ML25168A165
| ML25168A165 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/19/1983 |
| From: | Ray J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Dircks W NRC/EDO |
| References | |
| Download: ML25168A165 (1) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMlTTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS WASHtNGTON, D. C. 20555 December 19, 1983 Mr. William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
- u. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Dircks:
SUBJECT:
ACRS ACTION ON REVISION 1 TO PROPOSED REGULATORY GUIDE 1.89 ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS During its 284th meeting, December 15-16, 1983, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards concurred in the regulatory position of the pro-posed Regulatory Guide 1.89 on Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety For Nuclear Power Plants (Task No. EE 042-2),
dated November, 1983.
We note that the title of the Regulatory Guide refers to "electric equip-ment important to safety" whereas the Guide itself applies to 11safety-related 11 electrical equipment and to only certain equipment in the larger category of "important to safety."
We believe that the current attempts to clarify these categories is poorly served by the lack of clarity and specificity produced by this difference between title and text.
In our view, a more appropriate, and correct, title would refer to 11 certain electrical equipment important to safety."
In addition, we note that this Guide provides specific guidance for quali-fication of certain ~lectrical equipment important to safety only for environments resulting from L0CA and MSLB.
In the past, the Committee has expressed concerns related to the qualification of such equipment for other off-normal or accident situations, particularly as may be ex-perienced by equipment which is located in a normally 11mild 11 environment.
Such situations might include sprays caused by inadvertent activation of fire suppression equipment or failure of fire protection piping.
We have also expressed reservations concerning the qualification of *electrical equi-pment located in wet-steam environments caused by failure of hot water or $team lines located outside containment, resulting in condensation or deposition of entrained water droplets in the equipment.
We reaffirm these 3102
Mr. William December 19, 1983 concerns and recommend that the NRC Staff consider the need to provide additional regulatory guidance concerning qualification for such conditions.
Sincerely,
-~
J. J. Ray Chairman
Reference:
Revision l to Regulatory Guide 1.89,,.Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," Division 1, Task EE 042-2, dated November 1983 3103