ML25345A164
| ML25345A164 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/2026 |
| From: | Patricia Vossmar NRC/RGN-IV/ORA/ACES |
| To: | Hansett P Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| EAF-RIV-2025-0232 4-2024-001, IR 2025090 | |
| Download: ML25345A164 (0) | |
Text
January 27, 2026 EAF-RIV-2025-0232 Phil Hansett, Site Vice President Entergy Operations, Inc.
5485 U.S. Highway 61N St. Francisville, LA 70775
SUBJECT:
RIVER BEND STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2025090 AND NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT 4-2024-001
Dear Mr. Hansett,
This letter refers to the investigation completed on September 25, 2024, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Office of Investigations at River Bend Station (RBS). The investigation was conducted, in part, to determine whether: 1) a licensed senior reactor operator (SRO) willfully stood watch as the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) while unqualified for three days, 2) a licensed SRO willfully failed to perform required procedural actions, resulting in an unqualified SRO performing licensed activities, and if 3) two SROs willfully falsified logs by logging in as the CRS while performing other duties outside the control room. A factual summary of the investigation is provided as an enclosure to this letter. The issue was discussed with Johns Giddens, and other members of your staff, during a telephone conversation on January 15, 2026.
Based on the results of this investigation, the NRC has determined that two Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements occurred. Because you identified the violations and took prompt action to restore compliance, because the violations did not constitute deliberate misconduct based on the information developed during the NRCs investigation, and because the violations were not repetitive, the two violations are being treated as Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. These NCVs are described in the enclosed factual summary. If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response withing 30 days of the date of this investigation report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to: (1) the Regional Administrator, Region IV, 1600 Lamar Blvd., Arlington, TX 76001; and (2) the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, the enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or in the NRCs ADAMS, accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.
P. Hansett 2
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Doug Dodson of my staff at (817) 200-1148.
Sincerely, Patricia J. Vossmar, Acting Director Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000458 License No. NPF-47
Enclosures:
1.
Factual Summary 2.
Inspection Report 05000458/2025090 cc w/ encl: Distribution via GovDelivery Signed by Vossmar, Patricia on 01/27/26
ML25345A164 SUNSI Review ADAMS:
Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:
By: ACR Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive RGN4-001 OFFICE ES:ACES SPE:DORS/PBC C:DORS/OB C:DORS/PBC TL:ACES NAME ARoberts RKumana BTindell DDodson BAlferink SIGNATURE
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DATE 01/15/26 01/22/26 01/22/26 01/23/26 01/20/26 OFFICE RC D:DORS NAME DCylkowski PVossmar SIGNATURE
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DATE 01/20/26 01/27/26 FACTUAL
SUMMARY
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 4-2024-001 On October 18, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI), Region IV, initiated an investigation to determine whether: 1) a licensed senior reactor operator (SRO) willfully stood watch as the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) while unqualified for three days, 2) a licensed SRO willfully failed to perform required procedural actions, resulting in an unqualified SRO performing licensed activities, and 3) two SROs willfully falsified logs by logging in as the CRS while performing other duties outside the control room. The investigation was completed on September 25, 2024.
On July 9, 2023, a licensed SRO attempted to sign in as the CRS in the Electronic Shift Operations Management System (eSOMs), but eSOMs notified him that he was not qualified to take the position. In his testimony to OI, the SRO stated that he believed he had completed five required 12-hour shifts in June 2023, as required by 10 CFR 55.53(e) to maintain his qualification in active status. He checked his information in the My Learning System and saw five entries, which he interpreted as five complete 12-hour watches. However, the fifth watch, which he had stood on June 8, 2023, was not completed since he was relieved early.
Due to historical problems with eSOMs, the SRO believed it to be a system issue, and he did not realize that the system in fact operated correctly in identifying that he was not qualified to stand watch as CRS. On July 9, 2023, he left a message for the senior operations specialist requesting help resolving the eSOMs issue. Meanwhile, on July 9, 10, and 11, 2023, the SRO arranged with two other qualified CRS that they would sign into eSOMs as CRS, while he would actually perform the CRS duties while signed in as Shift Technical Advisor.
On August 30, 2023, RBS management notified the NRC that they had completed an internal investigation after becoming aware of this matter, and that they had suspended the SROs qualifications.
Based on the evidence gathered during the NRC OI investigation, the NRC staff concluded that, while the individuals actions resulted in violations of NRC requirements, their actions were not deliberate misconduct. The NRC staff noted that all three individuals had reason to believe that the SRO was in active status and in good standing with the number of hours and shifts he had worked in the prior quarter.
Evaluation of Violations 1.
Technical Specification 5.2.2 requires, in part, that while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3, at least one licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) shall be present in the control room.
10 CFR 55.53(e) requires, in part, that if a licensee has not been actively performing the functions of an operator or senior operator, the licensee may not resume activities authorized by a license issued under Part 55 except as permitted by 10 CFR 55.53(f). To maintain active status, the licensee shall actively perform the functions of an operator or senior operator on a minimum of seven 8-hour or five 12-hour shifts per calendar quarter.
Contrary to the above, from July 9 to July 11, 2023, the licensee resumed activities authorized by a license issued under Part 55 and did not maintain active status by actively performing the functions of an operator or senior operator on a minimum of five
E1-2 12-hour shifts per calendar quarter, and one licensed SRO was not always present in the control room while the unit was in MODE 1, 2, or 3. Specifically, the facility licensee scheduled a senior operator to stand watch as Control Room Supervisor when not in an active status, and the individual licensee had failed to maintain an active status by actively performing the functions of a senior operator on a minimum of five 12-hour shifts during the calendar quarter. Subsequently, the individual licensee inappropriately assumed the duties of the Control Room Supervisor on July 9, 10, and 11, 2023, while not maintaining an active license, and the individual with the inactive license was the only senior operator in the control room at various points on July 9, 10, and 11, 2023, while the unit was in MODE 1.
2.
10 CFR 50.9(a) requires, in part, that information required by the Commissions regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Procedure EN-OP-115-09, Maintaining the Station Narrative Log, a quality-related procedure, requires, in part, that shift management review the logs to ensure logs are accurate and appropriate and condition reports have been initiated for log entries as warranted.
Contrary to the above, on July 9 to July 11, 2023, shift management review of the logs did not ensure logs were accurate and appropriate and condition reports initiated for log entries as warranted. Specifically, the narrative logs were inaccurate and inappropriate because two individuals signed in as the Control Room Supervisor while not present in the control room and while another individual actively performed the functions of the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) without an active license.
These violations were evaluated under the NRCs traditional enforcement process as set forth in the NRC Enforcement Policy (Policy). Both violations meet the definition of Severity Level IV violation in the Policy: less serious, but of more than minor concern, that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequences (e.g., violations that created the potential of more than minor safety or security consequences). Additionally, after considering the factors set forth in Section 2.3.2.a of the Policy, both violations are being treated as non-cited violations (NCVs) because the issue is non-repetitive and non-willful, it has been entered in your corrective action program, and compliance was restored within a reasonable period of time. Because these violations were brought to the attention of the NRC by licensee management, they are being treated as licensee-identified violations in accordance with the reactor oversight program inspection manual and are documented in the attached inspection report.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Inspection Report Docket Number:
05000458 License Number:
NPF-47 Report Number:
05000458/2025090 Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-090-0010 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
River Bend Station Location:
St. Francisville, LA Inspection Dates:
September 25, 2024 to January 15, 2026 Inspectors:
R. Kumana, Senior Project Engineer Approved By:
Patricia J. Vossmar, Acting Director Division of Operating Reactor Safety
E2-2
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a NRC inspection at River Bend Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Licensee-identified non-cited violations are documented in report section: 71111.11Q.
List of Findings and Violations No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items None.
E2-3 INSPECTION SCOPES Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
INSPECTION RESULTS Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.11Q This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Technical Specification 5.2.2 requires, in part, that while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3, at least one licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) shall be present in the control room.
10 CFR 55.53(e) requires, in part, that if a licensee has not been actively performing the functions of an operator or senior operator, the licensee may not resume activities authorized by a license issued under Part 55 except as permitted by 10 CFR 55.53(f). To maintain active status, the licensee shall actively perform the functions of an operator or senior operator on a minimum of seven 8-hour or five 12-hour shifts per calendar quarter.
Contrary to the above, from July 9 to July 11, 2023, the licensee resumed activities authorized by a license issued under Part 55 and did not maintain active status by actively performing the functions of an operator or senior operator on a minimum of five 12-hour shifts per calendar quarter, and one licensed SRO was not always present in the control room while the unit was in MODE 1, 2, or 3. Specifically, the facility licensee scheduled a senior operator to stand watch as Control Room Supervisor when not in an active status, and the individual licensee had failed to maintain an active status by actively performing the functions of a senior operator on a minimum of five 12-hour shifts during the calendar quarter.
Subsequently, the individual licensee inappropriately assumed the duties of the CRS on July 9, 10, and 11, 2023, while not maintaining an active license, and the individual with the inactive license was the only senior operator in the control room at various points on July 9, 10, and 11, 2023, while the unit was in MODE 1.
Significance/Severity: Severity Level IV. The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.
The violation was evaluated under the NRCs traditional enforcement process as set forth in the NRC Enforcement Policy (the Policy). This violation meets the definition of a Severity Level IV violation in the Policyless serious, but of more than minor concern, which resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequences (e.g., violations that created the potential of more than minor safety or security consequences). Additionally, after considering the factors set forth in Section 2.3.2.a of the Policy, this violation is being treated
E2-4 as a non-cited violation (NCV), because the issue is non-repetitive and non-willful, has been entered in your corrective action program, and compliance was restored within a reasonable period of time Corrective Action References: CR-RBS-2026-00183 Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.11Q This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: 10 CFR 50.9(a) requires, in part, that information required by the Commissions regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Procedure EN-OP-115-09, Maintaining the Station Narrative Log, a quality-related procedure, requires, in part, that shift management review the logs to ensure logs are accurate and appropriate and condition reports have been initiated for log entries as warranted.
Contrary to the above, from July 9 to July 11, 2023, shift management review of the logs did not ensure logs were accurate and appropriate and condition reports initiated for log entries as warranted. Specifically, the narrative logs were inaccurate and inappropriate because two individuals signed in as the Control Room Supervisor while not present in the control room and while another individual actively performed the functions of the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) without an active license.
Significance/Severity: Severity Level IV. The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.
This violation meets the definition of a Severity Level IV violation in the Policyless serious, but of more than minor concern, which resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequences (e.g., violations that created the potential of more than minor safety or security consequences). Additionally, after considering the factors set forth in Section 2.3.2.a of the Policy, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV) because the issue is non-repetitive and non-willful, has been entered in your corrective action program, and compliance was restored within a reasonable period of time.
Corrective Action References: CR-RBS-2026-00184
E2-5 EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On January 15, 2026, the inspectors presented the NRC inspection results to John Giddens, Senior Manager Regulatory Compliance.