclear Management Company Palisades Nuclear Generating Station License Renewal Docket Number: 50-255-LR; ASLBP No: 05-842-03-LR Location: South Haven, MI were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings. Ronald erpl Official Reporter* Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202)234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com}}