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The inspectors identified a violation of 1The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, because the licensee failed to take corrective actions to preclude repetition of void formation in emergency core cooling system piping, a significant condition adverse to quality. After experiencing void formations in 2005 and 2006, the NRC identified violations of Criterion XVI. However, licensee corrective actions did not preclude repetition of void formations that were discovered on May 21, 2008. On that date, Callaway Plant engineering performed ultrasonic inspection of the safety injection system common suction piping Line EM023-HCB 6 and discovered a 6.6 cubic foot voided area. This exceeded the allowable void fraction of 2.1 cubic feet required for operability. This voided piping, determined to have existed for over a year, was caused by relief valve maintenance on Valve EM8858A (May 7, 2007). The maintenance restoration failed to perform an adequate fill and vent to ensure the suction pipe was full of water. The inspectors identified several related examples where the licensee had performed either inadequate operating experience evaluations, inadequate extent of condition reviews, or inadequate procedure corrections. The violation is being cited in a Notice of Violation because the licensee failed to restore compliance with a reasonable time after a violation was last identified in 2006. This finding, failure to restore compliance to prevent recurrence of emergency core cooling system voids, was more than minor because it is similar to Example 3e of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, criteria because the failure impacted the ability of the emergency core cooling system to function upon initiation of high-pressure recirculation. Using the Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined that this finding should be evaluated using the Phase 2 process described in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. As described in Section III, of Appendix A, given that the presolved table did not contain a suitable target or surrogate for this finding, the senior reactor analyst used the risk-informed notebook to evaluate the significance of this finding as very low risk significance (Green). This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because AmerenUE failed to thoroughly evaluate voiding problems such that the resolutions addressed causes and extent of condition, as necessary (P.1(c) extent of condition, as necessary (P.1(c)  
23:59:59, 30 June 2008  +
05000483  +
23:59:59, 30 June 2008  +
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03:05:24, 30 May 2018  +
23:59:59, 30 June 2008  +
Failure to Prevent Recurrence of Voids in ECCS Cold GET Recirculation Piping  +