NUREG/CR-0130, Responds to Encl to President Carter Re Nuclear Power Plants.Presidential 791207 Statement on Kemeny Commission Rept on TMI-2 & Excerpts from NUREG-0662 & NUREG/CR-0130 Encl

Responds to Encl to President Carter Re Nuclear Power Plants.Presidential 791207 Statement on Kemeny Commission Rept on TMI-2 & Excerpts from NUREG-0662 & NUREG/CR-0130 Encl

ML19320C817
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	05/12/1980
From:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Brucker L AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
References
NUDOCS 8007180067
Download: ML19320C817 (16)

Text

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MAY 121980 Ms. Linn W. Brucker 3404 Maltche Drive Columbus, Georgia 31907

Dear Ms. Brucker:

This is in reply to your letter of March 6,1980, to President Carter about nuclear power plants.

Enclosed for your information is a statement of December 7,1979, by the President on the Kemeny Commission Report on Three Mile Island.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is committed to protect the public health and safety. The Three Mile Island accident resulted in a need for changes in the approach to safety. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has found that actions recommended by its own staff and by the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island in the areas of human factors, operational safety, emergency planning, nuclear power plant design and siting, health effects, and public information ara necessary and feasible.

Interim measures have been taken and other actions will follow.

With regard to your question about venting radioactive gas in the damaged reactor at Three Mile Island, you may be interested in the enclosed excerpt from NRC Report NUREG-0662 on " Environmental Assessment for Decontamination of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor Building Atmosphere," March 1980.

As to your question about the nuclear plant at Savannah River, we have no information tnat it is leaking. This is a plant of the Department of Energy and not one licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

In connection with your question about decommissioning nuclear power plants, you may be interested in the enclosed excerpt from NRC Report NUREG/CR-0130 on " Technology, Safety and Costs of Decommissioning a Reference Pressurized Water Reactor Power Station," June 1978.

I trust that you will find this information helpful.

Sincerely, 94

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Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

As stated

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FOR It0*EDIATE REl. EASE DECE.v3ER 7,19 79 OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE EEME:;Y CO!OiISSION REPORT ON THREE MILE ISLAND Room 450, Old Executive Office Building (AT 2:45 P.M. EST)

THE PRESIDENT:

The purpose of this brief statment this af ternoon is to outline to you and to the public, both in this country and in other nations of the world, my own assessment of the Kemeny Report recommendations on the Three Mile Island accident and I would like to add, of course, in the presentation some thoughts and actions of my cwn.

I have reviewed the report of the Commission, which I established to investigate the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. The Commission, headed by Dr..Tohn Kemeny, found very serious shortcomings in the way that both the Government and the utility industry regulate and manage nuclear power.

The steps that I am taking today wic t help to assure diat nuclear power plants are operated safely. Safety, as it always has been and will remain, is my top priority. As I have said before, in this country nuclear power is an energy source of last resort. 3y this I meant that as we reach our goals on conservation, on the direct use of coal, on development of solar power and synthetic fuels, and enhanced production of American oil and natural gas, as we reach those goals, then we can minimize our reliance on nuclear power.

Many of our foreign allies must place much greater reliance than we do on nuclear power, because they do not have the vast natural resources that give us so many alternatives. We must get on with the job of developing alternative energy resources and we must also pass, in order to do this, the legislation that I have proposed to the Congress, making an effort at every level of society to conserve energy.

To conserve energy and to develop energy resources in our country are the two basic answers for which we are seeking. But we cannot shut the door on nuclear power for the United States.

The recent events in Iran have shown us the clear stark dangers that excessive dependence on imported oil holds for our nation.

We must make every effort to lead this country to energy security.

Every dcmestic energy source, including nuclear power, is critical if are to be f ree as a country f rom our present over-dependence on we unstable and uncertain sources of high priced foreign oil.

We do not have the luxury of abandoning nuclear power or imposing a lengthy neratorium on its further use.

A nuclear power plant can displace 35,000 barrels of oil per day, or roughly 13 million barrels of oil per year. We must take every possible step to increase the safety of nuclear power production. I agree fully with the letter and the spirit and the intent of the Kemeny Commission recommenfations, some of which are within my own power to implement, rthers of vnich rcly on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or the RC. or the utility indus try itself.

I To get tr.e Government's own house in :rder I wil. take Md

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o Firs, I will send to the Congress a reorganization plan several steps.

to strengthen the role of the Chairman of the NRC, to clarify assignrent of authority and responsibility and provide this person with the power to act on a daily basis as a chief executive of ficer, with authority to put needed safety recuirements in place and to implement better p rocedures. The Chairsan must be able to select key personnel aid to act on behalf of the Ccemission during any emergency.

Second, I intend to appoint a new Chairperson of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, someone f ron outside that agency, in the spirit of the Kemony Commission reconnendation. In the meantime, I have asked Commissioner Ahearne, now on the NRC, to serve as the Chairman.

Mr. Ahearne will stress safety and the prompt implementation of the needed reforms.

In addition, I will establish an independent advisory committee to help keep me and the public of the United States informed of the progress of the NRC and the industry in achieving and in making clear the recommendations that nuclear pcwer will be safer.

Third, I am transferring responsibility to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the FE::A, to head up all off-site emergency activities, and to complete a thorough review of emergency plans in all the states of our country with operating nuclear reactors by June,19 80.

Fourth, I have directed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the other agencies of the Government to accelerate our program to place a resident Federal inspector at every reactor site.

Fif th, I am asking all relevant Government agencies to implement virtually all of the other recommendations of the Kameny Commission. I believe there were 44 in all.

A detailed factsneet is being issued to the public and a more extended briefing will be given to the press this af ternoon.

With clear leadership and improved organization, the

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Executive Branch of Government and the NRC will be better able to act quickly on the crucial issues of improved training and standards, saf ety procedures, and the other Xemeny Commission recommendations.

But responsibility to make nuclear power safer does not stop with the Federal Government.

n fact, the primary day by day responsibility for safety rests with utility company management and with suppliers of nuclear equipment. There is no substitute for technically qualified and committed people working on the construction, the operation, and the inspection of nucletr power plants.

Personal responsibility must be stressed. Some one person must always be designated as in charge. both at the corporate level and also at the power plant site. The industry owes it to the American people to strengthen its commitment to safety.

I call on 2.c utilities to implement the following changes; first, building on the steps already taken, the industry must organize itself to develop enhanced standards for safe design, operation, and construction of plants second, the nuclear industry must work together to develcp and to r.aintain in operation a comprehensive training, examinatien, and evaluation program for operators and for supervisors.

This training program must pass muster with the URO through accreditation cf tne training prograr.s to be established.

Third, control roons in nuclear power plants must be modernized, standardized, and simplified as Luch as possible, to permit Y.3 nE

s better inforMod decision-making among regular operating hours and, of coursc, during emergencies.

I challenge our utility companies to bend every ef fort to improve the safety of nuclear power.

Finally, I would like to discuss how we manage this transition period during which the Kemeny recommendations are beir; implemented. There are a number of new nuclear plants now awaiting operating licenses or construction permits. Under law, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is an independent agency. Licensing decisions rest with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and as the Kereny Commission noted, it has the authority to proceed with licensing these plants on a case by case basis, which may be used as circumstances currounding a plant or its application dictate.

The NRC has indicated, however, that it will pause in issuing any new licenses and construction permits in order to devote its full attention to putting its own house in order and tightening up safety requirements. I endorse this approach which the NRC has adopted, but I urge the NRC to complete its work as quickly as possible and in no event later than six months frem today. Once we have instituted the necessary reforms to assure safety, we must resume the licensing process promptly so that the new plants we need to reduce our dependence on foreign oil can be built and operated.

The steps I am announcing today will help to insure the safety of nuclear plants. Nuclear power does have a future in the United States.

It is an option that we must keep open. I will join with tha utilities and their suppliers, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and also the state and local governments to assure that the future is a safe one.

Now Dr. Frank Press, Stu Eirenstat, and John Lau sch will be glad to answer your questions about these decisions and about nuclear power and the future of 8.t in our country. Frank?

3:00 P.M. EST)

END m

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NUREG-0662 Environmental Assessment for Decontamination of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 i

Reactor Building Atmosphere f

Draft NRC Staff Report For Public Comment ma

$Es Pu h arch 1 TMI Support' Staff Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20665 I

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1-1 1.0 Summary and Recommendations The krypton-85 (Kr-85) released to the reactor building during the accident at TMI-2 must be removed from the reactor building in order to permit greater access to the building than is currently possible. The gases currently in the building emit sufficient radiation (1.2 rea/hr total body,150 rad /hr skin dose) that occupation of the reactor building is severely limited even with protective clothing. Greater access is likely to be necessary to maintain instrumentation and equipment required to keep the reactor in a safe shutdown condition.

In addition greater access would facilitate the gathering of data An additional needed for planning the building decontamination program.

consideration is that prolonged enclosure of the Kr-85 within the building greatly increases the risk of its successive uncontrolled releases to the outside environment.

The staff's evaluation of alternative methods for removing the krypton shows that each could be implemented with little risk to the health and safety of the public. The reactor building purge system, charcoal adsorption system, gas compression, selective absorption process system, and cryogenic processing system could each be operated to keep levels of airborne radioactive materials to unrestricted areas in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Par + ?-

(Ref. 1), and the design objectives of Appendix I to 10 CFR rart 50 of the l

Commission's regulations (Ref. 2), and with the applicabie requirements of 40 CFR Part 190.10 (Ref. 3).

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Table 1.1 shows the environmental impact of each alternative for removing the i

Kr-85 from the reactor building atmosphere.

i Because the integrity and operability of components within (and part of) the j

reactor building are important to continued safe shutdown and inhibiting future radioactive releases to the environment, one of the most important factors in any decontamination option is the time required for its implementation.

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The Kr-85 in the reactor building has prevented maintenance of internal I

reactor-building components for about a year.

All options for removal of the j

Kr-85 to allow access to the reactor building, e.vcept for the purge option, i

would require at least 1-1/2 sdditional years to implement.

This time would t

be required for design and procurement, installation, testing, and operation of new systems.

The alternative of purging the reactor building atmosphere -through the hydrogen control system is clearly the most expeditious method available for removing the krypton.

It also results in the greatest environmental impact in terms of public dose during normal operations, even though such doses are well within articable regulations (Refs. 1, 2).

The other alternatives take much longer to implement and also require either long-term storage of large quantities of charcoal containing Kr-85 or long-term storage of large quantities of pressurized Kr-85 gas in piping or vessels.

Inherent in tnese storage methods is the risk of subsequent accidentai releases of the krypton due to either failure of the storage containers or operator error.

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1-3 Table 1.2 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of each of the alternative methods evaluated for removing the krypton from the reactor building atmosphere.

The staff is fully aware of the public sentiment against the planned or accidental release of any further radioactive materials from THI-2, regardless of how small the dose consequences are suspected to be.

Particular concern has been expressed against purging the Kr-85.

However, based on past experience, it is likely that future accidental releases or operational incidents will occur if storage is continued. The possiblity of future accidental releases is also increased by continued reliance on unmaintained equipment.

The staff therefore believes that a balance must be struck between the impact of a onetime preplanned release of krypton (and its additional benefits of allowing component maintenance inside the reactor building and the cleanup process) versus the impact of one or more accidental smaller releases while storing the Kr-85 for 1-1/2 years or more for subsequent low-impact processing (and its negative-effect of precluding significant work inside of the building during this period). The staff is unable to determine that the cumulative psychological stress resulting from the threat or actual occurrence of one or more minor releases over a 1-1/2 year period is not more significant than the stress that would result from a single larger but preplanned krypton release.

With all of the above considerations in mind, the staff recommends that purging i

of the reactor building atmosphere to the environment be selected as the decontamination option for disposal of the Kr-85.

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1-4 I

Based on our estimate of doses to the public from releases during the decontam-

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ination of the reactor building atmosphere by purging through the hydrogen I

control system, and our estimate of occupational dose, the staff concludes that this action does not constitute a tignificant environmental impact and that the environmental impacts for each of the alternative methods would be N

less than those considered in the TMI Final Environmental Statement (Ref. 4).

P The staff concludes that the health and safety of the public will not be g

endangered by operation of the system in the proposed manner and that such activities can and will be conducted in full compliance with the Comission's regulations (Refs. 1, 2). Accordingly, the staff does not propose to prepare i

a separate Environmental Impact Statement on this action.

i In accordance with the Commission's Nov. 21, 1979, " Statement of Policy and j

Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programatic Environmental Impact Statement" l

(see Appendix A), this staff Environmental Assessment is be.ing submitted to the Comission for their review and discussion.

In addition, the President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) is being consulted on this.

Coments are also being solicited from the public.

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i Table 1.1 Environmental Impacts of Alternatives for Removing the Krypton-85 from the Reactor Building Atmosphere Total Offsite Dose to Maximum Exposed Individual Method Normal Processing Accidents Occupational Exposures Reactor Building Beta skin dose -

Beta skin dose - 25 mres 1.3 person-ren Purge 11 mren Total body gamma dose - 0.3 aren Total body gamma dose -

0.2 mren Charcoal Absorption Less than Cryogenic Ambient Charcoal System 47 person-ree Systems Processing System Beta skin dose - 41 aren Total body gamma dose - 0.5 arem Refrigerated Charcoal System Beta skin dose - 124 mrem Total body gamma dose - 1.5 mrem

)k Gas Compression Less than Cryogenic Beta skin dose - 410 mres 42 person-rem System Processing System Total body gamma dose - 5 mrem -

Cryogenic Processing Beta skin dose -

Beta skin dose - 1700 mrem 137-255 person-rem System 0.01 mrem Total body gamma dose - 20 aren Total Body Gamma dose -

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less than 0.0002 mrem Selective Absorption Less than Cryogenic Absorption Process 45 person-res Process System Processing System Beta skin dose - 6 mrem Total body gamma dose - 0.1 mrem Cas Storage Beta skin dose - 1700 mrem Total body gamma dose - 20 mrem i

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Table 1.2 Comparison Among Alternatives for Removing the Arypton from the Reactor Building Atmosphere Estimated Method Advantages Disadvantages Installation Cost Reactor Building

. Immediately available for use

. Beta skin dose - 11 mrem

$75,000 Purge

. Noncomplex system Total body gamma dose -

(licensee estimate)

. Known technology 0.2 mrem

. No further uncontrolled

. Stress censiderations releases after purging associated with release

. No requirement for long term storage and surveillance of Kr-85 Charcoal Adsorption

. Offsite dose effects less than

. 2-4 year delay

$120-160 million Cryogenic Processing System

. Long-term storage and (licensee estimate)

. Known technology surveillance of Kr-85

. Ambient Charcoal System in large volume of charcoal

- noncomplex system

. Possible future uncontrolled releases of Kr-85.

. Refrigerated Charcoal System 4,

- complex system Gas Compression

. Offsite dose effects less

. 2-4 year delay

$50-75 million System than Cryogenic Processing System. Long-term storage and (licensee estimate)

. Knnwn technology surveillance of Kr-85

. Noncomplex system, but under under pressure

. Possible future uncontrolled pressure releases of Kr-85.

Cryogenic Processing

. Beta skin dose - 0.01 mrem

. 20-30 month delay

$10-15 million System

. Total body gamma dose

. Complex system.

(licensee estimate)

- 0.0002 mrem

. Long-term storage and

. Known technology surveillance of Kr-85

. Possible future uncontrolled releases of Kr-85.

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l Table 1.2 (Continued)

Estimated Method Advantages Disadvantages Installation Cost Selective Absorption

. Offsite dose effects less

. 2-4 year delay

$4-10 million Process System than Cryogenic Processing

. Process has only operated on (staff estimate)

System small scale units.

. Complex system.

. Long-term storage and surveillance of Kr-85

. Possible future uncontrolled releases of Kr-85.

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NUREG/CR-0130 Vol.1 TECHNOLOGY, SAFETY AND COSTS OF DECOMMISSIONING A REFERENCE PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR POWER STATION E )( C E R P T R.1. Smith G. J. Konzek W. E. Kennedy, Jr.

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Manuscript Completed: May 1978 Date Published: June 1978 Battelle Pacific Northwest Laborato:y Battelle Boulevard Richland,WA 99352 Division of Engineering Standards Office of Standards Development U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Under FIN No. B21178

a ABSTRACT Safety and cost infomation was developed for the conceptual

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1175MW(e) pressurized water reactor (PWR) power decomissioning of a large

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station. Two approaches to decomissioning, Imediate Dismantlement and Safe Storage With Deferred Dismantlement, were studied to obtain comparisons between costs, occupational radiation doses, potential radiation dose to the public, and other safety impacts.

Immediate Dismantlement was estimated to require about six years to complete, including two years of planning and preparation prior to final reactor shutdown, at a cost of $42 million, 'and accumulated occupational radiation dose, excluding transport operations, of about 1200 man-rem.

Preparations for Safe Storage were estimated to require about three years to complete, including 1-1/2 years for planning and preparation prior to final reactor shutdown, at a cost of $13 million and an accumulated occupational radiation dose of about 420 man-rem. The cost of continuing care during the Safe Storage period was estimated to be about $80 thousand annually.

Accumulated occupational radiation dose during the Safe Storage period was estimated to range from about 10 man-rem for the first 10 years.to about 14 man-rem after 30 years or more.

The cost of decomissioning by Safe Storage wii.h Deferred Dismantlement was estimated to be slightly higher than Imediate Dismantlement. Cost reductions resulting from reduced volumes of radioactive material for disposal, due to the decay of the radioactive containments during the defement period, are offset by the accumulated costs of surveillance and maintenance during the Safe Storage period. All costs are given in terms of constant 1978 dollars.

The decommissioning by permanent entombment of a PWR that had been operated for 20 to 30 years or more was found to be unsatisfactory because:

1) the 59 94 radiationdoseratesfromthelong-Iivedradionuclides Ni and Nb in the activated reactor vessel internals remain well above unrestricted release levels for a period of time far exceeding the known lifetime of any man-made structure, and 2) permanent entombment results in the.prolif;tstion of sites permanently comitted to the containment of radioactive materials.

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The principal incentive for deferring dismantlement comes from the reduction of radiation exposure that can be achievec. Compared with Immediate Dismantlement, deferral for 10 years reduced the estimated total radiation dose by about 40%; for 30 years, by more than 60%. Deferral of dismantlement beyond 30 years does not produce a significant further reduction in total radiation dose since most of the exposure is accumulated during the preparation for Safe Storage, rather than during Deferred Dismantlement.

The safety impacts of the decommissioning operations on the public were found to be small, compared with those of the operating power station. The principal impact on the public is the radiation dose resulting from the transport of radioactive materials to a disposal site.

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3404 Malatche Drive Columbus, Georgia 31907 March 6, 1980 President Jimy Carter Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Yesterday I attended a lecture on campus dealing with nuclear j.

power. He speaker was Helen Caldicott who is the author of " Nuclear lt Madness" and the main focus of her talk was the accident at Three Mile

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Island. hhen I came out of the session -I-was frightened _ancLmad:

r frightened because we_came.within 30 minutes of a holocaust; and mad because I believed you when you siid'everything was OK with nuclear power. To follow that up, I listened to Mr. Adhem (head of the nuclear registration comission?) this morning of " Good Morning America" and to my way of thinking, he substanciated much of what Mrs. Caldicott was saying.

So the bottom line is there is an election this November and I want to know the tmth about nuclear power before I VOTE.

I WILL NOT VUTE FOR YOU AGAIN (infact I will work against you) unless you change your stand regarding nuclear power or you make me a believer.

I live one hr.

from your home in Plains. Perhaps you might come to my home and answer a few questions:

1.

How are they going to vent the contaminated gas that is trapped in the damaged reactor at Three tille Island without contaminating the environment?

2.

Is the nuclear plant at Savanah, Georgia leaking?

3.

How can we continue to build new plants when we don't even know how to decomission the old ones?

Ee thing that fmstrates me most is that this letter will be answered by some FLINKIE on your staff and you will not be sble to respond to these very real concerns that I have or even be aware that I expressed them.

I understand that the President of the United States is an extremely busy man to say the least but I also understand that as President, you have a responsibility to me a.s a citizen.

I dare you to make a nuclear power believer out of me!

SincerelyM

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v[LinnW.Brucker