TXX-6608, Interim Deficiency Rept CP-87-29 Re Component Cooling Water Isolation Following Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier Rupture.Initially Reported on 870629.Evaluation Will Be Performed W/Engineering Reviews.Next Rept by 870915

Interim Deficiency Rept CP-87-29 Re Component Cooling Water Isolation Following Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier Rupture.Initially Reported on 870629.Evaluation Will Be Performed W/Engineering Reviews.Next Rept by 870915

ML20236E767
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	07/29/1987
From:	Counsil W, Keeley G TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
CP-87-29, TXX-6608, NUDOCS 8708030080
Download: ML20236E767 (1)

Text

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l M Log # TXX-6608'  !

FE File # 10110 '

= .-- 909.2

= = Ref- # 10CFR50.55(e)

NELECTRIC l

wmim c. coumu July 29, 1987  !

Executive Vas President U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 205b5

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)

DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) ISOLATION FOLLOWING REACTOR COOLANT PUMP (RCP) THERMAL BARRIER RUPTURE SDAR: CP-87-29 (INTERIM REPORT)

Gentlemen:

On June 29, 1987 we verbally notified your Mr. Shannon Phillips of a deficiency involving instrumentation and controls utilized for isolation of Component Cooling Water (CCW) _ to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) thermal barrier heat exchanger. This is an interim report of a potentially reportable item under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

Specifically,a tube failure in the RCP heat exchanger is isolated by a non Class-1E temperature actuated isolation valve. Backup isolation capability for this valve is provided by operator action using the containment isolation valves. To take credit for operator action as the backup isolation capability, the instruments used to detect the break must be Class IE (required by RG 1.97 Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident).

Currently, instrumentation capable of detecting a thermal barrier tube leak (flow, temperature, radiation monitors, and CCW surge tank high level), are non Class IE.

Our evaluation for possible adverse effects on plant safety and deportability under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) will be performed concurrently with  !

engineering reviews required to resolve the deficiency.

We anticipate submitting our next report on this issue no later than September 15, 1987.

Very trul yours, B7 B030 PD 870729 nd 49 W. G. O nsi w By: >

G. S. Keeley c- - /

~

Manager, Nuclear Lynsing c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3) 400 wrth onve herceu ta si canas. Texas mm f

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