ML23159A108

PR-050 - 63FR39522 - Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors

ML23159A108
Person / Time
Issue date:	07/23/1998
From:	Callan L NRC/EDO
To:
References
PR-050, 63FR39522
Download: ML23159A108 (1)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:DOCUMENT DATE: TITLE: CASE

REFERENCE:

KEYWORD: ADAMS Template: SECY-067 07/23/1998 PR-050 - 63FR39522 - REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS PR-050 63FR39522 RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

DOCKET NO. PR-050 (63FR39522) In the Matter of REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 07/16/98 FEDERAL REGISTER PUBLICATION OF ADVANCE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING 08/21/98 08/11/98 COMMENT OF THE OHIO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (JAMES R. WILLIAMS) (

1) 08/31/98 08/27/98 COMMENT OF UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (DAVID A. LOCHBAUM) (

2) 09/18/98 09/18/98 COMMENT OF FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT (JOHN GIANFRANCESCO) (

3) 09/21/98 09/18/98 COMMENT OF TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (MARK J. BURZYNSKI) (

4) 09/21/98 COMMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (JAMES W. DAVIS, DIR., OPS. DEPT.) (

5) 09/17/98 COMMENT OF FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION (ROBERT E. GRAZIO) (

6) 09/23/98 09/21/98 COMMENT OF COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (R. M. KRICH, VICE PRES., REG. SVCS.) (

7) 09/23/98 09/18/98 COMMENT OF NORTH ATLANTIC ENERGY SERVICE CORPORATION (TED C. FEIGENBAUM, EXEC. VP l CNO) (

8) 09/23/98 09/21/98 COMMENT OF NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT (BRADFORD L. HOUSTON) (

9) 09/23/98 09/21/98 COMMENT OF CAROLINA POWER l LIGHT COMPANY (DONNA 8. ALEXANDER) (

10) 09/23/98 09/21/98 COMMENT OF ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

(STEPHEN J. BETHAY, ACTING VP) (

11) 09/23/98 09/18/98 COMMENT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON (A. EDWARD SCHERER) (

12)

DOCKET NO. PR-050 (63FR39522) DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 09/24/98 09/18/98 COMMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY (DAVID A. LAVIGNE) (

13) 09/24/98 09/21/98 COMMENT OF SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

(H. L. SUMNER, VICE PRESIDENT) (

14) 09/24/98 09/21/98 COMMENT OF BOILING WATER REACTOR OWNERS 1 GROUP (BWROG)

(THOMAS J. RAUSCH, CHAIRMAN) (

15) 09/25/98 09/18/98 COMMENT OF PECO ENERGY COMPANY (GARRETT D. EDWARDS, DIRECTOR LIC.) (

16) 9/30/98 09/22/98 COMMENT OF VIRGINIA POWER (JAMES H. MCCARTHY, MGR., NUC. LIC.) (

17) 09/30/98 09/29/98 COMMENT OF NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY (MARTIN L. BOWLING, JR.) (

18) 10/05/98 09/30/98 COMMENT OF TU ELECTRIC (C. LANCE TERRY, SR. VP AND PNO) (

19) 10/15/98 09/21/98 COMMENT OF CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY (NATHAN L. HASKELL, DIRECTOR, LIC.) (

20) 10/26/98 10/19/98 COMMENT OF ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY (THOMAS W. ORTCIGER, DIRECTOR) (

21)

Jim Edgar Governor Secretary of the Commission October 19, 1998 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20055-0001 Attn: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff Thomas W. Ortciger Director f ~ -0 ~ ~~ N ~ lJl

SUBJECT:

Ti ~, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors FR July 23, 1998 (Vol. 63, Num. 141)

Dear Sir or Madam:

The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) provides the following comments on the subject advance notice on proposed rulemaking regarding licensee reporting requirements under 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. We understand and support the NRC 's intent to revise reporting requirements based on importance to risk. As a state agency responsible for independently assessing events at nuclear power plants, and making protective action recommendations for the public, we recognize the importance of timely event notifications. Our agency is also obligated to respond accurately to public inquiries about events surrounding nuclear power plant evolutions. Timely notification of those events allows us to respond appropriately. We agree that it is time these regulations were updated. However, the objective of reducing or extending the timing of reporting requirements should be subordinate to the licensee's responsibility to report important events in a timely manner. IDNS believes that three categories of events should be reported in a timely manner, so an appropriate public response can be made. These event categories are: a) events corresponding to emergency classifications under an approved emergency plan; b) unplanned radioactive releases beyond the site boundary regardless of source or quantity; and c) events that are likely to be of immediate interest to the public. In Section 50.72 of the advance notice of proposed rulemaking, seven non-emergency events listed as (f), are proposed to be reported in eight hours instead of @ recyclable Aeknowled ed

Secretary of the Commission Page 2 September 21, 1998 one hour. Of those seven events, six (specifically, (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), and (vii)) would probably be classified as emergency events under existing emergency plans at an Illinois site (see attached table). This will cause reporting confusion during an event at a time when clarity is necessary. These six events should all be reported as emergency events, not non-emergency events. EAL thresholds in licensee emergency plans should be required to reflect them clearly. All of these events would affect the State of Illinois' response and our emergency plans. NRC must reconsider the categories of non-emergency events in the context of the current guidance to licensees for classifying EALs to ensure there is a clear distinction between emergency and non-emergency reportable events. NRC proposes reducing unplanned radioactive emission reporting from a four-to an eight-hour timeframe, regardless of the release rates. This is unacceptable. It is of paramount importance that those charged with regulating and monitoring the public impact of radiological releases are being kept informed of unplanned releases in a timely manner. Illinois law requires that we perform independent assessments, decide what actions may be necessary to protect the public, and assist in informing the public regarding any radiological risk. Should follow-up action to a release be necessary, then the less time that has elapsed, the better the state is able to respond in a timely and appropriate manner. We oppose any reduction in notification requirements for unplanned radiation releases from a site regardless of the source or quantity. Timeliness is also important for items of obvious public interest. News of seemingly small events spreads quickly, particularly in local communities around the power plants. Delayed reporting of such events means that we will be unprepared to respond to queries from local officials, or the media, with a resultant loss of public confidence. Therefore, we also oppose any reduction in notification requirements for newsworthy events. Based on the above, we do not believe that the following other non-emergency events currently reported in 4 hours that would be reported in 8 hours should be delayed any further: "(i) Airborne radioactive release that results in concentrations over 20 times allowable levels in an unrestricted area; (ii) Liquid effluent in excess of 20 times allowable concentrations released to an unrestricted area; (iii) Radioactively contaminated person transported to an offsite medical facility for treatment;

Secretary of the Commission Page 3 September 21, 1998 (iv) News release or other government agency notification related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment." We do not believe making a phone call to report important events constitutes a burden on licensees without a commensurate benefit. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this important document. If you have any questions or concerns regarding our comments, please do not hesitate to contact me. Director TWO:sld Attachment

COMP ARIS ONT ABLE The following emergency action level (EAL) information was extracted from the Braidwood and Clinton EAL guidance provided to their operators for comparison. Each would result in an unusual event (UE) emergency classification. 10 CFR 50.72 Utility Emergency Action Levels f) other non-emergency events (ii.) serious degradation of plant including its HU2 - Conditions indicate a potential degradation of the level of principal safety barriers. safety of the plant. MU7 - The threshold values selected indicate a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a precursor to more severe conditions. MUS - RCS leakage is a precursor to more severe conditions and therefore represents a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. (iii) plant in unanalyzed condition, significantly HU2 - Conditions indicate a potential degradation of the level of compromising plant safety. safety of the plant, and plant conditions require operation outside analyzed conditions. I: vi) external or internal condition or event HUI - covers security events. t poses an actual threat or significantly HU2 - an event on-site or near the site which requires the ampers site personnel... assistance of the local police or fire department, or additional assistance is required to ensure the protection of the health and safety of workers or the public. It also covers unusual aircraft activity over the site. Approaching any UE threshold value as an anticipatory judgment call. HU4 - natural or destructive phenomena inside the protected area. It covers earthquakes, tornadoes, vehicle collisions, and turbine blade failures. HU6 - covers toxic or flammable gas releases that can disrupt plant operations. i valid ECCS initiation signals... Although no EALs specifically address this situation, ECCS initiation signals are typically set outside the range of values that would have caused the reactor protection system to initiate a reactor scram to shut a reactor down. They should be reported immediately if the ECCS setpoints are reached and the reactor protection system failed to scram the reactor when it should have. Equipment failures or operator mistakes during surveillance testing may be excluded if reported elsewhere. (vii) major loss of capability for emergency MU9 - The threshold values recognize a loss of communications assessment, off-site response or communication. capability that either inhibits the ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant operations or the ability to communicate problems to off-site authorities. Other non-emergency events that are currently RU2 - covers an unplanned release of> 2 times the Off-Site reported in 4 hours would be reported in 8 Dose Calculation Manual limits for> 60 minutes. hours: (i) Airborne radioactive releases that result in concentrations over 20 times allowable levels in an unrestricted area. (ii) Liquid effluent in excess of 20 times allowable concentrations released to an unrestricted area.

Consumers Energy> A CMS Energy Company September 21, 1998 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20055-0001 Palisades Nuclear Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert. Ml 49043 Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff DOCKETED USNRC "98 OCT 15 P2 :56 Tel: 616 764 2276 Fax: 616 764 2490 r-Nathan L. HWe 1 *. ~- Director, LicensingnLJl_t.t ADJ ' 1...J l, COMMENTS ON ADVANCE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING REGARDING REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS Consumers Energy Company is pleased to submit the attached comments on the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) regarding reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors. The NRC staff is to be commended for its attempt to make reporting requirements less burdensome and more focused on specific agency needs. Most of the changes listed in the ANPR would represent real improvements for licensees. In some cases these improvements would result in real savings in time and resources now expended on NRC reporting. In other cases the proposed changes would reduce the complexity of the rule, thereby making compliance decisions less ambiguous and more consistent. Wr-JiloJJt athan L. Haskell irector, Licensing oc 2 1998

UCLEAR REGULATORY CO I 10 n1JLC1Y1~.ruNGS ADJUDICATIONS STAFF FFICE OF THE SECRETi :i OF THE COMMISSION Postmark Date - ,;.+..;;..-=+~ Copies AecGlved _ ,/ Ad ~ Cop Rep uced 7" ',~J~ D~~~uti:.l~.A~ ~-,-- I ~~;f([/).S

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE FOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS NUCLEAR FOR POWER REACTORS, 63FR39522

GENERAL COMMENT

S

1. During the public meeting on August 21, 1998, the Nuclear Energy Institute provided comments on the ANPR, and made a number of suggestions for additional improvements to 10CFR50.72 and 50.73. As a member of the Nuclear Energy Institute Task Force on event reporting, Consumers Energy endorses those verbal comments, as well as others provided by NEI in correspondence dated September 21, 1998.

2. The overall time line for issuance of the revised rule could be accelerated. The early portion of the schedule during which the revised rule language is drafted is, admittedly, ambitious in that a great deal of industry and staff interaction is needed in a short time.

However, taking a year to move the new rule language through the administrative approval process after the language is developed appears excessive. 10CFR50.72 LANGUAGE

3. Item (b)(1)(v) Add the word "offsite" before communications capability to make it clear it applies to communications with outside agencies and not internal plant communications systems.

4. Item (b)(2)(iii) The word "alone" should be removed from the existing rule language.

NRC was concerned that "alone" added ambiguity, so proposed to add more words of clarification. The easiest way to remove the ambiguity is to remove the offending word.

5. Item (b)(2)(vii) The paragraph discussing the follow up written report should be moved to 10CFR50.73. It does not fit in the section for immediate notification requirements.

7. Item (c) Subpart (2) is vague and open ended. The current language can be construed to require that a follow up telephone notification to provide evaluation results would be required after every 50.72 notification, whether or not the accuracy of the initial report is affected. Subpart (2)(iii) should be moved to subpart (1) above, and the balance of (2) should be deleted from the rule. Subpart (1 ), then, would be worded "Immediately report (i) any further degradation in the level of safety of the plant or other worsening plant conditions, including those that require the declaration of any of the Emergency Classes, if such a declaration has not been previously made, or (ii) any change from one Emergency Class to another, (iii) a termination of the emergency Class, or (iv) information related to plant behavior that is not understood.

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE FOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS NUCLEAR FOR POWER REACTORS, 63FR39522 50.73 LANGUAGE

8. (a)(2)(v) Delete "alone" from this requirement and reword the balance as proposed in the NEI comment letter.

9. Add new (a)(2)(xi) that picks up the current 50.72 language for a follow up report under 10CFR72.216(b) concerning repairs to a defective spent fuel storage cask.

1UELECTR/C Log # TXX-98214 File# 10010 883 DOCKETED USNRC °98 OCT -5 P 2 : 1 9 C. Lance Torry Senior Vice President OFr= (.,,

Ji.: SE 1 September 30. ]ft., u~o,[:~I,~-J

& Principal Nuclear Officer Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington. DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

REF: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES) ENDORSEMENT OF NEI COMMENT LETTER ON "PROPOSED RULE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS"

1) 63 Federal Register 39522. dated July 23. 1998

2)

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) letter. addressed To Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. dated September 21. 1998. In response to the Federal Register Notice of July 23. 1998 (Reference 1) TU Electric has reviewed and endorses the NEI comment letter (Reference 2). TU Electric agrees with the NEI discussed issues. recommendations and rationale. If there are any questions. please contact Obaid Bhatty at (254) 897-5839 to coordinate this effort. This communication contains no new licensing basis commitments regarding CPSES Units 1 and 2. Sincerely, e.~.~ C. L. Terry By£~~-%'~ Roge~Walker Regulatory Affairs Manager OB/ob So c - NEI OCT - 7 1998 Acknowledged by card.. -...... ***-**,---- COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC ST A TION P.O. Box 1002 Glen Rose, Texas 76043-1002

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATO Y OMMI 10 RULEMAKINGS & ADJUDICATIONS STAFF OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSIO Docurnerit S1a. q/4afig I

Northeast Nuclear Energy "98 SEP 30 P 2 :SO DOCKET BER 0 RoPOSEo RU e 5o Rope Ferry Rd. (Route 156), Waterford, CT 06385 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385-0128 (860) 447-1791 Fax(860)444-4277 The Northeast Utilities System B17475 [VJSfR. 3'15:1:2) Re: 10CFR50.72 10CFR50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff Washington, DC 20555-0001 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Comments on the Proposed Rule for Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors These comments are submitted on behalf of Northeast Nuclear Energy Company's Millstone Station in response to the Federal Register notice concerning proposed rulemaking on Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors (63 Federal Register 39522 of July 23, 1998). Northeast Nuclear Energy Company endorses the comments provided by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) on behalf of the nuclear industry. Northeast Nuclear Energy Company also supports the efforts made by the NRC Staff with this proposed rulemaking in reducing the reporting burden on licensees and the NRC with regard to reports that have little or no safety significance. Northeast Nuclear Energy Company is in a unique position to provide comments on the proposed rulemaking in that almost 200 Licensee Event Reports (LER's) and over 36 supplemental LER's were issued since January 1997 to date. This volume of reporting activity afforded the station many opportunities to encounter some of the challenges of reporting and LER preparation particularly with respect to those events or conditions in the area of "outside the design basis". Many reports that had little or no safety significance were made in literal compliance with the current rule. The preparation of the non-safety significant LER's involved significant expenditure of resources both at Northeast Nuclear Energy Company and at the NRC. Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, therefore, heartily agrees that this and other aspects of the rule need to be changed. QC - S 1998 Acknowledged by card,. ____ _

LJ.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS/0 RULEMAKINGS & ADJUDICATIONS ST.AFF OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMtSSI Docllnent Statistics Postmark Date ----2/,?c; /4 ~ Copies ReoaN8d ~ Add'I Copie., Reproduced _!f_ Sp9CIAI 'bution,--!::~~ ~~-~

. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 817475\Page 2 Additionally, the 30-day reporting requirement has and does continue to place a constraint with respect to the ability to coordinate comprehensive root cause evaluations and the corresponding corrective actions. Developing a complete and accurate LER is labor intensive and involves resources across several departments. Northeast Nuclear Energy Company recommends extending the reporting time for LER's to 60 days. This would allow for a more efficient use of resources and for a more complete and accurate LER without necessitating the submittal of a supplemental LER. Northeast Nuclear Energy Company agrees with extending the non-emergency prompt notifications to eight hours. This would help to eliminate unnecessary reports and retractions. However, it is necessary to have the individual states closely involved with the rule change since they may have requirements that are more restrictive or conflict with the proposed rulemaking. For example, in Connecticut all 10CFR50.72 reports require notification of the state within one hour. Finally, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company agrees with eliminating reports of historical issues, i.e., those events or conditions which occurred in the past and have since been corrected. For example, in the past month two such issues have been discovered at Millstone for which LER's are being prepared. These issues have no current safety significance. If you have any questions regarding these comments, please contact Ms. Mari Jaworsky at (860) 447-1791, extension 5379. Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY Martin L ~n~~ Recovery Officer - Technical Services cc: H. J. Miller, Region I Administrator S. Dembek, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 1 D. G. McDonald, Jr., NRC Senior Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2 J. W. Andersen, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3 W. M. Dean, Director, Millstone Project Directorate D. P. Allison, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

OCT 01 '98 08:27 NUCLEAR OPS SUPPORT mn)*tm,fJtJ 'J'edmical G','t'llli!r 5000 Domit1iori Boulei,,at*d Glen Alie.rt, Virginia 2Jo60 September??., 1998 ooC\{ETEO The Secretary uf the Commission SEP I'.\ 0 1998 RULEMAKlNGS AND U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

-;\

ADJUD\cp; STAFF Washington, O.C. 20055-0001 '*'. \ ~ v

• Attn: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff IMGI.UI l'IIIMl!R To Whom It May Concern:

JOCKE 0 ROPOSED R 10 CFR PART 50i REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS. 63 FEDERAL REGISTER. N0.141, JULY 23, 1998 Virginia Power has reviewed the subJect entry in the Federal Register and is pleased have the opportunity to offer the followinQ comments:

1. We enders~ lite features of the proposed rulo that extend reporting time.s based on the need for timely NRC action that is consistent with safety significance. Changing one-hour reports to eight-hour reports for non-emergency events where there iA no complete or partial loss of capability to perform safety function allows Operations personnel to focus on safe plant operation.

2. We endorse the proposed ~check-the-box" format to streamline the LER submission process and make electronic repnrting viable. Electronic reporting will reduce the time and cost associated with reporting.

3. We are concerned about the interpretation of the wording under (1) "Required Initial Reporting Times", the paragraph after section (f) [page 39523, third column, first paragraph]. Thie paragraph implies that invalid ESF actuatio:ns will now require a 30-day LER. We are concerned that under the proposed rule, essentially any ESF actuation caused by human, e,quipment, or procedur;1I t1mor will have to be reported as an LER.

Thank you for your consideration of our comments. If you need further information about any of our comments on this issue please contact Gwen Newman at (804) 273-4255 or Gwen_Newman@VaNCPower.com. Very Truly Yours, Original signed by James H. McCarthy, Manager Nuclear Licensing & Operations Support Ackn wled 1998 by card...**.., *.,,..._ **-..... ~ .,Ao,...

U.S.N RULEMAKI 0 F

PECO NUCLEAR A Unit of PECO Energy Mr. John C. Hoyle Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff Washington, DC 20555-0001 DOCKETED USHRC '98 SEP 25 P 2 :Q6 OFFi _ RUL L. ADJU[,.( ;. \ Station Support Department PECO Energy Company 965 Chesterbrook Boulevard Wayne, PA 19087-5691 September 18, 1998 DOCKET NUMBER PROPOSED RULE 50 (IP1Fi<395;ii.)

Subject:

Comments Concerning Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 1 0CFR50, "Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors" (63FR39522, dated July 23, 1998)

Dear Mr. Hoyle:

This letter is being submitted in response to the NRC's request for comments concerning the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) 1 0CFR50, "Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors," which was published in the Federal Register (i.e., 63FR39522, dated July 23, 1998). The NRC is considering amending the event reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors to: 1) update the current rules, including reducing or eliminating the reporting burden associated with events of little or no safety significance; and 2) better align the rules with the NRC's current needs, including revising reporting requirements based on risk and extending the required reporting time consistent with the need for prompt NRC action. PECO Energy appreciates the opportunity to comment on this ANPR. We offer the following comments for consideration by the NRC. Comments In general, we believe that, in terms of regulatory burden reduction, the ANPR provides an improvement over the existing reporting requirements. Designing the Licensee Event Report (LER) form to employ a "check the box" approach is considered a good idea. This should help simplify reporting. Extending the reporting period from four (4) hours to eight (8) hours for some events should relieve some of the burden on the plant operating staff. This would be very helpful during instances when operations personnel must devote their undivided attention to a particular situation. A more controlled notification to the NRC would result. SEP 2 9 1998 Ackrlowledgeci by card.. -*************** *********NIN

lJ.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS RULEMAKINGS & ADJUDICATIONS STA F OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Doctlnent Statisf Poalnt8rk Da1e ~J_q_g__ - I

September 18, 1998 Page2 PECO Energy believes that there should be clear guidance with regard to Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) manual actuations. Specifically, guidance should exist for pre-planned RPS/ESF manual actuations for maintenance related activities. At our Peach Bottom facility, there is a practice to place a full scram signal in the RPS during certain pre-planned outage related activities. The Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) reporting requirement for manual initiation, imposed by NUREG-1022, Revision 1, has created an additional regulatory burden for the "exempted" systems currently listed in 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii) and 10CFR50.72(a)(2)(iv). Specifically, PECO Energy has written two (2) Licensee Event Reports (LERs) at our Limerick facility in 1998 for manual Reactor Enclosure HVAC isolation and related Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS} and Reactor Enclosure Recirculation System (RERS) initiation. Both events resulted from a conservative decision to manually control the Reactor and Control Enclosure HVAC systems in response to non-accident initiating procedures. The first incident was a manual action taken in response to delta-pressure swings from a passing storm front. Automatic isolation on delta-pressure is not an ESF. Therefore, if allowed to proceed automatically, this event would not have been reportable. The second incident was a manual isolation in response to an anticipated toxic gas alarm from an identified freon leak from a chiller. Freon creates a false toxic gas signal. With no intervention, a Main Control Room toxic gas isolation, and associated SGTS/RERS initiation, may have occurred automatically, but would not have been reportable since it was an invalid signal. The current guidance in NUREG-1022, Revision 1, allows no latitude when the ESF is from a manual action. Previous guidance considered the response to degrading plant parameters that are monitored to support ESF actuations. The current guidance leads licensees to report all manual actions, even if the action was in response to non-ESF monitored plant parameters, like the examples discussed above. Therefore, PECO Energy requests clarification with regard to this requirement, such that the only reportable manual actions are those taken to initiate an ESF in response to plant parameters monitored for automatic initiation of that ESF. With regard to the reporting requirements associated with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i}(b), it appears that if a surveillance requirement is late and its subsequent performance shows the testing was satisfactory, no reporting is required. PECO Energy supports this approach. However, we believe that additional clarification would be helpful concerning alternate methods for meeting surveillance requirements. There appears to be some ambiguity in the NUREG-1022, Revision 1. For example, the reporting requirements for Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) isolations indicate that RWCU isolations resulting from pre-planned activities (proceduralized} that will result in an isolation are not reportable. The NU REG guidance is not as clear on the reportability of other events.

September 18, 1998 Page3 In addition, PECO Energy endorses the Nuclear Energy lnstitute's (NEl's) position and comments with regard to the ANPR. Lastly, while the changes anticipated with regard to the ANPR are generally positive, we believe that the NRC should clearly define its needs relative to the information provided in LERs. Such needs should reflect the move toward a risk-informed environment, thereby eliminating many (if not most) LERs currently generated and allowing the NRC and industry resources to be better focused on safety significant issues. Information currently being provided by most LERs could be obtained via the revised plant assessment process now under development. If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us. Very truly yours, Director - Licensing

BWR OWNERS' GROUP Thomas J. Rausch, Chairman Tel: (630)663-3020 Fax: (630)663-7118 c/o Commonwealth Edison

• 4th Floor ETWIII
• 1400 Opus Place
• Downers Grove, IL 60515 DOCKET NUIHH Project No. 691 PAOPOSED RULE II.5 0 BWROG-98066 September 21, 1998 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC

( C:>3 f:R 3q5;;) Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff )> 0 E!:n=R cc ~, r-Or-c""; ')-- (.... ' /'J .,..... '""'T -.Jl ,.,n'*~n TJ ~ n, -u N ~ 7j ~ 0 0

Subject:

Proposed Rule for Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors, "63 Federal Register39522," July 23, 1998 The Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group (BWROG) appreciates the effort the NRC is putting forth to work with utilities on this issue. In general the new proposed rule is a vast improvement over the current regulation. There are some areas where further clarification of detail is needed to minimize future regulatory issues with interpretation differences in the future. We believe that every opportunity possible must be taken to reduce the regulatory burden as long as the safety and health of the public are not compromised. In light of this need, immediate relief for reporting "outside design basis" issues could be given via a Commission guidance document, such as an Administrative Letter or Information Letter, until the final rule is approved. The BWROG endorses the comments presented by NEI on this subject. Additionally, the BWROG Licensee Event Reporting (LER) Committee is closely working with the NEI Task Force on this subject. The BWROG LER Committee has reviewed the proposed changes to the rule and has found them to be much more useable and less burdensome than the previous rule. Comments concerning timing and concepts are pointed out first and followed up by our specific comments on individual sections. The first comment relates to the need for establishing time clocks which are clearly defined and not subject to varied interpretations. The principal concern is with starting the reportability clock. In the original NU REG - 1022, this matter was discussed to great lengths without adequate clarification. Secondly, we would recommend 60 days for the written follow-up report. This would allow the utilities Acknowledged by card SEP 2 9 1998 c::, cO <I) n ~ ~rri ..., ---i rri c::,

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS 1 RULEMAKINGS & ADJUDICATIONS STA OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Oocll1lent Statist~s C, /:;.,-at9.E I I

BWROG-98066 September 21, 1998 Page 2 to complete the majority of the root cause analysis before submitting a Licensee Event Report (LER) to the Commission. These proposed changes will not impact nuclear safety or the Commission's ability to respond to the plant in a timely manner. These timing changes would greatly reduce the need for follow-up LERs and therefore reduce the burden on both the Commission and the utilities. The BWROG believes that the NRC should focus on safety function instead of systems, structures or components. This would make it easy for the different types and vintages of plants to interpret the rules consistently. The BWROG is in favor of revising the Rule and associated guidance documents concurrently. This will allow for setting clearer expectations and needs at one time. Additionally, there are times when the proposed changes contain detail not needed to support reportability questions. Specifically referring to other rules, such as, 10CFR50.59, 10CFR50.71(e) or Appendix B to 10CFR50 can be misleading or confusing as to what point the NRC is trying to make. Finally, we would like to point out some specific comments on the individual sections of the proposed changes to the rule.

1. The proposed change to the Loss of Safety Function section should be clarified as suggested by the NEI comment letter.

2. Under the proposed changes to the RPS/ESF Actuation section there is a loss of clarity. The BWROG proposes that only valid, either manual or automatic, actuations should be reported under this section. A valid manual actuation should be defined as one performed manually in anticipation of a valid automatic actuation. This section should also only require reporting of initiation of systems for which the utility takes credit in their individual licensing basis as an ESF/RPS system.

3. Under the discussion about the pressure relief panels there should be some clarification added to make it clear that all the systems providing the implied safety function are lost when the building is lost. Therefore, the reporting requirement would clearly be loss of safety function. In general, any example used for explanation of a criteria should cover all potential reportability issues even if not reportable to add as much clarity as possible.

4. The term "Risk Significant" is used as a means to better define what is important to the Commission in regards to systems being actuated. The

BWROG-98066 September 21, 1998 Page 3 problem with using this terminology is that the Commission has yet to approve or define what this term means. The specific examples given in the new proposed rule include systems that are not taken credit for in the accident analysis for some plants, i.e., Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System. Again, trying to describe all systems is confusing and cumbersome. It would be more effective to describe safety function and require reporting all systems described in the individual licensing basis.

5. Tying enforcement to reporting criteria is not recommended. Enforcement actions should be based on the circumstances and event scenarios instead of the reporting criteria utilized.

6. The concept of "Checking The Box" in principle sounds appealing but will reduce flexibility and could lead to regimentalizing root cause analysis processes.

7. The submittal of a written report, for an event or condition that doesn't warrant an initial phone communication, is not appropriate. These types of situations can be appropriately handled through the utilities corrective action programs and the staffs enforcement process.

Very truly yours, w?~,P I?--* --c--L: Thomas J Rausch, Chairman BWR Owners' Group e-mail: Thomas.J.Rausch@ucm.com cc: BWROG Licensee Event Reporting Committee BWROG Primary Representatives WG Warren, BWROG Vice Chairman LF Daughtery, Entergy DB Townsend, GE HT Tang, EPRI RC Evans, NEI

Lewis Sumner Vice President Hatch Project Support Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. 40 Inverness Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Tel 205.992.7279 Fax 205.992.0341 DOCKETED USHRC

• 9s SEP 24 P1 :02

~ September 21, 1998 OHJ AUL'_ I ADJUC,(_,, . I SOUTHERN << COMPANY Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 Mr. John C. Hoyle, Secretary 50-321 50-366 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D. C. 20555 50-424 50-425 Ene~gy to Serve Your World"' HL-5683 LCV-1251 50 Comments on NRC's Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, "Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors" (63 Federal Register 39522 dated July 23, 1998)

Dear Sir:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company (Southern Nuclear) has reviewed NRC's advanced notice of proposed rulemaking "Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors," published in the Federal Register on July 23, 1998. In accordance with request for comments, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (Southern Nuclear) is in total agreement with the NEI comments which are to be provided to the NRC. In addition, there are elements of the proposed rule that are contrary to the guidance in NUREG-1022, Revision 1. While rulemaking is in process, SNC requests that the NRC provide guidance to the application ofNUREG-1022, Revision 1 in regard to these elements of the proposed rule (i.e., outside design basis). Should you have any questions, please advise. HLS/JDB Respectfully submitted, ~~ H. L. Sumner F 2 9 1998 Acknowledged b card--,--~~

U.S REGULATORY R ~,...I.IU .... **,..fl:J.. s & ADJuo1 AT OFTHE ECR ECOMMISSI OoClln q ~,f q~ I ~ ~ 1 -PP~1 1 1?ID..S

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page Two cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company L. M. Stinson, General Manager - Plant Farley P. H. Wells, General Manager - Plant Hatch J. T. Gasser, General Manager-Vogtle Electric Generating Plant D. N. Morey, Vice President - Plant Farley J.B. Beasley, Vice President - Vogtle Electric Generating Plant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC J. I. Zimmerman, Licensing Project Manager - Farley L. N. Olshan, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch D. H. Jaffe, Licensing Project Manager - Vogtle U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector - Farley J. T Munday, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector - Vogtle HL-5683 LCV-1251

Lavigne anager Support Services South Carolina Electric & Gos Co Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station P. 0. Box 88 South Carolina 803.345.4344 803.345.5209 www.scana.com OOCK J:"TED USNPC '98 SEP 24 Al 1 :43 September 18, 1998 RC-98-0169 A SCANA COMPANY OFFlt RULc. ', ADJUDh-Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff

Dear Sir:

VIRGILC. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NO. 50/395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-1-2 PROPOSED RULE FOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS 63 FEDERAL REGISTER 39522 -- July 23, 1998 50 South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G) has reviewed the advanced notice of rulemaking as published in the July 23, 1998 Federal Register. The proposed improvements to current reporting requirements would have a significant and positive impact on the regulatory burden at the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station. By copy of this letter, our company requests that the NRC staff consider the specific recommendations provided by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) on behalf of the nuclear power industry. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule. Should there be any questions, please contact Ms. April Rice, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience, at (803) 345-4232. Very truly yours, of!:i/{6-cJM/DAUdr c: ATS (PR 980004) File (811.02) DMS (RC-98-0169) 1998 NUCLEAR EXCELLENCE -- A SUMMER TRADITION!

LI.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO RULEMAKINGS & ADJUDICATI AFF OFFICE OF THE SEC ETA Y OF THE COMMISSIO Document StA *

• Postmark Date Copies R8CCllV~

d'I ,e /'f<ID.s

DOCKET A. Edward Scherer Manager of Nuclear Regulatory Affairs An l:DISOS /STE/iS.*\ T/0:\'.*\L '" Com pan\' PROPOSED RULE 60 (p3F~315~J.j )> 0 ~ ::D77 ~ c :-!: c ~r* Or1 i-* c:, September 18, 1998 V') c:O n, U)C"') "'O z :::,;: N

0 rr, The Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20055-0001

*)

' '"'7 vJ C"') --1 r'1 --0 w . \ Ll J>-

771, co Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff 77

Subject:

Gentlemen: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking - Changes to 10 CFR Part 50. 72, "Immediate Notification Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors," and 10 CFR Part 50.73, "Licensee Event Reporting System" (63 FR 39522, dated July 23, 1998) In the subject Federal Register Notice, the NRC solicited comments on proposed rulemaking regarding changes to reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors. This letter provides Southern California Edison's (SCE) comments on the subject Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) (enclosed). In general, SCE supports the proposed changes which will, as stated in the ANPR, reduce or eliminate the reporting burden associated with events of little or no safety significance. SCE also believes the NRC should fully apply the ANPR burden reduction goal to short term NRC notifications - phone reports should be required only when activation of the NRC emergency response organization is actually required. Finally, SCE's enclosed comments supplement and support the comments submitted by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). As discussed in the enclosure to this letter and in the comments submitted by NEI, SCE believes the NRC should conduct "tabletop exercises" to test key portions of the proposed rule and reporting guidance early in the rule development process. These exercises should include both industry and regional staff and should compare previously reported or evaluated events with the proposed rule to test for clarity and consistency of the revision. To further improve clarity and consistency, SCE believes the NRC should revise NUREG-1022, Rev. 1 concurrent with revisions to the reporting regulations. If you have any questions, please contact myself or Mr. Clay E. Williams at (949) 368-6707.

Enclosure:

As Stated cc: D. P. Allison, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data P. 0. Box 128 0 San Clemente, CA 92674-0 128 949-368-7501 SEP 2 5 1998 Acknowledged by card......................... 111..,.. Fax 949-368-7575

-AR REGULATORY COMMISSION AULE:MAKINGS & ADJUDICATI NS STAFF OFFICEOFTHES RETA Y OF THE COMMISSIO Docurn nt Statls

• Po l 9-8' Co Ad s

- i "E_D~ 'RI Ds

Enclosure:

Comments on Proposed Changes to Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors As detailed below, this enclosure provides Southern California Edison's specific comments on the NRC's advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) for Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors. SCE's Overall Perspective: SCE believes the NRC's reporting regulations should focus on two basic issues: (1) the NRC needs to be immediately informed of events for which the NRC will need to take immediate action to protect the public health and safety, and (2) issues of less significance that still warrant NRC attention. Reporting only issues and events which meet these two overarching themes will prevent the NRC and the utility from being distracted with reports for events which have little or no safety significance. SCE also considers that (1) redundant reporting requirements should be eliminated, (2) NRC reporting requirements should be unambiguous, and (3) the NRC guidance document (i.e., NUREG-1022) should be developed concurrently with the reporting regulations. The following comments have been numbered and formatted to match the outline provided in the ANPR: SCE Comment 1: (1) Required initial reporting times. In the proposed amendments, the required initial reporting times would be modified to extend some reports to 8 hours. SCE agrees with extending the reporting times, which are consistent with the NRC's need for information and/or prompt NRC action. It is also consistent with the NRC's desire for more risk-informed regulation. SCE also recommends the time allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to prepare and submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) be extended from 30 days to 60 days. SCE routinely prepares comprehensive root cause evaluations as part of our corrective action. Developing an LER, including data collection, evaluation and ensuring the LER complies with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(b), has become labor intensive for all plant departments involved. The increased time period will allow for completion of required engineering evaluations after event discovery, provide for more complete and detailed LERs, and result in fewer LER revisions and supplemental reports. Considering the NRC utilization of this information, this extension should not have an adverse impact on safety. SCE Comment 2: ( 1 )(f) Other non-emergency events. In the proposed amendments, unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS), would be reported within 8 hours when the reactor is critical. Otherwise, it would be reported in writing in an LER. Unplanned actuation of an engineered safety feature (ESF) other than the RPS, would be reported within 8 hours if it resulted from (a) intentional manual actuation or (b) a valid signal (i.e., a signal in response to actual plant conditions that warrant ESF actuation). Otherwise, it would be reported in writing in the LER. SCE recommends changing 1 O CFR 50. 72 to read: (b)(2)(ii) Any event or condition that results in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) from a critical condition, in response to actual plant conditions that warrant ESFIRPS actuation, except when: SCE recommends changing the corresponding section in 10 CFR 50.73 to read: (a)(2)(iv) Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS), in response to actual plant conditions that warrant ESFIRPS actuation except when: Basis: This would provide consistent wording between 10 CFR 50. 72 and 10 CFR 50. 73 and accomplish the intended change as proposed in the ANPR. SCE Comment 3: (1)(f) Failure of independent components due to a common cause. In the proposed amendments, failure of independent components due to a common cause would continue to be reportable in an LER. NU REG 1022, Rev. 1, contains discussions of common cause failures in several sections of the document. SCE recommend that this discussion be consolidated in section 3.3.4, of NUREG 1022. SCE Comment 4: (2) Clarification of requirement for reporting an event or condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a structure or system. In the proposed amendments, the wording would be revised to require reporting any event or condition that "alone or in combination with other existing condition(s) could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to... " SCE is concerned that this wording change will not clarify the requirement, but could add confusion to the rule and is counterproductive. The existing criterion is reasonable as presently written and this change should be eliminated. SCE Comment 5: (2) Clarification of requirement for reporting an event or condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a structure or system. As currently written, 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii) applies equally to current conditions or recently discovered historical events. (Historical events are newly discovered events that could have been safety significant at one time, but have since been resolved). Because historical events would not require the NRC to take immediate action to protect the public health and safety, Licensees should not be required to promptly report any historical events. 10 CFR 50. 72 should be revised to clearly indicate that it is intended for current conditions only. SCE recommend changing 1 0 CFR 50. 72 to read: (b )(2)(iii) Any current event or presently existing condition that alone could have prevented prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) Remove residual heat, (C) Control the release of radioactive material, or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. SCE Comment 6: (2) Clarification of requirement for reporting an event or condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a structure or system. As currently written, 1 0CFR50. 73(a)(2)(v) requires an LER for historical events satisfying this criterion, regardless of how long ago the event occurred. Two years encompasses at least one cycle of plant operation. Significant effort can be expended searching plant records for historical events. Reporting historical events more than two years old provides a low safety benefit and unnecessarily increases the reporting burden. 10 CFR 50.73 should be revised to clearly indicate that reporting is not required for events that are greater than two years old. SCE recommends changing 10 CFR 50.73 to read: (a)(2)(v) Any event or condition which existed during the previous two years that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition: (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. SCE Comment 7: (3) Reporting of design issues. The ANPR indicates the NRC plans to remove subparagraphs B & C of §50.72(b)(1)(ii) and §50.73(a)(2)(ii). SCE believes subparagraph A is redundant to other reporting criteria. 1 0 CFR 50. 72(b)(1 )(ii) and 1 0CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) are concerned with plant safety being jeopardized due to inoperable safety related equipment. However, the plant Technical Specifications (TS) already require a plant shutdown if certain systems are inoperable longer than allowed, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) requires Licensees to report the initiation of any TS required shutdown within one hour. Consequently, SCE recommends the NRC delete all of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii) and 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) entirely. SCE Comment 8: (4) Reporting of errors in and corrections to ECCS analyses. As noted in the ANPR, reporting of errors in and corrections to ECCS analyses would continue to be governed by 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii). As required by that section, failure to meet the ECCS acceptance criteria (i.e., peak clad temperature [PCT] greater than 2200°F, excessive cladding oxidation, etc.) would be reported pursuant to §50.72 (e.g., within 8 hours) and §50.73. Errors where PCT increases by more than 50°F but remains below 2200°F would be reported in writing in an LER. SCE believes there is no safety significance in reporting decreases in PCT and recommend deleting this requirement as well as the requirement to report lesser errors annually. SCE recommends changing 1 0 CFR 50.46 to read: (a)(3)(i) Each applicant for or holder of an operating license or construction permit shall estimate the effect of any change to or error in an acceptable evaluation model or in the application of such a model to determine if the change or error is significant. For this purpose, a significant change or error is one which results in a calculated peak fuel cladding temperature different by mere greater than 50° F above from the temperature calculated for the limiting transient using the last acceptable model, or is a cumulation of changes and errors such that the total resulting St:11'ltttf the absolute magnitudes of the respective temperature changes is greater than 50° F above the temperature calculated for the limiting transient using the last acceptable model. (a)( 3)(ii) For each significant change to or error discovered in an acceptable evaluation model or in the application of such a model that affects the temperature calculation, the applicant or licensee shall report the nature of the change or error and its estimated effect on the limiting ECCS analysis to the Commission at-+east annually as specified in § 50.4. If the change or error is significant, the applicant or licensee shall provide this report within 30 60 days and include with the report a proposed schedule for providing a reanalysis or taking other action as may be needed to show compliance with §50.46 requirements. Basis: This is consistent with the NRC's proposed policy of eliminating the reporting burden associated with events of little or no safety significance by reporting only errors which are "significant" and in the non-conservative direction. In addition, the time requirement for reporting "significant" errors is aligned with the proposed 60 day requirement for LERs. SCE Comment 9: (6) Reporting of missed or late equipment surveillance tests. In the contemplated amendments, the reporting requirement would be eliminated for events that consist of late TS required surveillance tests where there is no systematic breakdown of compliance with the TS, the oversight is corrected, the testing is performed, and the equipment is still functional or, alternately, the requirements of the TS are implemented. SCE is strongly supports this proposed change which will significantly reduce our reporting burden. SCE Comment 10: (7) Reporting of events that result in actuation of an ESF. SCE does not support the proposed amendments which specify the systems for which reporting is required, instead of using the term ESF. SCE recommends maintaining the current wording of the rule. The UFSAR for each plant already specifies equipment which is designated as ESF equipment. Plant specific differences exist in the safety related status of their systems. Additionally, the risk-significance of a particular system can vary greatly between plants due to a wide variety of design differences. It should also be noted that a valid A TWS actuation would occur only if valid RPS/ESF failures have occurred first, which would be reported under other criteria. SCE Comment 11: (10) Human performance. The ANPR proposes to modify human performance reporting requirements using a "check the box" approach added to the LER form. Human performance is often critical to understanding an event and cannot be easily deleted from the narrative or broken into "check the box" type categories. Due to differences between reporting personnel and individual Licensees, a "check the box" approach would permits unintended variation in human performance evaluation. Consequently, SCE recommends maintaining the current requirement to include human performance information in the LER narrative description. SCE Comment 12: (10) Codifying NUREG 1022. The ANPR states that "the amended rule would explicitly recognize the information discussed in NUREG 1022, Revision 1, "Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and

50. 73," January 1998." SCE considers that the reporting regulations should not reference NUREG-1022, Rev. 1. Instead, the NRC should prepare and publish a revision to NUREG-1022, Rev. 1, concurrent with revision the reporting regulations.

SCE Comment 13: (6) Enforcement. The NRC's enforcement policy should be modified at the same time that the rule is being developed. This will ensure consistent application of the requirements relating to enforcement. SCE Comment 14: 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(2)(i) The amended rule does not explicitly reference 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), but implies that it would not be included in the proposed rule since it is not mentioned in the categories which would be reportable within 8 hours. SCE recommends deleting 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) from the proposed rule: (b)(2)(i) Any event, found while the reactor is shut down, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded or being in an--ttnanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety. Basis: Given that the plant is already shut down, there is no immediate risk to the plant or the public health and safety. Consequently, because the intent of immediate reporting is to allow the Commission to take immediate action, this requirement is inconsistent with that stated NRC information need. SCE Comment 15: Proposed Schedule SCE believes this schedule can and should be accelerated. An aggressive schedule is warranted to expedite the staff's proposed changes which will improve the reporting process and allow the NRC and it's licensees to better focus on safety significant issues. SCE Comment 16: Tabletop Exercises To ensure the revised reporting regulations correctly implement the NRC's goal of reporting burden reduction, SCE proposes that the NRC conduct "tabletop exercises" to test key parts of the rule and guidance early in the development and review process. These exercises should include both industry and regional staff and should take place in a public meeting. It is proposed that both industry and regional staff provide scenarios of previously reported or evaluated events to test for clarity and consistency of the requirements. Feedback during these exercises will provide insights to the NRC staff during the rule review and revision process. These exercises could start as early as October 1998 and the results factored back into applicable regulatory guidance. Suggestions for possible areas to be included in the "tabletop" include: Loss/partial loss of function concept Significantly degraded conditions: Outside the design basis/Unanalyzed condition - 10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(ii) & associated part 50.73 section Conditions prohibited by Tech Specs - §50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) ESF/RPS actuations - §50.72 (b)(2)(ii) & associated §50.73 section Condition that alone could prevent fulfillment of a safety function - §50.72 (b)(2)(iii) & associated §50.73 section Common Cause - §50. 73(a)(2)(vii) Loss of single train systems Compliance with technical specification surveillance requirements SCE Comment 17: Workshops In addition to and after the "tabletop exercises," SCE proposes that the NRC conduct a two-day industry workshop early in public comment period. This workshop would promulgate the intent of the change and allow for a thorough implementation review. This workshop could include detailed discussions in breakout sessions and would allow any issues to be identified early in the review process. Other Reactor Reporting Requirements The ANPR also indicated that the NRC would also evaluate other reactor reporting rules (beyond 1 0 CFR 50. 72 and 50. 73) to identify areas where reporting requirements can be risk-informed and/or simplified. The ANPR requested comments to identify and propose changes to other reactor reporting requirements (beyond 10 CFR 50. 72 and 50. 73) that are potential candidates for modifying to a simplified, less burdensome, more risk-informed approach. This issue will be included in the agenda for the public meeting to discuss this ANPR, which is identified in the schedule provided above. SCE Comment A: 10CFR26.73, Fitness for Duty Reporting: This paragraph requires the licensee to notify the NRC within 24 hours of any FFD event involving a licensed operator or supervisor. The original LER rule, published on February 29, 1980, required immediate reporting to the NRC for 12 types of significant events where immediate Commission action to protect the public health and safety may be required or where the Commission needs accurate and timely information to respond to heightened public concern. FFD events do not fit this definition and do not warrant telephone notification. Inclusion in the existing required semiannual FFD report is sufficient for the NRC to meet its statutory commitments. SCE Comment B: 10CFR73.71, Reporting of Safeguard Events: 1 0CFR73. 71 references Appendix G for specific reporting criteria. Appendix G, Section (a) requires one hour reporting for: Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a credible threat to commit or cause: (1) A theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material; or (2) Significant physical damage to a power reactor or any facility possessing SSNM or its equipment or carrier equipment transporting nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel a facility or carrier possesses; or or (3) Interruption of normal operation of a licensed nuclear power reactor through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its machinery, components, or controls including the security system. Events in subparagraph (a) above warrant short term notification to the NRC because they may require Commission action to protect the public health and safety. The 1-hour requirement, however, should be extended based on the risk significance of the issue. Appendix G, Sections (b, c, and d) require one hour reporting for: (b) An actual entry of an unauthorized person into a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport. (c) Any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed. (d) The actual or attempted introduction of contraband into a protected area, material access area, vital area, or transport. Events in subparagraphs (b, c, and d) do not require immediate Commission action to protect the public health and safety and should be deleted. "b" applies to procedural errors which result in improperly badged personnel entering the PA. "c" typically applies to safeguards information that has been compromised or to security-related design basis type issues. While the CFR does not define contraband, typical definition include beer, controlled drugs, and cameras; clearly issues which do not warrant immediate NRC action. ~ Entergy DOCKET NtM3EA

• ~

PROPOSED R LE 5 0 (~3FR 3'f5;?:i) Entergy Operations, Inc. PO Box 3 1995 September 21, 1998 Mr. David L. Meyer Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch Office of Administration Mail Stop T-6 D59 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Subject Entergy Operations, Inc. Jackson. MS 39286 1995 Comments Regarding Proposed Rule for Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors, 63 Federal Register 39522, July 23, 1998 CN RO-98/00022

Dear Mr. Meyer:

In July 1998 the NRG published notice in the Federal Register declaring their intention to amend the reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors. The reasons given for revising the current rules were to reduce or eliminate the reporting burden associated with events of little or no safety significance and to better align the rules with the NRC's current needs. Entergy appreciates the effort the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is putting forth to work with the utilities to help both parties accomplish their appointed task of making electricity safely and cost effectively using nuclear energy. In order to do both, regulate and produce electricity, the two parties must work together in order to not stifle the industry. Every opportunity possible must be taken to further the reduction of burden on the regulated as along as safety and health of the public is not compromised. In light of this need immediate relief for reporting "outside design bases" issues could be given via a Commission guidance document, such as, a generic letter until the final rule is approved. In general the new proposed rule is a vast improvement over the current regulation. There are some areas where further clarification of detail is needed to minimize future regulatory issues with interpretation differences in the future. Entergy endorses the comments presented by NEI on this subject. Additionally the Entergy is supporting the BWR Owners Group Committee on Reportability which is closely working with the NEI Taskforce on this subject. Entergy has reviewed the proposed changes to the rule and has found them to be much more useable and less burdensome that the old rule. Entergy is in favor of revising the Rule and associated guidance documents concurrently. This will allow for setting clearer expectations and needs at one time.

U.S. UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RULEMAKINGS & ADJUDICATIONS STAFF OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION OocunentStatlsla, q ~3

Comments Regarding Proposed Rule for Reporting Requirements CNRO-98/00022 September 21, 1998 Page 2 of 4 A general comment on the proposal relates to the need for establishing time clocks which are clearly defined and not subject to varied interpretations. The principal concern is with starting the reportability clock. In the original NU REG 1022 a significant amount of space was taken up on discussion of this subject without really clarifying the matter adequately. Secondly, we believe that at least 60 days should be allowed for the written follow-up report. This would allow the utilities to complete the majority of the root cause analysis before submitting an Licensee Event Report (LER) to the Commission. These additional relaxation's would not impact nuclear safety or the Commissions ability to respond to the plant in a timely manner. These timing changes would greatly reduce the need for follow-up LER's and, therefore, reduce the burden on both the Commission and the utilities. Entergy believes that it would be clearer as to what the Commission wants reported if the discussion would center around safety function instead of around systems, structures or components. This would make it easy for the different types and vintages of plants to interpret the rules the same. In general the more detail (e.g., system list) provided the more confusing the issues become and the more likely it is that something won't be reported. Additionally the there are times when the proposed changes contains detail not need to support reportability questions. Specifically referring to other rule, such as, 1 0CFR50.59, 10CFR50.71(e) or Appendix B to 10CFR50 can be misleading or confusing as to what point the Commission is trying to make. Finally we would like to point out some specific comments on the individual sections of the proposed changes to the rule.

1. The proposed change to the Loss of Safety Function section adds confusion instead of clarity and should be revised. This section should be written along the lines suggested by the NEI comment letter.

2. Under the proposed changes to the RPS/ESF Actuation section there is a loss of clarity.

Entergy purposes that only valid, either manual or automatic, actuations should be reported under this section. A valid manual actuation is a manual actuation which was in anticipation of a valid automatic actuation. This section should also only require reporting of initiation of systems for which the utility takes credit for in their individual licensing basis as an ESF/RPS system.

3. In general any example used for explanation of a criteria should cover all potential reportability issues even if not reportable to add as much clarity as possible. For example, under the discussion about the pressure relief panels there should be some clarification added to make it clear that all the systems providing the implied safety function are lost when the building is lost. Therefore, the reporting requirement would clearly be loss of safety function.

4. The term "risk significant" is used as a means to try and better define what is important to the Commission in regards to systems being actuated. The largest problem with using this terminology is that the Commission has yet to approve or define what this term means. The

Comments Regarding Proposed Rule for Reporting Requirements CNRO-98/00022 September 21, 1998 Page 3 of 4 specific examples given in the new proposed rule includes systems that are not taken credit for in the accident analysis for some plants, i.e., Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System. Again trying to described all systems is confusing and cumbersome. It would be simpler to describe safety function and require reporting all systems described in the individual licensing basis.

5. Tying enforcement to reporting criteria will have a negative effect on the free flow of information between the staff and the licensees. Enforcement actions should be based on the circumstances and event scenarios instead of the reporting criteria utilized.

6. The concept of "Checking The Box" in principle sounds appealing but will reduce flexibility and could lead to regementalizing root cause analysis processes.

7. The submittal of a written report, for an event or condition that doesn't warrant an initial phone communication, doesn't seem to meet any safety needs of the staff. These types of situations are more appropriately handled through the utilities corrective action programs and the staff's enforcement process.

8. If NU REG 1022 is referred to in the rule, then industry comments and concerns with NU REG 1022 revision 1 need to be addressed and NU REG 1022 revision 2 should be developed and issued for comment along with the proposed rule. The are many instances in NUREG 1022 revision 1 where the NUREG is unclear, the NUREG needlessly expands the reporting requirements, industry comments were not addressed, or industry was not provided an opportunity to comment on the NUREG discussions. For example NUREG 1022 revision 1 attempts to expand the definition of "safety function" to include design criteria stated in the GDCs and functions of systems or programs "required by regulation".

Industry was not provided the opportunity to comment on this discussion when it was added in revision 1 and the expansion of this reporting criteria will result in reporting conditions that have no bearing on the ability to mitigate analyzed events. Please address any comments or questions regarding this matter to Bryan Ford at (601) 368-5792. Sincerely, ~ ~hen J. Bethay, Acting Vice President, Operations Support SJB/LAE/BSF/baa cc: (See Next Page)

Comments Regarding Proposed Rule for Reporting Requirements CNRO-98/00022 September 21, 1998 Page 4 of 4 cc: Mr. J. L. Blount Mr. L. J. Callan Mr. J. N. Donohew Mr. C. M. Dugger Mr. W. A. Eaton Mr. R. K. Edington Mr. R. J. Fretz Mr. C. R. Hutchinson Mr. J. R. McGaha Mr. C. P. Patel Mr. W. D. Reckley Mr. N. S. Reynolds Mr. L. J. Smith Mr. D. L. Wigginton

bee: Bill Abraham (GGNS) Lonnie Daughtery (GGNS) Early Ewing Kenneth Hughey (GGNS) Rick King (RBS) Tina Manzella (W3) Elizabeth Means (ANO) John Miller (ANO) Mary Beth Padgett (RBS) Jim Vandergrift (ANO) Central File (GGNS) Corporate File [ ] DCC (ANO) NOC (RBS) Records Center (W-3) CNRO-98/000?? Attachment Page 1 of8

CP&L Carolina Power & Light Company PO Box 1551 411 Fayetteville Street Mall Raleigh NC 27 602 SEP 211998 The Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20055-0001 Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff ~ SERIAL: PE&RAS-98-073

SUBJECT:

Proposed Rule for Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors, --63 Federal Register 39522 -- July 23, 1998

Dear Sir or Madam:

Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) submits the following comments for consideration by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as invited by an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. CP&L supports the objectives of the proposed rulemaking and the majority of the changes proposed by the NRC. CP&L participated in the NEI Task Force on the subject and concurs with the comments transmitted by NEI on behalf of the industry. In addition to the comments expected to be provided by NEI, CP&L submits the following:

1. CP&L supports elimination of reporting requirements that do not result in loss of safety function [Item 1.e of the ANPR]

2. CP&L supports deletion of reporting requirements for "outside design basis" conditions

[I tern 3 of the ANPR]

3. CP&L supports deletion of reporting requirements of late Tech Spec surveillance tests under specified conditions [Item 6 of the ANPR]

4. CP&L supports deletion of reporting requirements for conditions outside the coverage of procedures [Item 7 of the ANPR]

All of the above are consistent with the objectives of the proposed rulemaking and will reduce reporting burden without adverse impact on safety. ~ 2 199 cknowledged card----.....

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM! ~ RULEMAKI GS&ADJUDICATIONS STA OFRCE Of THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Documents 3/98' I 1 '?>1>£, '/7?/Ds

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 PE&RAS-98-073 September 21, 1998 CP&L appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the proposed rulemaking. If you have any questions concerning these comments, please contact John Caves at 919-546-4579. c: Donna B. Alexander, Manager Performance Evaluation and Regulatory Affairs Mr. J.B. Brady, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - SHNPP, Unit 1 USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - HBRSEP, Unit 2 Mr. S. C. Flanders, NRR Project Manager - SHNPP, Unit 1 Mr. C. A. Patterson, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - BSEP, Units 1 and 2 Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator - Region II Chair J. A. Sanford - North Carolina Utilities Commission Mr. R. Subbaratnam, NRR Project Manager - HBRSEP, Unit 2 Mr. D. C. Trimble, Jr., NRR Project Manager - BSEP, Units 1 and 2

DOCKETED US}.{RC N Nebraska Public Power District >$sf p ~3 12:aK '9B )lls1°)( p~ Nebraska's Energy Leader NLS980161 September 21, 1998 Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20055-0001 ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff Gentlemen:

Reference:

Comments on Proposed Rulemaking for 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, Reporting Requirements Cooper Nuclear Station, NRC Docket 50-298, DPR-46

1. 63 Federal Register 39522, dated July 23, 1998, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, "Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors" The Nebraska Public Power District (District) hereby submits comments on the proposed rulemaking in Reference 1 for NRC consideration in preparing the final rulemaking package.

The primary purpose of reporting under 10 CFR 50.72 is to provide the NRC prompt notification of significant events where immediate NRC action may be required to protect the health and So safety of the public or may need to respond to a heightened public concern. Reporting events under Section 50. 73 provides the NRC with information used to identify precursors or to identify and resolve threats to their primary purpose of protecting public health and safety. These types of reports may also be of generic interest to other licensees in preventing similar events at their stations. Current reporting requirements have resulted in may reports that are of minimal, if any, safety significance. The District believes that overall, the proposed rulemaking in Reference I will lessen the burden on licensee and staff resources by eliminating requirements to report events of little safety significance. As a result, resources will be appropriately focused on those events and occurrences which are safety significant. Aekno Cooper Nuclear Station P.O. Box 98 / Brownville, NE 68321-0098 Telephone: (402) 825-3811 / Fax: (402) 825-5211 http://www.nppd.com SEP 2 5 1998

u LEARR NGS OFFICE OF ~~g-_ j__i/;~f t - reu 1d v~ -~ ~ Ari *1 Cooies oc,,, 1 ~ C.,~ ~ ~ ; ?IDS

NLS980161 September 21, 1998 Page 2 of2 Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me. sg~/J~<L..- Bradfora L. Houston Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Safety /lrd Attachment

Attachment to NLS980161 Page 1 of 6 NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING 10 CFR 50. 72 AND 50. 73 Following are the District's specific comments on the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) for Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors.

1.

ANPR (1), Initial Reporting Requirements The District agrees with the change requiring initial reporting times for some reports to be extended to eight (8) hours based on the importance to risk. As such, the District recommends extending the required time to submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(l) from 30 to 60 days: "The holder of an operating license for a nuclear power plant (licensee) shall submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) for any event of the type described in this paragraph within 60 days after the discovery of the event. " This is due in large part to the comprehensive root cause evaluations which the District and many other utilities require to be performed in support of preparing LERs, as well as including probabilistic risk assessment (PSA) insights when appropriate. The District sees little benefit in submitting what in some cases is no more than a summary of the event and progress made on evaluating the root cause simply to meet the 30 day clock. This "incomplete" submittal is usually followed by a supplement containing the cause evaluation and corrective action approach in enough detail to meet the NRC's needs of identifying and resolving precursors. However, under the current regulation, the District makes every effort to complete the cause evaluation, prescribe corrective actions, and submit the LER within 30 days. Given the relaxation from 4 hour to 8 hour initial reporting as proposed in Reference 1, which applies more directly to issues of greater safety significance, granting an additional 30 days to complete LERs would relieve an existing, unnecessary burden with no compromise to the reporting of safety significant events. This is also consistent with the enforcement guidance in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 98-06, especially in terms of allowing licensees to perform thorough cause evaluations, comprehensively assess contributing factors, and develop effective corrective actions.

Attachment to NLS980161 Page 2 of 6

2.

ANPR (l)(f), Initial Reporting Times (Non-emergency Events), Unplanned Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation and Unplanned Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation other than RPS The District recommends that for the 8-hour reporting requirement, 50. 72(b )(2)(ii) be revised to the following: "Any event or condition that results in a manual or automatic action of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) from a critical condition, in response to actual plant conditions that warrant ESFIRPS actuation. except when... " The LER requirement, 50.73(a)(2)(iv), should be revised to the following: "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF) including the reactor protection system (RPS), in response to actual plant conditions that warrant ESFIRPS actuation. except when... " This language would clearly capture the intent of the ANPR and ensure that the 8-hour and LER requirements of 50. 72 and 50. 73, respectively, are consistent.

3.

ANPR (2), Clarification Of Requirement for Reporting an Event or Condition That Could Prevent Fulfillment of Safety Function a) The proposed language in both 50.27(b)(2)(iii) and 50.73(a)(2)(v), "or in combination with other existing condition(s)," does not further clarify the intent of the rule and could actually be more confusing, thus increasing the burden. The District contends that the existing language, "Licensees shall report any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function... " is sufficiently clear. As stated in NUREG I 022 Revision 1, the intent of the existing criteria is to capture those events where a reasonable expectation exists that there would have been a failure of the safety system to properly complete a safety function, regardless of when the failures were discovered or whether the system was actually called upon to perform its function at the time. In assessing whether the condition could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function, consideration is necessarily given to capture the synergistic effects of the event with existing conditions and determine the impact on the ability of the structure or system to perform its safety function. Thus the District believes it is unnecessary to include "or in combination with other existing condition(s)" in the rule language.

Attachment to NLS980161 Page 3 of 6 b) In 50.72(b)(2)(iii), reporting should be limited to those events which are contemporary. Reporting of historical events newly discovered that could have been safety significant at one time but have since been resolved provides a low safety benefit and unnecessarily increases the reporting burden. c) Reporting should also be limited to those cases where the loss of the safety function exceeded the time allowed in an associated Technical Specification (TS) action statement. NUREG 1022 states that the events preventing fulfillment of a safety function must be reported regardless of whether an alternate safety system could have been used to perform the safety function. However, if a system can be restored to operability (i.e., the ability to fulfill the safety function is restored) within the time allowed by TS, there is a minimal impact on public health and safety. This is true whether or not system is single train. Thus the question becomes, why are licensees expected to report conditions that are within their license? It seems inconsistent with a risk-informed approach to report temporary losses of a safety function, which are unavailable for less time than allowed by TS. For the reasons detailed above, the District recommends revising 50.72(b)(2)(iii) to the following language: "Any current event or presently existing condition that alone could. for a time period exceeding that allowed in the associated Technical Specification action statements. prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to... " d) Under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), a "statute oflimitations" should apply, in that it should in most cases be a written follow up to the prompt notification of 50.72(b)(2)(iii), rather than an independent reporting criteria. There is no benefit to safety in reporting those historical events which are newly discovered that could have been safety significant at one time but have since been resolved, which occurred more than two years ago. A significant burden exists in determining past operability and searching for historical events; searching back a time period encompassing one fuel cycle would be significant for serving the needs of the NRC and the intent of the reporting rules. The District recommends revising 50.73(a)(2)(v) to the following language: "Any event or condition which existed during the previous two years that alone could have.. for a time period exceeding that allowed in the associated Technical Specification action statements. prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to.... "

Attachment to NLS980161 Page 4 of 6

4.

ANPR (3), Design Issues and ANPR (7), Conditions Outside Coverage of Procedures It is proposed in the contemplated amendments that there will not be a specific criterion for reporting conditions outside the design basis of the plant, as the those design issues which would result in a loss or partial loss of the capability to perform the safety function would be reported under 50.72(b)(2)(iii) and 50.73(a)(2)(v), and conditions prohibited by TS under 50.73(a)(2)(I)(B). It is also proposed that the requirements to report conditions not covered by the plant's operating and emergency procedures would also be deleted, since other reporting criteria capture the events of safety significance that may fall in this category. In summary, the NRC intends to be removing the current subparagraphs (b) and© in 50.72(b)(l)(ii) and 50.73(a)(2)(ii). The remaining requirement would then be to report events or conditions that result ( or resulted in) the condition of the plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety. However, the requirements specified in 50.72(b)(l) when combined with Technical Specification requirements adequately covers events or conditions of this nature for reporting purposes. The existence of redundant reporting requirements will continue to add unnecessary burden on licensees and the NRC staff, therefore it is recommended that 50.72(b)(l)(ii) and 50.73(a)(2)(ii) be deleted.

5.

ANPR (6), Missed or Late Equipment Surveillance Tests The District agrees that the contemplated amendments which relax the requirements for reporting missed or late equipment surveillance tests are appropriate. However, this does not address 50. 73(a)(2)(i) which is particularly burdensome to licensees through its questionable interpretation on historical events. The District recommends that 50.73(a)(2)(i) be clarified to say: "The licensee shall report any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications occurring within the previous two years. " Although the District agrees that any violation of Technical Specifications is a serious matter warranting NRC notification, trying to assess past risk and past operability beyond one cycle of operation is not consistent with a risk informed approach, particularly in cases where the event has occurred and was previously corrected. For example, if a fire door is found blocked open without a fire watch and research indicates that it occurred from a discernible event seven (7) days ago, that would be reportable. However, to embark upon a research project to determine if the issue caused a hitherto unknown "past inoperability,"

Attachment to NLS980161 Page 5 of 6 when the current operability is unaffected, creates a massive drain on resources with little safety benefit. In assessing risk significance, the focus should not be on whether public health and safety was previously at increased risk as a result of a currently identified condition, especially if the outcome is known; i.e., no adverse effects resulted. Rather, the focus should be on how the risk to public health and safety would have been affected had this condition not been identified, how current operability is affected, and how future functionality would likely have been affected had corrective action not been initiated.

6.

ANPR (8), Events Resulting in Actuation ofESF The District has two recommendations with respect to the contemplated amendments to the reporting rules for events resulting in actuation ofESF: a) Specific listing of the systems which must be reported as an ESF system is inappropriate and should not be codified, since the design and licensing basis of each plant is unique and as such the there are variations of the risk significance of particular systems from plant to plant. Each facility's Updated Safety Analysis Report identifies the systems designated as ESF; for example, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) is not identified as an ESF system at Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS), however under the proposed rule language, CNS would be required to report an actuation of this system as though it were an ESF. Therefore, the language utilizing the term "ESF" should still remain as it is in the current regulation, 50. 72(b )(2)(ii). b) It appears that the criteria in determining the need for an LER in cases where unintentional manual ESF actuations and invalid automatic actuations could actually result in more LERs than is required under the current rule. The District recommends that ESF actuations caused from unintentional or manual initiation or invalid automatic actuations should be reportable only if they resulted in an operational transient. For example, an unplanned manual or invalid automatic isolation of Primary Containment during a refueling outage ( or such other time when Primary Containment is not required to be operable) would seem to be of little risk significance.

7.

ANPR (10), Human Performance The District is concerned with the interpretation issues that could arise from the proposed "check the box" type approach for human performance issues. It is unclear that this would reduce the reporting burden as the District would be compelled to continue explaining human performance issues in the narrative and thus the NRC Staff would still have to review the narrative to understand the context of the human performance evaluation and the critical role it often plays in events. Therefore, the District would recommend that the industry and the NRC agree upon a human performance evaluation methodology to ensure consistent

Attachment to NLS980161 Page 6 of 6 application of the "check the box" approach. Until such time that the NRC Staff and licensees agree on methodologies, it would be appropriate to continue the reporting of human performance in the narrative section.

8.

ANPR (11), LER Form and ANPR (12), Electronic Reporting The District agrees that the implementation of a new LER form and electronic reporting would be consistent with the proposed changes, however would recommend that the NRC consider any necessary training and guidance for licensees to utilize a new process.

9.

ANPR (13), Enforcement The enforcement policy and its application must be given parallel consideration with the contemplated amendments to reporting requirements such that there is consistency and also to solidify portions of the guidance in EGM 98-06 relevant to LERs.

10.

Other NUREG 1022, Revision 1, and its associated workshops, have provided very valuable to the District in applying the reporting rules. As such, it is essential that the guidance contained therein also be revised consistent with contemplated amendments. The District is in full support ofNRC Staff and licensee workshops to develop a finished guidance document that can continue to be used in implementing Sections 50.72 and 50.73.

North Atlantic DOCKETED US '.RC

• 9a SEP 23 P 1 :26 OFt--1:.

c*, RJU-*_* ADJUD1' -* United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff Washington, DC 20555-0001 Seabrook Station North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation P.O. Box 300 Seabrook, NH 03874 (603) 474-9521 The Northeast Utilities System September 18, 1998 Docket No. 50-443 NYN-98109 AR# 98014243 Comments on NRC Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR), Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors This letter provides North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation's (North Atlantic) comments in response to the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR), Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors, published in the Federal Register on July 23, 1998 (63 Federal Register 39522). North Atlantic appreciates the opportunity to provide comments. North Atlantic endorses the comments provided by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) on behalf of the nuclear industry and endorses the efforts made by the NRC Staff with this proposed rulemaking in reducing the reporting burden on licensees and the NRC with regard to reports that have little or no safety significance. North Atlantic endorses the NRC Staffs focus on the operability and functionality of equipment and concurs with NEI that reporting under 10CFR50.72 should be reserved for current conditions that have the potential to affect the ability of structures and systems to perform their safety function. In addition to the reporting rules addressed by NEI, in response to the ANPR request under the heading of Other Reactor Reporting Requirements, North Atiantic beiieves that the annuai or periodic reporting pursuant to 1 0CFR50.59(b )(2) should be eliminated. The creation of the periodic 50.59 reports requires the expenditure of significant licensee manpower to create a summary report that does not contribute to protecting the health and safety of the public. This report, by its specified requirements, is a summary report and to be useful requires the review of additional licensee documentation. A better utilization of licensee and NRC resources would be a review of selected 1 0CFR50.59 evaluations as part of the NRC inspection process, thereby ensuring a full review of the activity performed pursuant to I0CFR50.59. SEf> 2 5 1998 Acknowledged by card................. ----

lJ.S. NUCLEAR f1 R ILEMAKINGS OFFICE OFTHEC ~

=.~~l-C.~

~1-'1? LD..s

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NYN-98109/Page 2 If you have questions regarding our comments, please contact Mr. James M. Peschel, Regulatory Compliance Manager at (603) 773-7194. Very truly yours, NORTH ATLANTIC ENERGY SERVICE CORP. Te~ ~ Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer

Commo nwe alth Edison Compan y 1400 Opus Place Down e rs Grnve. IL 00515-57()} September 21, 1998 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 DOCKETED USNRC '98 SEP 23 A 9 :41 ComEd ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff

References:

Comments on Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, "Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors" (1) 63 Federal Register (FR) 39522, dated July 23,1998 (2) Letter from J. Davis Letter (NEI) to U.S. NRC, "NEI Comments on Proposed Rule for Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors," dated September 21, 1998 This letter provides the Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) Company comments on the subject Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposed rulemaking published in 63FR39522. We support the issuance of this proposed rulemaking. In Reference 2, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) transmitted the industry's comments. ComEd endorses these comments. ComEd encourages the NRC to issue the corresponding revision to NUREG 1022, Revision 1, "Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73," with the final rule. If this is not possible, the final rule should include statements that indicates that the NRC recognizes inconsistency between th~ finai rule and :NlTREG 1022, Revision 1. ComEd encourages the NRC to expedite the issuance of the revised rule. Many of the proposed changes address problems that have existed for years and will provide much needed relief in the event reporting arena. Issuance of the revision as soon as possible will be advantageous to the industry as well as the NRC. The use of tabletop exercises would be key to the expeditious approval of the final rule. Respectfully, R.M. Krich Vice President - Regulatory Services k:nla/allsta/reportreqmt/lic-98-145.doc A U nicPm Company SE.fl 2 S,998 Acknowledged by card----- (j)

Ll.S. UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RULEMAKINGS & ADJUDICATIONS STAFF OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Docllnent Statlslics PostrAark Date

) I 9 S' Co Rlilali~~oduc_ed ____

t _ __ _ s

.-J **** 7 Florida

• Ii*,. Power

\* CORPORATION '",I J c,,.,.,,;_ "";" Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 50 l'1'3F~ 3 9 5P:1) DOCKET D USN"C September 17, 1998 3F0998-16 The Secretary of the Commission Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

• gs SEP 22 P4 :58

Subject:

Comments on Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors, 63 Federal Register 39522, dated July 23, 1998

Dear Secretary:

This letter provides Florida Power Corporation's (FPC) comments on the above-referenced Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR). FPC commends the NRC's initiative to revise the current reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50. 72 and 10 CFR 50. 73. FPC also supports the NRC's effort to: reduce or eliminate the reporting burden associated with events of little or no safety significance; revise reporting requirements based on importance to risk; and, extend the required reporting times. As recognized by the NRC in this rulemaking, the current reporting requirements of 10 CFR

50. 72 and 10 CFR 50. 73 result in many reports with little or no safety significance. This causes a burden to both licensee and NRC staff resources to process and review such reports.

Reporting events with little or no safety significance is particularly distracting to Control Room Operators who must evaluate conditions and make the initial reports. The proposed rulemaking initiative offers an opportunity to eliminate excessive reports and shift focus to only those reports which impact safety. FPC recommends that the NRC clearly link "significant" to "loss of functionality," which will aide in establishing clarity. Confusion currently exists with the bounding definition of the word "significant." This word is used throughout the process of event reporting, and in some instances, "significant" has been interpreted as "any" deviation from a parameter. This rulemaking must clarify required reporting requirements and focus on safety. In light of this proposed revision to the reporting requirements, FPC requests that, while the rulemaking is in progress, the staff relax the interpretation of the "outside the design basis" reporting requirement. FPC believes existing regulations support reporting only design or analysis defects or deviations if they result in loss or partial loss of capability to perform a safety function, represent a condition not bounded by the safety analyses contained in the Final Safety Analysis Report, or impact the ability of a safety analysis to meet its acceptance criteria. This approach is consistent with the proposed revision to the reporting requirements. Acknowledged by cara __...l.. t.19 8 CRYSTAL RIVER ENERGY COMPLEX: 15760 W. Power Line Street

• Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708 * (352) 795-6486 A Florida Progress Company

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RULEMAKINGS & ADJUDICATIONS STAFF OFACE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Docunent Statistics q '" q 8'

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0998-16 Page 2 of 8 The time period allowed for licensee event report (LER) preparation should be increased from 30 to 60 days. Today's industry root cause evaluations are more comprehensive and are driven by corrective action programs. Developing an accurate LER has become labor intensive for all plant departments involved. This would allow for completion of required engineering evaluations after event discovery, provide for more complete and accurate LERs and will result in fewer LER revisions and supplemental reports. To remain consistent with the original intent of rule, implementation guidance provided by NUREG-1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73," Revision 1, needs to be revised and developed in parallel with the rule change. Revising the rule and guidance document should involve all interested parties including NRC headquarters, regions, licensees and other stakeholders. The rulemaking process should include a series of tabletop exercises and at least one workshop. This will improve the quality of the final product and speed the process of development. In developing the revised rule, it will be necessary to maintain an open dialog between all parties involved in the process. Specific comments on the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors (63 Federal Register 39522, dated July 23, 1998), are enclosed. FPC appreciates the opportunity to comment on this important NRC proposed rule. We would be happy to meet with you or your staff to discuss these comments further. Sincerely, ,o {~ / ~.Grazio Q Director Nuclear Regulatory Affairs REG/dwh Enclosure xc: NRC Document Control Desk

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0998-16 Page 3 of 8 ENCLOSURE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROPOSED CHANGES REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS These specific comments are made on the NRC's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) for Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors. Where possible, comments have been keyed to the relevant section of the text in the ANPR and are indicated by parentheses ( ). Issues and Contemplated Amendments:

1.

( 1) Required initial reporting times In the contemplated amendments, the required initial reporting times would be modified to extend some reports to 8 hours. FPC agrees with the revised reporting times based on importance to risk and extending the required reporting times consistent with the need for NRC action. Also, FPC recommends changing the time to submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) in 10 CFR 50. 73(a)( 1 l from 30 to 60 days. Rationale: Today's industry root cause evaluations are more comprehensive and are driven by corrective action programs. Developing an accurate LER has become labor intensive for all plant departments involved. This increased time period will allow for completion of required engineering evaluations after event discovery, provide for more complete and accurate LERs and result in fewer LER revisions and supplemental reports.

2.

(1 )(f) Other non-emergency events In the contemplated amendments, unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS), would be reported within 8 hours when the reactor is critical. Otherwise, it would be reported in writing in the LER. Unplanned actuation of an engineered safety feature (ESF), other than the RPS, would be reported within 8 hours if it resulted from (a) intentional manual actuation or (bl a valid signal (i.e., a signal in response to actual plant conditions that warrant ESF actuation). Otherwise, it would be reported in writing in the LER. FPC recommends changing 10 CFR 50. 72 to read: (b)(2)(ii) Any event or condition that results in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) from a critical condition, in response to actual plant conditions that warrant £SF/RPS actuation, except when:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0998-16 Page 4 of 8 FPC recommends changing 10 CFR 50. 73 to read: (a)(2)(iv) Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS), in response to actual plant conditions that warrant £SF/RPS actuation, except when: Rationale: This would provide consistent wording between 10 CFR 50. 72 and 10 CFR 50. 73 and accomplish the intended change as proposed in the ANPR. This would result in only reporting valid automatic and manual actuations.

3.

(1 )(f) Failure of independent components due to a common cause

4.

5.

In the contemplated amendments, failure of independent components due to a common cause would continue to be reportable in writing (LER). NUREG-1022, Revision 1, contains discussions of common cause failures in several sections of the document. FPC recommends that those discussions be consolidated in Section 3.3.4, of NUREG-1022. (2) Clarification of requirement for reporting an event or condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a structure or system In the contemplated amendments, the wording would be revised to require reporting any event or condition that "alone or in combination with other existing condition(s) could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to... " FPC is concerned that this wording change will not clarify the requirement, but could add confusion to the rule. The existing criterion is reasonable as presently written. (2) Clarification of requirement for reporting an event or condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a structure or system No safety significance exists for reporting historical events. (Historical events are newly discovered events that could have been safety significant at one time, but have since been resolved). Therefore, there is no need for prompt notification and 10 CFR 50. 72 should be revised to clearly indicate that reporting is for current conditions. FPC recommends changing 10 CFR 50. 72 to read: (b)(2)(iii) Any current event or presently existing condition that alone could ha¥o pro¥ontog prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (8) Remove residual heat, (C) Control the release of radioactive material, or

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0998-16 Page 5 of 8

6.

7.

8.

(D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. Rationale: Reporting historical events provides a low safety benefit and unnecessarily increases the reporting burden. (2) Clarification of requirement for reporting an event or condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a structure or system No safety significance exists for reporting historical events which occurred more than two years ago. 10 CFR 50. 73 should be revised to clearly indicate that reporting is not required for events that are greater than two years old. FPC recommends changing 10 CFR 50. 73 to read: (a)(2)(v) Any event or condition which existed during the previous two years that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition: (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. Rationale: Two years encompasses one refueling cycle of operation. Significant effort can be expended searching back in history for historical events. Reporting historical events more than two years old provides a low safety benefit and unnecessarily increases the reporting burden. (3) Reporting of design issues FPC believes 10 CFR 50. 72(b)( 1 )(ii) and 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) can be removed as redundant to the already existing reporting criteria. The NRC intends to remove subparagraphs B and C of these requirements. However, FPC's belief is that 10 CFR

50. 72(b)(1), when combined with Technical Specification requirements, adequately addresses the notification needs for events that would be reported under 10 CFR

50. 72(b)( 1 )(ii)(A) and conditions involving serious degradation or significantly compromising safety would result in reports under other criteria in 10 CFR 50. 73.

(4) Reporting of errors in and corrections to ECCS analyses Reporting of errors in and corrections to ECCS analyses would continue to be governed by 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii) when it applies, as is currently the case. As required by that section, failure to meet the ECCS acceptance criteria (i.e., peak clad temperature (PCT) greater than 2200°F, excessive cladding oxidation, etc.) would be reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 72 (i.e., within 8 hours) and 10 CFR 50. 73. Errors where PCT increases by more than 50°F but remains below 2200°F would be reported in writing in an LER. FPC believes that there is no safety significance in

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0998-16 Page 6 of 8

9.

reporting decreases in PCT and recommends deleting this requirement, as well as the requirement to report lesser errors, annually. FPC recommends changing 10 CFR 50.46 to read: (a)(3)(i) Each applicant for or holder of an operating license or construction permit shall estimate the effect of any change to or error in an acceptable evaluation model or in the application of such a model to determine if the change or error is significant. For this purpose, a significant change or error is one which results in a calculated peak fuel cladding temperature eiHoront ey ~ greater than 50° F above ~ the temperature calculated for the limiting transient using the last acceptable model, or is a cumulation of changes and errors such that the sum of the aesolwto magnitudes of the respective temperature changes is greater than 50° F above the temperature calculated for the limiting transient using the last acceptable model. (a)( 3)(ii) For each significant change to or error discovered in an acceptable evaluation model or in the application of such a model that affects the temperature calculation, the applicant or licensee shall report the nature of the change or error and its estimated effect on the limiting ECCS analysis to the Commission at loast annwally as sposifioe in § 50 £1 If tho shan90 or orror is si9nifisant, tho applisant or lisonsoo shall pro¥ieo this roport within.JO 60 days and include with the report a proposed schedule for providing a reanalysis or taking other action as may be needed to show compliance with 10 CFR 50.46 requirements. Rationale: This is consistent with the NRC's proposed policy of eliminating the reporting burden associated with events of little or no safety significance by reporting only errors which are "significant" and in the non-conservative direction. In addition, the time requirement for reporting "significant" errors is aligned with the proposed 60 day requirement. (8) Reporting of events that result in actuation of an ESF FPC does not support the contemplated amendments which specify the systems for which reporting is required, instead of using the term ESF. FPC recommends maintaining the current wording of the rule and believes that an all inclusive list of risk-significant systems in regulation is inappropriate. Each facility's FSAR specifies equipment which is designated as ESF equipment. Plant specific differences exist in the safety-related status of their systems. Additionally, the risk-significance of a particular system can vary greatly between plants due to a wide variety of design differences. An all inclusive list would therefore increase the burden for some plants whose equipment on the list was not ESF equipment or not equipment with a suitably high risk-significance.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0998-16 Page 7 of 8

10.

(10) Human performance FPC recommends maintaining the current wording of the rule which requires reporting information regarding human performance as a part of the narrative description of the event contained in the written LER. The ANPR proposes to modify human performance reporting requirements using a "check the box" approach added to the LER form. Human performance is often critical to understanding an event and cannot be easily deleted from the narrative or broken into "check the box" type categories. Additionally, any single event which is categorized into "boxes" by different individuals will result in different "boxes" being checked. This "check the box" approach permits unintended variation in human performance evaluation between utilities which could be translated into enforcement action due to improper "coding" of the human performance information.

11.

(10) Codifying NUREG-1022 The ANPR states that "the amended rule would explicitly recognize the information discussed in NUREG-1022, Revision 1, "Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50. 72 and 50. 73," January 1998." FPC strongly recommends not referring to NUREG-1022 in the rule. This use of regulatory guidance will create confusion since the rule would be clear enough to stand on its own.

12.

(13) Enforcement

13.

The NRC's enforcement policy should be reviewed at the same time that the rule is being developed. This will ensure consistent application of the requirements relating to enforcement. 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(2)(i) The amended rule does not explicitly reference 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(2)(i), but implies that it would not be included in the proposed rule since it is not mentioned in the categories which would be reportable within 8 hours. FPC agrees with not including 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(2)(i) in the proposed rule. Rationale: Given that the plant is already shut down, there is no immediate risk to the plant or the public health and safety and; therefore, no need for a prompt notification. Because the intent of immediate reporting is to allow the Commission to take immediate action, this requirement would not be consistent with the stated NRC information need.

14.

Contemplated Schedule FPC finds the schedule acceptable.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0998-16 Page 8 of 8 1 5. Tabletop Exercises To ensure a quality product, FPC proposes conducting table top exercises to test key parts of the rule and guidance early in the development and review process. These exercises should include both industry and regional staff and should take place in a public meeting. It is proposed that both industry and regional staff provide scenarios of previously reported or postulated reporting events to test for clarity and consistency of the requirements. Feedback during these exercises will provide insights to NRC staff during the rule review and revision process. These exercises could start as early as October 1998. Suggestions for possible areas to be included in the tabletop include: Loss/partial loss of function concept Degraded conditions: Outside the Design Basis/Unanalyzed Condition; 1 0CFR50. 72 (bl( 1 )(ii) and associated 10 CFR 50. 73 section. Conditions prohibited by Technical Specifications: 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) ESF/RPS actuation: 10 CFR 50. 72 (b)(2)(ii) and associated 10 CFR 50. 73 section Condition that alone could prevent fulfillment of a safety function: 10 CFR

50. 72 (b)(2)(iii) and associated 10 CFR 50. 73 section Common Cause: 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)

Loss of single train systems Compliance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements The tabletops need to include both reportable and non-reportable examples.

16.

Workshops In addition to the table top exercises, FPC proposes conducting industry workshops early in the public comment period. The workshops would promulgate the intent of the change and allow for a thorough implementation review. The workshops could include detailed discussions in breakout sessions and would allow any issues to be identified early in the review process.

NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE James W. Davis DOCKET NUMBER n DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT NUCLEAR GENERATION DIVISION PROPOSED RULE ri So September 21, 1998 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 {flJ3F~3f:/S;i:i) ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff Tl

SUBJECT:

Proposed Rule for Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors, --63 Federal Register 39522 -- July 23, 1998 PROJECT NUMBER: 689 \0 OJ (/) rr, 7:J N N 2:: 0 Ll A These comments are submitted on behalf of the nuclear power industry by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 1 in response to the Federal Register notice concerning proposed rulemaking on Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors (63 Federal Register 39522 of July 23, 1998). As recognized by the NRC in the advanced notice of proposed rule making, the current reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50. 72 and 10 CFR 50. 73 result in many reports of little safety significance. Current requirements cause a drain on both licensee and NRC staff resources to process reports that are not significant to maintaining safety. Excessive reporting is particularly distracting to Control Room Operators who must evaluate conditions and make the initial reports. Additionally, over reporting can lead to public confusion about the significance of events which have little impact on public health and safety. The proposed rulemaking initiative offers an opportunity to eliminate excessive reports and shift focus to only those reports which are significant to safety. Rulemaking must clarify required reporting requirements and focus on safety. Confusion currently exists with the bounding definition of the word "significant." This word is used throughout the process of event reporting, and in some instances, 1 NEI is the organization responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEI's Members include all utilities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel fabrication facilities, materials licensees, and other organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear energy issue. SEP 2 5 1998 0 c:O {/)('")

l!: rr,

u ~

"rri 0 Acknowledged by card.... -*--*-**-.. - I / J/) I STRfET lW ~I JITE 11 00 PHO f'.JE 10} /~iG 8000 ~AX 202 78.'5.1*.1 \ *;

U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO nuu::MIV'*.ll,GS & ADJUOICATIO s STAFF ACE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION

Secretary September 21, 1998 Page 2 "significant" has been interpreted as "any" deviation from a parameter. It is therefore recommended that the NRC clearly link "significant" to "loss of functionality," which will aide in establishing clarity. To eliminate reports for events with little or no risk significance, "risk significant" must also be clearly defined. If not clear, it could potentially be misapplied. There has been inconsistent enforcement of the current rules because of the lack of clarity and intent. As proposed by the NRC, there would be no specific criterion to report conditions outside the design basis of the plant. However, depending on whether they result in loss or partial loss of capability to perform a safety function, design or analysis defects or deviations would be reported. In light of this proposed revision to the reporting requirements, it is requested that, while rulemaking is in progress, the staff exercise enforcement discretion for events or conditions reported as outside the design basis of the plant. Today's industry root cause evaluations are more comprehensive and are driven by corrective action programs. Developing an accurate LER has become labor intensive for all plant departments involved. As a result, the time period allowed for preparation should be increased to 60 days to allow for completion of required engineering evaluations after event discovery, provide for more complete and accurate LER's and would result in fewer LER revisions and supplemental reports. Implementation of the new rule is an important part of the process. In developing the new rule, the existing guidance provided in earlier statements of consideration should not be lost. Guidance provided by NUREG 1022 should be revised and developed in parallel with the rule change. In order for the rulemaking process to work, this process must involve all interested parties including NRC headquarters, regions, licensees and other stakeholders. We therefore request that a revision to NUREG 1022 be processed in parallel with the rule change to allow a full understanding of the intended change and ensure proper implementation. Involvement of the regional staff, industry and other stakeholders is essential for effective development of clear guidelines. Their involvement with the proposed rule making process should include a series of tabletop exercises and at least one workshop. We believe that an open dialog between all parties will facilitate issue identification and resolution during the rulemaking process. In general, we support and concur with the Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors (63 Federal Register 39522 of July 23, 1998) except where comments have been provided. Specific comments on the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking are enclosed.

Secretary September 21, 1998 Page 3 We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule. Should you have further questions, please contact Bob Post of the NEI staff at 202-739-8115. Sincerely, Z::.~~ JWD/rs Enclosure

Enclosure Specific Recommendations on Proposed Changes to Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors These specific comments are made on the NRC's advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) for Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors. Where possible, comments have been keyed to the relevant section of the text in the ANPR and are indicated by brackets ( ). Objective: Reporting should focus on the ability of systems to perform their licensed safety function. Systems that don't have licensed safety functions or systems that are able to perform the licensed safety function at a specific plant should not be reported. Duplicate and redundant reporting requirements should be eliminated. Improving the clarity of reporting requirements would also be of significant benefit. The NRC's current reporting needs should be clearly explained. A general explanation of reporting needs would aid in developing more detailed requirements. Issues and contemplated amendments:

1.

(1) Required initial reporting times. In the contemplated amendments, the required initial reporting times would be modified to extend some reports to 8 hours. We agree with the revised reporting times based on importance to risk and extending the required reporting times consistent with the need for prompt NRC action. We recommend changing the time to submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) in 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(l) from 30 to 60 days. Rationale: Today's industry root cause evaluations are more comprehensive and are driven by corrective action programs. Developing an accurate LER has become labor intensive for all plant departments involved. This increased time period will allow for completion of required engineering evaluations after event discovery, provide for more complete and accurate LER's and result in fewer LER revisions and supplemental reports. Page 1

2.

(l)(f) Other non-emergency events. In the contemplated amendments, unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS), would be reported within 8 hours when the reactor is critical. Otherwise, it would be reported in writing in the LER. Unplanned actuation of an engineered safety feature (ESF) other than the RPS, would be reported within 8 hours if it resulted from (a) intentional manual actuation or (b) a valid signal (i.e., a signal in response to actual plant conditions that warrant ESF actuation). Otherwise, it would be reported in writing in the LER. We see no significance in reporting invalid ESF actuations and we recommend changing 10 CFR 50. 72 to read: (b)(2)(ii) Any event or condition that results in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF) system, including actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) from a critical condition, in response to actual plant conditions that warrant ESF I RPS actuation, except when:(A) The actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation; or(B) The actuation is invalid. We recommend changing 10 CFR 50.73 to read: (a)(2)(iv) Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF) system, including the reactor protection system (RPS), in response to actual plant conditions that warrant ESF I RPS actuation except when: (A) The actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation; or(B) The actuation is invalid. Rationale: Our proposed wording requires reporting only valid ESF actuations that address the response of the plant to actually challenges This would provide consistent wording between 10 CFR 50. 72 and 10 CFR 50. 73 and accomplish the intended change as proposed in the ANPR. Page 2

3.

(l)(f) Failure of independent components due to a common cause. In the contemplated amendments, failure of independent components due to a common cause would continue to be reportable in writing (LER). NUREG 1022, Rev. 1, contains discussions of common cause failures in several sections of the document. We recommend that this discussion be consolidated in section 3.3.4, of NUREG 1022.

4.

(2) Clarification of requirement for reporting an event or condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a structure or system. In the contemplated amendments, the wording would be revised to require reporting any event or condition that "alone or in combination with other existing condition(s) could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to... " We are concerned that this wording change will not clarify the requirement, but could add confusion to the rule. The existing criterion is reasonable as presently written.

5.

(2) Clarification of requirement for reporting an event or condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a structure or system. No safety significance exists for reporting historical events. (Historical events are newly discovered events that could have been safety significant at one time, but have since been resolved). 10 CFR 50. 72 should be revised to clearly indicate that this is for current conditions. We recommend changing 10 CFR 50.72 to read: (b)(2)(iii) Any current event or presently existing condition that alone could have prevented prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) Remove residual heat, (C) Control the release of radioactive material, or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. Rationale: Reporting historical events provides a low safety benefit and unnecessarily increases the reporting burden. Page 3

6.

(2) Clarification of requirement for reporting an event or condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a structure or system.

7.

No safety significance exists for reporting historical events which occurred more than two years ago. (Historical events are newly discovered events that could have been safety significant at one time, but have since been resolved.) 10 CFR 50. 73 should be revised to clearly indicate that reporting is not required for events that are greater than two years old. We recommend changing 10 CFR 50.73 to read: (a)(2)(v) Any event or condition which existed during the previous two years that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition: (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. Rationale: Two years encompasses one refueling cycle of operation. Significant effort can be expended searching back in history for historical events. Reporting historical events more than two years old provides a low safety benefit and unnecessarily increases the reporting burden. (3) Reporting of design issues. We believe paragraph §50.72(b)(l)(ii) and §50.73(a)(2)(ii) can be removed as redundant to the already existing reporting criteria. The NRC intends to remove subparagraphs E&C of these requirements. However, our belief is that 10 CFR 50.72(b)(l), when combined with Technical Specification requirements adequately addresses the notification needs for events that would be reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(l)(ii)(A) and conditions involving serious degradation or significantly compromising safety would result in reports under other criteria in 10 CFR 50.73. We can see no unique condition that would be reported under §50.72(b)(l)(ii) or §50.73(a)(2)(ii) and therefore recommend deleting these redundant requirements. Page 4

8.

(4) Reporting of errors in and corrections to ECCS analyses. The ANPR states that "Reporting of errors in and corrections to ECCS analyses would continue to be governed by 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii) when it applies, as is currently the case. As required by that section, failure to meet the ECCS acceptance criteria (i.e., peak clad temperature [PCT] greater than 2200°F, excessive cladding oxidation, etc.) would be reported pursuant to §50.72 (e.g., within 8 hours) and §50.73. Errors where PCT increases by more than 50°F but remains below 2200°F would be reported in writing in 30 days." We believe that there is no safety significance in reporting decreases in PCT and recommend deleting this requirement as well as the requirement to report lesser errors annually. Additionally, we recommend that the time requirement to notify the NRC of significant changes in PCT be lengthened to 60 days. We recommend changing 10 CFR 50.46 to read: (a)(3)(i) Each applicant for or holder of an operating license or construction permit shall estimate the effect of any change to or error in an acceptable evaluation model or in the application of such a model to determine if the change or error is significant. For this purpose, a significant change or error is one which results in a calculated peak fuel cladding temperature different by morn greater than 50° F above f:rom the temperature calculated for the limiting transient using the last acceptable model, or is an accumulation of changes and errors such that the sum of the absolute magnitudes of the respective temperature changes is greater than 50° F above the temperature calculated for the limiting transient using the last acceptable model. (a)( 3)(ii) For each significant change to or error discovered in an acceptable evaluation model or in the application of such a model that affects the temperature calculation, the applicant or licensee shall report the nature of the change or error and its estimated effect on the limiting ECCS analysis to the Commission at least annually as specified in § 50.4. If the change 01* error is significant, the applicant or licensee shall provide this report within W 60 days and include with the report a proposed schedule for providing a re-analysis or taking other action as may be needed to show compliance with §50.46 requirements. Rationale: This is consistent with the NRC's proposed policy of eliminating the reporting burden associated with events of little or no safety significance by reporting only errors which are "significant" and in the non-conservative direction. In addition, the time requirement for reporting "significant" errors is aligned with the proposed 60 day requirement. Page 5

9.

(8) Reporting of events that result in actuation of an ESF We do not support the contemplated amendments which specify the systems for which reporting is required, instead of using the term ESF. We believe that an all inclusive list of risk-significant systems in regulation is inappropriate. Each facility's FSAR specifies equipment which is designated as ESF equipment. Plant specific differences exist in the safety related status of their systems. Additionally, the risk-significance of a particular system can vary greatly between plants due to a wide variety of design differences. An all inclusive list would therefore increase the burden for some plants whose equipment on the list was not ESF equipment or equipment with a suitably high risk-significance. At the same time, some plants may no longer be reporting actual ESF actuations that may have had risk significance at their facility. In addition, it should be noted that a valid ATWS initiation only occurs if there are valid RPS/ESF failures; this remains reportable under other categories and would result in duplicate reporting and an increased reporting burden.

10. (10) Human performance We recommend maintaining the current wording of the rule which requires reporting information regarding human performance as a part of the narrative description of the event contained in the written LER. The ANPR proposes to modify human performance reporting requirements using a "check the box" approach added to the LER form. Human performance is often critical to understanding an event and cannot be easily deleted from the narrative or broken into "check the box" type categories. Additionally, any single event which is categorized into "boxes" by different individuals will result in different "boxes" being checked. This "check the box" approach permits unintended variation in human performance evaluation between utilities which could be translated into enforcement action due to improper "coding" of the human performance information.

11. (10) Codifying NUREG 1022 The ANPR states that "the amended rule would explicitly recognize the information discussed in NUREG 1022, Revision 1, "Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73," January 1998." We do not understand the intent of this statement and we recommend not referring to NUREG 1022 in the rule.

Page 6

12. (13) Enforcement The NRC's enforcement policy should be reviewed at the same time that the rule is being developed. This will ensure consistent application of the requirements relating to enforcement. We disagree with linking enforcement severity levels to the reporting criteria with which an event is reported.

13. 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(2)(i)

The amended rule does not explicitly reference 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(2)(i), but implies that it would not be included in the proposed rule since it is not mentioned in the categories which would be reportable within 8 hours. We recommend deleting 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) from the proposed rule. Rationale: Given that the plant is already shut down, there is no immediate risk to the plant or the public health and safety. Consequently, because the intent of immediate reporting is to allow the Commission to take immediate action, this requirement is inconsistent with that stated NRC information need.

14. Contemplated Schedule Although the proposed time line in the ANPR is aggressive, we find that this schedule is acceptable. This aggressive schedule is warranted to expedite the staffs proposed changes which will improve the reporting process and take steps to fix some issues that have existed in the event reporting arena for many years.

Page 7

15. Other Reporting Requirements The ANPR also requested comments pertaining to reporting requirements beyond §50.72 and §50.73. The following requirements are provided as potential additional rule changes:

10 CFR 20.1906(d)(l) and (d)(2) contain requirements for immediate reportability, which is not defined. Consider changing this requirement to 8 hours similar to §50. 72 changes. 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(i) contains the requirement for immediate reportability after the occurrence becomes known. Consider changing this requirement to 8 hours similar to §50. 72 changes. 10 CFR 20.2202(a) contains the requirement for immediate reportability, which is not defined. Consider changing this requirement to 8 hours similar to §50. 72 changes. 10 CFR 20.2203(a) contains the requirement for a 30 day written followup report. Consider changing this requirement to 60 days similar to §50. 73 changes. 10 CFR 26. 73(b) contains the requirement for reportability, within 24 hours by telephone. Consider changing this requirement to 60 days similar to §50.73 changes. 10 CFR 72.75, contains the requirement for a four hour report and a 30 day written followup report. Consider changing this requirement to 8 hours and 60 days similar to §50. 72 and §50. 73 changes 10 CFR 73. 71, App G contains requirements for one hour reports. Consider changing this requirement to 8 hours similar to §50. 72 changes Page 8

16. Tabletop Exercises To ensure a quality product, we propose conducting table top exercises to test key parts of the rule and guidance early in the development and review process. These exercises should include both industry and regional staff and should take place in a public meeting. It is proposed that both industry and regional staff provide scenarios of previously reported or postulated reporting events to test for clarity and consistency of the requirements. The table top exercises need to include both reportable and non-reportable examples.

Feedback during these exercises will provide insights to NRC staff during the rule review and revision process. These exercises could start as early as October 1998. Suggestions for possible areas to be included in the tabletop include: Loss/partial loss of function concept Significantly degraded conditions: Outside the design basis/Unanalyzed condition; 10CFR50. 72 (b)(l)(ii) & associated part

50. 73 section Conditions prohibited by Tech Specs: §50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B)

ESF/RPS actuations: §50. 72 (b)(2)(ii) & associated §50. 73 section Condition that alone could prevent fulfillment of a safety function: §50. 72 (b)(2)(iii) & associated §50. 73 section Common Cause: §50. 73(a)(2)(vii) Loss of single train systems Compliance with technical specification surveillance requirements

17. Workshops In addition to the table top exercises, we propose conducting a two-day industry workshop early in public comment period. This workshop would promulgate the intent of the change and allow for a thorough implementation review. This workshop could include detailed discussions in breakout sessions and would allow any issues to be identified early in the review process.

Page 9

[IE 50 Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 September 18, 1998 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Gentlemen: NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) - OPPORTUNITY FOR PUBLIC COMMENTS ON ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING, "REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS" On July 23, 1998, NRC published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) related to reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors for public comment (63 FR 39522). TVA has reviewed the ANPR and has several comments and recommendations for your consideration. TVA agrees with the stated objectives for the ANPR, namely, better aligning the reporting requirements with the NRC's current reporting needs, reducing the reporting burden, and clarifying the reporting requirements where needed. TVA is participating in an industry task force, sponsored by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). The task force provided comments regarding the ANPR to NRC staff in a public workshop at NRC headquarters on August 21, 1998, and in a subsequent letter from NEI. Because TVA endorses the task force comments, they will not be repeated in this letter. However, some additional comments on the same issues are included to emphasize our support and to provide TVA's perspective. Acknowledged by card SEP 2 4 1998 Printed on recycled paper

U.S. REGULATORY COMMISC:: 11') RUI S & ADJUDICATIONS Sr Of THE SECRETARY OF THE CO, MISSION s ' ~ 0a1e q / I 8 /'t '8' - ~ 1ol ~ '1. ~ v~ ~ &we- ~ ! I ~ q/:;;.1/98' Repr S D ~ ~~ ?1>~ 1 ~ID~

Secretary of the Commission Page 2 September 18, 1998 Additionally, there are several elements of the ANPR that were not addressed by the industry task force upon which TVA would like to comment. All of our comments are provided in the enclosure to this letter. We appreciate NRC's efforts in this area, and the opportunity to respond to the subject ANPR. Sincerely,

!r<<:11*~

Manager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure cc (Enclosure): U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

ENCLOSURE The comments that follow have been numbered (whenever possible) with the corresponding number from the "Issues and Contemplated Amendments" section of the ANPR for ease of review.

• Sections l[c], l[f] -

TVA supports the concept of relaxing the time requirements for reporting these conditions consistent with the needs of NRC. TVA recommends that NRC consider a further extension of the reporting time for these nonemergency conditions to "within 8 hours or by the beginning of the next business day." This approach is in keeping with NRC's needs for event or condition reporting. It does not appear that NRC takes actions during off hours or on weekends or holidays for these nonemergency events or conditions. Based on this understanding, the NRC reporting time limits are unnecessarily burdensome and serve little useful purpose. The responsibility for reporting these nonemergency conditions during nonroutine work hours falls on the operations crew instead of allowing these items to be, more appropriately, handled by plant support staff. TVA also recommends that NRC consider allowing these nonemergency notifications to be made to the site resident inspector in lieu of reporting via Emergency Notification System. Typically, the duty officer asks whether the resident inspector has been notified. Such dual reporting is unnecessarily redundant. For nonemergency events, it is sufficient that the resident inspector be notified and subsequent reports be made through NRC channels as appropriate. Section 2 - Adding the phrase "or in combination with other existing conditions" does not clarify the requirement as intended. Conversely, it introduces the potential for different interpretations regarding reporting of historical conditions than was intended. We believe that the rule, as currently worded, is sufficiently clear and that the need to consider other existing plant conditions in the evaluation of the condition being reported is understood and uniformly implemented. 1

Section 4 - TVA recommends rewording this amendment, as well as revising 10 CFR 50.46, to eliminate the need for reporting any cases of decreases in peak clad temperature. Section 8 - TVA does not support the proposed revision which would introduce a list of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) systems. ESF systems are identified in each plant's updated Final Safety Analysis Report. We believe that differences in plant designs and, consequently, contribution to risk of each system varies too widely from plant-to-plant to arrive at a universal list of systems. Accordingly, we recommend that this portion of the rule remain unchanged. Section 10 - We disagree with the implementation of a "check the box" approach to reporting human performance information in Licensee Event Reports (LER). The primary reason is that the "check the box" approach might not allow for a full understanding of all the nuances of an event and the impacts that human performance had in the progress of the overall event. Additionally, we believe that variations from licensee-to-licensee on which boxes were checked could lead to inconsistent reporting, misinterpretation, and potential enforcement based upon disagreements on the specific boxes checked for a particular event. It has been our experience that the complexities often associated with human performance related events do not lend themselves to such an approach. Section 11 - Similar to the issue identified above for "Section 10," we believe the potential exists for implementation problems with a reduced emphasis on the narrative portion of an LER in favor of a "check the box" approach. Section 13 - TVA strongly objects to tying enforcement criteria (i.e., violation severity level) to reporting criteria. We believe that this approach could result in an unintended adverse effect on open reporting when a licensee is forced to, in essence, make a predecisional determination of violation severity in advance of any regulatory reporting determination. In addition, such an approach is an unproductive use of decision-making time when one considers the variety of criterion under which an event could be considered as a violation. 2

Other Reporting Requirements License Conditions - TVA requests that NRC clarify its position on license conditions (included in some licenses and not included in others) that require reporting violations of license conditions. As example, the following is an excerpt from TVA's Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 license: "TVA shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Sections 2.C(3) through 2.C(24), 2.E, 2.F, and 2.G of this license within 24 hours by telephone and confirmed by telegram, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to the Director of the Regional Office, or his designate, no later than the first working day following the violation with a written followup report within 14 days." TVA previously submitted a license amendment to delete this condition. The amendment was denied based on a statement from NUREG-1022, supplement 1, question 2.6, which indicated that the LER rule did not supersede this requirement. Some type of generic issuance indicating that NRC would be receptive to license amendments to remove this license condition would be helpful. 10 CFR 50.55(e) - TVA recommends that the reporting requirements under 10 CFR 50.55(e) be reviewed for improvements regarding risk and simplification. Experience has shown that the construction completion process establishes numerous formal reviews, checks, and verifications that provide many opportunities to find deficiencies. The industry has gained considerable experience in documenting and correcting these deficiencies in effective corrective action program(s). The fact that a deficiency during construction could have created a substantial safety hazard under operating conditions requires regulatory reporting of many deficiencies that could have affected a safety function if not corrected. The benefit of the formal reporting of deficiencies found and corrected by the licensee is not readily apparent. The focus should be on the fact that a deficiency has been discovered during construction and corrected prior to operation. The reporting and correction is documented in the licensee's corrective action program which is highly visible and subject to review and inspection by the NRC. 3

The large number of reportability reviews and reports to the NRC unnecessarily burdens licensee and NRC resources, and potentially detracts from more significant deficiencies. The criteria should focus on licensee program breakdowns and defect reporting that would benefit other licensees. TVA recommends that the criterion requiring that a deficiency which "could have" created a substantial safety hazard were it to remain uncorrected be deleted and to focus reporting on defects and programmatic breakdowns. The reportability criteria should be based on: (1) Licensee program breakdowns and (2) Material defect. Other Reports - TVA also requests that, in light of the intent of this ANPR, NRC review their use of reports such as Core Operating Limit Reports, Fire Protection report changes, Semi-annual Radioactive Effluent reports, monthly operating reports, and annual operating reports to determine if the bases for generating these reports are still applicable, and to examine whether of the reports could be combined or reduced in order to reduce reporting and review burdens on the licensees and NRC. 4

Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff

Subject:

Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking-Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors 63 FR 39522 (July 23, 1998) P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 SEP 1 8 1998 L-98-244 On July 23, 1998 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) proposing amendments to the event reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors. These comments are submitted on behalf of Florida Power & Light (FPL), a licensed operator of two nuclear power plant units in Dade County, Florida and two units in St. Lucie County, Florida. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is providing comments on behalf of the nuclear power industry. FPL endorses the NEI comments and provides the following additional comments. FPL appreciates the NRC's continuing efforts to reduce or eliminate the reporting burdens associated with events of little or no safety significance. Even though the focus of this rulemaking is on Section 50. 72 and 50. 73, FPL agrees with the NRC that a number of other reporting

requirements would benefit from a critical review of this nature (e.g., 10 CFR 26, Fitness for Duty Programs, 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation, 10 CFR 73.71, Reporting of Safeguards Events, licensee technical specifications and license conditions).

The NRC' s public workshop on August 21, 1998 touched on a number of examples where opportunities exist to reduce reporting burdens. An industry representative commenting that licensees sometimes have to report the same event to state agencies and the NRC provided one such example. FPL concurs with the recommendation that the time requirement for reporting an event to the NRC and to the state should be consistent wherever practical and possibly in some cases eliminated. As another example, inconsistencies exist between environmental reporting requirements,and 50.72 and 50.73 reporting requirements. As a final example, FPL's operating license, and its associated license conditions, contains a reporting requirement (24 hour call to the Region and 14 day written report) for any nonconformance associated with a license condition. Section 50.72 or 50.73 should cover these types of reporting requirements. FPL recommends a continuing dialogue on these and other reporting burdens in concert with a proposed workshop as discussed below. an FPL Group company Acknowledged by

U.S. UCLEAA EGULA O Y COMMISSION RULEMAKINGS & ADJUDICATIONS S "AFF OFFICE OF THE SECREl A OF THE COMMISSION

Florida Power & Light Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors L-98-244 Pg.2 NEI recommends changing the time to submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(l) from 30 to 60 days. FPL highlights this comment and emphasizes that the development of an LER has become labor intensive for the plant departments involved. This increased time period will allow for completion of required engineering evaluations after event discovery and provide for more complete and accurate LERs. Implementation guidance provided by NUREG 1022 needs to be revised and developed in parallel with the subject rulemaking to understand the full impact of the change and ensure proper implementation by the interested parties. Involvement ofNRC headquarters, the regional staff, industry, and other stakeholders is essential for effective development of clear reporting guidelines. NEI has suggested that involvement with the proposed rulemaking process should include a series of tabletop exercises and at least one workshop. FPL concurs with this suggestion and also recommends that the workshop agenda include opportunities for utilities to provide other reporting burden examples. As a final comment, confusion continues to exist both within the industry and the NRC in evaluating reportable conditions as "outside the design basis" as opposed to "outside the licensing basis." FPL believes additional work is necessary to generate a consensus as to what comprises the licensing basis of a facility. The term is used extensively and, in fact, defined in 10 CFR 54.3 and in Generic Letter 91-18, but the definitions are not the same. FPL appreciates the opportunity to comment on this advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. Sincerely, 1/cL~ John Gianfrancesco Manager Administrative Support and Special Projects

r UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS August 27, 1998 The Secretary of the Commission DO KET Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff United. States Nuclear Regulatory Commission POSED AU Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 DOCKETED U ~RC '98 AUG 31 Pl2 :15 I

SUBJECT:

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS Good Day: In response to the advance notice of proposed rulemaking published in the July 23, 1998, Federal Register (Vol. 63, No. 141 ), I am pleased to submit the following comments on reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors on behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists: ( 1) The proposed rulemaking suggests that the reporting burden on licensees might be reduced by re-designing the licensee event report (LER) form to employ a "check-the-box" approach whenever feasible. UCS strongly recommends that no "check-the-box" approach be adopted in any reporting requirements. LERs are reviewed by members of the public who have not been trained on the scope and meaning of the terms that would be used to label boxes. Thus, it is not in the public's interest to "bar-code" information about safety issues at nuclear plants unless the public is equipped with "scanners." The proposed rulemaking contains numerous other provisions, such as elimination of reporting for matters that are not risk-significant, that should reduce the reporting burden on licensees without depriving the public of full and complete disclosure on the risk-significant matters that are reported. (2) The proposed rulemaking attempts to clarify the requirements for reporting design issues using an example about a reactor building pressure relief panel (i.e., the Nine Mile Point case). The proposed clarification would not require design issues to be reported if the applicable system, structure, or component remained capable of performing the specified safety function. UCS recognizes that this approach is consistent with the proposed handling of late surveillance tests (i.e., a late surveillance test is not reportable if the system/component successfully passes when tested). However, industry experience has shown that design issues frequently apply to more than one nuclear plant. The pump vortexing issue is a good example. Some plants had to revise low-level setpoints or increase the minimum required volume of tanks to deal with vortexing concerns. Other plants were okay as-is. Control room ventilation issues are another good example. If such a generic design issue is identified first at a plant which does not have to report it, comparable problems may remain undetected at those plants which would have to report it if they knew about it. UCS recommends that if the proposed clarification on design issues is adopted, some language should be included either in the rule or in its statements of consideration inducing licensees to submit voluntary reports under 10 CFR 50.9. Such voluntary reports could allow the NRC and other licensees to be aware of potential generic design issues. The open-ended time frame and self-imposed format of 10 CFR 50.9 reporting should place minimal burden on licensees. (3) The proposed rulemaking provides clarification of several requirements. Based upon a review of reports submitted by the licensees for the ten nuclear plants in our focus monitoring group, we have noticed significant reporting inconsistencies in two areas: (a) Problems identified by NRC inspectors: Some licensees have submitted reports under 10 CFR 50.72/50.73 on problems initially identified by NRC inspectors. Frequently, these reports describe other problems identified by the licensee during extent-of-condition evaluations. Other licensees have not reported similar Washington Office: 1616 P Street NW Suite 310

• Washington DC 20036-1495
• 202-332-0900
• FAX: 202-332-0905 Cambridge Headquarters: Two Brattle Square
• Cambridge MA 02238-9105
• 617-547-5552
• FAX: 617-864-9405 California Office: 2397 Shattuck Avenue Suite 203
• Berkeley CA 94704-1567
• 510-843-1872
• FAX: 510-843-3785

(,Q (,Q 00

r lJ.S. UC~EAR REGULATORY COM ISSIO RULEMAKINGS &ADJUDICATION TAFF OFFICE OF THE SECR R FTHE COMMISSI Copies Rec Add'I Copies RDCtlJCed "'o .1 I istnbution _./!) ~ 1 7 DR 1 '1? / D.S

(b) August 27, 1998 Page 2 of2 problems identified by NRC inspectors at their facilities. These problems are only documented in NRC inspection reports. If the finding does not result in escalated enforcement action, the licensee's evaluation of the problems are not publicly available. From a literal reading of 10 CFR 50.72/50.73, it seems that licensees must report the listed conditions irregardless of whether they are identified by plant workers, are found by NRC inspectors, or are self-revealing. Any inconsistency in reporting like problems will degrade plant performance assessment programs that use LER data. UCS recommends that any rulemaking effort affecting 10 CFR 50.72/50.73 clarify the reporting requirements for problems identified by NRC inspectors. When the problem could have been identified: Some licensees have submitted reports under 10 CFR 50.72/50.73 specifying when the problems were first introduced and what opportunities had been missed to detect them earlier. Nearly all reports contain lengthy discussions on actions taken or planned to prevent recurrence of the problem. It would be useful to complement this information with a discussion on actions taken or planned to prevent future missed opportunities to detect comparable problems. UCS recommends that any rulemaking effort affecting 10 CFR 50.72/50.73 incorporate provisions to require licensees to specify how many opportunities to detect the problem were or may have been missed and those actions taken or planned to prevent future misses. ( 4) The proposed rulemaking will eliminate the reporting requirement for late surveillance tests if the system or component is functional when tested and there is no systematic breakdown of surveillance testing. In the public workshop on August 21 '1, the staff proposed a criterion of X failures in Y months to define systematic breakdown. This time-based criterion is inappropriate for surveillance testing for many reasons. Any Y month period involving steady state operation will almost always involve far fewer surveillance tests than a Y month period spanning several reactor start-ups. In addition, the definition of X failures is uncertain. Would missing a daily test for an entire month count as one or 29 failures? UCS recommends that the criterion for systematic breakdown in surveillance testing be expressed in terms of percentage of tests during a specified period. (5) The proposed rulemaking will, in general, provide the licensees with longer time periods to report risk-significant matters. UCS concurs with this relaxation. During the public workshop on August 21 , an industry representative commented that licensees sometimes have to report the same event to state agencies and the NRC. UCS concurs with the recommendation that the time requirement for reporting an event to the NRC and to the state should be consistent wherever practical. (6) The contemplated schedule for rulemaking seems achievable. Based on past experience, UCS cautions the NRC staff not to shorten public comment periods if it needs to recapture time lost along the way. Additionally, the NRC staff indicated during the August 21 st workshop that NUREG-1022 would be revised if time permitted. UCS recommends that any changes to 10 CFR 50.72/50.73 not be published until at least a draft revision to NUREG-1022 is issued for public comment. It would not be productive to issue a substantial change to the reporting requirements rule without associated guidance. Sincerely, ~CUIAAIQ~ David A. Lochbaum Nuclear Safety Engineer

George V. Voinovich, Governor Nancy P. Hollister, Lt. Governor Mitchell J. Brown, Director Dale Shipley Deputy Director Ohio Emergency Management 2855 West Dublin-Granville Road Columbus, OH 43235-2206 (614) 889-7150 DOCK TED USHRC

• 98 AUG 21 P 1 :26 orr= \.

1 'L OHIO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

• Administration
• Ohio State Highway Patrol
• Bureau of Motor Vehicles
• Division of Emergency Medical Services
• Emergency Management Agency 1

August 11, 1998

RUL, I

The Secretary of the Commission ADJU 1 1-,, .,:.~F U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20055-0001 DOCKET 0 ROPOSEDRULE 50 Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff

DearNRC:

(re,'3F~3'r5:l:l) This letter is in regard to the NRC's advanced notice of proposed rulemaking to 10 CFR Part 50.72 and 50.73 on the reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors. The Ohio Emergency Management Agency (Ohio EMA) comments are as follows:

1.

2.

3.

The proposal objectives are well stated. In today's environment of diminishing resources "to reduce the reporting burden consistent with the NRC's reporting needs," is a noteworthy task. The clarification ofreporting requirements is necessary to avoid confusion and controversy. In many reporting requirements (i.e. design issues), the proposal gives solid examples. Ohio EMA's concerns lie not with the rule itself but with the implementation of the rule. As you may be aware, the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station declared an Alert at 9:18 p.m. on June 24, 1998. The plant sustained damages due to tornado's and heavy winds severing offsite power lines and offsite communication. Davis-Besse attempted to contact the State of Ohio but was unable to do so. When notification was made to the NRC, the NRC was unwilling to relinquish the line to permit Davis-Besse to contact Ohio. The NRC did contact Ohio for Davis-Besse, but the notification was not timely. Ohio had already been informally notified by the counties. An emphasis needs to be placed on the positive notification of offsite agencies first before notification to the NRC. The Ohio EMA appreciates the opportunity to submit comments on this very important topic. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 614-889-7150 or Larry Grove of my staff at 614-889-7173. Sincerely~ ~ I (!) ES R. WILLIAMS Acknowledg~ by~ AUG 2 7 1998 Mission Statement 'Yo save lives, reduce injuries and economic loss, to administer Ohio's motor vehicle laws and to preserve the safety and well being of all citizens with the most cost-effective and service-oriented methods available."

lJ.S UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RULEMAKINGS & ADJUDICATIONS STAFF OFACE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statista

rr;ct-<':T NUMBER L1l J:-1 Pv ED RULE ~ <..:I~ (63 FR31S2~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 RI N 3150-AF98 DOCKETED US 7 90-01-P] "98 JUL 27 A 9 :32 Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering amending the event reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors: to update the current rules, including reducing or eliminating the reporting burden associated with events of little or no safety significance; and to better align the rules with the NRC's current needs, including revising reporting requirements based on importance to risk and extending the required reporting times consistent with the need for prompt NRC action. This advance notice of proposed rulemaking invites public comment on issues related to such an amendment.

The Commission is also interested in evaluating other current regulations to identify areas where reporting requirements can be simplified and/or modified to a less burdensome, more risk-informed approach, and this advance notice of proposed rulemaking invites public comment on identification of other reporting requirements that are potential candidates for such modification.

1 /21 lt::tr DATE: Submit comments by (60 days after publication in the Federal Register). Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or before this date. ADDRESSES: Mail comments to: The Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20055-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff. Deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m., Federal workdays. Electronic comments may be provided via the NRC's interactive rulemaking web site through the NRC home page (http://www.nrc.gov). From the home page, select "Rulemaking" from the tool bar at the bottom of the page. The interactive rulemaking website can then be accessed by selecting "Rulemaking Forum." This site provides the ability to upload comments as files (any format), if your web browser supports that function. For information about the interactive rulemaking web site, contact Ms. Carol Gallagher, (301) 415-5905; e-mail CAG@nrc.gov. Certain documents related to this rulemaking, including comments received, may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW., (Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents also may be viewed and downloaded electronically via the interactive rulemaking website established by NRC for this rulemaking. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis P. Allison, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, Washington DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6835, e-mail dpa@nrc.gov. 2

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Section 50.72 has been in effect, with minor modifications, since 1983. Its essential purpose is"... to provide the Commission with immediate reporting of twelve types of significant events where immediate Commission action to protect the public health and safety may be required or where the Commission needs timely and accurate information to respond to heightened public concern." (48 FR 39039; August 29, 1983). Events defined in §50. 72 are currently required to be reported, by telephone, in the following time frames: (1) Declaration of an emergency class is reported immediately after notification of appropriate State or local agencies and not later than 1-hour after declaration. (2) Non-emergency, 1-hour events are reported as soon as practical and in all cases within 1 hour of occurrence. (3) Non-emergency, 4-hour events are reported as soon as practical and in all cases within 4 hours of occurrence. (4) Followup notification is made immediately during the course of the event for: further degradation in the level of plant safety, other worsening plant conditions, declaration of an emergency class, changes in an emergency class, termination of an emergency class, results of ensuing evaluations of plant conditions, effectiveness of response or protective measures taken, or information related to plant behavior that is not understood. Section 50. 73 has also been in effect, with minor modification, since 1983. Its essential purpose is to identify"... the types of reactor events and problems that are believed to be 3

significant and useful to the NRC in its effort to identify and resolve threats to public safety. It is designed to provide the information necessary for engineering studies of operational anomalies and trends and patterns analysis of operational occurrences. The same information can be used for other analytic procedures that will aid in identifying accident precursors." (48 FR 33851; July 26, 1983). Events defined in §50.73 are reported, in writing, within 30 days of discovery. Most of these events are initially reported under §50.72. However, for two categories of events the initial report is the 30-day LER. These categories are: (1) operation or condition prohibited by the plant's TS and (2) failure of independent components due to a common cause. Experience has shown a need for change in several areas. Specific proposals under consideration are discussed below. State Input Many States (Agreement States and Non-Agreement States) have agreements with power reactors to inform the States of plant issues. State reporting requirements are frequently triggered by NRC reporting requirements. Accordingly, the NRC seeks State input on issues related to amending power reactor reporting requirements. Appropriate State agencies will be requested by letter to provide comments on this advance notice of proposed rulemaking. 4

Specific NRC Proposals for Amending 10 CFR 50. 72 and 50. 73 Objectives: The objectives of contemplated amendments would include the following. (1) To better align the reporting requirements with the NRC's current reporting needs. Examples would include: (a) extending the required reporting times, consistent with the need for timely NRC action and (b) revising the reporting requirements based on importance to risk, such as by adding reports related to actuation of systems that are risk-significant and dropping reports related to actuation of systems that are not risk-significant. (2) To reduce the reporting burden, consistent with the NRC's reporting needs. Examples include: (a) reducing or eliminating the reporting burden associated with events of little or no safety significance, provided reporting is not otherwise needed to support NRC regulatory programs, and (b) simplifying the reporting effort, such as by redesigning the LER form to employ a "check the box" approach to the extent feasible. (3) To clarify the reporting requirements where needed. The principal example would be clarifying which events involving design or analysis defects or deviations must be reported. Issues and contemplated amendments: The issues under consideration and the contemplated amendments include the following. (1) Required initial reporting times. In the contemplated amendments, the required initial reporting times would be as follows. 5

(a) Emergencies: Declaration of an emergency class would continue to be reported immediately after notification of appropriate State or local agencies and not later than 1-hour after declaration. Emergency actions taken pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(x) would continue to be reported as soon as practical and in all cases within 1 hour of occurrence. (b) Follow up notifications: Follow up notifications during the course of an event would continue to be made immediately. (c) Loss of capability to perform safety function: An event or condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a structure or system [as described in 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(2)(iii) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)] would be reported promptly (e.g., within 8 hours) if the plant is in a mode where the affected structure or system is required to be operable. Otherwise, the initial report would be required in writing within 30 days. It should be noted that an event or condition that could prevent fulfillment of a safety function includes design and analysis defects and deviations. For example, if there is a defect in an analysis.mlS1 as a result of that defect a system is not capable of performing its specified safety functions, that is a reportable event or condition under this criterion. In addition, reportable events or conditions can result from factors such as: personnel errors; procedure violations; procedural errors; equipment failures; inadequate maintenance; or deficiencies in fabrication, construction or equipment qualification. (d) Partial loss of capability to perform a safety function: An operation or condition prohibited by the plant's TS [as described in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)] would continue to be reported in writing within 30 days. It should be noted that an operation or condition prohibited by the plant's TS results from any operation or condition, including a design or analysis defect 6

or deviation, that results in one train of a multiple-train safety system being incapable of performing its specified safety function for a period of time longer than allowed by the TS. (e) No loss of capability to perform a safety function: Conditions, including design or analysis defects or deviations, that do not result in a structure, system, or train being incapable of performing its specified safety function would no longer be reportable under 1 O CFR 50. 72 and 50. 73, unless they meet one of the other reporting criteria discussed below. However, other regulatory requirements such as 10 CFR 50.59, 10 CFR 50.71(e), or Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 may be applicable. (f) Other non-emergency events: Other non-emergency events that are currently reported in 1 hour would be reported in 8 hours, except for a condition outside the coverage of procedures, which would be deleted as discussed further in Item (7) below. Thus, the remaining events in this category, which would be reported in 8 hours, are summarized as follows: (i) Initiation of shutdown (SID) required by (TS); (ii) Serious degradation of plant including its principal safety barriers; (iii) Plant in unanalyzed condition, significantly compromising plant safety; (iv) External condition that poses an actual threat or significantly hampers site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for safe operation of the plant; (v) Valid Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiation signal that results (or should have resulted) in discharge to the reactor coolant system; (vi) Internal event that poses an actual threat or significantly hampers site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for safe operation of the plant; and, 7

(vii) Major loss of capability for emergency assessment, offsite response, or communication. Unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS), which is currently reported in 4 hours, would be reported in 8 hours when the reactor is critical. Otherwise, it would be reported in writing within 30 days. Unplanned actuation of an engineered safety feature (ESF) other than the RPS, which is currently reported in 4 hours, would be reported in 8 hours if it resulted from (a) intentional manual actuation or (b) a valid signal (i.e., a signal in response to actual plant conditions that warrant ESF actuation). Otherwise, it would be reported in writing within 30 days. Other non-emergency events that are currently reported in 4 hours would be reported in 8 hours. These are summarized as follows: (i) Airborne radioactive release that results in concentrations over 20 times allowable levels in an unrestricted area; (ii) Liquid effluent in excess of 20 times allowable concentrations released to an unrestricted area; (iii) Radioactively contaminated person transported to an offsite medical facility for treatment; (iv) News release or other government agency notification related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment; (v) Defect in a spent fuel storage cask structure, system, or component which is important to safety or significant reduction in the effectiveness of a spent fuel storage cask confinement system. 8

Failure of independent components due to a common cause would continue to be reportable in writing within 30 days. (2) Clarification of requirement for reporting an event or condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a structure or system. The current rules require reporting "Any event or condition that ~ could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (8) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident." [Emphasis added.] In the contemplated amendments, in order to eliminate any potential for misunderstanding the requirement, the wording would be revised to require reporting any event or condition that alone or in combination with other existing condition<s} could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to... (3) Reporting of design issues: In the contemplated amendments there would be no specific criterion to require reporting conditions outside the design basis of the plant. However, depending on whether they result in loss or partial loss of capability to perform a safety function, design or analysis defects or deviations would be reported as discussed in Items (1)(c) and (1 )(d) above. 9

There has been some confusion and controversy about the meaning of the current requirement to report conditions outside the design basis of the plant. For instance, in one case the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) characterized a building design basis as follows: pressure relief panels will relieve at about 45 psf in order to ensure that building pressure does not exceed its design pressure of 80 psf. When it was found that the panels would not relieve at 45 psf but would still relieve well below 80 psf, controversy ensued between the NRC staff and the licensee regarding whether a report was required. Under the contemplated amendments, the pressure relief panel example, discussed above, would not be reportable because the structure (building that houses the potentially affected safety systems) remains within its design capabilities so that the systems within the building would still be capable of performing their specified safety functions. The event would be reportable if the pressure relief panels would not prevent the building from exceeding its design capabilities such that the systems housed within the building would not be considered capable of performing their specified safety functions because of potential building collapse. (4) Reporting of errors in and corrections to EGGS analyses: Reporting of errors in and corrections to ECCS analyses would continue to be governed by 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii) when it applies, as is currently the case. As required by that section, failure to meet the ECCS acceptance criteria (i.e., peak clad temperature [PCT] greater than 2200°F, excessive cladding oxidation, etc.) would be reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (e.g., within 8 hours) and 50.73. Errors where PCT increases by more than 50°F but remains below 2200°F would be reported in writing in 30 days. Lesser errors would be compiled and reported annually. 10

(5) Reporting of information with a significant implication for public health and safety or common defense and security: In connection with the contemplated amendments, no changes would be made with regard to the requirement in 10 CFR 50.9(b) to report".... information identified by the applicant or licensee as having for the regulated activity a significant implication for public health and safety or common defense and security." (6) Reporting of missed or late equipment surveillance tests. Section 50. 73 requires reporting a condition or operation prohibited by the plant's TS. In some cases, this leads to reporting events that consist of late surveillance tests where the oversight is corrected and the equipment is tested. These events have proven to be of little or no risk-significance when the equipment is found to be functional or, alternately, the requirements of the TS are implemented (i.e., any applicable action statements are carried out) and no systematic breakdown of compliance with the TS is involved. In the contemplated amendments, the reporting requirement would be eliminated for events that consist of late TS required surveillance tests where there is no systematic breakdown of compliance with the TS, the oversight is corrected, the testing is performed, and the equipment is still functional or, alternately, the requirements of the TS are implemented. (7) Reporting of a condition outside the coverage of procedures. The current requirement is to report when the plant is in "a condition not covered by the plant's operating and emergency procedures." Experience indicates that this criterion does not result in needed reports. In addition, this criterion is redundant since the other reporting criteria capture events of safety significance. 11

In the contemplated amendments, the requirement to report a condition outside the coverage of procedures would be deleted. (8) Reporting of events that result in actuation of an ESF. The current requirement is to report "Any event or condition that results in a manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS) except when..... " This leads to confusion and variability in reporting because there are varying definitions of what constitutes an ESF. It also leads to reporting for systems of lesser risk-significance, such as e reactor water clean up system (RWCU) isolation. In the contemplated amendments, instead of using the term ESF, the rules would specify the systems for which reporting is required. Systems with lesser risk-significance would be dropped and systems with greater risk-significance would be added. The result would be similar to the discussion in the NRC staffs reporting guidelines. (See NUREG-1022, Revision 1, "Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73," January 1998, Page 60.) These changes would result in the following list: (a) Reactor Protection System (reactor scram, reactor trip). (b) Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (general actuation signals affecting numerous components such as: safety injection actuation signal, containment isolation signal, or recirculation actuation signal). (c) Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) for Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) including: high-, intermediate-, and low-head injection systems and the low pressure injection function of residual (decay) heat removal systems. 12

(d) ECCS for Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) including: high-and low-pressure core spray systems; high-pressure coolant injection system, feedwater coolant injection system, the low pressure injection function of the residual heat removal system; and automatic depressurization system. (e) BWR Isolation Condenser System and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System. (f) Containment Systems including: containment and reactor vessel isolation systems (general containment isolation signals affecting numerous valves, main steam isolation valve [MSIV] closure signals in BWRs); and containment heat removal and depressurization systems, 9 including the containment spray and the fan cooler system. (g) Electrical Systems including: emergency ac electrical power systems, including emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and their associated support systems; the hydroelectric facilities used in lieu of EDGs at the Oconee Station; safety related gas turbine generators; BWR dedicated Division 3 EDGs and their associated support systems; and station blackout diesel generators (and black-start gas turbines that serve a similar purpose and are started from the control room and included in the plant's and emergency procedures). (h) Anticipated Transient Without Scram (A TWS) Mitigating Systems. (i) PWR Auxiliary Feedwater Systems.

0) Service Water (actuation of standby, emergency service water systems only).

(k) Reactor Building and Containment Annulus Filter Systems. (9) Shutdown events. The current rule requires providing the "Status of structures, components, or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event and that contributed to the event" and "An assessment of the safety consequences and implications of the event. This assessment must include the availability of other systems or components that could have 13

performed the same function as the components and systems that failed during the event." In some cases, this does not provide enough information to estimate the risk associated with important shutdown events. In the contemplated amendments, these requirements would be clarified to better indicate information required on the status of systems that are included in the operating or emergency procedures that could have been used in recovering from the event to support risk assessment of the event. (10) Human performance. The current rule requires reporting the following information regarding human performance as a part of the narrative description of the event contained in the written 30 day report: "(1) Operator actions that affected the course of the event, including operator errors, procedural deficiencies, or both, that contributed to the event. (2) For each personnel error, the licensee shall discuss: (i) Whether the error was a cognitive error (e.g., failure to recognize the actual plant condition, failure to realize which systems should be functioning, failure to recognize the true nature of the event) or a procedural error; {ii) Whether the error was contrary to an approved procedure, was a direct result of an error in an approved procedure, or was associated with an activity or task that was not covered by an approved procedure; {iii) Any unusual characteristics of the work location (e.g., heat, noise) that directly contributed to the error; and 14

(iv) The type of personnel involved (i.e., contractor personnel, utility-licensed operator, utility non-licensed operator, other utility personnel)." Human performance information is needed to support analysis of human error probabilities used in risk assessments. This helps in making risk-informed decisions regarding human performance issues in areas such as inspection program development, evaluation of licensing actions, preparation of generic communications and resolution of generic issues. Consistent with the advanced incident reporting system of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the contemplated amendments would require information on how the human performance factors listed below affected the event to the extent they apply. (See NEA/CSNI/R(97)15, PART I, "Improving Reporting and Coding of Human and Organizational Factors in Event Reports," April 1998, Page 15 and Page 16.) (a) Personnel errors and human performance related issues in the areas of procedures, training, communication, human engineering, management, and supervision. (b) In the area of procedures, errors due to missing procedures, procedures which are inadequate due to technical or human factors deficiencies, or which have not been maintained current. (c) Training errors due to a failure to provide training, having provided inadequate training, or training (such as simulator training or on-the-job training) that does not provide an environment comparable to that in the plant. (d) Communications errors due to inadequate, untimely, misunderstood, or missing communication or due to the quality of the communication equipment. 15

(e) Human engineering issues related to the interface or lack thereof between the human and the machine (such as size, shape, location, function or content of displays, controls, equipment or labels) as well as environmental issues such as lighting, temperature, noise, radiation and work area layout. (f) Management errors due to management expectations, corrective actions, root cause determinations, or audits which are inadequate, untimely or missing. (g) In the area of supervision, errors due a lack of supervision, inadequate supervision, job staffing, overtime, scheduling and planning, work practices (such as briefings, logs, work packages, team work, decision making, and housekeeping) or because of inadequate verification, awareness or self-checking. (h) The department for which key personnel work and the type of work or activity being performed. This information is already being captured in the narrative section of most LERs submitted under the current rule, as discussed in the NRG staffs reporting guidelines. (See NUREG-1022, Revision 1, "Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50. 72 and 50. 73," January 1998, Page 110.) The amended rule would explicitly recognize the information discussed in the guidelines. In the amended rule, such human performance information would be provided using a "check the box" approach added to the LER form, to minimize the reporting burden. (11) LER form. The current LER form relies heavily on a narrative to provide information such as the human performance information discussed above, equipment that was not available, and equipment that was actuated. It appears that the reporting effort could be 16

reduced by adopting a "check the box" approach to the extent practical. A narrative would still be required to convey an understanding of the event. However, data regarding human and equipment performance, for example, would be incluC:ed in the narrative only if they are pertinent to understanding the event. In conjunction with the contemplated amendments, the LER form would be redesigned to reduce the reporting effort. To the extent practical, this approach would be compatible with equipment failure reporting in the industry's Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) program. (12) Electronic reporting. The NRC staff is currently planning to implement an electronic reporting program, known as the Agency-wide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS), that will in general provide for electronic submittal of many types of reports, including LERs. Accordingly, no separate rulemaking effort to provide for electronic submittal of LERs is contemplated. (13) Enforcement. Since the criteria for reporting arising from this rulemaking would focus on matters of safety significance and be more risk informed, the reporting criteria may be a relevant consideration in determining the severity level of a violation under the Enforcement Policy. The staff intends to consider the reporting criteria in its ongoing review of the severity levels in the NRC Enforcement Policy. Contemplated Schedule: The contemplated schedule for the rulemaking is as follows:

• 8/21/98, Conduct public workshop to discuss ANPR 17
• 9/18/98, Receive public comments on ANPR
• 10/16/98, Provide proposed rule package to NRC staff working group for comment
• 11 /27 /98, Provide proposed rule package to formal concurrence chain
• 1/8/99, Provide proposed rule package to CRGR and ACRS
• 2/5/99, Complete briefing of CRGR and ACRS
• 2/26/99, Provide proposed rule package to Commission
• 4/2/99, Publish proposed rule
• 5/2/99, Initial public comments due to 0MB (with copies to NRC), 30 days after publication
• 6/1/99, Receive 0MB approval, 60 days after publication
• 6/15/99, Public comments due to NRC, 75 days after publication
• 7/2/99, Provide final rule package to NRC staff working group for comment
• 8/13/99, Provide final rule package to formal concurrence chain
• 9/17/99, Provide final rule package to CRGR and ACRS
• 11/5/99, Complete briefing of CRGR and ACRS
• 11/26/99, Provide final rule package to Commission
• 1 n 100, Publish final rule Comments requested: The Commission invites advice and recommendations from all interested persons regarding changes to the event reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors contained in 10 CFR 50. 72 and 50. 73. Comments and supporting reasons are particularly requested on:

(1) the objectives; (2) the contemplated amendments, including: 18

(a) the clarity and specificity of the contemplated criteria for reporting design and analysis defects and deviations; and (b) the proposed initial reporting time of 8 hours for events that warrant prompt telephone notification but do not involve emergencies; (3) the contemplated schedule. To the extent feasible, commenters are requested to address the following factors. (1) Identify a specific reporting requirement. (2) Describe the problem with that requirement. (3) Describe the proposed resolution. (4) Estimate the change in resource burden as a result of the proposed resolution. In order to support meaningful consideration, comments on resource burden should provide the basis for the burden estimate in sufficient detail to allow specific identification of what causes the burden and how particular changes might affect the burden. Other Reactor Reporting Requirements Objectives: The NRC is also interested in evaluating other reactor reporting rules (beyond 1 O CFR 50. 72 and 50. 73) to identify areas where reporting requirements can be risk-informed and/or simplified. For example, the time limit for reporting could be adjusted based on the safety significance of the event or issue and the need for NRC's immediate action. The burden associated with reporting events, conditions or issues with little or no safety or risk significance should be minimized. 19

Comments reguested: Public comments are requested to identify and propose changes to other reactor reporting requirements (beyond 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73) that are potential candidates for modifying to a simplified, less burdensome, more risk-informed approach. This issue will be included in the agenda for the public meeting to discuss this ANPR, which is identified in the schedule provided above. List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The authority citation for this document is: 42 U.S.C. 2201; 42 U.S.C. 5841. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this &day of ~6 I 1998 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. L.J:!ft: Executive Director for Operations 20

NOTE TO: Emile Julian FROM: Chief, Docketing and Services Branch Carol Gallagher ADM.DAS September 22, 1998

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING FOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. This comment was received via the rulemaking website on September 21, 1998. The submitter's name is Bradford L. Houston, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Safety, Nebraska Public Power District--Cooper Nuclear Station, PO Box 98, Brownville, NE 68321. Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Dennis Allison (mail stop T 4-A-9) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o attachment: D. Allison

September 30, 1998 NOTE TO: Emile Julian Chief, Docketing and Services Branch FROM: Carol Gallagher fl_.* R, A n n,,,J.,.y/ ADM, DAS L,O-Ytr- ~(J

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING - REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject proposed advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. This comment was received via fax on September 29, 1998. The submitter's name is James H. McCarthy, Virginia Power, Innsbrook Technical Center, 5000 Dominion Boulevard, Glen Allen, VA 23060. Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Dennis Allison (mail stop T4-A-9) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o attachment: D. Allison

September 22, 1998 NOTE TO: Emile Julian Chief, Docketing and Services Branch FROM: Carol Gallagher /l. 0 (J.. A. P 1.A.lv ADM, DAS ~ ~-o**

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING FOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. This comment was received via the rulemaking website on September 21, 1998. The submitter's name is Stephen J. Bethay, Acting Vice President, Operations Support, Entergy Operations Inc., P.O. Box 31995, Jackson MS 39286-1995. Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Dennis Allison (mail stop T 4-A-9) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o attachment: D. Allison

NOTE TO: FROM: September 22, 1998 Emile Julian Chief, Docketing and Services Branch Carol Gallagher ADM,DAS ~~

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING FOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. This comment was received via e-mail on September 21, 1998. The submitter's name is Donna B. Alexander, Manager, Performance Evaluation and Regulatory Affairs, Carolina Power & Light Company. Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Dennis Allison (mail stop T 4-A-9) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o attachment: D. Allison

September 18, 1998 NOTE TO: Emile Julian Chief, Docketing and Services Branch FROM: Carol Gallagher /1 _ _ ll A. {) 0 .A111 Jvr ADM, DAS ~ ~-{

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING, "REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS" Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. This comment was received via e-mail on August 20, 1998. The submitter's name is Mark J. Burzynski, Manager, Nuclear Licensing, Tennessee Valley Authority. Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Dennis Allison (mail stop T4-A-9) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o attachment: D. Allison}}