IR 05000313/2024090
| ML24346A037 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/2025 |
| From: | Geoffrey Miller NRC/RGN-IV/DORS |
| To: | Pehrson D Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| EA-24-107, OI 4-2024-009 IR 2024090 | |
| Download: ML24346A037 (1) | |
Text
January 14, 2025
SUBJECT:
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 1 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2024090 AND INVESTIGATION REPORT 4-2024-009
Dear Doug Pehrson:
This letter refers to the investigation completed on September 18, 2024, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Office of Investigations at Arkansas Nuclear One. The investigation was conducted, in part, to determine if a licensed reactor operator assigned to Entergy Operations, Inc., at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Unit 1, willfully violated a facility procedure by accessing unauthorized internet sites while performing licensed activities in the at-the-controls (ATC) area of the unit 1 control room. A factual summary of the investigation is provided as Enclosure 1. The issue was discussed with Brian Patrick, Director of Regulatory Assurance and Performance Improvement, and other members of your staff during a telephone conversation on December 12, 2024.
Based on the results of this investigation, one apparent violation was identified and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
The Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The apparent violation involves a licensed operator that deliberately violated Entergy Nuclear Fleet Procedure EN-OP-115-02, Control Room Conduct and Access Controls, by accessing external internet sites hundreds of times while performing licensed activities in the ATC area of the unit 1 control room. The circumstances surrounding the apparent violation, the potential significance of the issue, and the need for lasting and effective corrective action were discussed with Brian Patrick on December 12, 2024.
Further details regarding this apparent violation are documented in Enclosure 2 to this letter.
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to:
(1) respond in writing to the apparent violation in Enclosure 2 of this letter within 30 days of the date of this letter or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference (PEC). If a PEC is held, it will be closed to public observation because personal privacy information and information related to an Office of Investigations report will be discussed and the report has not been made public. Please contact Heather Gepford at 817-200-1159 or at Heather.Gepford@nrc.gov within 10 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intent to either provide a written response or participate in a PEC. A PEC should be held within 30 days of the date of this letter. If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as a Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Investigation Report (4-2024-009); EA-24-107 and should include:
(1) the reason for the apparent violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. Your response should be sent to the Director, Division of Operating Reactor Safety, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 1600 E. Lamar Blvd., Arlington, TX 76011-4511 and emailed to R4Enforcement@nrc.gov. If an adequate response is not received within 30 days of the date of this letter or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a PEC.
If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your perspective on these matters and any other information that you believe the NRC should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a PEC does not mean that the NRC has determined that a violation has occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The topics discussed during the conference may include information to determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation, information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken or planned.
In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of apparent violation described in the Enclosure 2 may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
For administrative purposes, this letter and enclosures are issued as NRC Inspection Report 05000313/2024090. The apparent violation will be issued as AV 05000313/2024090-01.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or in the NRCs ADAMS, accessible from the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Heather Gepford, Chief, Operations Branch, of my staff at 817-200-1159.
Sincerely, Geoffrey B. Miller, Director Division of Operating Reactor Safety Signed by Miller, Geoffrey on 01/14/25 Docket No. 05000313 License No. DPR-51 Enclosures:
1. Factual Summary 2. Apparent Violation cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV
ML24346A037 SUNSI Review:
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Enclosure 1 FACTUAL SUMMARY OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 4-2024-009 On February 1, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI), Region IV, initiated an investigation to determine if a licensed reactor operator (RO)
employed by Entergy Operations, Inc., (facility licensee or Entergy) at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Unit 1, willfully violated a facility procedure and accessed unauthorized internet sites while performing licensed activities in the at-the-controls (ATC) area of the unit 1 control room.
The investigation was completed on September 18, 2024.
Entergy Fleet Nuclear Management Manual EN-OP-115-02, Control Room Conduct and Access Control, Revision 6, Section 5.1, Control Room Conduct, Step 5.1.7 states, in part, do not use the internet in the at-the-controls area of the control room, except as specifically authorized by the operations manager.
On January 6, 2024, Entergy identified that an RO frequently accessed external sites for personal use, using a laptop in the ANO control room. Entergy performed a more comprehensive search and documented in an internal investigation that between October 16, 2023, and January 6, 2024, the RO accessed hundreds of external sites using the control room laptop while performing licensed activities in the ATC area of the unit 1 control room.
During OI testimony, the RO acknowledged that he frequently used the internet for personal use while on duty and stated that this probably began at some point in 2023. The RO stated that it was his strategy for staying alert during monotonous watch periods, and that he felt it was preferable to using his phone or risking falling asleep.
When asked by OI, during the RO interview, what his understanding was of the policy regarding accessing the internet for personal use, the RO stated that he was aware of the facility licensees policy, and that he had received training on this policy. The RO stated that although he felt justified in using the internet while on duty to help stay alert and awake, he knew it was against the rules.
Based on the evidence developed during the investigation, it appears that the RO, while performing licensed activities in the ATC area of the control room, deliberately failed to comply with a site procedure by accessing internet sites without the authorization of the operations manager. Evidence indicated that the operator accessed the internet (without authorization)
hundreds of times between October 16, 2023, and January 6, 2024. The operators failure to comply with a site procedure appears to have caused Entergy to be in violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a), which requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained.
Enclosure 2 APPARENT VIOLATION Based on the results of an NRC investigation completed on September 18, 2024, an apparent violation of NRC requirements was identified. The apparent violation is listed below:
Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation), Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Typical Procedures for Pressurized Water Reactors and Boiling Water Reactors, Section 1.b, includes administrative procedures for safety-related activities in relation to authorities and responsibilities for safe operation and shutdown.
Entergy Fleet Nuclear Management Manual EN-OP-115-02, Control Room Conduct and Access Control, Revision 6, Section 5.1, Control Room Conduct, Step 5.1.7 states, in part, do not use the internet in the at-the-controls area of the control room, except as specifically authorized by the operations manager.
Contrary to the above, between October 16, 2023, and January 8, 2024, a licensed operator used the internet in the at-the-controls area of the control room without specific authorization by the operations manager. Specifically, the operator deliberately accessed internet sites hundreds of times without authorization and for non-work-related activities while standing watch as the assigned operator at-the-controls in the control room.