Text

Re-filed Hearing Request by San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, Friends of the Earth and Environmental Working Group for Hearing on Pacific Gas & Electric Companys License Renewal Application for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant
	ML24067A079
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	03/04/2024
From:	Curran D, Leary C, Templeton H; Environmental Working Group, Friends of the Earth, Harmon, Curran, Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg, LLP, San Luis Obispo Grandmothers for Peace
To:	; NRC/OCM
	SECY RAS
References
	RAS 56942, 50-275-LR, 50-323-LR
	Download: ML24067A079 (0)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION

In the matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company Docket Nos. 50-275-LR, 50-323-LR Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant March 4, 2024 Units 1 and 2

REQUEST BY SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP FOR HEARING ON PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANYS LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION FOR THE DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR PLANT

I. INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRCs) hearing notice, 88

Fed. Reg. 87,817 (Dec. 19, 2023), and pursuant to 10 CFR 2.309(f), San Luis Obispo Mothers for

Peace (SLOMFP), Friends of the Earth (FoE) and Environmental Working Group (EWG)

(collectively Petitioners) hereby request the Commissioners of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC or Commission) to grant a hearing on Pacific Gas & Electric Companys

(PG&Es) application for renewal of the operating licenses for the Diablo Canyon nuclear

power plant Units 1 and 2 (DCPP).

As demonstrated below in Section II, Petitioners have organizational standing to represent

the interests of their members and supporters in this proceeding. Petitioners contentions are set

forth in Section III below. Those contentions are:

CONTENTION 1: CONTINUED OPERATION OF DCPP UNDER A RENEWED LICENSE POSES AN UNACCEPTABLE SAFETY RISK AND SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF SEISMIC CORE DAMAGE ACCIDENTS

CONTENTION 2: PG&E FAILS TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE PLAN TO MONITOR AND MANAGE THE EFFECTS OF AGING ON UNIT 1 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL.

CONTENTION 3: PG&E FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT.

II. DESCRIPTION OF PETITIONERS Petitioners are non-profit organizations with a longstanding record of concern about the

safety and economic viability of the Diablo Canyon reactors. They seek a hearing in order to

ensure that DCPP is not permitted to operate another twenty years unless and until the NRC

addresses the significant safety and environmental risks that are now apparent and that would

continue.

A. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace

Located in San Luis Obispo, California, SLOMFP is a non-profit membership organization

concerned with the dangers posed by Diablo Canyon and other nuclear reactors, nuclear weapons,

and radioactive waste. SLOMFP also works to promote peace, environmental and social justice,

and renewable energy. SLOMFP has participated in NRC licensing cases involving the Diablo

Canyon reactors since 1973. SLOMFPs representational standing to participate in this proceeding

is demonstrated by the attached Declarations of SLOMFP members Sherry Lewis, Julie Mansfield-Wells, Linda Seeley, Lucy Jane Swanson, and Jill ZamEk. 1

B. Friends of the Earth

FoE is a tax exempt, nonprofit environmental advocacy organization dedicated to improving the environment and creating a more healthy and just world. 2 The organization was

founded in 1969 by David Brower in part to protest safety and environmental issues at the newly

emerging Diablo Canyon. FoE has more than 282,000 members in all 50 states and the District of

Columbia, approximately 42,600 of whom are in California. In addition to formal members, FoE

has more than 8.6 million online activist supporters across the country. FoE also has office space

1 See Exhibits 1(A) - 1(E).

2

in Berkeley, California. FoEs representational standing to participate in this proceeding is

demonstrated by the attached Declarations of FoE members Sherry Lewis, Julie Mansfield-Wells, Linda Seeley, Jane Swanson, and Jill ZamEk. 3

C. Environmental Working Group

EWG is a 501(c)(3) non-profit, non-partisan organization that works to empower people to

live healthier lives in a healthier environment. EWG does this, in part, by creating and sharing

research reports and consumer guides that help people educate themselves about the food they

consume, the products they buy, and the companies they support, so that everyone can make safer

and more informed choices. In furtherance of its mission, EWG engages in research and policy

advocacy on a broad range of issues related to state and federal energy policy, climate change,

renewable energy, toxic chemicals, food and agriculture, water and air pollution, and public health.

EWGs work on energy policy has included rate design and public policy issues related to

consumer use of and access to solar.

While EWG is a national organization, the group has a strong presence in California. Out of a

nationwide group of 410,000 active supporters, more than 58,000 Californians have signed up to

receive monthly EWG emails that seek to learn about supporters concerns and opinions in order

to guide EWG in establishing organizational goals.

Over several decades, EWG has developed public education information and has submitted

formal testimony about radiological risks posed by reactors and facilities for nuclear waste

transportation, storage and disposal. Since 2002, for example, EWG has examined and assisted

2 Friends of the Earth is a part of Friends of the Earth International, a federation of grassroots groups working in 74 countries on today's most urgent environmental and social issues. Friends of the Earth International is the worlds largest grassroots environmental federation.

3 See Exhibits 1(A) - 1(E).

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the public in understanding the transportation implications of nuclear waste routes that could be

utilized to transport deadly radioactive material from around the United States to California

nuclear sites. EWGs President Ken Cook testified on the crucial issues surrounding the licensing

process for the proposed facility for long-term storage of lethal, long-lived nuclear waste at Yucca

Mountain in Nevada. Additionally, as ionizing radiation is known to cause cancer in humans,

EWG provides educational and policy advocacy on radiation in drinking water. EWGs Tap Water

Database reports that more than a dozen different radioactive elements are detected in American

tap water. The most common are beryllium, radon, radium, strontium, tritium and uranium. EWG

data show that radioactive contaminants are detected in water serving 165 million people across

the U.S. Continuing Diablo Canyons operation increases the risk that even more people will be

exposed to cancer-causing radioactive elements in their drinking water. EWG has also participated

in proceedings for the advocacy of alternatives to dangerous nuclear reactor operation. In

California, EWG was found to have party status to intervene in a net energy metering tariff

proceeding due to its interest in developing a tariff that supports sustainable growth of rooftop solar. 4

EWG is highly concerned about -- and its supporters would be directly impacted by --

continued operation of the aging Diablo Canyon nuclear plant because of its high cost to taxpayers

and extreme safety and environmental hazards. EWG and its supporters are concerned that

continuing its operation hurts the states shift to safe, renewable energy and prolongs the risk of a

disaster at the plant. Californians are saddled with the cost of continuing to prop up the

unnecessary and unsafe nuclear power plant. Allowing Diablo Canyon to keep operating will

4 CA NEM Proceeding: R20-08-020.

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enable and compel PG&E and other companies with aging and uneconomic reactors to slow-walk

the transition to those renewable and far less expensive energy sources.

While EWG is not technically a membership organization, it represents the interests of its

supporters in a manner that satisfies the standard for organizational standing recently set forth by

the U.S. Supreme Court in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harv.

Coll., 143 S.Ct. 2141, 600 U.S. 181 (2003). First, EWG seeks to participate in this license renewal

proceeding in a good faith effort to ensure that its supporters interest in protecting public health

and safety and the environment from radiological contamination and risks are represented in the NRCs decision-making process. 5 Second, as stated in the attached declarations of EWG

supporters June Cochran, Patricia Kohlen, and Linda Parks, they voluntarily support EWG and

support its mission; they regularly receive emails from EWG seeking their input on its programs

and activities; and EWG keeps them informed of the status of legal proceedings in which their interests are represented. 6 [F]urther scrutiny into how EWG operates is not required. 7 Thus,

EWG has organizational standing in this proceeding.

In the event the NRC determines that EWG does not have organizational standing to represent

its supporters interests, EWG seeks discretionary recognition of its standing to advocate for the interests of its supporters. 8 EWG respectfully submits that it satisfies the standard for discretionary

intervention, as set forth in Pebble Springs, as follows:

5 Students for Fair Admissions, 143 S.Ct. at 2158 (requiring demonstration that organization represents its members in good faith). See also attached Declaration of Ken Cook, Exhibit 1(F)

(attesting to good faith representation of supporters interests).

6 See Exhibit 1(G) - 1(I). See also Students for Fair Admissions, 143 S.Ct. at 2158.

7 Students for Fair Admissions, 143 S.Ct. at 2158.

8 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(e); Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 &

2), CLI-76-27, 4 N.R.C. 610, 616 (1976) ( Pebble Springs ).

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First, EWG will significantly contribute to the development of a sound record through its

expertise on public health and environmental issues in California; that its thousands of

supporters have significant property, financial, public health and safety and environmental

interests in the state and the region; and that these interests will be affected by the NRCs

decision in this proceeding.

Further, EWG has no means other than this proceeding for protecting its interests. And

SLOMFP and FoE may not be able to fully represent EWGs interests without the

assistance and participation of EWG staff.

Finally, EWGs participation will not broaden this proceeding because EWG seeks to participate

regarding the same contentions as SLOMFP and FoE. In addition, as demonstrated above, EWGs

interest and activities fall within the zone of interest protected by the Atomic Energy Act and NEPA.9

9 Students for Fair Admissions, 143 S.Ct. at 2157 (requiring that interests sought to be protected must be germane to the organizations purpose). See also EWG Mission Statement at ewg.org:

EWG's team of scientists, policy experts, lawyers and communications and data experts work tirelessly to reform our nation's broken chemical safety and agricultural laws. We push industries to adopt our standards and stand against chemicals of concern.

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CONTENTIONS

CONTENTION 1: CONTINUED OPERATION OF DCPP UNDER A RENEWED LICENSE POSES AN UNACCEPTABLE SAFETY RISK AND SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF SEISMIC CORE DAMAGE ACCIDENTS

A. Statement of Contention

The NRC should deny PG&Es license renewal application for DCPP because continued

operation of the reactors poses an unacceptable risk of core damage accidents due to earthquakes.

Therefore, renewal of PG&Es operating license would not satisfy the statutory standard set by the

Atomic Energy Act that operation of DCPP will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public. 10 By the same token, continued operation of DCPP also poses significant or

LARGE adverse environmental impacts, not SMALL impacts as asserted by PG&E in its Environmental Report. 11 As required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42

U.S.C. § 4332(c)(iii), the Environmental Report should weigh the costs and benefits of the

alternative that would avoid these impacts: closing DCPP on the reactors current 2024/2025 retirement dates. 12

10 42 U.S.C. § 2232. The unacceptable risk of an earthquake-related core damage accident at DCPP is current and ongoing. Therefore, in conjunction with this Hearing Request, Petitioners have filed a separate petition with the Commissioners seeking immediate closure of the DCPP reactors unless and until the risk of an earthquake-related core damage accident can be significantly reduced.

11 Environmental Report at 4-61 (asserting that PG&Es seismic risk analysis did not change the conclusion of the 1996 License Renewal Generic Environmental Impact Statement (1996 License Renewal GEIS) that the environmental impacts of severe accidents are SMALL.). While the NRC retains ultimate responsibility for independently evaluating environmental impacts and alternatives under NEPA, the NRC also relies on the information presented in environmental reports. 10 C.F.R. § 51.41.

12 As discussed below, the risk posed by continued operation of DCPP is almost two orders of magnitude higher than the SMALL risk assumed by PG&E in the Environmental Report.

Therefore, the Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMAs) listed in Appendix G of the 7

Quantification of the seismic risks and environmental impacts can be found in PG&Es two

most recent public reports on earthquake risks - its 2018 Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) and its 2023 Environmental Report. In the SPRA, PG&E estimates a value of 3x10 -5 per

year for seismic core damage frequency. 13 In the Environmental Report, PG&E asserts a similar

value (2.96x10 -5) and characterizes their environmental significance as SMALL. 14 As set forth

in the attached Declaration of Peter Bird, Ph.D (March 4, 2024), (Bird Declaration), however, PG&Es SCDF estimate is too low by a factor of 47~70. 15

PG&Es significant underestimate of SCDF arises principally from its assumption that the

majority of large earthquakes affecting DCPP are strike-slip earthquakes and its disregard of the

significant contribution of thrust-faulting earthquake sources under the DCPP site and in the

adjacent Irish Hills. But the January 2024 occurrence of the Noto Peninsula earthquakes on

analogous faults in Japan now demonstrates in no uncertain terms that PG&Es assumption is both

unfounded and dangerous. As discussed below, these thrust-faulting earthquakes produce strong

Environmental Report are grossly inadequate to address the magnitude of the environmental impacts involved. Where the risk of significant impacts is as high as for DCPP, denial of PG&Es license renewal application and closure of the reactors is a reasonable alternative that should be considered.

13 PG&E Letter DCL-18-027 re: Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1: Seismic of the (sic) Near-Term Task force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, Encl. 1 at 52 (Apr. 24, 2018) (NRC Accession No. ML18120A201) (SPRA).

The SPRA relies in turn on PG&Es Seismic Source Characterization for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, San Luis Obispo County, California; report on the results of SSHAC level 3 study, (Rev. A, March 2018) (Available online at http://www.pge.com/dcpp-ltsp) (SSC); and PG&E Letter DCL-15-035 re: Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident: Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (Mar. 11, 2015) (NRC Accession No. ML15071A045).

14 Environmental Report at 4-62.

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shaking that leads to a much higher chance of seismic core damage than the strike-slip faults assumed by PG&E to predominate at DCPP. 16 Applying the experience of the Noto earthquakes to

the thrust-faulting earthquakes at and near DCPP, a reasonable SCDF estimate could be as high as 1.4x10 -3/year. 17 As stated by Dr. Bird:

In the 2024 Noto Peninsula earthquake, we have the advantage of the finite-fault solution (USGS, 2024), which maps the amount of coseismic slip onto the active fault plane. This study showed maximum slip of 3.7 m under the center of the Noto Peninsula, with a mean slip that I visually estimate as 2.0 m (or 2000 mm) in the seismogenic depth range.

Dividing this mean slip of 2000 mm by the long-term tectonic slip-rate of 2.8 mm/a in the Irish Hills, the inferred recurrence rate for Noto-type earthquakes under the Irish Hills is 715 years. In other words, the inferred probability of Noto Peninsula-type earthquakes under the Irish Hills is the inverse of this, which is 1.4x10 -3 /yr.

Again, reasonably presuming that the Noto Peninsula earthquake is a characteristic earthquake for this tectonic setting (shared by the Irish Hills in California), PGA values of 1.0~2.3 g (see section 1 above) must be expected with probability 1.4x10 -3 /yr.

However, in the 2015 SSC (specifically, in Figure 2.3.7-1 of PG&E, 2015L), we see that this outdated modeling associated this probability level with a PGA of only 0.32 g.

Consequently, it appears that the 2015 SSC severely underestimated (by a factor of 3~7) the severity of shaking (PGA) that must be resisted every ~715 years. 18

In other words, as asserted by Dr. Bird, the severe accident that PG&E asserts will occur only once

in 33,000~50,000 years may actually occur every ~715 years. That means that a license extension

15 Dr. Birds Declaration is attached as Exhibit 2.

16 Bird Declaration, ¶¶ 14(5), 18-21.

17 Id., ¶¶ 4, 6, 29-30. As stated in ¶¶ 32-34 of Dr. Birds Declaration, his SCDF estimate is based on information provided in the SPRA, for which some questions about the meaning of PG&Es terminology exist. And there may be differences of opinion about the appropriate interpretation of Noto Peninsula seismographs that should be resolved by further study. In the meantime, for purposes of evaluating PG&Es Environmental Report, it is reasonable to assume that the levels of shaking seen in the Noto Peninsula earthquake will cause seismic core damage at DCPP if and when they occur in the Irish Hills of California.

18 Id., ¶¶ 4, 6, 29-30.

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for 20 years would incur a ~2.8% probability of a severe accident. 19 Under NRC guidance, such a

high core damage frequency calls for immediate regulatory action to maintain the plant in a safe condition. 20 In this context, it requires the denial of PG&Es license renewal application. 21

B. Basis Statement

This contention is supported by the Bird Declaration, Exhibit 2. Dr. Bird, Professor

Emeritus of Geophysics and Geology at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), is

highly qualified through 46 years of training and experience in the fields of geology and

geophysics. His focus is on technophysics and seismicity, including plate motion and plate

deformation. And Dr. Bird has done extensive work on the geology of California, including a

number of academic papers on computer modeling methods and applications, including studies of

the ongoing (neotectonic) deformation in California. He has also been a member or officer of

several professional organizations relating to his expertise, including the Geological Society of

America, the American Geophysical Union and the Southern California Earthquake Center. The

former two organizations have recognized Dr. Birds work with two fellowships and an award.

Dr. Bird has a detailed understanding of the seismicity at DCPP. In 2012, he participated

in a Senior Seismic Hazards Analysis Committee (SSHAC) review sponsored by PG&E and run

by Lettis Consultants International, regarding seismic hazard at DCPP. He presented results on

both strike-slip and compressional deformation rates affecting the region, which were derived

from his computer models of neotectonics. These models were prepared for the Southern

19 Id., ¶¶ 14(6), 4, 6, 29-30.

20 NRC Office Instruction LIC-504, Integrated Risk-Informed Decision-Making Process for Emergent Issues at 4 (Rev. 6, Sept. 7, 2023) (ML23165A117) (LIC-504).

21 Id. at 4-5 (including orders to shut down reactors among the scenarios that could result from application of LIC-504).

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California Earthquake Centers project Unified California Earthquake Rupture Forecast, and also

for the US Geological Surveys 2013 Update to the National Seismic Hazard Model.

In Section IV of his Declaration, Dr. Bird sets forth in detail the basis for the data and

analyses supporting his expert opinion and this contention. As summarized in Section IV.A

(Abstract):

(1) The Noto Peninsula earthquake in Japan (2024.01.01, m7.5, 10 km deep) produced peak ground accelerations (PGA) of 1.0~2.3 g (that is, 100~230% of gravity) at 5 modern digital strong-motion seismometers as far as 42 km from the rupture.

(2) This strong shaking occurred in the Noto Peninsula, which is part of the hanging-wall (upper block) of two en-echelon thrust faults that run parallel to its two coasts.

(3) The Irish Hills, San Luis Range, and DCPP site in California are at risk for similar earthquakes and similar shaking because they are underlain by similar thrust faults, including the inland Los Osos thrust fault and the Inferred Coastline thrust running along the shore by DCPP. 22

(4) The expected recurrence interval between such events at DCPP can be roughly estimated by dividing the expected fault slip (averaging 2 m in the Noto earthquake, according to the USGS finite-fault solution) by the total heave rate of the thrust faults under DCPP, which is about 2.8 mm/year.... The result is 715 years. The inverse of this is the rate:

1.4x10 -3 /yr.

(5) In the existing SSC (PG&E, 2015; 2015L), the intensity of shaking at this return period of 715 years has been underestimated by a factor of 3~7. This means that the chance of seismic core damage is much higher when thrust-faulting earthquake sources are included.

(6) Applying Dr. Birds analysis to these facts, the probability of a severe accident of earthquake origin at DCPP has been underestimated by a factor of (1.4x10 -3 /yr) /

(2~3x10 -5 /yr) = 47~70. In other words, the severe accident that PG&E asserts will occur only once in 33,000~50,000 years may actually occur every ~715 years. That

22 Inferred Coastline thrust is Dr. Birds own term for a distinct fault surface whose trace follows the coastline opposite DCPP. Unlike the Shoreline fault in the same area, the Inferred Coastline thrust dips at a gentle angle beneath DCPP and has the up-dip rake of a thrust fault.

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means that a license extension for 20 years would incur a ~2.8% probability of a severe accident.

This contention is also supported by two NRC guidance documents which demonstrate that the SCDF of 1.4x10 -3/yr estimated by Dr. Bird poses a significant safety and environmental risk. First,

LIC-405 characterizes the risk impact from external events as high and therefore warrants

immediate regulatory action to place or maintain the facility in safe condition if:

Conditional core damage frequency (CCDF) (i.e., CDF because of the issue) is high (e.g.,

greater than or on the order of 1x10 -3/year). 23

Second, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.174, Rev. 1, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk

Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis (Jan.

2018) states that if total CDF is considerably greater than 10 -4 per reactor year, the NRCs focus

in considering licensing actions should be on finding ways to decrease rather than increase the risk. 24 Extending the DCPP license by 20 years clearly increases the risk to the public.

In this case, the significant risk and adverse impact posed by continued operation of DCPP

can and should be eliminated by closing the reactors no later than their current retirement dates of 2024 (Unit 1) and 2025) Unit 2, i.e. implementing the no action alternative under NEPA. 25

Finally, this contention is supported by the NRCs correspondence with PG&E, which

demonstrates that the NRC has found that DCPP poses a high seismic risk level compared to other

reactors and required PG&E to perform a seismic risk analysis and seismic PRA - and yet failed to

23 Id. at 4 (NRC Accession No. ML23165A117).

24 Id. at 28 (NRC Accession No. ML17317A256).

25 Because the unacceptable seismic risks also apply during the current license term, Petitioners have submitted a separate request to the Commissioners to take immediate enforcement action.

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make Atomic Energy Act-based safety findings in the course of reviewing those studies. 26 As

noted in NRC guidance, the word safety is used in NRC review documents to connote that an

evaluation measured compliance with the adequate protection standard of the Atomic Energy Act and NRC regulations. 27 That statutory language does not appear in either the NRC 12/21/16

Letter or the NRC 01/22/19 Letter. Therefore, in the absence of any Atomic Energy Act-based

safety evaluation by the NRC of PG&Es SSC and SPRA, there is no precedential value in this

license renewal review.

Accordingly, it is both necessary and appropriate to review PG&Es seismic risk analyses

in light of the new information provided by the Noto Peninsula earthquake and assessed by Dr.

Bird, with respect to whether continued operation of DCPP poses an unacceptable safety risk to

public health and safety and/or environmental risks that can only be avoided by denying PG&Es

license renewal application.

C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding

This contention is within the scope of this license renewal proceeding by virtue of the

26 See Letter from Frankie Vega, NRC, to Edward D. Halpin, PG&E, re: Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 - Staff Assessment of Information Provided Under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluation for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (CAC Nos. MF5275 and MF5276), Encl. at 1 (Dec. 21, 2016) (NRC 12/21/16 Letter) (NRC Accession No. ML16341C057); Letter from Louise Lund, NRC, to James M. Welsh, PG&E, re: Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 - Staff Review of Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Associated With Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Implementation of the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Seismic (EPID No. L-2018-JLDE-0006) (Jan. 22, 2019) (NRC 1/21/19 Letter) (NRC Accession No. ML20093B934).

27 See Office Instruction LIC-101, License Amendment Review Procedures (Rev. 6, July 31, 2020)

(NRC Accession No. ML19248C539):

[L]icensing actions typically require findings of reasonable assurance that operation of the facility can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public and will not be inimical to the health and safety of the public (e.g., 10 CFR 50.57(a)).

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commitment made by NRC Chairman Christopher T. Hanson on behalf of the full Commission,

whose members sat with him at the hearing, to California Senator Alex Padilla to review seismic

safety and environmental risks as part of the proceeding. In an April 19, 2023, hearing before the

Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Senator Padilla questioned Chairman

Hanson regarding the NRCs plans for ensuring that DCPP is operationally safe with specific concern about seismic risk. 28 Mr. Hanson responded that in addition to ongoing safety oversight:

Were going to be looking at updated safety information as part of that license renewal process. We did require all plants to take a look at the enhanced... you know to relook at their risks after Fukushima; Diablo, of course did look at their seismic risk again, and well take another look at that as part of the license renewal process... 29

Commissioner Hansons statements are also consistent with the NRCs authority and obligation

under the Atomic Energy Act to ensure that its licensing decisions pose no undue risk to public health and safety. 30

In addition, Commissioner Hansons commitment on behalf of the full Commission is

consistent with NEPAs requirement that all federal agencies must take a hard look at the environmental impacts of their proposed actions. 31 Because the Environmental Report is the

preliminary environmental risk evaluation on which the NRC will eventually rely for its EIS, its analysis must be rigorous and thorough. 32 Petitioners challenge the adequacy of the Environmental

28 A recording of the hearing is posted on the Committees website at:

https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=DD1B6EC6-588A-4A56-9961-F9961BE12270. Sen. Padillas question can be found at approximately 1:45:26.

29 Id. (emphasis added). Chairman Hansons response can be found at approximately 1:45:55.

30 42 U.S.C. § 2232 (requiring NRC to ensure that licensed activities will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.). See also Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station), CLI-91-11, 34 N.R.C. 3, 12 (1991) (The Commission has the ultimate responsibility to ensure the safe operation of the facilities that it licenses.).

31 Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Commn, 867 F.3d 1357, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

32 10 C.F.R. § 51.41.

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Report and PG&Es most recent seismic studies that purport to find that the safety and

environmental risks of operating DCPP in a renewed operating license term are acceptable or

insignificant. Chairman Hanson has committed the agency to review these issues in the course of

the license renewal proceeding.

Therefore, the consistency of Chairman Hansons commitments on behalf of the full

Commission with the NRCs statutory responsibilities for its licensing decisions under the Atomic

Energy Act establish that Petitioners contention is within the scope of the proceeding.

D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Renew PG&Es Operating License

Petitioners contention is material to the finding that Chairman Hanson and his fellow

Commissioners have committed to make in the license renewal proceeding, i.e., whether

continued operation of Diablo Canyon is operationally safe with respect to seismic risks. This

commitment is also material to the NRCs statutory responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act to

ensure that continued operation of DCPP will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public. 33 Finally, and also consistent with the Chairmans commitment on behalf of the full

NRC to Senator Padilla, Petitioners contention is material to the analysis required by NEPA

regarding the significance of environmental impacts and reasonable alternatives for avoiding or mitigating those impacts. 34

33 See note 30, supra.

34 See note 31, supra.

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E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials

The facts, NRC guidance, and expert opinion relied on in Petitioners contention are

provided in the Statement of the Contention, the Basis Statement, and the attached Bird

Declaration.

CONTENTION 2: PG&E FAILS TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE PLAN TO MONITOR AND MANAGE THE EFFECTS OF AGING ON UNIT 1 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL.

A. Statement of Contention

PG&Es license renewal application does not include an adequate plan to monitor and

manage the effects of aging due to embrittlement of the Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel (RPV) or

an adequate time-limited aging analysis (TLAA), as required by 10 C.F.R. § 54.21.

B. Basis Statement

As set forth in Exhibit 3, the Declaration of Digby Macdonald, Ph.D., the pressure vessel is

a uniquely important and vulnerable component in a nuclear reactor, because it holds water on the

highly radioactive reactor core, and because it has no backup if it should crack and lose water

during an accident. Therefore, compliance with NRC requirements for monitoring the condition of

the plant-specific pressure vessel is essential.

PG&Es proposed aging management program for the RPV relies heavily upon and

perpetuates the preexisting and inadequate surveillance program that PG&E has used during the

decades-old initial operating license period. That program is fundamentally deficient due to

serious indications of an unacceptable degree of embrittlement, coupled with a lack of information

to establish otherwise. These deficiencies are summarized in Section V of Dr. Macdonalds

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Declaration (Exhibit 2) with reference to his more detailed analysis of September 14, 2023. 35

Deficiencies include failure to consider serious indications of embrittlement that existed in 2003

and failure to conduct further monitoring of the Unit 1 RPV in the subsequent two decades,

including removal of specimens for Charpy testing and ultrasound inspection of reactor beltline

welds. In Section VI of his Declaration, Dr. Macdonald identifies additional, more recent

concerns, including the erroneous assumption that embrittlement accrues in a non-Markovian

manner, the appearance of Extrema in Capsule V CGraphs and Tables, the general failure by both

PG&E and the NRC to address the significance of errors in PG&Es analyses, and PG&Es failure

to address the potentially significant role of hydrogen in the embrittlement/crack propagation

process.

Taking all of these deficiencies into account, Dr. Macdonald concludes that the NRC must

reject PG&Es license renewal application because it relies on this outdated preexisting program

without addressing or resolving its multiple serious inadequacies.

C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding

Contention 2 is within the scope of this proceeding because it challenges the adequacy of

PG&Es aging management program with respect to the Unit 1 RPV, a component that is

explicitly covered by the NRCs Part 54 regulations. As provided by10 C.F.R. § 54.4(a)(3), the

scope of the regulations includes [a] ll systems, structures, and components relied on in safety

analyses or plant evaluations to perform a function that demonstrates compliance with the

Commission's regulations for... pressurized thermal shock (10 CFR 50.61).

35 Declaration of Digby Macdonald, Ph.D. in Support of Hearing Request and Request for Emergency Order by San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace and Friends of the Earth (Sept. 14, 2023)

(9/14/23 Declaration) (NRC Accession No. ML 23257A302). A copy of my 9/14/23 Declaration is attached to this Declaration as Attachment 1.

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D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Renew PG&Es Operating License

The issue of whether PG&E has proposed an adequate plan for monitoring and

management of RPV embrittlement is material to this relicensing proceeding because the NRC

must make certain findings as to the public health and safety; and if serious risks are found, it must

either deny the application or impose significant modifications on the applicants operations.

E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials

The facts and expert opinion supporting this contention are set forth in the Statement of

Contention, the Basis Statement, and Dr. Macdonalds expert Declaration.

CONTENTION 3: PG&E FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT.

A. Statement of Contention

The NRC may not approve renewal of PG&Es operating licenses for DCPP because

PG&E has not demonstrated compliance with the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), 16

U.S.C. § 1451, et seq. For the same reason, PG&Es Environmental Report also fails to satisfy the requirements of NRCs own regulations mandating the content of environmental reports. 36

B. Basis Statement

While Appendix F of PG&Es Environmental Report contains a document entitled

Coastal Zone Consistency Certification (Consistency Certification), by itself the Consistency

Certification is insufficient to support license renewal. Before the NRC may grant license renewal, PG&Es Consistency Certification must be sanctioned by the State of California. 37 In addition, the

36 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.45(b), (c), and (d).

37 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3); 15 C.F.R. § 930.50 et. seq. See also NRC Reg. Guide 4.2, Preparation of Environmental Reports for Nuclear Power Stations at 21 (Rev. 3, Sept. 2018) (NRC Accession No. ML18071A400) (emphasis added):

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State must grant any necessary coastal development permits (CDPs). 38 Neither of these crucial

approvals have occurred.

NRC regulations reflect these requirements at 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.45(b) and (c), which

together requires license renewal applicants to address the environmental impacts of their

proposed actions as well as alternatives for avoiding or mitigating them. Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. §

51.45(d), a license renewal applicant must also catalogue required approvals that must be obtained prior to license renewal. 39 Thus, through approvals such as CZMA consistency and permitting, the

license renewal application must incorporate State-imposed restrictions for addressing, avoiding

and mitigating adverse environmental impacts of the proposed action.

In this case, the State agency responsible for implementation of the CZMA, the California

Coastal Commission (CCC), has formally rejected PG&Es certification as incomplete and insufficient on multiple grounds (CCC Letter, Exhibit 4). 40 These grounds include PG&Es

failure to address effects on coastal uses and resources for the full 20-year period covered by

PG&Es license renewal application instead of only five years; effects on fragile coastline areas

and recreational activities of a proposed reduction in the size of the security area around DCPP;

the substantial loss of marine life productivity from continued reliance on DCPPs once-through

cooling system; effects of proposed dredging activities at DCPP; effects of continued operation on

Applicants must submit to both the NRC and to the State a certification that the proposed activity complies with the enforceable policies of the States program. If the Coastal Zone Management Act applies to the project, the NRC cannot issue its license or permit until the State has concurred with the applicants certification of a coastal consistency determination.

38 California Public Resources Code § 30600.

39 10 C.F.R. § 51.45(b).

40 Letter from Tom Luster, CCC, to Tom Jones, PG&E re: Pacific Gas & Electric Companys Requested Nuclear Regulatory Commission License Renewal for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, San Luis Obispo County - Incomplete Consistency Certification at 3-8 (Dec. 7, 2023).

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Environmentally Sensitive Habitat Areas, and effects of continued operation on traffic and circulation. 41

In addition, the CCC Letter notes that PG&E may be required to obtain a CDP if the CCC

finds that some of its activities meet the definition of development as provided by CCC policies

for implementation of the CZMA:

The proposed extension of the operating license would affect a variety of coastal uses and resources beyond those acknowledged by PG&E in its consistency certification, and the Commission must evaluate those effects for consistency with the applicable policies of the CCMP [California Coastal Management Program.] Moreover, as described below, the extended intake and discharge of seawater that would be carried out as part of license renewal constitutes development within the meaning of Section 30106 [of CCMP policies.] It is also reasonably foreseeable that the proposed license extension includes other uses and activities that likely constitute development within the meaning of Section 30106 - for example, intake cove dredging and a new or expanded spent fuel facility. 42

Accordingly, given the CCCs unequivocal rejection of PG&Es Coastal Certification as

incomplete and inadequate, and given the potential requirement to obtain one or more CDPs, the

NRC may not approve PG&Es license renewal application. Moreover, PG&Es license renewal

application is incomplete because it does not address this issue.

C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding

Contention 3 is within the scope of this proceeding because the CZMA requires that PG&E

must comply with its requirements before license renewal can be approved. In addition, NEPA and

NRC regulations require that PG&E must accurately and reasonably describe the environmental

41 Id. at 3-8.

42 Id. at 2. See also id. at 3 n.6 (clarifying that the CCC has not determined that there would be no development requiring a CDP for a license extension).

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impacts of its actions and alternatives to avoid or mitigate those impacts. 43 And PG&E must

demonstrate compliance with all relevant federal and State permitting requirements. 44

D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Renew PG&Es Operating License

Contention 3 is material to the findings NRC must make to renew PG&Es operating license

because the NRCs Environmental Impact Statement for renewal of PG&Es operating license will

rely on the Environmental Report to comprehensively address the environmental impacts of

PG&Es renewed operation and alternatives for avoiding or mitigating those impacts. As discussed

above in Section B, the Environmental Report is inadequate to fulfill that purpose with respect to

the consistency certification and development permits that are required or may be required. As

also discussed above in Section B, the NRC must also find that the State has confirmed PG&Es

compliance with the CZMA before re-licensing Diablo Canyon.

E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials

The facts supporting this contention are described above in the Statement of Contention and

Basis Statement. Further support is also provided in Exhibit 3, the attached CCC Letter.

43 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.45(b), (c). See also State of New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir.

2012) (renewal of reactor operating licenses constitutes a major federal action requiring evaluation of environmental impacts and alternatives under NEPA).

44 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.45(b), (c), and (d).

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the NRC should find that Petitioners have standing and grant their

hearing request.

Respectfully submitted,

__/signed electronically by/___

Diane Curran Harmon, Curran, Spielberg, & Eisenberg, L.L.P.

1725 DeSales Street N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20036 240-393-9285 dcurran@harmoncurran.com Counsel to San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace

__/signed electronically by/___

Hallie Templeton Friends of the Earth 1101 15 th Street, 11 th Floor Washington, DC 20005 434-326-4647 htempleton@foe.org Counsel to Friends of the Earth

__/signed electronically by/___

Caroline Leary Environmental Working Group 1250 I St N.W.

Washington, DC 20005 202-667-6982 cleary@ewg.org Counsel to Environmental Working Group

March 4, 2023

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