ML24019A046
| ML24019A046 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/19/2024 |
| From: | NRC/NMSS/DFM/IOB |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML24019A043 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML24019A046 (4) | |
Text
Summary of Fuel Cycle Inspection Findings FY2023
Type Licensee/ Description Applicable Performance CoC Holder Regulation(s) Area Category SL IV - NOV Honeywell While conducting cylinder fill operations, it was 10 CFR 70.61 Operational Metropolis determined that the remotely operated valve closing Performance Safety -
mechanism at the #4 fill spot failed to close the UF6 Requirements Chemical cylinder valve due to it disconnecting from the closure Hazard mechanism. The operations personnel then manually 10 CFR 70.62 closed the cylinder valve, terminating the Safety whisp/release of material. It was determined that there Program and was no design control over the closure arm Integrated mechanism. The lack of design control resulted in Safety fabrication of a closure arm without set screws to be Analysis manufactured/used, and inadequate testing/maintenance of the closure arm which only tested the mechanical closure motor, not the arm itself.
This is contrary to the licensees License Application regarding Management Measures and configuration management.
SL IV - NOV Global A mass of dry uranium oxide powder greater than 10 CFR 70.61 Criticality Nuclear expected was identified in the Sinter Test Grinder Performance Safety Fuels (STG) swarf collection can prompting a shutdown of Requirements America the STG. A transient in the plant air system had caused the hatch valves at the bottom of the STG 10 CFR 70.62 swarf collection enclosure to cycle, resulting in a Safety release of holdup material that had been trapped Program and between the hatch valves. The licensee's investigation Integrated found that the bottom hatch valve had been failed Safety closed for some time, including the last two annual Analysis cleanouts in 2022 and 2021, resulting in an incomplete cleanout of uranium oxide powder. The licensee's investigation determined that the safety limit could have been exceeded if swarf continued to build up.
SL IV - NCV Global While conducting reviews of personnel dosimetry the 10 CFR Radiation Nuclear licensee identified that a potentially inappropriate 20.1502 Protection Fuels algorithm was applied to thermoluminescent dosimeter Conditions Program -
America data for workers in the Ceramics Area. Further review requiring Occupational revealed the algorithm significantly undercalculated Individual deep dose equivalent and lens dose equivalent, Monitoring of resulting in inaccurate monitoring of occupational total External and effective dose equivalent for workers in the affected Internal area. Occupational Dose SL IV - NCV Louisiana The licensee implemented inadequate corrective 10 CFR 70 Construction Energy actions during a Root Cause Evaluation and failed to Services/ address the root cause with a corrective action to URENCO prevent recurrence.
Enclosure 2 SL IV - NCV Louisiana Safety controls were unavailable while a crane was 10 CFR 70.61 Construction Energy being operated within the controlled access area. Prior Performance Services/ to operation of a crane within the established "safe Requirements URENCO distance," visual indication of the "No Swing Zone" and spotters are required. The crane was operated to move 10 CFR 70.62 and install counterweights on the crane itself contrary Safety to the stablished work package, and without the Program and required visual indicators or spotters present. Integrated Safety Analysis
SL III - NOV BWXT Uranium bearing organic solution was inadvertently 10 CFR 70.61 Criticality transferred into an organic annular storage tank Performance Safety through a partially open valve. The annular tank Requirements overflowed. Operators also noticed organic solution in a dropout column coming off a low point in the 10 CFR 70.62 ventilation ductwork. Two criticality safety item(s) Safety relied-on for safety (IROFS) are supposed to prevent Program and organic solution from getting into the ventilation Integrated system, an overflow drain that spills to the floor and an Safety air gap between the top of the organic tank and the Analysis ventilation system. Contrary to the design, when the organic tank overflowed, the overflow line contained an intact rupture disk which did not allow solution to flow through it. As a result the solution overflowed through the air gap, and some of the overflowing organic solution was sucked into the ventilation system.
IROFS were not designed, implemented, and maintained as necessary to perform their intended safety function as an air gap and overflow line on a uranium bearing vessel. This violation had two examples.
SL IV - NOV Nuclear Fuel A chemical reaction occurred outside of process Failure to Operational Services containment equipment during inventory cleanout follow License Safety -
activities from chemical residue containing small Application Chemical quantities of licensed material that had fallen on a Hazard protective covering that had been placed on the floor.
The Nuclear Fuel Services (NFSs) Conduct of Operations procedure instructs personnel not to approach a chemical reaction occurring outside of a process containment and additionally states that only a trained and qualified member of the fire brigade may do so. Contrary to the procedure, following a recommendation from a Fire Brigade member and direction from area supervision, two operators wearing respiratory protection for radiological exposure (not chemical exposure), gathered, and attempted to transfer the chemical residue material from the floor covering. During that transfer a small, short duration flame was observed. Additionally, a strong chemical odor was noted and inhaled by the operators.
SL IV - NOV Nuclear Fuel A chemical reaction occurred outside of process Failure to Operational Services containment equipment during inventory cleanout follow License Safety -
activities from chemical residue containing small Application Chemical quantities of licensed material that had fallen on a Hazard protective covering that had been placed on the floor.
Contrary to the procedure, following a recommendation from a Fire Brigade member and direction from area supervision, two operators wearing respiratory protection for radiological exposure (not chemical exposure) approached, gathered, and attempted to
2 transfer the chemical residue material from the floor covering. During that transfer a small, short duration flame was observed. Additionally, a strong chemical odor was noted and inhaled by the operators. The NFSs Drafting Safety Work Permits, procedure lists chemical hazards as an example of non-radiological hazards that should be considered in the drafting of any work permits. By not following the chemical safety measures detailed in the Drafting Safety Work Permits procedure, all hazards and the personal protective equipment needed were not identified (chemical vapors), and the operators were exposed to the chemical vapors.
SL IV - NCV Nuclear Fuel A drain in one of the facility process ventilation 10 CFR 70.61 Criticality Services systems is credited as an engineered control to Performance Safety prevent the presence of condensation (i.e. Requirements moderation). Several instances were discovered where this drain was found in a degraded or failed state 10 CFR 70.62 during scheduled inspection by the licensee. The drain Safety was fabricated in a way such that the drainpipe Program and protruded into the main ventilation duct rather than Integrated being flushed-mounted with the duct as designed, Safety which degraded its intended safety function (i.e. Analysis draining condensate or moderator away from the duct).
When the degraded condition was discovered, the licensee did not perform corrective actions to ensure that this engineered control was available and reliable to perform its intended function when needed. The failure to establish management measures, particularly corrective actions, resulted in repetitive instances where the drain was found in a state that prevented or degraded its safety function as an IROFS.
SL IV - NCV Nuclear Fuel A drain in one of the facility process ventilation Failure to Criticality Services systems is credited as an engineered control to follow License Safety prevent the presence of condensation (i.e. Application moderation). Several instances were discovered where this drain was found in a degraded or failed state during scheduled inspection by the licensee. The drain was fabricated in a way such that the drainpipe protruded into the main ventilation duct rather than being flushed-mounted with the duct as designed, which degraded its intended safety function (i.e.
draining condensate or moderator away from the duct).
Licensee procedure, "Acceptance Form for Major Work Request," provided steps to document verification that the installation of this drain had been inspected and completed satisfactorily. Additionally, the procedure stated, in part, that before closing a work request the initiator must verify that the work has been inspected by a nuclear safety engineer. However, licensee staff marked the work verification as "not applicable" because they believed that this verification would be covered under a separate procedure. The verification never happened and resulted in multiple instances of the engineered control in a failed or degraded state.
3 SL IV - NOV Nuclear Fuel On November 10, 2022, during dayshift, an operator-Failure to Operational Services in-training incorrectly installed equipment in Area 200 follow License Safety -
while conducting preparation activities for special Application Chemical nuclear fuel (SNM) processing. The incorrect Hazard equipment installation placed the Area 200 process in an undesired configuration for handling SNM. Subsequently, on the second shift, a trained operator assigned to Area 200 proceeded with routine SNM processing activities in that area. The second shift operator was required to observe the process start-up per Standard Operating Procedure-401 302, Revision 052E. However, the operator failed to observe the start-up as directed by the procedure and consequently failed to identify the incorrect equipment configuration established by the dayshift operator. As the start-up process in Area 200 continued, SNM spilled on the process floor as a direct result of the incorrect equipment set up performed by the dayshift operator. The spill did not result in the release of SNM outside the radiologically controlled area or occupational dose above the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulatory limits. The Area 200 process was returned to normal operations after corrective actions were completed.
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