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| Quarter | Site | Title | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05000341/FIN-2005012-01 | 2005Q2 | Fermi | Failure to Perform a 10CFR50/54(q) Review to Determine if Changing the Augmentation Process for the Station Nuclear Engineer Decreased the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan | The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) when the process for timely augmentation of on-shift staff was changed for the station nuclear engineer (SNE) position without performing a review to determine if the change decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan. The inspectors determined this change decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan and that the licensee did not obtain prior NRC approval contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance in that changes were made to the emergency response organization augmentation process which were not recognized and corrected by the organization. Because the issue affected the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated with the traditional enforcement process as specified in Section IV.A.3 of the Enforcement Policy. This issue was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because it involved a failure to meet a requirement not directly related to assessment and notification. Further, this problem was isolated to one 30-minute responder position and was not indicative of a functional problem with the emergency response organization augmentation process. Corrective actions included discussions with the SNEs that it was no longer acceptable to remotely activate the 3-D Monocore program to respond to an emergency at the plant instead of responding to the control room and that response to the control room was required within 30 minutes of the declaration of an emergency at the plant. In addition, the Emergency Call Out System test forms were revised to remove the option for the SNE to activate the software remotely in lieu of responding to the control room. |
| 05000346/FIN-2004002-02 | 2004Q1 | Davis Besse | Change to Emergency Plan Without Prior NRC Approval | The inspectors identified that the licensee had changed its standard emergency action level (EAL) scheme by revising one EAL's criteria for a Unusual Event declaration due to the initiation of the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System as a result of a rapid depressurization o the secondary side. The inspectors determined that this EAL change decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan, and that the license did not obtain prior NRC approval for this change, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). Because the issue affected the NRC' ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated with the traditional enforcement process as specified in Section IV.A.3 of the Enforcement Policy. According to Supplement VIII of the Enforcement Policy, this finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV becaus it involved a failure to meet a requirement not directly related to assessment and notification. Further, this problem was isolated to one EA and was not indicative of a functional problem with the EAL scheme. Additionally, because the licensee entered this issue into its correctiv action program and completed adequate corrective actions, this finding is being treated as a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation of 10 CF 50.54(q). |
| 05000341/FIN-2003010-02 | 2003Q4 | Fermi | 10 CFR 50.54(Q) Violation for Decreasing the Effectiveness of the E-PLAN by Changing Eals That Address Toxic Gases Without Prior NRC Approval | Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified that the licensee changed its standard emergency action level (EAL) scheme on December 19, 2000, for those events related to toxic gas releases for Unusual Event and Alert classifications. The inspectors determined these changes decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan, and the licensee did not obtain prior NRC approval, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). Because the issue affected the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated with the traditional enforcement process as specified in Section IV.A.3 of the Enforcement Policy. According to Supplement VIII of the Enforcement Policy, this issue was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because it involved a failure to meet a requirement not directly related to assessment and notification. Further, this problem was isolated to two EALs and was not indicative of a functional problem with the EAL scheme. Because the licensee has entered this issue into its corrective action program it is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation. (Section 1EP4) |
| 05000440/FIN-2003006-04 | 2003Q3 | Perry | Failure to Classify an Alert within 15 Minutes | The inspectors identified an apparent violation having preliminarily low to moderate safety significance when the licensee failed to follow the requirements of the Perry Emergency Plan during an ALERT level event on April 24, 2003. During this event, damage to irradiated fuel caused a high alarm on the fuel handling building ventilation exhaust gaseous radiation monitor. The finding was determined to be greater than minor because it affected the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The finding was preliminarily determined to be of low to moderate safety significance because the licensee failed to implement a risk significant planning standard (10 CFR 50.47(b)(4)) during an actual Alert emergency. (Section 4OA5.2) |
| 05000440/FIN-2003006-03 | 2003Q3 | Perry | Improper Maintenance Causes Emergency Service Water Pump Failure | A self-revealed apparent violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4 occurred when the Division 1 emergency service water (ESW) pump failed during routine pump operation. The licensee rebuilt the pump in 1997 and during this reassembly, failed to properly reassemble the pump shaft connections. The improper reassembly led to pump failure on September 1, 2003. The NRC assessed this finding through Phase 3 of the Significance Determination Process and made a preliminary determination that it is an issue with low to moderate safety significance. |