ML23159A076
| ML23159A076 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/15/1987 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC/SECY |
| To: | |
| References | |
| PR-050, 52FR34884 | |
| Download: ML23159A076 (1) | |
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KEYWORD: ADAMS Template: SECY-067 09/15/1987 PR-050 - 52FR34884 - NUCLEAR POWER PLANT STANDARDIZATION PR-050 52FR34884 RULEMAKI NG COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNS! Review Complete
PAGE 1 OF 2 STATUS OF RULEMAKING RECORD 1 OF OPOSBD*RULB: PR-050 RULB NAME: NUCLEAR POWER PLANT STANDARDIZATION PROPOSED RULB FBD REG CITB: 52FR34884 PROPOSED RULB PUBLICATION DATE: 09/15/87 ORIGINAL-DATE FOR COMMENTS: 10/30/87 NUMBER OF COMMENTS: EXTENSION DATE: I I FINAL RULB FED. REG. CITE: FINAL RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 7 1 I I NOTES ON: COMMISSION APPROVED POLICY STATEMEH'l' AND ASKED THE STAFF TO ORGANI STATUS
- ZEA WORKSHOP. SECRETARY SIGNED POLICY STATEKEH'l' 9/9/87. POLICY EF OF RULE: FECTIVE 9/15/87. SEE PR-52 (53FR32060). 1 FEDERAL REGISTER PUB.
PRESS PAGE DOD OR ENTER TO SEE RULE HISTORY OR STAFF CONTACT PRESS ESC TO SEE ADDITIONAL RULES, (E) TO EDIT OR (S) TO STOP DISPLAY l PAGE 2 OF 2 HISTORY OF THE RULE T AFFECTED: PR-050 RULE TITLE: NUCLEAR POWER PLANT STANDARDIZATION DATE PROPOSED RULE PROPOSED RULE SECY PAPER: PROPOSED RULE SRM DATE: I I SIGNED BY SECRETARY: 09/09/87 FINAL RULE SECY PAPER: 87-193 FINAL RULE SRM DATE: DATE FINAL RULE 08/27/87 SIGNED BY SECRETARY: STAFF CONTACTS ON THE RULE I I CONTACTl: JERRY N. WILSON CONTACT2: MAIL STOP: NL-007 MAIL STOP: PHONE: 492-4727 PRONE: PRESS PAGEUP TO SEE STATUS OF RULEMAKING PRESS BSC TO SEE ADDITIONAL RULES, (E) TO EDIT OR (S) TO STOP DISPLAY
DOCKET NO. PR-050 (52FR34884) In the Matter of NUCLEAR POWER PLANT STANDARDIZATION DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 09/11/87 09/09/87 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - POLICY STATEMENT 10/16/87 10/10/87 COMMENT OFT. TUTHILL (
- 7) 11/02/87 10/30/87 COMMENT OF STONE l WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORP (R.B. BRADBURY) (
- 1) 11/02/87 10/30/87 COMMENT OF BECHTEL POWER CORP (R.H. STONE)
.11/04/87 10/27/87 COMMENT OF JAMES PERKINS (
- 3) 10/23/87 COMMENT OF GENERAL ELECTRIC CO (R. ARTIGAS) 11/10/87 11/12/87 11/11/87 COMMENT OF COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC (A.E. SCHERER) (
- 5) 11/13/87 11/10/87 COMMENT OF WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP (W.J.
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Westinghouse Electric Corporation DOCKET NUMBER ~ PROPOSED RULE PR-:;?__. (52 F/2,-14??+- Power Systems Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Box 355 Pittsburgh Pennsylvania 15230-0355 November 10, 1987 NS-NRC-87-3289
Subject:
Westinghouse Comments to Nuclear Power Plant Standardization Policy Statement (52 FR 34884)
Dear Mr. Chilk:
Westinghouse is pleased that the NRC has issued the Policy Statement on Nuclear Power Plant Standardization. This policy statement represents an important first step towards establishing a licensing process by which future commercial nuclear generating facilities can be undertaken with certainty. In order to fully utilize the standardization policy, it is now important that the Commission move rapidly forward with proposed rulemaking packages and associated regulatory guidelines so that the licensing process described by the policy can be fully implemented by the industry. Westinghouse has participated in NUMARC efforts to provide review and comments to the Commission on this policy statement. Westinghouse fully endorses the NUMARC positions as described in their comment letter to you. We urge the Commission to move promptly in its rulemaking process to implement its Standardization Policy Statement. MHS/bek/3450n Very truly yours, -C. clL- "ft"9U,,,...-w. J Johnson, Manager Nuclear Safety Department
l U.S. NUCLEAR REGUI t, T'l.::Y COMMISSIOB DOCKETING & S *** '1*.:E !'.ECTION OFFICE C~ 7' l.~~ET ARY OF Tf-<C
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COMBUSTION~ ENGINEERING Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Office of the Secretary c/o Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 November 11, 1987 LD-87-062 OOC.:KEiEe USNRC 'II IIJV 12 Pl :30 OfFtCE GF SE i~RU/.rff DOCKETING~ SERVIC[ BRANCH
Subject:
Comments on the Policy Statement and Proposed Rulemaking on Nuclear Power Plant Standardization
Dear Sir:
Combustion Engineering appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's revised policy statement on Nuclear Power Plant Standardization and on the relevant issues that need to be addressed in the forthcoming rulemaking package as published in 52FR34884 of September 15, 1987. We understand, based on a conversation between Mr. Wilson (NRC) and Dr. Green (C-E), that comments submitted by today would be considered timely. Combustion Engineering has been a pioneer in the ~romotion and design of standardized nuclear power plants. Our System 80 is one of two designs to have received a Final Design Approval (FDA) and is the only design whose FDA has been successfully referenced in Operating License proceedings. Combustion Engineering continues to be firmly committed to nuclear power plant standardization. We have been a major participant in the Electric Power Research Institute's Advanced Light Water Reactor project to define the requirement for the next generation of commercial nuclear power plants. We have also announced our intention of pursuing a Design Certification for an enhanced System 80 design which we refer to as System 80 PLUS' under the support of the Department of Energy's Design Verification Program. Combustion Engineering participated in the October 20, 1987 workshop on standardization sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In that meeting, we fully endorsed the remarks made by Mr. Richard B. Priory, Chairman of the Nuclear Management and Resources Council's Standard-Power Systems Combustion Engineering, Inc. 1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 (203) 688-1911 Telex: 99297
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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk November 11, 1987 LD-87-062 Page 2 ization Oversight Group. We further participated in and endorse the November 10, 1987 written comments on standardization submitted by Mr. Bryon Lee, Jr., President of the Nuclear Management and Resources Council. We are taking this opportunity, however, to present some of our own perspective on this extremely important subject. The future viability of the nuclear power option is dependent on many factors. Two of the most significant factors are the ability of the nuclear industry to offer a pre-licensed standard design and the commitment of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to accede to the terms of the Design Certification when referenced by an applicant. One point must be emphatically declared -- the success of the standard-ization process and, in turn, the future LWR option, will depend on the industry's confidence that, years hence, the Commission will stand by the decisions it makes in the Design Certification. The first step the NRC must take to establish that confidence is to demonstrate now its commitment not to reopen during the Design Certification review issues which have already been closed. The second step is to establish early -- and then hold to -- regulatory standards for the closeout of open issues during the Design Certification Review. Our detailed comments are attached and are consistent with those of the Nuclear Management and Resources Council. In summary, we believe that the September 1987 policy statement is an encouraging beginning toward making the licensing process more predictable. We urge the Commission to continue with its effort to implement an appropriate and timely rulemaking to complete the process. If we can provide any additional information or clarification, please do not hesitate to call me or Dr. Michael Green of my staff at (203) 285-5204. AES:ss Attachment Very truly yours, COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC. A. E Director Nuclear Licensing
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING COMMENTS ON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT STANDARDIZATION POLICY STATEMENT AND PROPOSED RULEMAKING INTRODUCTION Combustion Engineering believes that one of the prerequisites to a viable domestic nuclear energy option is a reformed licensing process. The current two-cycle licensing process, with its attendant uncertainty and instability, effectively precludes utilities from considering the nuclear option. Ideally, licensing reforms should be captured in legislation. We believe, however, that most -::- if not all -- of the provisions of the Commission's 1987 legislative proposal can be effectively implemented under existing statutory authority. The new Standardization Policy Statement is an excellent first step towards reforming the licensing process. The next contemplated step, rulemaking, should go a long way toward completing this reformation. Combustion Engineering believes that the contemplated rulemaking should result in changes which: o provide for NRC certification of standardized nuclear designs that can be constructed without changes at any site, by any utility, on a predictable schedule, 0 provide for development of sites which can be made independently pre-approved by the NRC and o afford the public an improved opportunity to have a meaningful and timely input to the licensing process. The following provides Combustion Engineering's comments on the September 1987 Standardization Policy Statement, as well as NRC statements made at the October 20, 1987, workshop. LEVEL OF SCOPE AND DETAIL The term "standardized design" should be defined to be a design which the Commission determines is sufficiently detailed and complete to support licensing of a commercial production or utilization facility or approval of a major portion of such facility when referenced in an application for a construction permit, an operating license, a combined construction and operating license, a design approval, or a Design Certification and which is usable for a multiple number of units and/ or at a multiple number of sites without reopening or repeating the review. In order to obtain a conclusive review of the standardized design, the applicant should be required to include sufficient detail to allow the staff to reach the required health and safety determinations. Design Certification applications, therefore, should include the information necessary to properly define and characterize the construction and operation of the plant. The level of detail which should be required to support certification of standardized designs should be simply that which is sufficient to allow the staff to issue a conclusive Safety Evaluation Report. It is important that the NRC close out all applicable safety issues when reviewing a standardized design. The resulting Design Certification should ideally contain no qualifiers which might require additional review later. RESOLUTION OF SAFETY ISSUES The 1985 Severe Accident Policy contains additional licensing requirements for new plants. It is important that the NRC staff move quickly to establish acceptance criteria for demonstrating conformance to these additional requirements before the applicants finalize their designs. Development and publication of the appropriate regulatory acceptance criteria can -- and should -- be completed by October 1, 1988. These criteria can be developed via the Electrical Power Research Institute Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Regulatory Stabilization Program and the DOE Advanced Reactor Severe Accident Program (ARSAP). The NRC should specify that demonstration of compliance with these ALWR requirements and ARSAP findings, if incorporated, will be considered to resolve the associated safety issue on the individual Design Certification dockets. CHANGES TO APPROVED DESIGNS The Backfit Rule (10 CFR 50.109) explicitly states that it is applicable to design approvals. No unique or revised standard should be established for standardized plants, except that in applying the Backfit Rule to standard designs, analyses should be performed on the "lead unit" for any given design series. If the backfit can be justified on the "lead" ( or most expensive) unit, it should be implemented on all units referencing that design. If the backfit cannot be justified on the lead unit, it should not be applied to any unit referencing that design. To do less would violate one of the basic tenants of standardization -- that of maintaining all of the referencing units identical. If Design Certifications are to be credible, the NRC must also protect the rights of holders of existing Final Design Approvals (FDAs). That is to say, issues which had been closed in the review for an FDA should remain closed, absent a relevant substantial safety issue which had not been previously considered. By issuing an FDA, the NRC has determined that the design has met the rules and regulations of the Commission and will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public. The Commission has, however, established additional requirements as the basis for obtaining a Design Certification. For example, the Severe Accident Policy requires that the applicant for a Design Certification provide technical resolution of the applicable Unresolved. Safety Issues. These additional requirements are by definition, beyond the "adequate protection" threshold that the NRC is using to license current plants. The Backfit Rule, therefore, provides the appropriate criteria and process for resolving areas of dispute in the Design Certification review. The FDA holder should be required to make an additional change only if analysis, in accordance with the Backfit Rule, shows that its costs are justified by the increase in overall protection of the health and safety of the public. Once the Design Certification is granted, provisions similar to 10 CFR
- 50. 59 should be made applicable.
Currently, only holders of Operating Licenses can utilize the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. Allowing holders of Design Certifications ( and holders of a license referencing a Design Certification) to make 10 CFR 50. 59 findings would eliminate the need for trivial and cumbersome certification amendments that would otherwise be required. DESIGN CERTIFICATION HEARING PROCESS The rules should allow for a more effective means of public participation. Since in a Design Certification the applicant is providing essentially final information up-front, any possible hearings should be held before construction is started. Great care should be taken to assure that the results of these hearings are conclusive. This is in contrast to the current process where hearings are held ( 1) when only preliminary design information is available and (2) after the facility has been built. In the first case, the information available is insufficient to make the hearing conclusive. In the second case, changes are either not feasible or cannot be accommodated without significant impacts on cost and schedules. As to the form of NRC approval, we believe the Commission has authority to grant a Design Certification either by rulemaking or by issuance of a design license. We believe the Commission should seek views in its notice of proposed standardization regulation rulemaking as to whether Design Certification should be permitted via rulemaking only, or whether a design license should be allowed as an alternative. A license fits within a well-established regulatory framework, and brings with it certain rights and obligations that, absent express provision therefore, are not clearly defined in connection with the certification of a design by rulemaking. Thus, as an alternative to Design Certification by rulemaking, the Commission should seek public comment on and consider whether Design Certification by issuance of a design license is appropriate. Whatever procedures are eventually established for Design Certification they must contain provisions for the protection of proprietary information. Current Commission regulations and procedures for treatment of proprietary information in connection with Commission licensing provide appropriate protection and should be applied in connection with Design Certification procedures ir~espective of their format. RELITIGATION OF ISSUES The Design Certification must not be subject to challenge in. individual licensing proceedings. Any challenge to a Design Certification, whether sought by reason of special circumstances or otherwise, should only be considered in a Design Certification amendment proceeding. The Commission should not modify any final determination of an issue that has been considered and decided in Design Certification proceedings, unless it determines, based on significant new information, that a modification is required to protect the public health and safety or the common defense and security. Such modifications should be implemented in accordance with the Commission's Backfit Rule. In response to a third party petition for a Design Certification amendment proceeding, the Commission should not admit an issue that has been considered and decided in the Design Certification proceeding ( or an earlier Design Certification amendment proceeding) unless the Commission determines that a prima facie showing has been made that there is significant new information indicating that a design modification is required to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety or the common defense and security. QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN Applications for Design Certifications should define the tests, inspections, and related acceptance criteria necessary to assure that the designs are properly implemented in the "as-built" plant. The rule should specify that these tests and inspections may be verified by a series of "sign-as-you-go" audits as the plant is built. Such audits would confirm and document that
- the plant is being constructed consistent with the pre-approved criteria and that the specified tests have been completed satisfactorily.
There must be safeguards to prevent any redetermination of the acceptance criteria or of what constitutes an acceptable design basis involved in these audits. To allow such redeterminations would violate one of the most
- fundamental tenants of pre-approval.
APPROVAL AND RENEWAL OF DESIGN CERTIFICATIONS Combustion Engineering recommends that the Rule provide for a Design Certification valid for not less than ten (10) years from date of approval, with possible extensions of not less than ten (10) years each. The rule should also specify that a Design Certification be allowed to be referenced from its date of docketing. Requests for renewal of Design Certifications should be submitted no less than 12 months prior to the expiration date of the certification, since little, if any, re-review should be required. The staff should grant these renewals unless it determines that the design does not meet the basis for its approval. Assuming a timely renewal request, Design Certifications should remain in effect while awaiting Commission action. Additional hearings should not be mandated for a Design Certification renewal. I--- Finally, the expiration of a Design Certification should not affect the use of the reference design in applications which referenced the Design Certification prior to its expiration. In other words, an Operating License should be allowed to reference an expired Design Certification if it was referenced in the Construction Permit. LICENSING FEES Combustion Engineering urges the Commission to codify the deferral of fees for applications, amendments or renewals of Design Certifications. In addition, the fees associated with a post-FDA Design Certification review should be assigned to a unique category. Since the design has already been reviewed, approved, and an FDA issued, the NRC has already determined that the design meets all of the applicable rules and regulations of the Commission. All that is left, therefore, is to conduct a limited review to determine if the design will comply with the additional requirements of the Severe Accident Policy ( as referenced by the Standardization Policy). That effort should be significantly less than the original full scope FDA review for which a fee has already been paid. In order to minimize the administrative burden on applicants for Design Certifications, and in an effort to promote standardization, any fees associated with a post-FDA Design Certification review should be fixed at a small fraction of the existing FDA review fee. REVISED LICENSING PROCESS To allow the development of standardized nuclear power plants, it is not just necessary, but imperative, that the current process be modified. The new rule must provide for a pre-approval process which will result in permission to initiate power operation -- absent a Commission finding to the contrary. There is a compelling need to resolve at the front end, before construction has commenced, all applicable regulatory issues relating to the design and safety of the plant. Such resolution, together with the detailing of tests, inspections, and acceptance criteria for a plant, will allow a facility to be licensed for construction and operation in a single proceeding, and thereafter, to proceed through construction into operation without the necessity of undergoing an almost automatic second hearing at the Operating License stage. Stability and predictability in the licensing process can come only where issues are considered and decided prior to commencement of construction and prior to the investment of billions of dollars in a nuclear plant. We believe the public will benefit from such a revised process because of enhanced quality and opportunity for public hearing and because the greater degree of design detail available up-front and the early delineation of tests, inspections, and acceptance criteria will provide for a more complete review before construction begins.
I ,, ADVANCED REACTORS The reference system designs, at least initially, are expected to be evolutions of existing, proven LWR designs. Our System 80 PLUS is just such an evolutionary design. Truly advanced design concepts should be developed according to the guidelines of the Advanced Reactor Policy Statement. The rule should provide for certification of advanced designs on a "parallel path" approach to the evolutionary LWR designs. CONCLUDING REMARKS Combustion Engineering supports the Commission's intent to encourage standardization and improve the licensing process for standardized power plants. We also support the timely development of regulations and guidance describing how the goals expressed in the policy statement will be carried out. In order to support the needs of our current Design Certification program, the rulemaking process and its supporting guidance should be issued during fiscal year 1988. Combustion Engineering believes that the issues discussed above are critical to the viability of nuclear power as an energy source for future generations in the United States.
DOCKET NUMBER PR ~-~ /7) P,ROPOSED RULE - -tJ-u__ (::t,/ c~,2 ~ J...,,,,v GEN ERAL fj EL ECTRIC 00(;K[TE0 USNHC NUCLEAR ENERGY BUSINESS OPERATIONS 56 GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY* 175 CURTNER AVENUE
- SAN JOSE, cll}oRMJV 9tij5 P\\2 :
NUCLEAR PRODUCTS San Jose, California HCP- 078-087 October 23, 1987 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen : OF!C!: GF :,~CR.i/\\i~*1 DOCKETI NG l-< S f 1 V ICf. BRANCH. GE has reviewed the Commission's policy statement on nuclear power plant standardization as well as the NRC's plans for implementation of this policy as discussed in the October 20, 1987 workshop (noticed in the Federal Register of September 15, 1987). We are pleased to offer our comments and suggestions on the policy and its implementation. Our comments are made with a view toward establishment of a significant advancement in nuclear power plant standardization and its full implementation in the licensing process. GE's longstanding commitment to standardization is manifested by its active participation throughout the 1970's and early 1980's in efforts to pre-approve standard plant designs - - efforts that culminated in receipt of the first Preliminary Design Approval in December 1975, the first Final Design Approval (FDA) in July, 1983, and the first forward - referenceable FDA in September 1986 following completion of a severe accident review for the standardized design. While these accomplishments are noteworthy and represent a significant investment of resources by both GE and the NRC Staff, the overall result fell well short of its intended goal. The time required to obtain design approvals, the finality of approvals once gained, and the ability to utilize them in facil i ty licensing proceedings were all subject to severe shortcomings. We need to learn from the hard lessons of that experience and be prepared to apply those lessons in reshaping the Commission's design approval and licensing processes. One of the most important lessons to be learned is that previous design approvals lacked the regulatory framework needed to capitalize on the underlying investment of industry and NRC resources and maximize the inherent advantages of preapproval. More specifically, there was no defined process for design certi fication that would give these approvals true regulatory finality nor was there a process for later single - stage licensing of facility applications that referenced pre-approved designs. We have the opportunity to correct these shortcomings in the proposed regulations. HCP-87007:pd
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- c.,
GE is in agreement with the statement by Richard Priory at the October 20, 1987 workshop. In particular GE supports the Commission's endorsement of design standardization, and its recognition of the benefits that can be realized from standardization. GE is in full agreement with the Commission's stated intent to put in place a design certification process and a complementary licensing regime that will promote the practical achievement of standardization's goals. Also, GE endorses the development of implementing regulations which will accomplish, to the greatest possible extent, the aims of the legislative licensing reform proposals submitted by the NRG to the Congress earlier this year. GE considers it extremely important that the standardization program include specific licensing procedures for utility-applicants referencing certified standard designs for construction on approved sites. Specifically, the Commission is encouraged to strive to implement a single-stage licensing process. The objective of that process would be to close out definitively, before commencement of construction, all design and site-related issues; and to establish the tests, inspections, and acceptance criteria that will later demonstrate construction compliance. Finally, GE believes it is important that the proposed regulatory changes appropria:tely address certification of distinct reactor types, including the advanced design concepts such as the liquid metal reactor, as well as the evolutionary light water reactor designs. In this regard, the development of new regulations should be integrated with the ongoing NRG review of these advanced concepts and associated industry proposals for regulatory changes. GE appreciates this opportunity to provide input to this process and looks forward to working constructively with the NRG in the development of regulations implementing the standardization policy. Towards this
- end, additional comments are contained in the attachment to this letter addressing the matters discussed at the October 20, 1987 workshop.
Thank you again for this opportunity to provide comments. Sincerely, ~. ~:a--¥ "/4 Licensing & Consulting Services cc: L. S. Gifford J. N. Wilson (NRG) HGP-87007:pd
ATTACHMENT SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON STANDARDIZATION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
- 1)
The scheduled date for issuing the proposed rule for notice and comment was stated to be the end of 1987, with the final rule to be issued in 1988. This indicates that rule making has been given appropriately high priority within the NRG. We encourage adherence to this schedule.
- 2)
It was stated (S. Crockett) that the current thinking regarding new regulations is focused in the evolutionary designs but could include prototypical testing considerations. GE strongly recommends that the regulations being formulated address certification of all reactor types - both evolutionary and advanced concepts such as the liquid metal reactor. This includes consideration of prototype testing and empirical information as it relates to designs which represent a significant departure from those previously approved. To this end, the approach specified in the proposed 10CFR5O Appendix S, "Certification of Standard Designs for Advanced Nuclear Power Plants Applying Demonstrated Performance" should be incorporated into the new regulations for licensing of advanced reactor concepts.
- 3)
With regard to the finality of decisions on issues in a design certification proceeding, it appears that the doctrine of "adequate protection" is not clearly established. It seems appropriate to apply the criteria of 10CFRSO.1O9 "Backfitting" in cases were, on the basis of new information, reconsideration of decisions seems appropriate.
- 4)
During the workshop, S. Crockett asked for comments on how to specify the safety goal (i.e., by incorporating a specific goal in the rule, or in some other manner). GE recommends that a specific safety goal not be included in the regulations. The Commission policy statement on safety goals observes that safety goals were never intended to serve as a sole basis for licensing decisions, but only as one factor in the licensing decision process. Accordingly, flexibility in the application of a safety goal should be retained, with the goal established in a more appropriate form of document such as a regulatory guide.
- 5)
It was -stated that the proposed specific licensing procedure, for utility-applicants referencing certified standard designs in conjunction with approved sites, would involve issuing a combined construction permit and operating license prior to construction. The operating license would be "conditioned" to require the applicant to show compliance with appropriate construction authorization requirements and commitments. When construction is complete, an unencumbered operating license would be issued pursuant to 10CFRSO.57. This appears to be consistent with the objective of single-stage licensing only if all plant design and site acceptability issues resolved in the certification and early site approval process are, absent some extraordinary reason to the contrary, exempt from further review, and the 10CFRSO.57 review is limited to the determination of compliance during construction. HCP-87OO7:pd
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- 6)
It is clearly within the capability of todays technology to design plants which will operate well beyond the current 40 year license. Extending the maximum license term would encourage consideration of additional longevity in the design of standardized plants. This should provide economic benefits for the operating utility as well as eliminating some of todays regulatory uncertainty associated with plant life extension. Because of this, it is recommended that appropriate legislative action be considered to permit issuance of operating licenses for 60 years or longer. HCP-87007:pd
DOCKET NUMBER Dff ;;;-~-m~ PROPOSED RULE r, -:~~:,_ l::2) ( 52 FK S-1J?rt) 5 2b_ DOC:KEiED USNRC - Box 141 North Easton MA 02356 ~~ NOV -4 P*2 :20 27 October 1967 Samue 1 Chil k Secretary of the NRC USNRC Washington DC 20555
Dear Mr. Chi 1 k:
OFFICE OF SE CRETAF. Y oocKn ING & sn1v1cr, BRANGH. Please find attached comments for the record concerning the policy statement on reactor standardization, notice of which was published in the Federal Register (Vol. 52, No. 176, pp 34684-6) on Tuesday, September 15, 1967. cc: Sen. Edward Kennedy Sen. John Kerry Rep. Joseph Moakley James Perkins
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DOCKET NUMBER Dff ~ -- ~ PROPOSED RU E L -.;;;_:_*~ __ la) ( 52 F~ $-?J?rt) OOC:KEiEQ USNRC Box 141 North Easton MA 02356 ~ tllV -4 P*2 :20 27 October 1987 OFF!Cf. OF SECR "lAh Y OOCK~i ING & S tlVICf... BRA.NCl-l. Please find attached comments for the record concerning the policy statement on reactor standardization, notice of which was published in the Federal Register (Vol. 52, No. 178, pp 34884-6) on Tuesday, September 15, 1987. cc: Sen. Edward Kennedy Sen. John Kerry Rep. Joseph Moakley Jomes Perkins
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,\\ \\ ~_:___jomments of James Perkins Notice regarding Reactor Standardization 52 FR 1 76, September 15, 1987 page 1 of 3
Background
Despite its apparent belief otherwise, the NRC is not responsible for initiatives to "enhance the... availability of nuclear plants." This responsibility was excluded from the mandate of the Commission. This section twice refers to alleged "complexity and uncertainty in (or 'of') the regulatory process". Most of the complexity that has been introduced into the system of licensure has been due to Commission efforts to ease the burdens on those seeking licenses. For examp 1 e, the licensing hearings for the Seabrook Station have been split into several separate sets of proceedings because the Commission has seen fit to hold hearings on pieces of the licensing questions, rather than wait until the utility is ready for hearings on the whole. It is ludicrous to conduct fuJl-blown hearings on the evac~ation planning for communities in one state at a time, but that has been the Commission's decision, not the result of actions taken by the intervening parties. Before any actions are taken in the name of reducing complexity, there I should be an adequate opportunity to assess the nature and source of the alleged complexity. It is true that in this society nuclear power is controversial. Hence, the resolution of licensing questions are bound to be complex. In a democracy, there is no room for cutting the Gordian Knot. On the intent "to encourage the use of standard plant designs... ": Encouraging standardization, if done laxly, does not mandate standardization. Any individual utility which may appropriately (or not) opt for site-specific changes will reintroduce complexity. The Commission's plan to "envelop a large portion of the potential sites", whlch is referred to in the Statement of Policy~ will presumably not mandate the same requirements for tolerating seismic stress on a future California plant as on one in a region less seismically inclined. Hence, the envelopes will likely be so wide as to undo standardization. Encouraging standardization, if done rigorously, will certainly stifle ingenuity, notwithstanding the wishful assertion that it will not. Not even former Chairman Palladino would claim otherwise if he hoped to walk
C \\ \\ 'riments of James Perkins
~e 2 of 3 through the corridors of his Department of Nuclear Engineering at Penn State with head held high. The Commission should actively solicit opinions on this specious claim from engineering school professors across the country.
The Notice suggests later that, "(t)he most significant (drawbar:k) is that specific problems may potentially affect a large nurnber of reactors." That is a masterpiece of understatement. The Commission should face the reality that if this proposal were in place no utility would dare choose to buck an established design with its purported freedom from complexity and uncertainty in licensing in order to try out a newer model. No utility would dare look its state utility commission in the eye and opt for a plant design that is allegedly better, but one that carries with it the threat of a complex and uncertain regulatory future. On the "intent to make resources available on a priority basis... ": While the Commission may know a few reactor vendors with under-employed design staffs and may feel that its licensing boards won't have enough work in the years ahead, there is not an overwhelming clamor in the marketplace for new reactor designs. The problems of living with and correcting past design flaws should be more than adequate to keep the Commission and the country's nuclear engineers busy. There are enormous problems associated with the ongoing operation of GE containments, embrittled reactor vessels, and spent fuel pools filled beyond their design bases. It is for these and similar existing issues that the Commission should mak~ its resources available on a priority basis. Finally, it is interesting to note that the Commission has seen fit to revive here old dreams of "one-step licensing" and "site-banking". These are attempts to avoid the public opposition that mounts slowly, but often persuasively, to poorly planned projects. Statement of Policy It is asserted that "(o)ther features of the design which are dependent on the site... are also reviewed for acceptability and compatibility with the pre-approved/certified design at the time of an actual application." This statement requires substant i a 1 c 1 ari f i cation:
Comments of Jomes Perkins page 3 of 3 Is this section of the Statement of Policy asserting that all site-specific issues must be fully resolved and litigated prior to the granting of an OL (or of a combined CP/OL in the event of one-step licensing)? Or is it osserting that the pre-approved/certified design will have guiding parameters on these issues for licensing boards to apply and rule upon at their own discretion? It would not be acceptable, and it would certainly face court cha 11 enge, to grant a 1i cense to operate based upon a Board's judgement that some years in the future there will be sufficient cooling water and/or adeQuate emergency plans. Even more challengable would be a Board's finding that a plant is seismically adequately designed, if, as the construction progresses, new faults or fractured rock or unexpectedly soft soils are encountered. The Commission must address the Question of when and what types of new information would lead to the reconsideration of findings of adequacy. Finally, if "procedures will be developed to allow for plant-specific variances... at the reQuest of the facility licensees" (and would-be licensees, presumably), the Commission will have to address the reasons for denying interested third parties or will have to allow interested tf1frd parties the right to make a case for additional plant-specific variances. In Summary As an afterword, may I note that this Notice is sad evidence that the Commission has not learned the lessons which underlay and justified its creation. Others are supposed to worry about the future of nuclear power in this country. The Commission's main task is to make certain that the public's health and safety are protected from nuclear power. This need not_. on the face of it, mean that the Commission must close every reactor immediately. It does, however_. mean that the Commission should be concentrating on u-,e problerns at 1*,and. It was precisely because the AEC was so busy dreaming about the nuclear power of the future that it failed to regulate that which it had. The NRC is supposed to be free of such conflicts, but the temptation seems to be too great. The present mess is too unpleasant, even dangerous; so you yearn for the rosy future where no design flaws have yet been built in.
5026 Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 DOCKET NUMBER PR §?;'~~ (:i) PROPOSED RULE 5: F~ 'j"~~y,f) ~ Bechtel Power EorporatiorV Engineers-Constructors OO(;K[ if[) USN~ Fifty Beale Street San Francisco, California 1J1 tlJV _, r:u, :, s Mail Address: P.O. Box 3965, San Francisco, C~4fJ g" October 30, 1987 Orff Cf. Of 5~.::{f !ARY DOCKETING & '.iEt?VlCf. BRANCH Attention: Docketing and Service Branch
Subject:
Gentlemen: Policy Statement on Nuclear Power Plant Standardization, Federal Register, Vol. 52, No. 178, September 15, 1987
- We believe that a greater degree of standardization for future nuclear power plants in the U.S. would have many benefits.
These include less uncertainty in licensing, better utilization of design resources, clearer procedures for ensuring that operating experience is reflected in the design of new plants, as well as greater predictability in costs and schedules. We have presented our views on standardization in many forums, in a number of meetings with the NRC Commissioners, and in meetings with the NRC staff. We appreciate the opportunity to again express our views on achievable standardization for the U.S. The policy statement emphasizes development of designs for certifica-tion which "are essentially complete in both scope and level of detail." The issues of scope of a standardization package and the level of detail were the key points for discussion over the last 20 years and need very careful definition in any achievable standardization policy. We worked with the AIF Study Group on the Practical Application of Standardized Nuclear Power Plants and its Working Group on Design Infor-mation Requirements. We support the statement on the level of detail developed by this group, as described in the attached testimony to Congress presented by Richard B. Priory, and believe adoption of this level of detail by the NRC would be a positive step toward standardiza-tion. The scope of the standardized package is probably next in importance in defining a practical approach for standardization. For regulatory purposes, it is appropriate to only include safety related features in the standard plant application. This would exclude administrative facilities, shops and warehouses on all applications, and even the turbine building on plant designs where the turbine systems have no safety functions or implications. Minimizing the scope of the stan-dardized package is very important to encourage the first steps toward standardization. 4Cknowledged by card.
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Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission October 30, 1987 Page 2 Bechtel Power Corporation The policy statement states that the proposed NRC rules will address the. "relationship of the new regulatory framework to the existing provisions of Part 50 Appendices M, N, and O." We believe that in order to preserve the best of the current designs, it is important to retain the option to replicate plant designs. Likewise, the duplication approach described in Appendix N and used on the SNUPPS units is a proven workable system for standard-ization in the U.S., and should be retained. The proposed policy on fees indicates that the NRC fees for the review of the standard plant application would be collected as the design is referenced but, in any cas_e, would be fully recovered from the holder of the certification at the end of a ten-year period, even if the design has not been used. This provides substantial disincentive to filing an application for certification and probably should be waived for the first applications. We appreciate this opportunity to present our views on this important subject. Sincerely yours, ~$~ R. H. Stone Senior Vice President Attachment
STATEMENT OF RICHARD B. PRIORY BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY, CONSERVATION AND POWER HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES I. Introduction 7-1 My name is Richard B. Priory. I am Vice President, Design Engineering, of Duke Power Company. I am a member of the Atomic Industrial Forum's (AIF) Study Group on the Practical Application of Standardized Nuclear Power Plants in the United States and Chairman of its Working Group on Design Information Requirements. I am here today representing the AIF Study Group; my state-ment is supported by the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and the American Nuclear Energy Council (ANEC). I appreciate your November 26, 1985, invitation to appear before this Subcommittee and would note that the questions contained in your invitation are addressed in my written statement. Nuclear power is a significant and growing component of power supply both here in the United States and throughout the world. During calendar year 1984, more than 340 nuclear generating units provided about 13 percent of the world's electricity. Of the 220 million kilowatts of nuclear generating capacity in commercial service worldwide, the United States is by far the largest producer with about one-third of that total. Last year, 82 nuclear plants produced nearly 13.6 percent of our nation's electrical generation. The U.S. now has 90 reactors in commercial operation. Through the first three quarters of 1985 these plants produced 288 billion kilowatt-hours, or 15.S percent of total U.S. electrical output. Through September of this year
nuclear generation increased 16.6 percent over production during the same period in 1984. The comparable increase for electricity from all sources in 1985 is 1.5 percent, according to Department of Energy figures. Nuclear's share of total electricity production is expected to rise to nearly 20 percent by 1990, when most of the 31 nuclear plants currently under construction have begun operation. In some areas of the country, nuclear power's contribution to the electric power supply is much greater. For example, Duke Power Company, with a service area encompassing the Piedmont region of North and South Carolina, operates six large nuclear units -- with a seventh scheduled to come into service in the near future -- which produce in excess of SO percent of our generation. At Duke, nuclear power is our lowest-cost steam-electric gener-ation. I would also add that Commonwealth Edison, which serves the Chicago area, currently produces about 59 percent of its electric power by nuclear generation. With the U.S. economy expanding and demand for electricity on the rise, utilities are now planning for new generating capacity that will be needed in the 1990's and beyond. But commitments for new reactors are inhibited by a licensing process developed to meet the needs of the 1950's. Both industry and government (NRC and DOE) agree that the present licensing process needs to be modified substantially. The bills which have been introduced in the Congress demonstrate this recognition. The nuclear industry testified in 1983 in both the House and the Senate on earlier versions of the NRC and DOE licensing reform bills. In addition, Wallace B. Behnke, Vice Chairman of Commonwealth Edison Company, and Barton z. Cowan, partner in the law firm of Eckert, Seamans, Cherin and Mellott, and Chairman of the AIF Lawyers Committee, presented testimony on licensing reform on behalf of AIF, EEI, and ANEC in mid-July of this year before the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. While the particulars of the pending legislative proposals differ, the industry considers all of the bills to be a good starting point for consideration of improvements in the present licensing environment. On July 25, 1985, your Subcommittee held a hearing during which several senior members of our industry testified. We believe that the July 25 hearing together with the record developed here today provides sufficient information for this Subcommittee to move expeditiously to proceed to mark-up. We strongly urge you to do so now. As I just noted, utilities are now beginning to plan to add their next increment of generating capacity to meet forecasted load; without the changes we discuss here today I doubt that nuclear power will be seriously considered by any utility as a realistic option. My statement today will concentrate on the advantages of standardization in terms of safety, costs, and early public participation. In particular, I will address the standard design certification process and amount of design information which the industry anticipates will be available in an application for a standardized plant. I believe that the industry proposal which I will discuss with you today represents a fresh approach to a matter which all of us -- the utility industry, the NRC, the public, and the Congress -- have been working on for the past several years. II. AIF Study Group on the Practical Application of Standardized Nuclear Power Plants in the United States An executive-level AIF Study Group on the Practical Application of Standardized Nuclear Power Plants in the United States was formed earlier this Spring to obtain the practical benefits of standardization as soon as possible and to help remove roadblocks to its effective implementation. The Study Group has made iterative reviews of the work products of two active working groups, the Working Group on Regulatory Interactions, chaired by Mr. James Rhodes, Vice President, Virginia Power Company, and my Working Group on Design Information Requirements. The combined efforts of these groups were reflected in an "expanded outline" for a revised Policy Statement on Standardization which the industry is urging the NRC to adopt. This "expanded outline" was sent to Mr. William Dircks in a November 1, 1985, letter from Study Group Chairman John E. Ward, Vice President and General Manager of Management Analysis Company (MAC). The concepts included in the "expanded outline" were endorsed by the AIF Policy Committee on Nuclear Regulation, chaired by Mr. Wallace Behnke, Vice Chairman of Commonwealth Edison Company. The document reflected t~e collective judgement of the industry and demonstrated the high level of interest throughout the industry in achieving a workable standardization process. My Working Group on Design Information Requirements was chartered to review the level of design detail required to assure the issuance of a combined Construction Permit and Operating License (COL). We subsequently recommended design information requirements and documentation requirements we felt were sufficient to satisfy NRC needs for design detail and criteria so as to enable them to complete the safety review of the facility. These levels were included in the "expanded outline" to which I previously referred and will be discussed later in this testimony. I would like to begin my discussion by pointing out that Duke Power Company is unique in the investor-owned utility industry because we at Duke design, construct, and operate all our own power plants, including our nuclear plants. Therefore, Duke performs the role of the architect-engineer, the constructor, and the operator of a nuclear power plant. In addition, Duke also has close ties to B&W, Combustion Engineering and Westinghouse, three of the four NSSS vendors. It is appropriate to describe at this point what we mean when we use the term "standardization" and define some of the terminology involved. In the context of the proposed legislation, "standardized design" means designs for an entire nuclear power plant, a Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS), Balance of Plant (BOP), and/or discrete subsystems which have been submitted to, and reviewed and approved by, the NRC. Such preapproved designs can then be relied on by a utility to form the basis -- or a part of the basis -- for an application to construct and operate a nuclear power plant. The concept by which this goal would be achieved is known as the standardized design certification process. The base document which would b~ used to submit the proposed standard design to the NRC for its review and approval would be the Plant Safety Report (PSR). The approved design would be known as the Standardized Design Certification (SDC)
- Early in the deliberations of my Working Group, the relationships between design information requirements, standardization and single stage licensing became apparent.
Design information develops progressively as commitments are made. The risk of larger investments up front is balanced by the stability obtained after receiving the SDC and the COL. Without the COL as part of the overall revised process, it is my view that we will not obtain the benefits of standardization, because it will be highly unlikely that a utility will commit to the necessary large investment. What governs here is predictability. With a single-stage licensing process the ability to plan with certainty will be realized, and the potential for change and delay -s-
which so characterizes the current process will be alleviated. Thus, in order to achieve standardization, and allow utilities again to turn to nuclear as a generating option, the COL is a practical necessity. III. The Design Certification Process and Degree of Design Detail The AIF Study Group supports the SDC process which can be used to facilitate obtaining a COL. This SDC process has been proposed in legislation before this Subcommittee. In this process either a utility, NSSS vendor, Turbine-Generator (TG) vendor, Architect/Engineer, or a combination of these entities, would create a standard plant and/or a major subsystem design which represents a discrete element of the facility. This proposed design would fit within the envelope of potential sites. This standard design would then be submitted to NRC, via the PSR, for review and approval. This approval would result in the SDC, and would be effective for a period of ten years with renewal options. After an SDC has been received and a decision is made actually to build a plant, the plant owner would apply to NRC for a Construction-Operating License (COL) which would integrate site-specific information into the standard design. The opportunity for public participation regarding the adequacy of design would occur at the time the SDC is under consideration by the NRC. The opportunity for public participation concerning the adequacy of the plant site would be either in conjunction with an application for an Early Site Review, if applicable, or at the COL stage. Under the COL concept, a single license would be issued by the NRC authorizing construction and, if the plant is built in accordance with the license, operation. Thereafter what is contemplated is a phased approval process whereby the NRC would approve construction as the plant construction progresses, based upon its review of satisfactory performance of the tests, inspections and analyses and compliance with the pre-approved acceptance criteria. In order to support the NRC review and approval of a standard design to lead to an SDC, the plant or subsystem design must be sufficiently complete so that the applicant and the NRC have a clear definition of all sufficient safety aspects in order that construction and testing can be performed in accordance with preapproved methodology and procedures and measured against preapproved acceptance criteria. Accordingly, the following design and engineering information would be contained in the PSR: Design Basis Criteria - The PSR will identify the criteria upon which the design of the plant will be based. Included in this section will be references to the General Design Criteria (10CFRS0 Appendix A), Standard Review Plan (NUREG 0800), and the codes and standards used in design, construction and operation (ASME, IEEE, etc.). Other regulatory requirements identified will include emergency plans, QA program, materials requirements, ALARA, ECCS evaluation, fire protection, security plan and technical specifications. Analysis and Design Methods - The PSR will identify the engineering methods, assumptions, design guides, analytical approaches and computer codes to be used in the plant design. This will include methodologies for seismic design, pipe stress analysis, and fluid flow design. Additionally, load combinations will be identified. Functional Design and Physical Arrangement of Auxiliary, Balance of Plant and Nuclear Steam Supply Systems - The PSR will* describe the major plant parameters and functional design requirements resulting from NSSS and T/G selection, and will reference appropriate preapproved vendor supplied documents. It will include listings of basic systems, structures and components, functional descriptions of buildings, major equipment layouts, and interface requirements identified by major vendors. Plant Physical Arrangement Sufficient to Accommodate Systems and Components - The PSR will contain the general arrangement information derived from the major plant parameters and functional design requirements. Other requirements such as component removal, pull space, maintenance, and personnel access are incorporated in general arrangement information development. Functional/Performance Specifications for Components and Materials - The PSR will contain design criteria specifi-cations that will identify functional and performance requirements for systems and components in the balance of plant. Acceptance/Test Requirements - The PSR will identify applicable codes, standards, regulations and acceptance criteria to be used in construction, installation, and testing. Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methodology - The PSR will identify the methodologies, assumptions, and procedures to be used in the performance of the probabilistic risk assessment. The SDC process is definitely not "business as usual" but represents a significantly differen~ method of conducting the design and construction process for a nuclear power plant. In the past, the two-step licensing process led both the industry and the regulators to a design/regulatory system where only design information of a more preliminary nature was furnished on the front end leaving open the potential for significant changes on the back end. In the SDC process, much more engineering and regulatory review is done on the front end. For example, at the time of PSR submittal, the design engineering of the standard plant (described below) would be essentially complete and would be available as necessary for NRC review. This essentially complete design engineering would encompass the following design documents and drawings: Design Basis Criteria - This information will be addressed in General Design Criteria Specifications and Functional Design Criteria Specifications. Plant General Arrangements of Structures and Components - Spatial orientation of walls, floors, buildings, and the equipment and systems within these structures will be identified on General Arrangement drawings. Process and Instrumentation Diagrams - Direction of fluid flow, process information, and the components that are part of the plant systems will be identified on P&IDs. Control Logic Diagrams - Reactor protection, engineering safety features, and BOP will be identified on Control Logic Diagrams. System Functional Descriptions -,System purpose, function, and operational requirements will be identified in System Functional Descriptions. Component and Procurement Specifications including Acceptance Test Requirements - Equipment and material performance requirements will be identified on component and procurement specifications. Additionally, these specifications will include procurement information and the requisite codes and standards to which the materials and components shall be tested. Construction and Installation Specifications - These specifi-cations will identify the criteria and methods by which systems, structures and components are erected or installed in the facility. These specifications will include acceptance, inspection, and testing requirements and criteria. Supporting Design Documentation such as bounding site data and calculations sufficient to support the above level of design detail - Requirements for systems, structures or components associated with the bounding site will be identified. Typical information necessary to establish these requirements includes meteorology, geology, hydrology, subsurface and foundations, seismology, flood studies, and auxiliary sources of*nuclear service water. QA Program - A QA program will be identified which assures conformance of the design, construction a*nd operation of the facility to applicable regulatory standards such as 10CFRSO Appendix B, approved industry standards such as ANSI, and corresponding daughter standards or eguivalent alternatives. The program includes the surveillance and inspection of design, construction, and operation of the facility. Emergency Plans - These plans will identify actions to be followed in the event of a plant malfunction including both on-site and off-site evacuations. Security Plan - This plan will identify provisions for the physical protection of the plant consistent with the requirements of 10CFR73. The plan will address the use of guards, watchmen, physical barriers, and visual surveillance such that sabotage, theft or diversion of nuclear material does not occur. ALARA/Radiation Protection Plan - A program will be identified to protect employees from radiation exposure and to keep employee doses as low as reasonably achievable while the plant is being constructed, operated, and modified. Accident Analysis - A deterministic examination of undesirable events will be performed to determine the necessary response if such events should occur. This analysis will consider occurrences classified as operational transients, faults of moderate frequency, infrequent faults, and limiting faults. Draft Technical Specifications - These specifications will provide a description of plant opera~ion with respect to safety limits and limiting safety system settings, limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements, design features, administrative controls, and definitions. The process of formulating draft technical specifications will involve obtaining standard technical specifications from the NRC and determining which specifications are applicable, which need modification, provision of applicable values of parameters and variables, figures, graphs, and other information required to complete the standard technical specifications. Probabilistic Risk Assessment - A systematic and structured methodology will be applied to obtain quantitative estimates of the risks of various malfunctions through the use of accepted probabilistic and*statistical techniques and consequence evaluation methods. Due to its comprehensive and systematic nature, PRA methodology is a powerful tool for estimating the impact of design alternatives on a plant's margin of safety. One can see from the foregoing that a significant amount of design engineering would have been completed before submittal of the PSR to the NRC. The work required will result in a large expenditure of capital on the part of the group generating the standard plant design. In fact, I estimate these _expenditures to be in the range of 150 to 200 million dollars. This large front end commitment on the part of the entity pursuing an SDC will enhance the effectiveness of standardization. Because of the magnitude of the required commitment, there will not be a large number of different standard plant designs developed. This should enhance the quality of standard plant designs in that industry resources will be concentrated on the development of optimum designs. NRC resources will also be optimized as review is focused on a few standard plant designs, each with a consistent degree of design completion and consistent review criteria applied by NRC. Thus, it is clear that the level of detail needed to obtain the single COL will be such as to enable specification of the inspections, tests and analysis, and acceptance criteria, which are to be an integral part of the COL. All important safety features of the plant would be addressed, and the Commission would determine the detail level needed for it to make safety findings needed for setting forth the inspections, tests, analysis and acceptance criteria. Although name plate level information would not be required (partially so as not to preclude several sources of supply), the detail required generally would be such as to support equipment procurement plus explicit procedures defining implementation of detailed design qualification, construction, and testing to be performed. It also is clear that sufficient detail would be provided up front to protect against changes due to discovery of unanticipated items relating to the safety of the plant. In my opinion, the SDC process leading to preapproval of designs would initially be based on current reactor designs. The current generation of light-water reactors has exhibited an excellent safety and operational record and has furnished us with a large international experience base. Thus current light-water reactor technology is the prime candidate for standardization. Any improvements which are incorporated in initial submissions for an SDC generally would be market driven, based on their projected attraction to the utjlities who will be constructing the plants and incorporating the preapproved designs. While advanced reactor concepts are under development by a number of parties, such developments are not sufficiently far along to serve as generation alternatives in our current planning horizons. Efforts should be made in parallel with the standardization effort to consider a framework for advanced reactors, but there is no need to await such advanced reactors to gain the benefits of standardization. I feel that the SDC process, when combined with the COL, will help revitalize the nuclear option. It will add needed stability and discipline to the process from the perspective of both the industry and the regulator. The current two-step licensing process does not offer sufficient incentives for standardization to be implemented on a broad basis. There have been isolated exceptions to this where standardization has been pursued with some positive experiences indicating the overall benefit of standardization; however the net result has not produced what could be considered a viable nuclear option for the future. IV. The Trade Off and the Current Licensing Reform Bills It is our belief that the standardized design concept would, if enacted, yield significant benefits over the current licensing system. To achieve those benefits, the industry is willing to invest substantially greater resources at the initial stages of the licensing process than is presently the case. For example, as I have mentioned earlier, we envision, prior to filing an application for an SDC, a financial commitment on the order of $150-200 million for design and engineering work. That commitment would, in our view, provide substantial benefits when coupled with the proposals for a COL. The time to determine whether a plant should be built, and the design and safety parameters which it must meet, is prior to the time when construction is commenced. The proposed approach also enhances, and makes substantially more meaningful, public participation in the NRC licensing process. As I previously indicated, opportunity for public participation is available during the SDC review to focus on the application then before the NRC. Because of the much greater level of information and detail available, any hearing held at that time will be more complete, and able to explore technical issues to much greater depth, than is now possible at the construction permit stage. At either the Early Site Review, if applicable, or the COL stage, the public c~uld participate on site suitability, as well as environmental, matters. However, issues previously considered by the NRC in approving the SDC would be foreclosed. This process allows the public to provide input to the process at a stage where such participation is the most meaningful -- before commencement of construction is authorized. An additional benefit is that parameters and requirements -- indeed, in some cases virtually final documents -- for matters such as quality assurance can be established prior to application for an SDC. Inspections, tests and analyses, and the acceptance .criteria can therefore be considered and resolved at the SDC stage. Thereafter, the NRC can assure compliance with the license through its inspection and enforcement capabilities. V. The Benefits Any discussion of the SDC/COL concept is incomplete without a clear statement of the benefits to be realized therefrom. In sum, the concepts I have discussed today will increase safety, bring discipline to the licensing process, and thereby go far toward restoring to the United States the nuclear option. The importance of attaining stability in requirements provides a powerful incentive to obtain a regulatory framework that when combined with utility discipline offers a stable process. It is thus to the advantage of the industry to provide the large investment up front in exchange for a system that allows this stability. It is also to the advantage of the utility, in terms of construction efficiency and schedules, to maintain design well ahead of construction. The SDC/COL process will improve the process in several respects. First, in our view it will tend to improve safety, as it will allow the NRC, reactor vendors, designers, architect-engineers, and utilities to concentrate on discrete issues involved in fewer designs. The process I endorse today. will eliminate the substantial demands on these technical resources now caused by design changes during the construction phase. With the SDC/COL process, safety reviews will no longer be conducted on the critical path, after a utility has commenced construction. Standardization will substantially reduce the time for construction of a nuclear power plant by allowing design optimization, simplifying construction management, and reducing construction rework and post-construction design verification. This will in turn increase the effectiveness and efficiency of quality assurance programs. This will lower the direct costs of new plants, but most significantly it should reduce substantially the indirect costs of new plants -- primarily capitalized carrying charges, or allowance for funds used during construction -- by shortening the construction period and avoiding needless delay. Moreover, the cost of capital should be reduced by lowering the financial risk resulting from the uncertainty associated with the current nuclear regulatory environment. The reduction in licensing and construction time associated with standardization will enable utilities to plan better to meet their loads and lessen the risk of future mismatches between demand and capacity. Because a standard design would be used by several utilities, the costs of designing and building nuclear plants will be spread over a larger base. In fact, though there is a much larger commitment up front to support a standardized plant, I would like to point out that there is a distinct probability that, following NRC grant of an SDC and a COL, and construction and operation of a standardized plant, the amount of design information available for subsequent units would increase and the engineering dollar costs would decrease. Utilities can plan additions to their systems with greater certainty, knowing that a design has already been approved by the NRC and, absent good cause, will not be changed. As noted, standardization would improve construction productivity and construction quality assurance. More efficient training of operating personnel would be possible. Improved standard designs would lead to more efficient plant maintenance and operating practices and make possible more efficient and effective NRC Inspection and Enforcement activities. VI. Conclusion We urge your Subcommittee to move expeditiously to report a nuclear standardization and licensing bill. Taken together, the NRC and DOE bills provide a good starting point for drafting such a bill. The principal benefits of such legislation would be enhancement of public safety, reduction of costs to the customer, and reduction in the waste and inefficiency attending the current regulatory process. Standardized plant designs will benefit safety by concentrating the technical resources of the NRC as well as industry on a small number of designs. Consumers would benefit from the reduced capital costs and lower financial risks associated with nuclear power plants and from the.economies associated with improved on-line performance and reliability. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee. I will be pleased to answer your ques~ions. \\. I. Introduction SUf!NARY OF STATEMENT OF RICHARD B. PRIORY BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY, CONSERVATION AND PO~ER HOUSE COK~lTTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE My name is Richard Priory, Vice President, Design Engineering, DuKe Po~er Company, and a member of the Atomic Industrial Forum's (AIF) Study Group on the Practical Application of Standardized Nuclear Power Plants in the United States and Chairman of its Working Group on Design Information Requirements. I am here today to address the Subcorrrnittee regarding the benefits of standardization in nuclear power plant design in terms of safety, cost, and early public participation. I believe that the industry proposal which I will discuss with you today represents a significantly different method of conducting the design and construction process for a nuclear power plant. Put briefly, this process will provide to the NRC an application for a standard design plant or subsystem sufficiently complete in the relevant safety aspects that, following NRC review and approval, construction and testing can be performed in accordance with preapproved methodology and procedures and measured against preapproved acceptance criteria
- At the time of application, substantially more design and engineering work will be done than at the present, as the design engineering of the standard plant will be essentially complete. All important safety features of the plant necessary for licensing will be addressed in the application. This work will result in a substantial expenditure of capital on the part of an applicant for a standard plant design.
I estimate a financial convnitment in the range of $150-200 million. This substantial front end conrnitment on the part of the applicant will enhance the effectiveness of standardization. lt is my belief that this concept will yield substantial benefits over the current licensing system. The essential feature necessary to revitalize the nuclear option in this country is predictability. The risk of the much larger investment up front is balanced, in the industry's view, by the stability to be obtained through legislation authorizing the standardized design and one step licensing concepts. With the standardized plant, coupled with single stage licensing, the ability to plan with certainty will be realized and the potential for change and delay which so characterizes the current process will be alleviated. We urge this Subcorrrnittee to move expeditiously to report a nuclear standardization and licensing bill. The principle benefits would be to enhance public safety. establish certainty in the process, and enhance public part;cipation. The consumer will benefit from the reduced captial costs~ reduced financial risks associated with construction of nuclear power plants, and improved online performance and reliability of nuclear power plants.
DOCKET NUMBER PR r-71-,.....,,~,. PJWPOSED RULE -bv - -(!) C§,t F~.J4J7rfi STONE fl WEBSTE R ENGINE~~ CORPO~ ION USNRC B O STON NEW YORK CHERRY HILL. N.J. DENVER HOUSTON DALLAS PORTLAND. OREGON RICHLAND. WA WASHINGTON. D.C. 245 SUMMER STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS ADDRESS ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO Pw eoQ 2-2'0P-S-{Jft-02107 W. U. TELE X, 94-0001 94 -09 7 7 OFFICE OF SE CHL iAri '( OOCKfllNG & SEHVIC[ BRANCH DESIGN CONSTRUCTION REPORTS EXAMINATIONS CONSUL T I NG ENGINEERING The Secretary of the Commission Attn: Docketing and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 October 30, 1987 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT STANDARDIZATION POLICY STATEMENT 52FR34884; SEPTEMBER 15, 1987 We are pleased to submit our comments on the subject Policy Statement. We commend the Commission for its efforts to improve the licensing process for standardized nuclear power plants to reduce complexity and uncertainty in the regulatory process. We support the revised policy statement and believe that the premises contained in the policy statement constitute the important first step in establishing a strong regulatory framework that will significantly enhance the safety, reliability, and availability of nuclear plants and that will help ensure the continued viability of the nuclear option in providing for our country's energy future. We endorse the statement made at the NRC' s Standardization Workshop on October 20, 1987 by Richard B. Priory, Chairman of the Nuclear Management and Resources Council's Standardization Oversight Group. Two very important aspects that must be reflected in the Commission's regulations and licensing procedures, both of which are reflected in the policy statement, relate to the scope and level of detail of standard plant applications. We believe that the proposed regulations should recognize that the utilities, the customers, and the nation will be best served by retaining the natural system for executing projects, using experienced multi-discipline engineer-constructors as agents for the owner in all aspects of
- design, procurement, construction, quality assurance, preoperational testing, etc.
Being "agents," and having no manufacturing to offer, their important asset is objectivity. Limiting standardization to complete designs, which implies designs developed for the complete plant by reactor manufacturers, would place these traditional agents for the owners in a subordinate position, thus stifling ingenuity and removing the independence provided by engineer-constructors. Accordingly, the implementing regulations must allow for standardized designs that encompass major portions of the plant, e.g., a nuclear island, an NSSS, or the balance of plant, and not be limited to complete plants.
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NRC 2 October 30, 1987 As to level of detail, we agree with the statement in the policy statement that standard plant applications are expected to include detailed information consisting of design and procurement specifications, performance requirements, and acceptance and inspection requirements, in lieu of nameplate data. The application would include those criteria necessary to provide assurance that the plant is built within the specifications of the approved design. This plant equipment must be obtained by competitive bidding from a host of specialized suppliers, and much of the final design detail must await this procurement. Antitrust considerations and other practical business considerations would preclude prepurchasing all such equipment in advance of licensing. A "sign-as-you-go" approach to ensure compliance with the license, such as. that described in NUMARC' s detailed
- comments, combined with the specification of the acceptance criteria necessary to ensure that the plant is built in accordance with the approved design, would provide an effective basis for the NRC's approvals.
We appreciate this opportunity to provide these comments on the revised policy statement, and look forward to the issuance of the proposed rule and the further opportunity to assist in the finalization of the Commission's standardization regulations. 'n /D ~~~k ~hie£ Enginee )- Nuclear Technology and Licensin Division DJC:ms
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR-Part 50 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT STANDARDIZATION AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission ACTION: Pol icy Statement._ 7590..:01
SUMMARY
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is issuing a revised policy statement on the standardization of nuclear power plant designs. The policy statement encourages the use of standard plant designs and provides information concerning the certification of plant designs that are essentially complete in scope and level of detail. The Commission is also developing proposed regulations on standardization and licensing reform. The intent of these actions are to improve the licensing process ard to reduce the complexity and uncertainty in the regulatory process for standardized plants. DATE: Sep*tember 15, 1987. Workshop to be held October 20, 1987. ADDRESSES: Submit comments to: The Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Reguletory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch. A public workshop will be held on October 20, 1987, in the Cabinet Room of the Hyatt Regency Bethesda, One Bethesda Metro Center, Bethesda, Maryland. [7590-01] FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jerry N. Wilson, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 492-4727. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION .Workshop The NRC staff will conduct a workshop to inform the public of staff efforts to develop an implementing rulemaking on standardization and to provide a forum for public discussion of the revised policy statement and relevant issues that need to be addressed in the rulemaking package. The workshop will be held on October 20, 1987 at the Hyatt Regency Bethesda, One Bethesda Metro Center, Bethesda, Maryland 20814 in the Cabinet Room. The workshop will start at 9:00 a.m. The NRC staff will present an overview of the revised policy statement and the proposed rulemaking package at the workshop. Those members of the public who wish to make a presentation at the workshop should notify the contact listed abo~eso that they can be added to the agenda. Anyone who wishes to add further comments to the record or who cannot attend the workshop should send written comments to the Secretary of the Commission no later than October 30, 1987. [7590-01]*
Background
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission believes that standardization of nuclear power plant designs is an important initiative that can significantly enhance the safety, reliability and availability of nuclear plants. The Commission intends to improve the licensing process for standardized nuclear power plants and to reduce complexity and uncertainty in the regulatory process. Appendices M, N and Oto Title 10, Part 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50) establish vari6us optlons and procedures for the approval of standardized plant designs. A provision for Commission approval of a reference design in a rule-making proceeding is included in Appendix 0. This has been termed Reference System Design Certification and is the focus of the Commission's standardiza-tion policy. This policy statement revises the Standardization Policy State-ment of 1978 (August 31, 1978; 43 FR 38954). The purpose of this policy statement is to encourage standardization and to provide information concerning the Commissfon's efforts to develop a regulatory framework for the certification of plant designs which:* 0 Are esser.tially complete in both scope and level of detail; 0 Cover plant design, construction, and quality assurance programs; 0 Satisfy regulatory requirements before construction begins; and [7590-01] 0 Can be referenced for individual plant applications. Use of certified reference designs in future license applications should enhance plant safety, increase the efficiency of the NRC review process, and reduce complexity and uncertainty in the regulatory process. A regulatory framework which provides for certification of reference designs by means of rulemaking will alleviate the need-to reconsider design issues in individual licensing proceedings on future license applications which reference the certi-fied designs. Areas included within the scope of the reference system design certification rulemaking would require no further review by the* staff, the. I Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), or the hearing boards. The Commission 1s primary objectives in issuing a policy statement on nuclear power plant standardization are threefold: 0 0 To encourage the use of standard plant designs in future license applications in order to enhance plant safety, improve the efficiency* and reduce the complexity and uncertainty of the regulatory process; To identify the issues that are important to the implementation of standardization and to state the Commission's intent to develop proposed rules to address these issues more.fully; and
0 [7590-01]. To express _the Commission's intent to make resources available on a
- priority basis to faci 1 i ta te
- the reference sys tern design
- certification process for essentially complete nuclear power plant designs and for the licensing reviews of applications referencing these certified designs.
Experience has shown that the._ 11one-of.:a-kind 11 approach to reactor design, construction, and operation has led to an operating reactor population of great variability and diversity, even among reactors from the same vendor*. This variability is introduced when utilities and designers incorporate custom features into their designs; when varying construction practices are used; and when plants are operated and maintained by different organizations. This variability has introduced significant differences in the licensing and operation of these plants, in the transfer of experience from one reactor to another, in technical specifications, in_operating procedures, and in back-fitting considerations. The Commission believes that the use of certified standardized designs can benefit the public health and safety by concentrating resources on specific design approaches without stifling ingenuity; by stimulating standardized pro-grams of construction practice, quality assurance, and_ personnel training; and by fostering more effective maintenance and improved operation. Standardization should result in significant economies of scale in learning and sharing operat-ing experience, in maintaining qualified vendor support, and in maintaining an
- 6.- [7590-01] adequate inventory of long lead-time, high cost spare parts that can be shared by a number of units. These concepts are embodied in foreign experience with the standardization of nuclear power plant design, contruction, and operation. Standardization is expected to further improve the safety performance of futu*re plants. Standardization will allow for a more expeditious and efficient review process and a more thorough understanding of the designs by the industry and the NRC staff. In strongly etidorstng the concept of standardization, the Commission acknowledges that the~e can be drawbacks. The most significant is that specific problems may potentially affect a large numbers of reactors. However, on balance, the Commission believes that the enhanced safety of reactor operation should far outweigh any disadvantages. Conunission policy for plant safety is articulated in its Policy Statement on Safety Goals (August 4, 1986; 51 FR 28044; August.21, 1986; 51 FR 30028). The Standardization Policy also is consistent with the standardized plant provisions of the Commission's complementary Severe Accident Policy Statement (August 8, 1985; 50 FR 32138). Many of the desirable safety characteristics listed in the Advanced Reactor Policy Statement (July 8, 1986; 51 FR 24643} are equally desirable for evolutionary light water reactor standardized designs. The Commission believes that Congress should promote nuclear safety by pursuing legislative initiatives to further encourage the standardization con-cept. The proposed Nuclear Power Pla~t Standardization and Licensing Act of . 1987, which the Commission forwarded to Congress in January of this year, in-cludes the following three legislative.Proposals:
0 0 0 [7590-01] Issuance of a combined construction permit and operating license; Issuance of a site permit prior to submission of an application for a construction permit or combined construction permit and operating license; Issuance of a facility design approval (Reference System Design Certification) prior to submission of an application for a construction permit or a combined construction permit and operating license. The Commission believes that these legislative ~hanges are important to achieving the full benefits of standardization. The one-step licensing process would give licensees greater assurance that if the facility is constructed in accordance with the terms of the application/permit! it will be permitted to operate once construction is complete. The issuance of site permits and facility design approvals, in advance of specific applications for their use, would allow subsequent facility applications to reference the permits and/or approvals without further regulatory action unless there is a substantial reason not to do so. This process would also facilitate early identification and resolution of site and design issues after affording an opportunity for public participation. The Commission continues to believe that nuclear standardization and licensing legislation should be enacted. The Conmission recognizes, however, [7590-01] that much of its legislative proposal with respect to standardization could be accomplished under its existing statutory authority, In addition, there is a need for regulations to implement the Commission's standardization policy more effectively. For these reasons, the Commission is developing proposed regula~ tions that will address licensing reform and standardization. With regard to standardization, the proposed rules will provide a regulatory framework for Commission certification of standard designs by rulemaking, as set forth in paragraph 7 of Apperidix C to 10 CFR Part 50. The proposed rules will address the following subjects: relationship of the new regulatory framework to the existing provisions of Appendices M, N, and Oto Part 50; filing requirements; ccntents of applications; design certification and renewal fees; design certi-fication rulemaking procedures; referral of applications to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); duration and renewal of design certi-ficatiors; changes to certified standard designs; and provisions for plant-specific variances. The Commission 1s general approach to standard design certification under its existing rules is outlined in this policy statement. The issues important to execution of the Commission's standardization policy will be addressed more fully in the proposed rules. [7590-01] STATEMENT OF POLICY ON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT STANDARDIZATION The purpose of this standardization. policy is to provide the regulatory framework for reference system design certification of nucle~r power plant designs which are essentially complete in both scope and level of detail; cover plant design, construction, and quality assurance programs; satisfy regulatory requirements before construction begins; and can be referenced in individual plant applications. The reference system designs, at least initially, are expected to be evolutions of existing proven LWR designs. Detailed infonnation consisting of design and procurement specifications, performar.ce requirements, and acceptance and inspection requirements will be substituted for name plate data. For those systems, structures and component designs which represent significant deviations from previously-approved LWR designs, prototype testing and/or empirical information may also be required. Advanced design concepts should be developed according to the guidelines of the Advanced ~eactor Policy Statement. When an advanced design concept is sufficiently mature, e.g., through comprehensive, prototypical testing, an application for design certi-fication could be made. [7590-01] In the reference system design certification process, the final decision will be made by the Commission itself following review by the ACRS, the issuance of a final design approval by the staff, and the completion of a rule-making proceeding. The reference system concept means that an entire nuclear power plant design or a major portion of the design is acceptable for incor-poration by reference in indivjdual license applications. The design certifi-cation concept focuses on the certification**of a r*eference system design through rulemaking, as provided for by Appendi'x Oto 10 CFR Part 50. The rules being developed to implement this policy will ad.dress the criteria and procedures for issuance and renewal of design certifications, as well as the duration of the certification and renewals. The certified design must be used and relied upon by the staff, the ACRS, the hearing boards ancl the Commission in their consideration of applications that reference the certified design. The issue of relitigation of issues considered and decided in the design certi-fication rulemaking will be addressed in the proposed rules
- The Cammi ss ion believes that severa 1 benefits wi 11 be realized in this process which will not only enhance safety, but should also contribute added stability and predictability to the regulatory process.
The rulemaking will certify the acceptability of the design. The certified design will be refer-enced in the application for a Construction Permit or Operating Licens~. The rulemaking to obtain the design certification will cover the criteria necessary for design and cor.struction of a plant; the quality assurance program; and
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- [7590-01]
whatever tests, analyses, and inspection criteria are necessary to assure that the plant*is built within the certified design specifications. The Commission expects to implement the following policies with regard to design certification review. An applicant for a design certification must first obtain a Final Design Approval (FDA) pursuant to Appendix Oto Part 50. If the applicant intends to seek a design certification, the FDA application
- must indicate that intent. As set forth in Appendix 0, the FDA application must include information-on scope and design detail which is essentially equivalent to that required by 10 CFR 50.34(b), as well as any other informa-tion customarily required by the staff to perform a Final Safety Analysis Report review.* In addition; it must address the following four licensing criteria for new plant designs set forth in the Commission's Severe Accident Policy Statement:
(1) Demonstration of compliance with the requirements of the c~rrent Commission regulations, including the Three Mile Island requirements for new plants as reflected in the construction permit rule, 10 CFR 50.34(f); (2) Demonstration of technical resolution of all applicable Unresolved Safety Issues and the medium-and high-priority Generic Safety Issues, including a special focus on ensuring the reliability of decay heat removal systems and the reliability of both AC and DC electrical supply systems;* [7590-01] (3) Completion of a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and consideration of the severe accident vulnerabilities that the PRA exposes, along with the insights that it may add to the assurance that there is no undue risk to public health and safety; and (4) Completion of staff review of the design with a conclusion of safety acceptability using an approach that stresses deterministic engineering analysis and judgment complemented by PRA. The design certification applicetion should also propose, for staff review and approval, the tests, analyses, inspections and acceptance criteria that are considered necessary to provide reasonable assurance that a plant which refer-ences the certified design is built and operated within the specifications of the final design. Additional information beyond that required for an FDA may be necessary to support the design certification rulemaking~ Further de-tailed guidance in this area wJll be developed by the staff, if necessary, as a result of experience with the first few FDA/design certification reviews. Features of the design which can only be determined when a specific site is chosen_ generally are not included in the design approval or certification. Rather, the designer defines a set of site enveloping parameters (seismic events, rainfall, flood, etc.) which are used in the design of the plant. These parameters usually are selected to envelop a large portion of the potential sites in the U.S. Once the design is certified by the Commission, [7590-01] conformance of actual sites with the established site envelope must be demonstrated by the applicant and verified by the staff at the time an actual plant application is reviewed. Other features of the design which are dependent on the site (i.e., cooling water supply, emergency preparedness plans, etc.) are also reviewed for acceptability and compatibility with the pre-approved/certified design at the time of an actual application. Currently, NRC-initiated changes to the design certification rule will not be required unless the Commission determines that these modifications are in accord with the backfit rule specified in 10 CFR 50.109. The subject of modifications to be required after the design certification is granted, as well as amendments at the request of the design certification holder and variances at the request of a utility, will be addressed in the proposed rules. In developing those rules, the Commission will consider the appropriateness of employing the backfitting standard set forth in the proposed standardization and licensing reform legislati~n. The Commission expects that backfits to the_ design certification rule would be applied uniformly to all plants referencing the certified design. Similarly, amendments t~ the design certification rule initiated by the holder of the design certification would also be applied uniformly to all plants referencing the standard design. In addition, procedures will be developed to allow for plant-specific variances in limited circumstances at the request of the facility licensee.
. [7590-01] All applications for licenses and approvals for standard designs are at present subject to the fees and the fee recovery rates identified in 10 CFR Part 170. The Commission has authorized a revision of 10 CFR 170 to include a new provision for the reference system design certification process. This revision would permit the phased recovery of design certification costs through collection of fees from the holder of the design certification, as the design is referenced..If the design is not refe_ren_ced or if a 11 the cos ts a re not recovered within ten years, the.holder of the design certification will be
- responsible for any amounts still due at the end of the ten year period.
Although the Commission strongly encourages the use of certified designs for the entire plant in all future license applications, the r*egulations also allow for other standardization options including the duplicate plant, the replicate plant, and the manufacturing license concepts. While these options may be used in the interim, they are discourage~ for the longer term. The Commission also recognizes that review, approval and certification of major portions of complete plants may be useful in the interim. However, applica-tions for essentially complete designs are preferred and will be given priority in allocation of resources to support review and appro~al. . Dated at Washington, DC, this 9~ day of ~UJ, 1987. For the Nuclear ~egulatory Commission Samuel Secretary of the Commission}}