ML23179A172

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Hospital of Central Connecticut; NRC Inspection Report 03001250/2023001
ML23179A172
Person / Time
Site: 03001250
Issue date: 07/19/2023
From: Paul Krohn
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch
To: Edwards J
Hosp of Central Connecticut
References
EA-23-059 IR 2023001
Download: ML23179A172 (1)


See also: IR 05000202/2030001

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

475 ALLENDALE ROAD, SUITE 102

KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-1415

July 19, 2023

EA-23-059

Janette Edwards, MPH, MBA,

Vice President of Operations

The Hospital of Central Connecticut

100 Grand Street

Administrative Offices

New Britain, CT 06050

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 030-01250/2023-001

Dear Janette Edwards:

This letter refers to the announced inspection conducted on March 7-9, 2023, at your facilities

in New Britain, Southington, and Plainville, Connecticut, with an in-office review through

June 13, 2023. The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as

they relate to public health and safety, to confirm compliance with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commissions (NRC) rules, regulations, and with the conditions of your license. Within these

areas, the inspection consisted of a selected examination of procedures and representative

records, observations of activities, independent radiation measurements, and interviews with

personnel. The preliminary inspection findings were discussed with you and your staff following

the conclusion of the onsite portions of the inspection on March 7 and 8, 2023. A final exit

briefing was conducted telephonically with you and representatives of your staff, including

Gregory Hisel, Radiation Safety Officer, and George Pavlonnis, Associate Radiation Safety

Officer, on June 28, 2023. The enclosed report presents the results of the inspection.

Based on the results of the inspection, the NRC identified six apparent violations (AV), the

first of which is being considered for escalated enforcement action, including a civil penalty, in

accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is available on

the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.

These AVs involved the apparent failures to: (1) monitor occupational exposure of an

interventional radiologist; (2) assess occupational dose to twelve staff who had occupational

duties outside of the Hospital of Central Connecticut that involved exposure to radiation;

(3) ensure that byproduct material being decayed-in-storage had a physical half-life of less

than 120 days and perform adequate monitoring of the byproduct material prior to disposal;

(4) create and retain a record of each disposal of byproduct material via decay-in-storage;

(5) confine the possession and use of byproduct material to the locations authorized in the

license; and (6) provide commensurate training to staff involved in the disposal of byproduct

material via decay-in-storage.

The enclosure provides a description of the AVs. Please be advised that the number and

characterization of AVs described in the enclosure may change as a result of further NRC

review. You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on

this matter.

J. Edwards 2

Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to

(1) respond to the apparent violations addressed in this inspection report in writing within 30

days of the date of this letter, (2) request a Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference (PEC); or

(3) request alternative dispute resolution (ADR). If a PEC is held, it will be open for public

observation and the NRC will issue a press release to announce the time and date of the

conference.

If you decide to participate in a PEC or pursue ADR, please contact Anne DeFrancisco at

(610) 337-5078 or via email at Anne.DeFrancisco@nrc.gov within 10 days of the date of

this letter. A PEC should be held within 30 days of the date of this letter and an ADR session

within 45 days of the date of this letter.

If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as a Response to

Apparent Violations in NRC Inspection Report (030-01250/2023-001); EA-23-059 and should

include for each apparent violation: (1) the reason for the apparent violation or, if contested, the

basis for disputing the apparent violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and

the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full

compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed

correspondence if the correspondence adequately addresses your response. Additionally, your

response should be sent to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control

Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy mailed to Paul Krohn, Director, Division of

Radiological Safety & Security, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I, 475 Allendale

Road, Suite 102, King of Prussia, PA, 19406, and emailed to R1Enforcement@nrc.gov within 30

days of the date of this letter. If an adequate response is not received within the time specified

or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its

enforcement decision.

In lieu of providing this written response, you may choose to provide your perspective on

this matter, including the significance, cause, and corrective actions, as well as any other

information that you believe the NRC should take into consideration by requesting a PEC to

meet with the NRC. If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the

opportunity to provide your perspective on these matters and any other information that you

believe the NRC should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The

decision to hold a PEC does not mean that the NRC has determined that a violation has

occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be conducted to obtain

information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The topics discussed during

the conference may include information to determine whether a violation occurred, information

to determine the significance of a violation, information related to the identification of a violation,

and information related to any corrective actions taken or planned. In presenting your corrective

actions, you should be aware that the promptness and comprehensiveness of your actions will

be considered in assessing any civil penalty for the apparent violations. The guidance in NRC

Information Notice 96-28, Suggested Guidance Relating to Development and Implementation

of Corrective Action, may be helpful in preparing your response (Agencywide Documents

Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML061240509 1).

1 NRC Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Numbers listed in

this report may be accessible using the hyperlink below with the associated ADAMS Accession Number

inserted in place of the ML at the end. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML

J. Edwards 3

Finally, you may request ADR with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue. ADR is a

general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflicts using a neutral third-party

mediator. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is mediation. Mediation is a

voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral mediator works with parties to help them

reach resolution. If the parties agree to use ADR, they select a mutually agreeable neutral

mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no power to make decisions. Mediation gives

parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of

agreement, and reach a final resolution of the issues.

Additional information concerning the NRCs ADR program can be obtained at:

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict

Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRCs program as a neutral

third party. Please contact ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you

are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a

copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made

available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room and from the

NRCs ADAMS, accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary

information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.

If you have any questions related to this matter, please contact Anne DeFrancisco of my staff at

610-337-5078 or Anne.DeFrancisco@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

Digitally signed by Paul G.

Krohn

Paul G. Krohn Date: 2023.07.19

08:45:43 -04'00'

Paul G. Krohn, Director

Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Docket No. 030-01250

License No. 06-02388-01

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 030-01250/2023-001

cc w/ enclosure:

J. Semancik, Director, Radiation Division

Connecticut Dept. of Energy and Environmental Protection

G. Hisel, Radiation Safety Officer

G. Pavlonnis, Associate Radiation Safety Officer

J. Edwards 4

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 030-01250/2023-001 - DATED JULY 19, 2023.

Distribution:

OEMAIL

D Pelton, OE RIDSOEMAILCENTER

J Peralta, OE

N Hasan, OE

L Sreenivas, OE

D Bradley, OE

R Augustus, OGC

K Williams, NMSS RIDSNMSSOD RESOURCE

M Burgess, NMSS

Enforcement Coordinators

RII, RIII, RIV (M Kowal; D Betancourt-Roldan ; R Kumana)

H Harrington, OPA RIDSOPAMAILCENTER

R Feitel, OIG RIDSOIGMAILCENTER

D DAbate, OCFO RIDSOCFOMAILCENTER

P Krohn, DRSS, RI R1DRSSMAILRESOURCE

J Quichocho, DRSS, RI

C Cahill, DRSS, RI

A DeFrancisco, DRSS, RI

J vonEhr, DRSS, RI

M Wutkowski, DRSS, RI

N Patel, DRSS, RI

D Screnci, PAO-RI

N Sheehan, PAO-RI

F Gaskins, SAO-RI

M Ford, SAO-RI

B Klukan, ORA, RI

J Nick, ORA, RI

R1Enforcement.Resource

ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML23179A172

SUNSI Review: ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:

By: JEV Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive N/A

OFFICE RI:DRSS RI:DRSS RI:DRSS RI:ORA OGC OE

NAME MWutkowski NPatel JvonEhr MMcLaughlin RAugustus DBradley

SIGNATURE MJW NSP JEV MMM RAA DSB

DATE 06/29/23 06/29/23 06/28/23 07/05/23 07/11/2023 07/11/2023

OFFICE RI:DRSS RI:DRSS

NAME ADeFrancisco PKrohn

SIGNATURE CCahill /for/ PGK

DATE 07/13/23 07/19/23

OFFICAL RECORD COPY

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket: 030-01250

License: 06-02388-01

Report: 2023-001

EA No.: EA-23-059

Licensee: The Hospital of Central Connecticut

Locations Inspected: 100 Grand Street, New Britain, CT

183 North Mountain Road, New Britain, CT

201 North Mountain Road, Plainville, CT

Inspection Dates: March 7-9, 2023, with in-office review

through June 13, 2023

Inspectors: __Jason vonEhr__________________ _06/28/2023_

Jason vonEhr, Senior Health Physicist Date

Medical & Licensing Assistance Branch

Division of Radiological Safety & Security

__Netra Patel____________________ _06/29/2023_

Netra Patel, Health Physicist Date

Medical & Licensing Assistance Branch

Division of Radiological Safety & Security

__Michael Wutkowski______________ _06/29/2023_

Michael Wutkowski, Health Physicist Date

Commercial, Industrial, Research and Development,

and Academic Branch

Division of Radiological Safety & Security

Approved By: __Christopher Cahill_/for/___________ _07/13/2023_

Anne DeFrancisco, Chief Date

Medical & Licensing Assistance Branch

Division of Radiological Safety & Security

Attachment: Supplemental Inspection Information

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Hospital of Central Connecticut

NRC Inspection Report 030-01250/2023-001

A routine announced inspection was performed at the Hospital of Central Connecticut

on March 7-9, 2023, with in-office review through June 13, 2023. The inspection was an

examination of activities conducted under the NRC license as they relate to public health and

safety, to confirm compliance with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's rules, regulations,

and with the conditions of the NRC license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a

selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities,

independent radiation measurements, and interviews with personnel.

Program Overview

The Hospital of Central Connecticut was authorized by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission Materials License No. 06-02388-01 to use a variety of sealed and unsealed

byproduct material for medical use, including diagnostic and therapeutic uses authorized by

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 35.100-300, 35.600, as well as emerging

medical technologies under 10 CFR 35.1000. Storage and use of NRC-licensed byproduct

materials was authorized at the licensees facilities in and around New Britain, Connecticut.

(Section 1)

Inspection Findings

Six apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified. These apparent violations included

the apparent failures to: (1) monitor occupational exposure of an interventional radiologist;

(2) assess occupational dose to twelve staff who had occupational duties outside of the Hospital

of Central Connecticut that involved exposure to radiation; (3) ensure that byproduct material

being decayed-in-storage had a physical half-life of less than 120 days and perform adequate

monitoring of the byproduct material prior to disposal; (4) create and retain a record of each

disposal of byproduct material via decay-in-storage; (5) confine the possession and use of

byproduct material to the locations authorized in the license; and (6) provide commensurate

training to staff involved in the disposal of byproduct material via decay-in-storage.

Corrective Actions

The licensee performed a reconstruction to address the apparent gap in the occupational

exposure records for the affected interventional radiologist. The licensee has not yet

communicated its actions, planned or completed, to address the consistent and accurate

monitoring of occupational exposure in the future to ensure durable and lasting compliance with

the associated regulatory requirement. Further actions concerning apparent violation No. 2

identified above are described in Section 3.8.2 and No. 3-6 in Section 3.8.3 of this report.

2

REPORT DETAILS

1. Program Overview (Inspection Procedure 87130 and 87132)

1.1. Program Scope

The Hospital of Central Connecticut (HOCC) was authorized by the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) Materials License No. 06-02388-01 to use a variety of

sealed and unsealed byproduct material for medical use, including diagnostic and

therapeutic uses authorized by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)

35.100-300, a High Dose Rate Afterloader (HDR) under 10 CFR 35.600, as well as

emerging medical technologies in the form of yttrium-90 microspheres under 10 CFR

35.1000. Storage and use of NRC-licensed byproduct materials was authorized at the

licensees facilities in New Britain, Southington, and Plainville, Connecticut.

The license was amended three times since the NRCs last routine inspection (started

on March 5, 2021). These amendments included:

  • Amendment No. 121, issued on November 22, 2021, which removed two

Authorized Users (AU) and a medical physicist from the NRC license, removed

the authorization to use radioactive materials for manual brachytherapy under

10 CFR 35.400, and added a new location of use within HOCCs facilities;

  • Amendment No. 122, issued on December 3, 2021, which authorized a

change in the NRC-approved Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and removed

the self-shielded irradiator from the NRC license; and

  • Amendment No. 123, issued on February 7, 2023, renewed the NRC license,

changed the RSO, and added an Associate Radiation Safety Officer (ARSO).

1.2. Inspection Scope

The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under the NRC license as

they relate to public health and safety, to confirm compliance with the NRCs rules,

regulations, and with the conditions of the HOCC license. Within these areas, the

inspection consisted of a selected examination of procedures and representative

records, observations of activities, independent radiation measurements, and interviews

with personnel.

The inspection included a review of the findings, root cause(s), and corrective actions

from the NRCs last routine inspection, as documented in Inspection Report

No. 030-01250/2021-001, which resulted in escalated enforcement.

2. Review of Inspection Report No. 2021-001 Escalated Enforcement Findings

The NRC issued its report for Inspection Report No. (IR) 2021-001 on

September 15, 2022 (redacted public version found at ADAMS Accession

No. ML22258A099 2, nonpublic version at Accession No. ML22258A097), and revised

the report on January 23, 2023 (public version: Accession No. ML23023A111, nonpublic

version: Accession No. ML23023A106), in response to HOCCs written response dated

2 NRC Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Numbers listed in

this report may be accessible using the hyperlink below with the associated ADAMS Accession Number

inserted in place of the ML at the end. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML

3

October 21, 2022 (nonpublic document: Accession No. ML22336A183). The NRC

issued its final enforcement action on January 24, 2023 (public version: Accession

No. ML23024A024, nonpublic version: Accession No. ML22314A103).

The enforcement action described above involved one or more violations of NRC

security requirements that were categorized at Severity Level III. The NRC action

stemmed from the licensees failure to comply with requirements involving a category 2

quantity of radioactive material, as defined in 10 CFR Part 37 Physical Protection of

Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material. The NRC performed a

non-routine, limited scope inspection on September 22, 2021 (IR2021-002, ADAMS

Accession No. ML21326A047), which provided oversight of HOCCs transfer of the

category 2 quantity of radioactive material to the Department of Energy. This material

triggered HOCCs need to comply with the 10 CFR Part 37 requirements, and therefore,

with its removal, HOCC was no longer responsible for the requirements in 10 CFR Part

37. The HOCC NRC license was amended on December 3, 2021, to remove the

authorization to possess this material.

As a result of all the above, the NRC is closing all violations issued under IR2021-001,

as the requirements therein are no longer applicable to HOCCs operations. These

closures are further noted in this enclosures attached Supplemental Inspection

Information.

3. Observations and Findings

3.1. Locations Inspected and Licensee Oversight

This inspection included observations, interviews with staff, and select review of records

and procedures at the 100 Grand Street, New Britain, Connecticut facilities (New Britain

General Campus) and the satellite facility located at both 183 North Mountain Road,

New Britain, and 201 North Mountain Road, Plainville, Connecticut (Radiation Oncology

Treatment Center). The inspection did not address the licensed location located at

81 Meriden Ave, Southington, CT (Bradley Memorial Campus), as a result of the lack of

licensed activities.

The inspectors toured all areas where licensed material was used or stored at the New

Britain General Campus and the Radiation Oncology Treatment Center. This included

but was not limited to observations of initial package receipt, dose calibrator quality

control, dose preparation, administration, patient interaction, performance of radiation

surveys, and radioactive waste management. Additionally, independent radiation

surveys were performed and found to be consistent with licensee postings and within

regulatory limits.

The radiation safety program operated under the direction of a Radiation Safety

Committee (RSC) which met quarterly and included the representation required by

10 CFR 35.24. During the inspection period, the RSO changed from an onsite AU, who

received the support of an ARSO, and a physics consultant who performed quarterly

audits. The audits included, but were not limited to: equipment calibration, review of

written directives, training, general records review, exposure evaluations, and the

performance of sealed source leak tests and physical inventory.

4

3.2. Nuclear Medicine Operations - Imaging and Diagnostic

The inspector performed a sample review of records, polices, and procedures as they

related to the licensees nuclear imaging and diagnostic operations authorized under

10 CFR 35.100 and 10 CFR 35.200. The Nuclear Medicine Department had two full-time

and two per diem Nuclear Medicine Technologists (NMT). One of the full-time NMT and

one per diem NMT rotate at the cancer center. The licensee used technicium-99m to

perform cardiac stress testing. The licensee imaged approximately nine to fifteen

patients per day. PET/CT (Positron Emission Tomography/Computed Tomography)

scans were only performed at the cancer center. The licensee used fluorine-18 and

gallium-68 to perform PET scans. All the dosages were received from Cardinal Health as

unit doses, except technicium-99m which was received as bulk doses. All doses were

assayed prior to administration. The licensee also performed iodine-123 uptake studies

with approximately four patients per quarter. During the course of the review of the

licensees imaging and diagnostic operations, four apparent violations were identified

concerning the handling of unanticipated radioactive waste, which is discussed in

Section 3.8 below.

3.3. Nuclear Medicine Operations - Therapeutic

The inspectors reviewed the licensees nuclear unsealed therapeutic operations. The

inspectors found that the licensee had not performed any recent radium-223 Xofigo

administrations. The licensee provided the most recent administration, which occurred

prior to the last routine inspection. No other cases occurred in that time period, and

none were performed during the inspection. The licensee also performed therapeutic

iodine-131 administrations. These ranged from treatments for hypothyroidism through

thyroid ablations. The licensee performed four administrations in calendar year 2023

through the date of the inspection, including two ablations utilizing approximately

150 mCi of iodine-131.

No administrations were scheduled while the inspectors were onsite. All iodine-131

administrations were performed on an outpatient basis. The licensee provided sufficient

patient release instructions and performed adequate patient release exposure

calculations pursuant to 10 CFR 35.75. A sample of written directives representing

recent iodine administrations was reviewed, with no issues or concerns identified.

3.4. Manual Brachytherapy

The inspectors did not review the licensees now-terminated manual brachytherapy.

The NRC license was amended on November 22, 2021, to remove the AUs and

authorization for the 10 CFR 35.400 manual brachytherapy program. As a result, no

inspection effort was expended on the activities performed between the last NRC

inspection, which started remotely on March 6, 2021, and continued with an onsite

inspection on March 21, 2021, and the termination of authorization for the program on

November 22, 2021.

3.5. Remote Afterloader Brachytherapy

The inspectors performed interviews and reviewed select records, policies, and

procedures as they related to the licensees remote afterloader brachytherapy program

authorized under 10 CFR 35.600. The licensee possessed a single Elekta Model

5

microSelectron 106.990 HDR remote afterloader. The licensee demonstrated its

activities associated with this unit, including pre-treatment spot checks, periodic full

calibration, use during patient treatment, security of the device and its associated keys,

and availability of emergency response equipment. The licensee averaged between 130

and 140 treatments per year with this system. No patients were scheduled for treatment

the week the inspection was performed, and as a result no observations were able to

be made. The licensee was able to provide a walkthrough demonstration in order to

facilitate a general overview of a procedure. No issues or items of concern were

identified with respect to the licensees remote afterloader brachytherapy program.

3.6. Yttrium-90 Microsphere Program

The inspectors performed a review of records, policies, and procedures as they related

to the licensees yttrium-90 microsphere program authorized under 10 CFR 35.1000.

The licensee utilized the BWXT Medical Ltd. Model Therasphere for the performance of

its administrations. The licensees single AU for this type of activity was not onsite during

the inspection and was interviewed telephonically after the onsite inspection. The

licensees yttrium-90 program performed eight administrations in calendar year 2021,

ten in 2022, and a single administration in year-to-date 2023 (through the date of the

onsite inspection). The licensee was committed to the NRCs Yttrium-90 Microsphere

Brachytherapy Sources and Devices TheraSphere and SIR-Spheres Licensing

Guidance (Revision 10.2, dated April 20, 2021), which is accessible at Accession

No. ML21089A364. During the course of the review of the licensees yttrium-90 program,

one apparent violation was identified concerning the occupational monitoring of the AU,

which is discussed in Section 3.8 below.

3.7. Independent Radiation Surveys

The inspectors performed independent radiation surveys throughout the inspection in

areas of use or storage of radioactive materials, and included, but were not limited to:

the administration rooms in the nuclear medicine suite, radioactive waste areas,

radiopharmacy packages post-delivery, and the HDR unit. The survey results were

generally consistent with the licensees postings and applicable regulatory limits. One

item was discussed with the licensee concerning a posting for the HDR, specifically the

storage location storage for the HDR (an annex within the treatment room). HOCC

had posted this area with Caution: Radiation Area, despite the room not plausibly

exceeding the 5 millirem in any one hour at 30 centimeters from the surface of the HDR

as described in 10 CFR 20.1902(a) and as defined in 10 CFR 20.1003. The licensee

explained that this was in case of emergency, rather than the expectation of meeting or

exceeding the 10 CFR Part 20 requirement for posting this level of hazard during the

course of routine operations. The licensee was encouraged to ensure that their postings

were comparable and commensurate with the associated radiation hazard, and to not

over-post a room or area.

The inspectors surveys were performed with a: Ludlum Model 2401-P, serial number

145164, calibration date November 3, 2022; Ludlum 2401-P, serial number 285217,

calibration date January 05, 2023; and Ludlum 2401-P serial number 281353, calibration

date September 19, 2022.

6

3.8. NRC Findings

Over the course of the NRCs observations, three areas of concerns were identified,

resulting in six apparent violations. The first area of concern involved the licensees

occupational exposure monitoring program as it applied to a single interventional

radiologist and AU. The second area of concern involved the licensees monitoring for

individuals with exposure external of the license. The third area of concern involved

the licensees handling of unanticipated radioactive waste that was identified in its

non-radioactive waste streams.

Within the areas of concern identified above, six apparent violations of NRC

requirements were identified. These apparent violations included the apparent failures

to: (1) monitor occupational exposure of an interventional radiologist; (2) assess

occupational dose to twelve staff who had occupational duties outside of the HOCC that

involved exposure to radiation; (3) ensure that byproduct material being decayed-in-

storage had a physical half-life of less than 120 days and perform adequate monitoring

of the byproduct material prior to disposal; (4) create and retain a record of each

disposal of byproduct material via decay-in-storage; (5) confine the possession and

use of byproduct material to the locations authorized in the license; and (6) provide

commensurate training to staff involved in the disposal of byproduct material via

decay-in-storage.

These areas of concern and associated apparent violations are described in detail in

Sections 3.8.1-3.8.3 below.

3.8.1. Occupational Exposure Monitoring (AV1)

During a review of HOCC dosimetry, an AU (an interventional radiologist) for yttrium-90

microspheres was identified as having abnormal dosimetry results. This included 16

months in Calendar Years (CY) 2021 and 2022 with no radiation exposure results at all,

and three further months with exceptionally low radiation exposure results in contrast to

the type and frequency of work with both radioactive material and machine-produced

radiation. The machine-produced radiation was from the practice of interventional

radiology and, primarily, the use of a fluoroscope.

The licensee reviewed the subject dosimetry results and agreed that they did not

accurately reflect this AUs true occupational exposure and, as a result, took steps to

perform a dose reconstruction. This dose reconstruction was based on the amount of

time with the fluoroscopic beam on and combining this with academic literature in order

to estimate the occupational exposure to the individual. The literature the licensee used

suggested an exposure rate, as a result of scatter radiation from the fluoroscope, of

between 3 millirem/minute of beam time for the fluoroscope (with a lead shield skirt

on the patients table) and 6 millirem/minute (without this lead shield). As a result,

the licensee concluded that the AU experienced a radiation exposure of between

1,082 - 2,164 millirem for CY2021, and between 1,400 - 2,800 millirem for CY2022.

This estimate was compared to the five months in CY2021 and CY2022 where the

individuals dosimetry results appeared to be reasonable and potentially representative

7

of the interventional radiologists actual exposure. This comparison suggested the

licensees academic literature-based estimate was reasonable: these five months

dosimetry results suggested a per-minute radiation exposure from a low of 2.35

millirem/minute of beam time to 6.17 millirem/minute of beam time, with an overall

weighted average of 3.64 millirem/minute of beam time.

While this AU performed work at two other facilities, these facilities were within the

overall Hartford HealthCare system, and the Hartford HealthCare system demonstrated

during the inspection that it appeared to adequately aggregate occupational radiation

exposure from facilities within its purview. Furthermore, these other two facilities

contributed only very minor exposures to the AUs overall occupational exposure (the AU

works 1 day every 2 months at the first facility, and 1 day every 6 months at the second).

The AU and licensee confirmed that there was separately-issued dosimetry from each

facility and the corporate Hartford HealthCare primary dosimetrist demonstrated how

these were aggregated across the different Hartford HealthCare facilities.

In addition to the efforts described above, the licensee planned to provide extra

dosimetry for an 8-week trial period after the inspection (starting in June 2023). This

dosimetry would be provided to the AU with additional measures by the licensee to

provide high confidence in the consistent and accurate wearing of this dosimetry. The

purpose of this trial period was to supplement the academic literature and existing

occupational exposure results in order to provide confidence in and narrow the

estimated range of the final reconstructed occupational exposure result. As of the date of

this report, the trial had not yet concluded. HOCC provided communications to the NRC

regarding this reconstruction on April 13, 2023 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23166A148),

which was revised following NRC input on April 18, 2023 (ADAMS Accession

No. ML23166A149).

As a result of the gap identified between the AUs likely occupational exposure and what

was recorded and reported by the individuals dosimeter, and the dosimetry programs

apparent failure to identify the abnormal results in order to take compensatory

measures, an apparent violation of 10 CFR 20.1502 was identified and is described

below (030-01250/2023-001-01):

Apparent Violation No. 1: Occupational Monitoring

10 CFR 20.1502(a)(1) requires that each licensee shall monitor exposures to

radiation and radioactive material at levels sufficient to demonstrate compliance with

the occupational dose limits in 10 CFR Part 20. At a minimum, each licensee shall

monitor occupational exposure to radiation from licensed and unlicensed radiation

sources under the control of the licensee and shall supply and require the use of

individual monitoring devices by adults likely to receive, in 1 year form sources

external to the body, a dose in excess of 10 percent of the limits in 10 CFR

20.1201(a).

Contrary to the above, from at least March 24, 2021, through March 6, 2023, the

licensee failed to monitor exposures to radiation and radioactive material at levels

sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the occupational dose limits in 10 CFR

Part 20. Specifically, the licensee failed to monitor an interventional radiologists

exposure to radiation from radioactive materials and unlicensed radiation sources

under the

8

control of the licensee, and the subject interventional radiologists reconstructed

radiation exposures were in excess of the 10 CFR 20.1201(a)(1) 10% threshold to

require monitoring.

As a result of the estimated dose provided by HOCC at the time of this reports writing

and potential for the AU to exceed NRC regulatory requirements for annual occupational

dose, this AV is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with

the NRCs Enforcement Policy.

3.8.2. External Occupational Exposure Monitoring (AV2)

HOCC had staff, contractors, and physicians who were exposed to radiation from

NRC-licensed radioactive materials under the HOCC NRC license who were also

exposed to radiation as part of their occupational duties from both unlicensed sources of

radiation at HOCC as well as licensed and unlicensed sources of radiation at other

Hartford HealthCare system facilities. In the examples reviewed and discussions with

knowledgeable staff, HOCC appeared to have systems in place to collect and aggregate

monitored occupational radiation exposure from other facilities within the Hartford

HealthCare network. However, the licensee did not appear to have considered the need

to collect and aggregate occupational radiation exposure that occurs outside this

network.

Several staff were identified by the inspectors who worked under the scope of the HOCC

NRC license in addition to facilities external to the Hartford HealthCare network. The

occupational exposures experienced by these staff at these outside facilities was not

aggregated into the radiation monitoring records or accounted for in the licensees

implementation of its radiation safety program.

Following identification by the NRC, HOCC worked to identify which staff, contractors,

and physicians may be impacted by this gap in the monitoring program. Twelve

individuals were identified by HOCC as having occupational exposure to radiation

occurring outside of the HOCC and Hartford HealthCare network. At HOCC, this

impacted eight staff in radiation oncology and four staff from nuclear medicine (which

included PET).

Once identified, HOCC contacted each of the external facilities to share occupational

exposure information, with the consent of the impacted individuals (as these records are

generally protected from public disclosure under 10 CFR 20.2106(d) because of their

personal privacy nature). In no instance was staff, following aggregation of other

third-party entities, exposed to more than the NRC regulatory limits in 10 CFR 20.1201.

The magnitude of the external exposure that was unaccounted for by HOCC ranged

from no recorded (or minimal) exposure, which is common and reasonable in routine

radiation oncology operations, to 233 millirem whole body and 595 millirem extremity

for the nuclear medicine staff. The licensees initial outreach and final conclusions

were documented in letters to the NRC dated April 13, 2023 (ADAMS Accession No.

ML23166A147) and May 12, 2023 (redacted to protect privacy information, ADAMS

Accession No. ML23166A151).

9

As a result of all the above, an apparent violation of 10 CFR 20.1201(f) was identified

and is described below (030-01250/2023-001-02):

Apparent Violation No. 2: External Occupational Monitoring

10 CFR 20.1201(f) requires that the licensee shall reduce the dose that an individual

may be allowed to receive in the current year by the amount of occupational dose

received while employed by any other person.

Contrary to the above, in twelve instances from at least March 24, 2021, and

March 6, 2023, the licensee failed to reduce the dose that an individual may be

allowed to receive in the current year by the amount of occupational dose received

while employed by any other person. Specifically, for twelve individuals who

performed licensed activities under the NRC license, the licensee failed to assess

occupational dose received while the individuals continued their employment by

other organizations outside of the Hartford HealthCare , and from which the

individuals had duties that involved exposure to radiation.

3.8.3. Handling of Unanticipated Radioactive Waste (AV3-6)

The licensees RSC meeting minutes described Area Radiation Detectors and

low level alarms with some regularity. The inspectors noted a total of 27 alarms

documented in the RSCs meeting minutes in calendar year 2022. The HOCC staff and

representatives described these alarms as related to radiation portal monitors installed

at two points in the main facilitys exits for general trash services. While some of the

minutes described this as the result of in-patient waste (meeting minutes for 2022

Quarter 1) and in-house Tc-99m waste (meeting minutes for 2022 Quarter 2), it did not

appear that HOCC had exerted any material effort to investigate and identify the source

of this apparently radioactive waste, and therefore conclude with any certainty or

speculation on its origins.

The inspectors interviewed the manager of the Environmental Services group, who

described the procedures and training for handling these alarms and provided a

walk-down of a storage area and the two radiation portal monitors. The manager

explained that waste which triggered the radiation portal monitors would be partitioned

to identify the bag or container causing the alarm and that this bag or container would

be segregated into a separate room for radioactive decay for three days before being

passed through the radiation portal monitor again. If the portal monitor did not alarm, the

waste would be deemed non-radioactive and continue to be handled through the normal

non-radioactive waste processes. If the portal monitor alarmed for this post-decay check,

Environmental Services would contact the Nuclear Medicine Department for assistance.

As the source of the waste was not identified and no further material efforts were exerted

to identify the isotope of concern, HOCC could not conclude what the potential hazard

was posed by the waste. Furthermore, HOCC could not state whether their existing

controls for handling and processing known radioactive waste were experiencing failures

or if this unanticipated waste resulted from other uncontrolled areas (for example, from

patients in the Emergency Department who had radioactive administrations prior to their

emergency, whether this administration had occurred at HOCC or another licensed

facility). This, in part, contributed to deficiencies in addressing NRC regulatory

10

requirements, license limitations and commitments, and applicable HOCC policies

and procedures.

While it is likely that the subject radioactive material was from or related to nuclear

medicine operations, and thus represents short-lived, low-activity radionuclides, and

therefore relatively limited hazards, HOCC had not demonstrated this to be the case.

These deficiencies can be further subdivided into four areas of concern: (1) decay-in-

storage and monitoring; (2) decay-in-storage records; (3) confinement of possession and

use of byproduct material to locations authorized by the NRC license; and (4) training for

staff (10 CFR 35.92(a), 10 CFR 35.92(b) & 35.2092, 10 CFR 30.34(c), and License

Condition 15(A), respectively). These items are described, in brief, below, along with the

associated apparent violation.

First, the licensees apparent failure to identify the isotopes of concern resulted in its

inability to demonstrate that it was authorized to use the decay-in-storage provision

provided in 10 CFR 35.92, as this authorization is contingent upon the byproduct

material having a physical half-life of less than or equal to 120 days. In addition, the

licensees use of the radiation portal monitors failed to meet the regulatory requirement

for monitoring the byproduct material that is being released via decay-in-storage, as it

failed to monitor the byproduct material at its surface with an appropriate instrument at

its most sensitive scale with no interposed shielding.

As a result of the above, an apparent violation of 10 CFR 35.92(a) was identified and is

described below (030-01250/2023-001-03):

Apparent Violation No. 3: Decay-in-Storage Half-Life Limitation and Monitoring

10 CFR 35.92(a) states, in part, that a licensee may hold byproduct material with

a physical half-life of less than or equal to 120 days for decay-in-storage before

disposal without regard to its radioactivity if the licensee monitors the byproduct

material at the surface before disposal and determines that its radioactivity cannot be

distinguished from the background radiation level with an appropriate radiation

detection survey meter set on its most sensitive scale and with no interposed

shielding.

Contrary to the above, in numerous instances from at least March 24, 2021, through

March 6, 2023, the licensee: (1) failed to ensure that byproduct material had a

physical half-life of less than or equal to 120 days, prior to that byproduct material

being decayed-in-storage; and (2) failed to monitor the byproduct material at the

surface before disposal and determine that its radioactivity could not be distinguished

from the background radiation level with an appropriate radiation detection survey

meter set on its most sensitive scale and with no interposed shielding. Specifically,

the licensee disposed of unknown radioactive isotopes via decay-in-storage before

releasing them as non-radioactive waste, and that disposal occurred without

monitoring using an adequate instrument at the surface of the material.

Second, the licensee generated only auxiliary notes associated with the disposal of this

unanticipated radioactive material, such as the notes in the RSC meeting minutes. The

licensee attempted to identify and produce more detailed information such as the times

11

and occasions, or personnel involved, with individual disposals, and was not able to

produce such records.

As a result of the above, an apparent violation of 10 CFR 35.92(b) and its associated

requirement in 10 CFR 35.2092 was identified and is described below (030-01250/2023-

001-04):

Apparent Violation No. 4: Decay-in-Storage Record Creation and Retention

10 CFR 35.92(b) requires that the licensee retain a record of each disposal permitted

under 10 CFR 35.92(a) in accordance with 10 CFR 35.2092.

10 CFR 35.2092 requires that the licensee shall maintain records of the disposal

of licensed materials, as required by 10 CFR 35.92, for 3 years. The record must

include the date of the disposal, the survey instrument used, the background

radiation level, the radiation level measured at the surface of each waste container,

and the name of the individual who performed the survey.

Contrary to the above, in numerous instances from at least March 24, 2021, through

March 6, 2023, the licensee failed to create and retain a record of each disposal

permitted under 10 CFR 35.92(a). Specifically, the licensee disposed of unknown

radioactive isotopes and failed to create or retain a record regarding that disposal,

including the specific items described in 10 CFR 35.2092.

Third, the licensees retention of the unanticipated radioactive material involved

temporary storage for the three-day period following initial identification in a secure

room near the Environmental Services operations. This room was not identified by

the licensee to the NRC in its most recent license application or subsequent

communications amending the NRC license. The licensees applications and

subsequent communications include descriptions, consistent with NUREG-1556,

Volume 9, Section 8.9 Facilities and Equipment, of areas where byproduct material is

prepared, used, administered, and stored.

As a result of the above, an apparent violation of 10 CFR 30.34(c) was identified and is

described below (030-01250/2023-001-05):

Apparent Violation No. 5: Confinement of Byproduct Material to Authorized Locations

10 CFR 30.34(c) requires, in part, that each licensee shall confine its possession and

use of byproduct material to the locations authorized in the license.

License Condition 15 of NRC License No. 06-02388-01, Amendment No. 123, dated

February 7, 2023, requires, in part, that the licensee shall conduct its program in

accordance with the statements, representations, and procedures contained in the

application dated August 18, 2022, and subsequent letters dated November 22,

2022, and January 19, 2023, including any enclosures.

The application dated August 18, 2022, and subsequent letters dated

November 22, 2022, and January 19, 2023, identify and describe the locations

where radioactive materials will be stored.

12

Contrary to the above, in numerous instances from at least February 7, 2023 3,

through March 6, 2023, the licensee failed to confine its possession and use of

byproduct material to the locations authorized in the license. Specifically, the

licensee stored radioactive materials in a room not identified in the license

application or subsequent letters by the licensee as a location of storage.

Fourth, and finally, the personnel of the Environmental Services Department were

provided cursory hazard awareness training, consistent with all auxiliary staff at HOCC.

While this would be sufficient to address the limited potential these staff normally have to

encounter or be in proximity to radioactive materials, this training did not address

subjects consistent with the handling of radioactive waste, such as the performance of

adequate radiation surveys, contamination control, emergency procedures, record

creation and retention, or other HOCC policies, procedures, and NRC regulations as

they concern the handling and disposal of radioactive waste.

As a result of the above, an apparent violation of License Condition 15.A was identified

and is described below (030-01250/2023-001-06):

Apparent Violation No. 6: Adequacy of Training

License Condition 15 of NRC License No. 06-02388-01, Amendment No. 123, dated

February 7, 2023, requires, in part, that the licensee shall conduct its program in

accordance with the statements, representations, and procedures contained in the

documents, including any enclosures, in the letter dated November 22, 2022.

The application dated November 22, 2022, requires, in part, that the Hospital of

Central Connecticut shall develop and will implement and maintain written

procedures for a program for training required under 10 CFR 19.12 for each group of

workers, including (i) topics covered, (ii) qualifications of the instructors, (iii) method

of training, (iv) method for assessing the success of the training, (v) initial training,

and (vi) annual refresher training.

Contrary to the above, from February 7, 20233, through March 6, 2023, the licensee

failed to develop and implement and maintain written procedures for a program for

training. Specifically, auxiliary staff in the Environmental Services Department were

assessing and disposing of unknown radioactive isotopes and the licensee failed to

provide commensurate training to handle, assess, survey, and dispose of this

radioactive waste properly.

3 NRC License No. 06-02388-01 was renewed with Amendment No. 123, which was finalized and issued

on February 7, 2023, and as a result included a new application to the NRC from HOCC consistent with

NUREG-1556, Volume 9, Revision 3. The license prior to Amendment No. 123, and thus prior to

February 7, 2023, included equivalent and commensurate commitments and descriptions. Therefore,

while the apparent violation is quoted as beginning on February 7, 2023, this is for simplicity of

communication, rather than an actual description of the licensees apparent deficiency, which preceded

the quoted date.

13

3.8.4. Additional Observation Regarding Unanticipated Radioactive Waste

The licensee committed in its November 22, 2022, application to the NRC to develop,

implement, and maintain written waste disposal procedures for radioactive material in

accordance with 10 CFR 20.1101, which also meets the requirements of the applicable

section in 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart K, and 10 CFR 35.92. An equivalent and consistent

commitment was made with the license prior to the renewal of the license3. While the

inspectors noted several apparent gaps between the licensees practices as described

throughout Section 3.8.3 of this report with regards to the disposal of this unanticipated

radioactive material and HOCCs written policy, the specific items were determined to be

sufficiently addressed by AV3-6 above and therefore would be duplicative to include as a

separate AV. As a matter of completeness and communication, a brief description is of

this additional observation is provided below.

The licensees responsive waste disposal procedure (titled Radioactive Waste

Management Plan Revision August 2018, Manual Code 03.0005), required, in part, that:

  • Section II General Information: All persons required to handle radioactive

wastes will be provided with appropriate orientation, equipment, and on-the-job

training; and Only the Nuclear Medicine Department and the Radiation

Oncology Department are authorized by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

to possess radioactive material;

  • Section IV Storage of Waste Material: All radioactive waste material will be

stored in the designed shielded enclosures and Environmental Services

employees will follow departmental policies for responding to the radiation

alarm; and

  • Section IV [sic] Records for Disposal: Records of disposal will include the

following information: (1) the date placed in storage for decay and the container

identification if applicable; (2) approximate total activity and volume (or number

of sources for capsules, seeds, columns, etc.) at the time placed in storage; and

(3) date disposed as regular trash and the survey meter reading.

As AV4 and 6 already address apparent deficiencies in record generation and retention

as well as the training provided to staff in the Environmental Services Department, these

apparent gaps are already captured and described in the subject AVs. Regarding the

second bullet noted above (Storage of Waste Material), the inspectors found that the

segregated waste was not provided any designed shielded enclosure, and would instead

be stored, absent any additional shielding, in the secured room near the Environmental

Services Department. As the licensee did not know the isotope or quantity of material, it

is unclear what hazard this posed to staff working in or around this room.

HOCC provided the NRC copies of its draft revisions to relevant policies and

procedures, specifically the documents titled NRC Regulated Radioactive Waste

Disposal, Radioactive Waste Management Plan, and Radiation Portal Monitor Alarm.

HOCC emphasized, however, that these were yet under draft and final decisions on

long-term corrective actions were still being discussed and under review.

14

3.9. Conclusions

As a result of the NRCs inspection efforts, six apparent violations of NRC requirements

were identified. These apparent violations included the failures to: (1) monitor

occupational exposure of an interventional radiologist; (2) assess occupational dose to

twelve staff who had occupational duties outside of the HOCC that involved exposure to

radiation; (3) ensure that byproduct material being decayed-in-storage had a physical

half-life of less than 120 days and perform adequate monitoring of the byproduct

material prior to disposal; (4) create and retain a record of each disposal of byproduct

material via decay-in-storage; (5) confine the possession and use of byproduct material

to the locations authorized in the license; and (6) provide commensurate training to staff

involved in the disposal of byproduct material via decay-in-storage.

4. Corrective Actions

With regards to AV1 concerning the apparent failure to monitor the occupational

exposure of an interventional radiologist, the licensees efforts to reconstruct the

apparent gap in the occupational exposure records are documented in Section 3.8.1

above. The licensee had not yet communicated its actions, planned or completed, to

address the consistent and accurate monitoring of occupational exposure in the future to

ensure durable and lasting compliance with the associated regulatory requirement.

Similarly, for AV2 concerning the apparent failure to assess occupational dose to staff

who had occupational duties outside of the HOCC that involved exposure to radiation,

the licensees actions to address prior occupational exposure at outside facilities is

described in Section 3.8.2. The licensee has not yet communicated its actions, planned

or completed, for how it intends to address this in the future to ensure durable and

lasting compliance with the associated regulatory requirement.

Finally, for AV3-6, the licensee has taken steps to review and begin revision for relevant

policies and procedures related to the handling of radioactive waste. Draft versions of

these documents were shared with the NRC. However, HOCC has not yet

communicated its final decision in how it intends to handle further radioactive waste

identified outside its normal processes, which includes whether the current practice of

handling this material principally by the Environmental Services Department will continue

or not.

5. Exit Meeting Summary

The NRC inspectors presented preliminary inspection findings following the onsite

inspection on March 7 and 8, 2023. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented

and committed to formulating a corrective action plan. The NRC conducted a final exit

briefing via teleconference on June 28, 2023. HOCC was represented by: Janette

Edwards, MPH, MBA, Vice President of Operations; Gregory Hisel, Consultant and

Radiation Safety Officer; George Pavlonnis, Associated Radiation Safety Officer; and

other health physics and corporate support staff. The licensee again acknowledged the

findings presented and did not dispute any of the facts presented.

15

SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION

LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Janette Edwards, MPH, MBA, Vice President of Operations

Greggory Hisel, Consultant and Radiation Safety Officer

George Pavlonnis, Associate Radiation Safety Officer

Daniel Chiappetta, Radiation Safety Physicist

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

87130, Revision 1 - Nuclear Medicine Programs

87132 - Brachytherapy Programs

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED - PUBLIC

Opened

030-01250/2023-001-01 AV Apparent failure to monitor occupational exposure of an

interventional radiologist.

030-01250/2023-001-02 AV Apparent failure to assess occupational dose to staff who

had occupational duties outside of HOCC that involved

exposure to radiation.

030-01250/2023-001-03 AV Apparent failure to ensure that byproduct material being

decayed-in-storage had a physical half-life of less than 120

days and the apparent failure to perform adequate

monitoring of the byproduct material prior to disposal.

030-01250/2023-001-04 AV Apparent failure to create and retain a record of each

disposal of byproduct material via decay-in-storage.

030-01250/2023-001-05 AV Apparent failure to confine the possession and use of

byproduct material to the locations authorized in the

license.

030-01250/2023-001-06 AV Apparent failure to provide commensurate training to staff

involved in the disposal of byproduct material via decay-in-

storage.

(Continued on next page)

Attachment

Closed

All violations associated with IR2021-001 are considered closed. The licensee no longer

possesses, plans to possess, or is authorized to possess quantities of radioactive materials

within the scope of 10 CFR Part 37.

Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution

ARSO Associate Radiation Safety Officer

AU Authorized User

AV Apparent Violation

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CY Calendar Year

HDR High Dose Rate Afterloader

HOCC The Hospital of Central Connecticut

ICR Institute on Conflict Resolution

IR Inspection Report

NMT Nuclear Medicine Technologist

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PEC Pre-Decisional Enforcement Conference

PET/CT Positron Emission Tomography / Computed Tomography

RSC Radiation Safety Committee

RSO Radiation Safety Officer

2