ML993540173

IRC Brunswick 1999006 Integrated

ML993540173
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Issue date:	10/06/1999
From:	Division Reactor Projects II
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Download: ML993540173 (18)

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October 6, 1999 Carolina Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. J. S. Keenan Vice President Brunswick Steam Electric Plant P. O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461

SUBJECT:

NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-325/99-06, 50-324/99-06

Dear Mr. Keenan:

This refers to the inspection conducted on August 1, through September 11, 1999, at the Brunswick reactor facility. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection.

During the inspection period, your conduct of activities at the Brunswick facility was generally characterized by safety-conscious operation, sound engineering and maintenance practices, and careful radiological work controls.

Within the scope of the inspection, no violations or deviations were identified In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Sincerely, (Original Signed By B. R. Bonser)

Brian R. Bonser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-325, 50-324 License Nos.: DPR-71, DPR-62

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report cc w/encl: (See page 2)

CP&L 2

cc w/encl:

J. J. Lyash, Director Site Operations Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Carolina Power & Light Electronic Mail Distribution Terry C. Morton, Manager Performance Evaluation and Regulatory Affairs CPB 7 Carolina Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution K. R. Jury, Manager Regulatory Affairs Carolina Power & Light Company Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Electronic Mail Distribution William D. Johnson Vice President & Corporate Secretary Carolina Power and Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution John H. O'Neill, Jr.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N. Street, NW Washington, DC 20037-1128 Mel Fry, Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environment and Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Peggy Force Assistant Attorney General State of North Carolina Electronic Mail Distribution Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff NCUC P. O. Box 29520 Raleigh, NC 27626-0520 Public Service Commission State of South Carolina P. O. Box 11649 Columbia, SC 29211 Jo Ann Simmons, Chairman Brunswick County Board of Commissioners P. O. Box 249 Bolivia, NC 28422 Dan E. Summers Emergency Management Coordinator New Hanover County Department of Emergency Management P. O. Box 1525 Wilmington, NC 28402 Distribution w/encl: (See page 3)

CP&L 3

Distribution w/encl:

A. Hansen, NRR PUBLIC OFFICE DRP/RII DRP/RII DRP/RII DRP/RII SIGNATURE GWest:vyg TEaslick EBrown EGuthrie NAME DATE 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 COPY?

YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\Brunswick\\REPORT\\9906 drp.wpd

Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket Nos:

50-325, 50-324 License Nos:

DPR-71, DPR-62 Report No:

50-325/99-06, 50-324/99-06 Licensee:

Carolina Power & Light (CP&L)

Facility:

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location:

8470 River Road SE Southport, NC 28461 Dates:

August 1 to September 11, 1999 Inspectors:

T. Easlick, Senior Resident Inspector E. Brown, Resident Inspector E. Guthrie, Resident Inspector Approved by:

B. Bonser, Chief, Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-325/99-06, 50-324/99-06 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection.

Operations During hurricane recovery and plant startup activities, additional personnel were made available to supplement the shift. Supplemental personnel were given specific responsibilities and priorities, and good command and control were maintained. The duty shift maintained control and responsibility for any changes to system configuration and status. No deficiencies were noted during the observed portions of the startup activities (Section O1.1).

Recovery of an idle reactor recirculation (RR) pump following single-loop operation continued to be a challenge for the licensee. Operators made eight attempts to maneuver Unit 1 to the low-power, low-recirculation flow conditions required to start an idle RR pump. Feedwater system flow oscillations under these conditions resulted in power oscillations and indications of the unit being operated in the thermal hydraulic instability restricted region. During each attempt, the operators had to increase flow in the operating loop to exit the restricted region before the idle pump could be started.

Corrective actions and lessons-learned from a previous event allowed the operators to maintain positive control over plant systems (Section O1.2).

The use of overtime for licensed operators was consistent with regulatory requirements and the licencees own administrative procedures (Section O6.1).

Maintenance Maintenance activities observed were performed consistent with the applicable procedures, which were of the proper revision and implemented using the correct level-of-use. Three-part communications were used by maintenance personnel (Section M1.1).

Engineering The implementation of the modification for the Unit 1 digital feedwater control (DFWC) system was completed and tested on August 31 without any problems. This modification was the same as that installed in Unit 2 during the last refueling outage and was reviewed previously by the NRC. With the successful completion of the DFWC modification, all outstanding issues noted in the previous Year 2000 inspection have been resolved (Section E2.1).

2 Review of Inservice Testing documents for routine and corrective maintenance for a conventional service water pump and a residual heat removal service water pump, revealed that procedures were appropriately implemented by engineering. Pump reference values were appropriately reestablished after maintenance activities and the changes were noted in the record of test. All discrepancies had been appropriately identified and entered by the licensee into the corrective action program (Section E2.2).

Plant Support Reactor water clean-up spent resin was successfully transferred from the radwaste building to a storage liner located in the protected area. This was the first in a series of planned resin transfers. Health physics controls were effective in reducing overall exposure for the activity; area dose rates were lower than expected. Operations management provided continuous oversight of the evolution (Section R1.2).

Both units were taken to hot shutdown as a result of a prediction of hurricane-force winds from Hurricane Dennis. The shutdowns were completed successfully and all required safety features functioned as designed. The plant experienced no damage to safety-related structures or components. Recovery planning for staffing, responsibilities, and needed actions led to a prompt and thorough assessment of both units readiness to restart (Section P1.1).

Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 began the report period operating at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). On August 2, power was reduced to 35 percent RTP for control rod improvements and reactor recirculation (RR) motor generator (MG) set brush replacements. Power was returned to 100 percent RTP on August 5. On August 29, the unit was shut down in response to Hurricane Dennis and returned to 100 percent RTP on September 4, where it remained until the end of the report period.

Unit 2 began the report period operating at 100 percent RTP. On August 29, the unit was shut down in response to Hurricane Dennis. The unit was returned to 100 percent RTP on September 2, where it remained until the end of the report period.

I. Operations O1 Conduct of Operations O1.1 Control Room Observations (71707)

Following the shutdown of both units as a result of Hurricane Dennis, the inspectors observed several hours of operator performance during plant startup activities on September 1 and September 2. The inspectors attended pre-job briefings, reviewed applicable procedures, and observed the conduct of several operations activities. The inspectors also reviewed the previous months simulator evaluation reports on the crews that were observed during the startup activities.

The pre-job briefings adequately covered the job tasks. Procedure adherence and level-of-use were discussed. Three-part communications were used in most instances.

The inspectors did not observe any of the deficiencies recorded on the simulator training records during the plant startup. Additionally, the inspectors noted no other deficiencies during the observed portions of the startup activities. The inspectors noted that during hurricane recovery and plant startup activities, additional personnel were made available to supplement the shift. Supplemental personnel were given specific responsibilities and priorities, and good command and control were maintained. The duty shift maintained control and responsibility for any changes to system configuration and status.

O1.2 Unit 1 Restoration of an Idle Reactor Recirculation Pump

a.

Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors observed the restoration activities associated with the 1B RR pump, which was secured to support the RR pump MG set brush replacement.

b.

Observations and Findings On August 3, with the reactor at 30 percent RTP, operators made preparations to start the 1B RR pump following the completion of the brush replacement. Recirculation drive flow on the operating loop was reduced to meet the procedural requirement of less than 22,000 gallons per minute (gpm) for starting the idle RR pump. When recirculation drive flow reached approximately 23,000 gpm, noticeable feedwater flow oscillations began occurring. An average power range monitor upscale alarm was received, indicating that the unit had entered the thermal hydraulic instability (THI) restricted region. The operator immediately increased recirculation flow using the 1A RR pump to exit the restricted region. A control rod was inserted to reduce reactor power and another attempt was made to lower recirculation flow and start the idle pump; this was not successful.

A total of eight attempts were made to place the plant in a condition where the idle RR pump could be started. On the seventh attempt to exit the restricted region, an RR pump runback occurred. The 1A RR pump ran back to the #1 speed limiter (28 percent RR pump speed) due to total feedwater flow being less than 20 percent during one of the flow oscillations in the feedwater system. The runback was expected, having been discussed during the pre-job briefing, and the operators responded by resetting the runback and increasing flow in the operating recirculation loop. Reactor power was returned to 29 percent RTP and a new plan was developed to restore the idle loop. On August 4, the operators successfully started the idle RR pump by increasing feedwater flow via a flow path back to the main condenser which minimized the feedwater flow oscillation at the low power level and recirculation flow conditions required to start the idle pump.

Throughout the event the operators maintained positive control over the plant systems.

During the various attempts to start the idle pump, operations management conducted frequent briefings on contingency plans as the plant was placed in a position to start the idle pump. The operators monitored the reactor vessel bottom head region temperature to prevent thermal stratification due to low-flow conditions. This was a lesson-learned from a similar January 1999 event when plant Technical Specifications prevented restart of an idle RR pump due to bottom-head temperature stratification, resulting in the need for a manual scram. The corrective actions from that event resolved issues around operating near the THI restricted region but did not correct the fundamental problem of feedwater oscillation under the low-power, low-flow conditions needed to start an idle RR pump. This issue is captured in two condition reports (CRs) associated with this event and is currently under review by the licensee.

c.

Conclusions Recovery of an idle RR pump following single-loop operation continued to be a challenge for the licensee. Operators made eight attempts to maneuver Unit 1 to the low-power, low-recirculation flow conditions required to start an idle RR pump.

Feedwater system flow oscillations under these conditions resulted in power oscillations and indications of the unit being operated in the THI restricted region. During each attempt, the operators had to increase flow in the operating loop to exit the restricted

3 region before the idle pump could be started. Corrective actions and lessons-learned from a previous event allowed the operators to maintain positive control over plant systems.

O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Unit 2 Reactor Building Auxiliary Operator (RBAO) Rounds (71707)

On September 10, the inspectors accompanied the Unit 2 RBAO on rounds. The inspectors observed that the applicable procedures were used during the walkthrough.

All required checks of components or instrument readings were made. All values observed by the inspectors were acceptable. The inspectors noted that the RBAO paid considerable attention to housekeeping issues and to the material condition of the unit.

Any deficiencies identified were appropriately dispositioned in accordance with licensee procedures.

O2.2 Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Safety System Walkdown (71707)

The inspectors conducted a general walkdown of the Unit 1 HPCI system on September 9. The inspectors verified operability and proper configuration required for Mode 1 plant operation. The inspectors found the overall system condition to be satisfactory. The inspectors noted minor leakage from the turbine stop valve lagging.

The inspectors found that this leakage was captured as an equipment deficiency with a repair scheduled for the next system outage. Other minor deficiencies identified by the inspectors were found on the licensees deficiency work list.

O6 Operation Organization and Administration O6.1 Operations Overtime (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedure for scheduling overtime for licensed operators. Administrative Procedure 0AP-001, BNP Administrative Controls, Rev. 8, Section 5.1.3, details the process for scheduling overtime for operators, shift technical advisors, health physicists, and key maintenance personnel, as well as the guidelines for limitations on maximum work hours in a given period of time. Scheduling overtime in excess of these limits was permitted as long as prior authorization from the Plant General Manager had been documented. The inspectors reviewed the operations overtime tracking data, which highlighted individuals percent of overtime worked and the percent of overtime worked by the shifts as a whole. The average percent of overtime for the Operations department for June and July was 12.76 percent and 11.63 percent, respectively. The shift superintendents were responsible for scheduling overtime for operators and used a computer program to maintain the schedule. The inspectors noted that overtime authorizations were properly documented with approval granted prior to the work actually being performed. The use of overtime for licensed operators was consistent with regulatory requirements and the licencees own administrative procedures.

4 O7 Quality Assurance in Operations O7.1 Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) (71707)

The inspectors attended several PNSC meetings during the inspection period. In general, the chairman of the PNSC focused the discussions on plant safety issues.

Discussions were probing and thorough. The inspectors verified that membership requirements were met in the number of members and alternates present. The inspectors also noted that if a member was not present in a technical area being presented, the item was rescheduled instead of proceeding with an alternate member.

The inspectors verified that routine topics were discussed in accordance with requirements and that meetings were conducted at the required frequency.

O8 Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)

O8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-325(324)/99-007-00: Control Building Emergency Air Filtration System Actuation During Chlorine Car Replacement. On July 31, 1999, while disconnecting an empty chlorine tank car, the Control Building Emergency Air Filtration (CBEAF) system actuated and aligned to the chlorination mode.

The local chlorine detectors detected chlorine in the area. Using portable instruments, personnel at the scene were unable to detect chlorine. The licensee initiated the appropriate responses to the event. The licensees root cause investigation did not identify any personnel performance concerns and found that no configuration changes were necessitated by this event. The CBEAF actuation was not safety significant.

O8.2 (Closed) LER 50-325/99-002-00: Insertion of Manual Reactor Trip Due to Reactor Vessel Bottom Head Stratification. The event discussed in this LER was reviewed and documented in NRC Inspection Report (IR) 50-325(324)/99-01, dated March 15, 1999.

A non-cited violation (NCV) was documented associated with this event and was entered into the licensees corrective action program.

O8.3 (Closed) LER 50-324/99-007-00: Overlapping Safety System Outages Results in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications. The event discussed in this LER was reviewed and documented in NRC IR 50-325(324)/99-05, dated August 27, 1999. An NCV was documented associated with this event and was entered into the licensees corrective action program.

II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Maintenance Activities (61726, 62707)

The inspectors reviewed all or portions of the following surveillance tests and/or work activities:

5 Periodic Test 2PT-1.7, Heatup/Cooldown Monitoring, Revision 2; Section 8.1 of Operating Procedure 2OP-03, Reactor Protection System; Operating Procedure, Rev. 39, Transferring RPS Bus A From Normal to Alternate Power; and Work Request/Job Order (WR/JO) 98-ABDR1, Digital Feedwater Control Modification.

The inspectors observed that good supervisory oversight was provided. Procedures used were verified by the inspect ors to be of the proper revisio

n.

Satisfa ctory three-part comm unicati on was observ ed.

Operat ors were knowle dgeabl e of the evoluti ons and expect ed system respon ses.

All evoluti ons

6 were comple ted without inciden

t.

M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Diversion Structure and Caswell Beach Pumping Station (62707)

On September 8, the inspectors examined the diversion structure and the Caswell Beach pumping station. The structure showed no signs of damage as a result of Hurricane Dennis. No openings or significant damage to the coarse or fine mesh screens were observed. Additionally, no excessive vegetation was observed in the intake canal. The inspectors observed the circulating water ocean discharge pumps.

No damage to the pumps or the structure was seen.

III. Engineering E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 Digital Feedwater Control (DFWC) Replacement (TI 2515/141)

The inspectors reviewed WR/JO 98-ABDR1 and associated Engineering Service Request (ESR)98-106, DFCS Upgrade for Year 2000 Compliance, Unit 1. The modification evaluated in the ESR was intended to replace the existing Unit 1 digital feedwater controller with a Year 2000 compliant controller manufactured by the same vendor. The inspectors noted that this modification was the same as the replacement installed in Unit 2 during the last refueling outage, which was reviewed previously by the NRC. The implementation of the modification was completed and tested on August 31 without any problems. With the successful completion of the DFWC modification, all outstanding issues noted in the previous Year 2000 inspection have been resolved.

E2.2 Inservice Testing (IST) (37551)

The inspectors reviewed the actions taken upon the licensees discovery of out-of-tolerance data for the 2A conventional service water (CSW) pump and replacement of the 2B residual heat removal service water pump. The inspectors determined that the out-of-tolerance pump data for the 2A CSW pump was dispositioned by engineering in accordance with Engineering Procedure 0ENP-16.1, IST Pump and Valve Data, Rev.

19, and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers/American National Standards Institute (ASME/ANSI) Standard, OM-1987, "Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants, with OMa-1988 Addenda Part 6. The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for both pumps and found that the pumps were appropriately rebaselined as a result of maintenance activities that may have caused changes to the

7 pumps reference values. All discrepancies had been appropriately identified and entered by the licensee into the corrective action program.

E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)

E8.1 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) 50-325(324)/98-05-07: Inservice Inspection Technical Report. The inspectors thoroughly reviewed ESR 97-00639, ISI Technical Report 0BNP-TR-001. The purpose of the ESR was to verify that the inservice inspection (ISI) technical report complied with applicable regulations. The inspectors reviewed the ESRs ASME Section XI piping reclassification for eight engineered safety features and safety-related systems. Most of the changes reclassified the ASME requirements from Code Class 1 to Code Class 2 or 3. The inspectors found no safety significant issues or concerns with the reviewed changes.

E8.2 (Closed) IFI 50-325(324)/98-06-07: Generic Issue Resolution of Containment Pressure Suppression Bypass. The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of the generic issue associated with containment pressure suppression bypass. The licensees corrective actions, which were discussed in NRC IR 50-325(324)/98-06, were adequate to deter plant conditions which would enable pressure suppression bypass. The inspectors identified no further concerns with this issue.

E8.3 (Closed) IFI 50-325(324)/98-07-04: Equipment Database System Program Corrective Actions. This followup item was opened based on concerns with the licensees corrective actions for problems with the equipment database system (EDBS) program.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees verification and validation plans for EDBS. The plan was implemented through their Configuration Management Improvement Plan to provide confidence that both the type A and type B data were acceptably accurate.

The inspectors found that a random sampling of the database was scheduled to be verified and validated. Acceptance criteria were specified. Nonconformances were required to be corrected and a required action plan generated, including expansion of sample scope if acceptance criteria were not met. The inspectors determined that the verification and validation plan, which was estimated to be complete by the end of the year, was satisfactory to remove the concern about the licensees corrective actions on the EDBS program.

E8.4 (Closed) LER 50-325/99-004-00: Drywell Pressure Instrumentation Sensing Line Deficiency. The event discussed in this LER was reviewed and documented in NRC IR 50-325(324)/99-03, dated June 7, 1999. An NCV was documented associated with this event and was entered into the licensees corrective action program.

8 E8.5 (Closed) LER 50-325(324)/99-001-00: Missed Augmented Inservice Weld Inspections.

The event discussed in this LER was reviewed and documented in NRC IR 50-325(324)/99-01, dated March 15, 1999. An NCV was documented associated with this event and was entered into the licensees corrective action program.

IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 General Radiological Observations (71750)

During routine tours of the reactor and turbine buildings, the inspectors noted the addition or expansion of contaminated areas on the -17 foot elevation of the Unit 2 Reactor Building. Inleakage during Hurricane Dennis was severe enough to require posting of these areas as contaminated due to the rainwater collecting in and spreading from previously-contaminated areas. After the hurricane passed, standing water was drained into the plant radwaste system and remaining puddles were controlled in accordance with normal housekeeping practices. The inspectors verified that radiation and contaminated areas were appropriately labeled and controlled. All locked high radiation area doors challenged by the inspectors were found to be locked.

R1.2 Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) Spent Resin Transfer

a.

Inspection Scope (71750, 71707)

The inspectors observed activities associated with the transfer of spent resin from the clean-up phase separator tanks through the mobile process unit located at the radwaste loading dock to the storage liner located in the protected area.

b.

Observations and Findings On September 8, the inspectors observed a pre-evolution briefing, a PLP-17 (briefing for infrequently-performed evolutions), and a briefing of the as-low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) plan. The briefings were comprehensive and discussed the job scope, expected work area dose rates, sources, and resin flow path. The inspectors reviewed special procedure 0SP-99-038, RWCU Spent Resin Transfer, Rev. 0, and the ALARA work plan - 2485, Rev. 2. The inspectors observed the activities from the radwaste control room, where the shift superintendent and a dedicated senior reactor operator supervised the work. The activities required extensive coordination between Operations, Health Physics, and Engineering, as well as other site personnel since access was restricted along the transfer flow path.

The spent resin transfer was performed with all precautions taken to reduce exposure.

Area dose rates were lower than expected (estimated at 275 rem/hr on contact with full liner; actual was 35 rem/hr on contact). One problem occurred at the completion of the resin transfer. When the level in the storage liner was 12 inches from the top, the

9 transfer was terminated. As expected, a system flush valve opened to inject water to flush the transfer lines; however, it did not automatically close, requiring manual actions to prevent overflowing the liner and the A cleanup phase separator. The inspectors noted that the level at which filling would be terminated, leaving room for the flush, had not been previously agreed upon by the radwaste operator and the operator at the storage liner. This observation was discussed with the shift superintendent and captured in a CR. The licensee reviewed the logic for the flush valve sequence and identified a faulty relay timer. Additionally, the licensee was reviewing the operating procedure to determine if a manual flush of the line was more appropriate for this activity.

c.

Conclusions RWCU spent resin was successfully transferred from the radwaste building to a storage liner located in the protected area. This was the first in a series of planned resin transfers. Health physics controls were effective in reducing overall exposure for the activity; area dose rates were lower than expected. Operations management provided continuous oversight of the evolution.

P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities P1.1 Hurricane Dennis

a.

Inspection Scope (71750, 93702)

The inspectors monitored licensee activities associated with Hurricane Dennis.

b.

Observations and Findings The licensee began site severe weather preparations on August 26 and the abnormal operating procedure for severe weather was entered upon issuance of a hurricane watch for southeastern North Carolina by the National Weather Service at 11:52 p.m. on August 28. On August 29 at 5:10 p.m., the licensee declared a Notice of Unusual Event due to the issuance of a hurricane warning for the area The licensee manually scrammed Unit 2 at 11:46 p.m. and Unit 1 at 11:52 p.m. that day. Shutdown of both units was accomplished successfully and all required safety features functioned as designed.

The inspectors observed both unit shutdowns and noted good use of the related shutdown procedures by the shifts. Balance of plant mechanical issues were promptly identified and deficiency log events initiated. Throughout the event, severe weather constant monitoring of the reactor turbine gauge board was performed. Applicable annunciator procedures were accessed as needed.

Several emergency sirens were rendered inoperable during the storm. The inspectors verified that the appropriate reports were made. The licensee indicated that the majority of the sirens were repaired by August 30. Contingency actions were developed

10 for all outstanding siren deficiencies. The inspectors toured the plant after the hurricane had passed, and found no damage to any safety-related structures or components. The inspectors noted that hurricane-force winds were not experienced on-site at any time.

The licensees preplanning of staffing, responsibilities, and needed actions led to a prompt and thorough assessment of both units readiness to restart.

c.

Conclusions Both units were taken to hot shutdown as a result of a prediction of hurricane-force winds from Hurricane Dennis. The shutdowns were completed successfully and all required safety features functioned as designed. The plant experienced no damage to safety-related structures or components. Recovery planning for staffing, responsibilities, and needed actions led to a prompt and thorough assessment of both units readiness to restart.

V. Management Meetings XI Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 22, 1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The license did not identify any of the materials reviewed during this inspection as proprietary.

11 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee A. Brittain, Security Manager N. Gannon, Operations Manager J. Gawron, Nuclear Assessment Manager M. Herrell, Training Manager K. Jury, Regulatory Affairs Manager J. Keenan, Site Vice President B. Lindgren, Site Support Services Manager J. Lyash, Plant General Manager G. Miller, Brunswick Engineering Support Section Manager E. Quidley, Maintenance Manager S. Rogers, Outage and Scheduling Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:

Onsite Engineering IP 61726:

Surveillance Observations IP 62707:

Maintenance Observation IP 71707:

Plant Operations IP 71750:

Plant Support Activities IP 92901:

Followup - Operations IP 92903:

Followup - Engineering IP 93702:

Prompt Onsite Response to Event at Operating Power Reactors TI 2515/141: Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants

12 ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Closed 50-325(324)/99-007-00 LER Control Building Emergency Air Filtration System Actuation During Chlorine Car Replacement (Section O8.1) 50-325/99-002-00 LER Insertion of Manual Reactor Trip Due to Reactor Vessel Bottom Head Stratification (Section O8.2) 50-324/99-007-00 LER Overlapping Safety System Outages Results in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications (Section O8.3) 50-325(324)/98-05-07 IFI Inservice Inspection Technical Report (Section E8.1) 50-325(324)/98-06-07 IFI Generic Issue Resolution of Containment Pressure Suppression Bypass (Section E8.2) 50-325(324)/98-07-04 IFI Equipment Database System Program Corrective Actions (Section E8.3) 50-325/99-004-00 LER Drywell Pressure Instrumentation Sensing Line Deficiency (Section E8.4) 50-325(324)/99-001-00 LER Missed Augmented Inservice Weld Inspections (Section E8.5)