ML24059A393
| ML24059A393 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/18/2024 |
| From: | Cayetano Santos NRC/NRR/VPOB |
| To: | Nicole Coovert, Mark King Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC/RGN-II |
| References | |
| CFR Part 52 | |
| Download: ML24059A393 (1) | |
Text
March 18, 2024 MEMORANDUM TO:
Mike F. King, Deputy Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Nicole C. Coovert, Acting Director Division of Construction Oversight Office of the Regional Administrator, Region II FROM:
Cayetano Santos Jr., Senior Project Manager /RA/
Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Project Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF FEBRUARY 14, 2024, PUBLIC MEETING ON 10 CFR PART 52 CONSTRUCTION LESSONS-LEARNED REPORT On February 14, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) held a virtual information meeting with a question-and-answer session. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52 Construction Lessons-Learned Report, dated January 16, 2024 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML23325A202). The meeting notice and agenda are available at ML24044A029. A list of attendees is enclosed.
The NRC staff briefly described the one-step licensing process in 10 CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants"; how inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) are used to verify plant construction; and the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The 52.103(g) finding is made by the NRC after verifying that each ITAAC has been successfully completed and allows a Part 52 licensee to load fuel and operate the plant in accordance with its combined license. The NRC made the 52.103(g) findings for Vogtle Units 3 and 4 on August 3, 2022, and July 28, 2023, respectively. Vogtle Unit 3 has been operating commercially since the end of July 2023. Vogtle Unit 4 is performing the startup tests required before commercial operation can begin. The NRC staff noted that on February 14, 2024, Vogtle Unit 4 achieved initial criticality as part of this startup testing program.
CONTACT: Cayetano Santos, NRR 301-415-7270
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In 2021, the NRC staff began an effort to identify lessons learned after fully exercising the 10 CFR Part 52 licensing process for the first time. The NRC staff issued this lessons-learned report on January 16, 2024. The report identifies a robust set of potential improvements for the oversight of future nuclear construction projects as well as describes multiple best practices that the NRC will want to continue. This report also evaluated the ability of the agency to achieve the NRCs mission of providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety. The report concluded that the NRCs regulatory activities, which included construction inspection and reviews of ITAAC closure notifications, provided reasonable assurance that the facilities would operate in accordance with the licenses, the Atomic Energy Act, and the regulations.
The NRC staff also stated that the members of the Vogtle Readiness Group (VRG) were instrumental in preparing the agency to support the regulatory activities associated with the completion of construction and the transition to operation for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The collaboration among the VRG members, which includes staff from the region and several offices at headquarters, was outstanding and directly contributed to the NRCs ability to effectively oversee the construction of these facilities. Exercising the 10 CFR Part 52 construction inspection program for the first time was challenging, but the staff worked together under the leadership of the VRG to resolve issues in a timely manner, as they arose.
The NRC staff thanked Southern Nuclear Company, the Nuclear Energy Institute, and Kozak Innovative Safety Solutions for providing feedback for this lessons-learned effort during public meetings in the fall of 2022. The NRC staff also thanked a member of the public for providing feedback on the reports discussion of Tier 2* information shortly after its issuance.
The NRC staffs presentation described the objectives of this lessons-learned effort, the various outreach activities conducted by the staff, and the reports recommendations (ML24043A181).
The report identified best practices, areas for improvement, and recommendations based on lessons learned from the NRC's licensing and construction oversight of Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3 under 10 CFR Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants." The lessons-learned report also assessed the effectiveness of the agencys effort to achieve the NRCs mission of providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety in a timely and efficient manner, managing resources within established goals, and meeting key schedule milestones.
A member of the public provided written comments on the lessons-learned report prior to the February 14, 2024, meeting (ML24031A050). A summary of these comments is provided below:
In summary, the Lessons-Learned Report does not accurately describe regulatory control of Tier 2* information applied during the latter part of construction of Vogtle Units 3 and 4, nor does it fully describe how the intended safety significance of that information should be addressed in future certified design reviews. Accordingly, it is my view that the report should be supplemented to address these deficiencies. NRC should update relevant guidance so all stakeholders have a clearer understanding of how Tier 2* should be employed.
The NRC staff believes the report accurately describes the control of Tier 2* information for Vogtle Units 3 and 4 and discusses how the safety significance of Tier 2* information should be addressed in future reviews. Page 16 of the lessons-learned report states that Departures from Tier 2* information or the generic [technical specifications] require a license amendment in
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accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit. In the discussion of Tier 2* information, page 20 of the report states that
[t]hrough LAR-17-037, the NRC approved the addition of license conditions that would implement a criteria-based evaluation process to determine whether a departure from Tier 2*
information in the updated [final safety analysis report] requires prior NRC approval.
Regarding how the safety significance of Tier 2* information should be addressed in future reviews, the lessons-learned report states the following in Page 20:
The use of Tier 2* designations should be consistent with the approaches described in SECY-17-0075, Planned Improvements in Design Certification Tiered Information Designations, issued July 24, 2017 (ML16196A321) and SECY-19-0034, Improving Design Certification Content, issued April 2019 (ML19080A032). When this designation is used, the Tier 2* information should be carefully selected to minimize the potential to require [license amendment requests] for non-safety-significant changes to this information.
The NRC staff notes that Regulatory Guide 1.206, Applications for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1 (ML18131A181), references SECY-17-0075 in the discussion of changes to Tier 2*
information. In SECY-22-0052, Proposed Rule: Alignment of Licensing Processes and Lessons Learned from New Reactor Licensing (RIN 3150-AI66), (ML21159A055) the NRC staff proposed modifications to the definitions of Tier 1 and Tier 2* to be consistent with SECY 0034. This proposed rule is with the Commission.
Below is a summary of the general comments and discussions during the February 14, 2024, meeting:
A member of the public asked whether the scope of the lessons-learned effort covered just the licensing period after the issuance of the COL [Combined License]. The NRC staff responded that the focus of the lessons-learned effort was on the licensing period after the COLs were issued (i.e., construction phase of the plants) but some of the recommendations could be applicable to licensing activities prior to the issuance of a COL. As an example, staff added that the recommendations and suggestions in the report that apply to ITAAC mostly focus on the construction phase, post-COL issuance.
However, the report does suggest that ITAAC could be better developed to avoid misunderstanding the scope or including terminology that is not well defined. These enhancements to ITAAC should occur before a COL is issued. As another example, the staff recommendation regarding the careful selection of Tier 2* information in future design certifications to reduce unnecessary license amendment requests for non-safety-significant changes, could be applicable prior to COL issuance. The NRC staff also noted that this report does not cover topics addressed by previous lessons-learned efforts:
o Staff Report 10 CFR Part 52 Application ReviewsEfficiency Opportunities and Review Timelines, issued in 2016 (ML15114A452) o Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 52 Implementation Self-Assessment Review: 1 Year Post-Combined License Issuance, issued July 2013 (ML13196A403)
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o New Reactor Licensing Process Lessons Learned Review: 10 CFR Part 52, issued April 2013 (ML13059A239)
A member of the public noted that this lessons-learned effort was based on 10 CFR Part 52 licensing and asked how the NRC is planning to revise its inspection plans given that many future plants are planning to use the 10 CFR Part 50 licensing process.
The NRC staff noted that the Advanced Reactor Construction Oversight Program (ARCOP) will consider licensing under both the Part 50, Part 52, and Part 53 licensing processes, and that a future public workshop is planned to expand on this topic.
A member of the public stated that there were technical issues associated with the NuScale certified design and asked how future NRC inspections would address these deficiencies. The NRC staff disagreed with the characterization that the NuScale design is unsafe and believes that the NuScale design as approved by the NRC is robust and is adequate to protect public health and safety.
In the lessons-learned report, Suggestion 15 involves changing the significance determination process for determining the significance of construction findings to promote a risk-informed, safety-focused inspection and enforcement process, such that time spent by the NRC and the licensee is in proportion to the safety and risk significance of the structure, system or component along with the potential to have remained undetected and impact plant operations, and results in escalated enforcement only when warranted. A member of the public commented that Suggestion 15 is an important issue that the NRC should carefully consider, and that it should have been characterized as a recommendation in the report. Staff acknowledged its importance but noted that while all suggestions in the report were considered important, the recommendations were reserved for topics that could be viewed as overarching. This structure makes the report easier to follow. The NRC staff also noted a future ARCOP workshop would further discuss this issue. Another member of the public stated that they were encouraged by this discussion placeholder for an upcoming ARCOP workshop and encouraged the NRC staff to consider advanced micro-reactors that could be completely fabricated in a factory. The NRC staff commented that micro-reactors are an active area for the agency. The NRC staff also noted that the developing construction inspection program is considering all reactor technologies in order to develop a program that is technology neutral and scalable as needed.
Recommendation 2 of the lessons-learned report is related to ensuring clarity of the scope of each ITAAC, providing clear acceptance criteria with appropriate flexibility, and defining terminology in the ITAAC will help to ensure that the licensee and the NRC have a common understanding of how the ITAAC will be met. A member of the public asked what category of ITAAC would apply to this recommendation, such as ITAAC that include a report exists and concludes wording. To clarify with an example, staff responded that the report included a discussion on the ITAAC for personnel and vehicular access control where the NRC and the licensee had a different interpretation in how the ITAAC could be met. The NRC staff noted that numerous and frequent discussions between the NRC and licensee was critical to gain alignment on the expectations regarding ITAAC similar to these, and that there were also ITAAC demonstration projects to facilitate discussions in this area.
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A member of the public noted that the NRC staffs method of tracking requests for additional information (RAIs) used for Vogtle 3 and 4 was very useful and asked if this tool would be available in the future. The NRC staff noted that replacement tool similar to that used for Vogtle 3 and 4 is currently under development.
Enclosure:
List of Attendees
Enclosure LIST OF ATTENDEES FEBRUARY 14, 2024, PUBLIC MEETING ON 10 CFR PART 52 CONSTRUCTION LESSONS-LEARNED REPORT Name Organization Andrea Veil Anthony Ponko Billy Gleaves Carolyn Lauron Cayetano Santos Christopher Welch Dave Gasperson Garry Armstrong George Khouri Hsiang-Yuan Ho James Gaslevic Jonathan Greives Joylynn Quinones-Navarro Kevin Roche Laura Dudes Lauren Gibson Lauren Nist Luis Colon Fuentes Michael Spencer Mike King Nicole Coovert Omar Lopez-Santiago Phil OBryan Raju Patel Scott Burnell Stephen Philpott U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jana Bergman Tony Brown Eddie Grant Jerry Riggs Lisa Santoro Mary H Miller Eric Oesterle Steve Leighty Daniel W. Williamson Mike Dudek Brandon Norris Kalene Walker Tom Kozak Tim Polich Members of the Public
- via email
^via eConcurrence NRR-106 OFFICE NRR/DANU/UAL1 NRR/DANU/UAL2 NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/LA NAME CSantos JGaslevic KGoldstein DATE 2/28/2024 3/7/2024 03/06/2024 OFFICE NRR/DRO/IOLB/BC RII/DCO/D (Acting)
NRR/DANU/UAL1 NAME LNist NCoovert CSantos (s)
DATE 3/7/2024 3/18/2024 3/18/2024