ML25177C602

Third Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment of the NIST Center for Neutron Research

ML25177C602
Person / Time
Site:	National Bureau of Standards Reactor
Issue date:	05/30/2025
From:	US Dept of Commerce, National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST)
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML25177C600	List: ML25177C602
References
Download: ML25177C602 (1)

Text

Page 1 of 174 Independent Third Party Third Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment of the NIST Center for Neutron Research (Task 16)

Revision 0 Conduct of Assessment: March 10 Through May 30, 2025 Report Approval: May 30, 2025

Page 2 of 174 Contents EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

............................................................................................................ 4 Purpose.................................................................................................................................. 4 Scope and Approach.............................................................................................................. 4 Summary of Results............................................................................................................... 4 Overall Conclusion................................................................................................................13 Methods of Analysis..................................................................................................................14 Analysis Results........................................................................................................................16 Objective 1: Personal Accountability......................................................................................16 Objective 2: Questioning Attitude...........................................................................................17 Objective 3: Effective Safety Communications.......................................................................18 Objective 4: Leadership Safety Values and Actions...............................................................20 Objective 5: Decision Making................................................................................................22 Objective 6: Respectful Work Environment............................................................................23 Objective 7: Continuous Learning..........................................................................................25 Objective 8: Problem Identification and Resolution................................................................27 Objective 9: Environment for Raising Concerns.....................................................................29 Objective 10: Work Processes...............................................................................................30 Safety Culture Performance Improvement.............................................................................33 Traits by OU Group...............................................................................................................33 Review of Internal Events......................................................................................................33 Review of External Information..............................................................................................34 Matrix of Initiatives to Recommendations 2024.........................................................................36 Matrix of Initiatives to Recommendations 2025.........................................................................39 Attachments..............................................................................................................................43 : Survey Data Personal Accountability..............................................................44 : Survey Data Questioning Attitude...................................................................47 : Survey Data Effective Safey Communications................................................50 : Survey Data Leadership Safety Values and Actions........................................53 : Survey Data Decision-Making.........................................................................56 : Survey Data Respectful Work Environment....................................................59 : Survey Data Continuous Learning..................................................................62 : Survey Data Problem Identification and Resolution........................................65 : Survey Data Environment for Raising Concerns.............................................68 0: Survey Data Work Processes.......................................................................71

Page 3 of 174 1: Survey Data Status of NSC Improvement.....................................................74 2: Survey Data for Operations..........................................................................77 3: Survey Data for Reactor Engineering............................................................86 4: Survey Data for Health Physics....................................................................96 5: Survey Data for Aging Reactor Management.............................................. 106 6: Survey Data Comparison 2023 to 2024 to 2025.......................................... 116 7: Survey Question List................................................................................... 130 8: Effectiveness Review - Integrated RCA (RC #2)......................................... 135 9: Status of 2024 INSCA Recommendations................................................... 139 0: Status of 2023 INSCA Program Limiting Weaknesses................................ 155 1: Focus Group/Interviews Questions............................................................. 163 2: Meeting Observation Form......................................................................... 164 3: Behavioral Observation Form..................................................................... 165 4: INSCA Team Members, Assignments, and Bios.......................................... 166 5: INSCA Background Detail........................................................................... 168 6: NRC Inspection Report - Confirmatory Order Excerpt................................ 169 7: Definitions................................................................................................... 171 8: References................................................................................................. 174

Page 4 of 174 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Purpose The Independent Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment (INSCA) Team conducted a third independent and comprehensive assessment of the existing Organizational Nuclear Safety Culture (NSC), including the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE), at the NIST Center for Neutron Research. The assessment was performed in accordance with the requirements of the August 1, 2022, Confirmatory Order Modifying License No. TR-5 (Reference Attachment 25 and Attachment 26 for more detail). The Order required a third Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment, within 12 months of completing the second assessment, to ensure sustainability and effectiveness of the identified recommended corrective actions within the identified areas.

Scope and Approach A highly experienced INSCA team evaluated the current NCNR 10 Traits of a Healthy Safety Culture that included SCWE, using a survey, focus group/interviews, meeting observations, and other data collection methods. The survey data supported what personnel believe and the focus group/interviews and observations demonstrated what personnel do to support a healthy NSC.

The results were analyzed to identify Integrated Safety Culture (ISC) strengths and weaknesses. The strengths and weaknesses were then compared to the status of the existing seven initiatives, and twenty-two recommendations out of the 2024 INSCA, and formulated into recommendations to support continuing improvement and close any substantive gaps.

Summary of Results Area of Strength (AOS): Performance that is exceptionally effective in achieving its desired results; a program, process, or activity of such high quality that it could serve as an example for other similar elements.

Positive Observation (PO): A performance, program, or element that is sufficient to meet its basic intent and does not require additional management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Area in Need of Attention (ANA): A performance, program, or process element that is sufficient to meet its basic intent, but that requires management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Area for Improvement (AFI): A performance, program, or process element that requires significant improvement to obtain the desired results in a consistent and effective manner.

The overall results for each of the 10 Traits are provided below, with the supporting data and analyses being contained within the body of the report and attachments.

Trait 1: Personal Accountability (PA) - Individuals take personal responsibility for safety. The underlying Attributes include Standards (PA.1), Job Ownership (PA.2), and Teamwork (PA.3).

Positive Observation (PA.3): Cross-Functional Collaboration.

Cross-functional teamwork has notably improved, reflected in stronger coordination and collaboration between departments. Although some areas still require attention, overall interdepartmental teamwork has been strengthened.

Page 5 of 174 Recommendation:

1) Initiative - Safety Culture: Leverage teamwork to drive to a strength.

Trait 2: Questioning Attitude (QA) - Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions and activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or inappropriate action. The underlying Attributes include Nuclear is Recognized as Special and Unique (QA.1), Challenge the Unknown (QA.2), Challenge Assumptions (QA.3), and Avoid Complacency (QA.4).

Positive Observation (QA.2, QA.3, QA.4): Work Process Scrutiny.

Personnel are increasingly engaged in questioning work processes, procedures, and equipment. This is evident through continued growth in CAP initiations, a willingness to stop work when procedures or documentation are incomplete, and challenges to equipment status. Some personnel question whether this mindset will be maintained as the plant transitions to an operational environment.

Recommendation:

1) Initiative - Safety Culture: Leverage this questioning attitude in all storyboards and initiatives moving forward.

Trait 3: Effective Safety Communication (CO) - Communications maintain a focus on safety.

The underlying Attributes include Work Process Communications (CO.1), Bases for Decisions (CO.2), Free Flow of Information (CO.3), and Expectations (CO.4).

Positive Observation (CO.3): Communication Methods.

Communications have improved at NCNR because of significant efforts to improve the form and frequency of communication methods. Many individuals reported the increased use of various methods of Integrated Schedule and associated meetings, POD, CAP Review Meetings, K-Wing Communications, and Department Meetings.

Area in Need of Attention (CO.1, CO.2, CO.3, CO.4): Information Gaps.

Frequent emergent schedule changes, and a lack of clear understanding regarding the basis for key operational decisions has resulted in persistent communication breakdowns between Operations shifts, and across different levels within the Operations organization, and with other departments. These issues are evident in frequent emergent schedule changes, shifting priorities, and a lack of shared understanding regarding the basis for key operational decisions.

Recent Examples:

Draining the secondary - There was recent discussion about potentially draining the secondary system, but no clear decision or rationale was provided.

Engineering expressed uncertainty about the need for this action, noting that if draining were to occur, it would require ordering chemicals, developing or identifying appropriate procedures, and scheduling the work. While the idea is to be prepared in case it becomes necessary, the lack of clarity adds unnecessary workload.

Operations not always aware of daily schedule changes - real-time information is not always available in the control room for use by shift personnel.

Page 6 of 174 Reliance on informal communication channels when formal channels are ineffectively used. Formal channels have not been fully implemented.

This presents a potential vulnerability to nuclear safety once the plant transitions from the current environment to operations and it contributes to inefficiency in resource application.

Area in Need of Attention (CO.4): Inconsistent Integration of Safety Messaging Lack of incorporation of integrated safety message into daily activities and meetings, resulting in a plateaued understanding of integrated safety at NCNR. Knowledge and level of use of ISC principles may be diminished or extinguished as the organization progresses forward.

Recommendations:

1) Initiative - Communications: Complete implementation of the communication strategy.

2) Initiative - Communications: Focus on incorporation of Integrated Safety Culture message in daily activities.

Trait 4: Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA) - Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors. The underlying Attributes include Resources (LA.1);

Field Presence (LA.2); Incentives, Sanctions, and Rewards (LA.3); Strategic Commitment to Safety (LA.4); Change Management (LA.5); Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities (LA.6);

Constant Examination (LA.7); and Leader Behaviors (LA.8).

Area of Strength (LA.2): Effective Execution of Observation Program Implementation of the improved observation program as evidenced by:

The quality and usefulness of the observation tools Meeting and exceeding the goals for frequency across departments Proactive use of the program to capture information Ability to identify trends and provide input to the SCMP Creation of corrective actions based on those trends Positive Observation (LA.8): Leaders Effectively Addresses Safety Concerns.

Many interviewees cited specific plant, processes, and interpersonal examples where safety concerns were effectively addressed by NCNR leadership. Notable examples included the fuel plug damage discovery, Air Control Valves (ACV) valve issues, pre-job brief improvements, and adherence to procedures.

Positive Observation (LA.8): Leaders Exemplify Safety-First Behavior.

Survey results and focus group interviews confirm that leaders continue to model safety-first behavior (walk-the-talk), in which they communicate the importance of safety, prioritizing it in decisions, and engage in regular activities that ensure the constant examination of safety.

Area in Need of Attention (LA.1): Maintenance of Staff at Authorized Levels.

Page 7 of 174 NCNR leaders are hampered by federal government restraints to maintain staffing levels consistent with the demands to maintain safety and reliability.

Area in Need of Attention (LA.6 & LA.8): Lack of Enforced Workplace Standards.

Housekeeping, neatness, and arrangement of working areas to remove potential personnel safety issues and equipment damage issues need attention as observed by confinement cleanliness and trip hazards, and disarray of equipment and tools. Facility leadership has not established or enforced clear standards in this area, contributing to the current condition.

Area for Improvement (LA.8): Leadership Gaps in Building a Collaborative Culture.

Certain operational shifts have not effectively fostered a collaborative environment for all employees, particularly less tenured employees, and women in ROE. As a result, some employees feel that their input is not valued and that leaders are not actively seeking feedback from workers at all levels. This issue is highlighted by survey results, significant survey write-in comments, observations, and discussions in focus groups.

Recommendations

1) Initiative - Performance Improvement: Establish and enforce clear housekeeping standards to address safety hazards and improve work area organization.

2) Initiative - Communications: Establish clear expectations for leadership to actively engage with and incorporate input from all employees, particularly less-tenured staff, and women, to foster a more empowering and collaborative work environment.

3) Initiative - Resources: Continue to implement the Resources initiative.

Trait 5: Decision Making (DM) - Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are systematic, rigorous, and thorough. The underlying Attributes include Consistent Process (DM.1),

Conservative Bias (DM.2), and Accountability for Decisions (DM.3).

Positive Observation (DM.2): Prudent Decision-Making Practices.

NCNR has made progress in conservative decision-making as demonstrated by the implementation of the integrated schedule, challenging plans for ACV work to ensure safe and effective completion, and the development of a repair strategy and procedure prior to implementing refueling plug work. This illustrates Prudent vs. Allowable decision-making behaviors.

Area in Need of Attention (DM.1): Reactive Decisions Disrupt Operations.

The absence of a systematic decision-making process aligned with the work management process leads to unplanned schedule changes that disrupt daily operations and resource allocation. These reactive adjustmentsoften referred to as addressing the 'fire of the day'highlight ongoing challenges in applying rigorous and structured decision-making practices.

Recommendation

1) Initiative - Work Management: Establish clear decision-making protocols and integrate them with the work management process to prevent reactive adjustments and ensure more proactive, planned schedule management.

Page 8 of 174 Trait 6: Respectful Work Environment (WE) - Trust and respect permeate the organization.

The underlying Attributes include Respect is Evident (WE.1), Opinions are Valued (We.2), High Level of Trust (WE.3), and WE.4 (Conflict Resolution).

Positive Observation (WE.4): Improved Conflict Resolution Processes.

Conflicts are more effectively and fairly resolved during formal settings, such as the integrated schedule meetings, CAP review meetings, and emergent issue resolution discussions. This improvement is further demonstrated by Operations Crew Chiefs addressing conflicts in dedicated meetings rather than resolving them in public forums.

Area in Need of Attention (WE.1, WE.2, WE.3): Team Composition Across Shifts.

Operations have not yet adopted an effective approach to managing team composition across shifts. This is evidenced by survey results showing lower scores in this area compared to the rest of the organization, numerous written survey comments, and feedback from focus group discussions.

Area for Improvement (WE.1, WE.2, WE.3): Supportive Culture.

Less-tenured ROE employees reported that their questions and input are often ignored, talked over, or dismissed by Operations personnelsometimes even during meetings by supervisors. This suggests that some leaders are not effectively engaging less-tenured staff, which is critical for fostering a respectful and collaborative work environment.

Given the relatively small size of the NCNR team, failing to listen to and incorporate input from all employeeseven those with less tenurehas a disproportionately significant impact. As a result, NCNR is missing valuable opportunities to leverage diverse experience and perspectives of newer employees and support employee development through on-the-job training. This could adversely affect both the upcoming startup and future operations of the facility.

Recommendations

1) Initiative - Resources: Develop and implement a strategy to promote representation and collaboration across shifts, with a focus on improving engagement and addressing identified concerns.

2) Initiative - Resources: Implement structured feedback loops or mentorship programs for less-tenured employees to ensure their input is actively sought and integrated into operational decision-making.

Trait 7: Continuous Learning (CL) - Opportunities to learn about ways to ensure safety are sought out and implemented. The underlying Attributes include Operating Experience (CL.1),

Self-Assessment (CL.2), Benchmarking (CL.3), and Training (CL.4).

Positive Observations (CL.4): Informal Training.

Departments without a formal training structure have proactively created opportunities for skill development through classroom-style sessions, team meetings, and on-the-job familiarization activities to support employee success.

Positive Observations (CL.3): Proactive Approach to Learning NCNR Engineering conducted a high-quality benchmarking visit to the Cryogenics Group at Jefferson Lab (CEBAF) to identify best practices in cryogenic system design, maintenance, and operations. The benchmarking effort was well-structured, involving

Page 9 of 174 detailed facility tours, technical discussions, and evaluation of software and hardware systems such as the EPICS control interface and advanced compressor configurations.

While no documents were directly collected, the NCNR team is pursuing formal agreements to facilitate future knowledge sharing. Insights gained are informing NCNRs planning efforts across departments, particularly in support of cryogenic system improvements, helium recovery strategies, and long-term reactor design considerations.

Area in Need of Attention (CL.1, CL.2., PI.4): Established Processes.

There are currently no established processes for self-assessment, operating experience (OE) review, or trending. As a result, the organization may be missing key opportunities to proactively identify areas for continuous learning and improvement.

Area for Improvement (CL.4): Development and Implementation of Training.

A well-defined training strategy has been developed; however, the organization has not yet implemented this strategy due to resource constraints. This has led to continuing knowledge gaps in operations, significant knowledge gaps between senior personnel and less tenured employees, and the need for ad hoc training to fill knowledge gaps. As identified in the survey and interviews, the result is frustration of the less tenured employees that potentially impacts their willingness to engage.

Recommendations

1) Initiative - Training: Look at the opportunities for non-formal training knowledge transfer, Operations should review and provide insights into other departmental training strategies.

2) Initiative - Performance Improvement: Develop and implement the self-assessment, trending, and OE programs (Line Item 6).

Trait 8: Problem Identification and Resolution (PI) - Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance. The underlying Attributes include Identification (PI.1), Evaluation (PI.2),

Resolution (PI.3), and Trending (PI.4).

Positive Observation (PI.1): Use of CAP.

There has been an increased usage and acceptance of the Corrective Action Program (CAP), as demonstrated by a rise in the number of issues captured and the use of CAP data to support activities such as the Integrated Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (ISCMP). Additionally, there has been greater participation in CAP screening meetings.

Positive Observation (PI.2) Thorough Investigations.

The organization's focus on promoting and attending root cause analysis training reflects a strong commitment to continuous improvement. By building these skills across the workforce, NCNR is fostering a culture of learning, accountability, and long-term problem-solving.

Positive Observation (PI.4) Understanding of Declining Trends.

Trending of CAP items, using safety culture codes, is effectively applied to support the ISCMP. This approach helps identify potential areas of focus, contributing to the ongoing evaluation and improvement of the integrated safety culture.

Page 10 of 174 Area in Need of Attention (PI.1, PI.2 & PI.3): Leveraging CAP to Improve Performance.

There is a perception that the CAP process is overloaded with issues that do not belong in the Corrective Action Program. This perception may stem from a lack of understanding among personnel about the process, particularly the fact that issues not meeting the L0-L3 criteria are dispositioned outside of CAP. Of the 370 CAPs entered between April 2024 and March 2025, 71 are related to improvement opportunities, which are subsequently dispositioned outside of CAP, rather than actual L0-L3 issues, contributing to the confusion.

Area in Need of Attention (PI.1, PI.4): CAP User Interface.

The implementation of the new CAP interface has experienced significant delays, resulting in employee frustration, reduced efficiency, and limited accessibility, particularly for less-tenured staff unfamiliar with how to navigate CAP information. There is concern this may discourage employee engagement with the CAP process going forward.

Recommendations

1) Initiative - Communications - Develop and implement a communication strategy to educate NCNR personnel on the CAP process, emphasizing the criteria for L0-L3 issues and the disposition of non-L0-L3 items outside of the program. This will reduce confusion, align understanding, and mitigate the perception of overload.

2) Initiative - Performance Improvement - Communicate the schedule for, and finish building out the new CAP platforms (i.e., CAP dashboard, etc.) to improve the user interface, functionality, and visibility in problem identification, evaluation, and resolution.

Trait 9: Environment for Raising Concerns (RC) - A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) is maintained where personnel feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or discrimination. The underlying Attributes include SCWE Policy (RC.1) and Alternate Process for Raising Concerns (RC.2).

Area of Strength (RC.2): ECP Program Implementation NCNR has implemented an Employee Concerns Program that has demonstrated the ability to successfully resolve concerns.

Positive Observation (RC.1): Raising Concerns.

Individuals continue to feel comfortable raising issues with line management as evidenced by survey results, interviews, and observations.

Area in Need of Attention (RC.1): Leaders Own and Respond to Concerns.

While personnel may feel comfortable raising concerns, there is a perception that these concerns are not always acted upon in a timely or effective manner. This lack of follow-up potentially undermines the safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) and may discourage employees from raising concerns in the future.

Recommendation

1) Initiative - Safety Culture: Improve managements responsiveness to concerns by ensuring they have the tools and support to address issues promptly at the

Page 11 of 174 departmental level. This will help prevent concerns from escalating to the formal process, reinforcing a safety-conscious work environment.

Trait 10: Work Processes (WP) - The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety is maintained. The underlying Attributes include Work Management (WP.1), Design Margins (WP.2), Documentation (WP.3), and Procedure Adherence (WP.4).

Positive Observation (WP.3): Documentation Thorough and Accurate.

Major improvement in documentation, especially related to procedures, as recognized by survey results and focus group interviews across departments and at multiple levels.

Positive Observation (WP.3): Document Process Improves Overall Quality The document upgrade process, including procedures, drawings, and management of non-conformances, has improved the overall quality of documentation needed for NCNR work activities. The backlog has been identified and is being used to prioritize work based on limited resources.

Positive Observation (WP.1): Integrated Schedule.

An integrated schedule, including a two-week lookahead, has been developed and is being implemented across NCNR as recognized by interviews and observations.

Positive Observation (WP.4): Procedure Adherence.

Individuals are demonstrating behaviors indicating that they recognize value in the use of procedures and will stop to get procedures fixed prior to working in the field. This is confirmed by survey data and interviews. Field observations confirmed use of procedures and place keeping as an error-reduction technique to ensure they were being properly followed.

Area for Improvement (WP.1): Consistent Work Management Process NCNR does not have a deliberate process in which work is defined, selected, planned, scheduled, executed, closed and critiqued. This is resulting in:

Not following a clear risk-based decision-making process for work Frequent Schedule impacts and deferral of scheduled work Frequent ad-hoc planning and coordination of organizational resources Confusion related to roles and responsibilities and accountability when work groups are not ready for work Organization reacting on a short-term basis to perceived priorities and a churn on organizational resources Concerns of the sustainability of improvement as NCNR transitions to an operational environment.

Recommendations

1)

Initiative - Procedures: Continue in the implementation of planned actions for procedure initiative.

2)

Initiative - Work Management: Develop a structure for conduct of work management.

3)

Initiative - Resources: Attention is needed for transition from the current outage environment to daily research operations. NCNR needs a deliberate plan that defines roles and responsibilities, decision-making authorities and accountabilities, schedule management, and interfaces between ROE, RFO, and

Page 12 of 174 Research, and a change management strategy for the transition. Recommend revising the Work Management Initiative to include these aspects.

Page 13 of 174 Overall Conclusion The 2025 Independent Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment (INSCA) confirms that the NIST Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) has continued to make measurable progress in establishing foundational elements of a healthy Nuclear Safety Culture (NSC). This years assessment found meaningful changes in both attitudes and behaviorsdemonstrated by a growing willingness to question assumptions, increasing use of the Corrective Action Program (CAP), enhanced cross-functional collaboration, and improvements in documentation and procedural adherence.

Survey results and interviews reflect that many personnel increasingly understand and support the goals of an Integrated Safety Culture (ISC). Progress in leadership behaviors, decision-making, problem resolution, and conflict management has contributed to improved collaboration and operational effectiveness. Notable examples include the proactive use of the integrated schedule, increased CAP usage, and strengthened field observation programs.

While progress is evident, several areas still warrant focused attention to ensure the continued maturation and sustainability of the Integrated Safety Culture. Opportunities for improvement remain across a number of traits, including refining work management practices, strengthening decision-making consistency, advancing structured training implementation, and reinforcing leadership responsivenessparticularly in engaging less-tenured employees and ensuring timely follow-up on raised concerns. Communication across shifts and organizational levels, especially within Operations, also remains an area where further integration and clarity could enhance performance.

Interviews and observations indicate that most personnel feel encouraged to raise concerns and contribute to safety discussions; however, some expressed a desire for more visible and timely resolution of issues raised. While cross-functional collaboration and team cohesion have generally improved, additional attention to the engagement and involvement of newer staff would help sustain knowledge transfer and broaden organizational participation. These areas, while not indicative of widespread breakdowns, represent important levers for continued progress as NCNR transitions from its current phase into full operations.

Finally, the INSCA team noted that resource availabilityincluding staffing, funding, and time continues to present a challenge in fully supporting all ongoing improvement initiatives. These constraints have, at times, affected the pace of progress in key areas such as training, procedure development, CAP enhancements, and the consistent execution of work processes.

Continued attention to resource planning and prioritization will be important to maintain momentum and ensure that safety culture improvements are sustained over time.

In summary, NCNR has made encouraging progress with improvements evident across multiple aspects of the Integrated Safety Culture. Continued effort will help close remaining performance gaps, fully implement ongoing initiatives, and embed positive changes into daily operations.

Maintaining focus on leadership engagement, cross-functional coordination, and thoughtful resource planning will support the continued development of a resilient and lasting Nuclear Safety Culture.

Page 14 of 174 REPORT Methods of Analysis This INSCA was conducted by a team of independent consultants with over 235 years of aggregate experience in nuclear leadership, operations, maintenance, engineering, work management, licensing, training, safety culture and the safety conscious work environments, problem identification and resolution (equipment, human performance, process, organizational effectiveness), and recovery at power reactors following events of industry significance (Reference Attachment 24).

The Team evaluated the current NCNR Traits of a Healthy Safety Culture including SCWE, using a survey with 81 questions followed by 11 focus group/interviews, observations of meetings, training, work activities, and other data collection methods, identified strengths and weaknesses. (Reference Attachments 17, 21, 22, 23).

The survey data supported what personnel believe and the focus group/interviews and observations supported what personnel do to support a healthy NSC. The results were used to identify Areas of Strength (AOS), Positive Observations (PO), Areas in Need of Attention (ANA),

and Areas for Improvement (AFI).

The Areas of Strength, Positive Observations, Areas in Need of Attention, and Areas for Improvement were then compared to the status of the twenty-two Recommendations out of the 2023 and 2024 INSCAs, and the seven Initiatives to improve overall the NSC. The overall conclusions are presented in the Executive Summary.

The scope of the NSC Traits, Data Collection Methods, Survey, NSC Recovery Initiatives, and Interviews and Observations are briefly summarized below as a primer to the Analysis Results section of this report.

The NSC Traits The Traits included Personal Accountability (PA), Questioning Attitude (QA), Effective Safety Communication (CO), Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA), Decision Making (DM), Respectful Work Environment (WE), Continuous Learning (CL), Problem Identification and Resolution (PI), Environment for Raising Concerns (RC), and Work Processes (WP).

The Data Collection Methods The methods included the Safety Culture Survey, Functional Analysis, Structured Focus Groups, Interviews, Observations of Meetings, Archived Data Review, Behavioral Anchored Rating Scales (BARS), and a Behavioral Checklist.

The Survey The survey consisted of 81 Questions across the NSC Traits and was distributed across all NCNR groups. A total of 61 individuals respondedrepresenting Operations, Reactor Engineering, Health Physics, Aging Reactor Management, and other departments resulting in 100% participation from available personnel. The data was broken down by All Respondents, Individual Contributors, Supervisors and Above, and OU groups.

Page 15 of 174 NSC Recovery Initiatives The Seven Initiatives included Communications, Safety Culture, Performance Improvement, Training, Procedures, Work Management, and Resource Strategy, as based on the previous 2023 and 2024 INSCA Report Recommendations and Limiting Program Weaknesses (Reference Attachments 19 and 20 for status).

Interviews and Focus Groups There were multiple interviews, and 11 focus groups comprised of personnel across OU groups at both the individual contributor and supervisor and above levels. The OU groups included Operations, Reactor Engineering, Health Physics, Aging Reactor Management, and Others.

There was a subsequent collegial review with the NCNR leadership team which was only to gain additional insights and reduce the potential for any mischaracterizationof performance. To clarify, the review with the leadership teams was not intended to, and did not, alter the independence of the NSC team or its conclusions.

Note: This report uses the term Nuclear Safety Culture (NSC) aligned with the Confirmatory Letter requirement to conduct a Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment. NCNR uses the term Integrated Safety Culture (ISC) that encompasses nuclear safety, occupational safety, radiological safety, security, and environmental safety, as defined in Attachment 27.

Page 16 of 174 Analysis Results Objective 1: Personal Accountability Trait: Personal Accountability (PA) - individuals take personal responsibility for safety. The underlying Attributes include Standards (PA.1), Job Ownership (PA.2), and Teamwork (PA.3).

The survey included 6 questions related to PA to understand what people believe. The graph below is based on All Respondents. Individual Contributors and Supervisors and Above survey results are provided in Attachment 1, to provide additional insights for leaders and others with a need or desire to know.

Subsequently, the team used focus group/interviews, observations, and cognitive analysis to substantiate survey responses and gain further insights into what people believe and what people do. The analysis of data for the Trait PA identified the following:

The Assessment Category Area of Strength: None Positive Observation (PA.3): Cross-Functional Collaboration.

Cross-functional teamwork has notably improved, reflected in stronger coordination and collaboration between departments. Although some areas still require attention, overall interdepartmental teamwork has been strengthened.

Area in Need of Attention: None Area for Improvement: None Personal Accountability (PA.1} 5.1 clearly understand the importance of adherence to 11 integrated safety standards.

(PA.1} 10. I am accountable for shortfalls in meeting integrated safety standards/behaviors.

(PA.2) 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, encourage teamwork and identify 13 challenges to integrated safety.

(PA.2) 14. I ensure that I am trained and qualified to perform assigned work.

(PA.2} 39. I actively participate in pre-job briefings, understanding my responsibilities to raise integrated safety concerns before work begins.

(PA.3}73. I communicate and coordinate my activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure integrated safety is maintained.

2 6 2 6 5

9 11 17 13 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 12 22 28 Agree 55 4.79 35 4.17 45 4.61 36 4.39 42 4.51 31 4.41 Strongly Agree Average

Page 17 of 174 Comparison of the Trait 2023 to 2024 to 2025 Reference Attachment 16, Survey Data Comparison 2023 to 2024 to 2025, and Trait LA for additional Areas of Interest that may need management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Recommendations

1) Initiative - Safety Culture: Leverage teamwork to drive to a strength.

Objective 2: Questioning Attitude Trait: Questioning Attitude (QA) - Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions and activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or inappropriate action. The underlying Attributes include Nuclear is Recognized as Special and Unique (QA.1), Challenge the Unknown (QA.2), Challenge Assumptions (QA.3), and Avoid Complacency (QA.4).

The survey included 8 questions related to QA to understand what people believe. The graph below is based on All Respondents. Individual Contributors and Supervisors and Above survey results are provided in Attachment 2, to provide additional insights for leaders and others with a need or desire to know.

Subsequently, the team used focus group/interviews, observations, and cognitive analysis to substantiate survey responses and gain further insights into what people believe and what people do. The analysis of data for the Trait QA identified the following:

Questioning Attitude (QA.1) 51. Leaders ensures that activities that could affect reactivity are conducted with particular care, caution, oversight, and in accordance with procedures.

(QA.l} 57.1 recognize the special characteristics and unique hazards of nuclear technology.

1 6

13 12 44 52 (QA.2) 58.1 maintain a questioning attitude during pre-job briefs/job-site reviews to Identify _1_4 _ ____

2_2 ____ - __ _

and resolve unexpected conditions.

(QA.2} 60. I promptly cha llenge unanticipated test results or unexpected system response rather than rationalize t hem.

(QA.2) 81.I stop work activities when confronted with an unexpected condition.

(QA.3} 64.1 challenge assumptions/offer opposing views when I think something is not correct.

(QA.3} 45. Leaders solicit challenges to assumptions when evaluating integrated safety issues.

(QA.4} 37.1 perionn a thorough review of the work site and planned activity every time work is periormed.

(QA.4} 65. 1 avoid complacency and plan for the possibility of mistakes.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Disagree 1 4 20 12 45 17 12 23 13 18 28 Agree Strongly Agree 4.57 4.80 37 4.48 35 4.41 4.63 40 4.48 23 4.02 29 4.16 31 4.38 Average

Page 18 of 174 The Assessment Category Area of Strength: None Positive Observation (QA.2, QA.3, QA.4): Work Process Scrutiny.

Personnel are increasingly engaged in questioning work processes, procedures, and equipment. This is evident through continued growth in CAP initiations, a willingness to stop work when procedures or documentation are incomplete, and challenges to equipment status.

Some personnel question whether this mindset will be maintained as the plant transitions to an operational environment.

Area in Need of Attention: None Area for Improvement: None Comparison of the Trait 2023 to 2024 to 2025 Reference Attachment 16, Survey Data Comparison 2023 to 2024 to 2025, and Trait LA for additional Areas of Interest that may need management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Recommendations

1) Initiative - Safety Culture: Leverage this questioning attitude in all storyboards and initiatives moving forward.

Objective 3: Effective Safety Communications Trait: Effective Safety Communication (CO) - Communications maintain a focus on safety. The underlying Attributes include Work Process Communications (CO.1), Bases for Decisions (CO.2), Free Flow of Information (CO.3), and Expectations (CO.4).

The survey included 7 questions related to CO to understand what people believe. The graph below is based on All Respondents. Individual Contributors and Supervisors and Above survey results are provided in Attachment 3, to provide additional insights for leaders and others with a need or desire to know.

Effective Safety Communications (CO. 1 } 4. Integrated safety Is discu ssed at e v e ry m eeting vvhe r e plant vvork a ctivities are planned and revievved.

(CO.2} 21. Leade.-s e nsure that the basis for operational and org ani z ational d ecisions Is c ommunicated In a t ime ly manne r.

(CO.2) 59. Leaders e n c ourage Individuals t o a s k questions If they do not unde rsta nd the basis of operational and management decisions.

(CO.3} 35. I communicate openly and candidly,.vith oversight, audit, and reg ulatory organizations.

15 6

1 6

(CO.3) 7 4. Leaders respond to m e In an open, honest and non -d efensive manne r.

1 10 (CO.4) 40. Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation t hat integrat e d safety Is the organization's ove rridin g priority.

(C0.4) 61. Lea d ers e n s ure s uppl e m e ntal personnel unde rstand e "'f>ecte d b e haviors and actions necessary to mal ntaln Inte g rated safety.

3 7

2

• Str*ongly Disa g ree Disa g re e Neither Agree or Disagree 25 10 28 2 4 1 4 2 0 24 26 Agree Strongly Agree 24 4.11 15 3.62 34 4.40 4 1 4.48 34 4.34 30 4.27 25 4.16 Average

Page 19 of 174 Subsequently, the team used focus group/interviews, observations, and cognitive analysis to substantiate survey responses and gain further insights into what people believe and what people do. The analysis of data for the Trait CO identified the following:

The Assessment Category Area of Strength: None Positive Observation (CO.3): Communication Methods.

Communications have improved at NCNR because of significant efforts to improve the form and frequency of communication methods. Many individuals reported the increased use of various methods of Integrated Schedule and associated meetings, POD, CAP Review Meetings, K-Wing Communications, and Department Meetings.

Area in Need of Attention (CO.1, CO.2, CO.3, CO.4): Information Gaps.

Frequent emergent schedule changes, and a lack of clear understanding regarding the basis for key operational decisions has resulted in persistent communication breakdowns between Operations shifts, and across different levels within the Operations organization, and with other departments. These issues are evident in frequent emergent schedule changes, shifting priorities, and a lack of shared understanding regarding the basis for key operational decisions.

Recent Examples:

Draining the secondary - There was recent discussion about potentially draining the secondary system, but no clear decision or rationale was provided. Engineering expressed uncertainty about the need for this action, noting that if draining were to occur, it would require ordering chemicals, developing or identifying appropriate procedures, and scheduling the work. While the idea is to be prepared in case it becomes necessary, the lack of clarity adds unnecessary workload.

Operations not always aware of daily schedule changes - real-time information is not always available in the control room for use by shift personnel.

Reliance on informal communication channels when formal channels are ineffectively used.

Formal channels have not been fully implemented.

This presents a potential vulnerability to nuclear safety once the plant transitions from the current environment to operations and it contributes to inefficiency in resource application.

Area in Need of Attention (CO.4): Inconsistent Integration of Safety Messaging Lack of incorporation of integrated safety message into daily activities and meetings, resulting in a plateaued understanding of integrated safety at NCNR. Knowledge and level of use of ISC principles may be diminished or extinguished as the organization progresses forward.

Area for Improvement: None Comparison of the Trait 2023 to 2024 to 2025 Reference Attachment 16, Survey Data Comparison 2023 to 2024 to 2025, and Trait LA for additional Areas of Interest that may need management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Recommendations

1) Initiative - Communications: Complete implementation of the communication strategy.

Page 20 of 174

2) Initiative - Communications: Focus on incorporation of Integrated Safety Culture message in daily activities.

Objective 4: Leadership Safety Values and Actions Trait: Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA) - Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors. The underlying Attributes include Resources (LA.1); Field Presence (LA.2); Incentives, Sanctions, and Rewards (LA.3); Strategic Commitment to Safety (LA.4); Change Management (LA.5); Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities (LA.6); Constant Examination (LA.7); and Leader Behaviors (LA.8).

The survey included 16 questions related to LA to understand what people believe. The graph below is based on All Respondents. Individual Contributors, and Supervisors and Above, Survey results are provided in Attachment 4, to provide additional insights for leaders and others with a need or desire to know.

Subsequently, the team used focus group/interviews, observations, and cognitive analysis to substantiate survey responses and gain further insights into what people believe and what people do. The analysis of data for the Trait LA identified the following:

The Assessment Category Area of Strength (LA.2): Effective Execution of Observation Program Implementation of the improved observation program as evidenced by:

Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA.1} 13. Leadersensurethat personnel, tools, equipment, procedures and other resource materials 7

13 26 16 3.73 are available and adequate to support integrated safety.

( LA.1} 66. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs ensure staffing levels are consistent with the demands re lated to -

7 21 15 15 3.44 maintaining safety and reliability.

(LA.2/ 17. Leaders from all levels in the organization are involved in oversight of work activities. 5 30 21 3.95 (LA.2} 19. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors ensure supervisory and management oversight -

26 17 3.69 of contractors and supplemental personl1l work activities, such that integrated safety is supported.

(LA.2) 22. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs encoura ge informal leaders (non-suf)rvisors) to model safe 2 25 23 4.07 behaviors and high standards of accountability.

( LA.3} 12. Leaders provide incentives, sa nctions, and rewa rds that are aligned with NCNR integrated -

7 25 17 12 3.40 safety policies and reinforce behaviors and outcomes that reflect safety as the overriding priority.

( LA.3}34. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs reward individuals who identify and raise issues affecting the 1

22 23 14 3.66 integrated safety policy.

(LA.4} 9. Leaders ensure NCNR facility priorities are aligned to reflect integrated safety as the 11 27 22 4.02 overriding priority.

( LA.4} 20. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs develop and implement cost and schedule goa ls in a manner that 5

22 17 15 3.62 reinforces the importance of Integrated safety.

( LA.5} 26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs anticipate, manage and communicate the effects of impending 10 18 22 11 3.44 changes.

( LA.5} 33. Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and implement change so that integrated I 6 18 24 12 3.66 safety remains the overriding priority.

( LA.6} 6. Leaders ensure roles, responsibilities, and authorities are clearly defined, understood and 8

29 17 3.87 documented to promote integrated safety.

(LA.6} 48. Corporate governance, review boards, and independent oversight organizations support the I 13 25 21 4.08 Director's ultimate responsibility for decisions affecting nuclear safety.

( LA. 7} 80. Leaders constantly scrutinize nuclear safety through a variety of monitoring techniques, 2

12 27 21 4.08 including assessments of nuclear safety culture.

(LA.8} 8. Leaders exhibit behaviors that set the standard for integrated safety.

4 25 20 3.92

( LA.8} 24. Leaders "walk the talk", modeling correct behaviors when resolving apparent conflicts 14 27 18 3.97 between Integrated safety and facility availability.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 21 of 174 The quality and usefulness of the observation tools Meeting and exceeding the goals for frequency across departments Proactive use of the program to capture information Ability to identify trends and provide input to the SCMP Creation of corrective actions based on those trends Positive Observation (LA.8): Leaders Effectively Addresses Safety Concerns.

Many interviewees cited specific plant, processes, and interpersonal examples where safety concerns were effectively addressed by NCNR leadership. Notable examples included the fuel plug discovery, ACV valve issues, pre-job brief improvements, and adherence to procedures.

Positive Observation (LA.8): Leaders Exemplify Safety-First Behavior.

Survey results and focus group interviews confirm that leaders continue to model safety-first behavior (walk-the-talk), in which they communicate the importance of safety, prioritizing it in decisions, and engage in regular activities that ensure the constant examination of safety.

Area in Need of Attention (LA.1): Maintenance of Staff at Authorized Levels NCNR leaders are hampered by federal government restraints to maintain staffing levels consistent with the demands to maintain safety and reliability.

Area in Need of Attention (LA.6 & LA.8): Lack of Enforced Workplace Standards Housekeeping, neatness, and arrangement of working areas to remove potential personnel safety issues and equipment damage issues need attention as observed by confinement cleanliness and trip hazards, and disarray of equipment and tools. Facility leadership has not established or enforced clear standards in this area, contributing to the current condition.

Area for Improvement (LA.8): Leadership Gaps in Building a Collaborative Culture.

Certain operational shifts have not effectively fostered a collaborative environment for all employees, particularly less tenured employees, and women in ROE. As a result, some employees feel that their input is not valued and that leaders are not actively seeking feedback from workers at all levels. This issue is highlighted by survey results, significant survey write-in comments, observations, and discussions in focus groups.

Comparison of the Trait 2023 to 2024 to 2025 A comparison of the survey results for the LA Trait from 2023 to 2024 to 2025 indicated an improvement with respect to LA.2, and a decline with respect to LA.8 Leader Behaviors, as follows:

LA.2 Field Presence - Improvement - Supervisors practice visible leadership in the field during safety significant evolutions.

LA.8 Leader Behaviors - Decline - NCNR leaders actively seek out the opinions of workers at all levels.

Reference Attachment 16, Survey Data Comparison 2023 to 2024 to 2025 for additional Areas of Interest that may need management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Recommendations

Page 22 of 174

1) Initiative - Performance Improvement: Establish and enforce clear housekeeping standards to address safety hazards and improve work area organization.

2) Initiative - Communications: Establish clear expectations for leadership to actively engage with and incorporate input from all employees, particularly less-tenured staff, and women, to foster a more empowering and collaborative work environment.

3) Initiative - Resources: Continue to implement the Resource initiative.

Objective 5: Decision Making Trait: Decision Making (DM) - Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are systematic, rigorous, and thorough. The underlying Attributes include Consistent Process (DM.1),

Conservative Bias (DM.2), and Accountability for Decisions (DM.3).

The survey included 5 questions related to DM to understand what people believe. The graph below is based on All Respondents. Individual Contributors and Supervisors and Above survey results are provided in Attachment 5, to provide additional insights for leaders and others with a need or desire to know.

Subsequently, the team used focus group/interviews, observations, and cognitive analysis to substantiate survey responses and gain further insights into what people believe and what people do. The analysis of data for the Trait DM identified the following:

The Assessment Category Area of Strength: None Decision-Making (DM.l) 43. I use a consistent, systematic approach to making decisions.

2 5 (DM.1) 47. When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate these decisions to ensure 1 5 they remain appropriate and adjust as needed.

(DM.2) 46.1 use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent 1

choices over those that are simply allowable.

9 (DM.2) 63. Leaders apply a conservative approach to decision making, particularly when information is incomplete or conditions are unusual.

10 (DM.3} 44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 16 25 33 4.37 25 31 4.39 20 33 4.35 21 32 4.35 20 17 3.80 Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 23 of 174 Positive Observation (DM.2): Prudent Decision-Making Practices.

NCNR has made progress in conservative decision-making as demonstrated by the implementation of the integrated schedule, challenging plans for ACV work to ensure safe and effective completion, and the development of a repair strategy and procedure prior to implementing refueling plug work. This illustrates Prudent vs. Allowable decision-making behaviors.

Area in Need of Attention (DM.1): Reactive Decisions Disrupt Operations.

The absence of a systematic decision-making process aligned with the work management process leads to unplanned schedule changes that disrupt daily operations and resource allocation. These reactive adjustmentsoften referred to as addressing the 'fire of the day' highlight ongoing challenges in applying rigorous and structured decision-making practices.

Area for Improvement: None Comparison of the Trait 2023 to 2024 to 2025 Reference Attachment 16, Survey Data Comparison 2023 to 2024 to 2025, and Trait LA for additional Areas of Interest that may need management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Recommendation

1) Initiative - Work Management: Establish clear decision-making protocols and integrate them with the work management process to prevent reactive adjustments and ensure more proactive, planned schedule management.

Objective 6: Respectful Work Environment Trait: Respectful Work Environment (WE) - Trust and respect permeate the organization. The underlying Attributes include Respect is Evident (WE.1), Opinions are Valued (We.2), High Level of Trust (WE.3), and WE.4 (Conflict Resolution).

The survey included 9 questions related to WE to understand what people believe. The graph below is based on All Respondents. Individual Contributors and Supervisors and Above survey results are provided in Attachment 6, to provide additional insights for leaders and others with a need or desire to know.

Page 24 of 174 Subsequently, the team used focus group/interviews, observations, and cognitive analysis to substantiate survey responses and gain further insights into what people believe and what people do. The analysis of data for the Trait WE identified the following:

The Assessment Category Area of Strength: None Positive Observation (WE.4): Improved Conflict Resolution Processes.

Conflicts are more effectively and fairly resolved during formal settings, such as the integrated schedule meetings, CAP review meetings, and emergent issue resolution discussions. This improvement is further demonstrated by Operations Crew Chiefs addressing conflicts in dedicated meetings rather than resolving them in public forums.

Area in Need of Attention (WE.1, WE.2, WE.3): Team Composition Across Shifts.

Operations have not yet adopted an effective approach to managing team composition across shifts. This is evidenced by survey results showing lower scores in this area compared to the rest of the organization, numerous written survey comments, and feedback from focus group discussions.

Area for Improvement (WE.1, WE.2, WE.3): Supportive Culture.

Less-tenured ROE employees reported that their questions and input are often ignored, talked over, or dismissed by Operations personnelsometimes even during meetings by supervisors.

This suggests that some leaders are not effectively engaging less-tenured staff, which is critical Respectful Work Environment (WE.l) 7. Leaders regard individuals and their professional capabilities and 1 4 14 24 21 3.89 experiences as its most valuable asset.

(WE.l) 28. I treat other employees with dignity and respect. 1 13 50 4.77 (WE.l) 42. I treat decision-makers with respect, even when I disagree with a 1

15 49 4.72 decision.

(WE.2) 30. I am encouraged to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing I 5 9

11 39 4.26 opinions and questions to help identify and solve problems.

(WE.2) 31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected. 12 13 23 26 4.09 (WE.2) 78. I value the insights and perspectives provided by quality assurance, the employee concerns programs and independent oversight 12 5 28 26 4.23 organizations.

(WE.3) 27. Leaders promote collaboration among work groups. I 6 12 27 19 3.88 (WE.3) 32. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions 2

10 26 27 4.20 and concerns in an open and honest manner.

(WE.3) 36. Leaders share important information in an open, honest and timely manner such that trust is maintained.

12 10 20 31 4.22 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 25 of 174 for fostering a respectful and collaborative work environment. Given the relatively small size of the NCNR team, failing to listen to and incorporate input from all employeeseven those with less tenurehas a disproportionately significant impact. As a result, NCNR is missing valuable opportunities to leverage diverse experience and perspectives of newer employees and support employee development through on-the-job training. This could adversely affect both the upcoming startup and future operations of the facility.

Comparison of the Trait 2023 to 2024 to 2025 A comparison of the survey results for the CL Trait from 2024 to 2025 indicated an improvement in WE.4, and a decline in WE.1, WE.2, and WE.3 as follows:

WE.1 Respect is Evident - Decline - The organization regards individuals and their professional capabilities and experiences as its most valuable asset.

WE.2 Opinions are Valued - Decline - Leaders are receptive to ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing opinions, and questions.

WE.3 High Level of Trust - Decline - Leaders respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.

WE.4 Conflict Resolution - Improvement - The organization implements processes to ensure fair and objective resolution of conflicts and differing views.

Reference Attachment 16, Survey Data Comparison 2023 to 2024 to 2025, and Trait LA for additional Areas of Interest that may need management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Recommendations

1) Initiative - Resources: Develop and implement a strategy to promote representation and collaboration across shifts, with a focus on improving engagement and addressing identified concerns.

2) Initiative - Resources: Implement structured feedback loops or mentorship programs for less-tenured employees to ensure their input is actively sought and integrated into operational decision-making.

Objective 7: Continuous Learning Trait: Continuous Learning (CL) - Opportunities to learn about ways to ensure safety are sought out and implemented. The underlying Attributes include Operating Experience (CL.1), Self-Assessment (CL.2), Benchmarking (CL.3), and Training (CL.4).

The survey included 7 questions related to CL to understand what people believe. The graph below is based on All Respondents. Individual Contributors and Supervisors and Above survey results are provided in Attachment 7, to provide additional insights for leaders and others with a need or desire to know.

Page 26 of 174 Subsequently, the team used focus group/interviews, observations, and cognitive analysis to substantiate survey responses and gain further insights into what people believe and what people do. The analysis of data for the Trait CL identified the following:

The Assessment Category Area of Strength: None Positive Observations (CL.4): Informal Training.

Departments without a formal training structure have proactively created opportunities for skill development through classroom-style sessions, team meetings, and on-the-job familiarization activities to support employee success.

Positive Observations (CL.3): Proactive Approach to Learning NCNR Engineering conducted a high-quality benchmarking visit to the Cryogenics Group at Jefferson Lab (CEBAF) to identify best practices in cryogenic system design, maintenance, and operations. The benchmarking effort was well-structured, involving detailed facility tours, technical discussions, and evaluation of software and hardware systems such as the EPICS control interface and advanced compressor configurations. While no documents were directly collected, the NCNR team is pursuing formal agreements to facilitate future knowledge sharing.

Insights gained are informing NCNRs planning efforts across departments, particularly in support of cryogenic system improvements, helium recovery strategies, and long-term reactor design considerations.

Area in Need of Attention (CL.1, CL.2., PI.4): Established Processes.

Continuous Learning (CLl) 67. Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to facility processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs.

(CL2) 68. I use operating experience to understand equipment, operational and industry challenge sand adopt new ideas.

(CL2) 75. Leaders value the insight and perspective provided through assessments.

(CL3) 76. NCNR uses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire innovative ideas to improve integrated safety.

(CL4) 41. NCNR provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technical competent workforce.

(CL4) 56. I understand reactor operations to establish a solid foundation for decisions and behaviors.

(CL4) 71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals value and seek continuous learning opportunities.

11 3

9 I

17 15 12 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 22 23 21 17 Agree 17 15 3.50 27 4.17 28 4.21 20 15 3.61 15 18 12 3.29 19 24 3.97 26 21 3.97 Strongly Agree Average

Page 27 of 174 There are currently no established processes for self-assessment, operating experience (OE) review, or trending. As a result, the organization may be missing key opportunities to proactively identify areas for continuous learning and improvement.

Area for Improvement (CL.4): Development and Implementation of Training.

A well-defined training strategy has been developed; however, the organization has not yet implemented this strategy due to resource constraints. This has led to continuing knowledge gaps in operations, significant knowledge gaps between senior personnel and less tenured employees, and the need for ad hoc training to fill knowledge gaps. As identified in the survey and interviews, the result is frustration of the less tenured employees that potentially impacts their willingness to engage.

Comparison of the Trait 2023 to 2024 to 2025 A comparison of the survey results for the CL Trait from 2024 to 2025 indicated improvement in CL.3 as follows:

CL.3 Benchmarking - Improvement - The organization seeks out better practices using benchmarking to understand how others perform the same or similar functions.

Reference Attachment 16, Survey Data Comparison 2023 to 2024 to 2025, and Trait LA for additional Areas of Interest that may need management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Recommendations

1) Initiative - Training: Look at the opportunities for non-formal training knowledge transfer, Operations should review and provide insights into other departmental training strategies.

2) Initiative - Performance Improvement: Develop and implement the self-assessment, trending, and OE programs (Line Item 6).

Objective 8: Problem Identification and Resolution Trait: Problem Identification and Resolution (PI) - Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance. The underlying Attributes include Identification (PI.1), Evaluation (PI.2),

Resolution (PI.3), and Trending (PI.4).

The survey included 6 questions related to PI to understand what people believe. The graph below is based on All Respondents. Individual Contributors and Supervisors and Above survey results are provided in Attachment 8, to provide additional insights for leaders and others with a need or desire to know.

Page 28 of 174 Subsequently, the team used focus group/interviews, observations, and cognitive analysis to substantiate survey responses and gain further insights into what people believe and what people do. The analysis of data for the Trait PI identified the following:

The Assessment Category Area of Strength: None Positive Observation (PI.1): Use of CAP.

There has been an increased usage and acceptance of the Corrective Action Program (CAP),

as demonstrated by a rise in the number of issues captured and the use of CAP data to support activities such as the Integrated Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (ISCMP). Additionally, there has been greater participation in CAP screening meetings.

Positive Observation (PI.2) Thorough Investigations.

The organization's focus on promoting and attending root cause analysis training reflects a strong commitment to continuous improvement. By building these skills across the workforce, NCNR is fostering a culture of learning, accountability, and long-term problem-solving.

Positive Observation (PI.4) Understanding of Declining Trends.

Trending of CAP items, using safety culture codes, is effectively applied to support the ISCMP.

This approach helps identify potential areas of focus, contributing to the ongoing evaluation and improvement of the integrated safety culture.

Area in Need of Attention (PI.1, PI.2 & PI.3): Leveraging CAP to Improve Performance.

There is a perception that the CAP process is overloaded with issues that do not belong in the Corrective Action Program. This perception may stem from a lack of understanding among personnel about the process, particularly the fact that issues not meeting the L0-L3 criteria are dispositioned outside of CAP. Of the 370 CAPs entered between April 2024 and March 2025, 71 are related to improvement opportunities, which are subsequently dispositioned outside of CAP, rather than actual L0-L3 issues, contributing to the confusion.

Area in Need of Attention (PI.1, PI.4): CAP User Interface.

The implementation of the new CAP interface has experienced significant delays, resulting in employee frustration, reduced efficiency, and limited accessibility, particularly for less-tenured Problem Identification and Resolution (Pl.1} 50. I ensure issues, problems, degraded conditions and near misses Ii 11 18 33 4.27 are promptly reported and documented in the corrective action program.

(Pl.1) 62. I recognize deviations from standards. 1 9

29 25 4.22 (Pl.2) 69. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems to ensure that resolutions I 5 15 23 21 3.89 address causes and extent of conditions.

(Pl.2) 70. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems for underlying 12 13 27 19 3.98 organizational and safety culture contributors.

(Pl.3} 18. NCNR takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a I 6 20 18 19 3.71 timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance.

(Pl.4) 77. NCNR uses performance indicators to monitor both equipment 10 12 23 10 3.47 and organizational performance, including integrated safety culture.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 29 of 174 staff unfamiliar with how to navigate CAP information. There is concern this may discourage employee engagement with the CAP process going forward.

Comparison of the Trait 2023 to 2024 to 2025 Reference Attachment 16, Survey Data Comparison 2023 to 2024 to 2025, and Trait PI for additional Areas of Interest that may need management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Recommendations

1) Initiative - Communications - Develop and implement a communication strategy to educate NCNR personnel on the CAP process, emphasizing the criteria for L0-L3 issues and the disposition of non-L0-L3 items outside of the program. This will reduce confusion, align understanding, and mitigate the perception of overload.

2) Initiative - Performance Improvement - Communicate the schedule for, and finish building out the new CAP platforms (i.e., CAP dashboard, etc.) to improve the user interface, functionality, and visibility in problem identification, evaluation, and resolution.

Objective 9: Environment for Raising Concerns Trait: Environment for Raising Concerns (RC) - A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) is maintained where personnel feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or discrimination. The underlying Attributes include SCWE Policy (RC.1) and Alternate Process for Raising Concerns (RC.2).

The survey included 4 questions related to RC to understand what people believe. The graph below is based on All Respondents. Individual Contributors and Supervisors and Above survey results are provided in Attachment 9, to provide additional insights for leaders and others with a need or desire to know.

Subsequently, the team used focus group/interviews, observations, and cognitive analysis to substantiate survey responses and gain further insights into what people believe and what people do. The analysis of data for the Trait RC identified the following:

Environment for Raising Concerns (RC.1} 15. Claims of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and 18 14 23 4.09 discrimination are investigated.

( RC.l} 23. Leaders take ownership when receiving and responding I to concerns, recognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensuring 12 23 26 4.08 the concerns are adequately addressed in a timely manner.

( RC.l} 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns without fear of retribution and with confidence that their concerns will be 12 8

11 43 4.43 addressed.

( RC.2} 16. NCNR has a process for raising and resolving concerns I s 12 19 25 3.86 that is independent of line-management influence.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 30 of 174 The Assessment Category Area of Strength (RC.2): ECP Program Implementation NCNR has implemented an Employee Concerns Program that has demonstrated the ability to successfully resolve concerns.

Positive Observation (RC.1): Raising Concerns.

Individuals continue to feel comfortable raising issues with line management as evidenced by survey results, interviews, and observations.

Area in Need of Attention (RC.1): Leaders Own and Respond to Concerns.

While personnel may feel comfortable raising concerns, there is a perception that these concerns are not always acted upon in a timely or effective manner. This lack of follow-up potentially undermines the safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) and may discourage employees from raising concerns in the future.

Area for Improvement: None Comparison of the Trait 2023 to 2024 to 2025 A comparison of the survey results for the RC Trait from 2024 to 2025 indicated improvement in RC.2, as follows:

RC.2 Alternate Process for Raising Concerns - Improvement - Processes for raising concerns that are alternatives to CAP and operated outside the influences of the management chain are communicated and accessible.

Reference Attachment 16, Survey Data Comparison 2023 to 2024 to 2025, and Trait RC for additional Areas of Interest that may need management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Recommendation

1) Initiative - Safety Culture: Improve managements responsiveness to concerns by ensuring they have the tools and support to address issues promptly at the departmental level. This will help prevent concerns from escalating to the formal process, reinforcing a safety-conscious work environment.

Objective 10: Work Processes Trait: Work Processes (WP) - The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety is maintained. The underlying Attributes include Work Management (WP.1), Design Margins (WP.2), Documentation (WP.3), and Procedure Adherence (WP.4).

The survey included 8 questions related to WP to understand what people believe. The graph below is based on All Respondents. Individual Contributors and Supervisors and Above survey results are provided in Attachment 10, to provide additional insights for leaders and others with a need or desire to know.

Page 31 of 174 Subsequently, the team used focus group/interviews, observations, and cognitive analysis to substantiate survey responses and gain further insights into what people believe and what people do. The analysis of data for the Trait WP identified the following:

The Assessment Category Area of Strength: None Positive Observation (WP.3): Documentation Thorough and Accurate.

Major improvement in documentation, especially related to procedures, as recognized by survey results and focus group interviews across departments and at multiple levels.

Positive Observation (WP.3): Document Process Improves Overall Quality The document upgrade process, including procedures, drawings, and management of non-conformances, has improved the overall quality of documentation needed for NCNR work activities. The backlog has been identified and is being used to prioritize work based on limited resources.

Positive Observation (WP.1): Integrated Schedule.

Work Processes (WP.1} 54. Work is effectively planned and executed by I 6 20 18 16 3.65 incorporating risk-informed insights.

(WP.1} 72. NCNR implements the work management process 1 3 (planning, controlling and executing work activities) such that 10 31 18 3.98 integrated safety is the overriding priority.

(WP.2) 52. Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and 8

23 33 4.39 changed only with great thought and care.

(WP.2) 53. Safety-related equipment is operated and maintained 1 8

20 33 4.37 within design requirements.

(WP.3) 49. NCNR facility activities are governed by comprehensive 9

22 18 10 3.26 high-quality programs, processes, and procedures.

(WP.3} 55. NCNR creates and maintains complete, accurate and 15 17 13 14 3.25 up-to-date documentation.

(WP.4) 25. I understand and use human error reduction l 2 7

17 35 4.34 techniques, such as self-check, STAR, and pre-job briefs.

(WP.4) 38. I follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. 11 18 45 4.65 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 32 of 174 An integrated schedule, including a two-week lookahead, has been developed and is being implemented across NCNR as recognized by interviews and observations.

Positive Observation (WP.4): Procedure Adherence.

Individuals are demonstrating behaviors indicating that they recognize value in the use of procedures and will stop to get procedures fixed prior to working in the field. This is confirmed by survey data and interviews. Field observations confirmed use of procedures and place keeping as an error-reduction technique to ensure they were being properly followed.

Area in Need of Attention: None Area for Improvement (WP.1): Consistent Work Management Process NCNR does not have a deliberate process in which work is defined, selected, planned, scheduled, executed, closed and critiqued. This is resulting in:

Not following a clear risk-based decision-making process for work Frequent Schedule impacts and deferral of scheduled work Frequent ad-hoc planning and coordination of organizational resources Confusion related to roles and responsibilities and accountability when work groups are not ready for work Organization reacting on a short-term basis to perceived priorities and a churn on organizational resources Concerns of the sustainability of improvement as NCNR transitions to an operational environment.

Comparison of the Trait 2023 to 2024 to 2025 Reference Attachment 16, Survey Data Comparison 2023 to 2024 to 2025, and Trait LA for additional Areas of Interest that may need management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Recommendations

1) Initiative - Procedures: Continue in the implementation of planned actions for procedure initiative.

2) Initiative - Work Management: Develop a structure for conduct of work management.

3) Initiative - Resources: Attention is needed for transition from the current outage environment to daily research operations. NCNR needs a deliberate plan that defines roles and responsibilities, decision-making authorities and accountabilities, schedule management, and interfaces between ROE, RFO, and Research, and a change management strategy for the transition. Recommend revising the Work Management Initiative to include these aspects.

Page 33 of 174 Safety Culture Performance Improvement The survey results for all respondents revealed that personnel believe the NSC is improving based on the charts below.

2024 2025 A more detailed comparison of the 10 traits from the 2024 survey to the 2025 survey is available in Attachment 11. Some of the more noteworthy changes were factored into the overall analyses within the report.

Traits by OU Group The survey results for each of the 10 Traits are presented in Attachments by the Operations, Reactor Engineering, Health Physics, and Aging Reactor Management, which are in Attachments 12, 13, 14, and 15, for those with a need or desire to know. While this INSCA Report identifies Areas in Need of Attention (ANA) and Areas for Improvement (AFIs) with recommendations for improvement, the survey results by OU group provide leaders with additional more subtle information for group leaders to review and act as they deemed appropriate.

Review of Internal Events The Team reviewed one significant events since the last INSCA and identified the following Positive and Negative Observations.

In April 2024, During testing Shim Arm 3 failed to SCRAM as expected (CAP Item 333)

Positive Observations:

1) Entry into CAP was immediate to create a record of the failure

2) A very detailed Engineering Evaluation was conducted.

Negative Observations:

1) Though an engineering evaluation was performed, corrective actions appear to be effective and an extent of condition was performed, the facility did not use a structured cause analysis methodology. This presents the opportunity to miss key learnings and management control system gaps applicable to other ECN implementations.

The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the last survey in 2023.

Average 4.11 Strongly Agree 24 Agree 21 Neither Agree or Disagree 15 Disagree Strongly Disagree 5

10 15 20 25 30 The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has Improved Since the Survey in 2023.

Average 4.35 Strongly Agree

==:=

30 Agree 21 Neither Agree or Disagree 9

Disagree 0

Strongly Disagree 0

0 5

10 15 20 25 30 35

Page 34 of 174 Review of External Information NRC Inspection Activities and Reports:

NRC Supplemental Inspection Report 2024-201/202 On February 3, 2025, the NRC issued the 3rd and 4th QTR 2023 and the 1st and 2nd QTR 2024 Supplemental Inspection Report, 2024-202. From July 1, 2023 - December 31, 2024, the US NRC staff conducted an inspection at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

Center for Neutron Research facility in accordance with the NIST Supplemental Inspection Plan.

The supplemental Inspection examined activities conducted under the NBSR License as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the condition of the license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

Twelve (12) of the thirty nine (39) Supplemental Inspection Objectives remain open and will be the subject of future supplemental inspections.

Key Observations Misalignment of #3 shim arm output shaft and lower clutch plate o Review of corrective actions (CAP 333 and ECN 1361) for drawing, procedures, and component corrections o Root cause - 5 whys o Extent of condition for the remaining shim arms Reactor operations: startup to 50 - 200 kw o Pre-job briefs and reactor requalification training conducted thoroughly o Observation of reactor startup checklists and tech spec surveillances o Radiological surveys, effluent samples - difficulty with obtaining equilibrium results operation to determine effectiveness of efforts to reduce He leakage Good communication with staff using frequent ROE meetings, introduced new brochure for NCNR safety culture, upcoming schedules, foster good transparency with personnel and inspection staff Training of refueling operations - rotational latch checks and fuel moves observed o Operator feedback for additional training and time performing evolution August defueling of reactor o Unexplained marks on assemblies, stop and investigate demonstrated good questioning attitude November Safety Assessment Committee (SAC) report o Review of report pending. Debrief consistent with inspector observations -

improvements in processes and safety culture by assessment team, continues to improve over time Disassembly of reactor refuel plug/vessel cleaning preparation - no issues noted ECP implementation o Program overview discussed with lead. Safety culture specialists shared feedback with NCNR management and program lead Key Observations - Refueling Plug Assembly Briefed by engineering on the seam weld failure and weld joints o Review of data from 1994, 2022, and current condition o Potential scope of tasks o Technical evaluation by weld engineer/inspector o Recommendations for repairs (in-house repairs) o Documentation for quality repairs, design change (50.59 screening)

Page 35 of 174 o Will continue to follow progress

==

Conclusion:==

No violations or findings were identified The NRC will continue to conduct supplemental inspections in accordance with the inspection plan to provide enhanced oversight until further notice.

NRC Security Inspection Report, 2024-203 On February 20, 2025, the NRC issued a Security Inspection Report, 2024-203. From December 18 - 19, 2024 the NRC staff conducted a security inspection at the National Bureau of Standards Test Reactor.

The inspection examined activities conducted under the NBSR license as they relate to security and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspector reviewed selected procedures and records, observed various activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

Safety Assessment Committee November 2024 The Safety Assessment Committee (SAC) met at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Center for Neutron Research (NCNR). The SAC conducted an on-site review November 18 to 20, 2024.

The NCNR SAC has been established to provide an independent review of reactor operations, reactor engineering, and safety at the center.

The SAC reviewed the Safety Evaluation Committee (SEC), Organization and Staffing, Reactor Operations, Reactor Engineering, Ageing Reactor Management, Quality Assurance, Health Physics, Safety Program, and Training.

==

Conclusion:==

Efforts to improve Safety Culture are beginning to show some results. Culture is demonstrated and reinforced by management and leadership. There is an opinion with some staff that it is all superficial and will not be sustained after the reactor returns to normal experimental operations.

NCNR will likely continue NCNR has made substantial progress on the required actions dictated by the NRC under the compensatory order resulting from the original event. programs to improve safety culture and focus on demonstrating, thereby improving trust, that a good safety culture at NCNR is not a passing fad.

NCNR has made substantial progress on the required actions dictated by the NRC under the compensatory order resulting from the original event.

The SAC identified no license or safety violations during this review period.

Page 36 of 174 Matrix of Initiatives to Recommendations 2024 Initiative Trait Recommendation Communications Effective Safety Communications (CO)

Strengthen the follow up on the interim actions and develop strategy to support continuing improvement.

Effective Safety Communications (CO)

As a part of the pending strategy, take action to improve engagement to obtain feedback/confirmation on the quality, dissemination, and understanding of communications to support implementation of tactical check/adjust actions.

Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA)

Communicate and reinforce to NCNR personnel the expectation to, and importance of, promptly identifying deltas in procedures and drawings in comparison to actual plant configuration into the CAP for collective review of priority and level of resolution.

Decision-Making (DM)

Update the Communications Strategy Initiative to include the element of decision-making in the Communications Strategy Initiative. Specifically, updates to include more timely and complete communications on important decisions to increase awareness, understanding, and ability of personnel to contribute and provide feedback.

Continuous Learning (CL)

Communicate to NCNR personnel expectations for the use of internal and external operating experience, and successes in the use of OE in improving performance.

PI&R (PI)

Develop and implement a communication strategy to educate NCNR personnel on 1) the threshold for CAP entry, 2) their accountability for using CAP, 3) the importance of, promptly identifying nonconformances in procedures and drawings in comparison to actual plant configuration, and 4) reinforcement of CAP successes.

Safety Culture Personal Accountability (PA)

Stay the course.

Questioning Attitude (QA)

Stay the course.

Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA)

Implement the following actions to improve the Behavioral Observation Program and Leader reinforcement of standards and expectations.

Page 37 of 174 Initiative Trait Recommendation Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA)

Implement the following actions to improve the Behavioral Observation Program and Leader reinforcement of standards and expectations.

• Educate leaders on how to use the ABC Model (Aubrey Daniels - Antecedent, Behavior, and Consequence) to influence leader and worker behaviors.

• Develop and provide leaders with observation forms/criteria that reflect desired behaviors.

• Mentor of leaders in observing and coaching behaviors in addition to the Observation Program expectations, to ensure expectations are met and deviations in expectations are promptly identified and corrected on the spot or within the CAP.

Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA)

Roll out the ISC booklet and associated training for all workers.

Work Environment (WE)

Develop and incorporate actions within the Safety Culture Initiative with regard to providing positive reinforcement to individuals willing to raise concerns.

Work Environment (WE)

Consider incorporating a question regarding key NCNR stakeholder participation (OU Groups and Integrated Safety) into NCNR decision-making guidance. Suggest placing in Integrated Management Model, Integrated Safety Culture Traits and Attributes Book, or procedure.

Environment for Raising Concerns (RC)

Develop and implement a change management plan to issue the ECP procedure in a timelier manner - prior to NRC approval if necessary.

Performance Improvement PI&R (PI)

Finish building out the new CAP platforms (i.e., CAP dashboard, etc.) to improve the user interface, functionality, and visibility in problem identification, evaluation, and resolution.

PI&R (PI)

Identify OU groups not actively using CAP and the CAP Dashboard and provide some indoctrination into the mechanics of the system, the value added to performance improvement, and senior leader expectations for when and how to use.

Training Continuous Learning (CL)

Develop an overall strategy to improve training implementation across OU group functions and leader functions including the establishment of initial and continuing Training Program Descriptions.

PI&R (PI)

Educate evaluators on the analytical tools and techniques necessary for successful conduct and documentation of causal analysis.

Resource Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA)

Conduct a review of the current levels of personnel and funds to identify critical underfunded areas that comprise NSC and seek additional funding from NIST and Department of Commence

Page 38 of 174 Initiative Trait Recommendation (DOC). Examples include procedure quality, drawing quality, training, and necessary CAP improvements.

Continuous Learning (CL)

Provide augmented resources to allow a systematic approach to implementing the Operations Training Program PI&R (PI)

Augment CAP resources and provide mentoring to support OU groups in problem identification, evaluation, and resolution.

Work Processes (WP)

Conduct a review of the current levels of personnel supporting procedures, drawings, and configuration management, and acquire and allocate resources as necessary to support integrated safety.

Performance Improvement PI&R (PI)

Finish building out the new CAP platforms (i.e., CAP dashboard, etc.) to improve the user interface, functionality, and visibility in problem identification, evaluation, and resolution.

PI&R (PI)

Identify OU groups not actively using CAP and the CAP Dashboard and provide some indoctrination into the mechanics of the system, the value added to performance improvement, and senior leader expectations for when and how to use.

Training Continuous Learning (CL)

Develop an overall strategy to improve training implementation across OU group functions and leader functions including the establishment of initial and continuing Training Program Descriptions.

PI&R (PI)

Educate evaluators on the analytical tools and techniques necessary for successful conduct and documentation of causal analysis.

Procedures Work Processes (WP)

Continue in the implementation of planned actions for procedure initiative.

Page 39 of 174 Matrix of Initiatives to Recommendations 2025 Initiative Trait Recommendation Communications Effective Safety Communications (CO)

Complete implementation of the communication strategy.

Effective Safety Communications (CO)

Focus on incorporation of Integrated Safety Culture message in daily activities.

Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA)

Establish clear expectations for leadership to actively engage with and incorporate input from all employees, particularly less tenured staff, and women, to foster a more empowering and collaborative work environment.

PI&R (PI)

Develop and implement a communication strategy to educate NCNR personnel on the CAP process, emphasizing the criteria for L0-L3 issues and the disposition of non-L0-L3 items outside of the program. This will reduce confusion, align understanding, and mitigate the perception of overload.

Safety Culture Personal Accountability (PA)

Leverage teamwork to drive to a strength.

Questioning Attitude (QA)

Leverage this questioning attitude in all storyboards and initiatives moving forward.

Environment for Raising Concerns (RC)

Improve managements responsiveness to concerns by ensuring they have the tools and support to address issues promptly at the departmental level. This will help prevent concerns from escalating to the formal process, reinforcing a safety-conscious work environment.

Performance Improvement Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA)

Establish and enforce clear housekeeping standards to address safety hazards and improve work area organization.

Continuous Learning (CL)

Develop and implement the self-assessment, trending, and OE programs (Line Item 6).

PI&R (PI)

Communicate the schedule for, and finish building out the new CAP platforms (i.e., CAP dashboard, etc.) to improve the user interface, functionality, and visibility in problem identification, evaluation, and resolution.

Training Continuous Learning (CL)

Look at the opportunities for non-formal training knowledge transfer, Operations should review and provide insights into other departmental training strategies.

Page 40 of 174 Initiative Trait Recommendation Resource Respectful Work Environment (WE)

Continue to implement the Resource initiative.

Respectful Work Environment (WE)

Develop and implement a strategy to promote representation and engagement across shifts, with a focus on improving engagement and addressing identified concerns.

Respectful Work Environment (WE)

Implement structured feedback loops or mentorship programs for less-tenured employees to ensure their input is actively sought and integrated into operational decision-making.

Work Processes (WP)

Attention is needed for transition from the current outage environment to daily research operations. NCNR needs a deliberate plan that defines roles and responsibilities, decision-making authorities and accountabilities, schedule management, and interfaces between ROE, RFO, and Research, and a change management strategy for the transition. Recommend revising the Work Management Initiative to include these aspects.

Work Management Decision Making (DM)

Establish clear decision-making protocols and integrate them with the work management process to prevent reactive adjustments and ensure more proactive, planned schedule management.

Work Processes (WP)

Develop a structure for conduct of work management.

Procedures Work Processes (WP)

Continue in the implementation of planned actions for procedure initiative.

Page 41 of 174 Third-party Assessment Findings and Recommendations to Integrated Performance Improvement Plan methodology and status NCNR used the defined Assessments in the Confirmatory Order (CO), in addition to internal assessments, to compile an inventory of findings and recommendations. These were used as basis for task teams to develop strategies for discrete areas of needed improvement. Causal tools such as Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and Gaps, Drivers, Actions that get Results (GDAR) to determine causes and drivers to be used as basis for Initiatives going forward into an Integrated Performance Improvement Plan (IPIP).

Actions in process and making progress from the Initial Root Cause and Independent Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment were continued during the overall Collective Evaluation Process.

See Figure 1.

The facility is finalizing the Collective Evaluation 2, Production of Story Boards, and the IPIP to support CO Closure The process shown above was implemented and resulted in the results in Figure 2 NCNRs Overall Improvement Strategy: is divided up into 7 Initiatives and one Action Plan:

Safety Culture Performance Improvement Communications Procedures

Page 42 of 174 Training Resources Work Management The Action Plan tracking the Fuel Handling actions related to the Fuel Clad Event All recommendations and findings have traceability to either a discrete action or are embedded in the 7 initiatives. The Collective Evaluation Report and IPIP are in process and expected to complete the before the 3rd Calendar Quarter 2025.

A closure review process to ensure action closure with quality is in process of being approved as a Charter to support this process and performance improvement.

Page 43 of 174 Attachments

Survey Data Personal Accountability : Survey Data Questioning Attitude : Survey Data Effective Safey Communications : Survey Data Leadership Safety Values and Actions : Survey Data Decision-Making : Survey Data Respectful Work Environment : Survey Data Continuous Learning : Survey Data Problem Identification and Resolution : Survey Data Environment for Raising Concerns 0: Survey Data Work Processes 1: Survey Data Status of NSC Improvement 2: Survey Data for Operations 3: Survey Data for Reactor Engineering 4: Survey Data for Health Physics 5: Survey Data for Aging Reactor Management 6: Survey Data Comparison 7: Survey Question List 8: Effectiveness Review - Integrated RCA (RC #2) 9: Status of 2023 INSCA Recommendations 0: Status of 2023 INSCA Program Limiting Weaknesses 1: Focus Group/Interviews Form 2: Meeting Observation Form 3: Behavioral Observation Form 4: INSCA Team Members, Assignments, and Bios 5: INSCA Background Detail 6: NRC Inspection Report - Confirmatory Order Excerpt 7: Definition

Page 44 of 174

Survey Data Personal Accountability Trait: Personal Accountability (PA) - individuals take personal responsibility for safety. The underlying Attributes include Standards (PA.1), Job Ownership (PA.2), and Teamwork (PA.3).

The survey included 6 questions related to PA to understand what people believe about NCNR ROE NSC. The graphs below represent survey results based on All Respondents, Individual Contributors, and Supervisors and Above. The survey results were reviewed to understand what people believe and focus group/interviews were then held to obtain insights into their beliefs and then followed by observations to gain insights into what people do with key insights provided in the tables below. The results are provided in the Analysis Results section of this Report.

Graph of All Respondents 2024 2025 Personal Accountability (PA.1) 5.1 clearly understand the importance of adhere nce to 11 integrated safety standards.

(PA.l) 10. I am accountable for shortfalls in meeting integrated safety standards/be haviors.

(PA.2} 11. I unde rstand my personal responsibility to foste r a professional environment, encourage teamwork and identify 13 challenges to integrated safety.

(PA.2) 14. I ensure that I am trained and qualified to perform assigned work.

(PA.2} 39. I actively parti cipate in pre-job bri efings, understanding my responsibilities to raise integrated safety concerns before w ork begins.

(PA.3)73. I communicate and coordinate my activities w ithin and across organizational boundaries to ensure integrated safety is maintained.

2 6 2 6 11 17 13 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Disagree 12 22 28 Agree 55 4.79 35 4.17 45 4.61 36 4.39 42 4.51 31 4.41 Strongly Agree Average Personal Accountability (PA.1} 5.1 clearly understand t he importance of adherence to 12 49 integrated safety standards.

4.77 (PA.1) 10.1 am accountable fo r shortfalls in meeting

~ 9 19 32 integrated safety standards/behaviors.

4.29 (PA.2) 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a 2

14 46 professional environment, encourage teamwork and..

4.68 (PA.2} 14. I ensure t hat I am trained and qualified to perform '2 11 48 assigned work.

4.66 (PA.2} 39.1 actively participate in pre-job briefings, 6

8 45 understanding my responsibilit ies t o raise integrated safety...

4.66 (PA.3} 73. I communicate and coordinate my activities wit hin and across organizational boundaries to ensure integrated..

23 22 35 4.45 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 45 of 174 Graph of Individual Contributors 2024 2025 Personal Accountability Individual Contributors (PA.1} 5. I clearly understand the importance of adherence to integrated safety standards.

(PA.1) 10. I am accountable for shortfalls in meeting integrated safety standards/behaviors.

(PA.2} 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a profession al environment, encourage teamwork and identify chatle nge s to integrated safety.

1 5 7

9 12 11 (PA.2) 14. I ensure that I am trained and qualified to 12 16 petiorm assigned work.

(PA.2) 39. I actively participate in pre-job briefings, understanding my responsibilities to raise integrated safety 2

5 7

concerns before work begins.

(PA.3) 73. I communicate and coordinate my activities within and across organizational boundaries toe nsure 4

14 integrated safety is maintained.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 36 4.81 24 4.43 28 4.57 23 4.45 25 4.41 22 4.45 Strongly Agree Average Personal Accountability Individual Contributors jPA.1) 5.1 clearly understand the importance of adherence 8

25 4.71 to integrated safety standards.

(PA.1) 10. I am accountable for shortfalls in meeting 6

13 15 4.26 integrated safety standards/behaviors.

(PA.2} 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, encourage teamwork 2

9 23 4.56 and identify challenges to integrated safety.

(PA.2) 14. I ensure that I am trained and qualified to 2

6 26 4.65 perform assigned work.

IPA.2) 39. I actively participate in pre-job briefings, understanding my responsibilities to raise integrated 4

2 26 4.69 safety concerns before work begins.

(PA.3) 73. I communicate and coordinate my activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure 2

10 22 4.53 integrated safety is maintained.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 46 of 174 Graph of Supervisors and Above 2024 2025 Personal Accountability Supervisors and Above (PA.1} 5.1 clearly understand the importance of adherence to integrated safety standards.

(PA.1} 10. I am accountable for shortfalls in meeting integrated safety standards/behaviors.

(PA.2) 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, encourage teamwork and identify challenges to integrated safety.

(PA.2} 14. I ensure that I am trained and qualified to perform assigned work.

(PA.2} 39. I actively participate in pre-job briefings, understanding my responsibilities to raise integrated safety concerns before work begins.

(PA.3) 73. I communicate and coordinate my activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure integrated safety is maintained.

4 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 12 Agree 16 4.71 11 4.00 15 4.67 12 4.33 15 4.67 4.33 Strongly Agree Average Personal Accoutability Supervisors and Above (PA.1) 5. I clearly understand the importance of adherence to integrated safety standards.

4 (PA.1) 10. I am accountable for shortfalls in meeting integrated I i 3 safety standards/behaviors.

(PA.2) ll. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, encourage teamwo,k and identify challenges to integrated safety.

(PA.2) 14. I ensure that I am t rained and qualified to perlorm assigned work.

(PA.2) 39. I actively participate in pre*job briefings, understanding my responsibilities to raise integrated safety concerns before 2

work begins.

(PA.3} 73. I communicate and coordinate my activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure integrated safety is 3

maintained.

5 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 7

7 13 Agree 27 4.87 19 4.35 26 4.84 25 4.71 21 4.63 15 4.39 Strongly Agree Average

Page 47 of 174

Survey Data Questioning Attitude Trait: Questioning Attitude (QA) - Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions and activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or inappropriate action. The underlying Attributes include Nuclear is Recognized as Special and Unique (QA.1), Challenge the Unknown (QA.2), Challenge Assumptions (QA.9), and Avoid Complacency (QA.4).

The survey included 8 questions related to QA to understand what people believe about NCNR ROE NSC. The graphs below represent survey results based on All Respondents, Individual Contributors, and Supervisors and Above. The survey results were reviewed to understand what people believe and focus group/interviews were then held to obtain insights into their beliefs and then followed by observations to gain insights into what people do with key insights provided in the tables below. The results are provided in the Analysis Results section of this Report.

Graph of All Respondents 2024 2025 Graph of Individual Contributors Questioning Attitude (QA.1) 51. Leaders ensures that activities that could affect reactivity are conducted with panicular care, caution, oversight, and in accordance with proceWres.

(QA.1) 57. 1 recognize the spe cial characteristics and rnique haiards of nuclear teciYlology.

1 6

12 13 (QA.2} 58. I maintain a questioning attitude du-ing pre-job briefs/job-site reviews to Identify.,

1 _4 _ __

..,22 ______

and resolve unexpected conditions.

(QA.2} SO. I promptly challenge unanticipated test resU.ts or unexpected system response rather than rationalize them.

(QA.2} 81.1 stop work acti,..;ties when confronted with an unexpected condition.

1 7

20 1 4 12 (QA.3} 64.1 challenge assumptions/offer opposing views when I think something is not _1 _ 7 _ __

1_7 ___ --

(QA.3) 45. Leaders s olich challenges to assu~ tlons when evaluating Integrated safety issues.

(QA.4) 37. I perform a thorough review of the WOl"k site and plarvied activity every time work is performed.

(QA.4) 65. I avoid complacency and plan for the possibility of mi stakes.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Di sagree 12 23 13 18 28 Agree Strongly Agree 44 4.57 52 4.80 37 4.48 35 4.41 45 4.63 40 4.48 23 4.02 29 4.16 31 4.38 Average Questioning Attitude (QA.l) 51. Leaders ensure that activities that could affect reactivity are conducted with particular care, caution, 3

10 4 7 4.73 oversight, and in accordance with procedures.

(QA.l ) 57. I recognize the special characteristics and unique 12 4 6 4.70 hazards of nuclear technology.

(QA.2) 58. I maintain a questioning attitude during pre-job briefs/job-site reviews to identify and resolve unexpected 0 15 4 5 4.75 conditions.

(QA.2} 60.1 promptly challenge unanticipated test results or 16 37 4.53 unexpected system responses rather than rationalize them.

(QA.3) 45. Leaders solicit challenges to assumptions when

~ 11 21 25 4.15 evaluating integrated safety issues.

(QA.3) 64. I challenge assumptions and offer opposing views 16 44 4.68 when I think something is not correct.

(QA.4) 37. I periormed a thorough review of the work site and 14 11 18 25 4.05 planned activity every time work is periormed.

(QA.4) 65. I avoid complacency and plan fo r the possibility of mistakes.

1 4 23 34 4.45 0

10 2 0 3 0 40 5 0 60 7 0 8 0 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Ag ree Strongly Agree Average

Page 48 of 174 2024 2025 Questioning Attitude Questioning Attitude Individual Contributors Individual Contributors (QA.1} 51. Leaders ensures t hat activit ies that could affect (QA.1} 51. Leaders ensure t hat activit ies t hat could affect reactivity are conducted with particular care, caution, oversight, 3

7 30 4.68 reactivity are conducted with particular care, caut ion, 1 4 28 4.82 and in accordance w ith procedures.

oversight, a nd in accordance with procedures.

(QA.l} 57. I recognize the special characteristics and unique 9

32 4.78 (QA.1} 57. I recognize the special cha racteristics and hazards of nuclea r technology.

unique hazards of nuclea r technology.

2 9

23 4.62

( QA.2} 58. I mainta in a questioning attitude during pre-job bri efs/job-site revi ews to Ident ify and resolve unexpect ed 1 4 11 24 4.45 (QA.2} 58.1 mainta in a questioning attitude during pre-job conditions.

bri efs/job-site revi ews to identify and resolve unexpected 5

27 4.84 conditi on s.

(QA.2) 60_ I promptly challenge unant icipated test results or 6

9 24 4.46 unexpected system response rather than rationalize t hem_

(QA.2) 60. I promptly challenge unant icipated test results or unexpected system responses rather than rationalize 3

9 20 4.53 (QA.2) 81.1 stop w ork activities w hen confronted wit h an t hem.

unexpected condit ion.

3 9

26 4.61 (QA.3} 45. Leaders solicit challenges to assumpt ions when I i 4

10 16 4.22 evaluat ing integrated safety issues.

(QA.3) 64.1 challen ge assumpt ions/offer opposing views when I 1

5 12 23 4.39 t hink som ething is not correct.

(QA.3} 64. I challenge assumpt ions and offer opposing 2

8 24 4.65 (QA.3) 45. Leaders solicit challenges to assumptions when I views when I t hink something is not correct.

evaluat ing integrated safety issues.

7 16 15 4.13 (QA.4) 37.1 perfonned a thorough review of the work site 2

6 7

18 4.24 (QA.4)37. I perfonn a thorough review of the work site and and planned activity every t ime work is performed.

planned activity every t ime work is performed.

2 6

10 21 4.28 (QA.4 ) 65.1 avoid complace ncy and plan for t he possibility of (QA.4 ) 65.1 avoid complace ncy and plan for the possibility 1 2 10 21 4.50 mistakes.

5 15 21 4.39 of m istakes.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Di sagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 49 of 174 Graph of Supervisors and Above 2024 2025 Questioning Attitude Supervisors and Above (QA.1} 51. Leaders ensures that activities t hat could affect reactivity are conducted with particular care, caution, oversight, and in accordance with procedures.

(QA.l} 57. 1 recognize the special chara cteristics and unique ha zards of nuclear technology.

(QA.2} 58.1 maintain a questioning attitude during pre-Job briefs/job-site reviews to Identify and resolve unexpected conditions.

(QA.2) 60.1 promptly challenge unanticipated test results or unexpected system response rather than rationalize them.

(QA.2} 81.1 stop work activities when confronted with an unexpected condition.

(QA.3} 64. I challenge assumptions/offer opposing views when I think something is not correct.

(QA.3} 45. Leaders solicit challenges to assumptions when evaluating integrated safety issues.

(QA.4} 37.1 perionn a thorough review of the work site and planned activity every time work is periormed.

(QA.4} 65. I avoid complace ncy and plan for the possibility of mi stakes.

4 1 1 1 1 2 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 10 12 Agree 12 4.30 18 4.86 11 4.52 10 4.33 17 4.67 15 4.67 8

4.05 6

3.95 9

4.43 Strongly Agree Average Questioning Attitude Supervisors and Above (QA.l} 51. Leaders ensure that activities that could affect reactivity are conducted with particular care, caut ion, oversight, a nd in accorda nce with procedures.

(QA.1) 57.1 recognize the special cha racteristics and unique hazards of nuclea r technology.

(QA.2) 58. I maintain a questioning att itude during pre-job bri efs/job-site reviews to identify and resolve unexpected conditions.

(QA.2) 60.1 promptly cha llenge unanticipated test results or unexpected system responses rather than rationali ze them.

(QA.3} 45. Leaders solicit challenges to assumpt ions when evaluating integrated safety issues.

(QA.3) 64. 1 challenge assumptions and offer opposing views when I t hink something is not correct.

1 3 10 21 26 21 19 12 10 22 13 8

(QA.4} 37.1 perionned a thorough re vi ew of the work site and planned activity every t ime work is performed.

(QA.4} 65. I avoid complace ncy and plan fort he possibility of mistakes.

1 2 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Di sagree 13 15 Agree Strongly Agree 4.63 4.83 4.68 4.53 4.07 4.71 3.86 4.35 Average

Page 50 of 174

Survey Data Effective Safey Communications Trait: Effective Safety Communication (CO) - Communications maintain a focus on safety. The underlying Attributes include Work Process Communications (CO.1), Bases for Decisions (CO.2), Free Flow of Information (CO.3), and Expectations (CO.4).

The survey included 7 questions related to CO to understand what people believe about NCNR ROE NSC. The graphs below represent survey results based on All Respondents, Individual Contributors, and Supervisors and Above. The survey results were reviewed to understand what people believe and focus group/interviews were then held to obtain insights into their beliefs and then followed by observations to gain insights into what people do with key insights provided in the tables below. The results are provided in the Analysis Results section of this Report.

Graph of All Respondents 2024 2025 Effective Safety Communications Effective Safety Communications (C0.1} 4. Integrated safety is discussed at every meeting 'Where plant work activities (C0.1)4. Integrated safety is discussed at every meeting where 11 31 19 4.10 are planned and reviewed.

15 25 24 4.11 plant work activities are planned and reviewed.

(C0.2) 21. Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and organizational decisions (C0.2) 21. Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and 8 12 21 17 3.63 is communicated in a timely manner. -

6 10 28 15 3.62 organizational decisions is communicated in a timely manner.

(C0.2} 59. Leaders encourage individuals t o ask questions If they (C0.2) 59. Leaders encourage individuals to ask questions if they do not understand do not understand the basis of operational and management 2 4 21 35 4.44 the basis of operational and management decisions.

1 6

24 34 4.40 decisions.

(C0.3) 35. I communicate openly and candidlywlth oversight, 1 3 8

47 4.71 (C0.3} 35. I communicate openly and candidly with oversight, audit, and regulatory t 6 14 41 4.48 audit, and regulatory organizations.

organizations.

(C0.3} 74. Leaders respond tome in an open, honest and non*

13 15 34 4.26 defensive manner.

(C0.3) 74. Leaders respond to me in an open, honest and non-defensive manner. 1 10 20 34 4.34 (C0.4) 40. Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that integrated safety is the organization's overriding 1 7 21 32 4.38 (C0.4}40. Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that 24 30 4.27 priority.

integrated safety is the organization's overriding priority.

(C0.4} 61. Leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand expected behaviors and actions necessa,yto maintain 2

10 26 22 4.13 (C0.4} 61. Leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand elq)ected behaviors 11 26 25 4.16 integrated safety.

and actions necessary to maintain integrated safety.

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 51 of 174 Graph of Individual Contributors 2024 2025 Effective Safety Communications Individual Contributors (CO.1} 4. In tegrated s a fety Is discu ssed a t e v e ry m eeting w h e re plant work a ctivit ies are planne d and re vie w e d.

(C0.2} 21. Leaders ensure that the basis for operational a nd org anizationa l d eci sions I s c ommunicate d In a t ime ly (CO.2) 59. Lead e rs e n c ourage individuals t o ask questions if the y do not unde r stand t he ba s i s o f ope rat io nal and manage m e nt d ecis ions.

(C0.3 } 35. I c ommunicate ope nly a nd candidly wit h oversi ght, audit. and regulatory organi zations.

(CO. 3 } 7 4. L e aders respond to me in an open, hone st and non-d e f e n sive m a nne r.

( CO.4) 40. Lead e r s fre que n t ly c omr-nunl c a te and 3

5 5

10 15 8

14 10 16 r e inforce the e xpectation that integ rate d safety is th e 2

5 1 4 org aniz a t ion's overridin g priority.

(C0_4) 61_ Leade..s ensure supplemental pe..sonnel unde rstand exp ected b e h a viors and actions n ecessary t o maintain integrated safety_

6

• Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither A g r e e or Disagree 15 A g ree 17 4.17 17 11 3.78 24 4_51 2 4 4 _49 2 0 4_37 2 0 4.27 19 4.33 Strongly A g ree Average Effective Safety Communications Individual Contributors (CO.1} 4. Integrated safety is discussed at every meeting where plant 6

16 work activities are planned and reviewed.

(CO.2} 21. Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and I 5

11 organizational decisions is communicated in a timely manner.

(CO.2} 59. Leaders encourage Individuals t o ask questions if they do 1 1 10 not understand the basis of operational and mana gement decisions.

(CO.3} 35.1 communicate openly and candidly with oversight, audit, 1 3 3

and regulatory organizations.

(CO.3} 74. Leaders respond to me in an open, honest and non-6 7

defensive manner.

(CO.4) 40. Leaders frequently comm..Jnicate and reinforce the e,:pectation that integrated safety Is the organization's overric~ng 5

10 priority.

0 5

10 15 22 25 20 19 20 25 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 11 4.09 13 3.82 4.56 4.63 4.35 4.41 30 35 40 Average

Page 52 of 174 Graph of Supervisors and Above 2024 2025 Effective Safety Communications Supervisor and Above (CO.1) 4. Integrated safety is discussed at every meeting where plant work activities are planned and reviewed.

5 9

6 I C0.2} 21. Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and 2 organizational decisions is communicated in a timely manner.

2 12 3

(C0.2} 59. Leaders encourage individuals to ask questions if t hey do not understand the basis of operational and 11 8

11 management decisions.

(CO.3} 35. I communicate openly and candidly with oversight, 1 1 3

16 audit, and regulatory organizations.

(C0.3) 74. Leaders respond to me in an open, honest and non-3 3

14 defensive manner.

(CO.4} 40. Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that integrated safety is t he organization's 2

8 10 overriding priority.

(CO.4} 61. Leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand expected behaviors and actions necessary to 1

5 10 5

maintain integrated safety.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neit he r Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 3.95 3.57 4.38 4.52 4.43 4.40 3.90 Average Effective Safety Communications Supervisors and Above (C0.1) 4. Integrated safety is discussed at every meeting where 6

17 plant work activities are planned and reviewed.

(CO.2} 21. Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and I 4 9

organizational decisions is communicated in a timely manner.

(CO.3) 35.1 communicate openly and candidly with oversight, audit, and regulatory organizations.

6 (CO.2} 59. Leaders encourage individuals to ask questions if they do not understand the basis of operational and management 1 3 12 decisions.

(CO.3} 74. Leaders respond to me in an open, honest and non-1 2 3 10 defensive manner.

(CO.4} 61. Leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand expected behaviors and actions necessary to maintain integrated 2

7 13 safety.

(CO.4} 40. Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that integrated safety is the organization's overriding 1 2 13 priority.

12 24 15 15 14 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 8

4.06 4

3.39 4.80 4.32 4.16 8

3.90 4.33 Average

Page 53 of 174

Survey Data Leadership Safety Values and Actions Trait: Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors. The underlying Attributes include Resources (LA.1); Field Presence LA.2); Incentives, Sanctions, and Rewards (LA.3); Strategic Commitment to Safety (LA.4); Change Management (LA.5); Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities (LA.6); Constant Examination (LA.7); and Leader Behaviors (LA.8).

The survey included 16 questions related to LA to understand what people believe about NCNR ROE NSC. The graphs below represent survey results based on All Respondents, Individual Contributors, and Supervisors and Above. The survey results were reviewed to understand what people believe and focus group/interviews were then held to obtain insights into their beliefs and then followed by observations to gain insights into what people do with key insights provided in the tables below. The results are provided in the Analysis Results section of this Report.

Graph of All Respondents 2024 2025 Leadership Safety Values and Actions

( LA.1) 13. leaders ensure that personnel, tools, equipment, proced11es and other resornce materials areava llable andadeqU11teto supportintegrated safety.

fLAl) 66. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs ensure staffing levels are consistent w ith the demands related to m11lntalnlngsalety and1eliabillty.

(LA.2} 17. Leaders from all levels In the organization are Involved In oversight of work actMtles.

( LA.2) 19. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors ensure supelVlsory and management oversight of conuactors and supplemental personnel W01kactlvltles, such that integrated safety Is supponed.

(LA.3}12.Leadersprll'llde incentlves,sanctlons, andrewards thatare alignedwithNCNRintegrated safety policies and reinlor,;e behaviors and outcomes that reflect safety as the overriding priority.

(LA.3)34. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs reward Individua ls who identify and ialse issues affect Ir@ the Integrated safety policy.

I LA4) 9. Leaders ensure NCNR facility priorities are aligned to reflect Integrated safety as the overr1dlng priorlty.

(LAA} 20. Chiefs and Crew Chieni develop and implement cost and schediJ.e goals in a malYler that relnforcesthe lmponance ol lmegratedsafety.

7 7

5 8

7 5

(LA.5} 26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs anticipate~;:::!~ and cornmlJllcate the effects of impendinfl jLA.5} 33. Leaders use a syste":~::::::~:orth::e:~'!n~n:~=~~~ment ct-.lnge so that integrated I 6

(LA6)6.Leadersensureroles,responsibilitles,andauthoritlesaredearlydefined,understoodand documented to prornote lmegratedsafety.

(LA.6)48. Corporate gOYernance, review boards, and independent OYersight org,mizations suppon the Director's ultimate re~onsibility for decisions affecting nuclear safety.

(LA. 7) 80. Leaders constantly scrutinize nuclear safety through a variety of monitoring techniques, includinflassessmentsol nuclear saletyculture.

(LA.B}a Leadersexhlbltbet-.lvlorsthatsetthestandardforlntegratedsafety.

4 (LA.8} 24. Leaders "walk the talk", modellnfl correct behaviors when resolvlnfl apparent conflicts between lntegratedsaletyandlacilityavailability.

26 21 30 26 25 25 27 29 25 25 15 23 17 Stror1flly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Stronflly Agree Average 16 15 21 17 23 17 14 22 15 12 17 21 21 20 18 3.44 3.69 4.07 12 4.02 3.62 3.66 3.87 4.08 leadership Safety Value and Actions (LA.2}19.C""""-C.-Ct,l,t-l,r.,,......-.:!S..,.,..._s..,,....*~-d.., __

_,.d>l 4

olcon,.Kto,,.-,d~,.alpe<...,,w,el-tc;oc1M:ie.,.w,chthMll>1.. <<ed...,lll'rbs.upponed 0-C----"'----,--=------

ilAS)33.lA..... auM*...... -lc.,.oc...,lo,.,a1._.,.....-.dlmpl-ch..,....,tt..im.a;,**i,od Y'l.i,,........,~1M-**ldincl>flo.trr.

CLAIIIJlll.i.....t......_..*,o!..._,._,s.b1t1,1eo.,-..,,t.o_***cl..,lr.........t.un<1fta,ood.-.d d-nlfflopt-*ln;--,<<1~

llA.8)24 lA..... *..... alk1Mt*lk","'°""'4inlc-Kll>.... -..v,t-,rnol'llrc""P--c<><tlll<:U

~n1n,..,-,edwo!.. randli,cMi..,......,lll)ll,y

• Stt0t,glyOl1.>&0U Ob,,tpu N,:i,l,c1Ag1NooOh,.. g,ff

• Ac>**

S!fo *'IPYAl.*N

Page 54 of 174 Graph of Individual Contributors 2024 2025 Leadership Safety Value and Acitions Leadership Safety Value and Actions Individual Contributors Individual Contributors (LA.1)13. Leaders ensure that personnel, tools, equipment, procedures and other resource materialsareava ilableand adequateto supportintegrated safety.

I 2 17 12 3.93 (LA 1) 13. leaders e~ue tt>>t personnel, toots. equipmen1, p1oced1.1"es and oihef I 13 4.12 resot.l'ce materiats are available anda~quate tost4)portlntegrated safMy.

(LA.1) 66. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs ens11e stafflns levels are conslstem with the demands relatedtomalntalnlngsafetyandreUablUty.

5 11 13 3.56 (lA.l) 66. Chlet5 ;md Crew Chief$ en~H staffing levels are consistent with the demancb -

3 10 3.52 1ebted tom lntalnlng safew aod rt:llabllhy.

(LA2) 17. Leadersfromalllevels in theorganizationare invol.ved inover.;ight ofworkactivities. 1 21 14 4.14 (t.A.2) 17. Leaden. from atl lewiels In the organlz.:1tlon iH lmotved In over.;l&ht of work 16 12 4.18 k"'!Mttes.

(LA.2) 19. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and S14>ervisors en5Ure supervisory and management 1, (lA.2) 19. Chief~ C,ew Chiefs, Leach. and S~

ensure supeMs<<y and w ersight of contractors and supplemental personnel work activities, 5Uch that integrated 17 15 4.10 m:magcmert O\lert.lght of contractors and supplemcn1i1l pen;onl'W!I WOlkacthAtios, such 13 15 4.30 safety is sLl)ported thatln1eg,a1ed

'etylssl4)f)Ofted.

(LA.2) 22. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs encourage Informal leaders (non-supervisors) to model safe 11 (lA.2) 22. Chiefs and C~w Chlds ~ournge lnforrMl leaders (non--supeM~1*s) to behavlorsand high standardsolacco1.11tabllity.

5 16 15 4.13 3

2 11 18 4.29

~

safe behavl<n and high su11ndcu ds of accou1tab1Uty.

(LA.3) 12. Leaders provide Incentives, sanctions, and rewards that are aligned wtth NCNR I (LA.3) 12. LHde~ptcwlde lntemlw-s, sanctklfls, ard,eward:s lhb111,e aUgl'W!dwt1h integrated safety policies and reinforce behaviors and outcomes that reflect safety as t he 3

17 12 3.60 NCNR Integrated sa1ety potlcles and relnl01ce behaviors and outcomes 1ha1 lol'Ue<:t 11 3.56 w erriding priorlty.

!.llfetyastheow-11ktlngprioifty.

(LA.3} ~- Chiefs and Crew Chiefs reward individuals who identify and raise issues affecting (lA.3) 34. Chiefs.:md Crew Chiefs reward lndlvlek.lah, who lden:lfy and r;1!s.e Issues theirrtegratedsafety policy.

11 15 12 3.88 10 13 3.97 affecting the lnteg,ated safely policy.

( l.A.4) 9. Leaders ensl.-'"e NCNRfacility priorities are aligned to reflect irrtegrated safety as the 16 17 4.12 (LAA) 9. Leaders ensu-e NCNR facKhy prlOJhl~ are atlgned to,eflect Integrated safety as I 10 18 4 29 cwerrldins prlority.

the cwerrklns priorhy.

(LA.4} 20. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs develop and lrr-.,lement cost and schedule goals In a I 12 14 12 3.92 (lAA)20.Chle¥$;md Crew Chiefs develop 11nd lri,>leme~costandsche-cU* goats In a 13 11 4.03 mannerthatrelnforces the lmportanceof lntegratedsafety.

maf'llet that l'f:lnfo,ces the lmponar'ICe al 1megra1ed safety.

( LAS) 26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs anticipate, manage and comm1.11lcate the effects of I 4 13 14 3.60 (LAS) 26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs antklp..,te, m;,ruge and c01nn-ux,Ka1e the effec-ts of 13 11 3.9 1 lmpendlnschanges.

lmpendillJ chitn6e$.

( LAS) 33. Leaders use a systematic process for evaluatlns and implement change so that (LAS) 33. Le-adersuse.a systematic process !Of evaluating and lmplemem chanp so integrated safetyremainsthecwerriding priority.

17 11 3.95 th..11 Integrated safety1emalm; the o~nldlng pl"iorlty.

14 3.97 (CA.6) 6. Leadersensure rotes.responsibilities,andauthoritiesareclearlydefined, 19 14 4.13 (LA.6) 6. Leaden; en~e role:,. re:.pons lbllitk:.. 1111d authorhle:s 11n: clear Ir dertned, 14 12 4.13 understoocl and documented to promote integrated safety.

understood and documemed to promote lmegrated safety

( LA6)48. Co,porate governance, revi ew boards. and independent oversight organizations (lA.6)48.Corporate gOlo'e~e. r~ewboa1ds.11nd lndepend~nt Olo'e1S1gh1 16 15 4.21 organluitlons suppon the Director's. ~tlm..1te responslbllityf<<decl~lons affecting I II 17 4.29 support the Director's ultimate responsibility for decisions affecting nuclear safety.

nuctea, safety.

(LA. 7) 80. Leaders constantly scrutinize nudear safety through a variety of monitoring 17 15 4.18 (LA. 7) SO. Leaders comt;,nrly scn.rthize nuclear s.,fetytlTough a v.:t11etyof mo11h01fng 1 4 12 17 4.32 techniques, Ind ucing assessments of nuclear safety cult.xe.

1ectv\l:iues. lncludng assessments of nu.::leat safetyculu.n.

(LA.8} & Leaders exhibitbehavl orsthat set the standardforintegratedsafety.

2 10 15 15 4.02 (LA.8) 8. Leadt!rfi ext'lbh be:h3vlOrfi that ut the s13r'ldlrd fo, ln1egra1:ed:safety.

2 13 14 4.15 (LA.8) 24. Leaders w:ilkthe 11.tk*, modelil"ll!I couect behalliorswhcn re$Olv~ app:irent (LA.SJ 24. Leaders "walk the talk~, mocleling correct behaviors VI/hen resolvins apparent 18 11 4.00 14 14 4.15 conllictsbetween lntegratedsafetyand lacilityavailability.

con111ctsbetween lnt~11ated sa*ety aodfaclll1y.availability.

S trongl y Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Stronsly Agree Average Strorctv Disagree Disagree NeitherAt,ee m-Olsag,ee..,..

StrqyAgree Ave1aige

Page 55 of 174 Graph of Supervisors and Above 2024 2025 Leadership Safety Values and Actions Supervisor and Above (LA.1) 13. Leaders ensure that personnel, toots, equipment, proced1Jes and other resource materials are available and adequate to support integrated safety.

(LA. 1) 66. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs ensure staffing levels are consistent with the demands related to maintaining safety and reliability.

(LA.2) 17. Leaders from all levels in the organization are involved in oversight of work activities.

2 I

3

( LA.2) 19. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors ensure supervisory and management oversight of c ont ractors and supplemental personnel work activities, such that integrated safety is s~ported.

(LA.2} 22. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs encoura ge informal leaders (non-supervisors)to model safe behaviors and high standards of accountability.

1 1 2 10

( LA.3) 12. Leaders provide incentives, sanctions, and rewards that are a!igne d with NCN R integrated safety policies and reinforce behaviors and outcomes that reflect safety as the overriding priority.

4 (LA.3) 34. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs reward indivldualswho Identify and raise issues affecting the integrated safety policy.

(LA.4} 9. Leaders ensure NCNR facility priorities are aligned to reflect Integrated safety as the overriding priority.

(LA.5) 26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs anticipate, manage and commuiicate the effects of impending changes.

(LA.5) 33. Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and implement change so that integrated safety remains the overriding priority.

(LA.6} 6. Leaders ens11e roles, responsibilities, and authorities are clearly defined, understood and documented to promote integrated s afety. -

I 3

(LA.6)48. Corporate gove rnance, review boards, and independe nt oversight organi zations support the Director's ultimate responsibility for decisions affecting I nuclear safety.

( LA. 7) 80. Leaders constantly scrutinize nuclear safety through a variety of monitoring techniques, including assessments of nuclear safety culture.

(LA.8} 8. Leaders exhibit behaviors that set the standard for integrated safety.

1

( LAS) 24. Leaders "walk the talk", modeling correct behaviors when resolving apparent conflicts between Integrated safety and facility availability.

4 4

10 10 10 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 4

3.57 3.24 3.71 3.19 4.00 3.05 3.48 3.81 4

3.25 3.29 3.20 3.4 5 3.90 3.95 3.86 3.95 Average Leadership Safety Value and Actions Supervisors and Above (LA.2) 17. Leadersfrom alllevelsin the organlza:ionare lrwol,,.ed ln cwerslght ofworkactlvt1Ies.

2 ILA.2) 19. Chiefs, CrewChlef!i, leads and S~eM:;o,s em;ure supeivlso,y and maMgement oversight of contractors and supplemental persomel wo.-kactMtles, such that Integrated...

(IA3) 34. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs rew,nd lndMcllatswho Identify and raise Issues affecting the tn1esratedsafetypollcy.

(LAA)9. l.t<1~rs enwe NCNAfaclllt::;;~~:::i: ~tedtoreflect lntegratedsaiety <1sthe 11 2 _____ lB (LA.4) 20. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs develop and lrnplemem cost and schecllle goals In a manner that reinforces the lmponance of lntes,ated safety.

!LAS) 26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs anticipate, manage and commlnicate the effects of lmpendl"'

cha111es.

(LA.SJ 33. le<1ders use a systematic process for (Yalua1I~ and Implement change so that Integrated safety remains the overrldl"' priority.

(LA.6)6. Lea~rs enSU"e roles, responsibiUties, and aU1ho1itiesareclearlydelined,understood ar1d doeunented to promote Integrated safety.

(LA 7) eo. LeadersCol"l$tandy scrutirize nude a, s-a!etyllTough a variety of monl101"ing tectTilques, Inducing assessments ofnu::learsa1etycuht.-e.

2 ll 3

15 10 16 (LA.8) a Leaders eilibh beh.1\.-fors that set the standard for Integrated safety. I 1 3 _____ 19 13 (LA.8) 24. leaders walk the talk", modell111 eorreet behallforswhen resoM111 <1pparem eonfUcts between Integrated safety andfaellhy avallabllhy.

3 2

13 ___

Stro~ly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 1/4fee Stro~y ~ ree 13 3.94 3.35 12 3.90 3.77 12 4.16 12 3.29 3.40 4.06 3.27 12 3.29 3.73 3.90 3.97 11 4.23 3.97 12 4.13

Page 56 of 174

Survey Data Decision-Making Trait: Decision Making (DM) - Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are systematic, rigorous, and thorough. The underlying Attributes include Consistent Process (DM.1), Conservative Bias (DM.2), and Accountability for Decisions (DM.3).

The survey included 5 questions related to DM to understand what people believe about NCNR ROE NSC. The graphs below represent survey results based on All Respondents, Individual Contributors, and Supervisors and Above. The survey results were reviewed to understand what people believe and focus group/interviews were then held to obtain insights into their beliefs and then followed by observations to gain insights into what people do with key insights provided in the tables below. The results are provided in the Analysis Results section of this Report.

Graph of All Respondents 2024 2025 Decision-Making (DM.l} 43.1 use a consistent, systematic approach to making decisions.

(DM.l) 47. When previous operational decisions are called into 2 5 question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate these decisions to ensure 1 5 they remain appropriate and adjust as needed.

(DM.2} 46.1 use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable.

( DM.2} 63. Leaders apply a conservative approach to decision making, particulartywhen information is incomplete or condit ions are unusual.

(DM.3} 44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

10 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Disagree 16 25 33 4.37 25 31 4.39 20 33 4.35 21 32 4.35 20 17 3.80 Agree Strongly Agree Average Decision-Making

( DM.l} 43. I u se a consistent, systematic approach t o making d ecisions.

(DM.1} 47. When previous operat ional d ecisions are c alle d int o question by n ew facts, l eaders re-evaluate t h ese d ecisions to en sure they remain appropriate and adjust a s n eed ed.

4 5

(DM.2)46. 1 u se d ecision-making practices that em phasize 1>ruden t c hoices over t h ose that are simply 12 allowable.

( DM.2) 63. Leaders apply a c onservative appr*oac h t o d ecision making, partlcularlywhen information is 2

l Inc omplet e, or c onditions are unusual.

( D M.3} M. Chiefs and CrewChie-fs maintain singl e-point accountabilit y for Important s;;d ety d ecisions.

0 28 19 25 18 10 2 0 30 37 33 34 19 23 30 40 50 St rongly D isagree Disa gree N eit h er Agree or Disa gree Agree St rongly Agree 4.42 4.52 4."8 4.38 3.92 60 70 Average

Page 57 of 174 Graph of Individual Contributors 2024 2025 Decision-Making Individual Contributors IDM.1) 43. 1 use a consistent, systematic approach to making decisions.

( DM.1) 47. When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate t hese decisions to ensure they remain appropriate and adjust as needed.

I DM.2) 46. I use decision-making practices that emphasi ze prudent choices over those t hat are simply allowable.

I DM.2) 63. Leaders apply a conservative approach to decision making, particularly when information is incomplete or conditions are unusuaL (DM.3) 44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

2 2 3

6 0

14 14 11 13 11 10 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neit her Agree or Disagree 11 20 Agree 23 4.41 22 4.49 24 4.48 21 4.38 14 4.00 30 40 Strongly Agree Average Decision-Making Individual Contributors

( DM.1) 43. I use a consistent, systematic approach to making 2

11 decisions.

(DM.1) 47. When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate these decisions to 2

11 ensure they remain appropriate and adjust as needed.

(DM.2} 46. 1 use decision*making practices that emphasize prudent 11 13 choices over those that a re simply atlowabte.

( DM.2) 63. Leaders apply a conservative approach to decision making, particularly when information is incomplete, or conditions 2

5 8

are unusual.

(DM.3) 44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point I 3 4

9 accountability for important safety decisions.

0 5

10 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 21 4.56 20 4.55 19 4.47 19 4.29 15 4.06 15 20 25 30 35 40 Strongly Agree Average

Page 58 of 174 Graph of Supervisors and Above 2024 2025 Decision-Making Supervisors and Above (DM.1} 43. I use a consistent, systematic approach to making decisions.

(DM.1} 47. When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate these decisions to 1 2 ensure they remain appropriate and adjust as needed.

(DM.2) 46. I use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are s imply allowable.

( DM.2) 63. Leaders apply a conservative approach to decision making, particularly when information is incomplete or conditions are unusual.

(DM.3} 44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Disagree 12 10 Agree 7

4.24 8

4.19 8

4.15 10 4.35 7

3 3.40 Strongly Agree Average Decision-Making Supervisors and Above (DM.l) 43.1 u se a consistent, systemati c approach t ornaking 2

17 decisions.

( DM.1) 47. When previous operational decisions are called Into question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate th ese decisions to ensure 3

10 they remain approp t1 ate and adjust as needed.

(DM.2} 46. 1 u se decision-ma king practices that emphasize prudent 13 c hoices over those that are simply allowable.

(DM.2} 63. Leade rs apply a consetvatlve approach to decision making, pa rtlcularlywhen information Is incomplete, or conditions 3

11 are unusual.

(DM.3) 44. C hi efs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point I 4 5

accountability for Important safety decisions.

• Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 12 4.32 18 4.48 16 4.50 16 4.43 12 8

3.73 Strongly Agree Average

Page 59 of 174

Survey Data Respectful Work Environment Trait: Respectful Work Environment (WE) - Trust and respect permeate the organization. The underlying Attributes include Respect is Evident (WE.1), Opinions are Valued (We.2), High Level of Trust (WE.3), and WE.4 (Conflict Resolution).

The survey included 9 questions related to WE to understand what people believe about NCNR ROE NSC. The graphs below represent survey results based on All Respondents, Individual Contributors, and Supervisors and Above. The survey results were reviewed to understand what people believe and focus group/interviews were then held to obtain insights into their beliefs and then followed by observations to gain insights into what people do with key insights provided in the tables below. The results are provided in the Analysis Results section of this Report.

Graph of All Respondents 2024 2025 Respectful Work Environment Respectful Work Environment (WE.1) 7. Lead er s r egard indiv idual s a nd t h eir (WE.1) 7. Leaders rega rd Individuals and their professional capabilities and 1 4 14 24 21 3.89 professional capabilit ies and exp e rie n ces as its m ost 1 4 11 24 21 3.94 experiences as its most valuable asset.

valuable asset.

(WE. 1) 2 8. I t re a t othe r e mployees w it h dignity and 2

13 47 4.73 (WE.l} 28. I treat other employees with dignity and respect. 1 13 50 4.77 resp ect.

(WE.1} 42.1 treat decision-makers with respect, even when I disagree with a (WE.1) 4 2. I t re a t d e cision-makers w it h resp ect, eve n 1

18 4 3 4.68 decision.

15 49 4.72 w h en I d isagree w it h a d ec isio n.

(WE.2} 3 0. I a m en couraged to offer ideas, c oncerns, (WE.2} 30. I am encouraged to offer Ideas, concerns, suggestions, diHerillJ suggestio n s, differing o pinions an d q u estions to h e lp 6

21 33 4.35 opinions and questions to help Identify and solve problems.

I 5 11 39 4.26 iden t ify and solve problem s.

(W E.2) 31. Differing o pinio n s ar e wel comed and '2 5 29 25 4.21 (WE2) 31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected. 12 13 23 26 4.09 resp ected.

(WE.2) 78. I value t h e insigh ts an d p ersp ectives (WE.2) 78.1 value the Insights and perspectives provided by quality provided by qualit y assurance, t h e employ ee concerns t 3 20 35 4.45 assu-ance, the employee concerns programs and independent oversight 12 28 26 4.23 p rogra m s an d indep endent over sig ht organizat io n s.

organizat ions.

(WE.3) 32. Chief s, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors resp o nd to questio n s an d concerns in a n o p en a nd 5

24 3 0 4.27 (WE.3} 27. Leaders promote collaboration amongWO(k groups. I 6 12 27 19 3.88 h o n est m anner.

(WE.3} 36. Leaders sh are importan t information in a n (WE.3) 32. Chiefs, Crew O,lefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions ope n, h o n est and t imely manner su c h t hat t rust is I

9 27 23 4.08 10 26 27 4.20 maintained.

and concerns in an open and honest manner.

(WE.3 ) 27. Lead ers p ro mote collabo ratio n a m o n g wo rk 1 4 13 21 22 3.92 (WE.3} 36. Leaders share lmponant Information fn an open, honest and 12 groups.

timely maru-.er such that trust Is maintained.

10 20 31 4.22 0

10 2 0 30 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average Stro n gly Disagree D isagr ee N eith e r Agre e o r D isagr ee

• Agr ee St r o n gly Agr ee Aver age

Page 60 of 174 Graph of Individual Contributors 2024 2025 Respectful Work Environment Individual Contributors (WE.l} 7. Leaders regard individuals and their professional capabilities and 11 experiences as its most valuable asset.

(WE.1} 28. I treat other employees with dignity and respect.

1 (WE.l) 42. I treat decision-maker.; with respect, even when I disagree with a decision.

(WE.2) 30. I am encouraged to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing opinions and questions to help identify and solve problems.

(WE.2} 31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected.

1 (WE.2} 78. I value the insights and perspectives provided by quality 11 assurance, the employee concerns programs and independent oversight 2 1 17 organizations.

(WE.3} 27. Leaders promote col.laboration among work groups.

(WE.3} 32. Chiefs, Crew Oiiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.

(WE.3} 36. Leaders share important information in an open, honest and timely manner such that trust is maintained.

I 4 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 12 Agree 10 16 16 15 4.02 30 4.73 32 4.78 26 4..37 19 4.15 20 4.38 15 14 3.90 17 4.20 21 4..32 Strongly Agree Average Respectful Work Environment Individual Contributors (WE.1} 7. Leaders rega rd Individuals and theirproiessiona\

3 4

13 capabilities and experiences as its most valuable asset.

(WE.1) 28. I treat other employees with dignity and respect.

8 (WE.l) 4 2. I treat decision-makers with respect, even when I disagree 8

with a decision.

(WE.2) 30.1 am encouraged to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions, I 4 12 differing opinions and questions to help identify and solve problems.

(WE.2) 31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected.

1 4 12 (WE.2} 78.1 value the insights and perspectives provided by quality 2

10 assurance, the employee concerns programs and independent..

(WE.3} 27. Leaders promote collaboration among work groups. 2 8

(WE.3} 32. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.

11 (WE.3) 36. Leaders share impor1ant information in an open, honest I 15 and timely manner such that trust is maintained.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 14 4.12 26 4.76 26 4.76 17 4.29 17 4.32 22 4.59 9

13 3.85 20 4.50 13 4.15 Strongly Agree Average

Page 61 of 174 Graph of Supervisors and Above 2024 2025 Respectful Work Environment Supervisors and Above (WE.l) 7. Leaders regard individuals and their professional capabilities and experiences as its most valuable asset.

(WE.l) 28.1 treat other employees with dignity and respect.

(WE.1} 42. I treat decisioo-makers with respect, even when I disagree with a decision.

(WE.2) 30. I am encouraged t o offer ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing opinions and questions to help identify and solve problems.

(WE.2} 31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected.

WE.2) 78. I value the insights and perspectives provided by quality assurance, the employee concerns programs and independent oversight organizations.

(WE.3) 27. Leaders promote collaboration among work grol.4)s.

(WE.3} 32. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.

(WE.3) 36. Leaders share important information in an open, honest and timely manner s uch that trust is maintained.

4 1

2 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Di sagree 4

10 Agree 4

3.57 17 4.81 16 4.67 13 4.38 4.19 11 3.95 11 3.90 10 4.33 10 4.19 Strongly Agree Average Respectful Work Environment Supervisors and Above (WE.1) 7. Leaders rega rd individuals and t heir professional capabilities and exp e rie n ces as its most valuable asset.

(WE.1) 28. I treat other employees with dig nity and resp ect.

2 5

(WE.1) 4 2. I t reat dec ision-make rs Yllith respect, even when I disagree with a d ecision.

(WE.2) 30. I am e n c ouraged t o offer ideas, con cern s,

suggestions, diffe ring opinions and questions to h e lp identify 1

3 and solve problems.

(WE.2) 31. Diffe ring o pinions are welcomed and resp ected.

1 1 2 (WE.2) 78. I value the ins ights and p e rspectives provide d by quality assurance, t h e employee conce rns programs and independent oversight organizations.

11 10 18 12 13 24 19 17 9

14 (WE.3} 27. Lead e rs promote collaboration among work groups.

3

.s _

...,,..._.1.,3,--...--- 10 (WE.3) 32. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions a nd con cerns in a n open and h o nest (WE.3} 36. Leade rs share important Information in an open, honest and timely manne r such that trust is maint ained.

4 Strongly Disagree Disagree N e it h er-Agree or Disagree 14 12 15 10 Agree Strongly Agree 7

3.68 4.71 4.58 4.39 4.06 3.97 4.06 4.00 Averag

Page 62 of 174

Survey Data Continuous Learning Trait: Continuous Learning (CL) - Opportunities to learn about ways to ensure safety are sought out and implemented. The underlying Attributes include Operating Experience (CL.1), Self-Assessment (CL.2), Benchmarking (CL.3), and Training (CL.4).

The survey included 7 questions related to CL to understand what people believe about NCNR ROE NSC. The graphs below represent survey results based on All Respondents, Individual Contributors, and Supervisors and Above. The survey results were reviewed to understand what people believe and focus group/interviews were then held to obtain insights into their beliefs and then followed by observations to gain insights into what people do with key insights provided in the tables below. The results are provided in the Analysis Results section of this Report.

Graph of All Respondents 2024 2025 Continuous Learning (CL 1} 67. Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to facility processes, procedures, equipment, a nd training programs.

(CL2} 68.1 use operating experie nce to understand equipment,

'1 operational and industry challenges and adopt new idea s.

f (CL2} 75. Leaders value the insight and perspective provided t hrough assessm ents.

11 (CL3) 76. NCNR uses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire innovative ideas to improve integrated safety.

I 8 (CL4) 41. NCNR provides t raining and ensures knowledge t ransferto I maintain a knowledgeable, technical competent workforce.

(CL4} 56. I understand reactor operations to establish a sol.id foundation 14 for decisions and behaviors.

(CL4} 71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals value and 14 seekcontinuous learning opportunities.

17 15 12 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 22 23 21 17 Agree 17 15 3.50 27 4.17 28 4.21 20 15 3.61 15 18 12 3.29 19 24 3.97 26 21 3.97 Strongly Agree Average Continuous Learning (C L.1) 67. Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized t hrough changes to facility processes, procedures, equipment, and t raining programs.

(CL.1} 68.1 use operating experience to understand equipment, operational and industry challenges and adopt new ideas.

(CL.2} 75. Leaders value the insight and perspective provided through assessments.

(C L.3} 76. NCNR uses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire innovative ideas to improve integrated safety.

(C L.4}41. NCN R provides t raining and ensures knowledge t ransfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technical competent workfo rce.

(CL.4} 71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals value and seek continuous learning opportunities.

6 18 23 18

~ -,,--

13 0

10 20 31 36 30 40 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 16 3.62 4.33 24 4.08 17 3.81 13 3.50 4.48 17 3.82 50 60 Average

Page 63 of 174 Graph of Individual Contributors 2024 2025 Continuous Learning Continuous Learning Individual Contributors Individual Contributors (CLl.} 67. Operating experi e n ce Is effectively Implemented and Institutionalized through c hanges to 4

9 9

13 3.91 facility processes, procedures, equipment, and tr-aining (CLl} 67. Operating experience is effectively implemented and programs.

institutionalized through changes to facility processes, 3

13 11 13 3.85 (CL1) 68. I u se operating experience to understand procedures, equipment, and training programs.

equipment, operational and industry challenges and 1

5 10 18 4.34 adopt n ew ideas.

(CLl} 68.1 use operating experience to understand equipment, 7

14 17 4.21 operational and industry challenges and adopt new ideas.

(CL2} 75. L ea d ers value t h e Insig ht and perspective 2

7 11 16 4.1.5 provided through assessments.

(CL2} 75. Leaders value the insight and perspective provided 1 3 15 20 4.38 through assessments.

(C L3) 76. NCNR uses b e n c hmarking as an avenue to 12 10 13 4.03 (CL3} 76. NCNR uses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire I 3 acquire Innovat ive Ideas to Improve Integr ated safety.

innovative ideas to improve integrated safety.

10 12 13 3.85 (CL4} 41. NCNR provides training and ensures knowledge (CL4) 4 1.. NCNR provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, 4

9 10 10 3.59 transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technical competent 8

8 14 11 3.68 technical compete nt-workforce.

workforce.

(CL4} 56. I understand reactor operations to establish a solid (C L4) 56.1 understand r eactor operation fundamentals foundation for decisions and behaviors.

'3 9

14 14 3.90 to establi s h a so lid foundation for decisions and 1

4 11 19 4.33 b e haviors.

(CL4} 71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals 3

6 13 18 4.15 (C L4) 71.. Leaders foster an e nvironment In which value and seek continuous learning opportunities.

Individuals value and seek continuous learning 3

8 13 12 3.97 opportunities.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

• Strongly Disagree Disagree N e it h e r Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 64 of 174 Graph of Supervisors and Above 2024 2025 Continuous Learning Supervisors and Above ICL1} 67. Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to facility processes, procedures, 2

equipment, and training programs.

jCLl} 68.1 use operating experience to understand equipment, operational and industry challenge sand adopt new ideas.

ICL2} 75. Leaders value the insight and perspective provided through assessments.

ICL3} 76. NCNR uses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire innovative ideas to improve integrated safety.

ICL4}41. NCNR provides training and ensures knowledge transfer I to maintain a knowledgeable, technical competent workforce.

jCL4} 56.1 understand reactor operations to establish a solid foundation for decisions and behaviors.

(CL4) 71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals value I and seek continuous learning opportunities.

5 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 10 5

Agree 5

2 3.05 4.24 3.95 7

1 3.19 6

4 1 2.76 8

4.05 11 4

3.81 Strongly Agree Average Continuous Learning Supervisor and Above (CL3} 76. NCNR u ses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire l l innovative ideas to improve integrated safety.

( CL2} 75. Leaders value the insight and pe rspective provide d t hrough assessments.

( CL4} 71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals value and seek continuous learning opportunities.

(CLl} 68.1 use operating experience to understand equipment, operational and industry c halle n ges and adopt new ideas.

2 1 1 5

(CLl} 67. Operating e xperience is effective ly imple mente d and 2

institutionalized t hrough changes to facility processes, proce dures, equipment, and training programs.

(C L4} 56. I unde rstand reactor operation fundame ntals to establish a solid foundation for decisions and behaviors.

(C L4) 41. NCNR prnvidestraining and e nsures knowledge I transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technical comp etent 3

workforce.

13 7

15 12 9

13 Strongly Disagree Disagree Ne ither Agree or Disagree Agree 9

5 3.55 13 9

4.00 15 5

3.58 13 4.23 10 3

3.27 20 4.63 11 3

3.39 Strongly Agree Average

Page 65 of 174

Survey Data Problem Identification and Resolution Trait: Problem Identification and Resolution (PI) - Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance. The underlying Attributes include Identification (PI.1),

Evaluation (PI.2), Resolution (PI.3), and Trending (PI.4).

The survey included 6 questions related to PI to understand what people believe about NCNR ROE NSC. The graphs below represent survey results based on All Respondents, Individual Contributors, and Supervisors and Above. The survey results were reviewed to understand what people believe and focus group/interviews were then held to obtain insights into their beliefs and then followed by observations to gain insights into what people do with key insights provided in the tables below. The results are provided in the Analysis Results section of this Report.

Graph of All Respondents 2024 2025 Problem Identification and Resolution (Pl.1) 50. I ensure issues, problems, degraded conditions and near misses t 11 18 33 are promptly reported and documented in the corrective action program.

4.27 (Pl.1) 62.1 recognize de;;ations from standards.

29 25 4.22 (Pl.2) 69. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems to ensure that resolutions I 5 15 23 address causes and extent of conditions.

21 3.89 (Pl.2) 70. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems for underlying 12 13 27 organizational and safety culture contributors.

19 3.98 (Pl.3) 18. NCNR takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a I 6 20 18 timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance.

19 3.71 (Pl.4) 77. NCNR uses periormance indicators to monitor both equipment I 10 12 23 and organizational performance, including integrated safety culture.

10 3.47 I Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average Problem Identification and Resolution (Pl.l} 50.1 identify and ensure issues, problems, degraded condit ion s and n ear miss are promptly reported and documented in t he corrective action program.

(Pl.1} 62. I recognize deviations from standards.

(Pl.2) 70. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems for underlying 13 organizational and safety culture contributors.

(Pl.3} 18. NCNR takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a t imely m anner, commensurate with t heir safety significance.

(Pl.4} 77. NCNR uses performance indicat ors to monitor both equipment and organizational perfom,ance, including integrated safety culture.

5 10 19 24 21 13 18 18 21 21 14 10 20 30 33 40 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 4.35 31 4.35 27 4.22 26 4.07 18 3.84 19 3.78 50 60 70 Average

Page 66 of 174 Graph of Individual Contributors 2024 2025 Problem Identification and Resolution Individual Contributors (Pl.1} 50.1 en sure issues, problems, degraded conditions and near misses are prompt ly re porte d and d ocume nte d in the corrective action program.

(Pl.1} 62. I recognize devi ations from standards.

(Pl.2} 69. NCN R t ho roughly evaluates proble m s to ensure t hat resolutions address causes and extent of c onditions.

(Pl.2) 70. NCN R thoroughly evaluates problems for unde rlying organi zational and safety culture contributors.

(Pl.3} 18. NCNR takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significan ce.

(Pl.4 } 77. NCN R uses performance indicators t o monitor both equipment and organizational periormance, including integrated safety culture.

11 7

10 1 3 19 2

7 15 2

6 16 I 4 11 16 21 17 17 16 16 10 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neit her Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 4.23 4.30 4.15 4.15 3.85 3.86 Average Problem Identification and Resolution Individual Contributors (Pl.1) 50.1 identify and ensure issues, problems, degraded conditions and near miss are promptly reported and documented 1 3 in the corrective action program.

jPl.1} 62.1 recognize deviations from standards. I (Pl.2) 69. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions.

4 5

(Pl.2) 70. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems for underlying organi zational and safety culture contributors.

[

5 (Pl.3) 18. NCNRtakes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance.

jPl.4} 77. NCNR uses performance indicators to monitor both equipment and organizational perfonnance, including integrated safety culture.

2 12 10 10 11 10 10 7

17 18 20 17 14 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 4.36 4.29 4.47 4.26 12 3.94 3.94 Average

Page 67 of 174 Graph of Supervisors and Above 2024 2025 Problem Identification and Resolution Problem Identification and Resolution Supervisors and Above Supervisors and Above (Pl.1} 50. I identify and ensure issues, problems, (Pl.1) 50. I ensure issues, problems, degraded conditions degraded conditions and near miss are promptly 11 3 9

16 4.27 and near misses are promptly reported and documented 3

9 9

4.29 reported and documented in the corrective action in the corrective action program.

program.

L (Pl.1} 62.1 recognize deviations from standards.

2 14 15 4.42 (Pl.1) 62.1 recognize deviations from standards.

5 9

7 4.10 I

(Pl.2} 69. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems to (P 1.2) 69. NCN R thoroughly evaluates problems to ensure 1 2 ensure that resoluti ans address causes and extent of 2

6 14 7

3.90 that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions.

7 7

4 3.52 conditi ans.

( P 1.2) 70. NCN R thoroughly evaluates problems for (Pl.2) 70. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems for I

7 9

3 3.65 underlying organizational and safety culture 3

8 10 9

3.83 underlying organizational and safety culture contributors.

contributors.

(Pl.3) 18. NCNR takes effective corrective actions to (Pl.3) 18. NCNR takes effective corrective actions to I

address issues in a timely manner, commensurate with 2

7 9

3 3.62 address issues in a timely manner, commensurate with 3

10 12 6

3.68 their safety significance.

their safety significance.

(Pl.4) 77. NCNR uses performance indicators to monitor (Pl.4) 77. NCNR uses performance indicators to monitor both equipment and organizational performance, 6

6 6

2.80 both equipment and organizational performance, 2

13 9

5 3.59 including integrated safety culture.

including integrated safety culture.

0 5

10 15 20 25 30 35 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 68 of 174

Survey Data Environment for Raising Concerns Trait: Environment for Raising Concerns (RC) - A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) is maintained where personnel feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or discrimination. The underlying Attributes include SCWE Policy (RC.1) and Alternate Process for Raising Concerns (RC.2).

The survey included 4 questions related to RC to understand what people believe about NCNR ROE NSC. The graphs below represent survey results based on All Respondents, Individual Contributors, and Supervisors and Above. The survey results were reviewed to understand what people believe and focus group/interviews were then held to obtain insights into their beliefs and then followed by observations to gain insights into what people do with key insights provided in the tables below. The results are provided in the Analysis Results section of this Report.

Graph of All Respondents 2024 2025 Environmentfor Raising Concerns (RC.1} 15. Claims of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discrimination are investigated.

( RC.1} 23. Leaders take ownership when receiving and responding to conce rns, recognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensuring the concerns are adequately addressed in a t imely manner.

( RC.1} 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns without fear of retribution and with confidence that t hei r concerns will be addressed.

( RC.2} 16. NCNR ha s a process for raising and resolving concerns that is independent of line-management influence.

18 I

12 12 11 12 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Disagree 14 23 23 26 43 19 25 Agree Strongly Agree 4.09 4.08 4.43 3.86 Average Environment for Raising Concerns

( RC.1 } 15. Claims of harassmen t. int imidat ion, r*etallatlon, and discriminat ion a r e Invest igated.

(RC.1} 23. Lead e r-stake own e.--s hip w h e n r eceiv ing and r espondin g to c once.--ns. r ecognizing c onfi d e n tialit y If appropriate and e n s uring t h e 2

8 co n cern s are adequately addressed in a t irne ly

( RC.1} 29. I freely rai se integrated safety co n cern s without fear of r et.--lbutlon and w it h confide nce t hat t h e ir concerns will b e addresse d.

(RC.2 } 1 6. NCNR h as a process fo.--raisin g and r eso lving c oncern s that Is inde p e nde n t of line-management inf lue n ce.

6 0

17 7

19 11 7

14 1 0 2 0 3 0 30 30 43 30 40 5 0

• Strong ly Disag r ee Disagree N e it h e r A g r ee or Disagree

• Agree Strong ly Agree 4-.18 4-.56 4-.02 6 0 Average

Page 69 of 174 Graph of Individual Contributors 2024 2025 Environment for Raising Concerns Environment for Raising Concerns Individual Contributors Individual Contributors (RC.1) 15. Claims of harassment, intimidat ion, retaliation, and 13 9

13 4.00

( RC.1} 15. Claims of harassment, intimidation, I discrimination are investigated.

7 6

17 4.23 retaliation, and discrimination are investigated.

( RC.1} 23. Leaders take ownership when receiving and

( RC.1) 23. leaders take ownership when receiving and responding to concerns, recognizing confidentiality if I appropriate and ensuring t he concerns are adequately 8

13 18 4.18 responding to concerns, recognizing confidentiality if 1 4 11 16 4.31 addressed in a t imely manner.

appropriate and ensuring the concerns are adequately addressed in a timely manner.

( RC. l) 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns without fear

( RC.1) 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns of retribution and with confidence t hat the ir concerns will be 1

6 7

27 4.46 I

3 addressed.

without fear of retribution and with confidence that their 7

22 4.48 concerns will be addressed.

( RC.2} 16. NCNR ha s a process for raising and resolving 1 2 10 12 16 3.98 (RC.2) 16. NCNR has a process for raising and resolving concerns that is independent of line-management influence.

concerns that Is independent of line-management 5

5 8

14 3.79 influence.

0 5

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 70 of 174 Graph of Supervisors and Above 2024 2025 Environment for Raising Concerns Supervisor and Above

( RC.1} 15. Claims of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discrimination are investigated.

(RC.l) 23. Leaders take ownership when receiving and responding to concerns, recognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensuring the concerns are adequately addressed in a timely manner.

( RC. l} 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns without 4

fear of retribution and with confidence that their concerns 1 1 4

will be addressed.

(RC.2} 16. NCNR has a process for raising and resolving concerns that is independent of line*ma nageme nt influence.

5 9

9 15 7

8 8

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 4.28 4.10 4.57 3.76 Average Environment for Raising Concerns Supervisors and Above (RC.1} 15. Claims of harassment, intimidation, reta liation, and discrimination are investigated.

( RC.1) 23. Leaders take ownership when receiving and responding to concerns, recognizing confidentiality If 1 4 appropr'iate and ensuring the concerns are adequate ly addressed in a timely manner.

( RC.1) 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns 11 without fear of retribution ancJ with confidence that their 4

4 concerns will be addressed.

( RC.2} 16. NCNR ha s a process for raising and resolving concerns that is independent oi tine~management influence.

2 10 8

14 14 23 16 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 4.11 4.28 4.61 4.21 Average

Page 71 of 174 0: Survey Data Work Processes Trait: Work Processes (WP) - The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety is maintained.

The underlying Attributes include Work Management (WP.1), Design Margins (WP.2), Documentation (WP.3), and Procedure Adherence (WP.4).

The survey included 8 questions related to WP to understand what people believe about NCNR ROE NSC. The graphs below represent survey results based on All Respondents, Individual Contributors, and Supervisors and Above. The survey results were reviewed to understand what people believe and focus group/interviews were then held to obtain insights into their beliefs and then followed by observations to gain insights into what people do with key insights provided in the tables below. The results are provided in the Analysis Results section of this Report.

Graph of All Respondents 2024 2025 Work Processes (WP.l) 54. Work is effective ly planned and executed by incorporating risk-informed insights.

I 6 (WP.l} 72. NCNR imple m e nts th e work management process (planning, controlling and executing work activities) su c h that f 3 integrated safety is t he overriding priority.

(WP.2) 52. Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and changed only with great thought and care.

(WP.2) 53. Safety-related e quipment is operated and maintained within design requiremen ts.

1 8

10 (WP.3) 49. NCNR facility activities are governed by comprehensive high-quality programs, processes, and procedures.

s (WP.3) 55. NCNR creates and maintains complete, accurate and up-to-date documentation.

(WP.4} 25. I understa nd and use human e rror reduction techniques, s u c h as self-check, STAR, and pre-job briefs.

(WP.4) 38. I follow processes, proce dures, and work instructions. ll Strongly Disagree Disagree Ne ither Agree or Disagree 15 18 20 23 20 17 Agree 18 16 3.65 31 18 3.98 33 4.39 33 4.37 22 18 10 3.26 17 13 14 3.25 35 4.34 4 5 4.65 Strongly Agree Average Work Processes (WP.1) 5 4. Work Is effectively planne d and execu ted by incorporat ing risk-informed i,,s ig h ts.

(WP.1} 72. N C N R imple rnen ts t h e work managern e n t process (planning, c ontrolling a nd execu t ingwork activ it ies) s u c h t h at integ rated safety Is t h e ovenlding prlor*lty.

(WP.2) 52. Design a nd ope rat ing ma r-gins a re carefully g uarde d and c hanged o nly wit h g reat t h ough t and care.

(WP. 2} 53. Safety-related e quipment Is operated and maintaine d w it hin d esig n requlre rne rits.

(WP.3) 4 9. N C N R fac ility act ivities are governed by compre h e n s ive hig h -q1.1ality progra m s. processes. and procedures.

(WP.3) 55. NCN R c re a tes and maintains compl ete.

accurate a nd up-to -d ate d ocume n tation.

9 14 2

6 5

9 (WP.4) 25. I unde rstand a nd u se hu,na n e 1To r* re ductio n 14 techniques, s u c h a s self-c h eck, STAR, and pre-Job briefs.

15 0

1 0 13 2 0 17

• S t rong ly D isagree Dis a g ree N e it h e r Agree or Dis a g ree 19 2 4 15

?2 2 0 Agree 27 4.0 7 24 4.16 39 4.48 35 4.50 17 18 3.62 13 13 3.32 39 4.52 4-4 4.67 30 40 5 0 6 0 7 0 8

Stro n g ly Agree Average

Page 72 of 174 Graph of Individual Contributors 2024 2025 Work Processes Work Processes Individual Contributors Individual Contributors (WP.1} 54. Work is effectively planned and executed by 4

9 13 13 3.90 (WP.1) 54. Work is effectively planned and executed by 2

4 9

18 incorporat ing risk-informed insights.

incor1>orating risk-informed insights.

4.30 (WP.1) 72. NCNR implements the work management process (WP.1) 72. NCNR implements the work management process (planning, controlling and executing work activities) such that 3

4 20 13 4.08 (ptanning, controlling and executing work activities} such that 7

10 17 4.29 integrated safety is the overriding priority.

integrated safety is the overriding priority.

(WP.2} 52. Design and operating margins are carefully guarded 6

13 21 4.38

{WP.2} 52. Design and operating ma rgins are carefully guarded 1 2 8

22 and changed only with great thought and care.

and changed only with great thought and care.

4.55 (WP.2) 53. Safety-related equipment is operated and 6

12 19 4.29 (WP.2) 53. Safety-related equipment is operated and 3

12 18 maintained within design requirements.

maintained within design requirements.

4.45 (WP.3) 49. NCN Rfacility activities are governed by comprehensive high-quality programs, processes, and I 6 12 13 9

3.56 (WP.3}49. NCNR faci lity activities are governed by comprehensive high-quality programs, processes, and I 5 8

6 13 3.76 procedures.

procedures.

(WP.3) 55. NCNR creates and maintains complete, accurate 10 6

9 12 3.43 (WP.3) 55. NCNR creates and maintains complete, accurate I 4 11 7

and up-to-date documentation.

and up-to-date documentation.

10 3.56 (WP.4) 38. I follow processes, procedures, and work 11 9

30 4.66 (WP.4) 25. I understand and use human error reduction 11 7

24 instructions.

techniques, such as self-check, STAR, and pre-job briefs.

4.61 (WP.4} 25. I understand and use human error reduction 12 5 12 19 4.18 (WP.4) 38. I fo llow processes, procedures, and work 5

28 techniques, such as self-check, STAR, and pre-job briefs.

instructions.

4.76 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 73 of 174 Graph of Supervisors and Above 2024 2025 Work Processes Supervisors and Above (WP.1) 54. Work is effectively planned and executed by incorporating risk-informed ins ights.

(WP.1} 72. NCN R implements the work management process (planning, controlling and executing work I activities) s uc h t hat integrated safety is t h e overriding priority.

(WP.2) 52. Design and operating margins are carefuUy gu arded and chan ged only with great thou ght and care.

(WP.2} 53. Safety-related equipmen t is operated and maintained within d esign requirem ents.

3 3

(WP.3)49. NCNRfacilityactlvitiesare governed by comprehensive high-quality programs, processes, and procedures.

(WP.3) 55. NCNR c reates and maintains complete, I accurate and up-t o-date documentation.

(WP.4} 25. I understand and use human error reduction techniques, such as self-check, STAR, and pre-Job briefs.

(WP.4) 38. I follow processes, procedures, and work instructions.

3 10 5

9 6

4 5

4 7

10 9

9

• Strongly Disagree N eithe r Agree or Disagree Agree 4

3 3.24 4

3.80 9

4.29 12 4.43 5

2.76 4

2 3.05 13 4.50 14 4.67 Strongly Agree Averag Work Processes Supervisors and Above (WP.1} 72. NCNR implements the work management process (planning, control Ii ng and executing work activities) such that integrated safety is the overriding priority.

(WP.2) 52. Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and cha nged only with great t hought and care.

(WP.2) 53. Safety-related equipment is operated and maintained within design requirements.

(WP.3} 49. NCNR facility activities are governed by comprehensive high-quality programs, processes, and procedures.

(WP.3) 55. NCNR creates and maintains complete, accurate and up-to-date documentation.

(WP.4) 25. I understa nd and use human error reduction techniques, such as self-check, STAR, and pre-job briefs.

(WP.4) 38. I follow processes, procedures, and work instructions.

(WP.1} 54. Work is effectively planned and executed by incorporating risk-informed insights.

7 4

7 2

8 3

8 5

3 11 1

10 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Disagree Agree 16 8

4.03 18 4.40 20 4.60 12 3.42 13 6

4 3.10 17 4.45 19 4.60 10 11 3.84 Strongly Agree Average

Page 74 of 174 1: Survey Data Status of NSC Improvement The survey included one question related to, has NSC improved since the last survey in 2023 to understand what people believe about NCNR ROE NSC. The graphs below represent survey results based on All Respondents, Individual Contributors, and Supervisors and Above.

Graph of All Respondents 2024 2025 The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the last survey in 2023.

Average 4.11 Strongly Agree 24 Agree 21 Neither Agree or Disagree 15 Disagree 1

Strongly Disagree 0

0 5

10 15 20 25 30 The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the last survey in 2023.

Average 4.35 Strongly Agree 30 Agree 21 Neither Agree or Disagree 9

Disagree 0

Strongly Disagree 0

Page 75 of 174 Graph of Individual Contributors 2024 2025 The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the last survey in 2023.

Individual Contributors Average 4.05 Strongly Agree 13 Agree Neither Agree or Disagree 9

Disagree 1

Strongly Disagree 0

0 2

4 6

8 10 12 14 14 16 The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the last survey in 2023.

Individual Contributors Average 4.19 Strongly Agree Agree 10 Neither Agree or Disagree 8

Disagree 0

Strongly Disagree 0

14

Page 76 of 174 Graph of Supervisor and Above 2024 2025 The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the Last survey in 2023.

since the last survey in 2023.

Supervisors and Above Supervisors and Above Average 4.24 Average 4.45 Strongtly Agree 10 Strongly Agree 16 Agree 6

Agree I 13 Neither Agree or Disagree 2

Neither Agree or Disagree 5

Disagree 0

Disagree 0

Strongly Disagree 0

Strongly Disagree 0

0 2

4 6

8 10 12 14 16 1

Page 77 of 174 2: Survey Data for Operations Reactor Operations 2024-2025 Comparisons 2024 2025 Personal Accountability Reactor Operations (PA.1) 5. I clearly understand the importance of adherence to integrated safety standards.

( PA.1) 10. 1 am accountable for shortfalls in meeting integrated safety standards/behaviors.

(PA.2) 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, encourage teamwork and identify challenges to integrated safety.

(PA.2) 14. I ensure that I am trained and qualified to perform assigned work.

(PA.2) 39. I actively participate in pre-job briefings, understanding my responsibilities to raise integrated safety concerns before work begins.

I PA.3} 73. I communicate and coordinate my activities within and across organizational boundaries toe nsure integrated safety is maintained.

4 2

5 3

5 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 2

9 12 Agree 17 4.73 6

8 3.67 15 4.59 10 4.32 16 4.76 9

4.43 Strongly Disagree Averag Personal Accountability Reactor Operations (PA.1) 5.1 clearly understand the importance of adherence to integrated safety standards.

(PA.1) 10. I am accountable for shortfalls in meeting integrated safety standards/behaviors.

(PA.2) 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, encourage teamwork and identify challenges to integrated safety.

(PA.2) 14. I ensure that I am trained and qualified to perform assigned work.

(PA.2) 39. I actively participate in pre-job briefings, understanding my responsibilities to raise integrated safety concerns before work begins.

(PA.3) 73. I communicate and coordinate my activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure integrated safety is maintained.

4 1

3 5

0 15 7

14 5

13 5

13 11 5

10 8

7 15 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 4.79 4.16 4.74 4.53 4.63 4.32 20 Averag

Page 78 of 174 2024 2025 Questioning Attitude Reactor Operations (QA.1) 51. Leaders ensures that activities that could affect reactivity are conducted with particular care, caution, oversight, and in accordance 1 1 12 with procedures.

(QA.1) 57.1 recognize the special characteristics and unique hazards of nuclear technology.

(QA.2} 58.1 maintain a questioning attitude during pre-job briefs/job-site reviews to Identify and resolve unexpe cted condit ions.

(QA.2} 60. I promptly challenge unanticipated test results or unexpected system response rather than rationalize them.

(QA.2} 81.1 stop work activities w hen confronted with an unexpected condition.

(QA.3} 64.1 challenge assumptions/offer opposing views when I think something is not correct.

(QA.3) 45. Leaders solicit challenges to assumptions when evaluating integrated safety issues.

(QA.4} 37.1 petiom, a t horough review of the work site and planned activity every time work is pe,iormed.

(QA.4} 65.1 avoid complacency and plan for t he possibility of mistakes.

1 1 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 20 12 10 17 13 4

12 Agree Strongly Disagree 4.43 4.95 4.57 4.35 4.76 4.48 3.68 3.95 4.14 Average Questioning Attitude Reactor Operations (QA.l} 51. Leaders ensure that activities that could affect reactivity are conducted with particular care, caut ion, oversight, and in accordance with procedures.

(QA.l} 57. I recognize the special characteristics and unique hazards of nuclear technotogy.

(QA.2} 58. I maintain a questioning attitude dtXing pre-job briefs/job-site reviews to identify and resotve unexpected conditions.

(QA.3} 45. Leaders soticit challenges to assumptions when evaluating integrated safety issues.

(QA.2} 60. I promptly challenge unant icipated test results or unexpected system responses rat her than rat ionalize them.

(QA.3} 64. I challenge assumptions and offer opposing views when I think something is not correct.

(QA.4) 37. I pe,iormed a thorough review of the work site and planned activity every time work is periormed.

(QA.4) 65.1 avoid complacency and plan for the possibility of mistakes.

4 1

2 4

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 15 4.79 16 4.79 12 4.63 3.83 10 4.42 15 4.79 3.84 4.37 10 15 20 Strongly Agree Average

Page 79 of 174 2024 2025 Effective Safety Communications Reactor Operations (CO.1} 4. Integrated safety is discussed at every meeting where plant work activities are planned and reviewed.

(C0.2) 21. Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and organizational decisions is communicated in a t imely manner.

(C0.2} 59. Leaders encourage individuals to ask questions If they do not understand the basis of operational and management decisions.

(C0.3} 35. I communicate openly and candidly with oversight, audit, and regulatory organizations.

(C0.3) 74. Leaders respond t o me in an open, honest and non-defensive (CO.4) 40. Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that integrated safety is the organization's overriding priority.

(C0.4} 61. Leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand expected behaviors and actions necessary to maintain integrated safety.

1 1 2 4

4 2

1 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 4.00 3.05 11 4.33 13 4.29 4.14 4.19 4.00 Strongly Disagree Average Effective Safety Communications Reactor Operations (CO.1) 4. Integrated safety is discussed at every 1

m eeting wh ere plant w ork a ctivities are pla nned a nd...

(CO.2} 21. Lead ers e nsure t hat t he basis fo r ope rational -

and orga nization a l decisions is communicated in a...

( CO.2) 59. Lead ers en courage individua Is t o ask 1

questions if t hey do not understand t he basis of...

(CO.3} 35. I co mmunicate openly and can didly wit h 1

oversight, a udit, a nd regulatory orga nizations.

(CO.3) 74. Leaders resp o nd to me in an ope n, honest I and non-defens ive manner.

(CO.4) 40. Leaders freque nt ly communicate and reinforce t he expectation t hat integrated safety is t he... 1 (CO.4 ) 61. Leaders e ns ure s upplem ental personnel unde rstand expected behaviors and actions."

0 2

2 2

3 7

6 4

4 7

7 15 2

7 7

5 7

5 10 5

9 7

8 6

15 Strongly Dis a gree Dis agree Neit he r Agree or Di sagree Agree Strongly Agree 3.79 2

3.16 4.26 4.72 3.89 4.16 3.95 2 0 Average

Page 80 of 174 2024 2025 Leaership Safety Values and Actions Reactor Operations (LA.1} 66. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs ensa-e staffing levels are consistent with the demands related to maintaining safety and reliability.

( LA.2) 17. Leaders from all levels in the organization are involved in oversight of work activities.

(LA.2) 19. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and S[4)ervisors ensure supeivisoryand mana gement oversight of contractors and supplemental personnel work activities, such that Integrated safety issl4)ported.

( LA.2} 22. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs encourage informal leaders (non-supervisors) to model safe behaviors and high standards of accoU1tability. --

3 (LA.3) 12. Leaders provide incentives, sanctions, and rewards that are aligned with NCNR integrated safety policies and reinforce behaviors and outcomes that reflect safety as the -

overriding priority.

( LA.3} 34. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs reward individuals who identify and raise Issues affecting the integrated safety policy.

(LA.4) 9. Leaders ensure NCNRfacilitypriorities are aligned to reflect integrated safety as the overriding priority.

(LA.4) 20. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs develop and irr-.,lement cost and schedule goals in a manner that reinforces t he importance of integrated safety.

( LA.5) 26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs anticipate, manage and communicate the effects of impending changes.

( LA.5} 33. Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and implement change so that integrated safety remains the overriding priority.

(LA.6) 6. Leaders ensure roles, responsibilities, and authorities are dearly defined, understood and documented to promote integrated safety.

( LA. 7) 80. Leaders constantly scrutinize nuclear safety through a variety of monitoring techniques, Including assessments of nuclear safety cutuxe.

(LA.8} 8. Leaders exhibit behaviors that set the standard for integrated safety.

( LA.8} 24. Leaders "walk the talkn, modeling correct behaviors when resolving apparent conflicts between Integrated safety and facility availability.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Disagree Average 3.41 3.14 3.55 3.19 4.16 3.05 3.24 3.62 3.26 2.90 3.74 3.80 3.72 3.76 3.55 3.80 Leadership Safety Values and Actions Reactor Operations (LA.1} 13. Leaders ensure that personnel, tools, equipment, procedu-es and other resource materials are available and adequate to support integrated saf ety.

(LA.1} 66. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs ensure staffi ng levels are consistent w ith the demands related to mainta ining safety and reliability.

(LA.2} 17. Leaders from all levels in the organization are involved in oversight of work activities.

(LA.2) 19. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors ensure supervisory and management oversight of c ontractors and supplemental personnel work activities, such that integrated safety is supported.

( LA.2) 22. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs encoura ge Informal leaders (non-supervisors} to model safe behaviors and high standards of accountability.

I 2 2

(LA.3} 12. Lead ers provide incentives, sanctions, and rewards that are aligned w ith NCNR integrated safety policies and reinforce behaviors and 2

outcomes that reflect safety as the overriding priority.

( LA.3) 34. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs reward individuals w ho identify and raise issues affecting the integrated safety policy.

(LA.4} 9. Leaders en sure NCNRfacilitypriorities are aligned to reflect integrated safety as the overriding priority.

(LA.4} 20. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs d evelop and implement c ost and schedule goals in a manner that reinforces th e importance of integrate d safety.

(LAS) 26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs anticipate, manage and communicate the effects of impending changes.

(LA.5} 33. Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and implement change so t hat integrated safety remains the overridi ng priority.

(LA.6} 6. Leaders ensure roles, responsibilities, and authorities are clearly defined, L1nderstood and documented to promote Integrat ed sa fety.

(LA.6} 48. Corporate governanc e, review boards, and independent oversight organizations support t he Director's ultimate responsibility fordecisions affecting nuc le ar safety.

( LA. 7}80. Lea ders constantly scrutinize nuclear safety through a varl ety of monitoring techniques, Including assessments of nuclear safety culture.

2 2

3 (LA.8) 8. Leaders exhibit behaviors that set the standard for Integrate d safety. 2

( LA.8} 24. Leaders "walk t he talkn, modeling correct behaviors when resolving apparent conflicts between Integrated safety and facility availability.

10 12 11 10 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 3.79 3.00 4

3.53 3.58 10 4.26 3.26 3.21 3.79 0 2.74 2.95 3.50 4.00 3.95 4.11 3.68 3.89 15 20 Average

Page 81 of 174 2024 2025 Decision-Making Reactor Operations (DM.1} 43.1 use a consistent, systematic approach to making decisions.

(DM.1) 47. When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate these decisions to 1 1 ensure they remain appropriate and adjust as needed.

(DM.2) 63. Leaders apply a conservative approach to decision making, particularly when information is incomplete or conditions are unusual.

(DM.2) 46.1 use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are s imply allowable.

(DM.3) 44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

3 I 3 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 11 8

10 Agree 9

4.38 4.32 4.40 10 4.35 5

5 3.53 Strongly Disagree Average Decision-Making Reactor Operations (DM.1} 43. I use a consistent, systematic approach to making decisions.

(DM.1) 47. When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate these decisions to ensure they remain appropriate and adjust as needed.

(DM.2) 46.1 use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are s imply allowable.

( OM.2} 63. Leaders apply a conservative approach to decision making, particularly when information is incomplete, or conditions are unusual.

(DM.3) 44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

2 2

0 7

7 4

3 5

5 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 7

4.26 10 4.42 10 4.50 8

4.11 4

6 3.50 10 15 20 Strongly Agree Average

Page 82 of 174 2024 2025 Respectful Work Environment Reactor Operations (WE.1} 7. Leaders rega rd individuals and their professional capabilities and experiences as its most valuable asset.

(WE.1) 28. I treat other employees with dignity and respect.

(WE.1}42. I treat decision-makers with respect, even when I disagree with a decision.

(WE.2} 30. I am encouraged to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing opinions and questions to help identify and solve problems.

I 3

I 3

(WE.2) 31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected. I 1 WE.2) 78. I value the insights and perspectives provided by quality assurance, the employee concerns programs and independent oversight organizations.

(WE.3}27. Leaders promote collaboratlonamongwork gro~s. I 3

(WE.3} 32. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.

(WE.3} 36. Leaders share Important Information in an open, honest and timely manner such that trust Is maintained.

I 2

Stronsly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 4

3.43 17 4.81 15 4.71 10 3.90 3.95 11 3.84 3.48 10 4.14 3.70 Strongly Disagree Average Respectful Work Environment Reactor Operations (WE.1) 7. Leaders r egard Individuals and t h eir professional capabilities and experiences as its most valuable asset.

(WE.1) 28. I t f"eat other employees with dignity and respect.

(WE.1) 42. I tf"eat decision-makers with,-espect, even when I disagre e with a d ecision.

(WE.2) 30. I am encouraged to offer Ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing opinions and questions to help identify and solve problems.

2 (WE.2) 31. Differing opinions are welcomed and,-espected. 2 1

(WE.2} 78. I value the ins igh ts and perspectives p,-ovided by quality assurance, the employee conce,-ns p,-og,-ams and independent ove,-slght o,-ganlzations.

(WE.3) 27. Leaders promote collabora tion among work groups.

3 (WE.3) 32. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions and conce,-ns in an open and honest manner.

(WE.3) 36. Leaders share important information In an open, honest and t imely manner such that t rust is maintained.

2 10 S1,-ongly Dlsag,-ee Dlsag,-ee Nelthe,-Ag,-ee o,- Dlsag,-ee Agree 13 10 10 12 10 10 15 Strnngly Agree 4

3.42 4.63 4.47 4.21 3

3.74 4.06 0 3.26 6

3.79 3.89 20 Average

Page 83 of 174 2024 2025 Continuous Learning Reactor Operations (CLl} 67. Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to facility processes, procedures, equi pment, and training programs.

3 (CLl} 68.1 use operating experie nce to understand e quipment, I operational and industry challenge s and adopt new idea s.

(CL2) 75. Leaders value the insight and perspective provided through assessments.

(CL3) 76. NCNR uses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire innovative ideas to improve integrated safety.

4 6

6 3

4 3

(CL4} 41. NCNR provides training and ensures know(edge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technical compete nt workforce.

11 (C L4) 56.1 understand reactor operations to establish a solid foundation for decisions and behaviors.

(C L4} 71. Leaders foste r an environment in which individuals value and seek continuous lea rning opportunities.

4 I

3 4

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 10 Strongly Disagree 3

3 3.90 4.05 3.32 2.52 4.14 3

3.52 Average Continuous Learning Reactor Operations (CLl) 67. Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes t o fac ility processes, procedures, equipment, a nd training programs.

(CLl) 68.1 use operating experie nce to understand e quipment, operat ional and industry challenges and adopt new idea s.

(CL2) 75. Leaders value the ins ight and perspective provided through assessme nts.

(C L3} 76. NCNR uses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire innovative ideas to improve integrated safety.

(CL4}41. NCN R provides training and ensures knowle dge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technical compete nt workforce.

(CL4 ) 56.1 understand reactor operation fundamentals to establish a solid foundation for decisions and behaviors.

(C L4 ) 71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals value and seek continuous lea rning opportunit ies.

2 1 1 8

2 2

I 2 5

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Disagree Agree 7

9 5

2.94 9

4.32 4

3.88 4

3 3.47 7

3.16 12 4.63 9

1

3. 11 10 15 20 Strongly Agree Average

Page 84 of 174 2024 2025 2024 2025 Problem ldentifiction and Resolution Reactor Operations (Pl.1} 50.1 ensure issues, problems, degraded conditions and near misses are promptly reported and documente d in th e corrective action 6

program.

(Pl.1) 62.1 recognize deviations from standards.

4 (Pl.2} 69. NCNR t horoughly evaluates problem s to en sure t hat I 4

5 resolutions address causes and extent of conditions.

(P l.2} 70. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems for underlying 1 1 organizational and safety culture cont ributors.

(Pl.3} 18. NCNR takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a I 4

t imely manner, commen surate with t heir safety significance.

(Pl.4) 77. NCNR uses p erformance indicators t o monitor bot h I

equipment and organizational p erformance, including integrated safety 3

culture.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Environment for Raising Concerns Reactor Operations

( RC.l} 15. Claims of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discrimination are investigated.

( RC.l) 23. Leaders take ownership wh en receiving and responding to concerns, recognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensuring the con cerns are adequately addressed in a timely manner.

4 4

11 8

7

( RC.l) 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns without fear of retribution and with confidence that t heir concerns will be addressed.

14

( RC.2} 16. NCN R has a process for raising and resolving concerns t hat is independent of line-management influence.

4 4

10 6

6 5

5 4

5 8

4 Strongly Disagree 4.22 3.90 4.29 3.50 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neit her Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Disagree Average 4.10 4.10 3.48 3.74 3.36 3.58 Average Problem Identification and Resolution Reactor Operations (P L4-) 77. NCNR uses p erfonnance indic a tors to monitor both e quipment and organi zationa l p erformance. inc luding Integrate d safety c ult ure.

(PL2) 70. NCN R t horoug hly evaluates probl e ms for unde rlyin g organizationa l and safety c ult ure contributors.

(Pl.2} 69. NCN R t hor*oughly e valuates pr*obl e m s t o I 2 e n s ure t hat r esolut ions address cau ses a nd exten t of

1.

3 c ond itions.

(P l.1.} 62. I r ecognize d e viat ions from standards.

1.

(Pl.1} 5 0. I ide n tify a nd e nsure Issu es, probl e ms, d egrad e d conditions and n e ar miss are p r ompt ly r eported a nd docu m e n te d in t h e corrective actio n prog r am.

(Pl.3} 18. NCN R t akes effective c onectlve a ctions t o address i ssu es in a timely m a nner, c omm e n sur ate w i t h t h e ir safety signif ica n ce.

o 4

7 7

6 4

9 10 3

7 4

7 5

10 2

5 4

8 6

4 15

• Strongly D isag r ee D isag r ee N e lthe r Agree or* Disagree

• Agree Strongly A g r ee Environment for Raising Concerns Reactor Operations

( RC.l) 15. Claims of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and di scrimination are investigated.

(RC.l) 23. Leaders take ownership when receiving and responding to con cerns, recognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensuring t he concerns are adequately addressed In a timely m anner.

( RC.l) 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns w ithout fear of retribution and wit h confidence that their c oncerns wilt be addressed.

( RC.2) 16. NCNR ha s a process for raising and resolving concerns t hat is independent of line-manageme nt influence.

4 10 13 15 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neit her Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 4.13 4.06 4.58 3.61 20 Average 3.59 3.56 3.94-3. 58 2 0 Avera ge 25

Page 85 of 174 2024 2025 2024 2025 Work Processes Reactor Operations (WP.l) 54. Work ls effectively planned and executed by incorporating risk-informed insights.

3 (WP.l} 72. NCNR implements the work management process (planning, controlling and executing work activities} such that 1

3 integrated safety is the overriding priority.

(WP.2} 52. Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and changed only with great thought and care.

(WP.2) 53. Safety-related equipment is operated and maintained w ithin design requirements.

(WP.3} 49. NCNR facility activities are governed by comprehensive high-quality programs, processes, and procedures.

3 (WP.3) 55. NCNR creates and maintains complete, accurate and up-to-date documentation.

(WP.4} 25. I understand and use human error reduction techniques, such as self-check, STAR, and pre-job briefs.

(WP.4} 38. I fo llow processes, procedures, and work instructions.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 9

Agree 11 13 11 13 15 Strongly Disagree The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the Last survey in 2023.

Reactor Operations Average 3.91 I

Strongly Disagree 6

I Agree N e ithe r Agree or Disagree 6

Disagree 1

Strongly Disagree 0

2 4

6 a

3.10 4.00 4.62 4.43 2.71 3.00 4.57 4.71 Average 9

10 Work Processes Reactor Operations (WP.l} 54. Work is effective ly planned and executed by incorporating risk-informed insights.

(WP.l} 72. NCNR implements the work management process (planning, controtling and executing work activities} such that...

(WP.2} 52. Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and cha nged only with great thought and care.

(WP.2} 53. Safety-related equipment is operated and maintained within design requirements.

(WP.3} 4 9. NCNR facility activities are governed by comprehensive high-quality programs, processes, and procedures.

(WP.3} 55. NCNR creates and maintains complete, accurate and up-to*

date documentation.

(WP.4} 25. I understand and use human error reduction techniques, such as self-check, STAR, and pre-job briefs.

(WP.4} 38. I fo llow processes, procedures, and work instructions.

1 2

2 -

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Disagree

• Agree 10 11 4

11 14 10 15 Strongly Agree The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the survey in 2023.

Reactor Operations Ave.-age 4.16 I

Strongly Ag r ee 5

A g r ee I

I N e lthe.- A g.-ee o.- D isa g r ee 2

Disagre e St.-ongty Disagre e 0

2 4

s 8

10 12 3.68 3.95 4.32 4.53 3.11 2.79 4.47 4.78 20 Average 12 14

Page 86 of 174 3: Survey Data for Reactor Engineering Reactor Engineering 2024-2025 Comparison 2024 2025 Personal Accountability Reactor Engineering (PA.1} 10. I am accountable fo r shortfalls in meeting integrated safety sta ndards/behaviors.

1 2

(PA.1) 5.1 clearly understand the importance of adhere nce to integrated safety standards.

(PA.2} 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foste r a professional environment, encourage teamwork and identify challenges to integrated safety.

(PA.2) 14. I ensure that I am trained and qualified to periorm assigned work..

(PA.2) 39. I actively participate in pre-job briefings, understanding 3

my responsibilities to raise integrated safety concerns before work 1 1 begins.

(PA.3) 73. I communicate and coordinate my activities wit hin and across organizational boundaries to ensure integrated safety is 2

maintained.

4 5

4 10 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 4.69 11 4.73 12 4.80 4.27 8

4.36 4.33 Strongly Agree Averag Personal Accountability Engineering (PA.1) 5.1 clearly understand the importance of adhere nce to integrate d safety standards.

(PA.1) 10. I am accountable for shortfalls in meeting integrated safety standards/behaviors.

(PA.2} 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, encourage teamwork and identify challenges to...

(PA.2} 14. I ensure that I am t raine d and qualified to perform assigned work.

IPA.2} 39. I actively participate in pre-job bri efings, understanding my resp on sibilities to raise integrated safety concerns before work begins.

(PA.3} 73. I communicate and c oordinate my activit ies w ithin and across organi zational boundaries to ensure integrated safety is maintained.

2 2

1 1 2

5 5

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 13 4.87 9

4.40 12 4.67 13 4.73 11 4.60 9

4.53 10 15 20 Strongly Agree Average

Page 87 of 174 2024 2025 Questioning Attitude Reactor Engineering

\QA. 1} 51. Leaders ensures that activities that could affect reactivity are conducted with particular care, caution, oversight, and in accordance with procedures.

(QA.1} 57. I recognize the special characteristics and unique hazards of nuclear technotogy.

(QA.2} 58. I maintain a questioning attitude di.ring pre-Job briefs/Job-site reviews to Identify and resolve une,:pected conditions.

(QA.2) 60. I promptly challenge unanticipated test results or unexpected system response rather than rationalize them.

(QA.2) 81.1 stop work activities when confronted with an unexpected condition.

1 2

S(QA.3} 4. I challenge assumptions/offer opposing views when I think something is not correct.

(QA.3} 45. Leaders solicit challenges to assumptions when evaluating integrated safety issues.

(QA.4) 37. I perform a thorough review of the work site and planned activity every time work is performed.

(QA.4} 65. I avoid complacency and plan fort he possibility of mistakes.

1 1 4

4 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 4

11 4.60 12 4.80 4.47 4.47 11 4.71 4.40 4

4.20 4.13 4.47 Strongly Agree Average Questioning Attitude Reactor Engineering

( QA.1.} 51.. Leade r-sensu,-ethat activities t hat could affect.-eactlvity a.-e conducted vvlth particular-ca.-e,

1.

caution, over-sight, and in accor-dance vvith pr-ocedu,*es.

(QA.1.} 57. I.-ecogni ze the special c ha.-a cte.-istlcs a nd unique haza.-ds of nuclear-technology.

(QA.2} 58. I maintain a questioning attitude du.-lng p.-e -

job b.-lefs/job-site.-evlevvs to identify and r-esolve unexpected cond it ions.

( QA.2) 60. I p.-omptly cha llenge unanticipated test 3

4 r-esults o.- unexpected system r-esponses r-athe.- t han 1

3

.-ationali ze t h em.

(QA.3} 45. Leade.-s solicit c hallenges to assumptions vvhen evaluating I meg.-ated safety Issues.

(QA.3} 64. I c hallenge assumptions and otfe.- opposing vlevvs vvhen I think so met hi n g Is not correct.

3 (QA.4} 65. I avoid complace n cy and plan for-the possibility of mistakes.

4 (QA.4} 37. I perlon,,ed a tho.-ough revlevvof t h e vvo.-k site a nd planned activity every time vvork i s p erlo.-med.

5 7

1 4 4.93 11 4.67 11 4.73 1 0 4.64 7

4.40 11 4.67 10 4.53 9

• St.-ongly Disag.-ee D isag r-ee Neit her-Ag.-ee o.- /risag.-ee 5 Ag.-ee 1.1ir-onglyA!5ee Ave 20

Page 88 of 174 2024 2025 Effective Safety Communications Reactor Engineering (CO.1) 4. Integrated safety is discussed at everymeetin8 3

7 whore plant wO<'k activltl*s ro planMd and r""iew<ld.

(CO.2) 21. Leaders ensure that the basis lor operatlonal and orga nlzationa, decisions Is conTnunicated in a timely 1 1 1 7

mamer.

(CO.2) 58. Leaders encourage lntivid,.. ts to ask q,...stlons if they do not unde.-stand the basis of oper-a,lonal and 4

11 manageme:n~ decisions.

(CO.3l 35. I corrwnunlcate openly and candidly with 4

9 oversight, atdit, and regulatory organizations.

(CO.3) 74. Leaders re51,onclto me In nopell, honestand 4

10 non-crefenstve manner.

(CO.4)40. Leadef'S frequemly communicate, nd reinforce the expectation that inte8)"ated strfety is the orgonltation's 7

ove, riding 1>rlorl!y.

(CO.4) 61. Leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand cxpeelt:d behaviors,IU'id ac1ion:!i nece-ss.[iry ro 3

5 maintain lnteuated

• lety.

• Strongly Disauee Disagree Neither Agree or Di Ms,ee Agree 5

4.13 5

3.93 4.73 4.57 4.60 7

4.40 7

4.27 S11ongly Agree Average Effective Safety Communications Reactor Engineering (C0.1} 4. Integrated safety is discussed at every meeting 7

where plant work activities are planned and reviewed.

(C0.2} 21. Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and organizational decisions is communicated in a t imely 3

7 manner.

(C0.2} 59. Leaders encourage individuals to ask questions if they do not understand the basis of operational and 5

10 management decisions.

(C0.3} 35. I communicate openly and candidly with 1

2 11 oversight, audit, and regulat ory organizations.

(CO.3) 74. Leaders respond t o me in an open, honest and 9

non-defensive manne r.

(CO.4} 40. Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that integrated safety is the organization's 5

10 overriding priority.

(C0.4) 61. Leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand expected behaviors and actions necessary to 8

maintain integrated safety.

0 5

10 7

4 7

15 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 4.40 3.87 4.67 4.71 4.4 4.67 4.47 20 Average

Page 89 of 174 2024 2025 Leadership Safety Value and Actions Reacto r Engineering (LA. l) 13. Leadl!r5 e.--,re that per50nnel, tools, <!!quipmem, p,oced\.-e5 and o:iher <e 50Vr*,;e mateo1als,.,., aval\3ble an d adeq...,,u, to support lntegr*ated safety.

(LA. 1) 66. Chlef5 and Crew Chiefs ens,..-e staffln,g te-1,; ant,;on:.l,;teJll with t he d<=manch.

related to malntalnlns safety and, eUabiUty.

(LA.2) 17. Lead e*s from all lev,:ls In th!! Of'gllnlz.a\ion ar e 1...,olved In o ve 1,;lght of work (LA.2) 19. C hiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and s...,ervlsors ensure i;.upervlsory and ma,..-. gem ent

°""rslghl of con1, actors imd S.UJ>t>lememal pef'sonnel worka ctt111!1es, such that Integrated safetylS5UPl>orted (LA.2) 22. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs en.cou1,1ge lnform11l leadeH; (non-wpervl501s) to model sate beh a..tors and high st11ndards of acco....-.tabHlty.

(LA.3) 12. Lead ers provide incemh,"1!5, sanc:tlorn, and rew;ords th-"t a,e aUgned whh NCNR Integrated,..,fety policies and reinforce behaviors and outcon,es thal reflect safety as th!!

oYerridlngprlorhy.

(LAA) 9. Leadeu en s...-e NCNR fricllltypolotltles are aligned to ref'lect lntes,ated s.afety as th e oYen ldi,.prlority.

(LA.4) 20. Chiefs and CrewChlels develop and implement co5t and sch edule goals In a m1>nnertha1 relnlo,ces the Importance of Integrated safely.

(lA.5) 26. Chiefs and Crew C hiefs. a,,ticlpMe, manage and communicate the effects of Impending chl'lnges...

(LA.5) 33, Le..,ders u se a systematic poocess for evaluating _.,nd Implement change so that ln1egrated safety remaln5 the overrldlns priority.

4LA.6) 6. Leaders enslS*e roles. responslblUtl<!!s, and 1t,11ho,l1les 1tre clearly defined, under stood and documented to poornote Integrated $afety.

(LA.6)48. Co1por;1te goveonance, re..tew bo_.,,ds, 3n d Independen t overs.lghl organizations

"'-'PJ>Ort th e Director's ultimate respon,;ibllity for decisions 11ffecdng nucie,,or safery-(LA. 7) 80. L.eaden, constant1y scrutinize nudear safety t hrough a va,lety of monitor Ina techniques, lnc;ludlng assess,nen ts of nuclear salety c ult,*e.

(LA.8) 8. Leaders e1<hibi1 b,eha,..or s th in se1 th!! sti,nd.*1rd lo, 1mes,a1ed safety.

(L.A.8) 2 4. Leadeu "walk theUt(k", modeling correct b eh..,>Aors when resolving ap1>arent con fllcts b etwe<=n ln t<,grated safely an d facMhy avallablllty.

• Stron,gly Disagr ee Disagree Netth e, Agree or Disagree Ag,ee Strongly Agree Average 4.00 3.86 4.20 4.36 4.27 Leadership Safety Values and Actions Reactor Engineering (LA.1) 66. Chiefs and CrewChle'5 =~:~:~~:!: ;;:::~~tent wt:h the demands related to

( IA.2) 17. leaders lrom all levels In the orgi!Olzatloome l~ved In oversight of wo1kactMtles.

(lA-2) 19. Chie's. Crew Chiefs, lead$ 1md 5'.4>eMsors ensure supeMSoiy andm3fl.Jgement oversight of cont ractors 1111d supplemen:nl persomel wo,1,, acth,flles, Mich that ln:egrated safety Is st~poned.

(lA2) 22. Chlek and CrewChle's encourage informal leade,s (non--MJpervisors) tornodel sate behaviors tmd Ngh siar~fa,dsof accoontablUty.

(LA.3) 12, Luders provide Incentives, sanctk:lns, and rewards th111 are aU!jroedwtth NCNR Integrated safety po6ci<!s and reinforce beh.-.Yiorsand outcomes that reff<!ct saf<!ty as the o~rriding priority.

tLA.3) 34. Chief$ and Crew Chiefs reward lndNld.Ja!swho ldentlfyond raise Issues offectklg the integrated safetypoUcy ILA.4)9. Leaders ensu e NCNR !acilltyprloil:le& are ali&n-e(I to reflect lriegrated safety as theOYeTTldlng pr1orhy.

(LAA) 20. Chle'& andCR:wCh~ts dew lop and l~emem cos, and sc.Mdule goals In a manner that reln1orces the lmponance ol lntesrated safety.

(LAS) 26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs an:lclpate, mantll;e aod commmlcme the effects of lmpendlr(

cha,.es.

(LAS) 33. leaders u~e a systematic process for evalua!l~ 11ndlmplemem clunge so that Integrated safecy remains the werridng pr1orhy.

(LA.SJ 6. leaders ensu-e roles, responsibi611es, and 3\llhoritles are cle11rty defined, understood and documented to promote ln1egatedsa!ety.

(lA.6)48. Coipornte g0\lerr\3nce, review boards, andlrdcpendcnt oversight organizations support the Director's ultimate responsibility for ~

lslons affec:lng nudcarsafety.

(LA.7)80. Leaders constantly sc1ullol:e nuclea,safety thrOU!jha Yilrlety of monlto11,. tect-nkf..!es, includi-.;assessments of nuclear saletycul!lSfl.

(lA.8) 6. Lead...-rs extM>tl beh,ntors that set the stand:lrd for lntet;rated sa'e1Y*

iLA.8) 24. Leaden "walk the talk", mode lb' cooect b eha'Mrswhen rnsoMr~ apparent con'Ucts b etween Integrated safety and facllliy avaKBbillty.

Stro~y Dlsagree Disagree NettherAgreeorl)sagree Agree Str~y Agree 10 10 10 Averai;e 4.20 3.7'3 4.20 4.53 3.60 4.14 4 60 4.20 4.13 4.33 4.00 4.47 4 60 4.40

.4.53 15 20

Page 90 of 174 2024 2025 Decision-Making Decision-Making Reactor Engineering Reactor Engineering

( DM.1) 43. I use a consistent, systematic approach to making 1

3 6

5 4.00 (DM.1) 43. I use a consistent, systematic approach to 1

4 10 4.60 decisions.

making decisions.

( DM.1) 47. When previous 01,erational decisions are called

( DM.1) 47. When previous operational decisions a re into question by newf acts, leaders re-evaluate these called into question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate 1

3 11 4.67 decisions to ensure they remain appropriate and adjust as 1

8 6

4.33 these decisions to ensure they remain appropriate and needed.

adjust as needed.

( DM.2) 3. Leaders apply a conservative approach to decision (DM.2) 46. I use decision-making practices that maldng, particularly when information is incomplete or 3

3 9

4.40 emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply 7

8 4.53 conditions are unusual.

allowable.

( DM.2) 63. Leaders apply a conservative approach to (DM.2) 46. 1 use decision-making practices that emphasize decision making, particularly when information is 1

4 10 4.53 prudent choices overthosethat are simply allowable.

3 5

6 4.21 incomplete, or conditions are unusual.

(DM.3) 44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point (DM.3) 44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-2 5

7 4.21 4

5 4

4.00 point accountability for important safety decisions.

accountability for important safety decisions.

0 5

10 15 20 Strong1y Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Averag

Page 91 of 174 2024 2025 Respectful Work Environment Reactor Engineering (WE.l} 7. Leaders rega rd individuals and their professional capabilities and experiences as its most valuable asset.

(WE.1) 28.1 treat otheremployeeswith dignity and respect.

(WE.1} 42.1 treat decision-makers with respect, even when I disagree with a decision.

(WE.2} 30.1 am encouraged to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing opinions and questions to help identify and solve problems.

(WE.2) 31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected.

WE.2} 78. I value the insights and perspectives provided by quality assurance, the employee concerns programs and independent oversight organizations.

(WE.3) 27. Leaders promote collaboration among work groups.

(WE.3) 32. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.

(WE.3} 36. Leaders sha re important information in an open, honest and timely manner such that trust is maintained.

4 4

4 5

4 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 6

Agree 6

4.27 10 4.71 11 4.73 10 4.60 6

4.27 4.43 4.00 8

4.47 10 4.60 Strongly Agree Averag Respectful Work Environment Reactor Engineering (WE.1} 7. Leaders regard individuals and their professional capabilities and experiences as its most valuable asset.

(WE.1} 28. I treat other employees with dignity and respect.

(WE.1} 42. I treat decision-makers with respect, even when I disagree with a decision.

(WE.2} 30.1 am encouraged to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing opinions and questions to help identify and solve problems.

(WE.2) 78. I value the insights and perspectives provided by quality assurance, the employee concerns programs and independent oversight organizations.

(WE.2} 31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected.

(WE.3} 32. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.

(WE.3) 27. Leaders promote collaboration among work groups.

(WE.3} 36. Leaders share important information in an open, honest and timely manner such that trust is maintained.

1 1 4

2 3

2 7

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 14 14 4.20 4.93 4.93 4.47 12 4.80 4.53 4.53 10 4.53 4.00 10 15 Strongly Agree Average

Page 92 of 174 2024 2025 Continuous Learning Continuous Learning Reactor Engineering Reactor Engineering (CLl} 67. Operatinge:,.perience is effectively implemented and (CLl} 67. Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to facility processes, procedtxes, 7

4 4

3.80 institutionalized t hrough changes to facility processes, 1

3 7

4 3.93 equipment, and tralnl ng programs.

procedures, equipment, and training programs.

(CLl} 68.1 use operating experience to understand equipment, operational 2

6 6

4.29 (CLl} 68.1 use operating experience to understand equipment, I 2

6 5

4.00 and industry challenges and adopt newldeas.

operational and industry challenges and adopt new ideas.

(CL2} 75. Leaders value the Insight and perspective provided through (CL2} 75. Leaders value the insight and perspective provided 3

2 10 4.47 2

2 11 4.60 assessments.

t hrough assessments.

(CL3) 76. NCNR uses benchmarki~ as an avenue to acquire innova1ive (CL3} 76. NCN R uses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire 3

5 6

4.21 Ideas to Improve integrated safety.

5 5

5 4.00 innovative ideas to improve integrated safety.

(CL4}41. NCNR provides training and ensures knowledge (CL4) 41. NCNR provides traini~ and ensures knolNtedge transfer to t ransfer to maintain a knowledgeable, techni cal competent 1 1 4

5 4

3.67 maintain a knCM1ledgeabte, technical competent workforce.

2 4

5 4

3.73 workforce.

(CL4) 56.1 understand reactor operation fundamentals to 1

3 10 4.64 (CL4} 56. I understand reactor operations to establis h a solid fol.Kldation for I establis h a solid foundation for decisions and be haviors.

decisions and behaviors.

3 5

6 4.00 (CL4) 71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals 4

5 6

4.13 (CL4} 71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals value and seek value and seek continuous learning opportunities.

continuous learning opponuiities.

3 5

6 4.21 0

5 10 15 20 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Ag,ee Strongly Agree Average Strongly Disagree Disagree Neit he r Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Aver

Page 93 of 174 2024 2025 Problem Identification and Resolution Reactor Engineering (Pl.1} 50. I ensure issues, problems, degraded conditions and near misses are promptly reported and documented in 1

7 7

the corrective action program.

(Pl.1} 62.1 recognize deviations from standards.

1 8

5 (Pl.2} 69. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems to ensure 3

7 that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions.

(Pl.2) 70. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems for 2

8 underlying organizational and safety culture contributors.

(Pl.3} 18. NCNR takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety I 5

5 significance.

(Pl.4) 77. NCNR uses performance indicators to monitor both equipment and organizational performance, including 2

5 5

integrated safety culture.

4.40 4.29 5

4.13 5

4.20 4

3.73 1

3.38 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average Problem Identification and Resolution Reactor Engineering

( P 1.1} 50. I identify and ensure issues, problems, d egrad e d c onditions and n ear miss are promptly r e porte d and doc ume nte d in the c orrective a ction program.

(Pl.l} 62. I r eco gnize deviations from standards.

( P 1.2} 69. NCN R t horoughly evaluates problems to 3

ensure that r esolutions address causes and extent of 2

conditions.

(Pl.2} 70. NCNR t horoug hly evaluates problems for unde rlyin g organizationa I and safety c ulture contributors.

(Pl.3) 18. NCNR takes effective corrective act ions to address i ssu es in a timely manne r, comme nsurate with their safety significance.

(Pl.4} 77. NCN R u ses p erforman ce indicators to monitor both equipme n t and organizational periormance, including integrated safety culture.

4 2

0 I

11 I

4 8

6 7

7 8

5 6

4 3

6 5

10 4.79

4. 33 4.53 4.13 3.87 15

• Strongly Disagree Disagree N e ither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 20 Averag~

Page 94 of 174 2024 2025 Environment for Raising Concerns Environment for Raising Concerns Reactor Engineering Reactor Engineering (RC.1} 15. C la ims of h arassment, intim idation, retaliatio n, and 4

2 5

4_09 d iscrimin ation a re Investigated.

(RC.1} 15. Claims of harassment, intimidation. retaliation, and I I

discrimination are investigated.

2 3

7 4 _15 (RC.l} 23. Leaders take ownership w h en recel1,1ing and r esp onding to concerns, recognizing confiden tiality if 2

8 5

4_2 jRC.1} 23. Leaders take OYJnership when receiving and respondingto a p p ro priate a nd e n s uring t he con cerns a re adequ ately addressed in a t ime ly m a n ner.

concerns, recognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensll'ing the 6

8 4_57 concerns are adequately addressed in a timely ma mer.

(RC.1} 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns with ou t fear of retributi on a n d w it h confidence that the ir concern s w ill be 1

4 10 4_6 addl'essed.

(RC.1) 29. lfreely raise integrated safety concerns without fear of 1

2 11 I

4-71 retribution and 'Mith confidence that their concerns 'Mill be addressed.

(RC.2) 16. N C N R has a p rocess for r ais ing and resolv ing 1

4 3

7 4_07 concerns t hat i s indepe nden t of line-ma nageme nt influe n ce.

(RC.2} 16. NCNR has a process for raising and resolving cone ems that is independent of line-management influence.

2 4

9 4_33 Stron gly D isagree Disagree N eit he r Agree or Di sagree Agree Strongl y Agree Average I S1rongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average 0

5 10 15 20

Page 95 of 174 2024 2025 2024 2025 Work Processes Reactor Engineering (WP.l} 54. Wo,k is effectively planned and executed by incorporating risk-informed Insights.

(lf.lP.l} 72. NCNR implements thew<>fkmanagement process (planning, controlling and executing WOl"k activities} such that Integrated safety Is the overriding priority.

(WP.2) 52.. Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and changed ontywlth great thought and care.

(WP.2) 53. Safety-related equipment Is oi>erated and rnalntalnedwtthln design requirements.

(WP.3) 49. NCNR facility activities are governed by colT1)rehenSNe high-quality programs, processes, and procedures.

(WP.3) 55. NCNR creates and malnto11lns complete, 11ccurate and up-to-date documentation,

('WP.4) 25. I Ulderstandand use hll'llan errOf reducliontechnlques, s.uch as self-check, STAR, and pre-job briefs.

(WP A) 3a I follow processes, procedures, and wo,k instructions. -

Stro~y Disagree Dis.agree Neither 3/4§ee or Dis.agree 4

6 1

Stronely Agree Average The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the last survey in 2023.

Reactor Engineering Average 4.21 Strongly Agree 6

Agr ee 5

N e ither Agree or Di sagr ee 3

Disagree St rongly Disagree 3.47 4-33 4.33 4.00 3.53 2.67 4.27 4.53 Work Processes Reactor Engineering (WP.1} 54. Work is effective ly planne d a nd executed by Incorporat ing ri sk-inf o rmed Ins igh ts.

(WP.1} 72. N CNR imple m e n ts t h e work m a n agemen t process (planning, controlling and executing work activit ies) such that integr ated safety is t h e overriding priorit y.

(WP.2) 52. D esig n and ope ra ting ma rgins are car efully guarded and c hanged only with g reat t hough t a n d car e.

(WP.2) 53. Safety-re l ated equipment Is operated and maintaine d w ithin d esig n re quirements.

(WP.3) 49. N C N R facility activities are governed by 3

1 1 2

2 compre h e n sive hig h -quality program s, processes, and 1

3 proce dures.

3 7

13 5

9 8

11 5

(WP.3) 55. NCN R c r eates and rnaint alns complete, accurate a nd up-to -date documentation.

2 s _~_.,3 _

(WP.4) 25. I unde r sta nd and u se human error r e duction techniques, s u c h as self-ch eck, STAR, and pre-Job briefs.

(WP.4) 38. I follow processes, procedures, and work instructi o n s.

0 6

3 9

11 5

1 0 4

15

• Strongly Disagree D isagr ee N elth e r A gree or Di sagree

• A gree Strongly Agree The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the survey in 2023.

Reactor Engineering Ave rage 4.64 Strongly Agree 10 Agree 3

N e it h er Agree or Disagree 1

D isagree Strongly Disa g r ee 0

2 4

6 8

10 4.40 4.53 4.73 4.60 4.00 3.60 4.60 4.67 12

Page 96 of 174 Attachment 14: Survey Data for Health Physics Health Physics 2024-2025 Comparison 2024 2025 Continuous Learning Health Physics (CL l} 67. Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to facility processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs.

(CLl} 68.1 use operating experience to understand equipment, operational and industry challenges and adopt new ideas.

(CL2) 75. leaders value the insight and perspective provided through assessments.

2 2

6 4

(CL3} 76. NCNR uses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire innovative ideas to improve integrated saiety.

2 2

3 4

(CL4) 41. NCNR provides training and ensures kno~edge transfer to rnalntain a knowledgeable, technical cornpetent workforce.

3 3

2 (CL4} 56.1 understand reactor operations to establish a solid foundation for decisions and behaviors.

(CL4} 71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals value and seek continuous teaming opponunities.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Disagree 4

3 4

Agree 3

3.73 4

4.00 4

4.18 4

3.82 3

3.45 2

3.60 6

4.36 Strongty Agree Average Continuous Learning Health Physics (CL1) 67_ Ope rat:lnge xp e rl e n ce I s effect:lve ly imple m e nt:e d and inst:it:ut:ionali ze d t:hrough changes t: o f aclllt:y processes, procedures, e quipme nt:, and tra ining pro g ram s.

(C L1) 68-I use operat:ing experience t:o underst:and e quipme n t:, ope rational and lndust:rychaHe n ges and adopt n ew ideas.

(C L2) 75. Lea d ers value the Ins ig ht: and p e r s p ective provided t:hrough assess m e n ts.

(C L3) 76_ NCNR uses benchmarking as an avenue t:o acquire lnnovat:lve Ideas t:o Improve lnt:egrat:e d safet:y_

(CL4) 41-NCNR provldest:ralning and e nsures knowledge t:ransfert:o m a intain a knowledgeable, t:echnical compet:e nt: workforce.

(C L 4) 56. I unde r stand r eactor operation 2

2 2

2 2

5 2

fundament:als t:o est:ablish a solid foundat:ion for 1

3 d ec isions and b e haviors_

(CL4) 71_ Leaders foster an e nvironme n t In which individuals value and seek c ont:inuous learning opportuniti es_

0 2

2 3

3 2

4 4

2 6

• Strongly Disag r ee Disagree N e it:he r Agree or Disagree Agree 6

3.92 8

4.50 5

3.92 5

4_00 6

3.67 8

4_59 6

4 _33 8

1 0 12 1 4 16 St:rong ly Agree Ave ra g

Page 97 of 174 2024 2025 Effective Safety Communications Healthy Physics (CO.1) 4. Integrated safety is discussed at every meeting where plant work 6

activities are planned and reviewed.

(C0.2} 21. leaders ensure that 1he basis for operational and <<ga~zauon-,1 2

4 decisions Is corrmunlcated In a timely manner.

(C0.2) 59. Leaders encourage Individuals to ask questions If they do not 5

understand the basis of operational and management decisions.

(C0.3) 35.1 communicate openly and candidly with oversight, audit, and 4

regulatory organizations.

(CO.3} 74. Leaders respond to me In an open, honest and non-defensive 4

mamer.

(CO.4}40. Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that 4

integrated safety is the organization's overriding priority.

(CO.4) 61. leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand eY.pected 2

4 behaviors and actions necessary to maintain Integrated safely.

St,o~ty Disagree Disagree Neither Agree 01 Disagree Agree 4.27 3.91 4.36 4.45 4A5 4.09 5

4.27 Stror'lgly Agree Average Effective Safety Communications Health Physics (CO.l} 4. Integrated safety is discussed at every meeting 7

4 whe re plant work activities are planned and reviewed.

(CO.2} 21. Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and 2 2

6 organizational decisions is communicated in a t imely manner.

(CO.2} 59. Leade rs encourage individuals to ask questions if t hey do not understand the basis of operational and 4

7 management decisions.

(CO.3} 35. I communicate openly and candidly with oversight, 3

8 a udit, and regulatory organizations.

(CO.3} 74. Leaders respond to me in an open, honest and non-3 2

7 defensive manner.

(CO.4} 40. Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce t he expectation that integrated safety is t he organization's 4

2 6

overriding priority.

(CO.4} 61. Leaders ensure supplemental personnel unde rsta nd expected behaviors and actions necessary to 2

2 6

maintain integrated safety.

0 2

4 6

8 10 12 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neit he r Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 4.25 3.75 4.50 4.58 4.33 4.17 4.18 14 Averag

Page 98 of 174 2024 2025 Decision-Making Health Physics (DM.1} 43.1 use a consistent, systematic approach to making decisions.

(DM.l} 47. When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders re*evatuate these decisions to ensure they remain appropriate and adjust as needed.

(OM.2) 3. Leaders apply a conservative approach to decision making.

particularly when information is Incomplete or conditions are unusual.

(OM.2} 46.1 use decision-makjng practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply atlO\i\lable.

(DM.3) 44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

1 1

2 4

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 4

4 5

4.18 6

4.45 4

5 4.27 3

6 4.36 5

4.10 Strongly Agree Average Decision-Making Health Physics (DM.l} 43.1 use a consistent, systematic approach to making decisions.

( DM.1) 47. When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate these decisions to ensure they remain appropliate and adjust as needed.

( DM.2} 46. I use decision-making pract ices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable.

( DM.2} 63. Leaders apply a conservative approach to decision making, particularly when information is incomplete, or conditions are unusual.

(DM.3} 44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

1 1 2

4 3

3 2

4 6

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 7

4.50 8

4.58 7

4.33 8

4.58 6

3.92 8

10 12 14 16 Strongly Agree Average

Page 99 of 174 2024 2025 Leadership Safety Values and Actions Health Physics (IAl) 13. leade,uirl$rne that pe,~mel, tool.5,, e(Jllpment,proeed,us and othe, reilQUl'~e m11te1"i11b.:tie 11Vallable 11nd adequate to Sl4)1)(111 ln~grated sa1o1tty.

ILA.2)22. Chie!s aodCrewCh~s eneoor;ige inloonal leaders (oo,r~1pervlso,s)1omodel sa'e bet-.vlois and high standards ol accovrobibty.

(LA.2) 17. Leadersfromall le...els In 1he orpnlza.lonare lrwolvedln o...er..lght of woikaetMtle!..

(lA.2) 19. Chiefs. CrewChlels. Lead!. andS'4)ervlSOt$ensore supeM$<<yand marogemen1 ~r!,lght of cont1actorsand wpplemental persome!wo,kactl\41les, s.uchth.lt lotegra:ed safel't IS SI.C)l)Orted.

(tA.3) 12. Leader..provilk locen:IW:s, sanctloo:.. arld rewl11ds !hat are aUghedwi1hNCNRlmepa1ed safety policlu and,eln1oo:e beh.l'tiOJSandOtAcomes that re!tr<:t safety 1s tMowiridingprlorl:y.

ILA.3)34. Chlels Md Crew Chiefs rewaid lodM<t.illswho Identify and ral$e lmies a'fe-:tlng the Integrated r.afetY~-

( LAA) 9- ~a cicrs enw-e NCNR facillW pilofltles a, e aligned to rcfle(1 l111es,ated S3fety as the oven ldiog priority.

(1..A.4) 20. Chle1/4. and CrewChielsdewlop and ~ll!ffll!ll{ cosl and !oehl!OJle goals In amannl!r tha1 reln1orces1helmportanc:eollnteg.-ated5afety.

(LA.5) 26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs antkip.lle, manage and comm"11cate 1he effects ol lnlpendlng cM"4io1JS..

HA.5) 33. lt:ad,ersu~ a sy~tematlc Pf<>Cess !or evMu11tirt11ndiml}lemtm cMr"lge soth.>t imepated safety rffll-'lm !he o.-enlclngprlorlty.

(lA-6} 6.1.eaders en~e roles, responslbllltles_ and att.ho1ltlnare clear1yde'lned,understood and docume:ntedtoprorn<<elntes,iltedW,ny.

(lA.6)48. Co~,e governance,,~ew boards. and Independent o,;er~sh o,ganlza1lol'l$ wlll)On the Direc1or'sullima:e 1es4>om,ibillty forde(lsk>l'l$1ffect1ngruclea..safe1y.

jlA.7}80. Leadersconstantlyscrutlnlt,e nuctursa!etythrou&f\avarietyo!monltorlogtechntque~

lnclu(l!llass,essmentsofnuclearsaf,etycultue.

(lA.6)8. l.,eadi:!1s uhlbh beM.40!$ th111 s,et the stMCbrd for lnteS,ilted5alety, (LA6) 24. le~dcrs"wJlktMtillk",modelif"I co11ect bt:ha,40tswhen ruol~

app:11ent con'llct$between lnt,egra1eds.111etyandlacllhyavallabMhy.

Stfoll,iyDlsas,ee Olsagree NeltherAgreeorOlsasree A&ree Strof'E:lyAgree Average 3.82 3.64 4.27 4.18 4.09 3A5 4.00 4.16 3.90 3.73 3.64 4.00 4.10 4.18 3.89 Leadership Safety Values and Actions Health Physics (LA.1) 13. Leaders ensure that persomel, tools, equipment, procedU""eS and other rewurce materials areava ilableandadequatetosuppon integratedsafety.

(LA.1) Exi. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs enSll"e staffing levels are consistent with the demands related to malntainlngsafetyandrellabiUty.

(LA.2) 17. Leaders from all levels in the organization are irwolved in oversight of work activities.

(LA.2) 19. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, leads and S14>ervisors ensure supelViSOfY and management oversight ofcontractorsand supplementalpersonnel work actMties, stJChthat integratedsafety issl,l)ported.

(LA.2) 22. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs encourage Informal leaders (non*supervlsors} to model sale behaviorsandhighstandardsofaccollltabi!ity.

(LA.3)12.Leaders provideincentives,sanctions, andrewa rdsthat area Ligne dwithNCNRintegrated safetypoLiclesandrelnforcebehaviorsandoutcomesthat reftectsafetyastheoverrldlng priorlty.

j LA.3} 34. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs reward indivicllals who identify and raise issues affecting the integratedsafety policy.

jLA.4)9.Leadersensu-eNCNR facllityprlorltiesareallgnedtoreftectlntegratedsaferyasthe overriding priority.

I LA.4} 20. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs develop and ilTl)lement cost and schedule goals in a manner that reinforcestheimponanceofintegratedsafety.

j LA.5} 26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs anticipate, manage and commlllicatethe effects ol impending changes.

(LA.SJ 33. Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and Implement change so that Integrated saletyremainstheovenidingprlority.

(LA.6)6. l..eadersenS1Xe roles, responsibiUties,andauthoritiesareclearlydefined,understoodand documentedtopromoteintegratedsafety.

(lA6) 48. Corporate governance, review boards, and Independent oversight organizations support theDi rector'slitimate responsibilityfor decisionsaffecting ntJClearsaiety.

jLA.7)80.L.eadersconstantlyscrutinizenuclearsafetythrooghavarletyofrnonitorlngtedVJief..JeS, inclucingassessmentsofntJClearsafetycul!u-e.

1 1

(LA.8)8.L.eadersexhibitbehaviorsthatsetthestandardlorintegratedsafety.

1 1

(LA8)24. Leaderswalkthetalk", modellngcorrectbeha.4orsv.tienresolvlngapparentcon!llcts betweenintegratedsafetyandfaci!ityavailabitity.

Strongly Dlsas,ee Disagree Neither Atfee or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 10 Average 3.92 3.42 4.25 4.36 4.25 3.67 3.75 4.25 4.17 3.92 3.82 4.08 4.08 4.00 4.33 4.25 12 14 16

Page 100 of 174 2024 2025 Personal Accountability Health Physics (PA.1) 5.1 clearly understand the importance of adherence to integrated safety standards.

(PA.1} 10. 1 am accountable for shonfalls in meeting integrated safety standards/behaviors.

(PA.2} 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, encourage teamwork and identify challenges to integrated safety.

(PA.2) 14. I ensure that I am trained and qualified to perform assigned work.

(PA.2} 39. I actively participate in pre-job briefings, understanding 1 1 4

my responsibilities to raise integrated safety concerns before work 1

2 begins.

(PA.3) 73. I communicate and coordinate my activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure integrated safety is 3

maintained.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 4

5 3

2 Agree 9

4.64 6

4.18 6

4.36 5

4.27 5

4.09 6

4.27 Strongly Agree Average Personal Accountability Heath Physics (PA. l} 5. I clearly understand th e importance of 2

9 4.67 adherence t o integrated safety standards.

(PA. l) 10. I am accountable for shortfalls in m eeting 3

3 6

4.25 integrated safety standards/behavio rs.

(PA.2) 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, encourage teamwork 3

8 4.50 and ident ify challenges to integrated safety.

(PA.2} 14. I e nsure that I am trained and qualified to 1

1 10 4.67 perform assigned work.

(PA.2)39. I actively participate in pre-job briefings, understa nding my responsibilit ies to raise integrated 1

1 10 4.75 safety concerns before work b egins.

(PA.3} 73. I communicate and coordinate my activities w ithin and across organizational boundaries to ensure 2

3 6

4.08 integrated safety is maintained.

0 2

4 6

8 10 12 14 16 Strongly Disagree Disagree N eit her Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 101 of 174 2024 2025 Problem Identification and Resolution Health Physics (Pl.1} 50. I ensure issues, problems, degraded conditions and near misses a re promptly re ported and documented in t he 2

corrective action program.

(Pl.1} 62.1 recognize devi ations from standards.

(Pl.2} 69. NCN R thoroughly evaluates problems to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of condit ions.

IPl.2) 70. NCNRthoroughlyevaluates problems for underlying organi zat ional and safety culture contributors.

(Pl.3) 18. NCNR t akes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance.

(Pl.4) 77. NCNR uses performance indicators to monitor both equipment and organizational perlonnance, including integrated safety culture.

3 2

2 3

4 3

4 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 4.09 4.09 4.00 4.10 3.91 3.67 Average Problem Identification and Resolution Health Physics (P l.1} 50. I ide ntify and ens ure issues, problem s, degrade d conditions and near miss are prompt ly reported a nd documented in the corrective action program.

(Pl. l} 62. I recognize deviations from standards.

(Pl.2} 69. NCNR t horoughly evaluates pro blem s to ensure t hat resolutions a ddress causes and extent of conditio ns.

(Pl.2} 70. NCNR tho ro ughly evaluates proble m s for underlying organi zational a nd safety culture contributors.

(Pl.3} 18. NCNR takes effective c orrective actions to address issues in a timely manner, commensurate with t heir safety significa nce.

(Pl.4 } 77. NCNR uses performa nce indic ators to monitor both equipment and o rganizational periom,ance, including integrated safety culture.

1 1

3 4

3 3

,1 2

5 2

I 4

4 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neithe r Agree or Disagree Agree 4.33 4.17 4.25 4.17 4

3.75 3.92 8

10 12 14 16 Strongly Agree Average

Page 102 of 174 2024 2025 Questioning Attitude Health Physics (QA.1} 51. Leaders ensures that actl\4tles that could affect reactivity are conducted YVith particular care, caution, 011erslght, and in accordance with procedures.

(QA.1} 57. I recognize the special characteristics and t.r1lque haiards oi nuclear technology.

(QA.2) 81.1 stop W0r'kactlvlties when confronted with an unexpected condition.

(QA.2} 58. l maintain a questioning attitude du*lng pre-job briefs/job-site reviews to ldemify and resolve unexpected conditions.

(QA.2} 60.1 promptly challe~e unanticipated test resvhs or unexpected system response rather than rationalize them.

6(QA.3} 4.1 challenge assumptions/offer opposing views Y!.-hen I think something is not correct.

(QA.3) 45. Leaders solicit challenges to assurnptions when evaluating Integrated safety issues.

(QA.4)37.1 perform a thorough review of the work site and planned activity every time work is performed.

(QA.4) 65. 1 avoid complacency and plan fOf' the possibility of rnistakes.

4 1

1 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 6

3 4

Agree 10 4.91 4.64 4.60 5

4.18 7

4.45 5

4.27 4

4.27 4

4.00 5

4.27 Stror~ly Agree Average Questioning Attitude Health Physics (QA.1) 51. Leaders ensure t hat activities that could affect reactivity are conducted with particular care, caution, oversight, 2

2 8

4.50 and in accordance with procedures.

(QA.1) 57.1 recognize the special characteristics and unique 3

9 4.75 hazards of nucleartechnology.

(QA.2) 58.1 maintain a questioning attitude during pre-job briefs/job-site reviews to identify and resolve unexpected 2

10 4.83 conditions.

(QA.2} 60. I promptly challenge unanticipated test results or unexpected system responses rat her t han rationalize them.

2 3

7 4.42 (QA.3) 45. Leaders solicit challenges to assumptions when 2

7 4.27 evaluat ing integrated safety issues.

(QA.3) 64. I challenge assumptions and offer opposing views 2

9 4.67 when I t hink something is not correct.

(QA.4} 37. I perionned a thorough review of the work site and 2

3 6

3.92 planned activity every time work is performed.

(QA.4} 65. I avoid complacency and ptan forthe possibility of 2

4 6

4.33 mistakes.

2 4

10 12 14 16 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neit her Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 103 of 174 2024 2025 Environment for Raising Concerns Health Physics (RC.1} 15. Cla ims of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discrimination are investigated.

(RC.I) 23. leader.. 1ake ov,,nership when receiving and responding t o concerns, re cognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensurif" the concerns are adequate ly adCl'"essed In a timely manner.

( RC. l} 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns without fear of retribution and with confidence that their concerns wilt be addressed.

(RC.2) 16. NCNR has a process for raising and resolving concerns that ls independent of line-management influence.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Di sagree Agree 3.70 4.36 4.36 4

4.09 Strongly Agree Average Environment for Raising Concerns Health Physics (RC.1} 15. Claims of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discrimination are investigated.

I RC.1) 23. Leaders take ownership when receiving and responding to concerns, recognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensuring the concerns are adequately addressed in a timely manner.

I RC.1) 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns without fear of retribution and with confidence that their concerns will be addressed.

( RC.2} 16. NCNR has a process for raising and resolving concerns that is independent of line-management influence.

2 0

4 2

2 2

4 6

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 7

4.25 8

4.50 9

4.42 7

3.75 8

10 12 14 16 18 Strongly Agree Average

Page 104 of 174 2024 2025 Respectful Work Environment Health Physics (WE.1) 7. Leaders regard individuals ard their professional capabilities and experiences as Its most valuable asset.

(WE.1} 28. I treat other employees with dignity and respect.

(WE.1} 42. I treat decision-makers with respect, even when I disagree with a decision.

(WE.2) 30. 1 am encouraged to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions.differing opinions and c,.,estions to help Identify and solve problems.

(WE2} 31. Oifferins opinions are welcomed and respected.

WE.2) 78. I value the Insights and perspectives provtded by quality ass11ance, the employee concerns programs and Independent oversight organizations.

(WE.3} 27. Leaders promote coUaboratlon among WOfk gro'-'>S-1 1

(WE.3} 32. Chiefs. Crew Chiefs. Leads and Supervisors respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.

(WE.3) 36. Leaders share important information in an open, honest and timely mamer such th.it trU5t is maintained 4

4 Stror~ty Disagree Disagree Neither/Wee or Disagree 4.18 4.64 4.09 4.00 4.55 4.27 4.18 4.09 Strongly Agree Average Respectful Work Environment Health Physics (WE.1) 7. Leaders re gard individuals and their professional capabilities and experiences as its most valuable asset.

(WE.1) 28. I treat otheremployeeswith dignity and respect.

(WE.1) 42. I treat decision-makers with r espect, even when I disagree with a decision.

(WE.2) 30. I am en c ouraged to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions. differing opinions and questions to help identify and solve problems.

(WE.2} 31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected.

(WE.2) 78. I value the insights and p erspectives provided by quality assurance, t h e employee con cerns programs and independen t oversight organizations.

(WE.3) 27. Leaders promote c ollaboration among work groups.

(WE.3) 32. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest (WE.3} 36. Leaders share important information in an open, honest and timely manner such that trust is maintained.

3 2

1 0

2 3

4 3

5 2

1 3

2 4

2 4

Strongly Disagree Disagree N either Agree or Disagree Agree 6

6 4.17 9

4.75 8

4.67 8

4.58 6

4.42 8

4.50 6

4.00 9

4.67 7

4.50 8

10 12 14 16 Strongly Agree.

Average

Page 105 of 174 2024 2025 2024 2025 Work Processes Health Physics (WP.1) 54. Wo1kis effectlvetyplamed and executed by incorporating 1lsk-lnformed Insights.

('h'P.l) 72. NCNR lm~emems the wo,*k management process (planning, controlling and e;,,:ecutlng wo,k activities} such that Integrated safety is the overrldine pri0f'i1Y-(WP.2) 52. Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and changed only with great thought and care.

(WP.2) 53. Safety-related ecaulpment Is operated and malmalned 'Within design reqtirements.

(WP.3} 49. NCNR faclUty activities are governed by co01)rehensive high-quality programs, processes, and procecl-.ires.

(WP.3} 55. NCNR creates and malntalrls complete, accunue and up-to-date documentation.

(WP.4) 25. I t.nderstand and use human error reduction techniques, such as self-check, STAR, and pre-lob b1lefs.

4AO 3.91 4.09 6

4.50 3.73 3.60 3.60 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Aqee or Disagree Agree Stro~ly Agree Average The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the Last survey in 2023.

Health Physics Average 4.3 3 Strongly Agree 5

Agree 2

N e it her Agree or Di sagree 2

D isagree Stro ngly D isagree Work Processes Health Physics (WP.1} 54. Work is effective ly planned and executed by incorporating risk-i nformed insights.

(WP.1} 72. NCN R impl.ements th e work management p rocess (planning, controlling and executing work activities} such that Integrated safety Is the overriding priority.

(WP.2} 52. Design and o perating margins a re carefully guarded and changed only wit h great t ho ught a nd care.

(WP.2} 53. Safety-related equipment Is operated and ma intained within design re quirements.

(WP.3} 4 9. NC NR faci lity activities are governed by comprehensive high -qua lity programs, processes, an d procedures.

(WP.3} 55. NCNR creates and maintains complete, accurate and up-to-date documentation.

(WP.4} 25. I un derstand and use human error redu ction techniques, such as self-check, STAR, and pre-job briefs.

(WP.4 } 38. I follow processes, procedures, and work Instructions.

2 4

4 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 10 Strongly Agree The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the survey in 2023.

Health Physics Average 4.08 Strongly Agree

~

Agree 1

Neit her Agree or Disagree 5

Disagree 0

Strongly Disagree 0

0 1

2 3

4 5

6 4.17 4.17 4.33 4.25 3.92 4.00 4.50 4.58 12 14 Average 6

7

Page 106 of 174 5: Survey Data for Aging Reactor Management ARM 2024-2025 Comparison 2024 2025 Continuous Learning ARM (CLl} 67. Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to facility processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs.

(CLl} 68.1 use operating experience to understand equipment, operational and industry challenges and adopt new ideas.

(CL2} 75. Leaders value the insight and perspective provided through assessments.

(CL3} 76. NCNR uses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire innovative ideas to improve integrated safety.

(CL4) 41. NCNR provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technical competent workforce.

(CL4) 56.1 understand reactor operations to establish a solid foundation for decisions and behaviors.

(CL4) 71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals value and seek continuous learning opportunities.

3 1

1 2

2 3

2 3

2 4

4 3

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 4

7 6

3 4

2 4

4 Strongly Agree 3.90 4.70 4.56 3.80 3.50 4.10 4.20 Average Continuous Learning ARM ICLl) 67. Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to facility processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs.

(CLl) 68. 1 use operating experience to understand equipment, operational and industry challenges and adopt new ideas.

(CL2) 75. Leaders value the insight and perspective provided through assessments.

(CL3} 76. NCNR uses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire imovative ideas to improve integrated safety.

(CL4) 41. NCNR provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technical competent workforce.

(CL4) 56.1 understand reactor operation fundamentals to establish a solid foundation for decisions and behaviors.

ICL4) 71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals value and seek continuous learning opportunities.

4 4

4 4

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 4

3.75 4.00 4.13 4.50 3.88 4.13 3.75 10 12 Stro",ly Agree Average

Page 107 of 174 2024 2025 Effective Safety Communications ARM (CO.1} 4. Integrated safety is discussed at every meeting where plant work activities are planned and revi ewed.

2 3

(CO.2) 21. Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and organizational decisions is communicated in a timely manner.

2 6

(CO.2) 59. Leaders encourage individuals to ask questions If they do not understand the basis of opera1ional and 3

management decisions.

(CO.3) 35.1 communicate openly and candidly with oversight, audit, and regulatory organizations.

3 7

(C0.3} 74. Leaders respond to me in an open, honest and non-2 7

defensive manner.

(CO.4) 40. Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that integrated safety is the organization's 4

overriding priority.

(CO.4) 61. Leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand ex1>ected behaviors and actions necessary to maintain 5

integrated safety.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 5

4.30 2

3.80 6

4.50 4.70 4.60 5

4.40 4

4.30 Strongly Agree Average Effective Safety Communications ARM (C0.1} 4. Integrated safety is discussed at every meeting where 6

plant work activities are planned and reviewed.

ICO.2} 21. Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and 2

3 organizational decisions is communicated in a timely manner.

IC0.2) 59. Leaders encourage individuals to ask questions if they do not understand the basis of operational and management 4

decisions.

(CO.3) 35.1 communicate openly and candidly with oversight, 7

audit, and regulatory organizations.

(CO.3} 74. Leaders respond to me in an open, honest and non-6 defensive manner.

(CO.4} 40. Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that integrated safety is the organization's overriding 4

priority.

(CO.4} 61. Leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand expected behaviors and actions necessary to maintain integrated 5

safety.

0 2

4 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 2

4.25 2

3.75 4

4.50 4.88 4.63 4

4.50 2

4.13 6

8 10 12 Strongly Agree Average

Page 108 of 174 2024 2025 Decision-Making ARM (DM.1) 43. I use a consistent, systematic approach to making decisions.

(DM.1) 47. When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate these decisions to ensure they remain appropriate and adjust as needed.

(DM.2) 3. Leaders apply a conservative approach to decision making, particularly when information is incomplete or conditions are unusual.

(DM.2) 46.1 use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable.

(OM.3) 44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

4 3

3 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 4.60 7

4.70 4.50 4

4 4.10 5

3 4.00 Agree Strongly Agree Average Decision-Making ARM (DM.1} 43.1 use a consistent, systematic approach to making decisions.

(DM.1} 47. When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate these decisions to ensure they remain appropriate and adjust as needed.

(DM.2} 46.1 use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable.

IDM.2} 63. Leaders apply a conservative approach to decision making, particularly when information is incomplete, or conditions are unusual.

I DM.3} 44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

3 0

2 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 5

6 4

4 Agree 3

4.38 5

4.63 2

4.25 5

4.5 2

4.00 6

8 10 12 Strongly Agree Average

Page 109 of 174 2024 2025 Leadership Safety Values and Actions ARM (LA. l) 13. leaders el15Ure 1hat persom el, tools, e(JJipmem, procedires and other resource materials are avallabte and adequate to suppon lmegrated safety.

(LA.l) 66. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs en:.u-e staffl~ levels are consls1en1 with the demands relatedtomalmalnlngsaletyand reUabUity.

(LA.2) 17. Leaders from all level s In the <<ganization are Involved in oversight of work activities.

(LA.2) 19. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and S1.4>ervlsors ensure supeivlsory and management over!dght of contractors and supplemental personnel workactMtles, wch that Integrated...

(LA.2) 22. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs encourage Informal leaders (non-supervisors) to model safe beha>Aors and high standards of accoi.ntability.

~:!a~!~ l:~e:;::e:eal:::~:~:=::;sa~::::c:::~~t;~::::'i: ~~t:...._ 3 (LA.3) 34. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs rewa,d lndMdua!swho Identify and raise Issues affecting the integrated safety policy.

(lA.4} 9. Leaders en~e NCNR facility priorities are aligned to reflect Integrated safety as the oveu idini! priority.

(LAA) 20. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs dew,top and Implement cost and schedule goals In a manner that reinforces the Importance of Integrated safety.

(LA.5) 26. Chief:. and Crew Chiefs anticipate, manage and cornm...-iicate the effects of impendlr@ changes.

(LAS) 33. Leaders use a systematic processfore¥aluatlngandlmplement change so that integrated safety remains the oven idiog priority.

(lA.6) 6. Leaders ensi.e roles, responsibilities, and alJ!.horhles are clearty defined, undel'stood and documented to promote Integrated safety.

(LA.6) 48. Corporate governance, re..,ew boards, and Independent O',lerslght organizations suppon the Direetor's ultimate responsibility for decisions ;:iffecting nuclear safety.

(LA.7) 80. leaders constantly scmtlrize nuclear safetyttyough a variety of monitOl"lng tectvll(p.les, lnc!uclng assessments of nuclear safety cult i.e.

(tA.8} 8. Leaders exhibit beha\.'lors that set the standard for Integrated safety.

(LA.8) 24. leaders "walk the talk". modeling coirect beha\.'lorswhen resolving apparent conflicts between Integrated safety and faclUty a... aHablUty.

• Stro~ly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree N!fee Stronsly Agree A..,erage 4.11 3.70 4.10 3.80 4.00 3.90 3.70 4.40 3.60 3.70 3.60 3.90 4.30 4.56 4.20 4.10 Leadership Safety Value and Actions ARM (LA.1) 13. Lead e rse n s ure that personnel, tools. equ l1>rne nt, pmced...-es and other re eso.._.*ce rnate rlal e> are avaltable a nd adequate to,support Integrated safety

( LA.1) 66. C hiefs and Crew Chiefs e n e><Xe staffl r'f! levels are c onsistent with t h e d c tnandes re lated to m a intaini ng safety and re llnblllty (LA.2) 17. Lead ersfmm all levels In the organll'.ation are Involved In over.:lght o f wor'k (LA.2) 19. Chiefs. Crew C hiefs, Lead s,me.I Supervisor.: e n s ure s u1>e rvlso,y n nd manage m e n t ovenslgh t o f c ontrac to.-s and s upp* e m e n tal p e,so,u,..l ""Of"k actlvltlees.

such t h at Integrated safety Is supported.

j LA.2} 22. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs e n coun,ge lnfoo*mal leaders (non-supervlsorn)to mode l safe b e haviors and hig h standards of acco... ua blUty.

(LA.3) 1.2. Leaders1>rovlde Ince n tives, sanctions. and re,...,ards that are aligned with NCN R Integrate d safety polic ies and re lnf<wce b e hav lo,-e; and outcomes t hat re flect safety as th e ove,rldlng priority.

( LA.3} 34. Chiefs and c,-.,,..., Chiefs reward lndlvlduals""ho ide n tify and raise Issues affectin g th e Integrated s a fety poUcy.

(LA.4) 9. Leaders e n s...-e NCN Rfacilltyp,-lorlU es are aligne d to r eflect Integrated e,af ety "" the ove,r ldlng 1w lo r1 ty.

I LA.4) 20. Chiefs and Crew Chie fs d evelop and Implement c ost and sch edule goals In a manne l' t hat r e lnlor"cesthe lm1><><1an ce of lnt egrn ted safety.

( LA.SJ 26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs anticipate. manage and corromunlcate the effects of Impe nding c hm,gees

( LA.5) 33. Le aders u se a syste 1natlc p,-ocess for evaluatlns and Implement c hange

"° t hat Integra ted e,al ety re rn.~lne, t h e ovenl dln g p11o,lty.

(LA.6) 6. Leader s e n s...-e rolee>. r es ponslbllillee>. and Hulhodllesare clearlydeH r,..d.

undero.tood and documented to p,-ornote Integra ted safety.

( LA.6) 48. Co,pomte governance, revi e w boards. a nd Inde p e nde n t overnig h t organizations s upport the Director's ul t ima te responsibility for decisions affecting n ucl e ar s a fety

!LA.7)80. Leaders con stantly scrutinize nuc le ar safety t h rough a variety of monitoring t e c hniques, Including a s sessments of nucle ar safety c ult u.-,,.

(LA.BJ 8. Leaders exhibit b e havlOJ"s that set the standard for Integrate d safety.

(LA.8) 2 4. Leadere> " w,.lk t h e talk~, mode ling correct b e hHvlore> w h en r*ee,olvlng apparent c onflicts b et...,..,en integrated s a fety and facility a vailability.

• Stl'or'f!ly Dle>agree D isagree N eill,.., Agree or Disagree

• Agree Stron,sly Agree

Page 110 of 174 2024 2025 Personal Accountability ARM (PA.1} 5.1 clearly understand the importance of adherence to integrated safety standards.

(PA.1) 10. I am accountable for shortfalls in meeting integrated safety standards/behaviors.

(PA.2} 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, encourage teamwork and identify challenges to integrated safety.

(PA.2) 14. I ensure that I am trained and qualified to perform assigned work.

(PA.2} 39. I actively participate in pre-job bri efings, understanding my responsibiliti es to raise integrated safety concerns before work begins.

(PA.3) 73. I communicate and coordinate my activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure integrated safety is maintained.

4 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree 4.90 6

4.40 6

4.50 4.60 4.60 6

4.60 Strongly Agree Average Personal Accountability ARM (PA.l} 5. I clearly understand t h e importance of adherence to integrated safety standards.

2 (PA.l) 10. I am accountableforshortfalts in meeting integrated safety standards/behaviors.

(PA-2) 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, en courage teamwork and ident ify c hallenges to integrated safety.

(PA.2) 14. I ensure that I am trained and qualified to p erform assigned work.

(PA.2} 39. I actively participate in pre-job briefings, understanding my respon sibilities to raise integrated O

safety concerns before work begins.

(PA.3} 73. I communicate and coordinate my activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure integrated safety is maintained.

0 2

2 6

4 7

6 7

6 2

4 4.75 3

4.00 4.88 4.75 5.00 4.75 6

8 10 Strongly Disagree Disagree N either Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Ag ree 12 Average

Page 111 of 174 2024 2025 Problem Identification and Resolution ARM (Pl.1} 50.1 ensure issues, problems, degraded conditions and near misses are promptly reported and documented in the 4

5 corrective action program.

(Pl.1} 62. I recognize deviations from standards.

2 3

5 (Pl.2} 69. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions.

2 2

6 (Pl.2) 70. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems for underlying organizational and safety culture contributors.

4 5

(Pl.3} 18. NCNR takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety 2

3 5

significance.

(Pl.4} 77. NCNR uses performance indicators to monitor both equipment and organizational performance, including 1

2 4

2 integrated safety culture.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 4.56 4.30 4.40 4.40 4.30 3.50 Average Problem Identification and Resolution ARM (Pl.1)50. I identify and ensure issues, problems, degraded conditions and near miss are promptly reported and 4

3 documented in the corrective action program.

jPl.1) 62.1 recognize deviations from standards.

5 3

(PL2) 69. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions.

2 5

(Pl.2) 70. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems for underlying 2

organizational and safety culture contributors.

3 3

(Pl.3) 18. NCNR takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety 2

3 3

significance.

(Pl.4) 77. NCNR uses performance indicators to monitor both equipment and organizational performance, including 4

2 integrated safety culture.

0 2

4 6

4.25 4.38 4.38 4.13 4.13 2

3.75 8

10 12 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Average

Page 112 of 174 2024 2025 Questioning Attitude ARM (QA.1} 51. Leaders ensures that activities t hat could affect reactivity a re conducted with particular ca re, caution, ove rsight, and in accordance with procedures.

(QA.1) 57. I r ecognize t h e special cha racteristics and unique h azards of nucleartechno logy.

(QA.2) 58. I mainta in a questioning attitude during pre-job briefs/job-site reviews to Identify and resolve unexpected c onditions.

(QA.2) 60. I promptly c halle nge unant ic ipated test results or unexpected system response rather than rationalize t h e m.

(QA.2} 81.1 stop work activities when confronted with an unexpected condition.

6 (QA.3} 4. I c halle n ge assumptions/offer opposing views when I t hink something is not correct.

(QA.3} 45. Lead e rs s olicit c halle n ges to assumptions when evaluat ing integrated safety issu es.

(QA.4 } 37. I p erlonn a thorough review of the work s ite and planne d activity every time work is performe d.

(QA.4} 65. I avoid c omplace nc y and plan for t h e possibility o f mistakes.

3 2

1 1

2 Strongly Disagree Disagree N e it h e r Agree or Di sagree 3

3 3

2 5

8 7

6 6

6 8

5 3

6 5

Agree S trongly Agree 4.89 4.70 4.50 4.50 4.40 4.80 4.00 4.40 4.50 Average QuestioningAttitude ARM (QA.1) 51. Leaders ensure that activities that coU.d affect reactivity are conducted'Mth particular care, caution, oversight, and in accordaoce 'Mth... -

- ~--

\QA.1) 57. 1 recognize the special characteristics and t11ique hazards of nuclearteclTiology.

(QA.2) 58.1 maintain a questioning attitude during pre-job briefs/job-site reviews to identify and resolve une>t)ected conditions.

\QA.2) 60. I promptly challenge unanticipated test results or unexpected system responses rather than rationalize them.

(QA.3) 45. Leaders solicit challef"es to assumptions vi'hen evaluating integrated safety issues.

( QA.3) 64. I challenge assumptions and offer opposing views when I think something is not correct.

(QA.4) 37. I perionned a thorough re\.1ew of the work site and plamed activity every time work is performed.

(QA.4) 6.5.1 avoid complaceocy and plan for the possibility of mistakes.

• 4 4

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 4.5 4.63 4.86 4.75 4.25 4.5 4

4.5 10 12 Average

Page 113 of 174 2024 2025 Environment for Raising Concerns ARM (RC.1} 15. Claims of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discrimination are investigated.

(RC.1) 23. Leaders take ownership when receiving and responding to conce rns, recognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensuring the concerns are adequately addressed in a timely manner.

(RC.1} 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns without fear of retribution and with confidence that their concerns will be addressed.

(RC.2} 16. NCNR ha s a process for raising and resolving concerns that is independent of line-management influence.

3 2

2 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 3

8 6

Agree 5

4.44 5

4.30 4.80 3

4.20 Strongly Agree Average Environment for Raising Concerns ARM

( RC.1) 15. Claims of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discrimination are investigated.

( RC.l) 23. Leaders take ownership when receiving and responding to concerns, recognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensuring the concerns are adequately addressed in a t imely manner.

( RC.1) 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns w ithout fear of retribution and with confidence t hat t heir concerns will be addressed.

(RC.2} 16. NCNR has a process for raising and resolving concerns that is independent of line-management influence.

0 4

4 2

6 5

4 8

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 4.43 4.57 4.75 4.63 10 12 Average

Page 114 of 174 2024 2025 Respectful Work Environment ARM (WE.1) 7. Leaders regard individuals and their professional 4

capabilities and experiences as its most valuable asset.

(WE.l) 28. I treat other employees with dignity and respect.

3 (WE.1} 42. I treat decision-makers with respect, even when I disagree 2

with a decision.

(WE.2} 30. I am encouraged to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions, 9

differing opinions and questions to help identify and solve problems.

(WE.2} 31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected.

3 WE.2} 78. I value the insights and perspectives provided by quality assurance, the employee concerns programs and independent 3

oversight organizations.

(WE.3} 27. Leaders promote collaboration among work groups.

2 5

(WE.3} 32. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to 6

questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.

(WE.3} 36. Leaders share important informat ion in an open, honest 4

and timely manner such that trust is maintained.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neit her Agree or Disagree Agree 5

4.20 7

4.70 7

4.50 4.70 6

4.50 5

4.10 3

4.10 3

4.20 6

4.60 Strongly Agree Average Respectful Work Environment ARM (WE.l) 7. Leaders rega rd individuals and t h eir professional capabilities and experiences as its most valuable asset.

(WE.l) 28. I treat other employees w ith dignity and respect.

(WE.l) 42. I treat decision-makers w ith respect, even w h en I disagree w it h a decision.

(WE.2) 30. I am encouraged to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing opinions and questions to help identify and solve problems.

(WE.2) 31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected.

(WE.2} 78. I value the insights and perspectives provided by quality assurance, the employee concerns programs and independent oversight organizations.

(WE.3) 27. Leaders promote collaboration among work groups.

(WE.3) 32. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.

(WE.3} 36. Leaders share important information in an open, honest and timely manner such that trust is maintained.

2 5

4 5

4 3

3 2

4 4

4 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neit he r Agree or Disagree Agree 6

2 4.13 4.75 4

4.50 3

4.38 4

4.50 4

4.25 3

4.00 4

4.50 2

4.00 6

8 10 12 Strongly Agree Average

Page 115 of 174 2024 2025 2024 2025 Work Processes ARM (WP.l) 54. Work is effectively planned and executed by incorporating risk-informed insights.

(WP.1) 72. NCNR implements the work management process (ptanning, controlling and executing work activities) such that integrated safety is the overriding priority.

(WP.2) 52. Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and changed only with great thought and care.

(WP.2) 53. Safety-related equipment is operated and ma intained within design requirements.

(WP.3) 49. NCNR facility activities are governed by comprehensive high-quality programs, processes, and procedures.

(WP.3) 55. NCNR creates and maintains complete, accurate and up-to-date docurientatlon.

(W'P.4} 25. I understand and use human error reduction techniques, such as self-check, STAR, and pre-job briefs.

(WP.4) 38. I follow processes, procedures, and work instructions.

1 1

4 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 4.20 3.78 4.60 4.70 4

3.70 4.10 4.67 4.60 Agree Strongly Agree Average The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the last survey in 2023.

Ave.-age Strongly Agree Agr ee N e it h e.- Ag.-ee o.- Di sagree D isagr ee Stron gly D isagree ARM 2

4.22 4

3 Work Processes ARM (WP. 1} 54. Work is effectively planned and executed by incorporating risk-informed insights.

(WP.1} 72. NCNR implements the work management process (planning, controlling and executing work activities} such that integrated safety is the...

j\NP.2} 52. Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and changed only with great thought and care.

IWP.2} 53. Safety-related equipment is operated and maintained 'Mthin design requirements.

IWP.3} 49. NCNR fac ility activities are governed by comprehensive high-quality programs, processes, and procedures.

(WP.3} 55. NCNR creates and maintains complete, accurate and up-to-date documentation.

(WP.4) 25. I understand and use hLITlan error reduction techniques, such as self-check, STAR, and pre-job briefs.

(WP.4) 38. I follow processes, procedures, and work instructions.

4 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree or Disagree 4

4.00 4.13 4.50 4

4.50 3.63 4

3.38 4.75 4.63 4

10 Agree Strongly Agree Average The NCNR's Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the survey in 2023.

ARM Average 4.25 Strongly A g r ee 3

Agree 4

N either Agree or D i sagree 1

0 1

2 3

4 12 5

Page 116 of 174 6: Survey Data Comparison 2023 to 2024 to 2025 2023 QUESTIONS SCORE 2023 2024 QUESTIONS SCORE 2024 2025 Questions Score 2025 Q4. Safety is discussed at every meeting where plant work activities are planned and reviewed.

4.43 Q4. Integrated safety is discussed at every meeting where plant work activities are planned and reviewed.

4.11 Q4. Integrated safety is discussed at every meeting where plant work activities are planned and reviewed.

4.10 Q5. I am personally accountable for my nuclear safety culture behaviors.

4.68 Q 5. I clearly understand the importance of adherence to integrated safety standards.

4.79 Q 5. I clearly understand the importance of adherence to integrated safety standards.

4.77 Q6. Leaders clearly define roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountabilities to ensure nuclear safety.

4.00 Q6. Leaders ensure roles, responsibilities, and authorities are clearly defined, understood, and documented to promote integrated safety.

3.87 Q6. Leaders ensure roles, responsibilities, and authorities are clearly defined, understood, and documented to promote integrated safety.

4.02 Q7. Management regards individuals as their most valuable asset.

3.87 Q 7. Leaders regard individuals and their professional capabilities and experiences as their most valuable asset.

3.89 Q 7. Leaders regard individuals and their professional capabilities and experiences as their most valuable asset.

3.94 Q8. Leaders reinforce the focus on nuclear safety through site visits.

3.90 Q8. Leaders exhibit behaviors that set the standard for integrated safety.

3.92 Q8. Leaders exhibit behaviors that set the standard for integrated safety.

4.06 Not Used Q9. Leaders ensure NCNR facility priorities are aligned to 4.02 Q9. Leaders ensure NCNR facility priorities are aligned to reflect 4.16

Page 117 of 174 reflect integrated safety as the overriding priority.

integrated safety as the overriding priority.

Q10. Employees adhere to nuclear safety culture behaviors.

4.04 Q 10. I am accountable for shortfalls in meeting integrated safety standards/behaviors.

4.17 Q 10. I am accountable for shortfalls in meeting integrated safety standards/behaviors.

4.29 Not Used Q 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, encourage teamwork, and identify challenges to integrated safety.

4.61 Q 11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, encourage teamwork, and identify challenges to integrated safety.

4.68 Q12 Leaders provide incentives and rewards that are aligned with nuclear safety policies.

3.44 Q12. Leaders provide incentives, sanctions, and rewards that are aligned with NCNR integrated safety policies and reinforce behaviors and outcomes that reflect safety as the overriding priority.

3.40 Q12. Leaders provide incentives, sanctions, and rewards that are aligned with NCNR integrated safety policies and reinforce behaviors and outcomes that reflect safety as the overriding priority.

3.42 Not Used Q13. Leaders ensure that personnel, tools, equipment, procedures, and other resource materials are available and adequate to support integrated safety.

3.73 Q13. Leaders ensure that personnel, tools, equipment, procedures, and other resource materials are available and adequate to support integrated safety.

4.05 Not Used Q 14. I ensure that I am trained and qualified to perform assigned work.

4.39 Q 14. I ensure that I am trained and qualified to perform assigned work.

4.68

Page 118 of 174 Not Used Q 15. Claims of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discrimination are investigated.

4.09 Q 15. Claims of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discrimination are investigated 4.18 Q16. Team Leaders are visible in the plant reinforcing nuclear safety culture behaviors.

3.93 Q16. NCNR has a process for raising and resolving concerns that is independent of line-management influence.

3.86 Q16. NCNR has a process for raising and resolving concerns that is independent of line-management influence.

4.02 Q17. Leaders from all levels in the organization are involved in oversight of work activities.

3.83

17. Leaders from all levels in the organization are involved in oversight of work activities.

3.95

17. Leaders from all levels in the organization are involved in oversight of work activities.

3.82 Not Used Q18. NCNR takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance.

3.71 Q18. NCNR takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance 3.84 Not Used Q19. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors ensure supervisory and management oversight of contractors and supplemental personnel work activities, such that integrated safety is supported.

3.69 Q19. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors ensure supervisory and management oversight of contractors and supplemental personnel work activities, such that integrated safety is supported.

4.07 Q20. Leaders provide goals for the production of neutrons that are aligned to 3.92 Q20. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs develop and implement cost and schedule goals in a manner that 3.62 Q20. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs develop and implement cost and schedule goals in a manner that 3.68

Page 119 of 174 reflect nuclear safety as the overriding priority.

reinforces the importance of integrated safety.

reinforces the importance of integrated safety.

Q21. Leaders at all levels ensure that the basis for operational and organizational decisions is communicated to staff in a timely manner.

3.58 Q21. Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and organizational decisions is communicated in a timely manner.

3.62 Q21. Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and organizational decisions is communicated in a timely manner.

3.63 Not Used Q 22. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs encourage informal leaders (non-supervisors) to model safe behaviors and high standards of accountability.

4.07 Q 22. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs encourage informal leaders (non-supervisors) to model safe behaviors and high standards of accountability.

4.27 Q23. Team Leaders are selected based upon fostering a strong nuclear safety environment that promotes accountability.

3.45 Q 23. Leaders take ownership when receiving and responding to concerns, recognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensuring the concerns are adequately addressed in a timely manner.

4.08 Q 23. Leaders take ownership when receiving and responding to concerns, recognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensuring the concerns are adequately addressed in a timely manner.

4.31 Q24. Leaders 'walk the talk modeling behaviors when resolving conflicts between nuclear safety and production.

3.8 Q24. Leaders walk the talk, modeling correct behaviors when resolving apparent conflicts between Integrated safety and facility availability.

3.97 Q24. Leaders walk the talk, modeling correct behaviors when resolving apparent conflicts between Integrated safety and facility availability.

4.18 Not Used Q 25. I understand and use human error reduction 4.34 Q 25. I understand and use human error reduction techniques, such as 4.52

Page 120 of 174 techniques, such as self-check, STAR, and pre-job briefs.

self-check, STAR, and pre-job briefs.

Not Used Q26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs anticipate, manage, and communicate the effects of impending changes 3.44 Q26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs anticipate, manage, and communicate the effects of impending changes 3.62 Not Used Q 27. Leaders promote collaboration among work groups.

3.88 Q 27. Leaders promote collaboration among work groups.

3.92 Q28. I treat other employees with dignity and respect.

4.68 Q 28. I treat other employees with dignity and respect.

4.77 Q 28. I treat other employees with dignity and respect.

4.73 Q29. I freely raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retribution.

4.64 Q 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns without fear of retribution and with confidence that their concerns will be addressed.

4.43 Q 29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns without fear of retribution and with confidence that their concerns will be addressed.

4.56 Q30. Leadership encourages individuals to seek ways to improve nuclear safety processes.

4.31 Q 30. I am encouraged to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing opinions, and questions to help identify and solve problems.

4.26 Q 30. I am encouraged to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing opinions, and questions to help identify and solve problems.

4.35 Q31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected.

3.98 Q 31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected.

4.09 Q 31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected.

4.21 Q32. Supervisors respond to questions and concerns.

4.27 Q 32. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.

4.20 Q 32. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.

4.27

Page 121 of 174 Q33. Leaders implement change in a way that builds organizational trust.

3.56 Q33. Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that integrated safety remains the overriding priority.

3.66 Q33. Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that integrated safety remains the overriding priority.

3.92 Not Used Q34. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs reward individuals who identify and raise issues affecting the integrated safety policy 3.66 Q34. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs reward individuals who identify and raise issues affecting the integrated safety policy 3.69 Q35. I communicate candidly with oversight, audit, and regulatory organizations.

4.63 Q 35. I communicate openly and candidly with oversight, audit, and regulatory organizations.

4.48 Q 35. I communicate openly and candidly with oversight, audit, and regulatory organizations.

4.71 Q36. Leaders enhance trust and nuclear safety through communication.

4.08 Q36. Leaders share important information in an open, honest, and timely manner such that trust is maintained.

4.22 Q36. Leaders share important information in an open, honest, and timely manner such that trust is maintained.

4.08 Not Used Q 37. I perform a thorough review of the work site and planned activity every time work is performed.

4.16 Q 37. I perform a thorough review of the work site and planned activity every time work is performed.

4.05 Q38. I follow processes, procedures, and work instructions.

4.67 Q 38. I follow processes, procedures, and work instructions.

4.65 Q 38. I follow processes, procedures, and work instructions.

4.67 Q39. My supervisor discusses nuclear safety with 4.25 Q 39. I actively participate in pre-job briefings, understanding my responsibilities to raise 4.51 Q 39. I actively participate in pre-job briefings, understanding my responsibilities to raise integrated 4.56

Page 122 of 174 me regarding my job responsibilities.

integrated safety concerns before work begins.

safety concerns before work begins.

Not Used Q 40. Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that integrated safety is the organizations overriding priority.

4.27 Q 40. Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that integrated safety is the organizations overriding priority.

4.38 Q41. Leaders provide training and knowledge transfer to establish and maintain technical competence.

3.71 Q41. NCNR provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technical competent workforce.

3.29 Q41. NCNR provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technical competent workforce.

3.50 Q42. I treat decision-makers with respect, even when I disagree with a decision.

4.55 Q 42. I treat decision-makers with respect, even when I disagree with a decision.

4.72 Q 42. I treat decision-makers with respect, even when I disagree with a decision.

4.68 Q43. I apply a rigorous approach to problem solving in accordance with procedures.

4.24 Q 43. I use a consistent, systematic approach to making decisions.

4.37 Q 43. I use a consistent, systematic approach to making decisions.

4.42 Q44 Leaders assign single-point accountability for nuclear safety decisions.

3.25

44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

3.80 Q44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

3.92 Q45. Leaders ask for input when evaluating nuclear safety issues.

4.05 Q 45. Leaders solicit challenges to assumptions when evaluating integrated safety issues.

4.02 Q 45. Leaders solicit challenges to assumptions when evaluating integrated safety issues.

4.15

Page 123 of 174 Q46. I use a conservative approach to nuclear safety when making decisions.

4.47 Q 46. I use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable.

4.35 Q 46. I use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable.

4.48 Q47. When previous operational decisions are called into question by emerging facts, leaders re-evaluate and adjust as needed.

4.08 Q47. When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate these decisions to ensure they remain appropriate and adjust as needed.

4.39 Q47. When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate these decisions to ensure they remain appropriate and adjust as needed.

4.52 Not Used Q 48. Corporate governance, review boards, and independent oversight organizations support the Director's ultimate responsibility for decisions affecting nuclear safety.

4.08 Q 48. Corporate governance, review boards, and independent oversight organizations support the Director's ultimate responsibility for decisions affecting nuclear safety.

4.15 Q49. Plant activities are governed by comprehensive high-quality programs, processes, and procedures.

3.46

49. NCNR facility activities are governed by comprehensive high-quality programs, processes, and procedures.

3.26 Q49. NCNR facility activities are governed by comprehensive high-quality programs, processes, and procedures.

3.62 Not Used Q 50. I ensure issues, problems, degraded conditions and near misses are promptly reported and documented in the corrective action program.

4.27 Q 50. I ensure issues, problems, degraded conditions and near misses are promptly reported and documented in the corrective action program.

4.35

Page 124 of 174 Q51. The organization conducts activities that could affect reactivity with caution, in accordance with procedures.

4.36 Q 51. Leaders ensure that activities that could affect reactivity are conducted with particular care, caution, oversight, and in accordance with procedures.

4.57 Q 51. Leaders ensure that activities that could affect reactivity are conducted with particular care, caution, oversight, and in accordance with procedures.

4.73 Q52. Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and changed as defined by procedures.

4.21 Q 52. Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and changed only with great thought and care.

4.39 Q 52. Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and changed only with great thought and care.

4.48 Q53. Safety-related equipment is operated and maintained within design requirements.

4.28 Q 53. Safety-related equipment is operated and maintained within design requirements.

4.37 Q 53. Safety-related equipment is operated and maintained within design requirements.

4.50 Q54. Work is effectively planned and executed by incorporating risk-informed insights.

3.69 Q 54. Work is effectively planned and executed by incorporating risk-informed insights.

3.65 Q 54. Work is effectively planned and executed by incorporating risk-informed insights.

4.07 Q55. Plant activities are governed by comprehensive high-quality programs, processes, and procedures.

3.51 Q 55. NCNR creates and maintains complete, accurate and up-to-date documentation.

3.25 Q 55. NCNR creates and maintains complete, accurate and up-to-date documentation.

3.32 Q56. ROE employees master reactor operations to establish a solid foundation for decisions and behaviors.

3.97 Q 56. I understand reactor operations to establish a solid foundation for decisions and behaviors.

3.97 Q 56. I understand reactor operations to establish a solid foundation for decisions and behaviors.

4.48

Page 125 of 174 Q57. I recognize the unique hazards of nuclear technology.

4.64 Q 57. I recognize the special characteristics and unique hazards of nuclear technology.

4.80 Q 57. I recognize the special characteristics and unique hazards of nuclear technology.

4.70 Q58. I maintain a questioning attitude during pre-job briefs/job-site reviews to address changed conditions.

4.61 Q 58. I maintain a questioning attitude during pre-job briefs/job-site reviews to Identify and resolve unexpected conditions.

4.48 Q 58. I maintain a questioning attitude during pre-job briefs/job-site reviews to Identify and resolve unexpected conditions.

4.75 Not Used Q59. Leaders encourage individuals to ask questions if they do not understand the basis of operational and management decisions.

4.40 Q59. Leaders encourage individuals to ask questions if they do not understand the basis of operational and management decisions.

4.44 Q60. I promptly challenge unanticipated test results or unexpected system response.

4.44 Q 60. I promptly challenge unanticipated test results or unexpected system response rather than rationalize them.

4.41 Q 60. I promptly challenge unanticipated test results or unexpected system response rather than rationalize them.

4.53 Not Used Q 61. Leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand expected behaviors and actions necessary to maintain integrated safety.

4.16 Q 61. Leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand expected behaviors and actions necessary to maintain integrated safety.

4.13 Q62. I recognize and act upon deviations from standards.

4.42 Q 62. I recognize deviations from standards.

4.22 Q 62. I recognize deviations from standards.

4.35 Q63. Leaders apply conservative decision 3.94 Q63. Leaders apply a conservative approach to 4.35 Q63. Leaders apply a conservative approach to decision making, 4.38

Page 126 of 174 making to mitigate unpredicted failures.

decision making, particularly when information is incomplete or conditions are unusual.

particularly when information is incomplete or conditions are unusual.

Q64. I challenge assumptions/offer opposing views when I think something is not correct.

4.54 Q 64. I challenge assumptions/offer opposing views when I think something is not correct.

4.48 Q 64. I challenge assumptions/offer opposing views when I think something is not correct.

4.68 Not Used Q65. I avoid complacency and plan for the possibility of mistakes.

4.38 Q65. I avoid complacency and plan for the possibility of mistakes.

4.45 Not Used Q66. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs ensure staffing levels are consistent with the demands related to maintaining safety and reliability.

3.44 Q66. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs ensure staffing levels are consistent with the demands related to maintaining safety and reliability.

3.44 Q67. Leaders evaluate serious events and implement actions to learn from the experience.

4.18 Q 67. Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to facility processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs.

3.50 Q 67. Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to facility processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs.

3.62 Q68. Employees are well informed of lessons learned from industry events.

4.14 Q 68. I use operating experience to understand equipment, operational and industry challenges and adopt new ideas.

4.17 Q 68. I use operating experience to understand equipment, operational and industry challenges and adopt new ideas.

4.33 Q69. Root cause analysis is rigorously applied to identify 3.80 Q 69. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems to ensure 3.89 Q 69. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems to ensure that resolutions 4.22

Page 127 of 174 and correct the fundamental causes of significant events.

that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions.

address causes and extent of conditions.

Q70. We have processes to identify and resolve existing organizational weaknesses.

3.50 Q 70. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems for underlying organizational and safety culture contributors.

3.98 Q 70. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems for underlying organizational and safety culture contributors.

4.07 Q71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals value and seek continuous learning opportunities.

3.71 Q71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals value and seek continuous learning opportunities.

3.97 Q71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals value and seek continuous learning opportunities.

3.82 Not Used Q 72. NCNR implements the work management process (planning, controlling, and executing work activities) such that integrated safety is the overriding priority.

3.98 Q 72. NCNR implements the work management process (planning, controlling, and executing work activities) such that integrated safety is the overriding priority.

4.16 Not Used Q73. I communicate and coordinate my activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure integrated safety is maintained.

4.41 Q73. I communicate and coordinate my activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure integrated safety is maintained.

4.45 Not Used Q 74. Leaders respond to me in an open, honest, and non-defensive manner.

4.34 Q 74. Leaders respond to me in an open, honest, and non-defensive manner.

4.26

Page 128 of 174 Q75. The organization uses both self-assessments and independent oversight.

4.30 Q 75. Leaders value the insight and perspective provided through assessments.

4.21 Q 75. Leaders value the insight and perspective provided through assessments.

4.08 Not Used Q 76. NCNR uses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire innovative ideas to improve integrated safety.

3.61 Q 76. NCNR uses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire innovative ideas to improve integrated safety.

3.81 Q77. A broad set of performance indicators is utilized with a focus on early detection of problems.

3.49 Q 77. NCNR uses performance indicators to monitor both equipment and organizational performance, including integrated safety culture.

3.47 Q 77. NCNR uses performance indicators to monitor both equipment and organizational performance, including integrated safety culture.

3.78 Q78. We value insights provided by operational support or oversight groups.

4.08 Q 78. I value the insights and perspectives provided by quality assurance, the employee concerns programs and independent oversight organizations.

4.23 Q 78. I value the insights and perspectives provided by quality assurance, the employee concerns programs and independent oversight organizations.

4.45 Not Used Q79. The NCNRs Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the last survey in 2023.

4.11 Q79. The NCNRs Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the last survey in 2023.

4.35 Not Used Q80. Leaders constantly scrutinize nuclear safety through a variety of monitoring techniques, including 4.08 Q80. Leaders constantly scrutinize nuclear safety through a variety of monitoring techniques, including assessments of nuclear safety culture.

4.28

Page 129 of 174 assessments of nuclear safety culture.

Not Used Q 81.I stop work activities when confronted with an unexpected condition.

4.63 Not Used

Page 130 of 174 7: Survey Question List

Page 131 of 174 Trait Question

1. How long have you worked at the NCNR?

2. What is your level in the organization (i.e., individual contributor, lead, supervisor, crew chief, chief, director)?

3. Within the NCNR, where do you work?

CO1

4. Integrated safety is discussed at every meeting where plant work activities are planned and reviewed.

PA1

5. I clearly understand the importance of adherence to integrated safety standards.

LA6

6. Leaders ensure roles, responsibilities, and authorities are clearly defined, understood, and documented to promote integrated safety.

WE1

7. Leaders regard individuals and their professional capabilities and experiences as their most valuable asset.

LA8

8. Leaders exhibit behaviors that set the standard for integrated safety.

LA4

9. Leaders ensure NCNR facility priorities are aligned to reflect integrated safety as the overriding priority.

PA1

10. I am accountable for shortfalls in meeting integrated safety standards/behaviors.

PA2

11. I understand my personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, encourage teamwork, and identify challenges to integrated safety.

LA3

12. Leaders provide incentives, sanctions, and rewards that are aligned with NCNR integrated safety policies and reinforce behaviors and outcomes that reflect safety as the overriding priority.

LA1

13. Leaders ensure that personnel, tools, equipment, procedures, and other resource materials are available and adequate to support integrated safety.

PA2

14. I ensure that I am trained and qualified to perform the assigned work.

RC1

15. Claims of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discrimination are investigated.

RC2

16. NCNR has a process for raising and resolving concerns that are independent of line-management influence.

LA2

17. Leaders from all levels in the organization are involved in oversight of work activities.

PI3

18. NCNR takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance.

LA2

19. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors ensure supervisory and management oversight of contractors and supplemental personnel work activities, such that integrated safety is supported.

LA4

20. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs develop and implement cost and schedule goals in a manner that reinforces the importance of integrated safety.

CO2

21. Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and organizational decisions is communicated in a timely manner.

LA2

22. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs encourage informal leaders (non-supervisors) to model safe behaviors and high standards of accountability.

RC1

23. Leaders take ownership when receiving and responding to concerns, recognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensuring the concerns are adequately addressed in a timely manner.

LA8

24. Leaders walk the talk, modeling correct behaviors when resolving apparent conflicts between Integrated safety and facility availability.

WP4

25. I understand and use human error reduction techniques, such as self-check, STAR, and pre-job briefs.

Page 132 of 174 Trait Question LA5

26. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs anticipate, manage, and communicate the effects of impending changes.

WE3

27. Leaders promote collaboration among work groups.

WE1

28. I treat other employees with dignity and respect.

RC1

29. I freely raise integrated safety concerns without fear of retribution and with confidence that their concerns will be addressed.

WE2

30. I am encouraged to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing opinions, and questions to help identify and solve problems.

WE2

31. Differing opinions are welcomed and respected.

WE3

32. Chiefs, Crew Chiefs, Leads and Supervisors respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.

LA5

33. Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that integrated safety remains the overriding priority.

LA3

34. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs reward individuals who identify and raise issues affecting the integrated safety policy.

CO3

35. I communicate openly and candidly with oversight, audit, and regulatory organizations.

WE3

36. Leaders share important information in an open, honest, and timely manner such that trust is maintained.

QA4

37. I perform a thorough review of the work site and planned activity every time work is performed.

WP4

38. I follow processes, procedures, and work instructions.

PA2

39. I actively participate in pre-job briefings, understanding my responsibilities to raise integrated safety concerns before work begins.

CO4

40. Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that integrated safety is the organizations overriding priority.

CL4

41. NCNR provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technical competent workforce.

WE1

42. I treat decision-makers with respect, even when I disagree with a decision.

DM1

43. I use a consistent, systematic approach to making decisions.

DM3

44. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

QA3

45. Leaders solicit challenges to assumptions when evaluating integrated safety issues.

DM2

46. I use decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable.

DM1

47. When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders re-evaluate these decisions to ensure they remain appropriate and adjust as needed.

LA6

48. Corporate governance, review boards, and independent oversight organizations support the Director's ultimate responsibility for decisions affecting nuclear safety.

WP3

49. NCNR facility activities are governed by comprehensive high-quality programs, processes, and procedures.

PI1

50. I ensure issues, problems, degraded conditions and near misses are promptly reported and documented in the corrective action program.

QA1

51. Leaders ensure that activities that could affect reactivity are conducted with particular care, caution, oversight, and in accordance with procedures.

Page 133 of 174 Trait Question WP2

52. Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and changed only with great thought and care.

WP2

53. Safety-related equipment is operated and maintained within design requirements.

WP1

54. Work is effectively planned and executed by incorporating risk-informed insights.

WP3

55. NCNR creates and maintains complete, accurate and up-to-date documentation.

CL4

56. I understand reactor operations to establish a solid foundation for decisions and behaviors.

QA1

57. I recognize the special characteristics and unique hazards of nuclear technology.

QA2

58. I maintain a questioning attitude during pre-job briefs/job-site reviews to Identify and resolve unexpected conditions.

CO2

59. Leaders encourage individuals to ask questions if they do not understand the basis of operational and management decisions.

QA2

60. I promptly challenge unanticipated test results or unexpected system response rather than rationalize them.

CO4

61. Leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand the expected behaviors and actions necessary to maintain integrated safety.

PI1

62. I recognize deviations from standards.

DM2

63. Leaders apply a conservative approach to decision making, particularly when information is incomplete or conditions are unusual.

QA3

64. I challenge assumptions/offer opposing views when I think something is not correct.

QA4

65. I avoid complacency and plan for the possibility of mistakes.

LA1

66. Chiefs and Crew Chiefs ensure staffing levels are consistent with the demands related to maintaining safety and reliability.

CL1

67. Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to facility processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs.

CL1

68. I use operating experience to understand equipment, operational and industry challenges and adopt new ideas.

PI2

69. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions.

PI2

70. NCNR thoroughly evaluates problems for underlying organizational and safety culture contributors.

CL4

71. Leaders foster an environment in which individuals value and seek continuous learning opportunities.

WP1

72. NCNR implements the work management process (planning, controlling, and executing work activities) such that integrated safety is the overriding priority.

PA3

73. I communicate and coordinate my activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure integrated safety is maintained.

CO3

74. Leaders respond to me in an open, honest, and non-defensive manner.

CL2

75. Leaders value the insight and perspective provided through assessments.

CL3

76. NCNR uses benchmarking as an avenue to acquire innovative ideas to improve integrated safety.

PI4

77. NCNR uses performance indicators to monitor both equipment and organizational performance, including integrated safety culture.

Page 134 of 174 Trait Question WE2

78. I value the insights and perspectives provided by quality assurance, the employee concerns programs and independent oversight organizations.

79

79. The NCNRs Nuclear Safety Culture has improved since the last survey in 2023.

LA7

80. Leaders constantly scrutinize nuclear safety through a variety of monitoring techniques, including assessments of nuclear safety culture.

81. If there is any additional information you would like us to know, please add here.

Page 135 of 174 8: Effectiveness Review - Integrated RCA (RC #2)

SECTION 1 - Problem Statement:

On February 3, 2021, shortly after commencing normal reactor startup fuel element S-1175 located in core position J-7, experienced a significant reduction in primary coolant flow. This resulted in exceeding fuel cladding temperature limits, cladding failure, release of fission products into the confinement building, several radiation monitors exceeding setpoints with one causing a major SCRAM.

Additional event consequences:

1) Immediate evacuation of confinement building

2) Personnel contamination

3) Emergency Plan declaration of ALERT, subsequently downgraded to Notice Of Unusual Event (NOUE)

4) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Violations of Technical Specifications (with NRC Reference Numbers):

a. 05000184/2022201 Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 2.1, Safety Limit, for exceedance of fuel temperature safety limit

b. 05000184/2022201 Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 3.1.3, Core Configuration, for unlatched fuel element S-1175

c. 05000184/2022201 Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 6.4, Procedures, for inadequate fuel handling procedure

d. 05000184/2022201 Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 6.4, Procedures, for inadequate reactor startup procedure

e. 05000184/2022201 Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 6.4, Procedures, for inadequate emergency response procedure

f.

05000184/2022201 Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 3.9.2.1, Fuel Handling; Within the Reactor Vessel, failure to implement technical specification required method to ensure fuel element S-1175 was adequately latched

g. 05000184/2022201 Apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, tests and experiments, changes to the refueling tooling

5) Potential impact to public health and safety

6) Loss of facility usage/financial loss/loss of scientific research capabilities

7) Reputational loss

8) Significant financial burden associated with reactor recovery efforts The event was self-revealing.

SECTION 2: - Causes and Corrective Actions to Preclude Repetition:

Root Cause 2 - The NCNR Corrective Action Program in place at the time of the event lacked the necessary rigor to effectively identify, assess, and address critical safety issues, such as fuel element latching, in a timely manner.

CAPR for RC2 - Develop and implement a Problem Identification and Resolution processes, with implementing procedures within the Incident Reporting and Investigation Program to drive effective incident reporting, usage, prioritization, response, and communication; and direct effective incident investigations with regard to explicit risk-based prioritization of what is investigated, who leads the investigation, and how incidents are investigated; identification of true root causes (not just identification of superficial proximate causes); formulation of recommendations and actions that clearly address root

Page 136 of 174 causes (not just proximate causes); identification of contributing factors to mitigate risks; timeliness of investigations; and follow-through on completion and effectiveness of recommended corrective actions.

SECTION 3 - MAST Model:

Method:

Conduct an independent Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) assessment of the Corrective Action Program.

Objective 1: Review Condition Reports initiated since the CAPR was completed.

Objective 2: Conduct independent observations of the NCNR Safety Evaluation Committee (SEC).

Objective 3: Review quarterly leader field observation data.

Attributes:

Attribute 1: Review condition reports for quality of input from initiator, appropriate classification, completion of response/analysis per procedural requirements, timeliness of response, completion of corrective actions, and communications to appropriate personnel.

Attribute 2: Conduct observations of the NCNR Safety Evaluation Committee (SEC) to ensure classifications of condition reports meet procedural guidance, appropriate owners are identified for the issues/events, corrective actions are reviewed as required, and causal analyses are reviewed to ensure the appropriate depth, accuracy, and effectiveness of the root cause determination and corrective action plans.

Attribute 3: Monthly leader field observations will be reviewed to ensure condition reports are initiated when appropriate.

Success:

Success Criteria 1: Condition reports (CR) include appropriate information that allows accurate classification, analysis, and correction of issues/events, the classification of the CR is aligned with procedural guidance, the issue/event was analyzed at a depth as required by procedures, the issue was analyzed timely and actions to resolve were completed timely/scheduled to be completed in a timely manner, and communications are made to the initiator and appropriate levels of management as described in procedures.

Success Criteria 2: The Safety Evaluation Committee (SEC) reviews new condition reports and follows procedural guidance on classification and ownership. The committee reviews apparent and root cause analyses to ensure appropriate causes and corrective actions have been identified.

Success Criteria 3: Leader field observations that identify adverse conditions have been captured in condition reports.

Timeliness:

Six months following the implementation of the CAPR.

SECTION 4 - CAPR/CA Effectiveness Review Results:

Yes No 1

Has there been an opportunity for recurrence (same or similar conditions) since completion of the evaluation?

Page 137 of 174 2

Have all the required corrective actions from the evaluation been implemented or if any required actions were deleted or changed, were those deletions or changes properly approved?

If either 1 or 2 are answered NO, the effectiveness review is INDETERMINATE and should be rescheduled for a later date.

If 1 and 2 were answered YES, continue to 3 and 4.

3 Has the same problem or similar problem which should have reasonably been prevented by the corrective action plan occurred since the completion of the evaluation?

4 Were there any elements of the Success criteria of the MAST model NOT met?

If either 3 or 4 were answered YES, the effectiveness review is INEFFECTIVE, and a CR is required.

If any additional problems or unintended consequences were created due to implementation of the corrective action plan, initiate a CR.

Overall Assessment Effective Indeterminate Ineffective Objective 1:

A review of entries into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) initiated since the completion of the Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence (CAPR) which focused on several key attributes, including the quality of information provided by initiators, accuracy of classification, adherence to procedural requirements for response and analysis, timeliness of evaluations, completion of corrective actions, and communication to appropriate personnel was completed.

The CAPs reviewed generally met the established success criteria. Initiator input was sufficient to support accurate classification and effective analysis, and classifications were consistent with procedural expectations. Analyses were completed with appropriate depth and generally aligned with procedural timelines. While many corrective actions have been completed or are progressing toward completion, continued attention is needed to ensure timely closure across all cases.

Communication with initiators and management is currently handled through automated notifications.

Although this satisfies procedural requirements, there is an opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of communications to better support engagement and awareness throughout the CAP process. Overall, the review indicates that the improvements implemented following the CAPR have been largely sustained, with further enhancement possible in communication and the timely completion of corrective actions.

Objective 2:

As part of this effectiveness review, an independent observation of the NCNR Safety Evaluation Committee (SEC) was conducted to assess alignment with procedural expectations regarding the review and classification of entries in the Corrective Action Program (CAP). The observation focused on whether the committee followed guidance for CAP classification, identified appropriate issue owners, and adequately reviewed corrective actions and causal analyses when applicable.

During the assessment period, no Root Cause Analyses (RCAs) were completed for evaluation. While the SEC does not formally review completed Apparent Cause Evaluations (ACEs), it does discuss ACE findings during meetings. Although only one SEC meeting was directly observed, meeting records and

~

~

~

~

I I

Page 138 of 174 documentation indicate that the committee consistently reviewed new CAP entries and followed procedural guidance for issue classification and ownership. The committee appears to maintain a structured and disciplined approach to issue evaluation. However, due to the absence of completed causal analyses during this period, performance in that specific area could not be fully assessed.

Overall, the observation confirmed that the SEC is functioning in accordance with procedural requirements related to the initial handling of CAPs. Continued oversight will be necessary to verify the quality of causal analysis reviews when such items are available.

Objective 3:

A review of quarterly leader field observation data was conducted to evaluate whether adverse conditions identified during observations were appropriately captured in the Corrective Action Program (CAP) through the initiation of CAP entries. This review focused on confirming procedural alignment in recognizing and documenting issues identified in the field.

The review confirmed that when adverse conditions were observed, leaders appropriately initiated CAPs in accordance with procedural requirements. There was a clear and consistent connection between the field observations and the resulting CAP entries, demonstrating effective use of the observation process as a trigger for corrective action.

These results indicate that leader field observations are functioning as intended within the CAP framework, supporting timely and accurate identification of issues requiring resolution.

Page 139 of 174 9: Status of 2024 INSCA Recommendations Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update 1

INSCA#

1 Jun 2023 RECOMMENDATION 1:

Designate Operations and the I & C portion of the Aging Reactor Management section as priority groups and develop communications and team building strategies to better clarify and address the quality of the safety culture environment and implement corrective actions.

o Develop Communication and Team Building Plan to address toxic work environment between Operations and I&C groups Leadership, Workforce

Climate, Workforce Engagement 2

3 6

Safety Culture LOE Engaged the NIST OmBuds, and HR to aid in development of corrective actions.

Developed and implemented coaching and addition to performance evaluations for discrete individuals.

Follow-ups.

Behavior observations validate behavior change and anecdotal information from other portions of ARM and Ops reflect improvement.

Code of ethics refreshed from NIST.

The code of conduct for interpersonal behaviors is in development.

The NCNR Integrated Management Model has been completed and is in Final facility review.

Operations is in the processes of using the NIMM as basis for operations specific behavioral standards based on the NIMM to act as a department specific "Code of Conduct".

Page 140 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update 2

INSCA#

1 Jun 2023 RECOMMENDATION 2:

Develop and deliver a competence-based understanding of Nuclear Safety Culture.

Develop and implement a formal NCNR-ROE Nuclear Safety Culture Program based upon INPO 12-012 Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture / NUREG 2165 to understand Nuclear Safety Culture (including SCWE), Industrial Safety Culture, and the difference.

Develop and implement the vision, values, principles, and objectives that define the expected behaviors and attitudes needed to achieve and sustain a high-reliability Nuclear Safety Culture.

Enabling objectives need to focus on all NCNR-ROE leadership and staff owning and living nuclear safety culture attributes and role-modeling behaviors to: Build trust, Breakdown silos, and Improve daily communication behaviors.

Develop and implement NSC Training, and socialize Leadership, Workforce

Climate, Workforce Engagement 4

4 16 Safety Culture Task 7, 10, 13, 15 Based on Budget Limitations and timing this recommendation was broken into X pieces. 1. To answer the CO, SC Training in this area, for the ROE Leadership, was developed and implemented. (Nov 2023). 2. As an outcome of that training the Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Guidance was tested with accomplishment of the initial SCMP was completed and continuing on a regular basis. 3.

Modification of the INPO 12-012 SC Traits to match the NCNR Organization and Verbiage was completed published electronically and is in printing. 4.

Conducted a Baldrige Organizational

1. The NCNR IMM has been completed and is in final facility review and entering change management and communications stages.

2. The NCNR-3.18 SCMP Policy has been approved and issued as a Policy document. The SCMP is active and has held regular meetings.

3. The Integrated Safety Culture Traits and Attributes book is in use. Although use of the book may have plateaued or decreased over the year.

The NCNR IMM is in the change management and Communication/Roll-out stage. Expected roll-out summer of 2025.

Page 141 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update expected NSC behaviors, teamwork and interactions amongst departments and between people.

Engage external resources to assist in developing, delivering, implementing, and coaching sustainable actions.

Interim: Re-implement daily use of the Gray Book INPO 12-012, Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture.

Profile Exercise to define baseline Mission, Vision, Values and Culture for integration into a master reference for Behaviors, teamwork, and interactions as 5 Develop an Integrated Management Model as a frequently referenced tool for indoctrination, alignment, and improvement.

Page 142 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update 3

INSCA#

1 Jun 2023 RECOMMENDATION 3:

Mitigate the staffing and resource shortage in the Operations Department.

Obtain and prioritize external resources (including funding) who can take on the Operations Department administrative workload (see LA.1, Section 7.4.1.2.2, last table entry).

Prioritize the engagement of external resources to coach Operations Crew Chiefs, SROs, and non-licensed operators regarding shift Operational Focus.

Complete the planned selection and appointment of a Deputy Chief Reactor Operations.

Leadership, Workforce

Climate, Operations 5

4 20 Resource Strategy LOE New entry level hires have been added to Operations. Due to reactor conditions and primarily shutdown operations, the application of resources, has somewhat been mitigated in the area of administrative workload. Fed Government Continuing Resolutions and delay of 2024 funding made the application of coaching in a shutdown environment a lower priority for the time being. Applications for Deputy Chief of Operations have been non-existent.

1. While Operations staffing was nearly at full compliment in 2024, Operator licensing issues, filling of training staff positions and the temporary filling of the Deputy Chief RO, have reduced the available shift staffing ranks.

2. 2025 Federal hiring freeze has the potential to severely impact 24/7 operation of the reactor in the fall of 2025.

3. The Resource strategy/initiate is fully developed, and the majority of actions are withing the facilities capabilities of performed and completed. This effort will provide the facility with the facts and plans to leverage hiring for the present and future.

Page 143 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update 4

INSCA#

1 Jun 2023 RECOMMENDATION 4:

Develop, with Human Resources:

An effective and timely policy to attract and retain Operations staff.

Build Operator ranks with full support to stand up a fifth shift with a prescribed minimum reserve bench metric. Aggressively pursue increasing the number of licensed individuals.

Mitigate the resource shortage in the Aging Reactor Management (ARM)

Group with external resources to:

o Take on the administrative tasks.

o Develop and implement organization-wide programs (e.g., CAP, Observation Program, et.al.).

o Coach and mentor ARM staff with regards to programmatic responsibilities.

Strategy Implementatio n, Operations Workforce Climate 4

4 16 Resource Strategy LOE New entry level hires have been added to ARM. Due to reactor conditions and primarily shutdown operations, the application of resources have somewhat been mitigated in the area of administrative workload. The CAP, Observations Program, etc. have been reassigned outside ARM to strengthen focus of ARM on Maintenance, Surveillances and Trouble shooting.

1. New hires are performing at a leaning/functional level.

2. ARM was able to reduce backlogs of trouble tickets and age of backlogs from hundreds at average age of hundreds of days to less than 40 at an average age of 19 days.

3. CAP and Observations programs that have been transferred are performing well outside of ARM. Splitting the responsibilities has been successful.

Page 144 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update 5

INSCA#

1 Jun 2023 RECOMMENDATION 5:

Corrective Action Program:

Complete the PI&R Assessment as soon as practicable. Continue with plans to implement a right-sized PI&R process. In the interim, prioritize the following immediate actions:

Establish and enforce an expectation for a reporting threshold across NCNR-ROE.

Select external resources to assist with program implementation, administration, and coaching.

Develop and implement an easy and personal input method for CAP.

Establish a Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) / Management Operations Review Group utilizing external resources to assist with development, charter, startup, administration, and member coaching.

0 Performa nce Improve ment A part of Task 14 The PI&R Assessment was completed with 12 recommendations.

In parallel to development of follow-on scopes of work, strengthening of reporting, prioritization, application of CAP Screening, and disposition reviews (CARB/MGR.) have been effective at identification and proper classification of issues, Correction and closure of issues lag initiations are slow being addressed.

Additional resources have been delayed due to Government Funding Issues.

Chanes in input screens, metrics, etc. are in progress.

Revise benchmarking CAP was conducted in February with

1. The PI Strategy

/Initiative has been created and committed to by management.

2. The upgraded platform to improve useability has been developed. Conflicting priorities and resource limitations has delayed development of the process procedures, definition of training in implementation of the necessary change management towards implementation.

3. Significant progress has been made in overall implementation of the CAP Process, fidelity of completion of actions, and use by the facility. Backlogs of lower priority CAPI have grown, and resources will be needed to reduce those back logs going forward.

4. The Federal Funding issues of 2025 are the major limitations for progress in this area.

Page 145 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update MURR. The RTR high powered reactors have entered into a collaborative agreement to share and optimize RTR CAP as a consortium.

Page 146 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update 6

INSCA#

1 Jun 2023 RECOMMENDATION 6:

Conduct behavioral assessments of the Operations Crew Chiefs to assess attitudes, alignment, leadership capabilities, and provide targeted development feedback.

Behavioral assessments, feedback and coaching have been shown to be critical to aligning leadership behavior to obtain consistent performance improvements.

Consider extending these assessments to other key leaders as priorities allow.

Leadership, Workforce

Climate, Operations 3

2 6

Safety Culture A minor level of personality and behavior assessments have been performed by NIST and others to provide input into changes in performance evaluations. Based on plant condition the facility decided that additional assessment would be more appropriate once the base programs and processes we fledged out and near normal operations are achieved.

The priority was also adjusted based on Fed Government Continuing Resolutions and delay of 2024 funding and make the application of coaching in a shutdown environment a lower

1. In incorporating this recommendation into the Improvement Plan, the facility recognized the NCNR IMM was a prerequisite to this recommendation. It was necessary to set the M, V, G, Standards under which assessment and betterment could be addressed.

2. Based on the internal work of the Directors and Chiefs, the priority of this effort is viewed as future work, pending results of the 3rd Independent Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment.

Page 147 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update priority for the time being. Applications for Deputy Chief of Operations have been non-existent.

Page 148 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update 7

INSCA#

1 Jun 2023 RECOMMENDATION 7:

Develop a behavior-based mentoring/coaching program focused on safety culture attributes, leadership, and process improvements.

Provide the top leadership team with a team coach at the Director/Chief level to promote organizational alignment and teamwork.

Identify key leaders in ROE and establish individual mentors to develop manager behaviors and their interface to the organizational recovery processes.

Conduct behavioral assessments of current organizational leadership starting at Crew Chiefs level and going to top level management (Director/Chiefs).

Leadership, Workforce

Climate, Workforce Engagement 4

3 12 Safety Culture Part of Task 10 Part of this action is a repeat of the above. (Conducting Behavioral Assessments)

Identifying Key Leaders is a work in process as the staffing of the team is gelling. With changes in alignment (Safety, SEC, QA/Programs, Engineering) stability is needed to determine assessment needs and define the strategy (Resources Strategy)

Task 10 is providing the services of a team coach for the top team leadership.

The areas of present engagement are alignment, teamwork and R2A2, Baldrige, Aubrey Daniels basis for reinforcement of

1. Part of this action is a repeat of the above.

(Conducting Behavioral Assessments)

2. The Resources Strategy addresses this area for identifying key positions and attributes.

Task 10 has continued mentoring. Results of the 3rd INSCA will indicate a level of progress.

Page 149 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update behaviors and communication interim actions 8

INSCA#

1 Jun 2023 RECOMMENDATION 8:

Training and Procedures Programs: Complete the Training and Procedures Assessments as soon as practical.

Implement the Systematic Approach to Training (SAT).

4 5

20 Training Many Training and Procedures assessments are complete with a total of 25 recommendations.

Each of these assessments were The Training and Procedures Initiatives are fully formed and committed to, pending Funding in 2025.

Page 150 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update Fully implement the PPA /

INPO 11-003 requirements for procedures.

deemed to be separate Improvement initiatives 9

INSCA#

1 Jun 2023 RECOMMENDATION 9:

Establish and maintain housekeeping/combustibles and gas cylinder loading that reflect OSHA standards in:

Guide Hall, Confinement Building, Laboratories, and Other spaces.

Legal and Regulatory Compliance, Customer Engagement, Work Force Engagement 4

5 20 Performa nce Improve ment LOE Recommendation has been addressed Level of Effort by the facility. Recently

$80K has been allotted to continue in improvement. A significant reduction in fire loading in C100 and the Guide Hall has been achieved even in parallel to Instrument installation work.

Much work to do in B1. Two labs have been emptied of equipment and risk.

This has been addressed through workplace safety inspections, OSHE Support and OFPM Support.

Page 151 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update 10 INSCA#

1 Jun 2023 RECOMMENDATION 10:

Complete the planned development and implementation of an Employee Concerns Program (ECP).

Strongly recommend for the foreseeable future, establish and maintain a regular and consistent onsite presence.

Include within the scope of follow-on Nuclear Safety Culture Assessments.

4 3

12 Safety Culture LOE The ECP Coordinator was named and assigned at the beginning of 2024.

The ECP Procedure is in NRC Review.

There is an ECP SharePoint site. The Facility is highly considering activating that procedure and program without NRC Approval. A decision is expected in June.

The ECP Program is official as a policy, communicated and tested. NRC Provided feedback to the program which was incorporated.

The ECP Coordinator has been moved to a separate office in an acceptable location away from the leadership team for anonymity.

11 INSCA#

1 Jun 2023 RECOMMENDATION 11:Develop and implement a problem-solving approach for emergent issues to include:

Define the Problem Statement.

Conduct significance assessment.

Identify known consequences.

Perform extent of condition evaluation.

Pre-establish a Command-and-Control NCNR-ROE response structure.

Strategy Implementatio n, Operations, Workforce

Climate, Product and Process

Results, Leadership 4

3 12 Performa nce Improve ment Draft Task 44 The methodology has been piloted and applied in several circumstances. In concert with the development of the Integrated Project Schedule across NCNR this is maturing This will be accomplished inside the Work Management Strategy development as a part of the Work Management Initiative.

Page 152 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update Establish response teams with issue-specific roles &

responsibilities.

Develop a written response plan.

Implement and revise response plan as necessary.

Page 153 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update 12 INSCA#

1 Jun 2023 RECOMMENDATION 12: As a function of development of the comprehensive improvement plan that results from planned assessments and the collective evaluation process, consider the following elements to address Cross-Cutting, Distributed Function Programs.

Every line manager owns a piece of distributed functions; examples of distributed functions include, but are not limited to:

o Nuclear Safety Culture and Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities, and Accountabilities o Emergent Issue Management Process o Conduct of Operations o Operational Focus o PI&R/Corrective Action Program o Employee Concerns Program o Training o Management Observation Program o Work Planning, Operational, Financial, 4

1 4

Safety Culture Task 10, 13, 14, Collective Eval 1 was completed, 61 recommendations from the assessments and 11 recommendations from the first SCMP (All from both data sets) were risk ranked and prioritized for implementation. The IMM is intended to address, in some fashion, the list in this recommendation

1. This recommendation is addressed as a whole by elements in the 7 program initiates and the NIMM.

2. IDIQ Contract issuance and Funding are Key to fully accomplishing the goals of the initiatives.

3. The Improvement Plan is nearing finalization and will be separated into Must, Need, Want levels of priority, and those that are LOE and those that require funding/support.

Expected finalization is expected 3rd/4th quarter of FY2025.

Page 154 of 174 Source Recommendation Risk Domain, Baldrige Criteria Likelihood/

Exposure Impact/

Significa nce Overall Risk Initiative Area Task Order No May 2024 Status Update April 2025 Status Update Management and Control o Management of Change o QA and Oversight Function o Risk Management Obtain and prioritize external resources (including funding) to support development and implementation of the programs listed above.

Interim: Establish a daily framework: Morning meetings, daily schedule reviews, CAP Screening, Management Reviews, Plan of the Day, Break-out groups as needed.

Page 155 of 174 0: Status of 2023 INSCA Program Limiting Weaknesses Program 2023 Rating Trend Limiting Weaknesses 2024 Program Status 2024 Rating and Trend 2025 Program Status 2025 Rating and Trend Management Observation Program Marginally Effective AFI Flat The existing management observation program is limited to procedural observations.

Many observations, including some from senior management, are not consistently documented in a timely manner by NCNR observers; some managers meet minimum requirements for 2 per quarter.

CAPs are not consistently being written by observers when observations document problems.

From the Observation Dashboard - 5/13/24 Observation goals are being met or exceeded.

In the 1st Quarter 24, 23 observations were conducted for a goal of

18. This performance was improved based on actions taken on Oct 23 per CAP 199.

While the observation form has not been revised, approximately 25% of the observations were beyond procedure based. All observations had at least one element of behavioral observation beyond the procedure quality aspects.

Procedure issues found during observations are being entered into CAP Based on Observation data review the process is being implemented as designed. Interviews indicate some leaders are using the process for teaching moments.

Rating: Effective but not being fully leveraged for improvement.

Trend: Improving From the Observation Dashboard - 4/10/25 Observation goals are being met or exceeded.

The observation templates have been rewritten for 4 types of observations. Generic Safety Culture Attributes, Human Performance Tools (infield work),

Procedure Use and Adherence, and Procedure Quality.

Issues observed that meet the CAP Threshold are being routinely entered into CAP, Coaching documented, etc.

The AR 5.4 needs updating to reflect usage of the new forms.

Based on Observation data review the process is being implemented as designed.

Interviews indicate some leaders are using the process for teaching moments.

Rating: Effective and Maturing toward sustained improved performance.

The new forms are very user friendly, and explanation of terms, definitions and prompts are on the back of each form.

These are RTR Best practice level tools.

Page 156 of 174 Program 2023 Rating Trend Limiting Weaknesses 2024 Program Status 2024 Rating and Trend 2025 Program Status 2025 Rating and Trend Corrective Action Program Not Effective AFI Flat Less than adequate staffing to develop CAP.

Less than adequate training re:

CAP.

Program exists, recently revised.

Threshold not well understood by staff.

Lack of management engagement.

The CAP is being utilized to address deficiencies and events.

The CAP volume is 363, up from 58 at the time of the last assessment.

CAP Screening is mature. The backlog of unscreened items is at a minimum.

The AR 7.0 series need to be updated to reflect the detail being currently implemented.

The CAPA process is being transitioned to a new platform with much more mature functionality.

There is still some misunderstanding of what goes into CAP or other systems that need to be addressed.

Documentation of actions taken are entered into CAP Cause Analysis is not Rating: Marginally Effective Trend: Rapidly Improving The CAP is being utilized to address deficiencies and events.

There were 370 new CAP items entered between April 2024 and March 2025. This is a considerable increase in the use of CAP.

Of the 370 items entered in the CAP system, 299 were identified as Level 0-3.

CAP Screening is mature. The backlog of unscreened items is at a minimum manageable number; Screening is held every week.

The AR 7.0 series need to be updated to reflect the detail being currently implemented.

The CAPA process is being transitioned to a new platform with Rating: Effective Trend: Improving

Page 157 of 174 Program 2023 Rating Trend Limiting Weaknesses 2024 Program Status 2024 Rating and Trend 2025 Program Status 2025 Rating and Trend consistently attached to the CAP Item.

much more mature functionality. This transition is dependent on 3 SharePoint sites being moved to the SharePoint Cloud, vs On Premise.

There is still some misunderstanding of what goes into CAP or other systems that need to be addressed.

Documentation of actions taken are entered into CAP Cause Analysis is not consistently attached to the CAP Item.

Page 158 of 174 Program 2023 Rating Trend Limiting Weaknesses 2024 Program Status 2024 Rating and Trend 2025 Program Status 2025 Rating and Trend Audit/Surveillance/QA Program Not Effective AFI Flat QA Program applies only to Engineering.

The program does not identify important programs needed for safe and effective nuclear plant facility operation.

Of those programs that are identified, most have short runtimes and are in very early stages.

Program definition is fragmented among several documents, causing confusion and lack of use/compliance.

21 Audits and Self Assessments have been conducted in the last year. The findings of audits are entered into and resolved in CAP.

Development of a full QA program based on ISO 9000 is planned as a part of the Procedures and PI&R Initiative Strategies Rating: Marginally Effective Trend: Improving 6 Audits and Self Assessments have been conducted in the last year. The scopes of the assessments are recorded in the Observation Program.

The findings of audits are entered into and resolved in CAP.

Development of a full QA program based on ISO 9000 is planned as a part of the Procedures and PI&R Initiative Strategies Planned SEC Improvements have been made, and SEC Meetings are well managed and efficient.

Rating: Marginally Effective based on lacking the QA Plan Trend: Improving Document Control Program Not Effective AFI Flat No Records/Document Control Manager No plan to meet Federal Document Control requirements (36 CFR 1200 Att. B).

Lack of a Records Management Program that meets federal government requirements (36 CFR 1200 Att. B)

A Document Librarian has been hired and is actively resurrecting the Document Control Process.

Rating: Marginally Effective Trend: Improving The document librarian has been able to significantly improve accessibility and oversee a scanning program to modernize document retrieval. Document quality is improving via nonconformance Rating: Program is nearing Full Effectiveness Trend: Improving

Page 159 of 174 Program 2023 Rating Trend Limiting Weaknesses 2024 Program Status 2024 Rating and Trend 2025 Program Status 2025 Rating and Trend CAPS. However, there is a long way to go to get all the documents available and accurate.

One note: The librarian position recently became vacant. Replacement in the present political environment is stalled.

Contractors are continuing with scanning and cataloguing.

Conduct of Operations Program Marginally Effective AFI Positive Critical elements of CONOPs are insufficiently addressed in NBSR Conduct of Operations guidance. (See Section 7.3.5)

Operations staffing shortages, limited currently to two shifts.

Ops Training weaknesses (see Training program)

Lack of Ops staff understanding of NSC and how it applies to CONOPs AR 5.0, Procedure Use and Adherence and AR 1.1 Human Performance Tools address the majority of weaknesses in CONOPs as listed in section 7.3.5 of the 23 INSCA Report.

Three Shift Coverage is in effect.

Staffing levels continue to be a significant weakness.

Rating: Marginally Effective Trend: Improving Knowledge level has significantly improved regarding the revised Conduct of Ops Staffing levels continue to be a significant weakness.

Rating: Marginally Effective Trend: Improving

Page 160 of 174 Program 2023 Rating Trend Limiting Weaknesses 2024 Program Status 2024 Rating and Trend 2025 Program Status 2025 Rating and Trend Training Program Marginally Effective AFI Positive The current training program does not support a continuing Operator Training program.

Training that has been developed was not done using the Systematic Approach to Training.

Operator training is limited in scope and does not address the full spectrum of Operations Department needs.

The facility has named Training as an Initiative for improvement.

The training Supervisor has been named, Postings for 2 additional resources are posted.

Resources have been applied to SAT Application of the Ops Training Program Rating: Marginally Effective Trend: Improving The facility has named Training as an Initiative for improvement.

The training Supervisor has been named, Postings for 2 additional resources Have been filled.

Resources have been applied to SAT Application of the Ops Training Program The going forward plan is clear, but presently unfunded.

Interviews indicate Ops training is significantly improved.

Rating: Marginally Effective Trend: Improving

Page 161 of 174 Procedures Marginally Effective AFI Positive Procedures are inadequate for rule-based operations required by operators with less experience.

Some revised procedures are overly complex and cumbersome.

Pen and ink changes to important procedures (i.e., reactor startup) did not receive 10CFR50.59 review.

Inexperienced (rather than experienced) operators are writing procedures.

Procedures was named as an Initiative for Improvement. AR 5.0 was revised to meet industry guidance. Pen and Ink changes are now categorized as Major and Minor and receive the appropriate 50.59 screening and reviews.

The facility is applying outside resources to revising AR 5.1 Procedures Writers Guide and plans to revise the ~300 procedures that were revised earlier in 2021/2022 to be more user friendly, at the correct level of detail of consistent structure and format.

Rating: Marginally Effective Trend: Improving Procedures was named as an Initiative for Improvement. AR 5.0 was revised to meet industry guidance. Pen and Ink changes are now categorized as Major and Minor and receive the appropriate 50.59 screening and reviews.

The facility is applying outside resources to revising AR 5.1 Procedures Writers Guide and plans to revise the ~300 procedures that were revised earlier in 2021/2022 to be more user friendly, at the correct level of detail of consistent structure and format.

AR5.1 has been revised and is in routing for implementation.

Future efforts in this are pending funding.

Immediate needs are Rating: Effective Trend: Improving

Page 162 of 174 Program 2023 Rating Trend Limiting Weaknesses 2024 Program Status 2024 Rating and Trend 2025 Program Status 2025 Rating and Trend being met on a 1 by 1 basis.

Causal Analysis Not Effective AFI Flat Program has not been implemented

& is under development with no written plans.

Few trained causal analysts.

The few trained causal analysts have limited experience.

There are 3 trained cause analysts (Tap Root and other techniques). Experience is widely varied.

The facility would benefit greatly with a Cause Analysis Manual and training. This is planned as a part of the PI&R Initiative Rating: Marginally Effective Trend: Improving There have been a few cause analysis performed. While they generally determine effective actions, structure and completion rates are concerning.

The facility would benefit greatly with a Cause Analysis Manual and training.

This is planned as a part of the PI&R Initiative Rating: Marginally Effective Trend: Improving Employee Concerns Not Effective AFI Flat The program has not been implemented.

ECP Coordinator has not yet been trained or started in the position.

The ECP Coordinator has been hired, The ECP Website Developed. The ECP Program has been written and has been in NRC review for over a year. The facility has recently decided to implement the program in advance of NRC Review and approval.

Not Effective The ECP Program has been made official via policy issuance, the change-management and communications plans are complete.

The ECP Coordinator is located in a satisfactory location.

There has been some limited throughput, all having been or being appropriately addressed.

Fully Effective Trend: Flat

Page 163 of 174 1: Focus Group/Interviews Questions Safety Culture Assessment Meeting Focus Group Questions Q1: Can you share an example of when a leadership decision affected your work but was not clearly communicated or explained?

Q2: Do you believe NCNR leaders walk the talk? Can you share an example that illustrates either alignment or inconsistency between leaderships words and actions?

Q3: When you raise a concern or submit something to the Corrective Action Program (CAP),

how often do you hear back about what was done?

Q4: Do you trust the CAP process to fix real problems (i.e., plant), or does it feel more like a paperwork exercise? Why?

Q5: How well do you understand the integrated schedule versus the daily schedule, and how are changes communicated to you?

Q6: Can you describe a time when planning and execution were well alignedor misaligned and how it affected safety or productivity?

Q7: How realistic are current workload expectations? Do you feel the organization has the resources to implement whats been planned?

Q8: What would help reduce workload pressure while still meeting safety and performance goals?

Q9: Have you observed improvement in cross-department collaboration since last year? If not, where are the barriers?

Q10: Have you seen improvement in the quality of training?

Q11: How do you see training in the overall prioritization of department?

Q12: What types of rewards or recognition are meaningful to you and your peers? Tangible rewards? Are you seeing any of those used here?

Q13: Do you believe accountability for non-compliance or errors are applied fairly and consistently across the organization? Why or why not?

Q14: How would you characterize improvement of plant documentation since 2024?

Q15: Provide a number between 1 and 5, have you seen an improvement in safety culture since the event? If you arrived after the event, how do you rate since you started working at NCNR?

Page 164 of 174 2: Meeting Observation Form N

I ~

)cwo,<<><

~

I I NEVTn0HAESEN'ICH Nudea.r Safety Culture Observation Checklist Work Area/Ta.st:

Observef"s Name:

Template Rewioo oa:e: JanJary 30. 2025 Date:

1/30/2025 1nsorfi?o5*

Fill in the header fields: WOl'k Area/Task: Observer's Name: atld Date.

Mark appficable activities/topics observed and attach photos. if applicable.

Refer to the reference table oo page 2 and the NlST Center few Newon Research (NCNR) Integrated Safety Cultu.re Traits and Attrbutes pocketbook. as needed.

If a CAP is requred for this observation. then provide the CAP O in the Observer inputfoommerts box and attach a POF of this observation to the CAP.

NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE CATEGORIES TRAITS ANO ATTRBUTES GROUPNG:

INOMOUAL COMMITMENT TO 0 MANAGEMENT C OMMITMENT 0 MANAGEMENTSYSTEMS SAFETY TO SAFETY 0 Personal Accountability (PA)1 0 Respectful Work Environment Problem Identification and e>'

Resolution,,.. *

• 0 PA. I Standallls D WE.1 Respect is Evident 0 Pl.1 Identification PA2 Job Ownership 0 WE.2 Opil'W)ns are Vabed Pl.2 Evaluation PA3 Teamwotk 0 WE.3 High Level of Trust Pl.3 ResoJutioo 0 WE.4 Conflict Resolution Pl.4 Trending Effectwe Safety Communication OecisM>n -

ing (OM)'

0 ErM.ronment for Raising

• co" Concerns 'Re,*

CO. 1 Wcwt Process D OM. 1 Consistent Process 0 RC. 1 SCWE Po5cy C0.2 Bases for Decisions OM.2 Conservative Bias RC.2 Alternate Process for C0.3 Free Flow of lnfonnation 0 OM.3 Aocountablity rot Decisions Raisiog Concerns C0.4 E xpectations 0 Questioning Attitude {QA)7 0 l.Hdership Safety Val ues and 0 WOf1l Processes (WP)'

Actions ILAi' D OA.1 Nuclear is Recognized as D LA.1 Resources 0 WP. 1 Wort: Management Special and Unique 0 LA.2 Ftekl Presence 0 WP.2 O~n Margins 0 QA.2 Challenge the Unkrown 0 LA.3 Incentives.. Sanctions. and WP.3 Documentation 0 QA.3 Challenge Assl.l1lptions Rewards WP.4 Prooedae Adherence 0 QA.4 Avoid Complacency 0 LA.4 Strategic Commitmerf to Safety 0 LA.5 Change Management 0 LA.6 Roles. Respoosi>ilities. and Authcriies LA.7 Constant Examination 0 LA.8 Leader Behaviors Description of the observation:

0 Continuous Learning (CL)"

CL 1 Operatiog Experience CL2 Self-Assessment 0 CL3 Beoctwnartdog 0 CL4 Training Observer in comments:

s 0,

action taken:

Page 1 of 2

Page 165 of 174 3: Behavioral Observation Form NIST/NCNR INSCA Template RN61CWI Dale: Jar'JJary 30. 2025 lostrssioo:r Human Performance Tools Observation Checklist WOfk Area/Task:

Observer's Name:

Date:

1/30/2025 Fill in the header fields: Wock Area/Task: Observer's Name: and Date.

Mark appficable activitiesttopics observed and attach photos. if applicable.

Refer to the reference table on page 2 and AR 1.1 Ht.man Perfonnaooe Tools, as needed.

If a CAP is reqund foe this obsecvation. then provide the CAP I) in the Observer action taken box an:i' attach a PDF of this observation to the CAP.

BREF LEVEL REQUIREMENT FOR OPERATION:

STANDARD BRE F1 0 TAILORED BREF2 0 HI.ABRIEF3 IABRIEP' 0 Work Planning Pre-lob Work Execution Post.Work Review w°"Scope 0 5 Key Questions Obse<Ved SeW-Checl<

0 Post-Job Critique Risk Identifications Discussed7 A<:tions(STAR)'

Utilized Ops Coon:tination6 0 Interactive Brief 0 Verification Practices 0 Level of Brief Procedure Req 0 AR 1.1 Brief "Good Used" Appropriate Qualifications Req Practices" Used8 0 Error Reduction 0 Lessons Learned D WMgroup Coordination 0 H.lA Brief Methods Used11 Doa#ne,ted (HLA)

Error-Likely Siuations and Doa.mented STOP WORK Discussed Team Lead Responsibilities Supef'Visor WOf1<e<

Mtscelaneous Res-nsibilities Res---~ilities Ensu-e Workers Understand D Ensure Wo"-ers 0 Understands AR 1. 1 Housekeep,W'lg AR 1.1 Understand AR 1.1 0 Questioning Attitude 0 T~

Hazards D Zero T oleranoe for T akiog 0 Assignilg Workers 0 Focused on Tasks 0 PPE Used Shortcuts Verification Activities 0 Never Taking Shortcuts Resolving Conditions Identifying ard 0 Ut:iizing HU Tools Adverse 10 Quality Resolvilg Issues Ensuring Qualification Self-Assessments of the Use 0 Pron,otrlg a on the Assigned Task of HU Tools & THU Behaviots Ouestioning Attitude Promoting a Questionirg 0 Authorization of Attitude Briefed Tasks 12 Descri n of the observation:

Obsenlef innutfcomments:

Observer action taken or riecornmendation:

Page 1 of 2

Page 166 of 174 4: INSCA Team Members, Assignments, and Bios Independent TPNSCA Team Membership Frederic Lake, Task Leader, and Analyst**

Karen Hutchings, Analyst and Assessment Report Leader**

Thad McCloud, Analyst and Assessment Report Author Dr. Mary Jo Rogers, Behavioral Scientist, Analyst**

Bruce OBrien, Analyst**

John Ettien, TFE Oversight**

Kristen McDuffie, Recorder

• • Team members that are designated with stars were involved in the 2024 INSCA as either team members or oversight activities. These members will provide continuity and insights from the previous INSCA.

Frederic Lake (President WD Associates, Inc.)

Over 40 years of experience root cause analysis and leadership experience covering operations, maintenance, engineering, licensing, and performance improvement. NRC recovery experience at numerous nuclear plants; Senior organizational leader guiding implementation of 95003 recovery at the Palo Verde Nuclear Station. Developed and implemented training activities to improve worker and leader behaviors, and to improve safety culture at several nuclear power plants as part of regulatory recovery efforts.

Karen Hutchings (Consultant/Contractor WD Associates, Inc.)

Over 35 years of experience in commercial nuclear power plants. Development and implementation of safety culture and leadership training for nuclear power plants; Conduct of cause analyses for Chilled Work Environment, SCWE, and safety culture issues; Leadership for assessments, problem identification, and investigation, and resolution. Workforce and staffing planning, succession planning, knowledge transfer and retention process; Implementation of NSC assessments and surveys; Champion of Human Performance (HU) initiatives and mentoring to change behaviors.

Thad McCloud (Manager, Performance Improvement WD Associates, Inc.)

Over 30 years of experience in commercial nuclear power plants. Corrective action program management, implementation, and oversight; Evaluating programmatic, organizational, and cultural performance issues; Analysis and resolution of NRC 95001/95002/95003 Issues including Safety Culture (Organizational Weaknesses), Human Performance/Decision Making, Significant Equipment/Human Events (Plant Trips, EDGs, Refueling Activities, etc.),

Organizational Performance / Leadership Fundamentals (Culture/Behaviors), and Problem Identification & Resolution (Cross-Cutting Issues).

Dr. Mary Jo Rogers (President of Rogers Leadership Group)

Authored the book Nuclear Energy Leadership: Lessons Learned from U.S. Operators (PennWell) and several published articles in HazardEx and Power Engineering magazines. Dr.

Rogers has 25 years of experience consulting to commercial nuclear power, electric and gas utility companies, the U.S. Department of Energy, DOE contractors, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NCNR), among others. She has conducted board-requested

Page 167 of 174 effectiveness assessments of risk reduction programs and multiple safety culture assessments.

Her extensive background and education enable her to apply psychological and behavioral science principles, combined with real-world utility and business experience, to help individuals and organizations uncover the values, beliefs, and behaviors that may be limiting their performance.

Bruce OBrien (ATL International Director of Reactor Safety and Performance Improvement)

Over 50 years of experience in commercial nuclear power, naval submarine operations, and shipyard work. He has held senior management roles in Operations, Maintenance, Training, and Work/Outage Management, and has held an SRO license. Since joining Marathon Consulting Group in 2000, Bruce has taken on increasing leadership responsibilities, becoming President and CEO in January 2016. He has led major recovery efforts at multiple stations across North America and Africa, including several successful exits from NRCs Column 4 (Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone) of the ROP Action Matrix. His work includes project governance, regulatory interface, assessment oversight, procedure development, and senior leadership mentoring. Past assignments include leadership roles in maintenance and work management at Nine Mile Point, project leadership for emergency diesel system improvements, outage benchmarking at Pickering Nuclear Generating Station, and performance assessment at Koeberg Station in South Africa.

John Ettien (TFE Inc. Director of Operations & Technical Services)

More than 43 years of experience in program/project/facility management, procedure development and implementation, training, and qualification, conduct of operations (CONOPS),

and regulatory compliance to include over 21 years of experience directly supporting the U.S.

Department of Energy (DOE) and its prime contractors. His relevant experience includes Waste Disposition Operations Manager; Oak Ridge Reservation Landfill (ORRLF) Operations Manager; Operations Manager for the K-25 Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D)

Project; and Deputy Project Manager (DPM) for the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) chemical defueling project. He served as the Program Manager for URS l CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) Facility Management, training all UCOR Facility Managers (FMs) and implementing CONOPS organization wide for UCOR. Mr. Ettien also served as the Lockout/Tagout Subject Matter Expert (SME) and the Hazardous Energy Program Manager for UCOR. He was also the DPM for the U.S. Spent Fuel Team in the DPRK and mentor to the Operations Managers at the Comanche Peak, Point Beach, and Sizewell B Nuclear Plants. Mr.

Ettien is trained in Tap Root Cause Analysis and has participated in performing Root Cause Analysis utilizing other methodologies. Mr. Ettien has an active DOE "Q" clearance.

Kristen McDuffie (Planned Systems International (PSI), Communications Specialist)

Kristen McDuffie is a marketing and professional with over 15 years of experience in strategy development, brand messaging, and stakeholder engagement. Currently a Communications Specialist at Planned Systems International, she leads communication strategies based on safety culture assessments, collaborating with NCNR leadership to identify needs and craft effective plans. Kristen develops project execution frameworks, aligns sub-teams with clear missions, and evaluates communication channels to drive strategic improvements. Her expertise spans quality assurance, compliance, executive support, market research, and change management. Known for her data-driven leadership and commitment to organizational effectiveness, Kristen consistently delivers impactful solutions across diverse communications initiatives.

Page 168 of 174 5: INSCA Background Detail The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) owns and operates a heavy water-moderated nuclear test reactor and associated neutron beam research facility. The NCNRs reactor is licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under the name National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR).

On February 3, 2021, the chief of NCNR Reactor Operations and Engineering notified the NRC (event notification EN 55094) of an alert concerning elevated radiation levels at the NIST Reactor. Pursuant to the event notification received from NCNR staff on February 3, 2021, the NRC initiated a special inspection at the NCNR. On April 14, 2021, the NRC staff issued an interim special inspection report to provide an initial assessment of their understanding of the event sequence, consequences, and the NCNRs response to the event (ADAMS Accession No. ML21077A094).

On March 16, 2022, the NRC released a final report of its initial conclusion from its special inspection report. The NRCs final report confirms and expands on many aspects of NISTs analysis of the incident, pointing to deficiencies in policies, procedures, training, and safety culture as contributing to the incident.

On August 1, 2022, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order Modifying License No. TR-5. The issued Confirmatory Order documents the NIST NCNR completed and planned actions, as well as the commitments made by NIST to enable the safe operation of the research reactor in the NCNR.

On June 2, 2023, the Final Report for the baseline Independent Third-Party Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment of the NIST Center For Neutron Research was issued. This report was an independent and critical assessment of NCNR-ROEs performance compared to INPO 12-012 /

NUREG 2165 Nuclear Safety Culture Traits. This assessment established the state of NCNR-ROEs Nuclear Safety Culture and described it by NSC traits and attributes. This report identified gaps and made recommendations for improvement in several organizational areas.

On June 7, 2024, the Final Report for the second Independent Third-Party Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment of the NIST Center For Neutron Research was issued. This report was an independent and critical assessment of NCNR-ROEs performance compared to INPO 12-012 /

NUREG 2165 Nuclear Safety Culture Traits. This assessment established the current state of NCNR-ROEs Nuclear Safety Culture and described it by NSC traits and attributes, as well as identified the sustainability and effectiveness of the identified recommended corrective actions within the identified areas in the baseline INSCA.

This task (Task 16) provides a third independent and comprehensive assessment of the existing Organizational Nuclear Safety Culture, including the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) at the NIST Center for Neutron Research. The assessment will be performed in accordance with the requirements of the August 1, 2022, Confirmatory Order Modifying License No. TR-5, which required a second Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment, within 12 months of completing the second assessment, to ensure sustainability and effectiveness of the identified recommendation corrective actions within the identified areas.

Page 169 of 174 6: NRC Inspection Report - Confirmatory Order Excerpt

Reference:

NRC Inspection Report,

Subject:

National Institute of Standards and Technology, Center for Neutron Research - Confirmatory Order, Dated August 1, 2022

2. Nuclear safety program assessments

a. Nuclear safety culture assessment

i. Within 6 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will hire a third-party, independent nuclear consultant (consultant) to conduct an independent third-party nuclear safety culture assessment. The contract will specify that the consultant will assist NCNR in the implementation of the recommendations and corrective actions identified in the assessment to prevent recurrence of the February 3, 2021, event or similar events at the NBSR.

ii. Prior to issuance of the Request for Quotations, NCNR will include criteria equivalent to the those described in Section 03.02.c.1, c.2, and c.3 of Inspection Procedure 95003, Supplemental Inspection for Repetitive Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs or One Red Input, dated June 7, 2022, to ensure a consultant with the appropriate qualifications is identified.

iii. Within 6 months of contract award to the consultant, NCNR will submit a copy of the safety assessment report and NCNRs written response to the assessment report to the NRC. NCNRs written response will either address how it will implement the recommendations and corrective actions of the assessment report, including a proposed timeline; or provide an explanation and justification for why the recommendation(s) and corrective action(s) will not be implemented.

iv. Within 2 months of submitting the assessment report to the NRC, the NCNR Director shall issue written and verbal communications providing the results of the assessment, recommendations, and corrective actions to the NCNR staff. At least 30 days prior to issuing the written communication, NCNR will provide the statement for NRC staff review. Within 15 days of receiving the statement, the NRC staff will provide feedback to NCNR staff. NCNR will notify the NRC when the statement is issued.

v. The assessment will include employee surveys, the review of anonymous reports, and contractor-conducted interviews and focus groups to assess the effectiveness of the programs.

vi. NCNR will ensure this consultant is provided with all necessary materials, reports, and access to personnel to complete its assessment. The reports shall include the NRC special inspection report dated March 16, 2022, future NRC inspection reports regarding the February 3, 2021, event, and NCNR safety evaluation committee and safety assessment committee (SEC/SAC) reports.

vii. Within 12 months of completing the initial assessment, the consultant will perform a second assessment to ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of the corrective actions within the identified areas. Within 30 days of receiving the report, NCNR will submit a copy of the second assessment report to the NRC.

viii. Within 12 months of completing the second assessment, the consultant will conduct a third assessment to ensure long term sustainability and effectiveness of the identified

Page 170 of 174 recommendations and corrective actions. Within 30 days of receiving the report, NCNR will submit a copy of the third assessment report to the NRC.

Excerpt from NRC Inspection Manual, Inspection Procedure IP 95003: Supplemental Inspection Response to Action Matrix Column 4 (Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone) Inputs, Effective Date: June 7, 2022

c. Qualification Requirements for SCAs

1. The team leader should coordinate with the program office to select the lead SCA.

The lead SCA will determine the size of the SCA team and members.

2. The lead SCA, in coordination with the team leader, should verify that the SCAs collectively possess the education and experience needed in the following areas:

Knowledge of methods for gathering safety culture data through: (1) individual and group interviews, (2) structured and unstructured interviews, (3) surveys, (4) behavioral observations and checklists, and (5) case studies.

Ability to determine the applicability and usefulness of various data-gathering methods under different circumstances.

Ability to implement the different methods correctly, including, but not limited to (1) conducting focus groups and interviews in a manner that elicits the desired Issue Date:

06/07/22 22 95003 information while reducing potential biases in the responses, (2) conducting reliable (i.e., repeatable) structured behavioral observations, and (3) collecting insights from written documentation and verbal communications; Knowledge of the requirements for developing, administering, and analyzing the results of surveys and questionnaires, including knowledge of: (1) the strengths and weaknesses of different item types (Likert, BARS, forced-choice, etc.); (2) the requirements for administering a survey to reduce potential biases in the responses; (3) behavioral statistics and the appropriate methods, and their constraints, for analyzing survey data; and (4) statistical requirements for the different types of validity and reliability, and appropriate techniques to assess, measure, and establish them; Knowledge of the rationale for a multiple-measures approach and an ability to assess the limitations of a single-method safety culture assessment.

Knowledge of statistical and conceptual constraints on determining appropriate sample sizes for each method.

Knowledge of the alternatives for selecting samples for the assessment and the biases introduced by different sample selection strategies.

Knowledge of theories and research in organizational and human behavior.

Ability to integrate results from applying the different methods to arrive at defensible conclusions.

Knowledge of the ROP and applicable inspection requirements and techniques; and Knowledge of theory and research in safety culture.

3. The knowledge and experience of the selected SCAs should be evaluated promptly by the lead SCA to identify any training needs. The selected SCAs should complete the identified training before participating in IP 95003 inspection activities.

Page 171 of 174 7: Definitions Safety Culture: The set of core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment. (NUREG 2165, Safety Culture Common Language, INPO 12-012, Traits of a healthy Nuclear Safety Culture.

Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE): A working environment where personnel feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or discrimination because they raised the issue.

Integrated Safety Culture: The term integrated safety culture includes the values and beliefs associated with nuclear safety, occupational safety, radiological safety, security, and environmental safety.

Nuclear Safety: The achievement of proper operating conditions and the prevention or mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in the protection of workers, the public, and the environment from undue radiation hazards.

Radiation Safety: The protection of people from the harmful effects of exposure to ionizing radiation, and the means for achieving this.

Occupational Safety: The reduction of the risk of injury, loss, and danger to people, property, or the environment in any facility or place involving the manufacturing, producing, and processing of goods or merchandise.

Nuclear Security: The prevention, or detection and response, to intentional malicious acts involving radioactive substances or directed against facilities or activities where such substances are used.

Environmental Safety: The guidance, policies, and practices enforced to ensure that the surrounding environment is free from hazards that will warrant the safety and well-being of workers, employees, and residents near industrial operations, as well as the prevention of accidental environmental damage.

Organization Structure: The collective group of all individuals, the reporting structure, and the procedures, policies, and practices that individuals use to set goals and make decisions, to accomplish tasks, and to implement and maintain a healthy integrated safety culture.

NIST Senior Leadership: NIST decision makers who are responsible for setting the long-term strategic goals for the NCNR organization; in addition, develop and implement NIST policies.

Director / Deputy Director: Individuals who are responsible for the execution of business activities, including setting priorities for and monitoring the performance of the organization.

Leaders: Individuals who influence, coach, or lead others within the organization and determine the vision, goals, or objectives of their teams; leaders include NIST Senior

Page 172 of 174 Leadership, Directors, Chiefs, Supervisors, and others who influence individuals in the organization.

Chiefs and Leads: Individuals assigned to managerial positions who control, direct, guide, and advise.

Supervisors: Individuals who provide direction of the day-to-day activities of individual contributors; supervisors may include reactor supervisors, engineering supervisors, team leaders or work leaders.

Individual Contributors: Individuals who operate individually or as members of work groups to accomplish tasks; individual contributors may include leaders when leaders are acting in a nonsupervisory capacity or are accomplishing tasks as members of a work group.

Individuals: All people at all levels of the organization; individuals include all leaders, individual contributors, and supplemental personnel.

Supplemental Personnel: Individuals who accomplish work for but are not employees of the NCNR organization. Supplemental personnel include short-and long-term contractors, vendors, OFPM Office of Facilities and Property Management, research and science personnel and any other individuals who are not employed by the organization but occasionally perform work at NCNR.

Work Groups: Groups of individuals who work collaboratively to accomplish tasks; work groups may exist at any level of the organization.

Independent Oversight Organizations: Groups that independently review the performance and direction of the NCNR organization. This includes the NCNR Safety Evaluation Committee (SEC) and the NCNR Safety Assessment Committee (SAC), as well as independent reviews from groups outside of the NCNR organization.

Assessment Categories for Traits and Initiatives Area of Strength (AOS): Performance that is exceptionally effective in achieving its desired results; a program, process, or activity of such high quality that it could serve as an example for other similar elements.

Positive Observation (PO) - A performance, program, or element that is sufficient to meet its basic intent and does not require additional management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Area in Need of Attention (ANA): A performance, program, or process element that is sufficient to meet its basic intent, but that requires management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Area for Improvement (AFI): A performance, program, or process element that requires significant improvement to obtain the desired results in a consistent and effective manner.

Page 173 of 174 Area of Interest (AOI): A performance, program, or process element that is sufficient to meet its basic intent but would benefit from management attention to achieve full effectiveness and consistency.

Page 174 of 174 8: References US DOE G 414.1-1C, Management and Independent Assessments Guide US NRC Inspection Procedure 95003 US NRC Inspection Procedure 95003 Attachment 02 US NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, Oversight of Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition NUREG 2165, Safety Culture Common Language INPO 12-012, Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, dated March 2014 Research Report RSP-0060, Development of a Regulatory Organizational and Management Review Method. Haber, S.B. and Barriere, M.T., dated June 7, 2022 Task Order 01 dated January 31, 2023 (and additional documents referenced therein)

Safety Culture Policy Statement (76 FR 34773; dated June 14, 2011)

Special Inquiry into Oversight of Research and Test Reactors, OIG Case NO. I2100162 Technical Specifications for the NIST Test Reactor (NBSR) License No. TR-5 Appendix A Safety Analysis Report for the National Institute of Standards and Technology Reactor NBSR-14 NEA, No. 7673, OECD, 2024, Practice for Enhancing Leadership for Safety in Nuclear Regulatory Bodies Measure of A Leader, Aubrey Daniels, published 2007.

Note: Various references were reviewed, verbalized, and/or presented during interviews, focus groups, and/or subsequent discussions with NCNR and INSCA team personnel. The results of the reviews, verbalizations, and/or presentations were factored into the conclusions within this report.