NRC Generic Letter 1986-13
| ML031150257 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/23/1986 |
| From: | Miraglia F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| GL-86-013, NUDOCS 8607230265 | |
| Download: ML031150257 (3) | |
II.
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 JUL 23 1986 TO: ALL POWER REACTOR LICENSEES AND APPLICANTS WITH COMBUSTION
ENGINEERING AND BABCOCK AND WILCOX PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN PLANT SAFETY ANALYSES AND TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS (Generic Letter 86-13 )
inconsistency The purpose of this letter is to advise you of a potential between Technical Specifications and FSAR safety analyses.
discovered a In June 1984, Westinghouse informed the staff that they had and the safety potential inconsistency between the Technical Specifications In a analyses when a plant is in Mode 3 of operation (hot standby). documented the memorandum to the staff dated July 9, 1984, Westinghouse in Mode 3, the Technical inconsistency (NS-EPR-2935). When a plant is to be in Specifications may have required only one reactor coolant pump (which may have operation whereas the safety analysis presented in the FSAR
analysis in Mode 2) assumed that been presented only in terms of a bounding 3 events.
operation for Mode two or more reactor coolant pumps were in break, rod When Westinghouse reanalyzed the affected events (i.e., steamline only one ejection, and bank withdrawal from subcritical) in Mode 3 with that the FSAR analysis reactor coolant pump in operation, they concluded from subcritical remained bounding except for the control rod bank withdrawal criteria "may not be conditions'. For this event, they concluded that the DNBR
The Westinghouse plants have met when only one pump is in operation."
evaluated this inconsistency and some plants have proposed Technical Specification revisions or analyzed for the event.
and B&W designed We believe this situation may be equally applicable to CE the NRC that the plants. Representatives of both CE and B&W have notified to be operating, safety analyses assume more than one reactor coolant pump adequacy of but that no analysis exists which demonstrates directly the the current Technical Specifications.
you to review your In view of the potential for an inconsistency, we encourage for your FSAR and Technical Specifications for applicability of the problem plant(s). You may also wish to examine your Technical Specifications, this inconsistency procedures or other administrative controls to determine if that a dis- exists in Modes 4&5. Westinghouse plants which have determined to remedy this problem by: (1) proposing crepancy exists (Mode 3) have chosen within the revised Technical Specifications to ensure that the plant remains carrying out, and including in the next analyzed limits of the FSAR, or (2) and shows that FSAR update, an analysis which bounds the single loop operation consider this the applicable criteria are not violated. You might wish to approach if the discrepancy exists for your facility.
86723 65() D
-2- This generic letter is for information only and does not involve any reporting requirements. Therefore, no clearance from the Office of Management and Budget is required.
Frank J. aglia, ctor Division of PWR Licensing-B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
-2- This generic letter is for information only and does not involve any reporting requirements. Therefore, no clearance from the Office of Management and Budget is required.
rOriginal signed by
7rank J. Viraglia Frank J. Miraglia, Director Division of PWR Licensing-B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FOB - F. -B l d -
A/ knD: A
ACapptcci:js W. Regan D. Crutchfieli i F. M glia
07/!6 /86 07/,
//86 07// f/86 07/' 1 /86 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY