ML25014A156
| ML25014A156 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200050 |
| Issue date: | 01/14/2025 |
| From: | Shaver M NuScale |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| Shared Package | |
| ML25014A155 | List: |
| References | |
| RAIO-178267 | |
| Download: ML25014A156 (1) | |
Text
RAIO-178267 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360.0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com January 14, 2025 Docket No.52-050 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738
SUBJECT:
NuScale Power, LLC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information No. 032 (RAI-10297 R1) on the NuScale Standard Design Approval Application
REFERENCE:
NRC Letter to NuScale, Request for Additional Information No. 032 (RAI-10297 R1), dated October 31, 2024 The purpose of this letter is to provide the NuScale Power, LLC (NuScale) response to the referenced NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI).
The enclosure to this letter contains the NuScale response to the following RAI question from NRC RAI-10297 R1:
NonLOCA.LTR-3, 18, 27 is the proprietary version of the NuScale Response to NRC RAI No. 032 (RAI-10297 R1, Question NonLOCA.LTR-3, 18, 27). NuScale requests that the proprietary version be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR § 2.390. The enclosed affidavit (Enclosure 3) supports this request. The enclosed affidavit (Enclosure 3) supports this request. Enclosure 1 has also been determined to contain Export Controlled Information. This information must be protected from disclosure per the requirement of 10 CFR § 810. Enclosure 2 is the nonproprietary version of the NuScale response.
This letter makes no regulatory commitments and no revisions to any existing regulatory commitments.
If you have any questions, please contact Amanda Bode at 541-452-7971 or at abode@nuscalepower.com.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 14, 2025.
Sincerely, Mark W. Shaver Director, Regulatory Affairs NuScale Power, LLC
RAIO-178267 Page 2 of 2 01/14/2025 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360.0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com Distribution:
Mahmoud Jardaneh, Chief New Reactor Licensing Branch, NRC Getachew Tesfaye, Senior Project Manager, NRC Thomas Hayden, Project Manager, NRC
- NuScale Response to NRC Request for Additional Information RAI-10297 R1, Question NonLOCA.LTR-3, 18, 27, Proprietary Version : NuScale Response to NRC Request for Additional Information RAI-10297 R1, Question NonLOCA.LTR-3, 18, 27, Nonproprietary Version : Affidavit of Mark W. Shaver, AF-178268
RAIO-178267 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360.0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com NuScale Response to NRC Request for Additional Information RAI-10297 R1, Question NonLOCA.LTR-3, 18, 27, Proprietary Version
RAIO-178267 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360.0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com NuScale Response to NRC Request for Additional Information RAI-10297 R1, Question NonLOCA.LTR-3, 18, 27, Nonproprietary Version
Response to Request for Additional Information Docket: 052000050 RAI No.: 10297 Date of RAI Issue: 10/31/2024 NRC Question No.: NonLOCA.LTR-3, 18, 27 Issue The NPM-20 reactor pool is modeled by NuScale (( 2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
((
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2(a),(c). In addition, the staff notes that FSAR Chapter 5 states: A turbine trip at full power without bypass capability is the most severe AOO and is the bounding event used in the determination of RSV capacity and the RPV overpressure analyses. Sizing of the RCS and the PZR steam space avoids an RSV lift during normal operational transients that produce the highest RPV pressure at full power conditions, with system and core parameters within normal operating range. In the event of a safety valve lift, the size of the PZR steam space is sufficient to preclude liquid discharge. The analytical model used for the analysis of the overpressure protection system and the basis for its validity is in the NuScale Topical Reports "Non-Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis Methodology" and "Loss-of-Coolant Accident Evaluation Model". ((
}}
2(a),(c). Information Requested a) The Non-LOCA DHRS base model and its variants are not only used in Non-LOCA event simulations but also in LOCA analysis for FSAR Section 15.6.5 and Chapter 5 normal shutdown analysis. Provide evaluations and bases information that address the concerns, as described above, ((
}}
2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
(( }} 2(a),(c), NuScale is requested to describe, from the perspective of condenser-to-pool heat transfer, the startup of a DHRS loop from cold (reactor pool temperature) conditions to the point of peak heat transfer rate, with focus on the various condenser-to-pool heat transfer modes and wall heat transfer correlations that will be involved with the startup of DHRS. b) Provide an evaluation of the DHRS performance under a scenario (( }} 2(a),(c) NuScale Response: Executive Summary The response describes performance of the decay heat removal system (DHRS) during startup from cold condition to the point of peak heat transfer rate. NRELAP5 predictions and NIST-2 data demonstrate that high fluid temperatures inside the condenser tubes rapidly transfer energy to the tube walls. ((
}}2(a),(c) For NuScale Power Module (NPM) conditions, the heat flux at the top of the condenser remains below the CHF, therefore film boiling conditions do not occur. Margin to CHF near the top of the DHRS condenser is justified based on (( }}2(a),(c)
Evaluations conclude that the correlations in NRELAP5, ((
}}2(a),(c)
NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
(( }}2(a),(c) Sensitivity calculations demonstrate that safety analysis margins are not sensitive to (( }}2(a),(c) While reactor safety valve (RSV) lift is calculated in non-LOCA Chapter 15 analyses, calculation results demonstrate that the RSV lift is associated with the initiating event, not conditions of reduced DHRS heat transfer capacity. Evaluations and bases information are provided that address the concerns described in the RAI, (( }}2(a),(c) Overview This response provides the requested information in the following sections (i.e., the numbering in the list identifies the numbered section in the response where the requested information is found): 1. RAI part (a) - Description of DHRS startup from cold conditions to point of peak heat transfer rate, from the perspective of condenser-to-pool heat transfer, focused on various condenser-to-pool heat transfer modes and wall heat transfer correlations associated with startup of DHRS. This discussion provides foundation and context for the subsequent evaluations and bases information and therefore is provided first in the response. 2. RAI part (a) - Evaluation and bases information that address the described NRC concerns associated with the DHRS modeling in NRELAP5. This section addresses the following NRC concerns: (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
3. RAI part (a) - Evaluation and bases information to address the described NRC concerns about (( }}2(a),(c) 4. RAI part (a) - Discussion of RSV operation during two-train DHRS operation. 5. RAI part (b) - Evaluation of DHRS performance under a scenario with (( }}2(a),(c) 6. Response to NRC feedback on material presented during clarification call. NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
1. Decay Heat Removal System Startup During normal power operation, the DHRS is at standby conditions with the actuation valves closed. The DHRS condensate line, condenser, and steam piping up to the actuation valves are liquid-solid. The actuation valves are located above the pool water level. The liquid inside the DHRS is at equilibrium with surrounding pool fluid or pool atmosphere temperature conditions. Vertical condenser tubes are connected in parallel banks to horizontal header pipes; (( }}2(a),(c) Figure 1 through Figure 7 below provide NRELAP5 calculation results to illustrate key aspects of the DHRS startup and establishment of condenser-to-pool heat transfer. (( }}2(a),(c) When DHRS actuates, the containment isolation valves on the feedwater and main steam piping close, and the DHRS actuation valves open. Heat transfer from the RCS across the SG tubes generates steam in the SG tubes and pressure in the isolated secondary side loop increases due to the vapor generation, as shown in Figure 1. Liquid in the isolated secondary side loop redistributes between the DHRS and SG. ((
}}2(a),(c)
NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
(( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
(( }}2(a),(c) Pool boiling curves show that as surface temperature increases, surface heat flux increases, until the heat flux reaches the CHF. (( }}2(a),(c) However, heat fluxes in the DHRS condenser remain below pool boiling CHF values. The behavior described above and shown in the NRELAP5 calculations for NPM conditions is consistent with measured data from NIST-2 non-LOCA integral effects testing. Figure 8 provides a schematic of relevant instrumentation locations. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show (( }}2(a),(b),(c),ECI NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
((
}}2(a),(b),(c),ECI NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
(( }}2(a),(b),(c),ECI For NPM conditions, the heat flux at the top of the condenser remains below the CHF and therefore the startup evolution is as described above, and film boiling conditions do not occur. The pool boiling CHF appropriate for conditions around the DHRS condenser is discussed further in Section 3 of this response. NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Table 1: Legend Description for Figure 9 and Figure 10 (( }}2(a),(b),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Figure 1: (( }}2(a),(c) (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Figure 2: (( }}2(a),(c) (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Figure 3: (( }}2(a),(c) (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Figure 4: (( }}2(a),(c) (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Figure 5: (( }}2(a),(c) (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Figure 6: (( }}2(a),(c) (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Figure 7: (( }}2(a),(c) (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Figure 8: Schematic of NIST-2 Instrument Locations on the Scaled Decay Heat Removal Heat Exchanger (( }}2(a),(b),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Figure 9: NIST-2 Non-LOCA Run 3 Decay Heat Removal System Heat Exchanger Tube Fluid Temperatures Compared with NRELAP5 Simulation Results, Short-Term (( }}2(a),(b),(c),ECI NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Figure 10: NIST-2 Non-LOCA Run 3 Decay Heat Removal System Heat Exchanger Tube Fluid Temperatures Compared with NRELAP5 Simulation Results, Long-Term (( }}2(a),(b),(c),ECI NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
2. NRELAP5 Pool Modeling Effect on Decay Heat Removal System Heat Transfer Rate and Safety Analysis Event Margins The RAI identifies concerns that the NRELAP5 ((
}}2(a),(c)
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((
}}2(a),(c)
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Therefore, it is concluded that the correlations in NRELAP5, (( }}2(a),(c) can adequately account for natural convection heat transfer and boiling heat transfer on the DHRS tubes. (( }}2(a),(c) Sensitivity calculations demonstrate that safety analysis margins are not sensitive to (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
3. Evaluation of Margin to Film Boiling Conditions The discussion and calculations in Section 1 of this response demonstrate that during DHRS startup and initial operation, high fluid temperatures inside the condenser tubes rapidly transfer energy to the tube walls. (( }}2(a),(c) around the DHRS condenser, to demonstrate margin to film boiling conditions. This section of the response provides the following information: (a) Discussion of regulatory precedent (b) Justification of similarity between US600 plant DHRS conditions and US460 plant DHRS conditions (c) (( }}2(a),(c) (e) Summary of evidence demonstrating margin to film boiling conditions 3(a) Regulatory Precedent The key postulated NRC concern in the RAI is that if the wall heat flux exceeds the CHF, and film boiling conditions occurred, then DHRS heat transfer capacity could be reduced due to vapor blanketing at the top of the condenser. This concern was previously postulated during the NRC review of the 160 MWt NPM design. The concern was addressed in response to RAI 9374 NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Question 15.00.02-24 The RAI response demonstrated (( }}2(a),(c) Similar conditions occur in the NPM-20 design, as discussed further in Section 3(b). NuScale also notes that the AP1000 safety evaluation report in NUREG-1793 Section 21.5.4 identifies that concerns about film boiling degrading heat transfer on the AP1000 passive residual heat removal heat exchanger (PRHR HX) were resolved on the basis of the applicants analyses of the margin of the PRHR HX heat flux to the critical heat flux limit,and the fact that vapor blanketing was not observed in the APEX, SPES, and ROSA integral-effects test facilities. Therefore, in this RAI response NuScale provides justification of margin between maximum DHRS heat flux and CHF for pool boiling conditions around the DHRS. 3(b) Justification of Similarity between NPM-160 and NPM-20 Decay Heat Removal System Conditions The following points justify similarity in (( }}2(a),(c) The comparison addresses the DHRS condenser tube geometry and accounts for differences in plant primary fluid operating conditions and the system design pressure. In both designs the DHRS condenser tubes are (( }}2(a),(c) Therefore, the wall thickness and material are the same between the two designs. In both designs the condensers are located in a pool of subcooled water with nominal temperature around 100 degrees F. The design pressure of the secondary side, including the DHRS, increased from 2100 psia in the NPM-160 design to 2200 psia in the NPM-20 design. The saturation temperature at 2200 psia is 650 degrees F, compared to the saturation temperature of 643 degrees F at 2100 psia. However, this difference is not considered significant because (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Table 2 summarizes the maximum SG pressure for safety analysis heatup events, as presented in the US460 SDAA Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and the US600 Design Certification Application (DCA) FSAR. The heatup events were selected as representative of the limiting secondary side pressures that could occur due to DHRS operation in response to a design-basis initiating event. It is noted that the SG tube failure accident results in the maximum secondary side pressure across the safety analysis events, but this is due to the initiating event where the failed SG equalizes pressure with the reactor coolant system. Table 2 shows that for both designs, maximum secondary side pressure for the range of events is around 1400-1600 psia. This demonstrates that for both designs the maximum saturated steam temperature is around 605 degrees F. o The similarity in the maximum secondary pressure is consistent with the similar total temperature gradient from the RCS primary to the pool between the two designs. A characteristic of NPM designs is that after reactor trip and DHRS actuation, the RCS hot and cold temperatures converge near the average temperature. This is shown in Figure 11, for (( }}2(a),(c) In the NPM-160 design, the RCS average temperature range is 535-555 degrees F. In the 250 MWt NPM-20 design the RCS average temperature is 535-545 degrees F. Similarity in the NPM-160 and NPM-20 RCS temperatures after reactor trip, during DHRS startup, can be discerned by comparison of a range of different transients. NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Table 2: Comparison of Maximum Steam Generator Pressure between NPM-160 DCA and NPM-20 SDAA Chapter 15 Initiating Event Maximum Steam Generator Pressure (psia) SDAA FSAR Revision 0 DCA FSAR Revision 5 Turbine trip 1426 1545 Main steam isolation valve closure 1597 1512 Loss of normal alternating current power 1459 1415 Loss of normal feedwater 1548 1528 Feedwater line break 1424 1389 Inadvertent operation of DHRS 1490 1592 NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Figure 11: (( }}2(a),(c) (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
3(c) Alternate Evaluation of Decay Heat Removal System Tube Heat Flux and Wall Temperature Gradient NuScale performed (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
((
}}2(a),(c)
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((
}}2(a),(c)
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Figure 12: Schematic of Heat Transfer Thermal Resistance through Decay Heat Removal System to Reactor Pool (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Figure 13: Steady-State Temperature Distribution, (( }}2(a),(c) (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Figure 14: Steady-State Temperature Distribution, (( }}2(a),(c) (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
3(d) Critical Heat Flux around Decay Heat Removal System Condenser Tubes As discussed in Section 3(a) of this response, for the NPM-160 design, NuScale demonstrated ((
}}2(a),(c) This comparison remains valid for the NPM-20 design as discussed in Section 3(b) of this response.
The CHF ((
}}2(a),(c)
NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
((
}}2(a),(c)
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(( }}2(a),(c) the CHF remains above the maximum DHRS tube heat flux. Therefore, this evaluation confirms that appropriate parameters were previously used to evaluate the CHF limit and supports the continued conclusion that film boiling is not expected to occur around the DHRS condenser. Reference 1: NUREG/CR-4567, Prediction of Pool Void Fraction by New Drift Flux Correlation, Isao Kataoka and Mamoru Ishii. NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Table 3: Griffith-Zuber Pool Boiling Critical Heat Flux (kW/m2) (( }}2(a),(c) Table 4: Drift Flux Estimate of Void Fraction near Top of Decay Heat Removal System Condenser (( }}2(a),(c) NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
3(e) Summary This section of the RAI response provides evaluation and technical bases demonstrating that the maximum heat flux near the top of the DHRS condensers remains below the pool boiling CHF. ((
}}2(a),(c)
NuScale previously evaluated margin between the maximum DHRS condenser tube heat flux and the pool boiling CHF as part of the DCA review. ((
}}2(a),(c) The similarity is justified based on comparison of DHRS condenser tube geometry and accounting for differences in plant primary fluid operating conditions and the system design pressure.
((
}}2(a),(c) Therefore, this evaluation confirms that appropriate parameters were previously used to evaluate the CHF limit and supports the continued conclusion that film boiling is not expected to occur around the DHRS condenser.
NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
These evaluations provide technical bases to demonstrate that high vapor temperatures inside the DHRS condensers will not cause departure from nucleate boiling and therefore film boiling conditions will not occur. These results are consistent with the NRELAP5 sensitivity calculation results discussed in Section 2 of this response. NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
4. Reactor Safety Valve Operation during Two-Train Decay Heat Removal System Operation Although RSV operation is not an acceptance criteria in the non-LOCA topical report, the RAI requests ((
}}2(a),(c)
Section 3 of this response provides evaluations and technical basis information that departure from nucleate boiling does not occur for the maximum heat fluxes near the top of the DHRS condenser tubes. Section 2 of this response provides additional justification that the correlations in NRELAP5, ((
}}2(a),(c) can adequately account for natural convection heat transfer and boiling heat transfer on the DHRS tubes. (( }}2(a),(c) Sensitivity calculations demonstrate that safety analysis margins are not sensitive to (( }}2(a),(c)
The DHRS heat transfer capacity ((
}}2(a),(c) The increase in feedwater flow initiating events biased to limit DHRS heat transfer capacity demonstrate that the maximum pressurizer pressure is approximately 20 psi higher than the initial condition and RSV lift is not calculated to occur.
In other non-LOCA initiating events, particularly heatup events presented in FSAR Section 15.2, RSV lift is typically calculated to occur around the time of reactor trip and DHRS actuation, because the initiating event reduces heat transfer to the SG. The RSV lift under these conditions is not related to DHRS heat transfer capacity (i.e., is not related to DHRS modeling biases or uncertainties). The FSAR Section 15.5 results show that RSV lift is calculated to occur during two-train DHRS operation. The RCS pressure increase and RSV lifts in this event progression are due to the inventory addition of the initiating event that continues after reactor trip and DHRS actuation on high pressurizer pressure, until the inventory addition source is isolated by the high pressurizer level signal. The FSAR results demonstrate that the RCS average temperature generally decreases after reactor trip and DHRS actuation for two-train operation, demonstrating that the calculated RSV lifts are due to inventory addition and do not indicate unacceptable DHRS heat transfer capacity. NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
5. Evaluation of DHRS Performance under Scenario with Rapid Condenser Wall Temperature Increase Based on the results shown in Section 1 of this response, rapid increase of the outside tube wall during DHRS startup (( }}2(a),(c) no additional evaluation of DHRS performance under a scenario of rapid condenser wall heatup is needed. 6. Response to NRC Feedback on Presentation Material NuScale presented material to the NRC as part of clarification calls associated with this RAI. The presentation material was subsequently made available for audit. The NRC provided feedback on the presentation material. The NuScale response to the NRC feedback is provided in this section. (1) The NRC feedback requested a comparison of DHRS conditions between the SDAA design and the DCA design. The information is provided in Section 3 of the response. (2) The NRC feedback requested an explanation for (( }}2(a),(c) (3) The NRC feedback requested a comparison of DHRS conditions between the NPM and NIST-2. The information is provided in Section 1 of the response. (4) The NRC feedback requests explanation of how steady-state heat transfer calculations are related to the RAI request about DHRS startup transient. The information about the DHRS startup transient is provided in Section 1 of the response. The information about how steady-state heat transfer calculations, including how it is useful for understanding the DHRS startup transient, is provided in Section 3 of the response. (5) The NRC feedback requested explanation of pool-to-DHRS nodalization changes (i.e., SDAA vs DCA). NuScale reviewed the pool nodalization associated with DHRS for the SDAA and DCA. No significant changes have been made. NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
(( }}2(a),(c) This change has no impact on the information provided in this RAI response. However, to ensure consistency and clarity, TR-0516-49422, Loss-of-Coolant Accident Evaluation Model, is revised as shown in the attached markups (( }}2(a),(c) Impact on US460 SDAA: Topical Report TR-0516-49422, Loss-of-Coolant Accident Evaluation Model, has been revised as described in the response above and as shown in the markup provided in this response. NuScale Nonproprietary NuScale Nonproprietary
Loss-of-Coolant Accident Evaluation Model TR-0516-49422-NP Draft Revision 4 © Copyright 2024 by NuScale Power, LLC 75 RAI NonLOCA.LTR-3, 18, 27 Figure 5-2 Noding Diagram of NRELAP5 Loss-of-Coolant Input Model for the NPM-20 (( }}2(a),(c)
Loss-of-Coolant Accident Evaluation Model TR-0516-49422-NP Draft Revision 4 © Copyright 2024 by NuScale Power, LLC 83 5.1.4 Containment Vessel and Reactor Pool RAI NonLOCA.LTR-3, 18, 27 (( RAI NonLOCA.LTR-3, 18, 27 }}2(a),(c) RAI NonLOCA.LTR-3, 18, 27 The reactor pool is the ultimate heat sink in the NPM design. The reactor pool volume corresponding to an individual NPM is represented by a (( }}2(a),(c) A wide range of initial reactor pool temperatures is exercised to show the effect of the pool conditions on the LOCA behavior in Section 9.6.5. (( }}2(a),(c)
RAIO-178267 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360.0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com Affidavit of Mark W. Shaver, AF-178268
AF-178268 Page 1 of 2
NuScale Power, LLC AFFIDAVIT of Mark W. Shaver I, Mark W. Shaver, state as follows: (1) I am the Director of Regulatory Affairs of NuScale Power, LLC (NuScale), and as such, I have been specifically delegated the function of reviewing the information described in this Affidavit that NuScale seeks to have withheld from public disclosure, and am authorized to apply for its withholding on behalf of NuScale. (2) I am knowledgeable of the criteria and procedures used by NuScale in designating information as a trade secret, privileged, or as confidential commercial or financial information. This request to withhold information from public disclosure is driven by one or more of the following: (a) The information requested to be withheld reveals distinguishing aspects of a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.) whose use by NuScale competitors, without a license from NuScale, would constitute a competitive economic disadvantage to NuScale. (b) The information requested to be withheld consists of supporting data, including test data, relative to a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.), and the application of the data secures a competitive economic advantage, as described more fully in paragraph 3 of this Affidavit. (c) Use by a competitor of the information requested to be withheld would reduce the competitors expenditure of resources, or improve its competitive position, in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing of a similar product. (d) The information requested to be withheld reveals cost or price information, production capabilities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of NuScale. (e) The information requested to be withheld consists of patentable ideas. (3) Public disclosure of the information sought to be withheld is likely to cause substantial harm to NuScales competitive position and foreclose or reduce the availability of profit-making opportunities. The accompanying Request for Additional Information response reveals distinguishing aspects about the response by which NuScale develops its NuScale Power, LLC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI No. 10297 R1, Question NonLOCA.LTR-3, 18, 27) on the NuScale Standard Design Approval Application. NuScale has performed significant research and evaluation to develop a basis for this response and has invested significant resources, including the expenditure of a considerable sum of money. The precise financial value of the information is difficult to quantify, but it is a key element of the design basis for a NuScale plant and, therefore, has substantial value to NuScale. If the information were disclosed to the public, NuScales competitors would have access to the information without purchasing the right to use it or having been required to undertake a similar expenditure of resources. Such disclosure would constitute a misappropriation of NuScales intellectual property, and would deprive NuScale of the opportunity to exercise its competitive advantage to seek an adequate return on its investment. (4) The information sought to be withheld is in the enclosed response to NRC Request for Additional Information RAI 10297 R1, Question NonLOCA.LTR-3, 18, 27. The enclosure contains the designation Proprietary at the top of each page containing proprietary information. The information considered by NuScale to be proprietary is identified within double braces, (( }} in the document.
AF-178268 Page 2 of 2 (5) The basis for proposing that the information be withheld is that NuScale treats the information as a trade secret, privileged, or as confidential commercial or financial information. NuScale relies upon the exemption from disclosure set forth in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 USC § 552(b)(4), as well as exemptions applicable to the NRC under 10 CFR §§ 2.390(a)(4) and 9.17(a)(4). (6) Pursuant to the provisions set forth in 10 CFR § 2.390(b)(4), the following is provided for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld: (a) The information sought to be withheld is owned and has been held in confidence by NuScale. (b) The information is of a sort customarily held in confidence by NuScale and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, consistently has been held in confidence by NuScale. The procedure for approval of external release of such information typically requires review by the staff manager, project manager, chief technology officer or other equivalent authority, or the manager of the cognizant marketing function (or his delegate), for technical content, competitive effect, and determination of the accuracy of the proprietary designation. Disclosures outside NuScale are limited to regulatory bodies, customers and potential customers and their agents, suppliers, licensees, and others with a legitimate need for the information, and then only in accordance with appropriate regulatory provisions or contractual agreements to maintain confidentiality. (c) The information is being transmitted to and received by the NRC in confidence. (d) No public disclosure of the information has been made, and it is not available in public sources. All disclosures to third parties, including any required transmittals to NRC, have been made, or must be made, pursuant to regulatory provisions or contractual agreements that provide for maintenance of the information in confidence. (e) Public disclosure of the information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of NuScale, taking into account the value of the information to NuScale, the amount of effort and money expended by NuScale in developing the information, and the difficulty others would have in acquiring or duplicating the information. The information sought to be withheld is part of NuScales technology that provides NuScale with a competitive advantage over other firms in the industry. NuScale has invested significant human and financial capital in developing this technology and NuScale believes it would be difficult for others to duplicate the technology without access to the information sought to be withheld. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 14, 2025. Mark W. Shaver}}