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| Quarter | Site | Title | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05000395/FIN-2018003-01 | 2018Q3 | Summer | Licensee-Identified Violation | This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. V.C. Summer Operating License condition 2.c(18) states in part that the licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(c), National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 of which Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3, Procedures, states, Procedures shall be established for implementation of the fire protection program. Contrary to the above, on January 10, 2017, the licensee failed to implement an established procedure, FPP-025, Fire Containment, Revision 6D, to ensure fire door DRAB/319 closes and latches on its own power. |
| 05000395/FIN-2018003-02 | 2018Q3 | Summer | Minor Violation | The inspectors concluded that rotation of the safety-related SW pipe support, SWH-4021, was a condition adverse to quality (CAQ) identified in CR-04-01705. The inspectors also concluded that the failure to correct this CAQ was a minor violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, which states in part that CAQs are promptly identified and corrected. Screening: The inspectors determined that the degradation of SWH-4021 was minor based on the absence of any deformed components on the pipe support, and that the respective train of the SW system remained overall operable. The licensee corrected the CAQ during the quarter using WO 1813577, Return SWH-4021 to design requirements. Enforcement: This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. |
| 05000281/FIN-2018002-01 | 2018Q2 | Surry | Failure to Follow Preventative Maintenance Procedure Results in Additional Failures of Emergency Bus Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage Relays | An NRC-identified Green NCV of Surry Technical Specification (TS) 6.4.D was identified for the failure to follow procedure ER-AA-102, Preventative Maintenance Program, which resulted in the Unit 2 H emergency bus degraded voltage (DV) relay failure on March 13, 2018, and the Unit 2 J emergency bus under voltage (UV) relay failure on May 21, 2018, while the unit was operating at rated thermal power (RTP). |
| 05000338/FIN-2014502-01 | 2014Q3 | North Anna | Licensee-Identified Violation | The following LIV of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee, and is a violation of NRC requirements which met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation (NCV). Title 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) requires, in part, that a licensee shall follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan which meets the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). Title 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) requires that a standard EAL scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures. Contrary to the above, from December 30, 2008, to November 6, 2014, the licensee failed to maintain the effectiveness of its emergency plan. Specifically, the standard EAL scheme, Abnormal Rad Release/Rad Effluent-EAL RA2.1 listed an incorrect radiation monitor (Process Vent Normal Range radiation monitor GW-RI-178-1), and should have listed Vent Stack B Normal Range 1-VG-RI-180-1. This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the incorrect EAL only affected Alert declarations. The licensee implemented immediate compensatory actions by issuing a standing order to include the correct radiation monitor, and informed appropriate operators and decision-makers. The issue was placed in their corrective action program as CR531679. |
| 05000413/FIN-2010403-01 | 2010Q2 | Catawba | Security |