NL-25-0045, Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-2025-10 for Containment Unbonded Post-Tensioning System Inservice Inspection Requirements in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) (NL-25-0045)
| ML25058A186 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley |
| Issue date: | 02/27/2025 |
| From: | Coleman J Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| NL-25-0045, FNP-ISI-ALT-2025-10 | |
| Download: ML25058A186 (1) | |
Text
Regulatory Affairs 3535 Colonnade Parkway Birmingham AL 35243 205 992 5000 February 2, 2025 Docket Nos.: 50-348 NL-25-0045 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-2025-10 for Containment Unbonded Post-Tensioning System Inservice Inspection Requirements in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)
Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) hereby requests Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval of proposed inservice inspection (ISI) alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-2025-10 for Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Units 1 and 2. This proposed alternative, described in the Enclosure, would extend the inspection exam frequency of ASME Section XI Table IWL-2500-1 Examination Category L-B for item numbers L2.10, L2.20, L2.30, L2.40 and L2.50.
The Enclosure provides the justification for the requested alternative. Attachment 1 contains FNP Units 1 and 2 specific information to support the applicability of the methods in the Enclosure.
NRC approval is requested within twelve months of acceptance to support application of the revised schedule to the affected examination.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-25-0045 Page 2 This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Ryan Joyce at 205.992.6468.
Respectfully submitted, Jamie M. Coleman Regulatory Affairs Director JMC/was/cbg
Enclosure:
Proposed Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-2025-10 in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)
Attachment:
Plant-Specific Tendon Report FNP Units 1 and 2 cc:
Regional Administrator, Region ll NRR Project Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant Senior Resident Inspector - Farley Nuclear Plant RType: CFA04.054
ENCLOSURE Proposed Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-2025-10 in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)
Enclosure to NL-25-0045 Proposed Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-2025-10 in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)
E-1 Request for Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-2025-10 for Containment Unbonded Post-Tensioning System Inservice Inspection Requirements in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) 1.0 ASME CODE COMPONENTS AFFECTED:
Code Class:
==
Description:==
Concrete Components of Light-Water Cooled Plants, IWL-2421, IWL-2520, Table IWL-2500-1 Examination Category: Table IWL-2500-1, Category L-B Item Numbers:
L2.10 - Tendon L2.20 - Wire or strand L2.30 - Anchorage hardware and surrounding concrete L2.40 - Corrosion protection medium L2.50 - Free water Component Number:
Farley Unit 1 Containment Building Farley Unit 2 Containment Building 2.0 APPLICABLE CODE EDITION AND ADDENDA:
The Fifth 10-year Inservice Inspection (ISI) interval Code of Record for Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2 is the 2007 Edition through the 2008 Addenda of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components. The current fifth 10-year interval start date was December 1, 2017, and the current scheduled interval end date is November 30, 2027.
Note: Present-day Subsection IWL requirements for concrete containment in-service inspection were originally intended to be a part of ASME Section III Division 2, specifically, Article CC-9000. As Division 2 does not address ISI intervals, scheduling of containment ISI examinations was keyed to the date of the pre-operational structural integrity test (SIT).
Well into the development of CC-9000, ASME Codes & Standards transferred responsibility for its development to Section XI as Subsection IWL. This necessitated various changes to format and references. However, no change was made to the examination scheduling requirements; these are still tied to the SIT date rather than the Section XI ISI interval. As a result, scheduled examination activities often cross interval boundaries. This should be considered during the evaluation of the relief request.
Enclosure to NL-25-0045 Proposed Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-2025-10 in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)
E-2 3.0 APPLICABLE CODE REQUIREMENT:
Subsection IWL-2421(b) states that when the conditions of IWL-2421(a) are met, the inspection dates and examination requirements may be as follows:
(1) For the containment with the first Structural Integrity Test, all examinations required by IWL-2500 shall be performed at 1, 3, and 10 years and every 10 years thereafter. Only the examinations required by IWL-2524 and IWL-2525 need be performed at 5 and 15 years and every 10 years thereafter.
(2) For each subsequent containment constructed at the site, all examinations required by IWL-2500 shall be performed at 1, 5, and 15 years and every 10 years thereafter. Only the examinations required by IWL-2524 and IWL-2525 need be performed at 3 and 10 years and every 10 years thereafter.
Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP), Unit 1 and Unit 2 is currently required to examine the post-tensioning system every 10 years.
x Note: Farley received approval to use ASME IWL-2421(b) schedule for sites with two units during the 1st Containment Inspection Interval and subsequent intervals, reference NRC letter to Mr. L.M. Stinson, Southern Nuclear, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Request for Relief No. RR-57 and RR-58 Regarding Containment Tendon Inspections (TAC Nos. MC7209 and MC7210), ADAMS Accession No. ML060830221.
Subsection IWL-2500 requires examinations be performed in accordance with the requirements of Table IWL-2500-1.
Table IWL-2500-1, Item Number L2.10 requires that selected tendon force and elongation be measured.
Table IWL-2500-1, Item Number L2.20 requires that tendon single wire samples be removed and examined for corrosion and mechanical damage as well as tested to obtain yield strength, ultimate tensile strength, and elongation on each removed wire. The selected tendons are subsequently re-tensioned as required per IWL-2523.3 because wire removal requires de-tensioning to safely obtain wire samples.
Table IWL-2500-1, Item Number L2.30 requires that a detailed visual examination be performed on selected tendon anchorage hardware and adjacent concrete extending 2 feet from the edge of the bearing plate. The quantity of free water released from the anchorage end cap as well as any which drains from the tendon during examination shall be documented.
Table IWL-2500-1, Item numbers L2.40 and L2.50 require that samples of selected tendon corrosion protection medium (CPM) and free water be obtained and analyzed.
4.0 REASON FOR REQUEST:
ASME Section XI Subsection IWL requires periodic visual examination of Containment Building concrete as well as physical testing of post-tensioning systems. The examination and testing to date have indicated the post-tensioning system is expected to maintain its safety-related function through the period of extended operation for Unit 1 (June 2037) and
Enclosure to NL-25-0045 Proposed Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-2025-10 in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)
E-3 Unit 2 (March 2041). This alternative request proposes the examination frequency in Table IWL-2500-1, Examination Category L-B, Items L2.30 through L2.50, be increased from the present five years to 10 years in accordance with the schedule presented in Section 5.0.
Also, it is proposed that the interval between tendon force measurements (L2.10) be adjusted from the present 10 years in accordance with an alternating program shown in Section 5.0.
Based on maintaining an acceptable level of quality and safety, there are additional benefits to extending physical testing. Physical testing of tendons exposes personnel to various industrial safety hazards, including working at heights, handling high-pressure hydraulics, and operating near high energy systems and stored elastic energy. The work is often performed in difficult-to-reach areas, sometimes in adverse weather conditions, and involves exposure to hazardous materials such as solvents, hot petroleum products, and occasionally radiation fields. Removing tendon end caps and load testing or de-tensioning/tensioning the tendons unnecessarily cycles the tendons and exposes the system to an unsealed environment.
Reducing the frequency of tendon testing and eliminating tendon end cap removal can mitigate these risks, minimize environmental waste, and enhance safety for personnel.
5.0 PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE AND BASIS FOR USE:
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1), FNP, Unit 1 & Unit 2 are proposing alternative examination requirements on the basis that these alternative actions will provide an acceptable level of quality and safety.
FNP, Unit 1 & Unit 2 will continue to perform a General Visual Examination and Detailed Visual Examination (when required) of accessible concrete and exposed steel hardware as required by Section XI Table IWL-2500-1, Item Numbers L1.11 and L1.12, as modified by 10 CFR 50.55a. If an end anchorage area general visual examination uncovers a condition indicative of possible damage to the enclosed post-tensioning system hardware or an anchor head failure, the end cap will be removed for further examination and evaluation by the Responsible Engineer (RE). Additional actions will be taken as specified by the RE following the evaluation.
The examination and physical testing of post-tensioning systems per the requirements of Section XI Table IWL-2500-1 Item Numbers L2.10, L2.30, L2.40, and L2.50 will be increased in accordance with the schedule presented below.
It is also requested that removal and testing of tendon wires item number L2.20 be done only when specified by the Responsible Engineer. This will eliminate the routine need to de-tension and re-tension tendons and the consequent possible damage to the remaining wires.
In addition, it is requested that routine CPM testing item number L2.40 be limited to determination of absorbed water content and that additional tests for corrosive ion concentration and neutralization number be performed only if:
- Active corrosion is found on anchorage components and / or tendon wires.
- Free water is found at anchorages.
- CPM absorbed water content exceeds the Table IWL-2525-1 acceptance limit.
- And, otherwise if specified by the RE.
Eliminating routine ion concentration and neutralization number testing has the benefit of reducing the quantity of hazardous reagents to be disposed of by the testing laboratory.
Enclosure to NL-25-0045 Proposed Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-2025-10 in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)
E-4 Table 1 Current Examination Schedule Current Tendon Surveillance Schedule (includes the four most recent Unit 1 and Unit 2 surveillances for reference)
Year Units 1 & 2 Visual Examination, CPM Sampling &
Free Water Collection / Testing Tendon Force Measurement 2006 Performed Performed 2012 Performed N/A 2017 Performed Performed 2021 Performed N/A 2026 Perform Perform 2031a Perform N/A 2036 Perform Perform 2041a Perform N/A 2046 Perform Perform 2051b Perform N/A Table 2 Proposed Examination Schedule Proposed Tendon Surveillance Schedule (includes the four most recent Unit 1 and Unit 2 surveillances for reference)
Year Units 1 & 2 Visual Examination, CPM Sampling &
Free Water Collection / Testing Tendon Force Measurement 2006 Performed Performed 2012 Performed N/A 2017 Performed Performed 2021 Performed N/A 2031a Perform Perform 2041a Perform N/A 2051b Perform Perform Note a: For scheduling purposes, each future surveillance is due at mid-year and must be performed between 30 June of the year prior to the year shown and 30 June of the year following the year shown. 2041 exams will only apply to Unit 2 unless Unit 1 is granted subsequent license extension.
Note b: Schedule continues as above if subsequent license extension is granted.
x Include Unit 1 Groups 1 and 2 augmented examinations (examinations of tendons subject to repair / replacement activity during 2012 and 2019) with the Population 1 (see footnote
Enclosure to NL-25-0045 Proposed Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-2025-10 in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)
E-5 in Section 1.2 of Technical Report in Attachment) examinations to be performed per the above schedule.
x Eliminate the requirement for de-tensioning / re-tensioning of tendons, wire removal and wire sample testing (Subsection IWL Table IWL-2500-1 Item L2.20) unless specified by the RE.
x Limit initial corrosion protection medium laboratory tests (Subsection IWL Table IWL-2500-1 Item L2.40) to that which determines absorbed water content; perform the corrosive ion and reserve alkalinity tests only on those samples that have a water content above the acceptance limit, are collected at an anchorage where free water and / or corrosion is found or if specified by the IWL Responsible Engineer (RE).
The Attachment to this Enclosure provides a detailed discussion of the historical basis for examination and testing of containment post-tensioning systems. The Attachment to this Enclosure also includes the FNP, Unit 1 & Unit 2 specific observations that provide a basis for deviation from the Section XI examination and testing requirements included in Table IWL-2500-1, Examination Category L-B.
Additional Supporting Actions ASME Section XI Subsection IWL program at FNP, Unit 1 & Unit 2 is credited for managing Containment Building degradation. The Examination Category L-A visual examinations (every 5 years) being performed are expected to be capable of identifying conditions that would allow water intrusion into the tendons and gross leakage of CPM which would be precursors for providing an environment that could allow corrosion of the tendon wires or inaccessible tendon hardware covered by the tendon end cap. Such conditions would be evaluated by the RE to identify required additional actions to assure no corrosive environmental conditions exist. FNP, Unit 1 & 2 mean prestressing forces are predicted to be acceptable well beyond the 2037 and 2041 expiration dates of the extended Unit 1 and Unit 2 licenses 45th year (Unit
- 1) / 40th year (Unit 2) surveillance based on acceptable performance over 45 years; therefore, extending the surveillance in accordance with the schedule shown above will continue to provide an acceptable level of quality and safety.
Summary and Conclusions The results of the post-tensioning system inservice examinations conducted at FNP from 1977 to 2021 (Unit 1) and 1980 to 2021 (Unit 2) show that the system is continuing to perform its intended function and that it can be expected to do so until well past the June 2037 (Unit
- 1) and March 2041 (Unit 2) expiration of the extended operating period license. Visual Examination, CPM Sampling & Free Water Collection / Testing, Tendon Force Measurements will be scheduled June 30, 2031, plus or minus one year. General Visual examination (L1.11) of all accessible concrete surface areas will remain scheduled for the 45th year (Unit
- 1) / 40th year (Unit 2) surveillance which will occur in 2026 and will continue to be performed in accordance with IWL requirements.
6.0 DURATION OF PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE:
The proposed alternative is requesting to follow the proposed schedule shown in section 5.0 Table 2. As noted in the preceding Proposed Tendon Surveillance Schedule the 60-year license for Unit 1 expires before the 2041 inspection date and Unit 2 expires the year of the 2041 inspection date. If the license for Farley Units 1 and 2 is not renewed, then this 2041 inspection would not occur. If the license for Farley Units 1 and 2 is extended beyond the existing end dates, the Proposed
Enclosure to NL-25-0045 Proposed Alternative FNP-ISI-ALT-2025-10 in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)
E-6 Tendon Surveillance Schedule would continue with the same alternating schedule until the end of the new license date.
7.0 PRECEDENTS
This submittal is similar to NRC Approved requests listed below.
x Letter from Michael Markley (USNRC) to Cheryl A. Gayheart (Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc.), Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Inservice Inspection Alternative VEGP-ISI-ALT-19-01 for Containment Tendon Inservice Inspection Extension (EPID No. L-2019-LLR-0017), dated July 11, 2019, ADAMS Accession No. ML19182A077.
x Letter from Michael Markley (USNRC) to Steven Snider (Duke Energy),
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 - PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO ASME CODE RE: CONTAINMENT UNBONDED POST-TENSIONING SYSTEM INSERVICE INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (EPID L-2021-LLR-0034), dated December 7, 2021, ADAMS Accession No. ML21335A106 x
Letter from James G. Danna (USNRC) to Daniel Stoddard (Dominion Energy),
MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNITS 2 - PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE RR-05-05 TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ASME CODE RE: CONTAINMENT UNBONDED POST-TENSIONING SYSTEM INSERVICE INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (EPID L-2019-LLR-0120), dated October 20, 2020, ADAMS Accession No. ML20287A471
8.0 ACRONYMS
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers CFR Code of Federal Regulations CPM Corrosion Protection Medium FNP Farley Nuclear Plant ISI Inservice Inspection NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PSI Preservice inspection PWR Pressurized Water Reactor RE Responsible Engineer SIT Structural Integrity Test
9.0 REFERENCES
Code,Section XI, 2007 Edition, 2008 Addenda.
- 2) Farley Nuclear Plant 5th Ten Year interval Inspection Plan and Schedule
ATTACHMENT Plant-Specific Tendon Report FNP Units 1 and 2
FNP RR Technical Report Page 1 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 CONTAINMENT POST-TENSIONING SYSTEM INSERVICE INSPECTION BASIS FOR PROPOSED EXTENSION OF EXAMINATION INTERVAL TECHNICAL REPORT Report Prepared by:
Howard T. Hill, PhD, P.E. (California Civil Certificate C 22265)
BCP Technical Services, Inc.
Revision 1 / 20 June 2023
FNP RR Technical Report Page 2 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Table of Contents
- 1. PURPOSE, CONTAINMENT / ISI PROGRAM DESCRIPTION AND ORGANIZATION............................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Containment Description............................................................................................. 4 1.2 Containment ISI Program Summary Description................................................. 6 1.3 Report Organization..................................................................................................... 7
- 2.
SUMMARY
OF PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES....................................................................... 8
- 3. BACKGROUND OF CURRENT ISI REQUIREMENTS AND BASIS FOR PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES................................................................................................... 10 3.1 Regulatory Guide 1.35............................................................................................... 10 3.2 ASME Section XI / Subsection IWL....................................................................... 11 3.3 USNRC Regulation 10CFR50.55a......................................................................... 11 3.4 Basis for Proposed Deviations / Relief from 10CFR50.55a and IWL Requirements............................................................................................................................ 11
- 4. FNP EXAMINATION HISTORY AND RESULTS ANALYSIS / EVALUATION............ 17 4.1 Tendon Force Trends and Forecasts.................................................................... 19 4.2 End Anchorage Condition......................................................................................... 26 4.3 Wire Examination and Test Results Evaluation................................................. 40 4.4 Corrosion Protection Medium Testing................................................................... 42
- 5. OVERALL
SUMMARY
, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS....................... 46 5.1 Surveillance Results Overall Summary................................................................ 46 5.2 Conclusions................................................................................................................... 47 5.3 Recommendations...................................................................................................... 48
- 6. REFERENCES................................................................................................................................ 50
- 7. TABLES AND FIGURES.............................................................................................................. 53
FNP RR Technical Report Page 3 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 ACI ANS ANSI ASME ASTM BH CPM EF FNP FSAR ILRT kip ksi LCL MRV MT NCR NRC ORNL pH ppm Rc RE SIT LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS American Concrete Institute American Nuclear Society American National Standards Institute American Society of Mechanical Engineers American Society for Testing and Materials Buttonhead Corrosion protection medium Elongation at failure Farley Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report Integrated leakage rate test Kilo-pound (1,000 pounds)
Kips per square inch Lower confidence limit Minimum Required Value Magnetic particle testing NoQ-conformance report Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oak Ridge National Laboratory Potential of hydrogen (a measure of acidity or basicity)
Parts per million Rockwell C (a measure of hardness)
Responsible Engineer Structural Integrity Test USNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission UTS Ultimate tensile strength
FNP RR Technical Report Page 4 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620
- 1. PURPOSE, CONTAINMENT / ISI PROGRAM DESCRIPTION AND ORGANIZATION This report provides the technical evaluation / justification supporting a request for relief to allow alternatives to certain containment in-service inspection (ISI) requirements specified in USNRC Regulation 10CFR50.55a (Reference 6.1) and, by reference therein, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWL (Reference 6.2). The current Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) containment ISI program conforms to these regulatory and code requirements with modifications as allowed by approved relief requests.
1.1 Containment Description The FNP containments are essentially identical reinforced and post-tensioned concrete pressure vessels that serve as the final barriers (after fuel cladding and the reactor coolant system pressure boundary) against the release of radioactive material from the reactor core to the outside environment. The design basis internal pressure for both containments is 54 psig (Final Safety Analysis Report, Reference 6.3).
Each containment consists of a conventionally reinforced concrete flat base mat with a central reactor cavity connected to and supporting a pre-stressed concrete cylinder and a pre-stressed concrete shallow dome.
The cylinder is thickened at three equally-spaced locations with vertical buttresses that provide anchorage for the hoop pre-stressing tendons (see below).
The dome consists of a central spherical cap and outer toroidal section that transitions into a massive ring girder which serves as a connection between the dome and cylinder.
The ring girder also provides anchorage for the dome pre-stressing tendons and the upper ends of the vertical tendons. The interior surface of the containment is lined with a 1/4 inch (thicker at penetration regions) steel plate for leak tightness. Principal containment dimensions are, as shown in Reference 6.3:
x Cylinder inside radius - 65 ft.
x Inside height - 183 ft.
x Cylinder wall concrete thickness (increases at the wall to mat haunch) - 3 ft. 9 in.
x Dome thickness (increases at the transition to the ring girder) - 3 ft. 3 in.
x Base mat thickness - 9 ft.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 5 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 The cylinder wall and dome are post-tensioned with 1701 wire BBRV (wires anchored by cold-formed buttonheads) tendons. The ASTM A421 (Reference 6.4) wires have a diameter of 0.250 inches and a specified minimum ultimate tensile strength of 240 ksi.
The cylindrical wall is pre-stressed with both circumferential (hoop) and vertical tendons.
Wall circumferential pre-stressing consists of 1352 tendons arranged in 3 overlapping 45-tendon sub-groups, each spanning 240 degrees plus the width of a buttress. Vertically adjacent sub-groups are offset by 120 degrees to provide continuous overlap of pre-stressing force. Circumferential (hoop) tendons anchor at the buttress faces.
Circumferential tendon designations include two letters identifying the buttresses at which the tendons are anchored. The order of the letters, which may differ depending on the source document, is not significant; i.e., H20AB and H20BA identify the same tendon.
Wall vertical pre-stressing consists of 130 tendons anchored at the top of the ring girder and the bottom of the base mat. A tunnel (the tendon access gallery) below the base mat provides access to the lower anchorages.
Dome pre-stressing consists 93 tendons arranged in 3 layered sub-groups, each having 31 equally spaced and parallel (in plan-view) tendons. The layers intersect at 60 degrees.
Dome tendons anchor at the vertical face of the ring girder.
Tendon forces decrease with time as a result of elastic shortening (the effect of sequential tensioning operations), concrete shrinkage, concrete creep and pre-stressing wire relaxation losses. Mean tendon forces must remain above specified minima to ensure that concrete remains in a state of membrane compression under postulated accident pressure and temperature conditions. Minimum required mean tendon forces as specified in FSAR (Reference 6.3) Paragraph 18.4.3 are shown below. FSAR minima are shown as kips / wire. The kips per tendon minima are computed for 170 wire tendons.
x Hoop Tendon Group:
6.01 kips / wire 1,021.7 kips / tendon x Vertical Tendon Group:
6.81 kips / wire 1,157.7 kips / tendon x Dome Tendon Group 6.35 kips / wire 1,079.5 kips / tendon 1 Due to a duct constriction, Unit 1 tendon H16AC could not be installed with 170 wires; it was installed with 90 wires.
2 Both containments were designed for 135 tendons. Due to a blocked duct, Unit 2 tendon H5EF could not be installed. Following the failure of the H11AB anchor head in 2017, tendon H11BC was de-tensioned and abandoned in place as discussed in Part 4 paragraph 4.2.4.3.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 6 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 1.2 Containment ISI Program Summary Description Continuing structural3 integrity of the FNP containments is verified through regular examinations and tests (also referred to as surveillances) performed in accordance with the requirements of USNRC Regulation 10CFR50.55a (Reference 6.1) and, by reference therein, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWL (Reference 6.2) as modified by approved relief requests. The ISI program, as detailed in the Fifth-Ten-Year ISI Interval Containment Inspection Plan (Reference 6.5), requires visual examination of the entire accessible concrete surface and examination and testing of random samples selected from the tendon population. Surface visual examinations follow the applicable guidelines given in the ACI reports referenced in Subsection IWL and are not considered further in this report which addresses only the pre-stressing system.
Examination and testing of the post-tensioning system currently follows ASME B & PV Code (2007 Edition with 2008 Addenda)Section XI, Subsection IWL requirements as modified by approved relief requests. Examinations and tests, performed on a random sampling of tendons4, are described below:
x Visual Examination Anchorage area concrete and post-tensioning system hardware are visually examined for the following indications of damage or degradation:
o Cracking or spalling at the surface of concrete adjacent to bearing plates.
o Accumulation of water in endcaps.
o Lack of corrosion protection medium (CPM) coverage on anchor heads, shims and buttonheads.
o Corrosion on bearing plates, anchor heads, shims and buttonheads.
o Protruding or missing buttonheads.
o End anchorage component cracking or distortion.
3 Containment liner ISI, performed to assess leak tight integrity, is covered by Subsection IWE and is not addressed in this technical report.
4 Random samples are drawn from the following populations:
Population 1 - All tendons not previously included in a surveillance sample or included in Populations 2 and 3, with the exception of one tendon in each group (hoop, vertical or dome) designated as a common tendon and examined during each consecutive surveillance.
Population 2 - Unit 1 augmented examination Group 1 comprised of tendons subject to repair
/ replacement activity in 2012.
Population 3 - Unit 1 augmented examination Group 2 comprised of tendons subject to repair
/ replacement activity in 2019.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 7 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 x Tendon Force Measurement and Wire Testing5 The force at each end of the sample tendon is measured by applying jacking force just sufficient to loosen the shim stack (thus ensuring that all tendon load is carried by the calibrated jacks).
Also, a single wire (in addition to any found to be broken in service) is removed from one tendon in each group, examined for damage and corrosion and tested to determine yield strength, ultimate strength and elongation at failure.
x CPM Sampling and Testing Samples of CPM are collected at each end of each tendon and analyzed for water content, concentration of corrosive ions and reserve alkalinity.
x Free Water Collection and Testing Free water, if found in sufficient quantity for sampling, is collected and tested to determine pH.
1.3 Report Organization The remainder of this report consists of the following 6 parts:
Part 2 Summary of Proposed Alternatives Part 3 Background of Current ISI Requirements and Basis for Proposed Alternatives Part 4 FNP Examination History and Results Analysis / Evaluation Part 5 Overall Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations Part 6 References Part 7 Tables and Figures 5 In accordance with the provisions of ASME Section XI Paragraph IWL-2421, tendon force measurements and wire extraction / testing follow an alternating schedule as detailed in the Fifth-Ten-Year ISI Interval Containment Inspection Plan (Reference 6.5).
FNP RR Technical Report Page 8 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620
- 2.
SUMMARY
OF PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES The following alternatives to the currently approved ISI program are proposed and evaluated in this report:
x Extend the interval for visual examination (Subsection IWL Table IWL-2500-1 Items 2.30, L2.40 and L2.50) of Unit 1 and Unit 2 end anchorage areas from 5 years to 10 years as shown the schedule below.
x Extend the interval for complete Unit 1 and Unit 2 post-tensioning system examinations that include tendon force measurements (Subsection IWL Table IWL-2500-1 Items 2.10, 2.30, L2.40 and L2.50) in accordance with the following schedule.
Proposed Tendon Surveillance Schedule (includes the four most recent Unit 1 and Unit 2 surveillances for reference)
Year Units 1 & 2 Visual Examination, CPM Sampling &
Free Water Collection / Testing Tendon Force Measurement 2006 Performed Performed 2012 Performed N/A 2017 Performed Performed 2021 Performed N/A 2031a Perform Perform 2041a Perform N/A 2051b Perform Perform Note a: For scheduling purposes, each future surveillance is considered to be due at mid-year and must be performed between 30 June of the year prior to the year shown and 30 June of the year following the year shown.
Note b: If applicable.
x Include Unit 1 Groups 1 and 2 augmented examinations (examinations of tendons subject to repair / replacement activity during 2012 and 2019) with the Population 1 (see footnote in Section 1.2) examinations to be performed per the above schedule.
x Eliminate the requirement for de-tensioning / re-tensioning of tendons, wire removal and wire sample testing (Subsection IWL Table IWL-2500-1 Item 2.20).
x Limit initial corrosion protection medium laboratory tests (Subsection IWL Table IWL-2500-1 Item 2.40) to that which determines absorbed water content; perform the corrosive ion and reserve alkalinity tests only on those samples that have a
FNP RR Technical Report Page 9 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 water content above the acceptance limit, are collected at an anchorage where free water and / or corrosion is found or if specified by the IWL Responsible Engineer6 (RE).
The above proposed alternatives relate only to pre-stressing tendon tests and the associated examinations that require close-in access to tendon end anchorage areas.
Visual examination of the exposed areas of the containment concrete surface and tendon end caps will continue to be performed at 5-year intervals in accordance with past practice.
This report and the Relief Request that it supports address only proposed alternatives to the in-service inspection requirements covered by ASME Section XI, Subsection IWL Table IWL-2500-1 Examination Category L-B. The Category L-A concrete surface examinations will continue to be performed in accordance with Subsection IWL as modified by approved relief requests. Containment liner and penetration assembly examinations and tests will continue to be implemented in accordance with Subsection IWE as modified by approved relief requests.
Based on the evaluation of past examination results as discussed in subsequent sections of this report, it is concluded that implementation of the alternative containment in-service inspection program recommended herein will provide an equivalent level of assurance that the structural integrity of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containments is maintained at the highest level.
6 A registered professional engineer having qualifications and responsibilities as identified in ASME Section XI Paragraph IWL-2330.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 10 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620
- 3. BACKGROUND OF CURRENT ISI REQUIREMENTS AND BASIS FOR PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES Containment in-service inspection (also referred to herein as surveillance and in-service examination) requirements originated with the issuance of Regulatory Guide 1.35 (Reference 6.6) in the early 1970s and are currently mandated by ASME Section XI, Subsection IWL, which is incorporated by reference into USNRC regulation 10CFR50.55a. A brief history of current requirement development is summarized in 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 below. The basis for the proposed alternative program is discussed in 3.4.
3.1 Regulatory Guide 1.35 In February 1973, the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission issued the initial version of Regulatory Guide 1.35, Inservice Surveillance of Ungrouted Tendons in Pre-stressed Concrete Containment Structures. This document, drafted prior to the completion of the first pre-stressed concrete containment structures and well before the accumulation of prototype containment pre-stressing system performance data, described the following as an acceptable basis for system examinations:
x Examination schedule - 1, 3 and 5 years after the pre-operational structural integrity test and every 5 years thereafter.
x Examination sample size - 6 dome, 5 vertical and 10 hoop tendons.
x Wire / strand extraction - one wire / strand from a tendon in each group (dome, vertical, hoop); extraction requires de-tensioning.
x Visual examinations for damage, deterioration and corrosion - corrosion protection medium, end anchorage hardware, anchorage area concrete and extracted wires
/ strands.
x Physical tests - tendon lift-off force and extracted wire / strand strength and elongation at failure.
The regulatory guide does not discuss the basis for the examination interval, the sample size or the various tests and examinations to be included in an acceptable program (these represent consensus opinions reached among the individuals involved in guide development). Also, it does not address the possible need for changes as future operating experience accumulates.
Subsequent revisions to Regulatory Guide 1.35 added procedures for corrosion protection medium chemical analyses (added in Revision 3), substantially changed the sampling process and included numerous other additions and clarifications but retained the examination interval and wire / strand testing program as described in the original 1973 issue. The final revision, Revision 3, was issued in July 1990.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 11 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Regulatory Guide 1.35 was withdrawn in August 2015 following the incorporation, by reference, of ASME Section XI, Subsection IWL into NRC regulation 10CFR50.55a.
3.2 ASME Section XI / Subsection IWL The 1989 edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI included Subsection IWL for the first time, which provided comprehensive and detailed requirements for a concrete containment in-service inspection program. During the development of IWL7, which commenced in the 1970s, it was concluded that NRC acceptance and endorsement (by reference in 10CFR50.55a) of the document would be expedited if departures from the program described in Regulatory Guide 1.35 were minimized. For this reason, the examination interval, strength / elongation testing of wire
/ strand samples and relatively extensive chemical testing of corrosion protection medium samples mandated in IWL are unchanged from those identified in Regulatory Guide 1.35, Rev. 3.
Subsection IWL has been revised numerous times since its initial incorporation into Section XI in 1989. None of these revisions have altered the examination interval or the basic requirement to test wire / strand and corrosion protection medium samples.
3.3 USNRC Regulation 10CFR50.55a The 1996 amendment to 10CFR50.55a incorporated, by reference and with specified exceptions and additions, the ISI requirements given in the 1992 edition with addenda of ASME Section XI, Subsection IWL. Subsequent amendments have referenced later editions / addenda of IWL but none have addressed changes to either the examination interval or the requirements for testing wire / strand and corrosion protection medium samples.
3.4 Basis for Proposed Deviations / Relief from 10CFR50.55a and IWL Requirements
[Note: This section of the technical report includes a generalized summary of post-tensioning system performance observed during 4 decades of periodic examinations conducted at 24 U. S. nuclear plant sites with 41 pre-stressed concrete containments. It is intended to show that containment post-tensioning systems, with few exceptions, are continuing to perform well and that, in general, system examination intervals could be significantly increased without compromising safe operation of the plant.]
7 The author of this technical report has been a member of the IWL working group since the 1970s (when it was still being developed as an addition, CC-9000, to ASME Section III, Division 2) and served as chair of the working group during its later development and much of the period leading up to its incorporation into Section XI in 1989.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 12 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 The material covered in this section is based on the report authors experience as described below:
x Participation in containment post-tensioning system examinations at U. S. and foreign sites.
x USNRC funded research, performed under contract to ORNL, on age-related decrease in pre-stressing force and other age-related effects at ~20 U. S.
containments.
x Four decades of interacting with fellow members of the IWL working group.
x Review of USNRC informational bulletins and generic letters.
x Review of system performance history in connection with preparation of program basis documents for license renewal applications.
x Forecasting tendon forces in connection with the preparation of minimum required pre-stressing force calculations.
x Work on a USNRC-funded project to review and recommend updates to Regulatory Guides 1.35, 1.35.1 and 1.90, which all address in-service inspection of pre-stressed containments.
x A three-year association with the Crystal River 3 containment repair project; assignments included evaluating the condition of tendons not affected by the repair work.
The following summary is qualitative; specific references are not cited as the bases for the generalized statements regarding post-tensioning performance.
As noted in 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 above, the examination intervals and wire / strand testing addressed in the 1973 original issue of Regulatory Guide 1.35 are now, 50 years later, still incorporated effectively unchanged into the current edition of ASME Section XI, Subsection IWL.
In addition, the current edition of ASME Section XI, Subsection IWL specifies corrosion protection medium chemical testing procedures that are effectively unchanged from those described in Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 3, issued in July 1990.
The results of unbonded post-tensioning system examinations performed over the last 4 decades at 24 domestic sites with a total of 41 pre-stressed containments (listed in Table
- 1) provide ample evidence, as discussed below, that prescriptive requirements currently in IWL are in many cases overly conservative. These industry results as well as FNP plant-specific operating experience as subsequently discussed support the implementation of alternative programs with fewer prescriptive requirements.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 13 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Reducing prescriptive requirements, as addressed in this report and the associated Relief Request that it supports, has the following advantages:
x It reduces personnel and equipment safety hazards associated with working at heights, handling of heavy loads, working with high-pressure hydraulic equipment, working close to tendon end anchorages that can suddenly release stored mechanical energy, working with hot (>150 °F) corrosion protection medium that is under pressure, working in proximity to high-energy plant systems and working in radiation-controlled areas.
x It reduces the potentially deleterious cycling of tendon loads that occurs during de-tensioning / re-tensioning for wire removal and to a lesser extent during the measurement of lift-off forces.
The technical justification for the proposed deviations is based on operating experience accumulated over the past 4 decades at the 24 domestic plants with containments having unbonded post-tensioning systems and, in particular, the operating experience documented during the post-tensioning system examinations performed at FNP. The general conclusions regarding post-tensioning system performance are listed below.
Conclusions specific to FNP are addressed in detail in subsequent sections of this report.
3.4.1 Pre-Stressing Force Trend Containment design criteria typically require that the post-tensioning system provide sufficient pre-stressing force at the end of 40 years (period of initial licensure considered to be the plant operating lifetime when design work on existing plants commenced) to maintain membrane compression in the walls and dome under specified accident conditions.
Post-tensioning system design was based on a postulated linear decrease in pre-stressing force with the logarithm of time (log-linear decrease). The log-linear function was selected as this provided a reasonably good fit to the results of relatively short-term creep, shrinkage and relaxation tests and was consistent with expectations based on the calculated response of theoretical models that represent materials as an assemblage of linear springs and dashpots. Concrete creep and shrinkage tests were typically conducted for 180 days and pre-stressing steel relaxation tests for 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> (~40 days).
Designing for a 40-year plant operating lifetime required extrapolating concrete test durations by a factor of 80 and steel test durations by a factor of almost 400.
Post-tensioning system examination data have shown, with relative consistency, that the rate of change of pre-stressing force with the logarithm of time tends to decrease with time. Within 20 to 25 years after the completion of pre-stressing operations, the force
FNP RR Technical Report Page 14 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 time trend becomes essentially flat8. Given this general trend, it can be stated with a high degree of confidence that the examination interval may be increased beyond 10 years with no compromise of safety function if the following conditions are satisfied:
x The current mean pre-stressing force (hoop, vertical, dome, inverted U) computed using both the trend of individual tendon force data acquired to date and the mean of the most recently acquired data exceed the minimum required level by significant margins. The margin deemed significant is established through an evaluation by the Responsible Engineer. If the trend of the mean is considered to be a log-linear function, data acquired during the year 1, 3 and 5 surveillances may be omitted from the trend computation9.
x The forecasted mean pre-stressing forces (hoop, vertical, dome, inverted U),
determined using the data acquired to date and computed, for conservatism, at the 95% lower confidence limit, remain above the minimum required levels until well past the deadline for completion of the subsequent surveillance.
3.4.2 System Hardware Condition History Industry-wide, there have been relatively few significant issues associated with containment post-tensioning system hardware (tendon wire / strand10, anchor heads, wedges, shims and bearing plates).
Active corrosion is typically found only on the exposed parts of bearing plates. Free water at end anchorage areas, when found in quantities that are sufficient to allow collection and testing, has almost never been observed to cause corrosion.
Instances of deformation / damage / degradation are rare and almost always associated with singular construction events.
Most exceptions to the above are the result of unique situations that are plant-specific and not indicative of an industry-wide problem.
8 As discussed in Section 4 of this report, scatter of measured tendon forces tends to obscure the true trend of the mean. The conclusion regarding flattening of the trend is based on statistical analysis rather than an observed characteristic of the plotted data.
9 Industry-wide data tend to show that mean force (vs. log time) decreases significantly more rapidly during the first 10 years following completion of pre-stressing operations than it does during subsequent years. In addition, measurements made during the early years of plant life are often known to be less accurate than those made later using improved technology.
10 The only U. S. containments with strand tendons, anchored with hardened wedges rather than cold formed buttonheads are Rancho Seco, San Onofre (2 & 3) and Vogtle (1 & 2). Of these plants, only the Vogtle units are currently operating.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 15 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Two widely reported exceptions, one involving wire corrosion and the other anchor head material are described below. Occurrences have been limited to the plants where these were first observed.
x Debris blocked the drains at the perimeter of a shallow dome resulting in flooding that submerged the caps at the upper end of the vertical tendons. The hold-down bolt holes in the tops of the caps were not well sealed. Storm water entered the caps through these holes and submerged the short lengths of uncoated wire just below the anchor heads. A number of wires were severely corroded and found to be no longer effective as pre-stressing elements.
New maintenance procedures to prevent future flooding above the ring girder were implemented. The condition has not recurred.
x A unique combination of steel chemistry and high hardness led to the failure of anchor heads in both Farley Nuclear Plant units. This matter is covered extensively in subsequent parts of this report.
This problem, which is unique to Farley, has been addressed by implementing an enhanced examination and corrective action program.
3.4.3 Wire / Strand Test Results Wire sample tests, performed by certified laboratories using appropriate equipment and procedures as specified in the applicable ASTM standards, show that strength and elongation at failure do not degrade with time. While past industry data often show reported strength and elongation vary significantly from examination to examination, close evaluation of the data suggests that such fluctuations can generally be attributed to variations in the testing, specifically:
x Many of the earlier tests were performed using vendor procedures that differ from those specified by the applicable ASTM standards.
x Testing equipment was often vendor-fabricated and did not meet ASTM specifications.
x Personnel assigned to the testing work did not always have the necessary experience.
In general, tests that conform to ASTM specifications and that are performed by experienced technicians show that both strength and elongation are not only close to, but exceed, the minima (240 ksi and 4.0%, respectively) specified for ASTM A421 (Reference 6.4) wire.
As there is no evidence that either strength or elongation (at failure) decrease with time under load, it is concluded that there is no benefit to ongoing tests for these parameters.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 16 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 And, it is to be noted that there is no precedent across the broader (beyond nuclear power plants) industry to periodically evaluate the continuing mechanical properties of pre-stressing system hardware and other steel structural members.
Relaxing the requirement for wire / strand tests, when justified by evaluation of specific plant operating experience, reduces the deleterious cycling of tendon force resulting from the de-tensioning and re-tensioning needed to allow wire removal. It also reduces the industrial hazard associated with the de-tensioning and re-tensioning operation.
3.4.4 Corrosion Protection Medium Test Results Effectively all U. S. containments that have ungrouted tendons use a corrosion protection medium (CPM) product supplied by the Viscosity Oil Company. CPM formulations have changed over time, but the basic product remains the same, i.e., a microcrystalline wax that provides the following protective functions:
x An essentially waterproof coating on tendon wires and end anchorage hardware.
x A bulk-fill to limit water intrusion into tendon ductwork.
x A chemically built-in alkalinity to neutralize acid conditions that could lead to corrosion.
There is no industry operating experience to indicate that the CPM used in U. S.
containments has degraded over time in such a manner as to result in tendon or end anchorage hardware corrosion. Such hardware problems as have been found are attributable to either gross loss of medium from the ductwork, end anchorage design features that prevent full coverage of metallic components at the time of CPM injection, or metallurgical characteristics of certain anchor head production batches.
Current CPM testing requirements mandate relatively complex procedures, as described or referenced in ASME Section XI (Reference 6.2) Table IWL-2525-1, to determine absorbed water content, corrosive ion concentration and residual reserve alkalinity. As corrosive ions cannot enter the ductwork in the absence of water intrusion, and reserve alkalinity cannot be brought into play in the absence of acid ion presence in the bulk CPM, there is little or no benefit gained by testing CPM samples for ion concentrations and reserve alkalinity unless there is evidence of free or absorbed water.
Consequently, industry experience would suggest that CPM samples collected during end anchorage examinations should be initially tested only to determine absorbed water content and that additional tests should be conducted only if there is evidence of sufficient water to establish potentially corrosive conditions, or if specific unit / plant test data indicate a history of problems with the CPM. Modifying testing programs accordingly would reduce the environmental problems associated with disposal of the reagents used in these processes (the procedure for determining water content does not require use of reagents).
FNP RR Technical Report Page 17 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620
- 4. FNP EXAMINATION HISTORY AND RESULTS ANALYSIS / EVALUATION The visual examination results and test data used in the development of Sections 4.1 through 4.4 are those documented in FNP in-service inspection reports, References 6.7 through 6.23.
FNP has completed, to date, 11 surveillances of the Unit 1 post-tensioning system and 10 surveillances of the Unit 2 system. These were performed in the years as shown in the following table. The SIT year (References 6.24 and 6.25) is also shown for reference.
The examinations were conducted in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 2, or 10CFR50.55a / ASME Section XI Subsection IWL as noted.
SIT and Surveillance Number /
Year Year Performed Unit 1 Year Performed Unit 2 Governing Document(s)
SIT 1977 1980 ASME III / Div. 2 / CC-6000 1 / 1 1978 1981 Reg Guide 1.35, Revision 2 2 / 3 1980 1983 Reg Guide 1.35, Revision 2 3 / 5 1981-1982 1985 Reg Guide 1.35, Revision 2 4 / 10 1987 1990 Reg Guide 1.35, Revision 2 5 / 15 1992 1995 Reg Guide 1.35, Revision 2 6 / 20 1997 2000 (Unit 1) Reg Guide 1.35, Revision 2 (Unit 2) 10CFR50.55a / IWL 7 / 25 2002 2006 10CFR50.55a / IWL 8 / 30 2006 2012 10CFR50.55a / IWL 9 / 35 2012 2017 10CFR50.55a / IWL 10 / 40 2017a 2021 10CFR50.55a / IWL 11 / 45 2021a N/A 10CFR50.55a / IWL Note a: The Unit 1 40th year surveillance (2017) included a random sample from Augmented Examination Group 1, tendons subject to repair / replacement activity following the failure of the H7AB anchor head in 2012. The Unit 1 45th year surveillance (2021) included a random sample from Augmented Examination Group 1 and a random sample from Augmented Examination Group 2, tendons subject to repair / replacement activity following the discovery of the H11AB cracked anchor head in 2017.
As noted above, surveillances conformed to the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 2 (Reference 6.6), through the Unit 1 surveillance in 1997. Per regulatory guide position 1.3, Unit 2 is exempt from the requirements to measure lift-off forces, de-tension tendons and extract wires for testing. In addition, ASME Section XI, paragraph IWL-2421 allows the measurement of lift-off forces (and tendon de-tensioning / test wire extraction) to alternate between the two units, with Unit 2 lift-off forces measured in surveillance year 15 and every 10 years thereafter. Unit 2 surveillances were performed under Regulatory
FNP RR Technical Report Page 18 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Guide 1.35 through the year 15 surveillance in 1995. Therefore, Unit 2 tendon forces and wire strengths / elongations were measured only during the 25 and 35-year surveillances.
As a consequence of the Regulatory Guide 1.35 and Subsection IWL scheduling, Unit 1 and Unit 2 tendon lift-off force measurements (and associated wire extraction / testing) were performed as shown below:
Unit 1: Surveillance years 1, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30 and 40 Unit 2: Surveillance years 25 and 35 Sections 4.1 through 4.4 of this report provide a comprehensive evaluation of FNP post-tensioning system examination results as documented in the applicable surveillance reports.
Section 4.1 - Tendon force trends and forecasts x Unit 1 and Unit 2 hoop tendon force trends and forecasts x Unit 1 and Unit 2 vertical tendon force trends and forecasts x Unit 1 and Unit 2 dome tendon force trends and forecasts x Unit 1 and Unit 2 common tendon trends Section 4.2 - End anchorage condition Section 4.3 - Extracted wire condition and mechanical properties Section 4.4 - Corrosion protection medium chemical properties and free water analysis The proposed extension of the tendon examination interval to 10 years is justified if the extension can be separately justified for each of the 4 post-tensioning system performance categories listed above.
In this report, surveillances are generally referred to by calendar year and / or time, T, since the SIT date. Plots of time-dependent parameters use T for the time axis. Tables listing time-dependent parameters show both the calendar year of the surveillance and the applicable value of T.
T is calculated as the difference between the surveillance mid-point date and the SIT mid-point date, each expressed as decimal years. Mid-points are determined as decimal years midway between the event (SIT or surveillance) starting and ending dates as shown in the applicable reports (or, in Reference 6.5 as noted). To simplify computations, starting and ending dates are treated as the middle of the month during which the surveillance (or SIT) begins and ends. Values of T computed for Units 1 and 2 are shown in the following tables.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 19 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 FNP Unit 1 SIT & Surveillance Dates and Time, T, Since SIT Event Start End T', Mid-Point T,
Year Month Year Month Year & Fraction Years Since SIT SIT 1977 2
1977 2
1977.13 0.0 1a 1978 6
1978 6
1978.46 1.3 3
1980 3
1980 6
1980.33 3.2 5
1981 9
1982 4
1982.00 4.9 10 1987 6
1987 8
1987.54 10.4 15 1992 6
1992 7
1992.50 15.4 20 1997 5
1997 6
1997.42 20.3 25 2002 8
2002 8
2002.63 25.5 30 2006 1
2006 3
2006.13 29.0 35 2012 4
2012 6
2012.38 35.3 40 2017 4
2017 9
2017.50 40.4 45 2021 11 2021 12 2021.92 44.8 Note a: Surveillance dates not noted in report; date shown is from Reference 6.5.
FNP Unit 2 SIT & Surveillance Dates and Time, T, Since SIT Event Start End T', Mid-Point T,
Year Month Year Month Year & Fraction Years Since SIT SIT 1980 5
1980 5
1980.38 0.0 1
1981 4
1981 5
1981.33 1.0 3
1983 5
1983 6
1983.42 3.0 5a 1985 9
1985 9
1985.71 5.3 10 1990 4
1990 5
1990.33 10.0 15 1995 5
1995 5
1995.38 15.0 20 2000 5
2000 6
2000.42 20.0 25 2006 1
2006 3
2006.13 25.8 30 2012 4
2012 6
2012.38 32.0 35 2017 4
2017 9
2017.50 37.1 40 2021 11 2021 12 2021.92 41.5 Note a: Surveillance dates not noted in report; date shown is from Reference 6.5.
4.1 Tendon Force Trends and Forecasts In the following discussions and evaluations, all computed mean forces and LCLs are rounded to a whole kip value. Computed values ending in (.5) are rounded to the nearest even number.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 20 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Units 1 and 2 tendon forces were measured during the surveillances noted in the table below.
Unit Surveillance Year - Tendon Force Measurement Yes / No 1
3 5
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 1
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 2
No No No No No No Yes No Yes No N/A Force (lift-off force or the force required to separate the anchor head from the shim stack) in designated sample tendons, and additional tendons as mandated by procedure or specified by the Responsible Engineer, is measured during each examination. Measured force trends and forecasts provide ample evidence that mean pre-stressing in the containment wall and dome will remain at or above the lower limits shown in report Section 1.1 above until at least T = 100 years and well beyond the currently expected 80-year maximum operating lifetime of the units.
The purpose of a lift-off force measurement is to determine how the initial seating force in a tendon (seating force is used as a measure of the pre-stressing force contributed by the tendon) has been reduced by elastic shortening and time-dependent losses.
Reported tendon force is the average of the lift-off forces measured at the two anchorages. The mean of a number of tendon forces then serves as a reasonable estimate of the overall mean pre-stressing force provided by the applicable tendon group (i.e., hoop, vertical or dome).
Forces measured at tendon anchorages reflect the losses due to elastic shortening11, concrete creep, concrete shrinkage and tendon wire stress relaxation.
Concrete creep strain, concrete shrinkage strain and pre-stressing steel stress relaxation are shown by relatively short-term tests12 to vary more or less linearly with the logarithm of time. The log-linear characteristics established by these tests are used in containment design. For this reason, mean pre-stressing force trends are treated in this report as log-linear functions.
A log-linear mean force trend is computed for each of the Unit 1 tendon groups using all applicable lift-off force data acquired during the 1-year through 40-year surveillances. An additional trend is computed using only the 10-year through 40-year data (tendon forces 11 Elastic shortening loss is the loss in tendon force resulting from the compressive strain induced in the concrete by subsequent tendon tensioning. It is generally greatest for the first tendon tensioned and zero for the last tendon tensioned.
12 Creep and shrinkage tests are typically conducted for 6 months and relaxation tests for 1,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> (just under 42 days). These time frames are short relative to the expected service life of a containment (40, 60 or possibly even 80 years if a subsequent license extension is granted).
FNP RR Technical Report Page 21 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 were not measured during surveillance year 45) to address the generally observed tendency for the downward slope of the force-vs-log-time-trend to flatten over time.
Unit 2 tendon force measurements are limited to those obtained during surveillance years 25 and 35. Therefore, only a single trend is computed for each of the Unit 2 tendon groups.
Lift-off forces (and log-linear trend lines) are plotted on Figures 1 through 9. Each of these plots exhibits a significant degree of scatter, a phenomenon typical of lift-off force plots generated for other containments. As the number of tendons included in surveillance samples is a small fraction of the total, the mean force represented by a trend line fitted to scattered data is only an estimate of the true mean pre-stressing force provided by the tendon group. A meaningful lower limit on the true mean at any point in time is computed as the 95% lower confidence limit (95% LCL)13 on the trend line ordinate.
The 95% LCLs on-trend line ordinates are shown on the Unit 1 plots. The corresponding 95% LCL curves for the Unit 2 tendon groups, which would be based on only two data sets (those for the 25 and 35-year surveillances) would be effectively meaningless and are not computed.
Both the trend lines and LCL curves are extrapolated to T = 100 years, a major grid line on the plot abscissa.
The log-linear trend slope and intercept as well as LCL values, as applicable, are computed using the methods developed in Probability and Statistics for Engineers by Irwin Miller and John E. Freund (Reference 6.26).
Units 1 and 2 hoop, vertical and dome force trends are addressed separately in sub-sections 4.1.1 through 4.1.3 below.
4.1.1 Hoop Tendon Mean Force Trends, LCLs and Margins Unit 1 and Unit 2 hoop tendon mean force trends, LCLs (Unit 1 only) and margins above the 1,022-kip (rounded up from FSAR value of 1,021.7) minimum required value are addressed separately in 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2 below.
13 The use of a 95% confidence limit is based on a precedent set in the standard (ANSI / ANS 56.8, Reference 6.27) that governs the conduct of another safety related activity--the containment integrated leakage rate test.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 22 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 4.1.1.1 Unit 1 Augmented Examination Groups 1 and 2 tendon force data is limited to 2 lift-off values for Group 1 and a single value for Group 2. As this amount of data is insufficient for generating trends, Groups 1 and 2 tendon forces are not addressed separately; Groups 1 and 2 sample tendon forces measured during the 2017 and 2021 surveillances are included with the Population 1 forces for trending purposes.
Unit 1 hoop tendon mean force trends and LCLs are illustrated by the plots in Figures 1 and 2. The first of these uses all data from surveillance year 1 onward to develop the trend and LCL. The second uses only data from surveillance year 10 onward.
Both figures show the trend line and LCL remaining above the 1,022-kip minimum required mean hoop tendon force beyond T = 100. The visual appearance of the plotted points suggest that the trend does not flatten over time. While contrary to expectations (as discussed above, the trend is expected to flatten over time) Figure 2 shows lower mean force and LCL values at T = 100 years than does Figure 1, both figures do provide conclusive evidence that the Unit 1 hoop tendon forces will remain above the minimum required value (MRV) throughout the presumed 80-year maximum operating lifetime of the unit.
Unit 1 hoop tendon mean force trend and LCL values at T = 100 years are listed with margins above the MRV in the following table. Trend values are based on the following log-linear regression line equations (surveillance year data range used to calculate trend shown in parentheses) included on the figures.
(1 through 40-year):
Force trend value, kip = 1,302.0 - 95.08
- Log10(T)
(10 through 40-year):
Force trend value, kip = 1,375.1 - 140.69
- Log10(T)
Unit 1 Hoop Tendon Mean Force Trend, LCL and Margin at T = 100 Years Lift-off Data Range Used to Compute Trend and LCL Values Trend, kip LCL, kip Value Margin Value Margin 1 through 40-year surveillance data 1,112 90 1,086 64 10 through 40-year surveillance data 1,094 72 1,035 13 4.1.1.2 Unit 2 The Unit 2 hoop tendon mean force trend (LCL not calculated for the reason previously discussed) is shown on Figure 3. The trend is relatively flat and crosses the T = 100-year ordinate at 1,183 kips, or 161 kips above the minimum required value. Value at T = 100 years is based on the trend line equation, F (kip) = 1,288.9 - 52.82
- Log10(T), shown on the figure.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 23 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 4.1.2 Vertical Tendon Mean Force Trends, LCLs and Margins Unit 1 and Unit 2 vertical tendon mean force trends, LCLs (Unit 1 only) and margins above the 1,158-kip (rounded up from the FSAR value of 1,157.7) minimum required value are addressed separately in 4.1.2.1 and 4.1.2.2 below.
4.1.2.1 Unit 1 Unit 1 vertical tendon mean force trends and LCLs are illustrated by the plots in Figures 4 and 5. The first of these uses all data from surveillance year 1 onward to develop the trend and LCL. The second uses only data from surveillance year 10 onward.
Both figures show the trend line and LCL remaining above the 1,158-kip minimum required mean vertical tendon force beyond T = 100. As is the case for the hoop tendon data, the visual appearance of the plotted points suggest that the trend does flatten over time. This is expected and is confirmed by the trend and LCL values plotted on the figures. The trend line shown for the 10 through 40- year surveillance results case has a flatter slope (-28.64 kip per unit logarithmic interval) and greater T = 100 intercept (1,236-kip) than that shown for the 1 through 40-year surveillance results case (slope and T =
100 intercept of -36.80 and 1,221-kip, respectively).
Both figures provide conclusive evidence that the Unit 1 vertical tendon forces will remain above the minimum required value (MRV) throughout the presumed 80-year maximum operating lifetime of the unit.
Unit 1 vertical tendon mean force trend and LCL values at T = 100 years are listed with margins above the MRV in the following table. Trend values are based on the following log-linear regression line equations (surveillance year data range used to calculate trend shown in parentheses) included on the figures.
(1 through 40-year):
Force trend value, kip = 1,295.0 - 36.08
- Log10(T)
(10 through 40-year):
Force trend value, kip = 1,293.4 - 28.64
- Log10(T)
Unit 1 Vertical Tendon Mean Force Trend, LCL and Margin at T = 100 Years Lift-off Data Range Used to Compute Trend and LCL Values Trend, kip LCL, kip Value Margin Value Margin 1 through 40-year surveillance data 1,221 63 1,195 37 10 through 40-year surveillance data 1,236 78 1,216 58
FNP RR Technical Report Page 24 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 4.1.2.2 Unit 2 The Unit 2 vertical tendon mean force trend (LCL not calculated for the reason previously discussed) is shown on Figure 6. The trend slope is steeper than those computed for the Unit 1 surveillance results but still crosses the T = 100-year ordinate above the MRV. The mean force trend value at T = 100 years, based on the Figure 6 trend line equation, F (kip) = 1,364.0 - 80.29
- Log10(T), is 1,203-kip, which is 45 kip above the MRV.
4.1.3 Dome Tendon Mean Force Trends, LCLs and Margins Unit 1 and Unit 2 dome tendon mean force trends, LCLs (Unit 1 only) and margins above the 1,080-kip (rounded up from the FSAR value of 1,079.5) minimum required value are addressed separately in 4.1.3.1 and 4.1.3.2 below.
4.1.3.1 Unit 1 Unit 1 dome tendon mean force trends and LCLs are illustrated by the plots in Figures 7 and 8. The first of these uses all data from surveillance year 1 onward to develop the trend and LCL. The second uses only data from surveillance year 10 onward.
Both figures show the trend line remaining above the 1,080-kip minimum required mean dome tendon force beyond T = 100. Also, Figure 8 shows the LCL computed using the 10 through 40-year surveillance data remaining above the MRV at T = 100. However, the Figure 7 LCL, which is computed using all surveillance data, crosses the MRV at T =
60.5 years. As is the case for the vertical tendon data, the visual appearance of the plotted points suggest that the trend does flatten over time. This is expected and is confirmed by the trend and LCL values plotted on the figures. The trend line shown for the 10 through 40-year surveillance results case has a flatter slope (-19.35 kip per unit logarithmic interval) and greater T = 100 intercept (1,156-kip) than that shown for the 1 through 40-year surveillance results case (slope and T = 100 intercept of -99.69 and 1,090-kip, respectively).
Both figures provide reasonable evidence that the Unit 1 dome tendon forces will remain above the minimum required value (MRV) throughout the postulated 80-year maximum operating lifetime of the unit.
Unit 1 dome tendon mean force trend and LCL values at T = 100 years are listed with margins above (or below) the MRV in the following table. Trend values are based on the following log-linear regression line equations (surveillance year data range used to calculate trend shown in parentheses) included on the figures.
(1 through 40-year):
Force trend value, kip = 1,288.9 - 99.69
- Log10(T)
(10 through 40-year):
Force trend value, kip = 1,294.2 - 19.35
- Log10(T)
FNP RR Technical Report Page 25 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Unit 1 Dome Tendon Mean Force Trend, LCL and Margin at T = 100 Years Lift-off Data Range Used to Compute Trend and LCL Values Trend, kip LCL, kip Value Margin Value Margin 1 through 40-year surveillance data 1,090 10 1,052
(-28) 10 through 40-year surveillance data 1,156 76 1,091 11 4.1.3.2 Unit 2 The Unit 2 dome tendon mean force trend (LCL not calculated for the reason previously discussed) is shown on Figure 9. The trend slope, between those computed for the Unit 1 surveillance results, crosses the T = 100-year ordinate above the MRV. The mean force trend value at T = 100 years, based on the Figure 9 trend line equation, F (kip) =
1,285.5 - 62.97
- Log10(T), is 1,160-kip, which is 80 kip above the MRV.
4.1.4 Pre-Stressing Force Summary and Conclusion The tendon force trends and LCLs presented in 4.1.1 through 4.1.3 above are summarized in the following table.
Lift-Off Data Trend and LCL Summary Group /
MRV Unit Lift-Off Data Time, T, Range, Years Value, kip, & Margin, kip, Over / Under MRV At T = 100 Years Trend Margin LCL Margin Hoop 1,022 kip 1
1 - 40 1,112 90 1,086 64 1
10 - 40 1,094 72 1,035 13 2
25 & 35 1,183 161 N/A Vertical 1,158 kip 1
1 - 40 1,221 63 1,195 37 1
10 - 40 1,236 78 1,216 58 2
25 & 35 1,203 45 N/A Dome 1,080 kip 1
1 - 40 1,090 10 1,052
(-28)a 1
10 - 40 1,156 76 1,091 11 2
25 & 35 1,160 80 N/A Note a: The LCL curve crosses the 1,080-kip MRV line at T = 60.5 years.
The above table shows the hoop, vertical and dome tendon mean force trends remaining above the respective MRVs though T = 100 years, which is beyond the postulated 80-year maximum operating lifetime of the units.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 26 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 In addition, the Unit 1 hoop and vertical group LCL values (Unit 2 LCLs are not computed as previously discussed) as well as the dome LCL values computed using the 10-through-40-year surveillance lift-off data remain above the respective MRVs at T = 100. Only the dome LCL values computed using all lift-off data fall below the associated MRV before T
= 100.
In all, 10 of the 10 hoop and vertical group trend and LCL values listed above and 4 of the 5 dome group trend & LCL values are over the associated MRVs at T = 100.
Only the dome group LCL values computed using all (surveillance years 1 - 40) data fall below the 1,080-kip MRV before T = 100 years. However, the dome group all-data LCL remains above the MRV until T = 60.5 years after the 1980 SIT or until the year 2040.
This is 7 years after the 2033 deadline for completing the Unit 2 50th year surveillance (the next surveillance scheduled if the interval is extended as proposed in this technical report; see table in Part 2 above), which includes lift-off force measurements.
On the basis of the tendon group force trends and confidence limits on the trended forces as presented above, it is concluded that the interval between pre-stressing system surveillance activities may be extended as proposed in Part 2 of this technical report with no adverse impact on safe operation of the plant.
4.2 End Anchorage Condition During each of the surveillances, end anchorage areas were visually examined for evidence of corrosion, presence of free water, broken wires or missing buttonheads, damage to / distortion of load-bearing components and cracks in concrete adjacent to bearing plates. Results of these examinations are summarized in 4.2.1 through 4.2.5.
4.2.1 Corrosion Severity of corrosion, as documented in surveillance reports, is defined by alphabetic and numeric levels. The definitions went through several changes over time as noted below.
x Unit 1 1st year surveillance, 1978: Corrosion not addressed in the report.
x Unit 1 3rd year surveillance, 1980 through Unit 2 5th year surveillance, 1985:
Level Definition (Levels A and B Acceptable)
A Bright metal with no visible oxidation B
Reddish-brown metal with no pitting C
Metal having patches of red oxide with no pitting D
Metal having patches of red oxide with pitting E
Heavy rusting with substantial pitting F
Conditions more severe than E
FNP RR Technical Report Page 27 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 x Unit 1 10th year surveillance, 1987 through Unit 1 40th year / Unit 2 35th year surveillances, 2017:
Level Definition (Levels A and B Acceptable)
A No visible rust B
Rust that appears to have formed at installation; no evidence of progressing C
New or progressive rust x Unit 1 45th year surveillance / Unit 2 40th year surveillance, 2021:
Anchor Heads, Bushings, Shims and Bearing Plates Level Definition (Levels A and B Acceptable)
A No visible rust B
Rust that appears to have formed at installation; no evidence of progressing C
New or progressive rust Wires and Buttonheads Level Definition (Levels 1 and 2 Acceptable) 1 No visible corrosion 2
Reddish-brown color; no pitting 3
0.000 < pitting < 0.003 4
0.003 < pitting < 0.006 5
> 0.006 pitting Corrosion documented during surveillances conducted through the Unit 1 45th year / Unit 2 40th year is summarized below. Corrosion levels reported are A or B (1 or 2) except as noted.
End Anchorage Corrosion Surveillance Year Unit 1 Unit 2 1
Corrosion not addressed in surveillance report.
Conditions similar to Unit 1 3rd year; however, observed bearing plate corrosion found to have transferred from the uncoated gasket retainer plate to the surface of the bearing plate coating. Coatings intact.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 28 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 End Anchorage Corrosion Surveillance Year Unit 1 Unit 2 3
Level D & E corrosion reported on bearing plates (locations not noted) inside and outside the end cap gasket.
Inside corrosion not progressing; condition accepted as is.
Corrosion on H25CA shop end buttonheads. Degree of corrosion and number of corroded buttonheads not noted. Report notes water intrusion past damaged O ring and lack of full CPM coverage at anchor head.
Level C corrosion below coating on H34FD, H25EF and D227 shop end bearing plates; concluded to have no adverse impact on containment integrity.
5 Bearing plate corrosion found to have transferred from retainer plates (see Unit 2 1st year); also, small areas of Level C corrosion on the edges of 25 bearing plates (locations not noted) where concrete trimming resulted in damage to coating at bearing plate edge. Condition deemed not detrimental.
Level C corrosion at edges of hoop tendon bearing plates. Conclusions state that there is no sign of abnormal degradation; therefore, observed corrosion was accepted as is.
3 Year re-examination (see Note a)
Four shims on tendon H29AB (end not noted) and one each on the shop ends of H26AB and H39AB had small areas of non-progressing Level E corrosion; concluded to have been present prior to filling of tendon ducts and end caps with CPM.
N/A 10 (See discussion below)
Small area of Level C corrosion with no apparent penetration found on one shim (location not noted); accepted as is.
10 (of 22 examined) bearing plates had areas of Level C corrosion; most accepted as is. Shop end bearing plates of V14, V31, V72 and V120 buffed to bright metal and recoated.
All observed corrosion Level A or Level B.
15 Small areas of Level C corrosion at the edges of the V61, V99 and V113 field (bottom) end bearing plates; concluded not to affect continued containment integrity.
All observed corrosion Level A or Level B.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 29 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 End Anchorage Corrosion Surveillance Year Unit 1 Unit 2 20 All observed corrosion Level A or Level B.
All observed corrosion Level A or Level B.
25 All observed corrosion Level A or Level B.
All observed corrosion Level A or Level B.
30 All observed corrosion Level A or Level B.
All observed corrosion Level A or Level B.
35 (See discussion below)
Level C corrosion found on the H35AB Buttress B end anchor head, shims and bearing plate; report notes 100%
CPM coverage of anchor head and shims and no indication of water.
Bearing plate corrosion outside gasket area.
All observed corrosion Level A or Level B.
40 All observed corrosion Level A or Level B.
All observed corrosion Level A or Level B.
45 All observed corrosion Level A
(buttonheads Level 1) or Level B.
N/A Note a: Due to a stressing jack calibration error during the 3rd year surveillance, additional Unit 1 tendons were examined during the 5th year surveillance. The additional tendons were designated the 3rd year re-examination sample.
The Unit 1 10th year surveillance report noted a small area of Level C corrosion on one shim (tendon / end ID not noted). It also noted that anchorage component CPM coverage was complete and that no free water was found.
With full CPM coverage and no moisture, new or ongoing corrosion is not possible.
Therefore, it is concluded that the Level C corrosion on the shim formed during construction and prior to filling of the tendon duct and end caps with CPM.
The Unit 1 35th year / Unit 2 30th year surveillance report noted Level C corrosion on the anchor head, shims and bearing plate (only outside the gasket) at the Buttress C end of Unit 1 hoop tendon H35AB. The report also noted that the buttonheads (Level B corrosion), anchor head, shims and bearing plate area inside the gasket had 100% CPM coverage and that no water was found at the anchorage.
With full CPM coverage and no moisture, new or ongoing corrosion is not possible.
Therefore, it is concluded that the Level C corrosion on the anchor head and shims formed during construction and prior to filling of the tendon duct and end caps with CPM.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 30 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 It is deemed likely that the Level C corrosion on the bearing plate outside the gasket (none was noted inside the gasket) and away from the edges was transferred to the coating surface from the uncoated gasket retainer plate.
Corrosion, other than that which is concluded to have existed prior to filling of tendon duct and end caps with CPM, appears to be confined to the edges of bearing plates14. Bearing plate edge corrosion probably resulted from damage to coatings during trimming of concrete that would otherwise obstruct pre-stressing jack seating and tendon anchorage end cap installation. This corrosion is limited in extent and does not affect the structural function of the bearing plates.
Most corrosion product observed on bearing plates, other than that at the edges, was located outside the gasket circle and was shown to have transferred from the uncoated steel gasket retainer plates. Removing the corrosion product generally exposed an undamaged bearing plate coating surface.
On the basis of the above descriptions and evaluations, it is concluded that corrosion observed on the pre-stressing system hardware is not progressing and is not adversely impacting containment structural integrity. Therefore, it is concluded that corrosion does not constitute a constraint to extending the pre-stressing system examination interval from 5 to 10 years.
4.2.2 Free Water Free water found at tendon end anchorages is documented in the following table. The surveillance reports identify free water quantities in terms of gallons, pints, ounces, few ounces, tablespoons, teaspoons, drops and minor. As all quantities are effectively estimates, these are converted to equivalent metric units rounded to the nearest 0.1 liter; amounts of 1 ounce or less are listed as < 0.1 liter. Amounts reported as few ounces are shown as ~0.1 liter. Amounts reported in terms of tablespoons / teaspoons, drops or as minor are shown as Trace.
14 Water intrusion (with loss of CPM) through a damaged O ring, lack of full CPM coverage at the anchor head and corrosion on buttonheads were observed at the Unit 1 hoop tendon H25CA shop end during the 3rd year surveillance. The report provides no details on quantity of water or degree and extent of corrosion other than to say that the corrosion was not excessive. This is treated as a singular condition which should not have any effect on the decision to extend the pre-stressing system examination interval.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 31 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 End Anchorage Free Water Surveillance Year Unit 1 Unit 2 1
Amount >10 liters reported to have drained from dome tendon D309 (end, shop or field, not noted).
~0.1 liter bottom end of V16
~0.1 liter bottom end of V66
~0.1 liter field end of H8FD
< 0.1 liter shop end of H2FD 0.1 liter field end of D309 0.1 liter shop end of D317 3
Traces found at low points of end caps (tendon ID not noted) during draining; no water found in contact with anchorage components.
Water, quantity not noted, found at the H25CA shop end; water concluded to have entered the end cap past a damaged O ring seal.
0.1 liter bottom end of V20 0.1 liter bottom end of V47 0.1 liter bottom end of V103 0.2 liter bottom end of V127 0.1 liter field end of D107 0.1 liter shop end of H44DE 5
Water not mentioned in report.
0.1 liter found at the bottom end of V52.
3 Year re-examination 0.2 liter drained from the bottom end of V105.
N/A 10 No free water found.
No free water found.
15 No free water found.
Trace found at field end of H37FD.
20 No free water found.
Trace found at field end of D124.
25 No free water found.
No free water found.
30 No free water found.
No free water found.
35 No free water found.
No free water found.
40
< 0.1 liter found at the Buttress B end of H3BC.
No free water found.
45 No free water found.
N/A With the exception of the >10 liters of water drained from Unit 1 dome tendon D309 during the 1st year surveillance in 1978, no quantities in excess of 0.2 liter (quantities documented in surveillance reports are estimates as previously noted) have been found at tendon anchorages. Since the Unit 2 5th year examination in 1985, only 3 findings of water have been documented as shown in the table, with 0.1 liter being the largest estimated quantity.
In addition, and with the possible exception of the >10 liters drained from Unit 1 dome tendon D309, observed accumulations of water were not in contact with tendon load bearing elements.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 32 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 No corrosion was noted on the buttonheads, anchor head, shims or bearing plate (area inside the O ring gasket) of any tendon listed in the table.
The surveillance results summarized in the above table lead to the conclusion that water intrusion into tendon ductwork and end anchorage areas is not a significant concern and should not constitute a constraint on extending the FNP pre-stressing system examination interval from 5 years to 10 years. This conclusion is based on the following surveillance results:
x With one exception (Unit 1 dome tendon D309 during the 1st year surveillance),
the quantity of water found at any anchorage did not exceed an estimated 0.2 liter.
Also, since the Unit 2 5th year surveillance in 1985, water has been found at only 3 tendon end anchorages (one Unit 1 anchorage and two Unit 2 anchorages), with the largest quantity estimated at 0.1 liter. The >10 liters of water reported for D309 during the 1st year surveillance are concluded to be construction-related and not an aging issue.
x With the possible exception of Unit 1 dome tendon D309, water was not in contact with load-bearing elements of the pre-stressing system.
x Neither new nor ongoing corrosion was observed on anchorage components (including bearing plate areas inside the O ring seals) where water was found.
4.2.3 Broken / Protruding Wires and Missing Buttonheads Only one broken wire, found during the Unit 1 3rd year surveillance, was noted in the surveillance reports. The report does not identify the tendon but does state that the break was a cup-cone fracture and that test specimens cut from the wire (which was extracted) met strength and ductility acceptance criteria (see Section 4.3).
The surveillance reports identified a number of unseated buttonheads. However, in no case other than that discussed in the previous paragraph was this condition found to be result of a wire break (all sample tendons were de-tensioned / re-tensioned during the 1st year through 20th year Unit 1 surveillances with continuity of many unseated wires verified while tendons were slack). Intact, unseated wires carry load, with load transfer at the unseated end through friction rather than buttonhead bearing at the anchor head. For this reason, unseated wires are considered to be effective load-carrying elements and are not identified as deficient items in this technical report.
Broken wires (only one as noted) and a count of missing buttonheads (BH) not previously documented are noted in the following table. In many cases, missing buttonheads could not be found in the end caps. This would indicate that either the associated wires were not buttonheaded, or that buttonheads detached prior to original installation of the end cap and probably during initial tensioning. Tendon end, where documented in the surveillance report is identified in the table by (S) for shop, by (F) for field, by (B) followed
FNP RR Technical Report Page 33 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 by buttress letter ID for ends identified to a buttress, and by (D) followed by (N, S, E, W or combination, e.g., NW) for dome tendon ends identified to an azimuth orientation.
Broken Wires and Missing Buttonheads Surveillance Year Unit 1 Unit 2 1
No missing BH H33DE(F) - 1 missing BH D231(F) - 1 missing BH 3
One broken wire
[Further data on wire location /
condition missing from the microfilm copy of the report.
Missing buttonhead count not in report copy.]
V20(S) - 1 missing BH 3 Year re-examination All missing BH accounted for in the 3rd year report N/A 5
H8AB(F) - 4 missing BHs V18(F) - 1 missing BH V100(F) - 1 missing BH H3EF(S) - 1 missing BH H26FD(F) - 2 missing BHs D117(F) - 1 missing BH 10 V31(F) - 1 missing BH H2AB(F) - 4 missing BHs H44BC(S) - 1 missing BH D228(F) - 1 missing BH V55(F) - 1 missing BH 15 H27CA(F) - 1 missing BH H42BA(S) - 2 missing BHs D110(S) - 1 missing BH D231(F) - 1 missing BH 20 H3BA(F) - 2 missing BHs No missing BH 25 D313(F) - 2 missing BHs H8DE(F) - 2 missing BHs D201(F) - 1 missing BH 30 H33BA(F) - 1 missing BH D226(DNW) - 1 missing BH D226(DE) - 1 missing BH H34FE(BF) - 2 missing BHs 35 H4CA(BA) - 1 missing BH H27DE(BD) - 1 missing BH 40 H10AB(BB) - 2 missing BHs V22(F) - 1 missing BH V91(F) - 4 missing BHs 45 No missing BH not previously documented N/A
FNP RR Technical Report Page 34 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 The following table lists (for each unit and each tendon group) the number of tendons examined, the number of associated wires (170 per tendon in accordance with system design), the number of missing buttonheads and the percentage of wires with missing buttonheads. The Unit 1 3rd year surveillance information is not included in the table totals since the microfilm copy of the report for that year is missing the necessary data.
Tendons Examined, Missing BH and Percentage Missing Parameter Unit 1 Unit 2 Hoop Vertical Dome Hoop Vertical Dome Number Examined 70 50 32 47 34 42 Number of Wires 11,900 8,500 5,440 7,990 5,780 7,140 Number BH Missing 18 4
4 9
6 6
Percentage Missing 0.15%
0.05%
0.07%
0.11%
0.10%
0.08%
The above fractions are considered to be structurally insignificant. Also, the Broken Wire and Missing Buttonhead table shows no evident increase in the number of ineffective wires (broken wires or those with missing buttonheads) found during consecutive surveillances.
Therefore, based on the results of surveillances conducted to date, it is concluded that the fraction of ineffective wires in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment tendons has, and will continue to have, no structural significance. This conclusion supports the extension of time between system examinations as presented in Part 2 of this technical report.
4.2.4 Load Bearing Components Damage / Distortion Failed and cracked (but still carrying load) anchor heads were discovered in 1985, 2012 and 2017. All were field end (single-piece) heads. Circumstances of discovery, evaluations and corrective actions are described in the subsequent paragraphs.
4.2.4.1 1985 Discovery, Evaluation and Corrective Action A failed Unit 2 vertical tendon field (bottom) end anchor head was found during a pre-ILRT (Integrated Leakage Rate Test) containment walkdown in 1985. Follow-on examinations uncovered one additional failed anchor head and one cracked along an arc across a full diameter. These findings led to a complete examination of all Unit 1 and Unit 2 vertical tendon field end anchor heads as well as limited examinations of selected hoop and dome tendon anchor heads, a comprehensive metallurgical evaluation, and a corrective action program as detailed below.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 35 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 x Anchor Head Examinations and Results All Unit 1 and Unit 2 vertical tendon field (bottom) ends were examined for the presence of water and visible damage. Each head was removed, in a prescribed sequence that ensured continuing adequate vertical pre-stressing force, and checked by magnetic particle testing (MT) for the presence of micro-cracks. In addition, selected hoop (30 Unit 1 and 72 Unit 2) and dome (29 Unit 1 46 Unit 2) anchorages were examined for the presence of water and visible anchor head damage. Hoop and dome anchor heads were not removed for MT.
Seven Unit 1 and 17 Unit 2 vertical tendon heads were found to be failed, visibly cracked or with micro-cracks at the upper face of the honeycomb region (the central region containing the holes for tendon wires).
Water was observed at 62 Unit 1 and 59 Unit 2 vertical tendon bottom anchorages.
However, water was reported to have been found at only 8 of the 24 failed / cracked anchor head locations.
None of the hoop and dome tendon anchor heads examined were found to have visible damage.
Water was found at the anchorage areas of 1 Unit 1 hoop tendon, 3 Unit 1 dome tendons, 4 Unit 2 hoop tendons and 2 Unit 2 dome tendons.
Examination results are documented in the tables included in Reference 6.28.
x Metallurgical Evaluation A comprehensive metallurgical investigation conducted by Inryco (the post-tensioning system supplier) and documented in Reference 6.29 concluded that anchor head cracks (including those that progressed to failure), were a consequence of the following conditions:
o High hardness (specified as Rc 40 - 44) of the anchor heads, making these susceptible to hydrogen stress cracking.
o The presence of water at the upper face of the vertical tendon bottom anchor heads; water presumed to have accumulated following tendon installation and prior to effective sealing after tensioning when the upper anchorage end cap was installed on the ring girder bearing plate.
o The presence of zinc particles at the anchor head; zinc presumed to have been transferred from the galvanized tendon duct to the wires during pulling and subsequently deposited in the honeycomb region during bottom anchor head installation.
o Electrical currents generated by the zinc anode and steel (anchor head) cathode and conducted by water containing various ions.
o Atomic hydrogen liberated by hydrolysis of the water electrolyte.
o Migration of atomic hydrogen into the anchor head grain structure resulting in hydrogen stress cracking.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 36 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 x Corrective Action Corrective action, as documented in the Reference 6.28 tables, consisted of the following:
o Replacement of all failed / cracked anchor heads with new material.
o Reinstallation of acceptable anchor heads (i.e., those with no indications of visible cracks or micro-cracking) following magnetic particle testing.
o Immersion, following wire buttonheading, of each anchor head and an associated length of wire above the anchor head in hot corrosion protection medium (CPM) to drive off any residual water and ensure a coating of CPM on all metal surfaces.
o Re-tensioning each vertical tendon.
o Refilling each vertical tendon duct with hot 2090P-4 CPM following re-tensioning.
Examinations of Unit 1 and Unit 2 vertical tendon end anchorage areas performed during the surveillances conducted at nominal 5-year intervals between 1985 and 2021 (the most recent surveillances) have uncovered no indications of vertical tendon anchor head distress. This provides clear evidence that the 1985 corrective actions were effective in eliminating the cause of vertical tendon anchor head cracking.
4.2.4.2 2012 Event, Evaluation and Corrective Action The 2012 event, subsequent evaluation and follow-on corrective action are addressed in References 6.30, 6.31 and 6.32, and summarized below.
x Event On 03 May 2012, the Unit 1 hoop tendon H7AB field end anchor head failed suddenly, releasing force in the tendon and ejecting the shop end approximately 12 ft across a stair case in the auxiliary building.
x Evaluation The subsequent analyses and root cause evaluation attributed the H7AB field end anchor head failure to hydrogen stress cracking, possibly exacerbated by a low CPM base number and consequent low degree of protection against corrosion.
Hydrogen stress cracking was attributed to the same elements addressed in the 1985 anchor head failures.
o The presence of water.
o Electrolytic currents established between zinc and iron in the presence of an electrolyte (water with some dissolved mineral).
o Release of atomic hydrogen by hydrolysis.
o Susceptibility of the high hardness material to intergranular cracking resulting from migration of atomic hydrogen into the grain structure.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 37 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 x Corrective action Corrective action consisted of:
o Replacing Unit 1 tendon H7AB.
o Replacing the field anchor heads on the following tendons found to have low base number CPM:
Unit 1: H13AC, H25AC, H27AC, H29AB, H33AB, H35AB, H41AB and D322.
Unit 2: H5DE, V60, D220 and D231.
Anchor heads removed from the above tendons were visually examined and checked for micro-cracking by magnetic particle testing. No deficiencies were found.
o Refilling the above tendons with 2090P-4 CPM.
All replacement anchor heads were heat-treated to a lower hardness; Rc 38+/-1.
4.2.4.3 2017 Discovery, Evaluation and Corrective Action The 2017 discovery, subsequent evaluation and follow-on corrective action are addressed in References 6.31 and 6.32, and summarized below.
x Discovery During the Unit 1 40th year surveillance, the field end anchor head of sample tendon H11AB was found to be cracked across its full width.
x Evaluation Tendon H11AB was de-tensioned from the shop end using a procedure specifically developed for de-tensioning a double-end stressed tendon from one end. As before, a metallurgical analysis as reported in Reference 6.32 determined the proximate cause of the crack to be a combination of hydrogen stress cracking and high hardness.
The Unit 1 tendon H11AB field anchor head was included in the same heat treatment lot (Lot 10114) as the Unit 1 tendon H7AB field anchor head which failed suddenly in 2012 as addressed in 4.2.4.2 above.
Altran performed hardness tests on a number of specimens cut from the H11AB anchor head. These tests, documented in the Altran report (Reference 6.32) showed maximum hardness values close to Rc 48 at both the buttonhead and bearing faces15. This value is well above the material specification limit of Rc 44.
Altran also performed hardness tests on the remnants the H7AB anchor head as 15 Hardness values typically vary through the thickness of an anchor head with maximum values near the surfaces and minimum values in the interior. Surface values are expected to be critical with respect to the initiation of hydrogen stress cracking.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 38 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 well as additional Lot 10114 anchor heads removed under the corrective action program (see below). Several of these tests showed hardness values in excess of Rc 44.
Evaluation of the test results concluded that the heat treatment lot 10114 anchor heads could be particularly susceptible to hydrogen stress cracking and should be replaced.
x Corrective Action Corrective action, documented in Reference 6.31, consisted of replacing 13 of the 14 anchor heads remaining in heat treatment lot 10114 (the field anchor head of H7AB was previously replaced as discussed above) with new material having a Rockwell C hardness of 38+/-1. The affected tendons, all in Unit 1, are H9AB, H11AB, H15AB, H37AB, H1BC, H3BC, H5BC, H7BC, H13BC, H15BC, H1CA, H29CA and H31CA. None of the removed anchor heads other than that on tendon H11AB were found to be damaged (cracked).
Due to its location, the field anchor head of H11BC (also in heat treatment lot 10114) could not be replaced. The tendon was de-tensioned to eliminate a possible future sudden failure and abandoned in place as documented in Reference 6.33.
Following anchor head replacement, tendons were re-tensioned. Tendon end anchorage areas and ducting were then filled with 2090P-4 CPM.
4.2.3.4 2021 Surveillance Results The Unit 1 45th year and Unit 2 40th year surveillances (Reference 6.23) were performed in 2021. Visual examination of the end anchorage areas uncovered no indications of anchor head damage.
4.2.3.5 Damage to Other Load-Bearing Items Examinations performed during surveillances conducted to date have uncovered no indications of damage (distortion, cracking) to shop anchor heads, shims or bearing plates. All damage found has been limited to field anchor heads.
4.2.4 Concrete Cracking Adjacent to Bearing Plates Concrete extending out 24 inches from the edges of tendon bearing plates was visually examined for cracking. Cracks exceeding 0.01 inches in width were recorded and require evaluation for structural significance.
Only 4 cracks exceeding 0.01 inches in width were documented in the surveillance reports.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 39 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 One of these, documented in the Unit 2 15th year report, is a 0.20-inch-wide crack in a dome tendon (D312, end not noted) pocket grout patch and does not extend into the underlying concrete; it is not considered structural and not addressed further in this technical report.
A 3/16-inch-wide crack at the corner of a Unit 1 dome tendon D119 bearing plate (tendon end not identified) is noted in the in the 5th year surveillance report. The report stated that the crack appeared to be old and showed no sign of progressing. Length and other details are not provided in the report. As there is no further mention of this crack in the report, it is concluded that the crack was considered to have no structural significance.
The Unit 1 45th year report identified two parallel cracks, each 0.25 inches wide, just over 6 inches long and separated by about 1 to 2inches, extending out perpendicular to an edge of the hoop tendon H37AB shop end bearing plate. These cracks, which are addressed in FNP Condition Report 10842658, were considered by the Responsible Engineer to be non-detrimental and to require no corrective action. Evaluation of a photograph (included in the surveillance report) of the area leads to the conclusion that the cracks are shallow and probably the result of an inclusion (air void, water or other) at the face of the formwork, or possibly, localized formwork movement during concrete placement.
Based on the results of surveillances conducted to date and as documented above, it is concluded that there is no structurally significant cracking in the concrete adjacent to the tendon end anchorage areas and no indication that this condition will change in the foreseeable future. This conclusion supports the extension of system examination intervals as presented in Part 2 of this technical report.
4.2.5 Anchorage Condition Summary and Conclusions With the exception of field end anchor heads, tendon end anchorage hardware and adjacent concrete have performed well throughout the life of the plant (through the most recent surveillance in 2021) and show no trends of deteriorating condition.
The development of hydrogen stress cracking in field end anchor heads, as discussed in 4.2.4 above, has been limited to bottom heads on vertical tendons prior to (and possibly during) 1985 and subsequently, two heads in heat treatment lot 10114. No damage to vertical tendon bottom heads has been found since corrective action was completed in 1985. In addition, no damage to hoop or dome tendon field end anchor heads, other than the two in heat treatment lot 10114 as noted, was found over the 43-year time span from the first Unit 1 surveillance in 1978 through the Unit 1 45th year / Unit 2 40th year combined surveillances in 2021. Therefore, it is concluded that field end anchor head damage has been addressed by corrective actions taken in 1985 and 2017 and described in 4.2.4 above, and should not be a concern in the future.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 40 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 There have been no findings of active corrosion on bearing plates, anchor heads, shims or buttonheads. Inactive corrosion is, with a few exceptions, limited to light rusting. Heavy rusting found on bearing plates outside of the O ring seal areas was, in almost all cases, transferred from the uncoated O ring retainer plates and did not penetrate the bearing plate coating.
Only minor amounts of free water have been found in anchorage areas and, with one exception (the Unit 1 H25CA shop end damaged O ring discussed in the 3rd year surveillance report), no corrosion has been associated with such water as has been found.
Only a small fraction (0.15% or less in any tendon group) of examined wires was found to be ineffective and there was no indication that the incidence of ineffective wires was increasing with time.
No damage, cracking or distortion has been found during visual examinations of bearing plates, anchor heads (except as noted above), and shims.
Concrete cracks observed adjacent to bearing plates were either less than 0.01 inches in width, were accepted during the applicable surveillance (D119 pocket area crack found during the Unit 1 5th year surveillance) or were concluded to be confined to surface concrete (H37AB shop end cracks documented in the Unit 1 45th year surveillance report).
No cracks deemed structurally significant were found.
End anchorage visual examination trends, as discussed above, show that the condition of both post-tensioning system hardware and concrete adjacent to tendon end anchorage bearing plates is stable and unlikely to experience significant change over the operating lifetime of the plant.
The results of the tendon end anchorage examinations support the extension of system examination intervals as presented in Part 2 of this technical report.
4.3 Wire Examination and Test Results Evaluation Specified test wires (one from one tendon in each group) and broken wires were extracted from surveillance tendons and tested to verify continuing strength and ductility. Testing, test results and conclusions are addressed below. No wires were extracted from Unit 2 tendons until the 25th year surveillance, and no wires were extracted from the tendons in either unit during the visual-examination-only surveillances in 2012 (Unit 1 35th year / Unit 2 30th year) and 2021 (Unit 1 45th year and Unit 2 40th year).
Unit 1 and Unit 2 test results are listed in Tables 8a / 8b and 9a / 9b, respectively. With three exceptions, these results meet the ASTM A421 acceptance criteria (240 ksi minimum tensile strength and 4% minimum elongation at failure) and are both reasonable
FNP RR Technical Report Page 41 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 and consistent with the results of tests performed on wire specimens extracted from containment tendons at other nuclear plants. The exceptions are discussed below:
x The elongations at failure listed in the Unit 1 20th year surveillance report vary between 10% and 12%. This is double the nominal 4% to 6% elongation typical for ASTM A421 wire and shown for most of the remaining FNP test specimens in Tables 8b and 9b (but see below). As the high elongations are limited to one series of tests, it is concluded that these represent a testing error.
x The 2006 surveillance report, which covers the Unit 1 30th year and Unit 2 25th year lists, for both units, several elongations at failure that are below the 4% acceptance limit. As these low elongations are reported for 11 (of 18) test specimens cut from 5 of the 6 extracted wires (three from each unit) and are unique to 2006 test series, it is concluded that these represent a testing error. The condition of the extracted wires was judged to be acceptable and is covered in NCRs N959-009, N959-010 and N959-015.
x One specimen cut from the Unit 2 vertical tendon V61 extracted wire in 2006 (25th year surveillance) failed at a reported tensile stress of 234 ksi. The remaining 2 specimens failed at 255 and 259 kips, respectively, both well above the 240 ksi minimum. The 234-kip failure stress may represent a testing error (possible given the large number of apparent errors in elongation measurements common to the 2006 testing series) or a singular anomaly. The failure to meet minimum required tensile strength is addressed in NCR N959-015.
Extracted wires were generally free of corrosion (Level A or 1) with occasional small areas of light rust (Level B or 2), which is acceptable.
Other than those reported results considered erroneous and one that might represent a singular condition, wire tests showed that acceptable levels of tensile strength and ductility are ongoing. The surveillance year mean values of strength and elongation shown in the rightmost columns of Tables 8a / 8b and 9a / 9b do not show that these values are trending up or down. This is typical of tests performed over the years on specimens from the tendons in containments at other nuclear plants.
The results of tests performed on Unit 1 and Unit 2 tendon wire specimens, as shown in Tables 8a / 8b and 9a / 9b, do not give any indication that tensile strength and ductility are decreasing over time. And, with the limited exceptions discussed above, the results show that strength and ductility meet the ASTM A421 acceptance criteria. Finally, visual examination results show that tendon wires are not corroding over time.
Therefore, it is concluded that there is no need to continue extracting and testing wires.
Further, it is recommended that requirements for de-tensioning of tendons for the purpose of extracting of test wires and subsequent testing be eliminated from the post-tensioning system surveillance program. However, wire tests may be specified by the Responsible Engineer when conditions (e.g., broken wires, active corrosion or low pH water) found at an anchorage indicate the possibility of wire degradation.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 42 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 4.4 Corrosion Protection Medium Testing Corrosion protection medium (CPM) was collected at the ends of sample tendons during each surveillance16. Each CPM sample was tested for the presence of three corrosive ions (chlorides, nitrates and sulfides), absorbed water content and reserve alkalinity (expressed as neutralization number or base number). Tests were performed as specified in ASME Section XI Subsection IWL Table IWL-2525-117.
Absorbed water content and base number are determined for bulk samples of CPM. The laboratory procedure used to determine water content is standardized and easily performed. It should yield reasonably accurate results. That used to determine base number is fairly complex; results tend to exhibit more variability than would be expected for the material being analyzed.
Corrosive ion concentrations are not determined for bulk samples of CPM but, rather, for water maintained in contact with a defined CPM surface area under specified conditions.
More recently conducted tests tend to yield the expected results; i.e., that corrosive ions are essentially absent from the CPM samples. Earlier tests gave erratic results, particularly for nitrate ion concentrations. The erratic results may have resulted from errors in specimen preparation or application of the procedures used to quantify concentrations in the water samples, or both.
Most of the CPM used at FNP is the Visconorust 2090-P4 formulation. However, as noted in the 2017 surveillance (Unit 1 35th year / Unit 2 30th year) report Abstract, it appears likely that some of the earlier 2090-P2 formulation was also used. The P2 formulation has a much lower reserve alkalinity than the P4 formulation. This is reflected in the results of the reserve alkalinity tests.
All CPM test results met the FNP acceptance criteria shown below.
FNP Corrosion Protection Medium Test Acceptance Criteriaa Parameter Chloride Ion Concentration Sulfide Ion Concentration Nitrate Ion Concentration Water Content Base Number Acceptance Criterion 10 ppm 10 ppm 10 ppm 10% by Weight
>0 /
17.5b Note a: Ion concentration limit is for a water extract prepared per IWL Table IWL-2525-1.
Note b: The 17.5 criterion is applicable to tests performed on 2017 and 2021 surveillance samples.
16 Unit 1 1st year and 3rd year surveillance test results not found.
17 Early CPM tests followed procedures developed by the supplier, Viscosity Oil Co. These procedures were subsequently incorporated into Subsection IWL.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 43 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 4.4.1 CPM Test Results Unit 1 and Unit 2 CPM test results are summarized below.
Unit 1 CPM Sample Corrosive Ion Concentrations Surveillance /
Calendar Year Number of Samples Tested Chloride Ion Concentration, ppm Nitrate Ion Concentration, ppm Sulfide Ion Concentration, ppm Min Max Min Max Min Max 1 / 1978 Test results not found 3 / 1980 Test results not found 5 / 1981 84c 1a 5
1a 1a 1a 1a 10 / 1987 22 5a 5a 5a 5a 1a 1a 15 / 1992 18 0.10 0.70 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.09 20 / 1997 18 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.03 25 / 2002 18 None Detected (ND)
ND ND 30 / 2006 23
<0.50a
<0.50a
<0.50a
<0.50a
<0.50a
<0.50a 35 / 2012 20
<0.50a
<1.00
<0.50a
<1.00
<0.50a
<1.00 40 / 2017 67
<0.50a 3.00
<1.0a
<1.0a
<0.5a
<2.50 45 / 2021 22
<0.50a
<0.50a
<1.00a
<1.00a
<0.50a
<0.50a Unit 1 CPM Sample Water Content and Base Number Surveillance /
Calendar Year Number of Samples Tested Water Content, %
Base Number Min Max Min Max 1 / 1978 Test results not found 3 / 1980 Test results not found 5 / 1981 84c 0.04 1.9 10.7 / 0.6b 52.2 10 / 1987 22 0.1 0.7 30.1 60.1 15 / 1992 18 0.36 1.71 37 / 3b 60 20 / 1997 18 0.06 0.58 19.45 / 2.53b 49.61 25 / 2002 18 ND 0.50 11.0 / 3.37b 36.7 30 / 2006 23
<0.10a 0.50 16.2 / 2.03b 51.0 35 / 2012 20
<0.10a 0.95 16.4 61.4 40 / 2017 67
<0.10a 1.50 17.9 / 0.528b 82.8 45 / 2021 22
<0.10a 0.61 20.0 / 5.25b 67.0
FNP RR Technical Report Page 44 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Unit 2 CPM Sample Corrosive Ion Concentrations Surveillance /
Calendar Year Number of Samples Tested Chloride Ion Concentration, ppm Nitrate Ion Concentration, ppm Sulfide Ion Concentration, ppm Min Max Min Max Min Max 1 / 1981 50 1
7 1a 1a 1a 1a 3 / 1983 42 1.4 4.6 1a 1a 1a 1a 5 / 1985 36 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 10 / 1990 22
<5a
<5a
<5a
<5a
<1a
<1a 15 / 1995 20 0.24 0.66 0.01 0.02 0.025 0.101 20 / 2000 19 NDd N/D 0.50 2.00 ND ND 25 / 2006 18
<0.50a
<0.50a
<0.50a
<0.50a
<0.50a
<0.50a 30 / 2012 18
<0.50a
<0.50a
<0.50a
<0.50a
<0.50a
<0.50a 35 / 2017 18
<0.50a 1.00
<1.0a
<1.0a
<0.50a
<0.50a 40 / 2021 18
<0.50a
<0.50a
<1.0a
<1.0a
<0.50a
<0.50a Unit 2 CPM Sample Water Content and Base Number Surveillance /
Calendar Year Number of Samples Tested Water Content, %
Base Number Min Max Min Max 1 / 1981 50 0.1 1.2 15.7 45.4 3 / 1983 42 0.1 0.8 43.3 57.1 5 / 1985 36 0.1 1.3 22.3 69.8 10 / 1990 22 0.1 2.0 43.7 64.2 15 / 1995 20 0.13 0.72 11.9 / 4.6b 44.9 20 / 2000 19 ND 0.92 14.8 57.3 25 / 2006 18
<0.10a 0.41 40.1 72.6 30 / 2012 18
<0.10a 0.40 33.7 58.5 35 / 2017 18
<0.10a 0.70 17.7 58.1 40 / 2021 18
<0.10a 0.73 28.3 59.6 Note a: Lower limit of resolution for the analytical procedure used.
Note b: Sample with the higher min base number is Visconorust 2090-P4 formulation; that with the lower min base number is probably 2090-P2 formulation.
Note c: Includes 42 samples collected during the re-examination of the tendons examined during the 3rd year surveillance.
Note d: None detected.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 45 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 4.4.2 CPM Test Evaluation, Conclusions and Recommendations The results of Unit 1 and Unit 2 CPM tests show that concentrations of corrosive ions and absorbed water content have remained well below the specified acceptance (upper) limits and, in addition, exhibit no adverse trends over time. Neutralization numbers remained well above the specified acceptance (lower) limits and exhibited no consistent trends over time. When evaluated in conjunction with the tendon end anchorage and wire examination findings, these results demonstrate that the CPM is continuing to perform its corrosion protection function. In addition, the test results give no indication that the protective properties of the CPM have degraded since initial installation in the 1970s.
An evaluation of the CPM test results, as summarized above, leads to the conclusion that the interval between collecting samples and performing such tests can be extended to 10 years with no adverse consequences.
In addition, unless evidence of active corrosion is found during visual examinations of end anchorage hardware and / or extracted strand, free water is found or there is evidence that the quantity of absorbed water has increased over time, there should be no need to perform the tests for corrosive ions and neutralization number. It is concluded that these tests need be done only if corrosion or moisture conditions favoring corrosion are found.
If free water is found, it will be collected and analyzed to determine pH.
Therefore, it is recommended that future CPM testing be limited to determining absorbed water content, unless the Responsible Engineer specifies otherwise based on evaluation of surveillance findings or industry operating experience.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 46 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620
- 5. OVERALL
SUMMARY
, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A summary of surveillance results, conclusions based thereon and recommendations for future changes to the surveillance program are outlined Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 below.
5.1 Surveillance Results Overall Summary The results of the 21 post-tensioning system surveillances conducted at FNP between 1978 and 2021 as well as the corrective actions taken to eliminate hydrogen stress cracking of field end anchor heads, show that the systems are continuing to perform the intended functions and can be expected to do so until well beyond the maximum expected 80-year operating lifetime of the units. Performance of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems, determined by evaluations of the visual examination findings / test results as detailed in Part 4 of this technical report, is summarized below.
5.1.1 Tendon Force The mean force in each of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 tendon groups is projected by log-linear regression to remain above the specified minimum required values through T = 100 years (after the unit SIT), which is well beyond the maximum expected 80-year operating lifetime of the units. In addition, and with one exception, the 95% lower confidence limits on Unit 1 (Unit 2 confidence limits not computed for the reason noted in Section 4.1) group mean force also remain above the minimum required values through T = 100 years. The lone exception is the confidence limit constructed using all Unit 1 dome tendon data. This limit crosses the minimum required force line at T = 60.5 years18. The more meaningful LCL, which is constructed using data acquired during the 10th through 40th year surveillances, remains above the MRV line at T = 100 years.
5.1.2 Condition of End Anchorage Hardware / Concrete and Extracted Wires Enclosed end anchorage hardware and tendon wires extracted for tensile testing show no signs of active corrosion. The minor (acceptable) rusting that has been observed is concluded to have occurred prior to filling of the tensioned tendon duct with corrosion protection medium or following extraction for testing. Corrosion on the exposed surface of bearing plates is also minor and meets acceptance criteria.
Hydrogen stress crack development in vertical tendon field end anchor heads was effectively eliminated by the extensive corrective actions taken in 1985. Hydrogen stress cracking of Unit 1 hoop tendon field end anchor heads was limited to those in heat treatment lot 10114. Some of these were found to have hardness levels as high as Rc 48, which is well above the original material specification limit of Rc 44. Anchor heads in 18 Based on the schedule in Part 2 of this report, tendon forces will be measured in 2031 at T ~ 54 years.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 47 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 this lot have been replaced with new material having a lower hardness of Rc 38+/-1. No dome tendon field end anchor head damage has been found.
Broken wires and missing / protruding buttonheads represent only a miniscule fraction of the number of installed tendon wires.
Free water was present in only a few surveillance tendon anchorage areas and, with the exception of the estimated 10 liters drained from Unit 1 dome tendon D309 during the 1st year surveillance and the two reported instances of 0.2 liter accumulations, only small quantities of 0.1 liter or less were found.
Only 4 anchorage area concrete cracks wider than 0.01 inch were reported. One, limited to the depth of a grout patch, is not considered structural. One found in a Unit 1 dome pocket area during the 5th year surveillance is not described in detail but was accepted with the notation that it was old and not progressing. Two short (~6 inches long) cracks were found adjacent to a hoop tendon bearing plate during the Unit 1 45th year surveillance. These appeared to be shallow surface indentations resulting from a formwork issue (possibly a localized movement or an inclusion) during concrete placement and are not considered to have any structural significance.
5.1.3 Tendon Wire Strength and Ductility Tensile tests on samples cut from extracted wires show, with unique exceptions limited to tests performed on the 2006 surveillance (Unit 1 30th year and Unit 2 25th year) specimens, that ultimate strength and ductility (quantified by the measured elongation at failure) remain above specified minimum values. Test results also show that strength and ductility are not decreasing over time. The 2006 test results were concluded to reflect procedural or other errors and are not considered credible.
5.1.4 Corrosion Protection Medium Characteristics Results of corrosion protection medium (CPM) tests to determine corrosive ion concentrations, absorbed water content, and neutralization number confirm that acceptance criteria have been met. There are no discernible trends to these parameters and no indication that the protective characteristics of the CPM are degrading over time.
5.2 Conclusions Based on the evaluations detailed in Part 4 of this technical report and summarized above, it is concluded that the FNP post-tensioning system will continue to perform its
FNP RR Technical Report Page 48 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 design function until well beyond the maximum expected operating lifetime of the units.
And, specifically that:
x Tendon group mean forces will remain above the specified minima; x End anchorage hardware and tendon wire will remain free of active corrosion; x There should be no further instances of hydrogen stress cracking in field end anchor heads (no damage was ever found in the two-piece shop end anchor heads);
x Tendon wire strength and ductility will not change over time and will remain acceptable throughout the operating lifetime of the plant; x Corrosion protection medium will retain its protective properties with no unacceptable degradation over time; and, x Free water will not be a concern.
5.3 Recommendations On the basis of the above conclusions, it is recommended that the interval between post-tensioning system surveillances, which include examinations identified in Reference 6.2, Table IWL-2500-1, Examination Category L-B, Items L2.10 through L2.50, be increased from the present 5 years to 10 years in accordance with the schedule presented in Part 2 of this report. Also, it is recommended that the interval between tendon force measurements be adjusted from the present 10 years in accordance with the alternating program shown in that schedule. This recommendation applies to Population 1 (see footnote in Section 1.2) tendons as well as those tendons in Unit 1 Augmented Examination Groups 1 and 2.
Implementing this change will provide the following safety and related benefits:
x Reducing personnel exposure to a number of industrial safety hazards associated with system examination / testing. These include:
o Working at heights; o Working on open platforms with no ready means of egress in the event of sudden changes in weather; o Working in a de facto confined space (the tendon gallery);
o Working with high-pressure hydraulic systems; o Working around high-energy plant systems; o Working around solvent and hot petroleum product fumes; o Working around containers and lines filled with hot petroleum products;
FNP RR Technical Report Page 49 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 o Close-in exposure to high levels of stored elastic energy in tendons (sudden rotation during force measurement has resulted in rapid shim ejection); and, o Handling heavy loads, often in the vicinity of critical plant components.
x Reducing potentially damaging repetitive loading on tendons during de-tensioning
/ re-tensioning as well as during implementation of force measurement procedures.
x Reducing end anchorage exposure to the elements during periods when end caps are removed for examination, force measurement and wire extraction.
x Reducing radiation exposure.
It is also recommended that removal and testing of tendon wires be done only when specified by the Responsible Engineer. This will eliminate the routine need to de-tension and re-tension tendons and the consequent possible damage to the remaining wires.
In addition, it is recommended that routine CPM testing be limited to determination of absorbed water content and that additional tests for corrosive ion concentration and neutralization number be performed only if:
x Active corrosion is found on anchorage components and / or tendon wires; x Free water is found at anchorages; x CPM absorbed water content exceeds the Table IWL-2525-1 acceptance limit; x And, otherwise if specified by the Responsible Engineer.
Eliminating routine ion concentration and neutralization number testing has the benefit of reducing the quantity of hazardous reagents to be disposed of by the testing laboratory.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 50 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620
- 6. REFERENCES 6.1 USNRC Regulation 10CFR50.55a, Codes and standards.
6.2 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Subsection IWL, Requirements for Class CC Concrete Components of Light-Water-Cooled Plants, (editions / addenda as noted).
6.3 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant FSAR Update Revision 31.
6.4 ASTM A421, Specification for Uncoated Stress Relieved Wire for Pre-stressed Concrete, Published by the American Society for Testing and Materials.
6.5 Farley Nuclear Plant, 5th Interval Containment Inspection Plan, Volume 5 / Version 4.0, February 2021.
6.6 USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.35, Inservice Inspection of Ungrouted Tendons in Pre-stressed Concrete Containments, Revision 2.
6.7 16 May 1978 Letter (with enclosure Review of Data / Containment Post Tensioning System / One Year Surveillance / Joseph M. Farley Unit 1 / Bechtel Job 7597-08) from A. A. Vizzi, Bechtel Power Corp. to O. D. Kingsley, FNP Plant Manager.
6.8 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant / Unit 1 / 3-Year Containment Tendon Surveillance
/ Final Report, report prepared by Bechtel Power Corporation, August 1980.
Addendum to Three-Year Tendon Surveillance Report / Resurveillance Report on Three-Year Surveillance Tendons for Containment Post-Tensioning System /
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Unit 1 / Alabama Power Company / Job No. 7597, report prepared by Bechtel Power Corporation, Gaithersburg Maryland, June 1982.
6.9 Containment One-Year Tendon Surveillance Report / Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Unit 2 / Alabama Power Company / Job No. 7597-20, report prepared by Bechtel Power Corporation, Gaithersburg Maryland, August 1981.
6.10 Five Year Tendon Surveillance Report on Containment Post-Tensioning System /
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Unit 1 / Alabama Power Company / Job No. 7597, report prepared Bechtel Power Corporation, Gaithersburg Maryland, June1982.
6.11 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant / Unit 2 Containment Post-Tensioning System /
Three-Year Inservice Inspection / Volume 1 - Report, report prepared by Southern Company Services, Inc., September 1983.
6.12 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant / Unit 2 Containment Post-Tensioning System /
Five-Year Inservice Inspection / Volume 1 - Report, report prepared by Southern Company Services, Inc., September 1985.
6.13 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant / Unit 1 Containment Post-Tensioning System /
Ten-Year Inservice Inspection, report prepared by Southern Company Services, Inc., October 1987.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 51 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 6.14 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant / Unit 2 Containment Post-Tensioning System /
Ten-Year Inservice Inspection, report prepared by Southern Company Services, Inc., July 1990.
6.15 Containment Fifteen-Year Tendon Surveillance Report / Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 / Southern Nuclear Operating Company, report prepared by Southern Company Services, Inc., October 1992.
6.16 Containment Post-Tensioning System / Fifteen-Year Inservice Inspection Report
- Unit 2 / Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, report prepared by Southern Company Services, Inc., August 1995.
6.17 Containment Twenty-Year Tendon Surveillance Report / Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 / Southern Nuclear Operating Company, report prepared by Southern Company Services, Inc., October 1997.
6.18 Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and 2 / ASME Section XI Sub-Section IWE/IWL Report
/ June 2000, report prepared by Southern Company Services, Inc., October 2000.
6.19 Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 / ASME Section XI Sub-Section IWE/IWL Report /
November 2002, report prepared by Southern Company Services, Inc., November 2002.
6.20 Unit 1 (30th Year) & Unit 2 (25th Year) Physical Containment Building Tendon Surveillance at the Farley Nuclear Plant / Post Tensioning Surveillance Report, report prepared by Precision Surveillance Corporation, Revision 0, August 2006.
6.21 Final Report for the Containment Structure Tendon Surveillance at Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2, report prepared by Precision Surveillance Corporation, Revision 2, August 2013.
6.22 Final Report for the Containment Structure Tendon Surveillance at Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2, report prepared by Precision Surveillance Corporation, Revision 0, February 2018.
6.23 Final Report for the 2021 ASME IWL Tendon and Concrete Surveillance at Farley Station - Unit 1 and Unit 2, report prepared by Precision Surveillance Corporation, Revision 0, March 2022.
6.24 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Containment Structural Integrity Test
[Report not Found]. Integrated leakage rate test report cited below for test time frame reference.
Final Report / Primary Reactor Containment / Integrated Leakage Rate Test /
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant / Unit No. 1 / Bechtel Job 7597 / Bechtel Power Corporation Preoperational Test for Alabama Power Company, report prepared by Bechtel Power Corporation, April 1977.
6.25 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant / Unit No. 2 / Alabama Power Company / Structural Integrity Test Report / Containment Structure / Unit 2, [Preparer / Issue Date not Noted].
FNP RR Technical Report Page 52 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 6.26 Miller, Irwin and John E. Freund, Probability and Statistics for Engineers, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1965.
6.27 ANSI/ANS-56.8, Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements, published by the American Nuclear Society.
6.28 U738360, 1985 Inryco Inspection Unit #1 and #2 Tendon Grease Reports.
6.29 Inryco Post Tensioning Division / Joseph M. Farley nuclear Plant, Unit No. 2 /
Anchor Head Investigation / OMD Investigation No. 19975 - Final Report.
6.30 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, RER SNC320306, Support for Farleys Unit 1 Hoop Tendon H7AB Failure and Extended Conditions, Approved 10 July 2013.
6.31 Document Number: SNC1000660, Revision 1, DECP-U1 Anchor Head Replacement, Approved 28 January 2020.
6.32 Failure Analysis and Testing of Thirteen (13) Post Tension Containment Anchor Heads, 17-0174-TR-001, Revision 0, November 2017, report prepared by Altran.
6.33 Calculation SC-SNC432512-001, Ver. 1.0, Evaluation of Two Adjacent Inactive Hoop Tendons.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 53 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620
- 7.
TABLES AND FIGURES Tables and figures cited in the above text follow.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 54 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Table 1 - List of US Containmentsa with Ungrouted Pre-stressing Systems Plant / Unit Containment Typeb / Notationc Millstone 2 Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; B Ginna Vertical tendons only; anchored in rock; B TMI 1 Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; B; N Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; B V. C Summer Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; B Oconee 1, 2 & 3 Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; B Vogtle 1 & 2 Hemispherical dome w / hoop & inverted U tendon groups; S Crystal River 3 Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; B; N Turkey Point 3 & 4 Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; B Farley 1 & 2 Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; B Palisades Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; B; N Zion 1 & 2 Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; B; N Braidwood 1 & 2 Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; B Byron 1 & 2 Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; B LaSalle 1 & 2 BWR Mark II (cylinder - cone) containment w / hoop & vertical tendon groups; B Point Beach 1 & 2 Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; B Callaway Hemispherical dome w / hoop & inverted U tendon groups; B ANO 1 & 2 Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; B South Texas 1 & 2 Hemispherical dome w / hoop & inverted U tendon groups; B Wolf Creek Hemispherical dome w / hoop & inverted U tendon groups; B Ft. Calhoun Shallow dome with spiral and dome tendon groups; B; N Palo Verde 1, 2 & 3 Hemispherical dome w / hoop & inverted U tendon groups; B San Onofre 1 & 2 Hemispherical dome w / hoop & inverted U tendon groups; S; N Rancho Seco Shallow dome w / hoop, vertical & dome tendon groups; S; N Trojan Hemispherical dome w / hoop & inverted U tendon groups; B; N Note a: Bellefonte 1 & 2, which are still under construction, Midland 1 & 2, which were terminated prior to fuel load and Robinson & TMI 2, which have grouted tendon systems, are not listed.
Note b: All units are PWRs except LaSalle (BWR).
Note c: B - BBRV system with buttonheaded wires; S - strand system with wedge anchors; N - unit(s) are no longer in operation.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 55 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Table 2 - Summary of Unit 1 Hoop Tendon Forces, Sh. 1 Surveillance /
Calendar Year T, Time Since SIT, Years Tendon FM, Measured Force, kip 1 / 1978 1.3 H25CA 1,307 H36CA 1,312 H1BA 1,323 H6BA 1,306 H12BA 1,280 H17BA 1,278 H24BA 1,340 H32BA 1,307 H29BC 1,312 H39BC 1,301 3 / 1980 3.2 H25CA Note a H30CA H36CA H6BA H12BA H26BA H29BA H39BA H36BC H39BC 5 / 1981-82 (Note b) 4.9 H18CA 1,183 H20CA 1,164 H38CA 1,200 H44CA 1,236 H8AB 1,208 H14AB 1,190 H36AB 1,210 H25BC 1,220 H33BC 1,212 H40BC 1,198
FNP RR Technical Report Page 56 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Table 2 - Summary of Unit 1 Hoop Tendon Forces, Sh. 2 Surveillance /
Calendar Year T, Time Since SIT, Years Tendon FM, Measured Force, kip 10 / 1987 10.4 H26AC 1,217 H2AB 1,231 H44BC 1,269 15 / 1992 15.4 H27CA 1,178 H42BA 1,225 H18CB 1,147 20 / 1997 20.3 H42CA 1,242 H3AB 1,229 H26CBc 1,145 25 / 2002 25.5 Visual examination only 30 / 2006 29.0 H35CA 1,205 H33BA 1,176 H26CBc,d 1,112 35 / 2012 35.3 Visual examination only 40 / 2017 40.4 H24CA 1,149 H7AB 1,117 H10AB 1,150 H12ABe 1,167 H26CBc,d 1,127 45 / 2021 44.8 Visual examination only Note a: Jack calibration not valid; lift-off forces excluded from trend.
Note b: Tendons examined during the 3rd year surveillance in 1980 were de-tensioned and re-tensioned. These tendons were examined again during the 5th year surveillance in 1981 / 1982 as discussed in the body of this report. As these tendons were re-tensioned during the 3rd year surveillance, forces measured during the re-examination in the 5th year are excluded from the Unit 1 hoop tendon trend.
Note c: Common tendon.
Note d: Tendon H26CB de-tensioned / re-tensioned during year 20 surveillance; lift-off force excluded from trend.
Note e: Tendon H12AB de-tensioned / re-tensioned in year 1; lift-off force excluded from trend.
Note: Shaded tendons de-tensioned / re-tensioned.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 57 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Table 3 - Summary of Unit 1 Vertical Tendon Forces, Sh. 1 Surveillance /
Calendar Year T, Time Since SIT, Years Tendon FM, Measured Force, kip 1 / 1978 1.3 V16 1,340 V39 1,301 V66 1,323 V95 1,301 V116 1,323 3 / 1980 3.2 V16 Note a V27 V86 V105 V126 5 / 1981-82 (Note b) 4.9 V5 1,216 V18 1,213 V60 1,204 V100 1,214 V128 1,238 10 / 1987 10.4 V14 1,255 V31 1,261 V72 1,294 V109 1,277 V120 1,258 15 / 1992 15.4 V61 1,248 V99 1,247 V113 1,253 20 / 1997 20.3 V1c 1,258 V43 1,253 V80 1,253 25 / 2002 25.5 Visual examination only
FNP RR Technical Report Page 58 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Table 3 - Summary of Unit 1 Vertical Tendon Forces, Sh. 2 Surveillance /
Calendar Year T, Time Since SIT, Years Tendon FM, Measured Force, kip 30 / 2006 29.0 V1c,d 1,274 V70 1,250 V104 1,254 35 / 2012 35.3 Visual examination only 40 / 2017 40.4 V1c,d 1,263 V52 1,243 V117 1,262 45 / 2021 44.8 Visual examination only Note a: Jack calibration invalid; lift-off forces excluded from trend.
Note b: Three-year re-surveillance, performed with the 5-year surveillance, included only tendons de-tensioned / re-tensioned in year 3; lift-off forces not valid for inclusion in trend and are not shown.
Note c: Common tendon.
Note d: Tendon V1 de-tensioned / re-tensioned during year 20 surveillance; lift-off force excluded from trend.
Note: Shaded tendons de-tensioned / re-tensioned.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 59 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Table 4 - Summary of Unit 1 Dome Tendon Forces, Sh. 1 Surveillance /
Calendar Year T, Time Since SIT, Years Tendon FM, Measured Force, kip 1 / 1978 1.3 D114 1,268 D123 1,284 D202 1,312 D230 1,311 D309 1,323 D317 1,351 3 / 1980 3.2 D107 Note a D122 D227 D231 D309 D324 5 / 1981-82 (Note b) 4.9 D110 1,152 D119 1,192 D203 1,146 D229 1,170 D303 1,176 D319 1,191 10 / 1987 10.4 D121 1,198 D228 1,187 D320 1,166 15 / 1992 15.4 D110 1,166 D201 1,102 D318 1,126 20 / 1997 20.3 D102 1,212 D118 1,185 D311 1,203 25 / 2002 25.5 Visual examination only 30 / 2006 29.0 D116 1,196 D202c,d 1,183 D313 1,178
FNP RR Technical Report Page 60 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Table 4 - Summary of Unit 1 Dome Tendon Forces, Sh. 2 Surveillance /
Calendar Year T, Time Since SIT, Years Tendon FM, Measured Force, kip 35 / 2012 35.3 Visual examination only 40 / 2017 40.4 D109 1,156 D202c,d 1,184 D305 1,127 45 / 2021 44.8 Visual examination only Note a: Jack calibration invalid; lift-off forces excluded from trend.
Note b: Three-year re-surveillance, performed with the 5-year surveillance, included only tendons de-tensioned / re-tensioned in year 3; lift-off forces not valid for inclusion in trend and are not shown.
Note c: Common tendon.
Note d: Tendon de-tensioned during the year 1 surveillance; excluded from trend.
Note: Shaded tendons de-tensioned / re-tensioned.
Table 5 - Summary of Unit 2 Hoop Tendon Forces Surveillance /
Calendar Year T, Time Since SIT, Years Tendon FM, Measured Force, kip 25 / 2006 25.8 H8DE 1,188 H24FDc 1,219 H30FE 1,236 30 / 2012 32.0 N/A, Visual Only 35 / 2017 37.1 H27DE 1,161 H24FDc 1,222 H33FE 1,235 40 / 2021 41.5 N/A, Visual Only Note c: Common Tendon.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 61 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Table 6 - Summary of Unit 2 Vertical Tendon Forces Surveillance /
Calendar Year T, Time Since SIT, Years Tendon FM, Measured Force, kip 25 / 2006 25.8 V16c 1,247 V61 1,239 V118 1,266 30 / 2012 32.0 N/A, Visual Only 35 / 2014 36.6 V16c 1,249 V53 1,242 V99 1,223 40 / 2021 41.5 N/A, Visual Only Note c: Common Tendon.
Table 7 - Summary of Unit 2 Dome Tendon Forces Surveillance /
Calendar Year T, Time Since SIT, Years Tendon FM, Measured Force, kip 25 / 2006 25.8 D113 1,217 D114f 1,121 D115 1,234 D201 1,248 D318 1,163 30 / 2012 32.0 N/A, Visual Only 35 / 2017 37.1 D123f 1,178 D228 1,178 D315 1,204 40 / 2021 41.5 N/A, Visual Only Note f: D114 designated as common tendon for the year 25 surveillance; D223 designated as new common tendon for the year 35 surveillance. Per the Unit 2 25th year surveillance report (Reference 6.20), the force in common tendon D114 fell below 95% of predicted and was re-tensioned. This required designating a new common tendon (D123) for the 35th year surveillance.
FNP RR Technical Report Page 62 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Table 8a - Unit 1 Wire Test Results / Ultimate Tensile Strength Exam Year Tendon Ultimate Tensile Strength, ksi Wire
- Mean, ksi Exam
- Mean, ksi Specimen 1 Specimen 2 Specimen 3 Specimen 4 5
D119 264 265 266 N/A 265 263 D229 270 259 268 264 265 H33BC 247 271 261 271 263 V5 258 260 259 N/A 259 10 V14 258 257 260 N/A 258 256 H26AC 251 251 251 N/A 251 D121 259 259 257 N/A 258 15 V61 260 260 259 N/A 260 256 H27CA 256 256 258 N/A 257 D110 250 251 252 N/A 251 20 V1 253 258 252 N/A 254 253 H26CB 253 253 252 N/A 253 D118 249 252 251 N/A 251 30 V104 262 252 247 N/A 254 265 H33BA 278 271 273 N/A 274 D116 271 265 269 N/A 268 40 D305 255 255 255 N/A 255 254 H24AC 256 254 255 N/A 255 V52 251 252 251 N/A 251
FNP RR Technical Report Page 63 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Table 8b - Unit 1 Wire Test Results / Elongation at Failure Exam Year Tendon Elongation at Failure, %
Wire
- Mean, Exam
- Mean, Specimen 1 Specimen 2 Specimen 3 Specimen 4 5
D119 6.2 7.5 6.9 N/A 6.9 6.6 D229 6.9 6.2 6.9 9.4 7.4 H33BC 5.4 6.2 6.2 6.7 6.1 V5 5.4 8.0 4.5 N/A 6.0 10 V14 6.4 5.5 6.2 N/A 6.0 5.7 H2AC 5.7 6.1 5.4 N/A 5.7 D121 4.8 5.2 5.6 N/A 5.2 15 V61 5.0 5.4 5.1 N/A 5.2 5.1 H27CA 5.1 5.3 5.3 N/A 5.2 D110 5.0 4.8 4.8 N/A 4.9 20 V1 10.0 N/A 12.0 N/A 11.0 11.3 H26CB 11.0 12.0 N/A N/A 11.5 D118 12.0 11.0 11.0 N/A 11.3 30 V104 3.4 1.9 1.9 N/A 2.4 3.6 H33BA 3.9 5.0 4.0 N/A 4.3 D116 4.1 4.3 4.2 N/A 4.2 40 D305 5.0 5.0 5.1 N/A 5.0 4.9 H24AC 4.8 4.8 4.8 N/A 4.8 V52 4.6 5.1 5.2 N/A 5.0
FNP RR Technical Report Page 64 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 Table 9a - Unit 2 Wire Test Results / Ultimate Tensile Strength Exam Year Tendon Ultimate Tensile Strength, ksi Wire
- Mean, ksi Exam
- Mean, ksi Specimen 1
Specimen 2
Specimen 3
Specimen 4
25 V61 234 259 255 N/A 249 255 H30FE 254 258 252 N/A 255 D318 261 260 261 N/A 261 35 D315 255 255 255 N/A 255 256 H33FE 259 258 260 N/A 259 V53 250 253 255 N/A 253 Table 9b - Unit 2 Wire Test Results / Elongation at Failure Exam Year Tendon Elongation at Failure, %
Wire
- Mean, Exam
- Mean, Specimen 1
Specimen 2
Specimen 3
Specimen 4
25 V61 2.2 3.2 3.4 N/A 2.9 3.7 H30FE 4.0 4.8 3.8 N/A 4.2 D318 3.8 4.0 3.9 N/A 3.9 35 D315 4.0 4.2 4.0 N/A 4.1 4.6 H33FE 5.0 5.3 5.3 N/A 5.2 V53 4.6 4.3 4.3 N/A 4.4
FNP RR Technical Report Page 65 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 1,000 1,050 1,100 1,150 1,200 1,250 1,300 1,350 1,400 1
10 100 F, Tendon Force, kip T, Time Since SIT, Years (Logarithmic Scale)
Figure 1 - Unit 1 Hoop Tendon Force Trend & LCL / 1 - 40 Year Surveillance Results Hoop Tendon Mean Force Trend Line F (kip) = 1,302.0 - 95.08
- Log10 (T)
Minimum Required Mean Hoop Tendon Force FMin = 1,022 kip Lift-Off Force Data Point (Typ) 95% LCL on Mean Force
FNP RR Technical Report Page 66 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 1,000 1,050 1,100 1,150 1,200 1,250 1,300 1,350 1,400 10 100 F, Tendon Force, kip T, Time Since SIT, Years (Logarithmic Scale)
Figure 2 - Unit 1 Hoop Tendon Force Trend & LCL / 10 - 40 Year Surveillance Results Hoop Tendon Mean Force Trend Line F (kip) = 1,375.1-140.69
- Log10 (T)
Minimum Required Mean Hoop Tendon Force FMin = 1,022 kip Lift-Off Force Data Point (Typ) 95% LCL on Mean Force
FNP RR Technical Report Page 67 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 1,000 1,050 1,100 1,150 1,200 1,250 1,300 1,350 1,400 10 100 F, Tendon Force, kip T, Time Since SIT, Years (Logarithmic Scale)
Figure 3 - Unit 2 Hoop Tendon Force Trend Hoop Tendon Mean Force Trend Line F (kip) = 1,288.9-52.82
- Log10 (T)
Minimum Required Mean Hoop Tendon Force FMin = 1,022 kip Lift-Off Force Data Point (Typ)
FNP RR Technical Report Page 68 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 1,000 1,050 1,100 1,150 1,200 1,250 1,300 1,350 1,400 1
10 100 F, Tendon Force, kip T, Time Since SIT, Years (Logarithmic Scale)
Figure 4 - Unit 1 Vertical Tendon Force Trend & LCL / 1 - 40 Year Surveillance Results Vertical Tendon Mean Force Trend Line F (kip) = 1,295.0 - 36.80
- Log10 (T)
Minimum Required Mean Vertical Tendon Force FMin = 1,158 kip Lift-Off Force Data Point (Typ) 95% LCL on Mean Force
FNP RR Technical Report Page 69 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 1,000 1,050 1,100 1,150 1,200 1,250 1,300 1,350 1,400 10 100 F, Tendon Force, kip T, Time Since SIT, Years (Logarithmic Scale)
Figure 5 - Unit 1 Vertical Tendon Force Trend & LCL / 10 - 40 Year Surveillance Results Vertical Tendon Mean Force Trend Line F (kip) = 1,293.4 - 28.64
- Log10 (T)
Minimum Required Mean Vertical Tendon Force FMin = 1,158 kip Lift-Off Force Data Point (Typ) 95% LCL on Mean Force
FNP RR Technical Report Page 70 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 1,000 1,050 1,100 1,150 1,200 1,250 1,300 1,350 1,400 10 100 F, Tendon Force, kip T, Time Since SIT, Years (Logarithmic Scale)
Figure 6 - Unit 2 Vertical Tendon Force Trend Vertical Tendon Mean Force Trend Line F (kip) = 1,364.0- 80.29
- Log10 (T)
Minimum Required Mean Vertical Tendon Force FMin = 1,158 kip Lift-Off Force Data Point (Typ)
FNP RR Technical Report Page 71 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 1,000 1,050 1,100 1,150 1,200 1,250 1,300 1,350 1,400 1
10 100 F, Tendon Force, kip T, Time Since SIT, Years (Logarithmic Scale)
Figure 7 - Unit 1 Dome Tendon Force Trend & LCL / 1 - 40 Year Surveillance Results Dome aTendon Mean Force Trend Line F (kip) = 1,288.9 - 99.69
- Log10 (T)
Minimum Required Mean Dome Tendon Force FMin = 1,080 kip Lift-Off Force Data Point (Typ) 95% LCL on Mean Force
FNP RR Technical Report Page 72 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 1,000 1,050 1,100 1,150 1,200 1,250 1,300 1,350 1,400 10 100 F, Tendon Force, kip T, Time Since SIT, Years (Logarithmic Scale)
Figure 8 - Unit 1 Dome Tendon Force Trend & LCL / 10 - 40 Year Surveillance Results Dome aTendon Mean Force Trend Line F (kip) = 1,194.2 - 19.35
- Log10 (T)
Minimum Required Mean Dome Tendon Force FMin = 1,080 kip Lift-Off Force Data Point (Typ) 95% LCL on Mean Force
FNP RR Technical Report Page 73 of 73 Revision 1 / 20230620 1,000 1,050 1,100 1,150 1,200 1,250 1,300 1,350 1,400 10 100 F, Tendon Force, kip T, Time Since SIT, Years (Logarithmic Scale)
Figure 9 - Unit 2 Dome Tendon Force Trend Dome Tendon Mean Force Trend Line F (kip) = 1,285.5-62.97
- Log10 (T)
Minimum Required Dome Tendon Mean Force FMin = 1,080 kip Lift-Off Force Data Point (Typ)