ML993640216
| ML993640216 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/23/1999 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML993640216 (21) | |
Text
April 23, 1999 Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN:
Mr. J. A. Scalice Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice President 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-327/99-02 AND 50-328/99-02
Dear Mr. Scalice:
This refers to the inspection conducted on February 14, 1999 through March 27, 1999, at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant facility. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection.
During the inspection period, your conduct of activities at the Sequoyah facility was generally characterized by good maintenance and plant support. Operations was considered to be acceptable. Engineering support was considered to be acceptable.
During the inspection period, the NRC received responses dated March 2, 1999 and March 19, 1999, to Notices of Violation transmitted to you with NRC Inspection Reports 50-327/98-11-01 and 50-327/98-11-02, respectively. We have evaluated your responses and found that they meet the requirements of 10 CFR 2.201. We have examined the implementation of your corrective actions during this inspection period and found the corrective actions acceptable.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV),
consistent with Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy. The NCV is described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violation or the severity level of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
TVA 2
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Sincerely, (Original signed by Paul E. Fredrickson)
Paul E. Fredrickson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-327, 50-328 License Nos. DPR-77, DPR-79
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report cc w/encl:
Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Jack A. Bailey, Vice President Engineering and Technical Services Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Masoud Bajestani Site Vice President Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority ET 10H 400 West Summit Hill Drive Knoxville, TN 37902 cc w/encl continued: See page 3
TVA 3
cc w/encl: Continued N. C. Kazanas, General Manager Nuclear Assurance Tennessee Valley Authority 5M Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Mark J. Burzynski, Manager Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 4X Blue Ridge 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Pedro Salas, Manager Licensing and Industry Affairs Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 D. L. Koehl, Plant Manager Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 Michael H. Mobley, Director Division of Radiological Health TN Dept. of Environment and Conservation 3rd Floor, LNC Annex 401 Church Street Nashville, TN 37243-1532 County Executive Hamilton County Courthouse Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
April 23, 1999 Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN:
Mr. J. A. Scalice Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice President 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-327/99-02 AND 50-328/99-02
Dear Mr. Scalice:
This refers to the inspection conducted on February 14, 1999 through March 27, 1999, at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant facility. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection.
During the inspection period, your conduct of activities at the Sequoyah facility was generally characterized by good maintenance and plant support. Operations was considered to be acceptable. Engineering support was considered to be acceptable.
During the inspection period, the NRC received responses dated March 2, 1999 and March 19, 1999, to Notices of Violation transmitted to you with NRC Inspection Reports 50-327/98-11-01 and 50-327/98-11-02, respectively. We have evaluated your responses and found that they meet the requirements of 10 CFR 2.201. We have examined the implementation of your corrective actions during this inspection period and found them acceptable.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV),
consistent with Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy. The NCV is described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violation or the severity level of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
TVA 2
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Sincerely, (Original signed by Paul E. Fredrickson)
Paul E. Fredrickson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-327, 50-328 License Nos. DPR-77, DPR-79
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report cc w/encl:
Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Jack A. Bailey, Vice President Engineering and Technical Services Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Masoud Bajestani Site Vice President Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority ET 10H 400 West Summit Hill Drive Knoxville, TN 37902 cc w/encl continued: See page 3
TVA 3
cc w/encl: Continued N. C. Kazanas, General Manager Nuclear Assurance Tennessee Valley Authority 5M Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Mark J. Burzynski, Manager Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 4X Blue Ridge 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Pedro Salas, Manager Licensing and Industry Affairs Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 D. L. Koehl, Plant Manager Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority P. O. Box 2000 Soddy Daisy, TN 37379 Michael H. Mobley, Director Division of Radiological Health TN Dept. of Environment and Conservation 3rd Floor, LNC Annex 401 Church Street Nashville, TN 37243-1532 County Executive Hamilton County Courthouse Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Distribution w/encl:
L. R. Plisco, RII H. N. Berkow, NRR R. W. Hernan, NRR W. C. Bearden, RII C. F. Smith, RII Distribution w/encl continued: See page 4
TVA 4
Distribution w/encl: Continued D. W. Jones, RII D. H. Thompson, RII L. S. Mellen, RII PUBLIC NRC Resident Inspector, Operations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, TN 37381 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP SIGNATURE NAME P Taylor alt 04/22/99 M Shannon 04/22/99 D Starkey 04/22/99 R Telson 04/22/99 DATE 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 COPY?
YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: R:\\PLTDATA\\RPTS\\SEQ\\99\\9902DRP.WPD
Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket Nos:
50-327, 50-328 License Nos:
50-327/99-02, 50-328/99-02 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facility:
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location:
Sequoyah Access Road Hamilton County, TN 37379 Dates:
February 14 through March 27, 1999 Inspectors:
M. Shannon, Senior Resident Inspector D. Starkey, Resident Inspector R. Telson, Resident Inspector Approved by:
P. Fredrickson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-327/99-02, 50-328/99-02 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance and engineering. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
Operations A Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for failure to perform a proper independent verification when tagging out a safety injection pump. This failure resulted in the racking out and tagging of an incorrect 6.9 kV safety related breaker (Section O1.2).
Fuel handling personnel were thorough in the handling and inspection of new fuel for the U2C9 refueling outage (Section O1.3).
The Management Review Committee was effectively performing its duties and senior plant management was actively involved in the committee meetings (Section O7.1).
Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated throughout the inspection period at 100 per cent power.
Unit 2 began coasting down from 100 per cent power on February 20, 1999, in preparation for a refueling outage scheduled to start on April 18, 1999. When the inspection period ended the unit was at approximately 74 per cent power.
I. Operations O1 Conduct of Operations O1.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was considered to be satisfactory.
O1.2 Improper Independent Verification During Tag Out of Safety-Related Breaker
- a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances related to operators disconnecting, tagging out, and then independently verifying the wrong 6.9 kV safety related breaker while placing a hold order.
- b.
Observations and Findings On February 26, 1999, two assistant unit operators (AUO), using Hold Order 2-HO-99-0623, were dispatched to the 2A-A 6.9 kV shutdown board to tag out the breaker for the 2A-A safety injection pump for a scheduled maintenance activity on the pump. According to the licensees investigation, the first AUO, responsible for placing the hold order, located the correct breaker, compartment 15, specified on the hold order. He then left the area to obtain a racking tool, but failed upon return to reidentify the correct breaker. As a
result, the AUO mistakenly racked out and tagged the adjacent breaker, compartment 16, which was the alternate feeder breaker to the 2A-A 6.9 kV shutdown board. (This did not result in the 2A-A 6.9 kV shutdown board being inoperable). When the second AUO arrived to perform the independent verification for the hold order, he compared the hold order tags to the hold order sheet but did not verify that the tags were hung on the correct breaker. Maintenance personnel walking down the hold order clearance, prior to beginning work, identified the tagging error which was then corrected.
The inspectors reviewed Site Standard Practice Procedure SSP-12.6, Equipment Status Verification and Checking Program, Revision 10, for licensee expectations regarding independent verification. SSP-12.6, Section 5.0, defines independent verification, in part, as an act performed...that confirms, substantiates, or ensures that an activity or condition has been implemented in conformance with specified requirements. SSP-12.6, Section 3.3.1, states that independent verification is required for the components listed in Appendix A of SSP-12.6, which includes the emergency core cooling system.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings requires that Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures......and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions and procedures for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. The failure to perform a proper independent verification as required by SSP-12.6 is identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings. The violation is
3 identified as a Non-cited Violation (NCV) 50-328/99-02-01, Failure to perform proper independent verification when tagging out SI pump 2A-A. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
This violation is in the licensees corrective action program as Problem Evaluation Report (PER) No. SQ99001610PER.
- c.
Conclusions One NCV was identified for failure to perform a proper independent verification when tagging out a safety injection pump. The failure resulted in the racking out and tagging of an incorrect 6.9 kV safety related breaker.
O1.3 New Fuel Receipt and Handling
- a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
During this inspection period the inspectors observed the licensees receipt and inspection of new fuel for the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage (U2C9).
- b.
Observations and Findings Inspectors conducted frequent observations of the receipt and inspection of new fuel for the U2C9 refueling outage. The inspectors verified that the licensee conducted the receipt and inspections
4 according to Fuel Handling Instruction Procedure, FHI-1, Receiving, Returning, Inspecting and Storing New Fuel and Inserts, Revision 53.
The inspectors observed that the AUOs and the fuel handling senior reactor operator (SRO) were thorough and meticulous in performing the fuel inspections.
- c.
Conclusions Fuel handling personnel were thorough in the handling and inspection of new fuel for the U2C9 refueling outage.
O7.1 Review of Management Review Committee
- a.
Inspection Scope (40500)
The inspectors observed the performance of the Management Review Committee (MRC) on several occasions during this report period.
5
- b.
Observations and Findings The inspectors attended several MRC meetings over the course of the inspection period. The committee is chaired by the plant manager and is normally attended by the site vice president and various department managers. The inspectors observed that senior managers closely reviewed the root causes and corrective actions associated with individual PERs to ensure that deficient conditions were adequately addressed. Senior management oversight continued to be evident during MRC meetings and has resulted in increased emphasis on root cause identification and corrective actions.
- c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the MRC was effectively performing its duties and that senior plant management was actively involved in the MRC.
O8 Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
O8.1 (Closed) LER 50-327/98003: Reactor Trip Resulting from a Failure of a Vital Inverter and a Subsequent Inverter Failure. This event was discussed in Inspection Report (IR) 50-327, 328/98-11. No new issues were revealed by the LER.
O8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-327/98-11-01: Failure to Enter TS 3.0.3 When LCO for TS 3.3.1.1 was not met. The inspector verified the
6 corrective actions described in the licensees response letter, dated March 2, 1999, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identified.
O8.3 (Closed) Violation 50-327/98-11-02: Failure to Follow EOP Resulting in Exceeding RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits. The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensees revised response letter, dated March 19, 1999, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identified.
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments
- a. Inspection Scope (61726 & 62707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing maintenance and surveillance activities.
- b. Observations and Findings The inspectors observed and/or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities and/or surveillances:
7 WR C442756 Identify and repair source of electrical short in auxiliary control room panel WO 99001993 Repair U2 TDAFW trip and throttle valve
- c.
Conclusions The above maintenance and surveillance activities were completed in accordance with procedures and performed by knowledgeable personnel.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-327/97013, Revision 2: Missed Surveillance as a Result of an Inadequate Procedure. Revision 2 of this LER was issued when additional conditions were identified during the performance of the corrective actions of the LER. On December 16, 1998, plant personnel determined that two penetration over-current protection fuses were not included in the surveillance program. One of the fuses supplied power to the Unit 1 reactor building code call (medical/fire alarm) system. The other fuse supplied power to the Unit 2 backup control instrument loops. Upon identification of the missed surveillance, operations personnel entered the appropriate TS action statement and subsequently verified that the fuses met the surveillance requirements. The appropriate procedures were then revised to include the fuses. Other than the identification of the two fuses which were not surveilled, identified during the licensees extent of condition review, no new issues were revealed by Revision 2 of the LER.
8 Revision 0 to this LER was discussed and closed in IR 50-327, 328/98-04 and resulted in the identification of a NCV. Revision 1 to this LER was discussed and closed in IR 50-327, 328/98-06.
II. Engineering E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) IFI 50-327/97-18-05: Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Update to Include Plant Modifications to the Main Switchyard.
This IFI was opened to track the completion of the UFSAR revisions for plant modifications to the main switchyard. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR Chapter 8.2, Sections 8.2.1-8.2.1 were revised by UFSAR Revision 13 to include the previous modifications to the main switchyard. In addition, the inspectors verified that UFSAR Section 8.2.2, Transmission System Studies, was revised by UFSAR Revision 14, to provide operational guidance in the event that sections of the system became available, such as a loss of the 161-kV capacitor banks. The inspectors concluded that the UFSAR revisions were appropriate.
E8.2 (Closed) IFI 50-327, 328/97-08-03: Removal of Information From the UFSAR. This issue involved the acceptability of removing information from the UFSAR for reasons other than actual changes to the facility or procedures. The inspectors discussed this issue with the NRC Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) Sequoyah project manager
9 and were informed that removal of information from the UFSAR is an industry generic issue. An NRC staff position is forthcoming, but has not yet been developed. This item is being administratively closed, with concurrence of the NRR project manager, based on the industry-wide generic nature of the issue.
V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 2, 1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee M. Bajestani, Site Vice President C. Burton, Assistant Plant Manager H. Butterworth, Operations Manager J. Gates, Site Support Manager E. Freeman, Maintenance and Modifications Manager
10 J. Herron, Engineering and Support Systems Manager C. Kent, Radcon/Chemistry Manager D. Koehl, Plant Manager B. OBrien, Maintenance Manager P. Salas, Manager of Licensing and Industry Affairs M. Lorek, Acting Engineering & Materials Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Process to Identify, Resolve, and Prevent Problems IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 92901: Followup - Operations IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance IP 92903: Followup - Engineering
11 ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 50-328/99-02-01 NCV Failure to Perform Proper Independent Verification When Tagging Out SI Pump 2A-A (Section O1.2).
Closed 50-327/98003 LER Reactor Trip Resulting From a Failure of a Vital Inverter and a Subsequent Inverter Failure (Section O8.1).
50-327/98-11-01 VIO Failure to Enter TS 3.0.3 When LCO for TS 3.3.1.1 Was Not Met (Section O8.2).
50-327/98-11-02 VIO Failure to Follow EOP Resulting in Exceeding RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits (Section O8.3).
50-327/97013, Rev 2 LER Missed Surveillance as a Result of an Inadequate Procedure (Section M8.1).
50-327/97-18-05 IFI Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Update to Include Plant Modifications to
12 the Main Switchyard (Section E8.1).
50-327, 328/97-08-03 IFI Removal of Information From the UFSAR (Section E8.2).