TXX-6565, Final Deficiency Rept CP-87-23 Re Class 1E Conduit Installation Runs Coupled W/Unions Not Securely Tightened. Initially Reported on 870626.Validation Program Being Performed by Ebasco Under Procedure TE-FVM-CS-033

Final Deficiency Rept CP-87-23 Re Class 1E Conduit Installation Runs Coupled W/Unions Not Securely Tightened. Initially Reported on 870626.Validation Program Being Performed by Ebasco Under Procedure TE-FVM-CS-033

ML20236D577
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	07/27/1987
From:	Counsil W, Keeley G TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
CP-87-23, TXX-6565, NUDOCS 8707300531
Download: ML20236D577 (2)

Text

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M Log # TXX-6565 F9 File # 10110-903.9-i

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'Ref # 10CFR50.55(e) 1 1UELECTRIC Wimaru G. Counsil =

. Emytive Vice President U. S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission ATTN:: Document Control Desk i

Washington', D.C.

20555 i

SUBJECT:

- COMANCHE. PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)

DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446

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CONDUIT UNIONS

-l SDAR:

CP-87-23.-(FINAL REPORT)

Gentlemen:

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0n June 26, 1987, we' verbally notified your Mr. Bob Warnick.of. a. deficiency 1

involving Class 1E conduit. installation runs coupled with unions which were not securely tightened. We have determined that this condition is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). The required information follows.

DESCRIPTION During random validation inspections, couplings were' observed.~1oose'in both safety and non-safety class conduit installations..In evaluation of the site

' initiated Corrective Action Request (CAR 87-002), the root cause of the

-deficiency was determined to be inadequacies in the associated construction and inspection procedures.

Specifically, these procedures omitted provisions for the verification of. secured condui'. couplings..

The basis of this weakness in the procedures is speculative, however, the I

intent of the procedures infers that " good workmanship practice" would preclude' the need to formally' address securing the conduit couplings.

I SAFETY IMPLICATIONS in'the event conduits separate as a result of loose couplings due to equipment-vibration or during a seismic event, the two conduit sections woulc be held in a cantilever position by the respective supports.. Continued movement of the free. conduit end could damage the enclosed cable which could result in the inability of associated safety-related systems to perform as required for plant operation and shutdown.

CORRECTIVE ACTION i

A 100 percent validation program is being performed by Ebasco under Procedure l

TE-FVM-CS-033, " Design Control of Electrical Conduit Raceways for Unit 1-

. Installation in Unit I and Common Areas". This program includes a field ADOCK0500g5[

8707300531 070727 DR fp,

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TXX-6565 July,27, 1987 i

Page 2 of 2' H

validation of the Unit 1 Train A and B, and non-safety related (over 2 inches in diameter) conduit installations. Also this program includes a validation of the:neo-weld, communications, security system conduits greater than 2 inches in diameter and safety-related. radiation monitoring system conduits..

Non-safety.related conduit 2 inches.and under in diameter are not included within the scope of the issue.

Loose conduit unions' found during the walkdown' will be identified and dispositioned using deficiency documents.'.The projected. completion date for identifying and correcting any loose unions is December'1, 1987.

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Unions installed in Unit 2 conduit are noted on the conduit isometrics drawings.

Conduits having unions will be identified by review of the isometric. drawings and the unions will be inspected. As ' applicabl e, -

correction of the identified loose unions will be dispositioned using

. deficiency documents and the completion date of-' activities is December 1,

-1987.

The.following Units 1 & 2 installation and inspection procedure / specification will be revised by September 4,1987 to require validation of conduit union connections for tightness:

ECP-19

" Exposed Conduit / Junction Box and Hanger Fabrication and Installation",

2323-ES-100

" Electrical Erection Specification".

Records supporting our evaluation will be available for your inspectors review at the CPSES site after December 15, 1987.-

J Ver t uly yours, 1

W. G. Co.unsil By:

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G. S. Keeley x/'

Manager, Nuclear LicensYng DAR/mgt c.- R..D. Martin, Region IV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3)

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