U-600785, Forwards Revised Tech Specs Based on Lessons Learned & Experience Gained for Improvement of Operation of Facility & Changes to Ensure Consistency W/Fsar,Sser 7 & as-built Facility
| ML20207L622 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1987 |
| From: | Hall D ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| U-600785, NUDOCS 8701120276 | |
| Download: ML20207L622 (65) | |
Text
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U-600785 L30-87(01-08)-L 1A.120
/LLINDIS POWER 00MPANY CLINTON POWER STATION. P.O. OX 678. CLINTON. ILLINOIS 61727 g JA.N 8 1987 Docket 50-461 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Clinton Power Station Technical Specifications for Full Power Operating License
Dear Mr. Denton:
Illinois Power Company (IP) has been operating in accordance with the provisions of license NPF-55 since September 29, 1986. IP has gained experience during this period and attached are requested changes to Appendix A (Technical Specifications) of the license which, because of lessons learned and experience gained, IP feels will be an improvement toward the operation of Clinton Power Station (CPS). In addition, certain changes are requested to ensure consistency between the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and Supplements through Supplement #7 (SSER-7) and the as-built facility. Some changes reflect commitments to satisfy requirements of the Staff as discussed with your Mr. B. Siegel. These changes to the Technical Specifications (CPS-TS) are requested at the issuance of the full-power operating license. These changes to CPS-TS have been reviewed and are consistent in all material aspects with the FSAR as amended, the SER and its Supplements No. 1-7 and the as-built plant. An affidavit relating to this certification accompanies this letter. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me. Si ce lv u ,
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870112O276 B70108 PDR ADOCK 05000461- , 9p DR
. P. Hall Vice President RFP/ckc Attachments Boot
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r U-600785 L3 0-87 (01-08)-L 1A.120 cc: B. L. Siegel, NRC_Clinton Licensing Project Manager NRC Resident Office Regional Administrator, Region III, USNRC Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
-9 .
U-600785 L30-(01-08)-L 1A.120 STATE OF ILLINOIS COUNTY OF DEWITT DONALD P. HALL, Being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That he is Vice President of Illinois Power Company; that the provided information to certify that these changes to the Clinton Power Station (CPS) Technical Specifications are consistent with the CPS - Final Safety Analysis Report = the NRC Safety Evaluation Report and the as-built facility, has been prepared under his supervision and direction; that he knows the contents thereof; and that to the best of his knowledge and belief said request and the facts contained therein are true and correct. DATED: This[ day of.Ja , 19 Signed: Donald P. Hall ' Subscribedandsworntobeforemethis(([/ayof d January, 1987. Notary Public
/
My commission expires:
$,///.l$0
1 s
' Specification CPS-TS 3/4.3.1
' Description of Change Page 3/4 3-8,9,10 Change requirements of Table 4.3.1.1-1 as marked up.
Discussion / Justification On May 31, 1986, the BWR Owners Group submitted an analysis for BWR Reactor Protection Systems, NEDC-30851P. This. report provided the results of the application of reliability analysis to identify improvements to the test intervals and allowable out-of-service times given in the BWR Reactor Protection System (RPS) Technical Specification. The analysis was conducted on the Clinton-specific solid-state design.
, - - - , , - , - - , n - - -, , .- ----- - e, , ,-
TABLE 4.3.1.1-1 . b
. REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E
CHANNEL
- c. OPERATIONAL .
CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL g FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK TEST _ CALIBRATION (,) CONDITIONS IN WHICN SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
~ 1. Intermediate Range Monitors:
- a. Neutron Flux - High S/U S,(b) S/UIC) ,W R 2 S W R 3,~4, 5
- b. Inoperative NA W NA 2,3,4,5
- 2. Average Power Range Monitor: II) '
- a. Neutron Flux - High, S/U S,(b) S/U IC) ,W SA 2 Setdown S W , ,,
s* b. SA i 3,4,5 Flow-Biased Simulated y Thermal Power - High S,D(h) S/U(c) [ q g(d)(e),34,g(f) cn , y
- c. !!eutron Flux - High S .S/U(c) gq g(d)(e), SA 1
- d. Inoperative NA .F q NA '
1,2,3,'4,5
- 3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High II)
#Q R IU)
S 1, 2
- 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level -
Low, Level 3 S [q R I9) 1, 2 S. Reactor Vessel Water Level - f High, Level 8 S
#-Q R I9) 1 k
- 6. Hain Steam Line Isolation
- Valve - Closure NA fQ R 1
- 7. Main Steam Line Radiation -
High S /q R 1, 2 I33-
- 8. Drywell Pressure - High I9)
S fq R 1, 2 fI) ,
.- . m d:.:.
l TABLE 4.3.1.1-1 (Centinued) n REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS C 5
@ CHANNEL OPERATIONAL
. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN WHICH c- FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK TEST CALIBRATION (a) SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED 5
- 9. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High ,
- a. Level Transmitter S [Q R I9) 1, 2, 5(k)
Float Switches 1, 2, S N)
- b. NA Q R -
Q
- 10. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure NA kI")q R(") 1
- 11. Turbine Control Valve Fast ~~
.I Closure Valve Trip System 011 141 w Pressure - Low NA NI")q R(*) 1 A h -
w 12. Reactor Mode Switch di Shutdown Position NA R NA 1,'2,.3, 4, 5 8 i
- 13. Manual Scram NA M NA 1,2,3,4,5 .
S l
= .
e , 1 i
. , i .
I ' *' i ,' *
, , .[#8 se+f. e, et ' .
~
TABLE 4.3.1.1-1 (Continued) .. , REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION-SURVEILLANCE. REQUIREMENTS . ,, If
- TABLE NOTATIONS f
(a) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. s (b) The IRM and SRM channels shall be determined'to overlap for at least 1/2.de-cade during each startup after entering OPERATIONA.L CONDITION 2.and the IRM - and APRM channels shall be determined to overlap for at least 1 decade dur- - ing each controlled shutdown,1f not performed within the previous 7 days. (c) Within 24 he'urs prior to startup, if not performed within the previous 7 days. . (d) This calibration shcIl consist of the adjustment of the APRM channel to , conform to the power values calculated by a h' eat balance during OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 when THERMAL POWER > 251; of RATED THERMAL POWER. Adjust the APRM channel if the absolute difference is greater tha'n 2% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Any APRM channel gain adjustment made in compliance with Specifi-cation 3.2.2 shall not be included in determining the absolute difference. ,, (e) This calibration shall consist of a setpoint verification of the Neutron Flux-High and the Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power-High trip functions. The Flow Biased Simulated Thermal-High trip function is verified using a 5 g
~
calibrated flow signal. (f) The LPRMs shall be calibrated at least once per 1000 effective full power f - hours (EFPH) using the TIP system. W , (g) Calibrate the analog trip module at least once per kdays. (h) Veriff measured core (total core flow) flow to be greater than or equal to - established core flow at the existing loop flow control (APRM % flow). (i) This calibration shall consist of verifying the 610.6 second simulated thermal power time constant. - (j) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when the reactor pressure vessel head is removed per Specification 3.10.1. (k) With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2. (1) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when DRYWELL INTEGRITY is not required to be OPERABLE per Special Test Exception 3.10.1. (m) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the turbine first stage pressure instruments.
. ye CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 3-10
Specification CPS-TS 3/4.3.2 Description of Change __ Table 3.3.2-1 Item k. page 3/4 3-13 A) Add note ( A) to the Minimum Operable Channels Per Trip System Column. Discussion / Justification l The purpose of note ( A) is to identify certain [ operability relief for this instrument when the associated valves are sealed closed per Specification 3/4.6.4. Description of Change Table 3.3.2-1 Table Notations page 3/4 3-18 B) Add note (A)
"Not required to be OPERABLE when valves IVR002A,B and IVQ006A,B are sealed closed in accordance with Specification 3.6.4" Discussion / Justification Valves IVQ006A,B and IVR002A,B are required to be sealed closed to satisfy the NRC requirements of TMI Action Item II.E.4.2. When the valves are sealed closed (deactivated automatic valve secured in position - key locked) the instrument signal is not meaningful to assessment or meeting the requirements of OPERABILITY per i
Specification 1.27. As described in the FSAR these valves do not meet the NRC position on TMI Action Plan Item II.E.4.2 and must be sealed closed during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1,2,3 and 4. CPS-TS reflect adherence to 10CFR50 Appendix A requirements for containment isolation (GDC 54 through 57) as delineated in FSAR Table 6.2-47. CPS-TS Table 3.6.4-1 and FSAR Table 6.2-47 do not reflect the additional requirements of the TMI Action Plan Item. This Tech Spec change will bring the Tech Specs into agreement with the FSAR commitments.
~
TABLE 3.3.2-1 - P g CRVICS INSTRUMENTATION E! 7 MINIMUM OPERABLE APPLICABLE ISOLATION CHF"rLS PER TRIP OPERATIONAL ,k TRIP FUNCTION SIGNAL tt SYL. it CONDITION ACTION ] 1. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
- a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, '
Level 2 8(b)(f) 2(a) 1,2,3 20
# 25
- b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 (ECCS Div. I and II) B 2(,) 1,2,3 29
- c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low B 2I *) 1, 2, . 3 -
29 Low, Level 2 (ECCS Div. III)
- d. Drywell Pressure - High L III) 2I *) 1, 2, 3 ., 20
- e. Drywell Pressure - High L 2(*) 1, 2, 3 29 y (ECCS Div. I and II) ,
U f. Drywell Pressure - High (ECCS Div. III) L 2g ,) , 1,2,3 29-
- g. Containment Building Fuel Transfer Z(b)(f) p(a)
Pool Ventilation Plenum 1, 2, 3 X25 ET l Radiation - High
- h. Containment Building Exhaust -
Radiation - High
- 1) Containment Bldg. HVAC (VR) and M ID)(f) 2 f'* ) 1, 2, 3 .- W lg Drywell Purge (VQ) # 25 g
- 2) Containment Monitoring (CM) and Process Sampling (PS)
M I I) ' 1, 2, 3
# ' ' M2925 l$ e
- i. Containment Building Continuous 5(b)(f) 2(a) 1, 2, 3 Jf li l Containment Purge (CCP) Exhaust # 25 Radiation - High -
- j. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low U 2(k) 1,2,3 '29 Low Low, Level 1 # 25
- k. Containment Pressure-High P 1( ) 1, 2, 3 ,2f2T l,
# , 25 2 .
e
'A
, , ...' . ~.N .;. .6
TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued) . -
-.s
~]
CRVICS INSTRUMENTATIOR
. . , .l g
TABLE NOTATI'ONS'
~
3 ci
# When ha.ndling irradiated fuel in the primary or secondary contal'nment and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. * ~
With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to c'ontrol rods removed per
~
Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2. ,
** When any turbine stop valve is greater than 95% open or the react'or mode switch is in the run position. .
t Main steam line isolation trip functions have 2'-out-of-4 isolation l'ogic except for the main steam line flow - high trip function which has 2-out-of-4 isolation logic for each main steam line. tt See Specification 3.6.4 Table 3.6.4-1 for valves which are actuated by these isolation signals. (a) A channel may be placed iri an inoperable status for up .to'2 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system ig the tripped con- ' ' dition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter. (b) Also actuates the standby gas treatment system. (c) Deleted (d) Also trips and isolates the mechanical vacuum pumps. (e) Isolates RWCU valves 1G33-F001 and 1G33-F004 only. (f) Also actuates secondary containment ventilation isolation dampers per Table 3.6.6.2-1. . (g) Hanual Switch closes RWCU system inboard isolation valves F001, F028, F053, F040 and outboard isolation valves F004, F039, F034 and F054. (h) Vacuum breaker isolation valves require RCIC system steam supply pressure ^ low coincident with drywell pressure high for isolation of vacuum breaker isolation valves. (i) A single manual isolation switch isolates outboard steam supply line isolation valve (F064) and the RCIC pump suction from suppression pool valve (F031) only following a manual or automatic (Reactor Vessel Water Level 2) RCIC system initiation. (j) Only actuates secondary containment ventilation isolation dampers per Table 3.6.6.2-1. Note it is not applicable to this Trip Function. (k) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the trip con-dition provided that the redundant trip system is OPERABLE and monitoring that parameter. (/) M ceguiNA k be OPERABLE Jen Vcd oc s io Aoo 2 A, B ul g W qooG A,B are sealed dosed in accordance w% 5pecWcce ig a S.6.4 g CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 3-18
Specification CPS-TS 3/4.3.2 Description of Change Page 3/4 3-19 Table 3.3.2-1 ACTIONS 29,21,25 Change the ACTIONS 29,21 and 25 as described below: A) Revise ACTION 29 as follows:
" Operations may continue provided that the affected CRVICS isolation valve (s) are closed within one hour and, as appropriate, declare the affected system or component inoperable and follow any ACTIONS appropriate to Specifications of the affected system. Otherwise, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.
B) Delete ACTION 21 and insert ACTION 29 for the appropriate trip functions. C) Revise ACTION 25-as follows:
" CORE ALTERATIONS, operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel and handling irradiated fuel in the primary or secondary containment may continue provided that SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established with the standby gas treatment system operating within 1 hour."
i
I + Discussion / Justification A) Due to the-diverse instrumentation of the Containment and Reactor Vessel-Isolation Control System (CRVICS) an attempt was made prior to licensing to identify the-correct ACTION to take for safe plant-operation while at , the same time adhering to the requirements of the ACTIONS l listed in the BWR 6 Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-0123). The Standard Technical Specifications , ACTIONS did not exclusively lend themselves toward application to the Clinton-specific design. In review of the Grand Gulf specification.(GGNS-TS ACTION 29) it was recognized that more appropriate ACTION would also apply . -to the CPS design and it was incorporated into CPS-TS
- ACTION 29. Unfortunately, ACTION 29 does not apply
'l verbatim because of the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS for each trip function. ACTION 29 is separated into-two parts. One part pertains to applicable Operating Conditions 1,2,3, and the second part to applicable Operating Condition f. In all cases, both parts of ACTION 29 do not apply to the exact Operating Conditions; e.g., Table 3.3.2-1, Item 1.b., (Rx Water Level Low Low Level 2) is required to_be OPERABLE during Conditions 1,2,3. ACTION 29 is in two parts. Part "a . ' would apply; part "b." would not. Since ACTION 29, part "b.", does not apply to any CPS-TS trip functions, it should be deleted to ensure that the separate action parts do not contribute to any recurrence of an event in which the CPS-TS can be violated. The CPS-TS are not incorrect as written. However, the representation of Operating Conditions in the . CPS-TS and the ACTION-29 tend to confuse an individual reading ACTION 29. In CPS-TS cases where OPERATING CONDITION f is delineated,
.the appropriate ACTION for continued operation under this i- OPERATING CONDITION is ACTION 25, and not ACTION 29. If
- the provisions of OPERATING CONDITION f are ceased, i.e.,
1 CORE ALTERATIONS are stopped, then the plant is no longer under an OPERATING CONDITION requiring Instrument Operability per CPS-TS. i } B) Similarly, ACTION 21 is also divided into two parts and only part "a." associated with OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1,2,3 is utilized in the CPS-TS. ^ C) The above revision of ACTION 25 clarifies that should CORE ALTERATIONS, etc., be of such importance to continue, the plant configuration necessary to protect the public is i established consistent with the analysis. If desired, i CORE ALTERATIONS, etc., may be stopped negating the } OPERATIONAL CONDITION requiring instrument operability. I i
,m_ . -, . . _ , - , _ _ , - . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ - ~ _ . _ _ _ , . _ . _ . _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . .
3
. TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued) -
h
. 'g.:
CRVICS INSTRUMENTATION .I
..-i iACTION I"
,.h ACTION 20
~
Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COL'D SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours. . . D ele +ed ACTION 21 -f"Close the affected system. isblation valve ('s) within 1 h'our or: - '
- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN -
6* within the following 24 hours. '
$I
- b. In Operational Condition E, suspend CORE ALT'ERATIONS, .
handling of irradiated fuel in the containment and ( ' operations < with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. j [ ACTION 22 - With one channel in either trip system inoperable restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or ~ be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. ACTION 23 - Be in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves closed within 6 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours. ACTION 24 - Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours. -- f%s s eef A du)* J u ? ACTION 25 -Y[EstablishSECONDARYCONTAINMENTINTEGRITYwiththestandbygas1 g Ltreatment system operating within 1 hour. J s Y ACTION 26 - Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within 8 hours or be in at least HOT SHUT 00WN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. ACTION 27 - Close the affected system isolation valves within 1 hour and declare the affected system inoperable. ACTION 28 - Lock the affected system isolation valves closed within 1 hour and declare the affected system inoperable. ACTION 29 - E Close the affected system isolation valves within one hour and 4 declare the affected system or component inoperable or:
- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3 be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. -
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION # suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and ?
operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. a l- - - I w Tis. sed ANacAd Y g CLINTON - UN T 1 3/ 3-19
Jaser4 4. Ac.T2cN 25 i
. ,; I]
Core AL.TER6TIoW5 , ope.cdf.ons wi
.a potenfial for -
~
dedining Me renetor vessel, and h and ling iread io.4ed Su e-l in % e prirnary or secondacy . c,onfo.inment ma3 Con 4Inde. provided %o 4 SEcoNDARV . CONTAI.NHENT 'E MTE 6 RI.TY is esfa b lis h e d .wiM -th e S4and by 3as Area 4Me64 5ys+em OPetwUn3 ubifhin i bour.
~
J'nsec4 fo ACTION 29 ; k 0pearliens may consinae pruvided %a4 %e affeeled CRVIcS ,salaiton value Cs) are clos ed w i n in I hour o.nd ,. as affrof ria-le , dec.lar e -{ke. affected Sysfem or com p on en+ increeable and folloas an3 ACTToMS a.gpropriale 4e SpeciCeahins a4 +he affeeded Sys}cm. C4kerwise., be. In hot SHuTDok/N wi% :h -d e n e.x+ . 12 hours and in COLD $HuTDowA1 winin &-follodig 29 hours. l CLzuToAl- UIV.IT I 3/Y 3-/96-
, ' -t .
. i :- Specification CPS-TS 3/4.3.7.1-page 3/4 3-71, 72 Description of Change-Add a note "a" to item 1., p 3/4 3-71: add note "a" to page 3/4 3-72, Table Notations.
-(a) A channel may.be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the. tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.
Discussion / Justification
.It is not the intent of Technical Specifications.to restrict operations in the performance of surveillance tests. Presently the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL' TEST procedure requires a time of about 2 hours and the CHANNEL 4 CALIBRATION 4 hours to perform. Placing a channel in an INOPERABLE status.for greater than or equal to 1 hour involves ACTION 70 of CPS-TS on page 3/4 3-72 Conformance with this action disrupts the completion of the required surveillance and restricts the operation of the VC system by placing the VC system in the
-Recirculation Mode of operation.
Operating the VC system in the recirculation mode reduces the effective life of the associated charcoal adsorbers. This creates an unwarranted economic burden on the operation of the plant as well as reduces the safety of operation in the event the adsorbers are needed in an emergency. Deviation from satisfaction of single failure criterion required by NRC is justified by IEEE 279, paragraph 4.11. CPS previously implemented similar conditions for testing instrument channels on other portions of actuation instrumentation (RPS, ECCS, etc). The VC system logic for shifting the recirculation
" mode" is-1 of 4 such that for 2 monitors / intake and 2 intakes, any one trip condition of 4 will create isolation of the VC system and shift the system to the recirculation mode. This situation places unwarranted transients on the VC equipment.
Removing one channel from service does not present a significant reduction in safety of operation with the given logic. It reduces the trip logic from any 1 of 4 to any 1 of 3. Review of other plants' control room HVAC systems indicates differences in action requirements and logic of trip systems. Plant specific deviations from Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-0123) are further justified because of the potential for reduction of inadvertent trips (initiations) of ESF a3 stems subject to reportability of 10CFR50.72 and 73.
TABLE 3.3.7.1-1 -- n . O C RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION h 5 m' E MINIMUM CHANNELS APPLICABLE ALARM / TRIP s INSTRUMENTATION OPERABLE CONDITIONS SETPOINT ACTION h c f.
- 1. Main Control Room 2/ intake (a.) 1, 2, 3, 5, and * ~< 10 mR/hr 70 l)
I Air Intake Radiation - - Monitor
- 2. Area Monitors ,
- a. New fuel 1 1 2.5 mR/hr** 71 .
Storage Vault , . 71 !
- b. Spent fuel 1 $ 2.5 mR/hr**
Storage Pool
- c. Control Room 1 At all times ~< 2.5 mR/hr** 71 Direct Radiation R
Monitor , , h 3. Pre-treatment Off gas 1 *** 1 50 pCi/cc**,1 72
- PRM - Noble Gas Activity ,
Monitor
- 4. Post-treatment Off gas .
PRM ,,
- a. High-Range Noble 1 $ 7.06 pCi/ccit 73 ,
Gas Activity Monitor .. Providing Alarm and - Automatic Termina-tion of Release
- b. Effluent System 1 *** NA- 74 '
flow Rate Measuring . . Device , Sample Flow Rate ***
- c. 1 NA 74 Heasuring Device .
I ', ., , ,
. .se . . ,', .
e y ,%. %,.s.l. '. .* d s l , ,
TABLE 3.3.7;1-1 (Continued) " . l2i
.4 'i
. . . *1 8tADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION
~ j TABLE NOTATIONS When irradiated fuel is being. handled in the secondary containmen,t.
Alarm only.' - During operation of the main c,ondenser' air ejector. '
, With fuel in the new fuel storage vault. .
- U With irradiated fuel in the spent fuel storage pool. -
t Reactivity concentration expected at the monitor location is a noble gas g mix with a 2.9 minute d: ay. , ft Radioactivity concentration expected at the monitor location is a noble 4 gas mix released from the off gas treatment system. $ g A.) S h d ANacMed ACTION -
~
ACTION 70 - a. With one of the required monitors inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the (downscale) tripped condition within 1 hour; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or, within the next 6 hours, initiate and maintain operation of the control room emergency filtration system in the recirculation mode of operation.
- b. With both of the required monitors inoperable, initiate and maintain operation of the control room emergency filtration system in the recirculation mode of operation within I hour.
ACTION 71 - With the required monitor inoperable, perform area surveys of the monitored area with portable monitoring. instrumentation at least once per 24 hours. ACTION 72 - With the number of channels OPERABLE 1ess than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, gases from the main con-denser off gas treatment system may be released to environment for up to 72 hours .provided:
- a. The off gas treatment system is not bypassed, and
- b. The post-treatment air ejector off gas PRM high range noble gas activity monitor is OPERABLE.
- ACTION 73 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the i
Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via ; t this pathway may continue provided grab samples are taken at least once per 8 hours and analyzed for gross noble gas activity within 24 hours. ACTION 74 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the ! Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via l this pathway may continue provided the flow rate is estimated -H at least once per 8 hours. l CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 3-72 i
. .3
__Lnsec4- 4e note a-) . y, g- .-
~
A) 4 channel may be placed in a.n inopera.6le. s4a4ws b u.p to 6, hou rs , f o r e eguect ' ui no w-t p iacin3 uc. delp sur v ei llan c <. sy34cm in +Ae + c Ceped c.ond i+ con proo1 dea , a.4 leas + on e. o%er OP6RaBLE chann el To N ? Sa m e frip system is men,+ocig 4ka.4- f paco m e+ec . E 1 . 1 l 1
-l CGUTOU-00T7 / 3/V 3-72a.
=
Specification CPS-TS 3/4.6.4 Table 3.6.4-1 Description of Change A) Page 3/4 6-38 Item 48, 49: Valves IVR002A,B and OPERATIONSCONDITIONSshouldread1((g006pgyAP{g}CAByg)
, 2 ,3 , 4 ,
l. Discussion / Justification In order to satisfy the commitment of TMI Item II.E.4.2 as described in the CPS FSAR (Appendix D, page D-49) the subject valves must be sealed closed. This requirement is more restrictive than the requirements described in FSAR Table 6.2-47. CPS-TS must be updated to comply with the requirements of 10CFR50.36 as represented in FSAR Appendix D. (See also discussion / justification for change to CPS-TS 3/4.3.2)
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Centinued) , n CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES C 5 - MAXIMUM SECONDARY
@ APPLICABLE ISOLATION CONTAINMENT TEST
, VALVE PENETRATION ISOLATION OPERATIONAL TIME- 8.YPASS PATH PRESSURE c NUMBER NUMBER SIGNAlt CONDITIONS (Seconds) (YES/NO) (psig)*
5
]AutomaticIsolationValves(Continued)
- 48) Containment HVAC Supply 101 1, 2, 3,#' 'Yes 9.0 1VR001A 8, L, M, 2, 5, R 4 IVR0018 B, L, M, Z, 5, R 4 -
IVR002A IVR0028 P P [d hUf/p 16 16 g
- 49) Containment HVAC Exhaust IVQ004A 102 B,L,M,Z,5,R 1, 2, 3,#
10 Yes 9.0 ( i IVQ004B B,L,M,Z,5,R
/,( g, , f g #
10 g t' IVQ006A P , 16
- P 16 IVQ0068
? '
M 50) Plant Chilled Water Supply 103 1, 2, 3,# Yes 9.0 1W0001A L, U 44 1W00018 L, U 44 ,
- 51) Plant Chilled Water Return 104 1, 2, 3,# Yes 9. 0 IW0002A L, U , 44 .
1W0002B L, U 44 , 1
- 52) Containment Bldg. HVAC 106 1, 2, 3,# - Yes > 9. 0 -
I IVR0078 B, L, M, Z, 5, R.. 6 ,. IVR007A B,L,M,Z,5,R ' 6-
- 53) DW Chilled Water Supply 9.0 107 1,2,3 No, IVP0048 L, U 74- '
IVP005B L, U , 74 *
- 54) DW Chilled Water Return 108 1,2,3 No -
9.0 IVP014B L, U , 74 IVP0158 L, U 74 - i.
, , , , , , i .;' ' . .',7 . .' -
Specification CPS-TS 3/4.6.4 Table 3.6.4-1 Description of Change B) Page 3/4 6-44 Item 13: Delete valve 1E12-F351 Discussion / Justification Valve 1E12-F351 should be deleted because it does not serve to satisfy requirements of containment isolation identified by 10CFR50 Appendix A (GDC 54-57). Penetration IMC-17 is fully isolated by the outboard isolation valve, and a closed loop which returns to the containment. i i
. s
~
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued) p CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES M e
' MAXIMUM SECONDARY APPLICABLE ISOLATION CONTAINMENT TEST Si VALVE PENETRATION. ISOLATION OPERATIONAL TIME BYPASS PATH PRESSURE Z NUMBER _ NUMBER SIGNAlt CONDITIONS (Seconds) (YES/NO) (psig)*
w Test Connections. Vents and Drains (Continued)
- 13) RHR/LPCI C Injection 17 NA 1,2,3(a) .,NA No a 9. 0 1E12-F056C IE12-F057C IE12 F351 # , .
g L
- 14) RHR A Test Line 18 NA 1,2,3(*)' NA No. 9.0
- IE12-F365A w IE12-F366A -
1 1E21-F346 -
. 1E21-F347 ,, ,
j, IE12-F414 .
** IE12-F415 .
1E12-F418 ' IE12-F419 IE12-F420 ' 1E12-F421 - 1, 2, 3(a)~
- 15) RHR C Test Line 19 NA -
NA No 9.0 1E12-F353 -' IE12-F354 .. 1E12-F428 a 1E12-F429 "
- 16) RHR B Test Line 20 NA 1, 2, 3(a) NA No' 9.0 IE12-F3658 .
1E12-F3668 . 1E12-F426 . 1E12-F427 s. L',,,.
, , ,. 1. * .
e'. .Nh E,..i.: . bd' - .
d Specification CPS-TS 3/4.6.4 Table 3.6.4-1 (continued) C) Para 3/4 6-51, 6-52 Part 4. Items 1), 2), 3) and 4): Delete valves 1B21-F098
'A,B,C,D Discussion / Justification Valves 1B21-F098 A,B,C,D should be deleted. These valves are shutoff (block) valves located downstream of the two MSIV's located on each main steam line (containment penetration numbers 5,6,7,8). These valves
-do not serve to satisfy 10CFR50 Appendix A, GDC 54. The FSAR will be revised accordingly. SER Sections 10.3.1 and 10.3.2 discuss the NRC's evaluation of these valves, t
P
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continu:d) . n CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES C
?<
@ MAXIMUM SECONDARY APPLICABLE ISOLATION CONTAINMENT TEST
- e VALVE PENETRATION ISOLATION OPERATIONAL TIME gi BYPASS PATH PRESSURE HUMBER NUMP,ER SIGNAlt CONDITIONS e (Seconds) (YES/NO) (psia)*
~ Test Connections, Vents and Drains (Continued)
- 64) Drywell Pressure NA 1, 2, 3(a) NA No 9. 0 1CM076 151 1CM077 203 .
- 65) Peactor Pressure 151 NA 1, 2, 3(a) NA No . 9.0 ICM072 1
1CM073 R 66) Reactor Pressure 160 NA 1,2,3(a) NA No 9.0 ICM074
- T, ICM075 u
- 67) Equipment Hatch 1 NA 1,2,3 N'A No , 9. 0 1CM099
~
- 4. Other Isolation Valves 0
- 1) Main Steam Line C 5 1, 2, 3 NA No -9.0 $,
IE32-f00lJ NA g
= r=W w '
v 4 e e e e 2 i. [.:,d ./.'.hd M . . 1- ,
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Centinued)
<> CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES C "i 8 MAXIMUM SECONDARY . APPLICABLE' ISOLATION CONTAINMENT TEST c VALVE PENETRATION ISOLATION OPERATIONAL TIME BYPASS PATH PRESSURE ?! NilMBER NUMBER SIGNAlt CON 0!TIONS (Seconds) (YES/NO) (psig)*
Other Isolation Valves (ConLinued) .
- 2) Main Steam Line A 6 1,2,3 , NA ' No 9.0 1E32-f001A NA M
1021 T000A l
- 3) Main Steam Line D 7 1,2,3 NA No' 9.0 1E32-F00lN NA %
-1021 f000 M
- l sv
- 4) Main Steam Line B 8 1,?,3 , NA No 9.0 i en IE32-F001E- NA %
c'n w 1021 T0000
/ b
- 5) feedwater/RilR Line A 9 NA 1, 2, 3 NA Yes 9.0
. IB21-f010A -
1821-f 065A
- 6) feedwater/RilR Line B 10 NA 1, 2, 3 NA Yes " 9.0 IB21-f0108 .
IB21-F0658 .. 9.9
- 7) RilR A Suction Line 11 NA 1,2,3, NA ' No IE12-F004A(*) .
- 8) RilR B Suction Line 12 NA 1, 2', 3 NA No 9.9 IE12-f004BI *) -
9 1
' d * .I,'
' I * 'g h *I
- 8
,d */ ea 4 4 e g ,
l Specification t-l CPS-TS 3/4.6.4 Table 3.6.4-1 (continued) Description of Change i D). Page 3/4 6-56, 6-60 Items 37 and 67: Delete valves IIAl28A and lIA128B Discussion / Justification Valves IIAl28A.and IIA 128B were removed from their described positions (FSAR Table 6.2-47) by a design change (FECN 13969). These valves no longer serve as containment isolation valves. The valves were replaced with blind flanges and relocated outside the containment isolation l boundary. 1
i TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued) n CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES C - - 'i g MAXIMUM
. SECONDARY APPLICABLE ISOLATION CONTAINMENT TEST
- c. VALVE PENETRATION ISOLATION OPERATIONAL TIME BYPASS PATN PRES $URE 5
NUMBER NUMBER SIGNAlt CONDITIONS (Seconds) (YES/NO) (psig)* g Other Isolation Valves (Continued) Primary Containment (Continued) -
- 35) SX To Containment Cooler 48 NA 1,2,3 NA No 9.0'
- ISX089A '
ISX088A
- 36) Instrument Air 57 NA 1,2,3 NA No. 9. 0
- 11A175 R
- 37) Instrument Air Bottles 58 NA 1, 2, 3,# NA .Yes 9.0 IIA 0428 v
g; OI=IIA 012A
~
Y k
- 38) CRD 63 NA 1, 2, 3,# NA Yes. 9.0 1C11-F122 .
IC11-F083 - '
- 39) RHR Flush Line 76 NA -
1,2,3 NA' No
'i ~
- 9. 9 1E12-F030 #
~
- 40) RHR/LPCI A Injec. Relief 87 NA 1,2,3 - NA No 9.0 lE12-F025A - --
- 41) RHR HX A Vent 89 NA 1, 2, 3 . NA.
No. 9.9 IE12-F074A j 4'.. N il O . '.
. : i. .,.",f,6 { .
TABLE 3.6.4-1(Continued] n CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES C 5 ' g MAXIMUN . SECONDARY APPLICABLE ISOLATION CONTAINMENT TEST c VALVE PENETRATION ISOLATION OPERATIONAL TINE BYPASS PATN PRESSURE 5 u NUMBER NUMBER - SIGNAlt CONDITIONS (Seconds) (YES/N0) (psig)* 9 Other Isolation Valves (Continued) Primary Containment (Continued)
- 65) SX Return 204 NA 1,2,3 NA No 9. 0
., ISX096B . ISX097B ,
. 1
- 66) SX Supply 205 NA 1,2,3 -
NA No . . 9. 0 1SX0888 m ISX0898 . s - i [67) Instrument Air Bottles a 206 NA 1, 2, 3 NA. . , Yes . 9.0 % 5 l $ (11A042A 1!f.1200 I IIA 013A 4'
- 68) SX From Cont. Cir. 208 NA 1, 2,' 3 -
R NA - No . 9. 0 ISX096A
- ISX097A
.. , s. .
- b. Drywell '# *
~
l None NA NA NA - NA- NA' NA i j . 1 . i.
., .n,. . .
). . .. : ..d,d ;./. d h # #. .
4 Specification CPS-TS 3/4.6.4 Table 3.6.4-1 (continued) Description of Change E) Page 3/4 6-59 Item 64: Add note (c) ' Discussion / Justification Add note (c) to valve 1CM053 to be consistent with the provisions of FSAR Table 6.2-47 (Note 6). The note was inadvertently omitted at the issuance of the CPS-TS. J
. , , . . - - - . - - , , . _ - - - - - - , , , . - . . .,.-,-_.e_.. ,
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Centinued) n CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES C z y MAXIMUM SECONDARY APPLICABLE ISOLATION CONTAINMENT TEST VALVE PENETRATION ISOLATION OPERATIONAL TIME BYPASS PATH PRESSURE ' c NUMBER SIGNAlt CONDITIONS (Seconds) (YES/NO) (psig)* 5 NUMBER
~ Other Isolation Valves (Continued) '
Primary Containment (Continued)
- 57) RHR HX Vent 8 172 ,NA 1, 2, 3 NA No 9.9 1E12-F074B .
- 58) Suppression Pool Level 177 NA 1,2,3 >1<21I b)
No' NA 1E51-F377B(c)(d) ' i m 59) Suppression Pool Level 179 NA 1,2,3 >1<21(D) Ko NA
! D 1E22-F332(C)Id)
- l 3 15M011(c)(d)
' ~
i 60) HPCS 180 NA 1,2,3 >1515(b) No;' NA 1E22-F330(c)(d) ,
- 61) Suppression Pool Level 181 NA 1,'2, 3 >1<21(b)
No NA ISH008(c)(d)
- 62) Suppression Pool Level 183 NA 1,2,3 -->1<21(b) y, .. NA 1CM002B(c)(d)
- 63) RCIC 200 NA 1,2,3 )- No ' -
NA
- "'>1<15 -
1E51-F377A(c)(d) , i 64) Drywell Pressure 203 NA 1 , 2 , 3' >1<30(b) No NAl , f ICM053(d) (c) S 6 e
. i, , . 5 ,. . ' :. . .i/ if. ,
'l
Specification CPS-TS_3/4.6.4 Table 3.6.4-1 (continued) Description of Change F) Page 3/4 6-61: Delete words of note-(g): insert new note (g)-wording. Discussion / Justification The existing note (g) is not currently used in Table 3.6.4-1.
'The. revised wording indicates certain provisions to satisfy NRC requirements for.TMI Item II.E.4.2 as described in FSAR Appendix D page D-49. (See discussion /
justification for change to CPS-TS 3/4.3.2)
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)
..,4
, j -
~
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES .
. ' .d.
. TABLE NOTATIONS .
sk (a) May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative c'ontrol. (b) Excess flo.w check valve actuatipn differential pressure. -
-l (c) Isoletion valving for instrument lines which penetrate the containment con-form to the requirements of NRC Regulatory. Guide 1.11. The in-service in-spection p'rogram will provide assurance of the operability and integrity of these. isolation provisions. Type "C" testing will not be performed on the instrument line isolation valves. The instrument lines sill be within
- the boundaries of the Type "A" test, open to the media- (containment atmo-sphere or suppression pool water) to which they will be exposed under pos-tulated accident conditions. Instrucent taps from the process line located between the girocess isolation valves and the penetration, and not them-selves penetrating containment, will be Type ".A" and/or "C"' tested along with the process line isolation valves. -
(d) Excess flow check valve. (e) The RHR system may be operating in the shutdown cooling mode during the Type A test. These valves are tested using water but the results are not required to be added to the Type A test results. The LPCS, HPCS, and RHR may be aligned in the normal standby or injection mode during the Type A test. This will expose the closed loop outside containment to containment pressure through the suppression pool. This is the closest valve alignment to the post-LOCA alignment possible. Type C water test results on these suction valves will not be added to the Type A test results. (f) Valves shall be closed in accordance with SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. g (g) .J/4.t :tc vg. . , dski:p:t eb d[8'*f
;::. clo se# la y u.M liz,%j ,eu.6.*c u l d < vices
+o s cal o r Iack %c U*Id' C IOS'd ar +* P "U W ' **
b<rng s%py//ed +o +At WI A c1N mfe e . L(' b
# When nandling irradiated fuel in secondary containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
## Isolates on RCIC low steam line pressure only, t Isolation signal descriptions are provided in Table 3.6.4-2.
For test pressure = 9.0 psig, the valve (s) shall be pressurized using air or nitrogen, and for test pressure = 9.9 psig, the valve (s) shall be pressurized using water. With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to any control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2. 4 e . CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 6-61 _ _ ,_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - - - - _ - - - - - - ~ - -
Specification CPS-TS BASES B 3/4.6.4 Description of Cha. ige G) Page B 3/4 6-7: Revise BASES by adding the following to the first paragraph of 3/4.6.4:
"and the requirements of 'NUREG -0660 as clarified by NUREG-0737 as described in the FSAR, Appendix D, item II.E.4.2 (Containment Isolation Dependability)." ,
i 4 Discussion / Justification The purpose of this clarification is to ensure the full BASES is understood and that the requirements for containment integrity are amended by the TMI requirements. (See discussion / justification for change to CPS-TS 3/4.3.2) 4 t h l l l
)
1 I 1
-_. ., , _ - _ _ _ . . _ , _ . - . _ - _ _ . . _ . _ . . . . . , _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ , _ . . _ _ _ ________J
~
A
~
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
. . . ,j N:'.,
BASES Y-3/4.6.3 DEPRES'SURIZATION SYSTEMS (Continued) . The suppression pool cooling function is a mode of the RHR system and functions . as part of the containment heat removal system. The p'urpose of the' system is ~. to ensure containment integrity followirig a LOCA by preventing excessive con-tainment pressures and temperatures. The suppression pool cool,ing mode is designed to limit the long term bulk temperature of the pool to 185'F consider-ing all of the post-LOCA energy additions. The suppression pool cooling trains, being an integral part of the RHR system, are redundant, safety-related component systems that are initiated following the recovery of the reactor vessel water level by ECCS flows from the RHR system. Heat rejection to the standby service water is accomplished in the RHR heat exchangers. The suppression pool make-up system provides water from the upper containment '.- pool to the suppression pool.by gravity flow through two 100% capacity dump - lines following a LOCA. The quantity of water provided is sufficient to account - for all conceivable post-accident entrapment volumes, ensuring the long term energy sink capabilities of the suppression pool and maintaining the water cover-e age over the uppermost drywell vents. The minimum freeboard distance above the suppression pool high water level to the top of the weir wall is adequate to preclude flooding of the drywell in the event of an inadvertent dump. During refueling, neither automatic nor manual action can open the make-up dump valves. 3/4.6.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the contain- h ment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of g a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressuriza- i tion of the containment and is consistent with the re uirements of GDC 54 g through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 g f4% ,j Measurement of the closure time of automatic containment isolation valves is performed for the purpose of demonstrating PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and system OPERABILITY (Specification 3/4.6.1).
~
The Maximum Isolation Times (MIT) for primary containment automatic isolation valves listed in this specification are either the analytical times used in the accident analysis; described in the FSAR; or times derived by applying margins to the test data obtained by performing testing in accordance with the Inservice Testing program (IST) outlined in Section XI of the ASME Code. For non-analytical automatic primary containment isolation valves, the MIT is de-rived as follows:
- 1) Valves with full stroke times less than or equal to 10 seconds, MIT = Initial Base Line Time X 2 '_.
- 2) Valves with full stroke time greater than 10 seconds, MIT = Initial ]
2 Base Line Time X 1.5. 1 J CLINTON - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-7
- k' E n.e/ +o 3/4.6. 4 , p_ B a/9 47 7 . :;
v s
. l
,~:~
and Ne re8airemesth of NilAE6 ~0640 0 s
?_
as c{arified by NUE6 -0737 as clexribed ' At Se fSAA ,'Affendix D, 1/ent E. E. y. 2 h ( cmia1,,arin z,ata-1,hi, i>epe,,sa;u/, J. N 4 i
- 2*
CLluwt -UNtr / 27 3/'/ 6- 7a.
.a
- Specification CPS-TS 3/4.8.4.1 Description of Changes Pages 3/4 8-27 through 43: Delete columns entitled Circuit
. Breaker Trip, Penetration Cable Size, Cable Number, and Systems Affected.
Discussion / Justification These columns are purely informational and do not contain any information required to satisfy any requirements of Specification 3/4.8.4. The circuit breaker trip setpoints, for example, are based upon manufacturer's data and specifying this information in the Technical Specification is not necessary. This is consistent with the River Bend Technical Specifications which have been reviewed and approved by the NRC Staff, i J 1 1 W ey> , - -. , - - r ..-yw - ..--,r. .-. ..,-.,-,,,----..,,m-- , ..-----,-,-w-,,- - - - - -..--r- ,, -
TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Continued) ,
, ,j
~
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES
- i.
.~
- b. Lower Voltage Circui't Breakers - ~
3;. r,
- 1. Type Molded Case
- s -
Auxiliary Building MCC IF -(1 Ph1E)
. Location 119, Y'(R,C); El 762'ft ~
- - " ~ ~
Each Compartment listed below has two identical - circuit breakers in series.
~ -
- i. p EIR BKk (ENETRATION EQUIPMENT hABLE PENETRATION !;YSTEMS * '
COMPT TRIP QABLE SIZE 1 SERVIL l iUMBER NUMBER / FFECTE ) 1 1E J00 3 0 MCM RLC118 : LLO53 1EE03E Lighti
~
ILL18EA j 10 100 3 0 MCM RLC116 1 .LOSA. IEE03E L'ghtihg . ILL16EA #- 3D L5 #6 Sump Pump 1A ltE0 LA 1EE05E E ip rn 1RE03PA Ra waste SA :5 #6 Sump Pump 1R H3A 1EE05E Eq ip Drn 1RE05PA Ra w 'te SB 15 #6 i I Sump Pump 1A 1Rp7A 1EE05E Floc Drn IRF03PA Rad ste SC ll #6 Sump Pump Flo Orn 1RFJOA 1EE05E s i 1RF07PA ! Radwaste g i 88 15 #6 RWCU Viv Mtr 1R'T2A 1EE05E Rea Water 4 1G33-F102 Cle up p, 7A 1l5 #6 RWCU Viv Mtr 1RT0hA 1EE05E Re c Water N 1G33-F031 Clea up b 78 . 5 #6 RWCU Viv Mtr lhT1tA 1EE05E Re c Water 1G33-F042A C1 an p 7C 15 # RWCU Viv Mtr Reac Vater T166 IEE05E 1G33-F044 f C eanup f 2A
\ \
15 6 acte Head Vent Viv :.NB01j IEE07E 1821-F001 entin 2B 15 #6 eacto l Head Vent Viv )1NB03A' 1EE07E 1B21-F005 ,
/entin i
CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-27
- I a . )
TABLE 3.8.~4.1-1 (Continued) 4 ) fi j CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES. i *>< .:
~ 1
'5
, Auxiliary Building MCC IF (IAP41E) (Continued) ~ )J - ,
COMPT-(IRBK[t TRIPJ kENETRATI0fEQUIPMENT CABLE PENETRATION IIYSTEMS .' 2C 15 QABLE SIZE 1 SERVICE I lUMBEF NUMBER hFFECTE_f U ,, ) f #~ '
' WtrPress' Cont (RD03L 1EE07E ChntRo '-
l VLv IC11-F003 ., . D'iver , . ; 3C L5 # Space Htr ItR013 1EE07E
- ~ R cR irc - '
1 IB33-C001A . .
. {-
4 4C :S #6 Suct Viv'Mtr 1F R02 A 1EE07E Ho1 t IB33-F023A j 4A 15 #2 WINCH IF 11 3A 1EE05E Hoi t 1F42-E001 6B 1i #6 - Disc DC Viv 1Rf (8A 1EE07E Reac Recirc ~~~ IB33-F067A 1 8A 14 #6 RWCU Suct 1RT 20A 1EE07E Di Reac ater VLV 1G33-F100 Cle p 1B 3 #6 1F15-E005 1FH 2A 1EE07E Fue' H ndling g 8C #6 J/B L k , If l 1HC69G 1HU67A 1EE07E Hoi ts 80 :5 #6 Shield Door 16 :6oA IEE07E Ho sts 1HC71G 48 190 3 MCMl Oil Pump Mtr I 11 :R144 1EE36E R ac Rec rc 1933-D003A - 50 15 Fan Motor 1 RR20a IEE36E P ac Reci c 1B33-D003A k 3B 15 6 Fan Motor VR24A 1EE36E ont. Purg i i i IVR12C l L b CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-28
'4 TABLE 3.8.4.1-1.(Continued) .
?(.
CONTAINMENT PENE'TRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES
'\
~
Auxiliary Building MCC 1,F (1AP41E) (Continued) * '- hIR BKl kENETRATIO
')CABLEfPENETRATION kYSTEMS.
EQUIPMENT - COMPT' TRIP QABLE SIZE. SERVICE UMBEi NUMBER AFFECTED - 1F 15 i SRM/IRM INR02k IEE05E C ntrol R s Drives liR0 ) 1EE05E: C ntrol R ds
' 1H22-P008 '1 4R0 1EE05E Ce trol ds 111R0 H IEE05E Co trol ods it R0 K 1EE05E- Ce trol ods
!M 1EE05E Co rol Rod's 1FlR INR P IEE05E Con rol Rods R R 1EE05E 1R Con rol Rods IN 2T IEE05E Cont o' Rods IN 2V IEE05E Cont o Rods f IN 2X IEE05E Cont Rods h IN 33A 1EE05E Cont 1 Rods
\
i - 6C 20 #6 IW25JX IWF 1E 1EE07E Pn1 . a g 1WB 1F 1EE07E Cooler n 4 IW205JY IW[ H 1EE07E Pn1 Ar ? 1 29j J 1EE07E Co er q g 1W905JU 09'..L 1EE07E P i Are 09: M 1EE07E C oler 9A .5 # IVP01CE :!vP334 IEE05E g Fan 9B 15 6 IVP01CG VP35j IEE05E Ig Fan 1 i CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-29
...l l
.~.,1
, TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Cont'inued)
~
.k,
.. ?'
CONTAINMENTPENETRATIONCONDUCTOROVERCURRENTPRbTECIVE~ DEVICES (
' Auxiliary. Building MCd IG (1AP42E) -
g.'.'9 Lo' cation 106, Y (R.C); El 762 ft' Each Compartment listed below has two identical - - circuit breakers in- series'. . .- i . - CIR BKt ENETRATI EQUIPMENT bABLE , PENETRATION ~ t ' YSTEMS COMPT TRIP ABLE SIZ SERVICE I UMBER NUMBER CFECTED - IE 1)0 ' 350 MCM Ltg Pn1 117 ILLO6E 1EE04E , L ghting . ILL7EA ~ 10 - 100 3 MCM Ltg Pn1 115 1, .LO6n IEE04E Libhtingf ILL15EA
~ I 4A ]5 #6 Sump Pump 11'E01 E 1E'E06E Eqt ip D' n IRE 03PB Ra <as ,
4C #6 li Sump Pump 1RCO:E 1EE06E Flo'r frn ' 1RF03PB Ra sr.e I 4D 1! #6 Sump Pump 1RJ1 ]E 1EE06E Floo prn 1RF07PB Radw site
,[ s 6D 15 #6 Viv 1R1] 5A 1EE06E Reac Vater O 1G33-F0428 Clea p d
SB 15
#6 Agitator Go .
1RT k6A 1EE06E Reac ter i 1G36-A001 Cleal ) 48 15 #6 Sump Pump 1 REC 3E 1EE06E Equi ) I rn IRE 05PB Ra se SA If #6 Fan 1RIt17A 1EE06E Reac Re irc - 1833-0003B IB 15 #6 Hyd Sys IFHO,lF IEE08E FuaflHarling 1F42-D002 3A 15 #6 Vent Valve 1HB02A 1EE08E Repctor 1821-F002 Veh,t Val e 2D :.5 # Space Htr IRR023 1EE08E R ac Reci c 1833-C001B 3C L5 Suct Valve :.RR05,6 IEE08E F eac Reci d i [ 1833-F0235 , , d I
.N CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-30
. TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT Ph0TECTIVE DEVICES J ',
. . 1
~
Aux ^iliary Building MCC 1G (1AP42E) (Continued) * ,.-[i-(IRB NETRATI COMPT TRIP C BLE.512 EQUIPMENT _ SERVICE CABLE i UMBE PENETRATION NUMBER ' STEMS FECTED 6A
~
L5 f #6 Disch.'iv V 1 RR09} 1EE08E
~
.R ac Reci c .
1833-F0678 . 38 1( 0J 350 MCM 011 Pump 11 R1 A 1EE04E Re Re irc IB33-D003B .. SD 15 #6 Demin Pump 1R ~ A 1EE08E' Re'a W t'er 1G36-C001B Clea u SC 11
#6 Agitator IRT 7A 1EE08E Reac ater 1G36-A002 Clea p g 6B 2C #6 1W005JT IW 2E 1EE06E Chil e Water -1 7A #6 If IVP01CF IV 3 %A 1EE06E Clg Fan IF 78 5 #6 IVP090B 1 P311A 1EE06E Cl Wat c 7C :5 #" IVP0918 P4 4 1EE06E C g Wa'te 8A # IVP01CH JL5 VP364 IEE06E g Fan 1 s.J CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-31
. I
=
l
\
. . l
- %. 1 TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Continued) , . J .' - ;
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT. PROTECTIVE DEVICES
~
~
.~'-
. . Auxillary Building MCC 1A2 (1AP73E) *-
Location 121, V (R,C); El 781 ft . I
~
Each Compartment lis'ted below has two identical.
- circuit br,eakers in series .
blR BK kENETRATIOji EQUIPMENT
. COMPT TRIP 1 @BLE SIZU SERVICE hABLEl PENETRATION ~ kYSTEMS f UMBEFI . NUMBER AFFECTED IB 15 f # ~
RHR. Valve 3RH63n IEE09E. R sid Ht-1E12-F037.A R moval - 13C .5 # IIA 0128 1/A0 1EE09E In trume t Ai i t ' Au if ary Building MCC 1A1 (1AP72E)
- L cation 121, Y (R,C); El 781 ft '
~
Each > artner.t listed below has two identical circuit breakers in series. 2BL 100 350 > M SLC 158 IL ?lB 1EE03E . Ligh ng ILL58EA l D i 10 Sit #2 Drywell Fan IV C SA 1EEOSE Dr 1 4 IVP01CA HVA . 3B 50 350 MC Drywell Fan IVP01CC 1 PO 7A IEE05E Dry ell HV C: h IC 0 35 MCM Comb Gas iG0] A IEE09E H2 Recom Compressor 1HG02CA 3A .00 0 MCM Stby Liq Pmp SC01;, IEE09E .andby 1C41-C001A iq Contro I L
. 5 l .-
CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 6-32
- .. . ~
, =
._)
_ TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Continued) 3
', .. .-[
- CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURR'ENT PROTECTI
}
- s. .
' Auxiliary Building' MCC 1A3 (IAP74E)
,. Location 121, V (R,C); El 781 ft ,,
Each Compartment liited below has two identica'l t circuit breakers in series. . t'I R BKk kENETRATIOf EdVIPMENT lABLE COMPT TRIP PENETRATION SYSTEMS QABLE SIZEJ SERVICE l UMBER NUMBER , LFFECTE SC 15 \ # Sample Pump ' J,PS15 IEE07E froces IP508P j ampli g 4B .5 #6 Sample Pump 1.'515 IEE07E P' oces IP506P Simpli g. 40 2 5f #6
, Sample Pump 1 PSI G' IEE07E Prace s . . '-
IP507P Sa p1 ng
*. 20 1i #6 Sample Pump IP! A IEE07E Prc' ss IP505P S ing 13B 15 #6 Shutoff Valve ISM)2A 1EE09E Sup Pool N ISM 002A Mak up ?
13A 1 #6 Shutoff Valve 15 C IA IEE09E Sup Pool \ ISM 001A Ma i p 13C 45 #6 Spray Valve 1 H2 'A 1EE09E Re id;Ht IE12-F042A Re oval IB .5 # Isol Valve P67 4 IEE09E F- re IFP078 P otection 14D 20 6 Supply Fan jVR17 o IEE37E l IVR08C l ntaip i VAC i
?
CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-33
TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Continued) , , 3
~
~
. CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES , Ai.
. . . s
* ' Auxillary Building MCC 1A4 (IAP93E)
- Location 121, V Y tR,C); El 781 ft Each Compartment lis'ted,,below has two identical * *
~
circuit breakers in'serjes. . hlRBKl hNETRATI0fEQUIPMENT (:ABLE PENETRATION' COMPT TRIP YSTEMS C)BLE SIZU SERVICE' I , UMBER NUMBER hFFECTED
~
10B 15 #l Spray Valve JRH61A 1EE09E. sid Ht ' . IE12-F028,A R'moval - 7C , L5 #6 Isol Valve 1:YO9a IEE09E C : led ICYO21 Ce den 10A :5 #6 Suct Valve IF G02A IEE09E H2 Rec . - t IHG009A . 1 . . 9A 15 #6 Isol Valve 15(5 iA 1EE09E Shu<do n ISX095A - Ser k ter 98 in #6 Isol Valve IC( J{7A IEE09E Comp ent ICC057 Cool ater ss 9C 1! #6 Isol Valve ICC L7F 1EE09E 9 Comp lent i I ICC128 Cool iater hg
- 10C 15
(
#6 j .
Outlet Valve ISquSA 1EE09E Sta 1C41-F001A Liq Co trol 7A 1E #6 Isol Valve 15 (22A 1EE37E Shu;do n ISXO89A Se Wa er 78 1h #6 Isol Valve 1X2dL 1EE37E Shltdow 1SXO96A Se v Wa r IC 15 # IWO551A 4092 A 1EE37E C illed ater 88 : 5 IWO552A WO964 IEE37E C illed ter 8C 6 1C11-F370 .RD57s, IEE05E I.5 I ontrol R d rive t
. ~?
CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-34 "
~
TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Continued) . . 2 .'.s,
. ,4 ,;
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES i- -
~ Auxiliary Building MCC 181 (1AP75E) i' Location 105, X (R,C); El 781 ft .
- ~ Each Compartment lis'ted below has two identical
- circuit breakers in' series. .
1 CIRBR ENETRATI EQUIPMENT BLE PENETR TION. COMPT YSTEM rRIP BLE SIZ SERVICE UMBE NUMBER EFECT .. 2C !'O # Cool Fan 1 P0 1EE06E. D ywel - IVP01CB . HC - 3A 9) 35 MC Cool Fan IV A 1EE06E Or 1 IVP01CD HV C 4A 10( '350 M Stby Pump
~ 15 2A 1EE10E .Sta.dby IC41-C001B .
Li Control
- 2A 1 350 M H2 Compr 1 G0 A 1EE11E H Rtcomb
, 1HG02CB C nt<in g 2B 5 #6 Supply Fan i VR18 IEE11E onta~n g L IVR11C VAC k t
- CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-35
+ _ TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Continued) - . 2 .' -
- CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTE [i
- .e
. yxiliary Building MCC 182 (1AP76E)
- 5 O'
Location 106, V 1R,C); El 781 ft
. ~
~
Each Compartment 1isted below has two identical , circuit breakers in series.
- Cl R BKk kENETRATIOfEQUIPMENT COMPT CA BLEfPENETRATION ,
1 RIP @BLE SIZEl SERVICE bYSTEMS ' FUMBEF NUMBER 11C / FFECTED - 15 , #h Isol Valve 3SC06L IEE10E S tandby-1C41-F001B L iq Cont ol 2B li #6 Inlet Valve 1CC Cc mpone ; ICC068 08f IEE10E Cc ol Wa r 1B 10 .#6 Inlet Valve ICC0 0 IEE10E Ce npone t ICC065 . Cool W er . . , 2C 15 #6 Outlet Valve IC20A 1EE10E Con pon nt ICC070
~ Cool W ter 2A 15 #6 Outlet Valve ICC Q90 IEE10E Compo ent ICC067 -
l Coo' ater 10C 15 #6 Sup Pool Viv 1RH 2A IEE11E Resi Ht 1E12-F073A Remo al llB 15 #6 Isol Valve 15) 7A 1EE11E Shut fown ISX0958 Serv Water %g 10A 1 i
#6. Suct Valve IHG0098 1H 0 5A 1EE11E H2 e:omb k 11A 13 #6 Sup Pool Viv 1 H4:A IEE11E Re id Ht IE12-F0738 Reoova l 14B 15 # Spray Valve i
I tH624 1EE11E R id it 1E12-F028B R moval 10B p5 # Upper Pool Univ RH64a IEE11E i R sid it emoval IE12-F0378 i CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-36
l s l TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Continued). - CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEV -
," 5 ,
AuxiiiaryBuildingMCC183(1AP77E) ~ Location 106, V (R,C); El 781 ft .. , Each tempartment listed below has two identical
, circuit breakers in ser,ies. .-
kIR BKF hENETRATIOhEQUIPMENT COMPT TRIP- ('ABLE SIZEl FABLE -PENETRATION bYSTEMS - SERVICE -" P UMBE t ~ NUMBER
/ FFECTED 2A 15 'A5 Isol Valve .1CC12 4 IEEl'0E C amponeri ~
1CC050 C )ol Wat r' 28 ~5 #l Isol Valve l '.C120 IEE10E Cc mpone t ICC053 Ccol Wa'er 3B 15 '#6 Is01 Valve IC C11A 1EE10E . Conpone t . ICC071
- Coc 1W er I 3C 15 #6 Isol Valve 1C :130 1EE10E c
1CC074 Cohenint Coo Witer-3A #6 li Isol Valve ICC:.6D IEE10E Com; or nt 1CC060 Cool ater 4.A 15 #6 Isol Valve ICCL6L 1EE10E Compo ent ICC127 Cool' ater s 4C 15 #6 Isol Valve ICf 6A 1EE10E Cyc1 3 i ICYO17 Cond sate q) 5A 15 #6 1 i Isol Valve IC"C6F 1EE10E Cyc1 y 1 1CYO20 Con ensate )R SB 15 #6 Isol Valve 1F :0 5A 1EE10E Fue Pool IFC007 Cao ins SC 15 #6 Isol Valve IF C2(IA IEE10E Fu 1 Poal IFC037 Co ling 10A li # Isol Valve 1 1I024 1EE11E R c IE51-F063 I ject 14A ]5 # RCIC Valve 3 RI15a 1EE11E R at 1E51-F076 I ject 10B .5 6 Isol Valve ;.RTO5A 1EE11E d l ' 1G33-F001 i eacWate{- leanup i CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-37
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDU .
..k VERCURRENT PROTECTIVE A - ~
0 [IRBK Auxilfhry Building MCC 183 (IAP7hE) ( - i
,C,_0MP T,
_ TRIP CABLE dENETRATI0d, lh SIZEl EQUIPMENT Continued) IOC 15 _ SERVICE - dABLE J'
#5 .
[UMBE PENETRATION Isol Va.1ve
,__gLMBER .tYSTEMSf pFFECTEDJ .
3 RT08 11A 15 IG33-F028. IEE11E ,,,
#6
- leac Wa er Isol. Va'1ve Cleanup .
11B 1G33-F040 ItT13 IEE11E '
"5
#6 , , Rtac Wa er '
Isol Valve C 'eanup - ILT1 , 8A ;5 1G33-F053 15E1E '
#6 Raac.W ter Iso 1 Valve Cleanu 8C 35 IE12-F009 1RH1 A 1EE11E
#6 Re sid t Spray Valve Renov 7B IE12-F0428 IR,i2 A 1EE11E 15
#6 '
Ret id Ht ' Isol Valve Renov 1 - 7C li OMC010 1MC 3A IEE11E
#6 Conde sate Mak !
Isol Valve INB 12B IB21-F016 SA 1EE11E 1!' Rear ater
#6 Isol Valve 13A 'ISX0898 15 ?3A 1EE11E %I 15 Shut.cwn
#6 Ser Water Isol Valve 138 1
#6 ISX0968 15 23L 1EE11E Shu'down (i Ser' Water Isol Valve 7A IVQ0069 IV 24A IEE11E Or 1
#6 eli Isol Valve Pu e 1
IIA 013B A03A 1EE11E 148 5 # In tr Ai Isol Valve 14C 1WB0018 1 014A IEE11E 5 # C ille d W ter Isol Valve 4016; 1W20028 IEE11E 13C 5 6 C illet i Isol Valve k ter VR09n IVR0028 IEE11E ontair VAC CLINTON - UNIT 1,
\
3/4 8-3B : s* a
TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Continued) ,
. ,< ,~
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES' , -M
~
Auxiliary Building MCC 183 (1AP77E) Continued) tIR BKk hENETRAT .N EQUIPMENT - ( ABLE ' l 3 PENETRATION LYSTEMS : COMPT TRIP (ABLE SI SERVICE P UMBE t NUMBER J FFECTED .
*~
6A 15 #5 Isol Valve
~
IFP64 L IEE11E Fire - - 1FP052i- P rotecti n 6B L5 #t Isol Valve 1 :P6! A 1EE1]E . F ire '
, 1FP053 Protect on , _
11C :S #6 Isol Valve A IEE11E' 1FP61 Flre . 1FP079 Pr o'tection Auxiliary Building MCC 184 (1AP94E) Location 105, X (R,C); El 781 ft ' Each Compartment listed below has t'wo identical -- I circuit breakers in series. f BC 15 #6 Shutoff Valve ISK 3A 1EE11E Sup) !ool ISM 001B Maktu 9A 15 #6 Shutoff Valve ISP )4A 1EE11E Supp iPool ISM 0028 Make up f s 98 15 #6 Isol Valve f C IFP 52A 1EE11E Fire i IFP050 Pro ection 4 7A 15 #6 Isol Valve IVF :1A 1EE11E ' Dr oil IVP005A HVAl 78 15 #6 Isol Valve IVP22A 1EE11E Or a11 IVP0058 HV/C 7C 1! #6 Isol Valve IValiA 1EE11E Dr ell IVP014A HV C 8A 15 # Isol Valve 1\ P10A 1EE11E D e' 1 IVP0148 H AC i 18 35 #, IWO5528 lb295 E 1EE11E Pjant Cpil le1 kater 10A '5 6 i
, 1WO551B 1 4094 4 1EE11E lant j i hil lec ater 1
l CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-39
e
; *)
TABLE 3.'8.4.1-1 (Continued) , . CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEvlCES , . ,<.: 4
.=
' Auxifiary Building MCC IH (1AP95E) ""
Location 119, I (R, C); El 762 ft . -
- ~ -
Each Compartment lis'ted below has two identical
- circuit breakers in ser.ies. -
C IR BKt kENETRATIEQUIPMENT h COMPT TRIP __ QABLE SIZS __ SERVICE EABLE P UMBER PENETR TION bYSTEMS NUMBER /FFECTEC I
~ 70~ B0 3 0 MCM Welding ]EW01A 1EE03E- helding -
~
1EWO2E - - 2C ;L5 # Supp Pool 15M05a IEE05E Supp Po al Fill Valve Ma keup ISM 004 3C ]5 #6 RWCU IVX0EA. 1EE05E I
- Re ic W4 iste. ,, :
IWX01PA Cloanu) ~ j 2A 15 #6 RWCU
- 1RT3NA 1EE05E Hoists I 1G33-F107 3A I!i #6 RWCU 1R"43A 1EE05E Rea ; Mater IG36-C001A Clenn ap
! 78 30 #2 Monorail 1HC:3E 1EE05E Hoists 1821-E300 l g 7F , 15 #6 Hatch Shield 1HC 55A IEE07E Hois". s \9 Door 1HC68G 5A 20 #6 Circuit 7 1FH 6Y 1EE07E Fuel iandling 1F42-E001 I 6B 15 #2 - Refuel Plat 1FI;11E 1EE05E Fuel IF15-E003 Handi- ng 4A If #6 i
- Air Hand Fan 1W325G IEE07E Chi lled 1W0055F Wai er 48 4) # Air Hand Fan 1) Q2iN 1EE07E Ch llei IWODSSH Wa ter 40 35 # Air Hand Fan 1N025J 1EE07E Cr illec IW2055M Wi ter 40 :.5 6 Air Hand Fan d
' 3WO27a IEE07E 4
C iilled 1W205SK Mater l 1 w' CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 S-40
e
+
. TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Continued) , , ,-
~'
CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES M.
.)
Auxi1'iary Building MCC IH (iAP95E) (Continued)
- 81 C IR BK t MENETRAThNEQUIPMENT '
COMPT- TRIPI hABLE' PENETRATIO.N STEMS . CLBLE SITE SERVICE IlUMBEI: NUMBER A FECTED 30 TO '
.#J f Air Han'd Fan JWB25L IEE05E C 111ed f IWB05SB . Wa;er -
6A 100 353 MCM Oil Pump 1 1R15A 1EE36E Re - 1833-0003A .. R,ec rc . 28 100 35l MC Mixing Htr C0lA 1EE36E 15 Sta'dby IC41-D003 Liq on ;rol 3B 30 350 M- Tnk Htr 15 :04A IEE36E Stan IC41-D002 Liq trol - 7A 15 #E Fan Mtr 1RK1A' IEE36E Reac circ - IB33-0003A 7C 1
#6 Area Coolers o 17 IW 34C IEE07E Area : olers i IW 14D IEE07E Area C lers R IWO4E 1EE07E Area Co lers F
{ IWl: 4F 1EE07E Area Co lers 1Wl:4P IEE07E Are Co lers 1W J34Q IEE07E Are Coo lers - IW!3 4R 1EE07E Are Coo'ers lh 3345 IEE07E Are Coo rs. 1B # q) IVP090A 15 P31 A 1EE05E Ch".lled W ter IC .40 # IVP091A 19P38; IEE05E Ch 11ed Wa er 10 !O 6 1F15-E003EC' 1:H13 : 1EE07E F el Hand 11 g - 7E B0 p6 1F15-E003EA JFH13; IEE07E F el Handli g i ~ e CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 6-41
TABLE 3.8.4.1-1.(Continued) ;
.4
,j
- 4 CONTAINMENT PENE'TRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE; D
~
~
'E Auxil'iarp Building MCC II (1AP96E) -
Location 167, Z (R C); El 762 ft . Each Compartment listed below has two identical circuit bieakers in' series. 1 kIR BKk P NETRATI N EQUIPMENT i CABLE r t COMPT
- TRIP CABLE SIZ PENETRdTION. SYSTEMS .
SERVICE P UMBEf NUMBER A:FECTEf 6C '80 3! O MCM Welding ' IEWO2h IEE04E- Welding, IEWO3E
- 6B 100 35 ) MCM- Welding 1 ?WO6 i 1EE04E We Idint 1EW15EA thru EF IB ]5 #6 Drn Valve *
' 1FT2LA 1EE06E Reac ster .. ;'
1G33-F101 Cleant 10 15 #6 Tank Pump
- IW(0iD 1EE06E chemidal IWX01PB Radsa Lte 6E 1!i #6 Jib Crane 1HC13A IEE06E Hoi-; s 1HC65G 3B 1! #6 s Fan Motor 1RE8A 1EE06E IB33-D003B Reac p Recirc g SC 100 350 011 Pump RM 1RR L6A 1EE06E Reaq I 1833-D003B RecR-c 1C 15 #6 Precoat Pump 1RU SA 1EE06E Rea': Water 1G36-C002 Clear up 6F 3C #2 Crane 1HC13C 1EE06E Holsts 1B33-E300 2A 40 #2 Fan Motor 1W32iA 1EE06E Chillnd IWBOSSC W .er SB 15 #6 Suct Valve IF T22 A IEE08E R ac ater IG33-F106 Cean(ca 5A :5 # Bypass Valve lit 23; 1EE06E ac. ' ate r 1G33-F104 Cleanu)p 2B .5 Fan Motor A
l IdB26G 1EE08E hillec J IWOO5SG l l ater L .j il CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-42
+
. ~
*:.3
~
TABLE 3.8.4.1-1.(Continued)
,4 07I.
. CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICE
. . ]t, Auxilia B'uilding MCC II (1AP96E) (Continued) * 'F
.- ' *1 CIR BKj ENETRATIO EQUIPMENT (ABLE COMPT TRIP PENETRATION S 'fSTEMSf i ABLE SIZE SERVICE .>UMBEF NUMBER
' AliFECTEDI -
2C 40 f M5 , Fan,Motoi- 1 499i
, IEE08E Ct,illed 1W905SJ -
Waler
- 3A :5 .
# Fan Motor '
- 108263 1EE08E Cht11e .
~~
IW905SN
- Water -
2D li #6 Fan Motor IW2:G IEE08'E Chi le IWSOSSL Wate r 6A 15 #6 Area Coolers 1W115C 1EE08E . Area colers 1W9055R IWE50 1EE08E
. Area colers IW805SS IW2 : SE - IEE08E Area colers
- IWP SF 1EE08E , Area colers D ,, .,-,
1We 15P IEE08E Area colers i IW 15Q IEE08E Area colers 4 1W L5R IEE08E Area colers % IW1 : 55 IEE08E Are olers
't k 125-V DC MCC ID (1DC15E)
Location 25, U (R,C); El 781 ft , Each compartment listed below has two identical , circuit breakers in series. - IR BKt PNETRAThNEQUIPMENT C BLE PENETRATION 5 STEMS COMPT TRIP CABLE SIIE SERVICE n'JMBE R NUMBER A FECTED 4C u.00 0 MCM Emerg : LL22I IEE04E ergenc ~ j i . Lighting ' ghting ILL63E I a i;
.)
CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-43
4 Specification,
- l. CPS-TS 3/4.8.4.2 Description of Changes Page 3/4 8-52: Add valves 1WO551A,B and 1WO552A,B.
Discussion / Justification .. Valves 1WO551A,B and 1WO552A,B have thermal overload' (TOL) bypasr devices and are safety related. The TOL's j are. continuously bypassed in the closed direction, i 4 1 4 l y -, , , _ . - - < , - -,. .. --,_...,,,,-.,,,-y--. .--.-c-.w,,, , . . , - . - . . -,v,. ., . .-r,-- - - -,--,.y,-,,..-r-,,- - - . - - -- - - ,
l
.
- l
. -- l TABLE 3.8.4.2-1 (Continu'ed)
. *M di '
MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION ,
'.~1!
VALVE NO. ,. BYPASS DIRECTION SYSTEM (S) AFFECTED i; i IVP005A Continuous Close Drp ell Cooling ' Plant I
. Chilled Water' '
IVP005B Continuous Close . - Drp ell Cooling - Plant ,-
. J Chilled Water - -
IVP014A Continuous Close Drywell Coolin - 1 Chilled Water'g - Plant ! IVP014B Continuous close Drp ell. cooling - Plant Chilled Water - IVP015A Continuous Close Dip ell Cooling - Plant Chilled Water IVP015B Continuous Close Drp ell Cooling - Plant Chilled Water IVQOO6A Continuous Close Depell Purge ~.Contain HVAC IVQ006B Continuous ~ Close Drp ell Purge - Contain HVAC - IVR002A Continuous Close Drp ell Purge - Contain HVAC , IVR0023 Continuous close Drp ell Purge - Contain HVAC IW0001A Continuous Close Drp ell Cooling - Plant Chilled Water
- 1W0001B Continuous close Drp ell Cooling - Plant Chilled Water IWOOO2A Continuous Close Drywell Cooling - Plant Chilled Water 1WOOO2B Continuous Close Drp ell Cooling - Plant Chilled Water iW055lA Conhnuous C1ese t wbSSIB Depe4 Culic.k;llej tade$ 3 - Flc
~_
two652A to Iwc5525 i 9 CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 8-52
4
- Specification CPS-TS 3/4.9.12 Description of Change Page 3/4 9-19, 20 Change surveillance 4.9.12.2 as follows:
1)_ Move 4.9.12.2.a,b,d to'new surveillance 4.9.12.3 1 2)- Re-letter 4.9.12.2.c accordingly > Add surveillance 4.9.12.3 to read "Within 4 hours prior to the operation of the IFTS and at least once per 7 days thereafter, verify that a) All access door
- interlocks are OPERABLE.
b) The blocking valve in the Fuel Building IFTS hydraulic aower unit is OPERABLE.** c) The keylock switches which provide IFTS access or control-transfer system lockout are OPERABLE." Discussion / Justification The change is justified based on similar plants' (Perry and River Bend) issued technical specifications. These plants have the same basic IFTS. Additionally, the type of interlock is typical to other refueling interlocks which are demonstrated prior to use and on a 7-day interval thereafter. The 7-day interval is more in keeping with SRM operability (3/4.9.2) and control rod block operability (3/4.3.6) and is more conducive to the mechanical equipment involved; e.g., to demonstrate operability of one access hatch involves lifting an access plug with an overhead crane. To demonstrate this interlock involved lifting the plug some 50 times during initial fuel load. Unless corrective maintenance is required on the system, it is unlikely that this plug would be moved at all during a refueling process.
-i REFUELING OPERATIONS
~1 3/4.9.12 INCLINED FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM
- ' t-
' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION. - '
?
?.
3.9.12 ' that: The inclined fuel transfer system (IFTS) may be in operation provided a. The access doort* of all rooms through which the transf.er system penetrates are closed and locked. " b. All access door interlo'cks are OPERABLE. c. The blocking valve loc ~ated in the fuel building IFTS hydraulic. power unit is OPERABLE.** d. At least one IFTS carriage position indicator is OPERABLE at each carriage position and -at least one liquid level sens'or is OPERABLE.** '
- e. .
Any keylock switch .that.provides IFTS access control-transfer system lock- ' ' ' '
, out is OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: When the IFTS containment blank flange is removed. ACTION: With the requirements of the above spec _ification not satisfied, suspend IFTS operation with the IFTS at either terminal point. The provisions of Specifi- , cation 3.0.3 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS f 4.9.12.1 Within I hour prior to the startup of the IFTS, verify that no personnel are in areas immediately adjacent to the IFTS and that all access g doors to rooms through which the IFTS penetrates are closed and locked. k 4.9.12.2 Within 4 hours prior to the operation of IFTS and at least once per 12 hours thereafter, verify that F *
'Io N O'/
- a. ~~)
All access door interlocks are OPERABLE. do b. Yq The blocking valve in the Fuel Building IFTS hydraulic pcwer unit is # OPERABLE.** m ( # 1 east one IFTS carriage position indicator is OPERAELE at each carriage esition and at least one liquic level indicator is OPERABLE.*"
" Includes remov ble shields.
**The blocking valve in the fuel building IFTS hydraulic power unit and the .
. liquid level indicator are not requirec to be OPERABLE for the purposes of i
.these specifications until after fuel loading, but before exceeding 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER or before removal of the reactor pressure vessel head "
after the initial criticality. CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 9-19
REFUELING OPERATIONS ;i !
~. j INCLINED FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM i
- 4
,; I SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued) '.1 4.9.12.2 (Continued) + ,%
c
, .4:*- The keylock . switches which provide IFTS access or control-t'ransfer system - -
I lockout are OPERABLE. - - 4 9,12.3 MNs 4 hows PNo e '4 o 4ke opuodt'en of s o
% e _T FT.5 and cd Imsi once per 7 clap -R ercaf-f ee, vtr\ $3 %AY
- a. .7A p Uf 1-20 9.' 9. a. 2 a-, b h-b A
CLINTON - UNIT 1 3/4 9-20
Specification CPS-TS 6.1.2 Description of Change Page 6-1: Change appropriate level of management for issuance of the endorsement letter describing the control room command function to Vice President-Nuclear. Discussion / Justification The Vice Fresident-Nuclear is-the senior management person on-site. This level of management is commensurate with the level of management currently described in FSAR subsection 13.1.2.2.1. 4 4 4 l l l l l
. .~..
6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ; -
. 4 ',}
6.1 RESPONSIBILITY
~
~
'Y r
. . -r 6.1.1. The Manager-Clinton Power Station shall be responsible for overall unit '#
operation and shall delegate in writing the s'uccession to this responsibility during his absence. ,
. h.-
6.1.2 The Shift Supervisor or during his absence'from'the control room, a 4 - designated individual _shall be respons'ible for the control room, command i function. A management directive to this effect, signed by the' " "+ Vice President shall'be-reissued to all station personnel on an annual basis. . Nucles 6.2 ORGANIZATION OFFSITE CORPORATE STRUCTURE 6.2.1 The offsite corporate structure relative to Clinton. Power Station for unit management and technical support shall be as shown on Figure 6.2.1-1. UNIT STAFF , 6.2.2 The unit organization shall be as shown on Figure 6.2.2-1 and:
- a. Each on duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 6.2.2-1;
- b. At least one licensed Operator shall bc in the control room when fuel is in the reactor. In addition, while the unit is in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3,. at least one licensed Senior Operator shall be in the control room;
- c. A Radiation Protection Technician
- shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor;
- d. All CORE ALTERATIONS shall be observed and directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Operator or licensed Senior Operator Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation;
- e. A site fire brigade of at least five members shall be maintained on site at all times *. The fire brigade shall not include the Shift Supervisor, the Shift Technical Advisor, nor the two other memoers of the minimum shift crew necessary for safe shutdown of the unit and any persconel required for other essential functions during a fire energency; and
*The Radiation Protection Technician and fire brigade ccmposition may be less t!ian the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 neurs, in order to accommodate unexpected absence, provided immediate action is taken to fill the required positions. -_
CLINTON - UNIT 1 6-1
.s'-
Specificasion CPS-TS 6.2.1, Figure 6.2.1-1 Description of Change
.Page 6-3: Change Organization Chart as marked up.
Discussion / Justification Change figure to comply with current organization as depicted in the Safety Evaluation Report Figure 13.1 of SSER-6. l h e
*o t
H CHAIRMAN AND P RESIDENT
% V
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~~
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VICE P S NT vlCE S NT C EXE UTfvE I h j H VICE PRESIDENT
' VICE
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PROJECT ' , I I MANAGER 0* RECTOR PRESIDENT H VICE I NUCLEAR l INT ERNE PRESIDENT '
" '"O MANAGER ASSISTANT TO l
NUCLEAR PROGRAM - VICE PRESIDENT l M AN AGE R AUDITOR COORD' NATION l ENVIRONMENYAL I STAFF AF F AIRS ' ' DIRECTOR DIRECTOR . l NUCLEAR . i-NUCLEAR STAFF l PROGRAM PROJECTS . . I ASSESSMENT ,
- 8 GROUP - i i - .
I I I !I I h 1 I .- 1 MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER CORSTRUC. MANAGER ~ ASSISTANT MANAGER MANAGER DIRECTOR WANAGER f START-UP Tf0N SYS TEM PROJEET NUCLEAR QUALITY LICENSING NUCLEAR NUCLEAR I 400TAGE CLINTON STATION PLANNING MANAGER RELEASE MANAGER AND SAFETT cn MANAGEMENT POWER TRAINING ASSURANCE AND
/ TURNOVER ENGINEERING d STATION SUPPORT I I g
Q I I _I I I .. I
8
! l OPERATIONS l [' T AFF ll STAFF ll STAFF l ( STAFF ll STAFF l{) l STAFF I ASST. DIR.- CONSTRUCTION f 4 ) PIPING * % l i CIVIL /HVAC l l ' -
] l
- k $CAE)ull% AND r ASST. DfR. !
DIRECTOR D: RECTOR 8T U TI N
- LICENSING NUCLEAR SAFETY ECT CR 3, .
. g , l l STAFF l l STAFF l .,
SUPT. ~
- CONST RUCTION SERVICES
-l .
DIRECTOR COMPLIANCE Figure 6.2.1-1 Corporate Structure Relative to Clinton Power. Station
- Of fSite Organization ,
1
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s.- . 2 . ",. *
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up o Specification CPS-TS 6.5.1.2 Description of Change Page 6-7: Change FRG Membership Discussion / Justification Change the membership of the Facility Review Group due to change in plant organization. Delete Director - Plant Maintenance and Director - Plant Operations. Add Assistant Manager - Plant Operations and Assistant Manager Plant - Maintenance. Specification CPS-TS 6.4.1 Description of Change Page 6-7: Revise training requirements for unit staff as indicated. Discussion / Justification Illinois Power Company anticipates that this change will meet the proposed rulemaking to 10CFR Part 55 regarding training for the unit staff. This proposed rulemaking provides certain relief and supersedes the present recommendations contained in the 1978 version of ANSI /ANS 3.1 and the March 28, 1980 NRC letter for relevant industry operational experience.
p . s. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS - 6.3 UNIT STAFF OUALIFICATIONS 6.3.1.EachmemberoftheunitstaffshallmeetorexceedtheminirI1umqualifi-
~
cations of ANSI /ANS 3.1-1978** except'for the Director-Plant Radiation Protec-tion and the Radiation Protection Supervisor who shall meet or exceed the quali- - fications of Regulatory Guide 1.8, September 1975. The licensed Operators and Senior Operators shall also meet or exceed the minimum. qualifications of the March 28, 1980 NRC letter to all licensees. . 6.4 TRAINING '. 6.4.1 A retraining and replacement training program for the un'it staff shall ~ . , be maintained under the direction of the Director-Nuclear Training 7 shall meet or exceed the requirements and r;;;mmendationfof 5;;tica 5.5 of ff'SI/ffC
- 4 3.1-1070 and Appandix "A" of 10 CFR Part 55, nd th: :upplem:nt:1 re:;uirc :nt:
-:peci' icd " S : tion: f and C of Encle:ure 1 of the " ecd 2C, 1000 RC letter t all licen::::, and : hall includ f:miliarization ith r levant indu try operational experi n :. ,
6.5 REVIEW AND AUDIT
. 6.5.1 FACILITY REVIEW GROUP (FRG)
FUNCTION 6.5.1.1 The FRG shall function to advise the Manager-Clinton Power Station on all matters related to nuclear safety. COMPOSITION 6.5.1.2 The FRG shall be composed of the: Chairman: / Assa.rfaar / Manic-- Assistant.Manaaer-Clinton Power Station Member: N Direct:M aetJMaintenance l Member: ni ecter* Plant Operation STET Member: Director Plant Technical l Member: Supervisor-C&I Maintenance Member: Director Plant Radiation Protection Member: Supervisor-Nuclear Member: Supervisor-Chemistry
**The staff reported its conditional acceptance of the applicant's request for exception to ANSI /ANS 3.1-1978 qualification requirements for the Clinton Supervisor of Control and Instrumentation in NUREG-0853, Supplement No. 5. -_
CLINTON - UNIT 1 6-7}}