ML25196A103
| ML25196A103 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/13/1978 |
| From: | Lawroski S Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Hendrie J NRC/Chairman |
| References | |
| Download: ML25196A103 (1) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie Chairman
- u. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, DC 20555 March 13, 1978
SUBJECT:
PIOPOSED RESEAROI ON SYSTEMS 'IO IMPIOVE SAFETY
Dear Dr. Hendrie:
The Advisory Comnittee on Reactor Safeguards has reviewed the proposed research program on systems to improve the safety of nuclear power plants, as embodied in the draft report, "Report to t:he U.S. Congress on NRC Plans for Research Directed Toward Irnproving the Safety of Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants," dated March 3, 1978. This report was reviewed by the full Corrrnittee at its 215th meeting, March 9-10, 1978. The pro-posed prograi11 was reviewed by a Subcorrmittee at a meeting on February 23, 1978. In addition, members of the Corrmittee Staff attended the meetings of the NRC Research Review Group on January 10 and February 10, 1978.
The proposed program has been developed in response to the requirement by Congress in the FY 78 Budget Authorization Act for the NRC.
Although the pertinent section of the Act bears the subheading, "Improved Safety System Research," the wording of new subsection (f) refers to "... projects for the development of new or improved safety systems... " The NRC Staff has recognized, and pointed out in its report, that the requirement for
- aevelopment," if interpreted literally, could compromise the position of the NRC as an impartial judge of safety systems incorporated into nuclear plants. The NRC Staff has proposed, therefore, that its pro-gram be limited chiefly to the evaluation of new concepts for inproving reactor safety. The Comnittee agrees with. this approach.
In its re-cent report to the Congress (NUREG-0392), the Comnittee stated:
- ... The ACRS believes that the development, testing, and proof of efficacy of new or improved safety systems should not be the responsibility of the NRC, but should be con-ducted by the nuclear industry or DOE.
However, the ACRS believes that it is a proper and even necessary function of the NRC to perform or sponsor research on concepts that, if developed and implem::?nted by the appropriate bodies, could lead to improvem::?nts in safety."
3476
Honorable Joseph March 13. 1978 The NOC-Staff has recomnended five research projects as having the greatest prospect of leading to improved safety. They are:
A. Alternate containment concepts, especially vented containments.
B. Alternate decay heat rem:>val systems, especially bunkered systems.
- c. Alternate ECCS concepts.
D.
Inproved accident response.
E. Advanced seismic design.
The Conmittee concurs in these choices and believes that these studies should be undertaken even though their risk reduction potentials are not yet clearly known.
These studies and the follow-on programs will serve to place in perspective the extent and suitability of possible safety improvements.
The NOC Staff has stated in its report that rrost of these research proj-ects will require only one to two years for completion, the possible exceptions being Projects A and E.
Although these five projects in the.11-selves would not appear to represent the sort of "long-term plan" requested by the Congress, the NRC Staff has proposed that two additional programs be undertaken, as follows:
F.
Inprovement of the methodology for evaluating research topics and alternate plant designs.
G.
Scoping studies of the eleven additional research topics that have been suggested.
These programs can be expected to provide a basis for a longer term effort.
The Conmittee believes that Project Fon the development of better rnethods for evaluating concepts proposed to improve safety is essential to the success of this new effort. Although there will always be a large sub-jective or judgmental eleirent in the selection of research projects on improved safety, these selections should be made on as quantitative and factual a basis as practical. It seems evident also that it will be extrencly difficult to provide a suitable rnethodology without at sone point addressing the question of how safe is safe enough.
Sincerely yours,
~;/~
Stephen Lawroski Chairman 3477