ML25038A103

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NRC Inspection Report No. 15000037/2024001(DRSS) - Mckenna, Sunabe, & Associates, LLC (Public)
ML25038A103
Person / Time
Site: 15000037
Issue date: 03/04/2025
From: David Curtis
NRC/RGN-III/DRSS/MIB
To: Donato T
McKenna, Sunabe, & Associates
Craffey R
References
EA-R3-2024-0049, EA-24-136 IR 2024001
Download: ML25038A103 (10)


Text

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION of this letter contains Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information. When separated from Enclosure 2, this transmittal letter and Enclosure 1 are decontrolled.

EA-R3-2024-0049 EA-24-136 Travis Donato Operations Manager McKenna, Sunabe, & Associates, LLC 12370 Jackson Run Road Sugar Grove, PA 16350

SUBJECT:

NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 15000037/2024001(DRSS) - MCKENNA, SUNABE, & ASSOCIATES, LLC

Dear Travis Donato:

On September 5, 2024, an inspector from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted a non-routine inspection of activities that McKenna, Sunabe, & Associates performed under the terms of a general license for reciprocity in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 150.20(a)(1) at a temporary job site in Mount Vernon, Indiana. The purpose of the inspection was to review activities performed under this general license to ensure that activities were being performed in accordance with NRC requirements and your Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Radioactive Materials License. The inspector performed an additional in-office review through January 28, 2025, to evaluate the inspection findings and their significance. The enclosed inspection report presents the results of the inspection.

This inspection examined activities conducted under reciprocity as they relate to safety and compliance with the NRCs rules and regulations and with the conditions in your Commonwealth of Pennsylvania license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of an examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, independent measurements, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of the inspection, two apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified. One concerned the failure to comply with U.S. Department of Transportation requirements for blocking and bracing a Type B package containing radioactive material while in transport on public highways, as required by 10 CFR 71.5(a). The other concerned NRC security requirements and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, available on the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/about-March 4, 2025

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OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The circumstances of the apparent violations, including the corrective actions to restore compliance, are described in the enclosed inspection report (Enclosure 1) and its non-public security addendum (Enclosure 2).

The circumstances surrounding the apparent violations, the significance of the issues, and the need for lasting and effective corrective action were also discussed with you at the inspection exit meeting conducted by Ryan Craffey on February 5, 2025.

Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to (1) respond in writing to the apparent violations addressed in this inspection report within 30 days of the date of this letter, (2) request a Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference (PEC), or (3) request Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). If a PEC is held, it will be open for public observation and the NRC will issue a press release to announce the time and date of the conference. Please contact Rhex Edwards at (630) 829-9722 or Rhex.Edwards@nrc.gov within 10 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intended response or request. A PEC should be held within 30 days and an ADR session within 45 days of the date of this letter.

If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as Response to the Apparent Violations in Inspection Report Nos. 15000037/2024001(DRSS); EA-24-136, and should include, for each apparent violation: (1) the reason for the apparent violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations; and (4) the date when full compliance was or will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. Your response should be sent to the NRCs Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy mailed to the NRC Region III Office, 2056 Westings Avenue, Suite 400, Naperville, IL 60563, within 30 days of the date of this letter.

If an adequate response is not received within the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a PEC.

If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your perspective on these matters and any other information that you believe the NRC should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a pre-decisional enforcement conference does not mean that the NRC has determined that a violation has occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The topics discussed during the conference may include information to determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation, information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken or planned. In presenting your corrective action, you should be aware that the promptness and comprehensiveness of your actions will be considered in assessing any civil penalty for the apparent violations. The guidance in NRC Information Notice 96-28, "Suggested Guidance Relating to Development and Implementation of Corrective Action," may be helpful in preparing your response. You can find the information notice on the NRC website at: https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1996/index.html.

You may also request ADR with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue. ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflicts using a neutral third-party. The

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OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION technique that the NRC has decided to employ is mediation. Mediation is a voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral party (the mediator) works with parties to help them reach resolution. If the parties agree to use ADR, they select a mutually agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no power to make decisions. Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the issues. Additional information concerning the NRCs program can be obtained at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral third party. Please contact ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR. If you choose ADR, please also contact Rhex Edwards at the telephone number or email address listed above.

In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violations described in the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.

In accordance with the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure in 10 CFR 2.390, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, any response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made publicly available without redaction.

Please feel free to contact Ryan Craffey of my staff if you have any questions regarding this inspection. Ryan can be reached at 630-829-9655 or ryan.craffey@nrc.gov.

Sincerely, David Curtis, Director Division of Radiological Safety and Security Docket No. 150-00037 License No. PA-1687

Enclosures:

1. Inspection Report No. 15000037/2024001(DRSS)
2. Security Addendum to Inspection Report (non-public) cc w/encl: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State of Indiana Signed by Curtis, David on 03/04/25

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OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION Letter to T. Donato from D. Curtis, dated March 4, 2025.

SUBJECT:

NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 15000037/2024001(DRSS) - MCKENNA, SUNABE & ASSOCIATES, LLC DISTRIBUTION w/encl:

Jack Giessner Mohammed Shuaibi David Curtis Jared Heck Diana Betancourt-Roldan Kenneth Lambert Geoffrey Edwards Jason Draper MIB Inspectors ADAMS Accession Number: ML25038A103 OFFICE RIII-DRSS RIII-DRSS RIII-EICS HQ-OE NAME RCraffey:brt REdwards DBetancourt-Roldan JPeralta DATE 2/07/2025 2/11/2025 2/12/2025 & 2/28/2025 2/20/2025 OFFICE OGC RIII-DRSS NAME MSimon DCurtis DATE 2/28/2025 3/04/2025 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION Enclosure 1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION of this letter contains Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information. When separated from Enclosure 2, this transmittal letter and Enclosure 1 are decontrolled.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III Docket No.

150-00037 License No.

PA-1687 Report No.

15000037/2024001(DRSS)

EA No.

EA-R3-2024-0049 EA-24-136 Licensee:

McKenna, Sunabe, & Associates, LLC Site:

1 Lexan Lane Mount Vernon, Indiana Inspection Dates:

September 5, 2024 In-office review through January 28, 2025 Exit Meeting Date:

February 5, 2025 Inspector:

Ryan Craffey, Senior Health Physicist Approved By:

Rhex Edwards, Chief Materials Inspection Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

McKenna, Sunabe & Associates, LLC NRC Inspection Report 15000037/2024001 (DRSS)

This was a non-routine inspection of radiographic operations conducted on the premises of SABIC Innovative Plastics in Mount Vernon, Indiana. These activities involved the use of a radiographic exposure device containing iridium-192 by McKenna, Sunabe, & Associates, LLC (the licensee), as authorized by Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Radioactive Materials License No. PA-1687 and the general license in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 150.20(a)(1) to perform activities licensed by an Agreement State in NRC jurisdiction under reciprocity.

As a result of the inspection conducted on September May 4-5, 2024, with in-office review through January 15, 2025, two apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified. One concerned the failure to comply with U.S. Department of Transportation requirements for blocking and bracing a Type B package containing radioactive material while in transport on public highways, as required by 10 CFR 71.5(a). The other apparent violation concerned NRC security requirements and is being considered for escalated enforcement action.

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REPORT DETAILS 1

Program Overview and Inspection History McKenna, Sunabe, & Associates (the licensee, d/b/a Engineering & Inspections) was authorized by Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Radioactive Materials License No. PA-1687 to store radiographic exposure devices containing iridium-192 (Ir-192) at its field station in Sugar Grove, Pennsylvania, and to use them at temporary job sites in Commonwealth jurisdiction. The company was approved to perform these activities at temporary job sites in NRC jurisdiction during calendar year 2024 under the terms of the general license in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 150.20(a)(1) i.e.,

reciprocity.

The NRC has not previously inspected this licensee under reciprocity. The company does maintain an NRC License for a field office in Hawaii (Engineering & Inspections Hawaii, docket no. 030-36017); however, with limited exceptions, the offices implement and oversee their operations independently.

2 Transportation of Hazardous Material 2.1 Inspection Scope On September 5, 2024, the inspector evaluated the licensees compliance with USDOT requirements for transportation of hazardous material incident to traveling on public highways to and from the temporary job site in Evansville, Indiana. The inspector interviewed licensee personnel, examined equipment, performed independent and confirmatory surveys, and reviewed a selection of available records.

2.2 Observations and Findings On July 10, 2024, the licensee provided notification to the NRC that it intended to perform radiographic operations between September 3 and October 8, 2024, on the premises of SABIC Innovative Plastics in Mount Vernon, Indiana (a fixed gauge licensee, docket no. 030-04383). The licensee had been contracted to support another radiography company with a permanent presence there (JRGO, docket no. 030-38303) in performing radiographic and other non-destructive testing on the second shift during an upcoming outage.

On September 5, 2024, an inspector met the crew dispatched to Indiana at the temporary job site in Mount Vernon. The inspector examined the vehicle in which the crew had transported a QSA Global Model 880D radiographic exposure device, a Type B package (USA/9296/B(U)-96) containing Ir-192. The crew had used a locked cable looped through an eye bolt on the inside wall of the vehicles darkroom to block and brace the package by its handle; however, the cable was sufficiently long to allow the device to shift and change position (i.e., roll/tilt) freely while inside the darkroom.

The crew had used this rig on September 3, 2024, to transport the package on public highways from the field office in Sugar Grove to lodging in Mount Vernon, and again on September 4 and 5 on public highways to and from lodging to the job site.

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10 CFR 71.5(a) states that each licensee who transports licensed material outside the site of usage, as specified in the NRC license, or where transport is on public highways, or who delivers licensed material to a carrier for transport, shall comply with the applicable requirements of the DOT regulations in 49 CFR parts 107, 171 through 180, and 390 through 397, appropriate to the mode of transport.

49 CFR 177.834(a) states that any package containing any hazardous material, not permanently attached to a motor vehicle, must be secured against shifting, including relative motion between packages, within the vehicle on which it is being transported, under conditions normally incident to transportation.

49 CFR 177.842(d) states, for packages of Class 7 (radioactive) materials that packages must be so blocked and braced that they cannot change position during conditions normally incident to transportation.

Contrary to the above, between September 3 and 5, 2024, McKenna, Sunabe &

Associates, Inc. did not adequately comply with the requirements in 49 CFR 177.834(a) and 49 CFR 177.842(d) to secure a QSA Global Model 880 Delta radiographic exposure device, a Type B package containing Class 7 (radioactive) material, against shifting or to block and brace it so that the package could not change position during conditions normally incident to transportation. Specifically, the licensee used a locked cable looped through an eye bolt on the inside wall of the vehicles darkroom to block and brace the exposure device by its handle; however, the cable was sufficiently long to allow the device to shift and change position freely.

This is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 71.5(a) in accordance with Section 6.8.d of the NRCs Enforcement Policy, as the violation did not reasonably result in a failure to maintain control of the package during transport, nor was there a substantial potential for either personnel exposure or contamination above regulatory limits.

As corrective action to restore compliance for the remainder of the work in NRC jurisdiction, the crew used a stack of cones already present in the darkroom to prevent the device from shifting and changing position freely, until a more permanent solution could be devised upon their return to Pennsylvania.

The inspector also confirmed that the Type B package was appropriately marked (UN 2916) and labeled (Yellow-II) for transport, and that shipping papers accurately reflecting the hazardous material therein were present in the vehicle and accessible within arms reach of the driver.

Independent surveys of the package returned readings of 0.6 mrem per hour at approximately 1 meter, and approximately 50 mrem per hour on the surface.

Confirmatory surveys by the licensee returned readings of 1.0 mrem per hour at approximately 1 meter, and 50 mrem per hour on the surface, the limit for contact readings on a package labeled as a Yellow-II.

2.3 Conclusions The inspector identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 71.5(a).

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3 Preparations to Safely Conduct Radiographic Operations 3.1 Inspection Scope On September 5, 2024, the inspector evaluated preparations for the conduct of activities performed by the licensee under reciprocity at a temporary job site in Evansville. The inspector interviewed licensee personnel, examined equipment, performed independent and confirmatory surveys, and reviewed a selection of available records.

3.2 Observations and Findings The inspector examined the radiographic exposure device and associated equipment that the licensees crew had brought to the temporary job site. The exposure device was appropriately labeled with the licensees information and was in good condition.

Associated equipment was likewise in good condition and compatible with the exposure device.

The crew demonstrated the conduct of daily equipment checks as well as the setup for and conduct of radiographic operations. Based on the hypothetical scenario, the crew established and posted an adequate restricted area and appeared capable of controlling the hypothetical high radiation area within. Both members of the crew had assigned dosimetry as well as calibrated operable instrumentation, including direct reading dosimeters, alarming rate meters, and survey instruments. Both were also knowledgeable of radiation protection principles, licensee procedures, and applicable regulatory requirements for the safe conduct of radiography.

The inspector also reviewed a selection of records available on the job site, including a copy of the licensees NRC Form 241 approved August 8, 2024, which accurately described the intended work and licensed material involved, a copy of the licensees Operating & Emergency (O&E) procedures, documentation of quarterly maintenance for the camera, camera DU checks, and personnel dosimetry reports. During the period of in-office review, the inspector also reviewed documentation of quarterly maintenance for associated radiography equipment and confirmed that the O&E procedures reviewed at the job site were the latest revision.

3.3 Conclusions The inspector had no findings in this area.

7 Exit Meeting Summary The NRC inspector presented preliminary inspection findings following the onsite inspection on February 5, 2025. The licensee did not identify any documents or processes reviewed by the inspector as proprietary. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented and demonstrated a commitment to provide effective corrective actions to address the potential for recurrence of similar issues.

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LIST OF LICENSEE PERSONNEL CONTACTED OR INTERVIEWED Charlie Brown Travis Donato Chad Fuller Attended exit meeting on February 3, 2025 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 87121 - Industrial Radiography Operations