PNO-IV-98-043, on 980922,NRC Operation Ctr Notified That Criticality Safety Specialist Noted Visible Accumulations of Solids in Disassembled Sections of Ductwork.Training Planned for Disassembly Crew in Aspects of Safety Requirements

PNO-IV-98-043:on 980922,NRC Operation Ctr Notified That Criticality Safety Specialist Noted Visible Accumulations of Solids in Disassembled Sections of Ductwork.Training Planned for Disassembly Crew in Aspects of Safety Requirements

ML20153D299
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	09/23/1998
From:	Collins E, Linda Howell NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
References
PNO-IV-98-043, PNO-IV-98-43, NUDOCS 9809250018
Download: ML20153D299 (1)

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September 23,1998 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-IV-98-043 This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by Region IV staff in Arlington, Texas on this date.

Facility Licensee Emeraency Classification Siemens Nuclear Power Corporation Notification of Unusual Event Siemens Nuclear Power Corporation Alert  :

Richland, Washington Site Area Emergency l Dockets: 07001257 License No: SNM-1227 General Emergency l X Not Applicable l

Subject:

DlSCOVERY OF APPROXIMATELY 9.2 KG OF SOLID, LOW ENRICHED l

URANIUM IN DISASSEMBLED DUCTWORK (NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT) l On September 22,1998, Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) notified the NRC Operations l Center that a Criticality Safety Specialist noted visible accumulations of solids in I disassembled sections of ductwork. These sections of ductwork were part of the plant being permanently shutdown (Ammonium Diuranate Conversion Line-1). The visible solids were removed from the ductwork, sampled, and placed into authorized storage within four hours of discovery Analysis determined that the solids contained approximately 9.2 kg of low l

enriched uranium (< 5% 235U). 1 Staff investigation determined that personnel had completed all the required routine and pre-job equipment surveillance, but contrary to criticality safety requirements, the disassembly crew did not have a process operator remove visible solids from the ductwork prior to placing it in an accumulation area. This constituted a loss of mass and geometry control. Some ductwork had an unfavorable cross-section area Moderation control was maintained. It was determined that the mass of the removed material was less than 26% of the minimum critical mass.

Disassembly activities have been discontinued and will not restart until a thorough review of the event is complete. Training is planned for the disassembly crew in the aspects of the safety requirements associated with the ductwork disassembly. The licensee estimated that the work would restart by September 24.

NMSS has been informed of this occurrence. The state of Washington has been informed.

This information is current as of 5:00 p.m. (CDT), September 22,1998.

Contact:

Elmo Collins Linda Howell (817)860-8291 (817)860-8213 oL 9809250018 980923 \ (, 9 '

PDR I&E \

PNO-IV-98-043 PDR g\