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Advanced Reactor Stakeholder Meeting October 30, 2024 Master Deck Slides
	ML24301A001
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Issue date:	10/30/2024
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Advanced Reactor Stakeholder Public Meeting October 30, 2024 Microsoft Teams Meeting Bridge line: 301-576-2978 Conference ID: 248 924 550 24#

Time Agenda Speaker 9:50 - 10:00 am Advanced Reactor Ready Slides 10:00 - 10:15am Opening Remarks NRC 10:15 - 10:35 am Section 401 of the ADVANCE Act of 2024 NRC 10:35 - 11:00 am Advanced Reactor Licensing Update NRC (Josh Borromeo) 11:00 a.m. - 1:00 pm LUNCH 1:00 - 3:00 pm Advanced Reactor Fire Brigade Sizing Analysis NEI/Jensen Hughes 3:00 -3:15 pm Public Comment Period Public 3:15 pm Closing Remarks/Adjourn 2

Opening Remarks

Advanced Reactor Program Recent Highlights

Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024 (ADVANCE Act of 2024)

Section 401 Advanced Methods of Manufacturing and Construction for Nuclear Energy Projects Periodic Advanced Reactor Stakeholder Meeting October 30, 2024

Meeting Purpose

Introduce ADVANCE Act Section 401

Present NRC response goals 6

Opening Remarks and Background By January 2025, the NRC will submit a report to Congress that will:

Examine:

unique licensing issues or requirements relating to the use, for nuclear energy projects, of:

- Advanced manufacturing process

- Advanced construction techniques

- Rapid improvement or iterative innovation process 7

Examine:

Requirements for nuclear-grade components in manufacturing and construction

Potential use of standard materials, parts, or components in manufacturing and construction

Potential use of standard materials to support or encapsulate new materials not yet in codes

Requirements related to the transportation of a fueled advanced nuclear reactor core 8

Identify:

Safety aspects of advanced manufacturing processes and advanced construction techniques that are not addressed by existing codes and standards

Based on the results of the NRCs examination:

Options for addressing the issues, requirements, and opportunities

How domestic nuclear manufacturing and construction developers are impacted

Extent to which Commission action is needed for implementation 9

NRC Response Goals Develop graded options with the potential to increase efficiency and reliability of review:

Clarify areas of flexibility in regulations

Develop options that produce actionable guidance and review criteria for both technology neutral and technology specific topics.

Develop options to enable use of alternate codes and standards in a consistent and efficient way (guidance, regulation, etc.)

10

Closing Remarks 11

12 Recently Completed and Current Reviews EVOLVING LANDSCAPE Current and potential applications by 2027 Potential operating licenses by 2027 Molten Salt Reactors High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors Liquid Metal Cooled Fast Reactors Project Schedule Established Safety Review (Targeted/Completed)

Environmental Review (Targeted/Completed)

Kairos Hermes 1 CP December 2021 September 2023 / June 2023 September 2023 / August 2023 Kairos Hermes 2 CP October 2023 November 2024 / July 2024 August 2024 / August 2024 Abilene Christian University CP December 2022 September 2024 /

September 2024 April 2024 / March 2024 TerraPower -

Kemmerer Unit 1 CP June 2024 August 2026 / Ongoing May 2026 / Ongoing

13 Advanced Reactors by the Numbers EVOLVING LANDSCAPE 20+

5+

Current and potential applications by 2027 Potential operating licenses by 2027 Research and Test Reactors Molten Salt Reactors Small Modular and Microreactors High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors Liquid Metal Cooled Fast Reactors 15+ Entities actively engaged in pre-application activities 100+ Topical reports and white paper reviews completed 40+ Topical reports and white papers under evaluation Infrastructure Improvements

14 LUNCH BREAK Meeting will resume at 1:00 pm EDT October 30, 2024 Microsoft Teams Meeting Bridge line: 301-576-2978 Conference ID: 248 924 550 24#

Background

Regulation and guidance document review Regulatory submittals and approval process Advancements in technology and analysis techniques Risk-informed, performance-based fire response evaluation process Fire Brigade Staffing

Regulations and Guidance

©2024 Nuclear Energy Institute 18 The following regulations apply to the Advanced Reactor Fleet 10 CFR 50.48, Fire Protection Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Plants, Criterion 3, Fire Protection Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.232, Principal Design Criteria for Non-Light-Water Reactors

==

Conclusion:==

There are no regulations that require a specific classification and complement of fire brigade for the Advanced Reactor Fleet.

Regulations

Methods and solutions that differ from those set forth in RGs will be deemed acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings required for the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.

NRC Guidance Documents

©2024 Nuclear Energy Institute 20 DANU-ISG-2022-09, Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project, Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program (for Operations), provides guidance regarding potential acceptance criteria for alternate fire response strategies:

Applicants considering fire protection programs that do not rely on these measures (for example, an onsite fire brigade) should demonstrate their ability to safely shut down the facility and minimize radioactive releases to the environment in the event of a fire without the excluded measures NRC Guidance Documents

©2024 Nuclear Energy Institute 21 Section 8 of RG 1.189 provides guidance for fire protection for new reactors and emphasizes the integration of fire protection requirements into the planning and design phase for the plant.

Specifically, Section 8.2, Enhanced Fire Protection Criteria states:

New reactor designs should ensure that safe shutdown can be achieved by assuming that all equipment in any one fire area will be rendered inoperable by fire and that reentry into the fire area for repairs and operator actions is not possible. Additionally, new reactor designs should ensure that smoke, hot gases, or the fire suppressant will not migrate into other fire areas to the extent that they could adversely affect safe-shutdown capabilities, including operator actions.

Other Nuclear Guidance Documents

The station may elect to have another recognized fire suppression organization respond to emergencies as the primary responder. This is ACCEPTABLE to NEIL if ACCEPTABLE response plans are written and implemented. As a minimum, fire response plans utilizing organizations other than the recognized plant Fire Brigade SHALL include the following:

Indication of a fire, off-site org SHALL be notified immediately Verification via periodic drills that the responding org arrives within ACCEPTABLE period Verification responding org will respond in full turnout gear with at least 5 qualified members Verification that the responding org will respond to the site with compatible equipment A written fire pre-plan SHALL be made available.

A fire drill SHALL be conducted at least annually

©2024 Nuclear Energy Institute 23 The CSA N293, Fire protection for nuclear power plants, Clause 12.1.2.2 SMRs states in part Fire response capability shall be provided based on the analysis of Clause 12.1.3 (Fire Response Needs Analysis)

Notes:

1.

The intent of this Clause is to provide a fire response capability and capacity commensurate with the hazards and risks associated with the technology, location or siting (e.g., taking into consideration the local response capability), environmental protection needs, protection of personnel, protection of occupants, and protection of the public Pertinent Industry Guidance

10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, or 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants Information to support the fire protection program will be similar A description and analysis of the fire protection design features for the plant necessary to comply with General Design Criterion 3 of appendix A to this part A description and analysis of the fire protection design features for the plant necessary to comply with § 50.48 and a description of the fire protection program required by § 50.48 and its implementation Regulatory submittal

Onsite Incipient Fire Brigade Acceptable*

Onsite Structural Fire Brigade Recommended

Offsite fire response organization acceptable Maintain Defense-in-Depth Configuration Control of Bases

Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis

Fire PRA (if performed)

FHA

Process

Address need for onsite response

Address potential for onsite incipient brigade

Assess the acceptability of the offsite response capability Fire Response Evaluation Process

©2024 Nuclear Energy Institute 29 Any fire-induced damage will not result in a public dose to exceed 10 mSv (1 rem) total effective dose equivalent at the site boundary for 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> Pre-determined, prompt protective measures are established Ensure adequacy of offsite responders Offsite Responders Only

©2024 Nuclear Energy Institute 30 The incipient stage fire is defined in NFPA 600 as A fire which is in the initial or beginning stage and which can be controlled or extinguished by portable fire extinguishers, Class II standpipe, or small hose systems without the need for protective clothing or breathing apparatus.

Onsite Incipient Fire Brigade

Whether the types of fire can propagate beyond the ignition source.

Is the fire expected to be identified in the incipient stage?

If the fire is expected to progress, evaluate the detection and/or automatic suppression to address uncertainty.

Onsite Incipient Fire Brigade

©2024 Nuclear Energy Institute 32 Fire Areas which contain equipment important to safety Following enhanced guidance Section 8.2 of RG 1.189 One success path should be free of fire damage without re-entry into the fire area Fire Areas of Concern

©2024 Nuclear Energy Institute 33 Types of fires expected in FAs of concern Electrical cabinets High energy arcing faults Diesel generators Air Compressors Electric motors larger than 5 HP MG Sets Off-gas/H2 recombiners Transformers Batteries (i.e., Station battery banks)

Pumps with electric motors larger than 5 hp Ventilation subsystems Boilers Turbine Generator

©2024 Nuclear Energy Institute 35 A reviews of fire events determined multiple ignition sources have been detected by plant personnel Observed with electrical cabinets as documented in NUREG-2230 Plant personnel detection is applicable to most ignition sources.

But, not applicable to:

HEAF

Transformer - Catastrophic,

Transformer - Non-catastrophic, and

Yard Transformer (Others)

These events are primarily detected by equipment failure alarms Personnel Detection

Suppressed Automatically?

Is the fire expected to be contained within ignition source?

Can the fire be suppressed automatically?

No No Onsite Incipient Fire Brigade Acceptable Is the fire expected to be suppressed in the incipient stage?

No Yes Yes Yes

Do the postulated fires require specialized training beyond offsite fire response organizations capabilities?

Can the reliability of the offsite responders be verified?

MOU to guarantee response and service level?

Acceptability of Offsite Responders

An individual with overall responsibility for the fire protection program.

An individual with the necessary level of understanding of the plant be available to oversee the fire response.

A process for maintaining configuration control of the fire protection program.

A method for ongoing demonstration of capability of the offsite fire response to effectively respond to fire events.

Maintain Basis for Acceptability

©2024 Nuclear Energy Institute 39 Prevent fires from starting Designed plant appropriately Programmatic controls in place Detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur Design phase minimizes the probability that fires will propagate beyond the ignition source Provide detection and suppression as necessary Ensure fires not detected/suppressed in the incipient stage are separated from fire areas that contain equipment important to safety Provide protection for SSCs important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.

Meet the enhanced design guidance of RG 1.189 Section 8.2 Defense-in-Depth

Next Steps

Public Comments

Closing Remarks Next Advanced Reactor Stakeholder Meeting on December 12, 2024

ML24301A001

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