View source for Information Notice 1987-14, Actuation of Fire Suppression System Causing Inoperability of Safety-Related Ventilation Equipment

{{Adams
| number = ML031180007
| issue date = 03/23/1987
| title = Actuation of Fire Suppression System Causing Inoperability of Safety-Related Ventilation Equipment
| author name = Jordan E
| author affiliation = NRC/IE
| addressee name = 
| addressee affiliation = 
| docket = 05000000, 05000003, 05000010, 05000029, 05000133, 05000155, 05000206, 05000213, 05000219, 05000220, 05000237, 05000244, 05000245, 05000247, 05000249, 05000250, 05000251, 05000254, 05000255, 05000259, 05000260, 05000261, 05000263, 05000265, 05000266, 05000267, 05000269, 05000270, 05000271, 05000272, 05000275, 05000277, 05000278, 05000280, 05000281, 05000282, 05000285, 05000286, 05000287, 05000289, 05000293, 05000295, 05000296, 05000298, 05000301, 05000302, 05000304, 05000305, 05000306, 05000309, 05000311, 05000312, 05000313, 05000315, 05000316, 05000317, 05000318, 05000320, 05000321, 05000322, 05000323, 05000324, 05000325, 05000327, 05000328, 05000329, 05000330, 05000331, 05000333, 05000334, 05000335, 05000336, 05000338, 05000339, 05000341, 05000344, 05000346, 05000348, 05000352, 05000353, 05000354, 05000358, 05000361, 05000362, 05000364, 05000366, 05000368, 05000369, 05000370, 05000373, 05000374, 05000382, 05000387, 05000388, 05000389, 05000390, 05000391, 05000395, 05000397, 05000400, 05000409, 05000410, 05000412, 05000413, 05000414, 05000416, 05000417, 05000423, 05000424, 05000425, 05000437, 05000438, 05000439, 05000440, 05000441, 05000443, 05000444, 05000445, 05000446, 05000454, 05000455, 05000456, 05000457, 05000458, 05000461, 05000482, 05000483, 05000498, 05000499, 05000508, 05000522, 05000523, 05000528, 05000529, 05000530, 05000546, 05000547
| license number = 
| contact person = 
| document report number = IN-87-014, NUDOCS 8703200082
| document type = NRC Information Notice
| page count = 4
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:SSINS Ho.: 6835 IN 87-14 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 23. 1987 IE INFORmATION NOTICE 87-14:   ACTUATION OF FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM CAUSING

INOPERABILITY OF SAFETY-RELATED VENTILATION

EQUIPMENT

==Addressees==
:
                                                                    license (OL) or a

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating

construction permit (CP).

==Purpose==
:
                                                           generic problem involving

This notice is to alert recipients to a potential          that initiate fire

operator errors and single- and common-cause failures  safety-related systems.

suppression systems and cause the inoperability of

for applicability to

We expect that recipients will review the information      to preclude similar

their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, However, suggestions contained in

problems froma occurring at their facilities.NRC requirements; therefore, no

q     this information notice do not constitute

specific action or written response is required.

i

==Description of Circumstances==
:
       In June 1983 the NRC issued Information Notice   (IN)83-41. The purpose of that

events during which fire

notice was to alert licensees to several reported

the inoperability ef safety-related

suppression systems actuation resulted in indicate  that the concerns addressed by

systems. A continuing series of   events

IN 83-41 are not resolved.

the deluge system temperature

On October 15, 19&#xa3;6, at Duane Arnold, testinginofboth   trains of the control room

sensors resulted in wetting of the charcoal             isolation of the water

ventilation system. Although procedures called forfailed to requ1-e that the

i4    supply before testing the sensors, the procedures       valve.

control valves be reset before reopening the supply

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 On August 27, 1986, the licensee for initiation

determined that automatic or manual system would  of the standby gas treatment

result in the charcoal beds

(SBGT) system deluge fire suppression        the Pilgrim SBGT system's redundant

of one train becoming water soaked. Sincenormally                open dampers, a

trains are cross-connected via pneumatic action toopen/fail

close  the  cross connect

deluge system actuation without operatorof SBGT system operability.

dampers will result in a complete loss

Q8703200
          %D.V                     Dtet-

IN 87-14 March 23, 1987 I observed water falling from a

On May 15, 1985, personnel at Hatch Unit    conditioning (HYAC) vent onto an

control room heating ventilation and air the control room. The water was from

analog transmitter trip system panel in system which had been inadvertently

the control room RVAC filter train deluge             activities (See Information

activated as a result of unrelated maintenance liftin9 of 3 safety relief valve four

Notice 85-85). The water resulted in the cycle, Initiating a severe tran- times. The valve stuck open on the fourthpressure coolant injection (HPCI) trip

sient. Moisture also energized the high    vessel makeup during part of this

solenoid making the HPCI inoperable for

event.

the Cooper Nuclear Power Station

On April 4, 1984, construction workers at system. When the hydrant was

sheared a hydrant from the fire protection

a water hammer forced the SBGT system

isolated and the system repressurized,flooding      the charcoal filters. Both

fire suppression deluge valves open, trains of SBGT were rendered inoperable.

in the firewater system (that was

On March 21, 1984, a pressure transient In     the plant) momentarily opened the

caused by a false initiation elsewhere         at WNP2. One valve did not reseat

deluge valves for both SBGT system trains one train occurred on April 4 and 27 properly. Similar events involving only

of the same year.

of a new control valve in the fire

On March 24, 1983, incorrect installation

train at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

suppression deluge system for one SBGT    deluge system was not tested after

resulted in the loss of the train. The              of the installation error. As

modification and the valve leaked as a result   system design and operational config- discussed above, because the Pilgrim SBGT             dampers, the continued opera- uration includes normally open cross connection

bility of the redundant SGTS train was threatened.

Discussion:
                                           are of particular concern, not only

Events such as those described abovethat   are required for accident mitigation, because of their impact on systems                problem presented by dry charcoal

but also because of the special fire safety temperature) and because of water

that has been wetted (i.e., lower ignitionDesign Criterion 3 (Fire Protection)
     damage to other safety systems. Generalin part: "Fire detection and fighting

of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 states                shall be provided and designed

===II    systems of appropriate capacity and capability===
                                                   on structures, systems and components

to minimize the adverse effects of fires         shall be designed to ensure that

I     important to safety. Fire fighting systems       not significantly Impair the safety

their rupture or inadvertent operation doesand components.' Appendix R to 10 CFR

capability of these structures, systems           be performed to assess the proba- Part 50 requires that a fire hazard analysis utilization facility. This analysis

bility and consequences of fires in each operation or leaks in moderate energy

should include the effects of inadvertent      events reported in this notice

lines of the fire suppression system. Theproblem has not been fully resolved.

subsequent to IN 83-41 indicate that the

mar-               --                          _ --
                                                                           IN 87-14 March 23, 1987 on the

To date, none of the    repotted events have resulted in a serious impactcould lead

health and safety of    the public. However, each instance cited above systems

to much more serious    consequences given a valid demand for the safety

that were damaged by    the event.

required, it is suggested that

Although no written response to this notice is         this notice for applicability

holders of OLs or CPs review the information In occurred          at BWes but our

at their facilities. The specific events citedSupplement 2 to Information

concern is not limited to BWRs. For example,           dioxide fire suppression system

Notice 86-106 describes actuation of the carbon entering the control panels

at the Surry Power Station as a result of       water

resulted in carbon dioxide

through the ends of several open conduits. This breath, dizziness, and nausea

entering the control room, causing shortness of

of some personnel.

above, NRC's evalua- Because of the recurring failures such as those discussedAEOD   is  currently evaluating

tion of this problem is continuing. Specifically, actuations of fire suppres- the safety significance of a number of inadvertent        results of the evaluation, sion systems at operating plants. Depending on the           actions may be requested.

further information will be published and/or      specific

matter,  please   contact the Regional

If you have any questions regarding this                     or   this office.

Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional       Office,
                                           0    a      4dordan, Director

Divis1o     f Emergency Preparedness

and E    ineering  Response

Office of   Inspection   and Enforcement

Technical Contacts:    R. F. Scholl, NRR

(301) 492-8443 J. B. Henderson, IE

(301)492-9654 Attachment:    List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

F

Attachment 1 IN 87-14 March 23, 1987 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

information                                    Date of

Notice No.     Subject                         Issue             Issued to

86-106 Sup. 2 Feedwater Line Break             3/18/87          All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

87-13           Potential for High Radiation 2/24/87            All power reactor

Fields Following Loss of                         facilities holding

Water from Fuel Pool                              an OL or CP except

Fort St. Vrain.

86-106 Sup. 1 Feedwater Line Break             2/13/87           All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

87-12           Potential Problems With        2/13/87           All power reactor

Metal Clad Circuit Breakers,                     facilities holding

General Electric Type AKF-2-25                   an OL or CP

87-11           Enclosure of Vital Equipment   2/13/87           All power reactor

Within Designated Vital                          facilities holding

Areas                                            an OL or CP

87-10           Potential for Water Hammer      2/11/87          All BWR facilities

During Restart of Residual                       holding an OL or CP

Heat Removal Pumps

87-09           Emergency Diesel Generator      2/5/87           All power reactor

Room Cooling Design                               facilities holding

Deficiency                                        an OL or CP

87-08           Degraded Motor Leads in         2/4/87            All power reactor

Limitorque CD Motor                               facilities holding

Operators                                         an OL or CP

87-07          Quality Control of Onsite       2/3/87            All power reactor

Dewatering/Solidification                         facilities holding

Operations by Outside                             an OL or CP

Contractors

87-06          Loss of Suction to Low-          1/30/87          All power reactor

Pressure Service Water                           facilities holding

System Pumps Resulting From                      an OL or CP

Loss of Siphon

UL - Operating License

CP a Construction Permit

__________________ ------ I -------.-'}}

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