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| Quarter | Site | Title | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05000354/FIN-2005005-02 | 2005Q4 | Hope Creek | Review of RCS Leak from Check Valve Position Indicator | The inspectors reviewed procedure HC.ER-AP.BB-0002(Q) Rev. 4, Hope Creek Reactor Recirculation Piping Vibration Monitoring, and its application prior to the June 7, 2005 event. PSEG noted during discussions with the inspectors that the vendor-provided acceptance criteria values in the vibration monitoring procedure were based on large bore piping stresses only, and there would not have been recorded data processed prior to June 2005, that would have led PSEG to inspect the FO50A position indicating device. Operation of the plant with reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary leakage is prohibited by TS 3.4.3.2.a and constitutes a violation of TS requirements. Although PSEG did not identify the position indicator leak until June 7, 2005, and met the associated TS action statement from the point of discovery, it is reasonable to conclude that the pressure boundary leak existed for some in-determinant period of time prior to discovery and during plant operations, contrary to the requirements of the technical specifications, which prohibits plant operation with pressure boundary leakage. However, this fact alone does not constitute a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined the FO50A valve position indicator pressure boundary leakage was of very low safety significance. Assuming worst case degradation, the leakage would not have increased due to internal restriction in the position indicator tube. The leakage would have remained within the capacity of the control rod drive pumps and would not have likely affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The inspectors concluded that the RCS pressure boundary leak resulted from an equipment failure that was not avoidable by the implementation of reasonable quality measures or management controls. The inspectors also concluded that PSEG took appropriate actions to correct the condition and adequately characterized the extent of condition and safety significance. Accordingly, although RCS pressure boundary leakage is a violation of NRC requirements, the NRC has decided to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with VII.B.6 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and refrain from issuing enforcement action for the violation (EA-05-229). |
| 05000354/FIN-2004013-04 | 2004Q4 | Hope Creek | Failure to Adequately Evaluate and Correct a Failed Open Level Control Valve in the Moisture Separator Drain System | A finding of low to moderate safety significance wa identified where engineering staff did not properly evaluate and correct degraded level control valve for the i12Ai12 moisture separator drain tank, as require by station procedures. In addition, engineers did not properly consider a simila occurrence from 1988. The level control valve failed 25 days prior to the even and caused the moisture separator drain system to operate in a condition outsid its design. As a result, an 8-inch pipe in that system failed and caused the even on October 10, 2004 This issue is greater than minor because it is associated with the Equipmen Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected th objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability an challenge critical safety functions. A Significance Determination Process Phas 2 risk analysis determined that this finding had low to moderate safet significance based on the increased frequency of a transient with the loss of th power conversion system initiating event over the 25-day exposure period. (Section 3.3) |