TXX-6334, Final Deficiency Rept CP-87-03 Re Installation of safety- Related 6.9 Kv Switchgear on Structural Embedments.Initially Reported on 870213.Switchgear Will Be Removed & Reinstalled After Concrete Floor & Structural Embedments Reworked
| ML20207S682 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 03/16/1987 |
| From: | Counsil W TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| CP-87-03, CP-87-3, TXX-6334, NUDOCS 8703200171 | |
| Download: ML20207S682 (2) | |
Text
-
a E
log # TXX-6334 File # 10110 1
C 908.3 C
Ref # 10CFR50.55(e) tilELECTRIC
%lhm G. Coumil c m wn, n,ern a.
March 16, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 6.9 KV SWITCHGEAR INSTALLATION SDAR: CP-87-03 (FINAL REPORT)
Gentlemen:
On February 13, 1987, we verbally notified your Mr. I. Barnes of a deficiency involving the installation of the safety-related 6.9kV Switchgear on structural embedments which were not level. We are reporting this issue under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) and the required information follows.
DESCRIPTION Pre-Operational testing for the Unit Two safety-related 6.9kV Switchgear revealed construction deficiencies involving the structural embedments and concrete floor supporting the switchgear. The equipment manufacturer (Brown Boveri) expanded on the scope of the deficient installation by letter on September 5, 1986.
Due to the structural embedments and concrete floor not being level, the switchgear was not installed on a level surface.
Resulting gaps between the switchgear and the floor could cause the metal floors to distort because of breaker weight, which could cause a change in the dimensional relationship between the 6.9kV breaker tulips and the 6.9kV cabinet stabs and, therefore, inadequate contact.
The switchgear, as initially installed, failed to conform to the manufacturer's installation specifications and therefore would not meet the criteria used for the equipment's seismic qualification. However, further equipment qualification will not be required since the reworked installation will meet the original manufacturer's installation specifications.
The scope of this issue includes both Unit One and Unit Two 6.9kV Switchgear.
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS In the event these construction deficiencies had remained uncorrected, the performance of the safety-related 6.9kV Switchgear could not be assured under normal operating and accident conditions.
8703200171 870316 l
PCR ADOCK 05000445 S
.,, _ s_ um,..,_ m,,
i
3 TXX-6334 March 16, 1987 Page 2 of 2 1
CORRECTIVE ACTION The corrective action for this issue will include disconnecting and removing all cables from the safety-related 6.9kV Switchgear, followed by the removal of the switchgear from the structural embedments. After the switchgear is removed, the concrete floor and structural embedments will be reworked in accordance with site issued Design Change Authorizations. After verification of floor levelness is complete, the switchgear will be reinstalled and attached in accordance with the vendor's (Brown Boveri) requirements. After i
cables have been terminated, the switchgear will undergo Pre-Operational testing. The reinstallation and testing of the safety-related 6.9kV Switchgear is scheduled for completion by November 21, 1987.
The scope of this issue has been expanded to include corrective actions associated with SDAR CP-86-14, "6.9 kV Switchgear Breaker Jack Shaft Weld Failure" (See TXX-6341 of March 16,1987).
Very truly yours, l
NWVE W. G. Counsil l
WJH/dl c - Mr. E. H. Johnson - Region IV
)
Mr. D. L. Kelley, RI - Region IV l
Mr. H. S. Phillips, RI - Region IV l
f 4
i l
i
~ -
_ _ _, _ - _ _ _ _, _. - _. _ _ _ _ _