ML23157A243

PR-071 - 62FR25146 - Requirements for Shipping Packages Used to Transport Vitrified High-Level Waste

ML23157A243
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Issue date:	05/08/1997
From:	Hoyle J NRC/SECY
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PR-071, 62FR25146
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ADAMS Template: SECY-067 05/08/1997 PR-071 - 62FR25146 - REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPPING PACKAGES USED TO TRANSPORT VITRIFIED HIGH-LEVEL WASTE PR-071 62FR25146 RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

STATUS OF RULEMAKING PROPOSED RULE:

PR-071 OPEN ITEM (Y/N) N RULE NAME:

REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPPING PACKAGES USED TO TRANSPO RT VITRIFIED HIGH-LEVEL WASTE PROPOSED RULE FED REG CITE:

62FR25146 PROPOSED RULE PUBLICATION DATE:

05 / 08/ 97 ORIGINAL DATE FOR COMMENTS: 07/22 / 97 NUMBER OF COMMENTS:

EXTENSION DATE:

I I

7 FINAL RULE FED. REG. CITE: 63FR32600 FINAL RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 06/15/ 98 NOTES ON: PROPOSAL IN RESPONSE TO PRM-71 PACKAGING REQUIREMENT FOR DOUB STATUS LE CONTAINMENT WOULD NOT APPLY TO CANISTERS CONTAINING HLW WITH PL OF RULE: UTONIUM.

FR GRANTS PRM-71-11, 59FR8143 HISTORY OF THE RULE PART AFFECTED: PR-071 RULE TITLE:

REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPPING PACKAGES USED TO TRANSPO RT VITRIFIED HIGH-LEVEL WASTE PROPOSED RULE PROPOSED RULE DATE PROPOSED RULE SECY PAPER: 97-047 SRM DATE:

04/ 04/ 97 SIGNED BY SECRETARY:

FINAL RULE FINAL RULE DATE FINAL RULE SECY PAPER: 98-040 SRM DATE:

04/3 0/ 98 SIGNED BY SECRETARY:

STAFF CONTACTS ON THE RULE CONTACTl: EARL EASTON MAIL STOP: O-6F18 PHONE:

CONTACT2: MARK HAISFIELD MAIL STOP: T-9F31 PHONE:

05/ 01/97 05/20/ 98 415-8520 415-6196

DOCKET NO. PR-071 (62FR25146)

In the Matter of REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPPING PACKAGES USED TO TRANSPO RT VITRIFIED HIGH-LEVEL WASTE DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 05/12/97 05/01/97 07/22/97 07/21/97 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - PROPOSED RULE COMMENT OF GENERAL ATOMICS (AL ZIMMER) (

07/22/97 07/21/97 COMMENT OF OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY (R. B. POPE) (

2)

1) 07/22/97 07/22/97 COMMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENERGY CONSULTANTS, INC.

(FRANK P. FALCI, PRESIDENT) (

3) 07/24/97 07/17/97 COMMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (CHRISTOPHER A. KOUTS) (

4) 07/24/97 07/21/97 COMMENT OF SANDIA CORPORATION (JAMES K. RICE) (

COMMENT OF SIDNEY CRAWFORD (

6)

5) 07/24/97 11/06/97 07/22/97 10/31/97 COMMENT OF OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT (CHRISTOPHER A. KOUTS, DIRECTOR) (

7) 05/21/98 05/20/98 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - FINAL RULE

7/

DOCKETED USNRC (7590-01-P]

.98 MAY 21 A10 :13 NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 71 RIN 3150-AF59 Requirements for Shipping Packages Used to Transport Vitrified High-Level Waste AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its regulations to add vitrified high-level waste (HLW) contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport to the forms of plutonium which are exempt from the double-containment packaging requirements for transportation of plutonium. This amendment responds to a petition for rulemaking submitted by the Departme,1t of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (DOE/OCRWM). This final rule grants the petition for rulemaking, with modifications, and completes NRC action on the petition.

This final rule ah:,O will make a minor correction regarding the usage of metric and English units, to be consistent with existing NRC policy on such use.

~

/~ 1193 EFFECTIVE DATE: (~Q gayi fror:i:i dat& ef publicatio1, i1, ti 1e F!!O~R:fc.t Rf!Gl5 I ER). The incorporation by reference of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and I v,\\FF

~. D-n 1P/15/~8 J" ~~Ff<3~1,oo

Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, editions through the 1995 Edition,.is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of (30 days from the date of publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Earl Easton [telephone (301) 415-8520, e-mail EXE@nrc.gov] or Mark Haisfield [telephone (301) 415-6196, e-mail MFH@nrc.gov] of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

In 197 4, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) adopted the special requirements in 10 CFR 71.63 that regulate the shipment of plutonium in excess of 0.74 terabecquerels (TBq)

(20 Curies] per package. These requirements specify that plutonium must be in solid form and that packages used to transport plutonium must provide a separate inner containment (the "double-containment" requirement). In adopting these requirements, the AEC specifically excluded from the double-containment requirement plutonium in the form of reactor fuel elements, metal or metal alloys, anJ, on a case-by-case basis, other plutonium-bearing solids that the agency determines do not require double containment. The Statement of Consideration for the original rule (39 FR 20960; June 17, 1974), specifies that "... solid forms of plutonium that are essentially nonrespirable should be exempted from the double-containment requirement."

On November 30, 1993, DOE/OCRWM petitioned the NRC to amend§ 71.63(b) to add vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister to the forms of plutonium which are exempt from 2

the double-containment packaging requirements of Part 71. The.NRC published a notice of receipt for the petition, docketed as PRM-71-11, in the FEDERAL REGISTER on February 18, 1994 (59 FR 8143). Three comments were received on the petition.

Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (NWPA), DOE is the Federal agency responsible for developing and administering a geologic repository for the deep disposal of HLW and spent nuclear fuel. DOE plans to ship the vitrified HLW in sealed canisters from four storage locations: Aiken, South Carolina; Hanford, Washington; West Valley, New York and Idaho Falls, Idaho; directly to the geologic repository in transportation packages certified by the NRC. Currently, this HLW exists mostly,11 tt,e form of liquid and sludge resulting from the reprocessing of defense reactor fuels. DOE proposes to encapsulate the HLW in a borosilicate glass matrix. The HLW is added to molten glass and the mixture is then poured into a stainless steel canister and allowed to solidify (i.e., vitrify). The canister is then seal-welded shut. The canisters will eventually be placed inside Type 8 transportation packages for transport to the geologic repository or an interim storage facility.

The beneficial aspect of this ame11dment would be the elimination of an unnecessary requirement that DOE transport vitrified HLW in a separate inner container (i.e., a second barrier which is subject to the leak testing requirements of§ 71.63(b)). The Commission believes that the vitrified HLW form in its sealed canister provides sufficient defensl:'!-in-depth for protection of public health and safety and the environment, when transported inside an NRC-certified Type B transportation package. The Commission agrees with DOE's assertion that shipments of this form of plutonium are comparable to shipments of (irradiated) reactor fuel elements which are exempt from the double-containment requirement. Therefore, the Commission agrees that the double-containment requirement is unnecessary. Additional beneficial aspects of this amendment would be a reduction in DOE's costs associated with the 3

transportation of HLW from production sites to the geologic repository or an interim storage facility; and the simplification of the NRC staffs review of DOE's application for certification of a transportation package.

Although, in most other types of shipments, DOE is not subject to the requirements of Part 71, the NWPA requires that DOE's transport of spent nuclear fuel or HLW to a geologic repository or a monitored retrievable storage facility be in packages certified by the NRC. The packages used to transport vitrified HLW contained in sealed canisters will be certified by the NRC as Type B packages. Type B packages are designed to withstand the normal and hypotl,dical accident conditions spec,,;,ad in Part 71. The canistered vitrified HL\\JY also will be subject to the special transport controls for a "Highway Route Controlled Quantity" pursuant to U.S. Department of Transportation regulations contained in 49 CFR Part 397. In addition, the NWPA requires DOE to provide technical assistance and funds to train emergency responders along the planned routes.

DOE asserted that shipments of vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister will not adversely affect public health and safety and the environment if shipped without double containment. DOE stated that a separate inner container is unnecessary because of the high degree of confinement provided by the stainless steel waste canister and the essential nonrespirability of the s.:'id, plutonium-bearing waste form. In addition, DOE argued that vitrified HLW in sealed canisters provides a comparable level of protection to that of irradiated reactor fuel elements, which the Commission previously determined should be exempt from the double-containment requirement (39 FR 20960).

On June 1, 1995, the NRC staff met with DOE in a public meeting to discuss the petitioner's r:equest and the possible alternative of requesting an NRC determination under

§ 71.63(b)(3) to exempt vitnfied HLW contained in a sealed canister from the double-4

containment requirement DOE informed the NRC in a letter dated January 25, 1996, of its intent to seek an exemption under§ 71 63(b)(3) The NRC received DOE's exemption request on July 16, 1996, in which DOE also requested that the original petition for rulemaking be held 1n abeyance until a decision was reached on the exemption request In response to DOE's request, the NRC staff prepared a Commission paper (SECY-96-215, dated October 8, 1996) outlining and requesting Commission approval of the NRC staff's proposed approach for making an exemption under§ 71.63(b)(3) However, in a staff requirements memorandum (SRM) dated October 31, 1996, the Commission disapproved the NRC staff's plan and directed thctl this policy issue bP addressed by rulemaking rather than by exen 1pt1on.

The. NRC published a proposed rule in the FEDERAL REGISTER on May 8, 1997 (62 FR 25146) in response to DO E's petition The Statement of Considerations for th~ 1

• proposed rule contains a complete discussion of DOE's petition, comments received on the petition, and the NRC's analysis of those comments.

01scuss1on The NRC is amending 10 CFR 71. 63 based on its evaluation of the petition submitted by the DOE; the attachment to the petition, "Technical Justification to Support the PRM by the DOE to Exempt HLW Canisters from 10 CFR 71.63(b)" (Technical Justification); the three public comments received on the petition after its publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER; and the seven comments on the proposed rule. In amendi,19 § 71.63, the NRC is accepting, with modifications, the petition submitted by DOE, for the reasons set forth in the following paragraphs.

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In the early 1970's, the AEC anticipated that a large number of shipments of plutonium nitrate liquids could result from the spent fuel reprocessing ant1c1pated at that time. This raised a concern about leakage of liquids because of the potential for a large number of packages (probably of more complex design) to be shipped due to reprocessing and the increased possibility of human error resulting from handling this expanded shipping load.

In 1973, the AEC proposed a rule which would deal with this problem by (a) requiring that shipments of plutonium containing greater than 20 curies be shipped in solid form, and (b) requiring that the solid plutonium be shipped in an inner container which would meet "special form" requirements as they then existed; i.e., not only would the "::iole package have to meet Part 71 requirements but the inner container would separately have to meet stringent requirements. One alternative to the proposed rule the AEC considered was to require that shipments of plutonium be in nonrespirable form, either in a single or double containment. This alternative was rejected, apparently because fuel fabricators did not have the technology to use plutonium in a nonrespirable form.

In 197 4, the AEC published a final rule which contained two significant changes from the proposed rule:

(1) The AEC abandoned the "special form" requirement and instead simply required "double containment"; i.e., the inner container was required not to release ph... :onium when the whole package was subjected to the normal and hypothetical accident tests of Part 71, but no separate tests were required for the inner container. Double containment was required to take account of the fact that the AEC had decided not to require that the plutonium be in a nonrespirable form; and (2) The AEC exempted two forms of plutonium altogether-reactor fuel elements and metal or metal alloy-on the basis that these forms were "essentially nonrespirable" and 6

therefore did not require double containment. The exemption provision placed m the regulation also 1nd1cates that the AEG saw the possibility that other forms of plutonium would be similar enough to these two forms to also qualify for exemption from the double-containment requirement because they were also essentially nonrespirable In the statement of cons1derat1ons accompanying the final rule, the AEG stated that

".. solid forms of plutonium that are essentially nonrespirable should be exempt from the double containment requirements" (39 FR 20960).

DOE's petition argues that a particular form of plutonium-vitrified high-level waste contr.:.,ad u, a sealed canister-is s*-;tar enough to irradiated reactor fuel elements to qualify for its own exemption from the double-containment requirement. This is because of (1) the material properties of the vitrified HLW, (2) the high degree of confinement provided by the stainless steel waste canister, and (3) the NRG-approved quality assurance program implemented by DOE makes it highly unlikely that any plutonium would be released from an NRG-certified transportation package under the normal or hypothetical accident conditions of Part 71. The NRG is required to certify the transportation packages used for vitrified HLW pursuant to Section 180 of the NWPA and every transportation package for vitrified HLW will be required to meet the standards for accident-resistant packages (i.e., Type 8 packages) set forth in Part 71.

The tests described in DOE's Technical Justification demonstrate that the canisters containing the vitrified HLW provide an additional barrier to the release of radionuclides and compare favorably to the cladding surrounding spent fuel pellets in reactor fuel elements. The comparison is based upon physical drop tests, upon the material properties and dimensions of the sealed canisters, and the effects of radiation damage to materials.

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DOE's analysis demonstrates much lower concentrations of plutonium in the HLW canisters than in irradiated reactor fuel elements. However, the DOE has not established an upper limit on plutonium concentration for these vitrified HLW canisters, and the NRC is not basing its decision to remove these canisters from the double-containment requirement based on the plutonfum's concentration.

In its Technical Justification, DOE described the physical characteristics and acceptance standards of the canisters of vitrified HLW, including that the canistered waste form be capable of withstanding a 7-meter drop onto a flat. essentially unyielding surface, without breaching or dispersing radionuclides. This requirement is imposed by the DOE's 'Waste Acceptance System Requirements Document (WASRD)," Rev. 0, which is referenced in the Technical Justification. This test should not be confused with the 9-meter drop test, onto an essentially unyielding surface, which is required by the hypothetical accident conditions of§ 71. 73. The 9-meter drop test is performed on the entire transportation package under the Part 71 certification process. The 7-meter drop test standard only applies to the canistered HLW.

The NRC agrees that the 7-meter drop test requirement is relevant to the demonstration that the canistered HLW_represents an essentially nonrespirable form for shipping plutonium.

The NRC believes that the 7-meter canister drop test is a more severe challenge than the 9-meter drop test for an t.:1C-approved Type B package. This is because the Type B package and the impact limiters will absorb much of the energy which would otherwise be expended against the canister.

In some of DOE's tests, the HLW canisters were dropped from 9 meters-2 meters above DOE's 7-meter design standard-and portions of the testing included deliberately introducing flaws (0.95 cm holes) in the canisters' walls. For those HLW canisters tested with the 0.95 cm holes, the quantity of respirabl~ plutonium released through these holes was less 8

than 0.74 TBq (20 curies). This review of DOE's Technical Justification has provided th_e NRC staff confidence that DOE's petition is supportable and that vitrified HLW In a sealed canister is essentially nonrespirable.

The NRC does not control the requirements in, or changes to, DOE's WASRD Because of concerns that DOE's WASRD could be changed in the future, the NRC added the requirement in the proposed rule that vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister meet the design criteria of§ 60.135(b) and (c). However, in response to comments received on the proposed rulemaking, the Commission has reconsidered its proposed imposition of referencing Part 60 des:;;in criteria. The final rule, instead, incorp')rates one of the design requirements from Part 60 into this rule. The other Part 60 design requirements are satisfied by other existing Part 71 requirements and other language in the fm,;:il rule. Additionally, the Commission has included one acceptable method for meeting these design requirements for liandling by referencing appropriate American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code criteria. The explanation for this change is discussed below. Further, the NRC staff does

,perform technical reviews to certify package designs. For a HLW package, the review would include the sealed canister as well as the radioactive contents in the form of vitrified HLW: It is expected that an application for approval of a HLW package design would include a canister design and vitrified HLW c:-itents with characteristics and attributes comparable to those described in the Technical Justification.

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Comments on the Proposed Rule This section presents a summary of the principal comments received on the proposed rule, the NRC's response to the comments, and changes made to the final rule as a result of these comments. The Commission received seven comment letters from six commenters on the proposed rule. One was from a member of the public, two were from national laboratories, one was from a transportation cask designer, one was from a consulting company, and one was from DOE. In addition, DOE submitted a subsequent letter commenting on one of the other comments. Over-,lf, five of the six commenters supported the proposed rule and the remaining commenter, while not specifically opposing the rule, proposed changes regarding the performance of the canister and limiting its contents. Copies of these letters are available for public inspection and copying for a fee at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at 2120 L Street, NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

Comment. DOE and another commenter objected to the proposed rule's use of design criteria from Part 60. DOE noted tha~ basing canistered waste approved for transport under

§ 71.63 upon the rules for disposal of HLW under§ 60.135(b) and (c) assumes that certification approval for transport packages wil; not take place until a repository or interim storage facility becomes available; and that this may not be the case. The commenters are concerned that if certification for transport packages under the proposed rule is sought before a license application for a repository or interim storage facility is submitted, this situc:tion could complicate and impede progress on the HLW cask certification process. One commenter supported the use of Part 60 criteria.

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Response The Commission has reconsidered the need to reference Part 60 criteria for canistered v1tnf1ed HLW in the amended regulation The Comm1ss1on agrees that,tis best to avoid incorporating into Part 71-which contains standards for the packaging and transportation of rad1oact1ve materials-requirements referenced from Part 60 which are intended for the permanent disposal of HLW in a geologic repository The NRC staff has analyzed the requirements contained m § 60.135(b) and (c) and has determined that the intended requirement-that the canistered vitrified HLW maintain,ts integrity-can be achieved by reliance on existing Part 71 requirements and language from the proposed rule for all of the Part 60 requirements, but one. That one requirement is to des1g,,,ne canister to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport. This has been added to the final rule. Additionally, the Commission has included one acceptable method for meeting these design requirements by referencing appropriate American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code criteria.

The design criteria in § 60 135(b) require that the waste package shall not contain explosive, pyrophoric, or chemically reactive materials or free liquids m amounts that could cause harm; that waste packages shall be designed to maintain waste containment during handling; and that waste packages have unique ident1f1cat1on numbers The design criteria in

§ 60.135(c) require that the waste '.Je in solid form and placed in a sealed container; that any particulate waste forms be consolidated into an encapsulating matrix; and that any combustible radioactive waste be reduced to noncombustible form. As noted, the Comm1ss1on believed that by referencing tnese criteria in the proposed rule, It could assure the integrity of the canistered vitrified HLW The Commission now believes that the integrity objective can be achieved by relying on requirements in the final rule and other requirements In Part 71. First, as stated above, the final 11

rule has added language that the canister be designed to maintain waste containment during handling act1vit1es associated with transport Second the rule requires that the HLW be v1tnf1ed, and thus be in a solid form for encapsulation V:trif1cat1on of HLW uses molten glass and this high temperature process will reduce any combustible radIoactIve waste into a noncombustible form. Finally, the Part 60 requirement that a unique 1dent1f1catIon number be attached to the HLW canister Is not relevant for transportation.

Third, the Commission believes the integrity obJectIve can be achieved by relying on other requirements in Part 71. Part 71 already requires that the transportation packages must not cc,.,,din explosive, pyrophoric, or emically rear;tIve matenals or free llquids. Section 71.43(d) requires that:

A package must be made of materials and construction that assure that there will be no significant chemical, galvanic, or other reaction among the packaging components, among package contents, or between the packaging components and the package contents, including possible reaction resulting from inleakage of water, to the maximum credible extent. Account must be taken of the behavior of matenals under irradiation The existing requirement in§ 71.63(a) that the plutonium be in a solid form also will assure that the waste will be in solid form and that the waste package will be free of liquids.

Additionally, the Commission has included one acceptable method for meeting the canister design requirements for handling by referencing appropriate Amencan Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code cntena. Use of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code would ensure that the C?anister would be designed to maintain waste containment dunng handling, including normal loading and unloading activities. Certain criteria of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, are excluded because they are not appropriate for a sealed canister containing v1tnfied HLW For example, the criteria to include a pressure relief device and openings to inspect the interior are unnecessary and could 12

compromise the long term integrity of the canister Specific alternatives to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code cntena may be considered and approved without resorting to exemptions from the regulation.

Final Rule. The final rule has been revised to read as follows. Vitrified high-level waste contained In a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport As one method of meeting these design requirements, the I

NRC will consider acceptable a canister which is designed in accordance with the ~mencan Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.Section VIII, 3C.,.,ons through the 1995 Edition. However, this canister need not b~designed in accordance with the requirements of Section VII I, Parts UG-46, UG-115 through UG-120, UG-125 through I

UG-136, UW-60, UW-65, UHA-60, and UHA-65 and the canister's final closure weld need not be designed in accordance with the requirements of Section VI 11, Parts UG-99 and UW-11.

Necessary language to incorporate by reference the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code has also been added.

Comment. Four of the six commenters stated that the NRC should evaluate the..

technical bases for§ 71.63, or referred to a Commission SRM to SECY-96-215, dated October 31, 1996, which directed the NRC staff to "address whether the technical basis for 10 CFR 71.63 remains valid, or whether a revision or elimination of portions of 10 CFR 71.63 is needed to provide flexibility for current and future technologies." One of the commenters noted that the lnternationa1 Atomic Energy Agency standards do not impose a double-containment requirement. Four of the commenters recommended that if the NRC retained the double containment provision, that the rule use performance~based criteria for dispersrbility and respirab1hty as a basis for exemption, or that double containment only be required for "highly 13

dispersible materials" One of the commenters recommended that§ 71.63 be eliminated entirely. One commenter expressed an interest in any Commission action on§ 71.63, and recommended that the evaluation of§ 71 63 take the form of an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.

Response. The Commission believes that those comments to evaluate the technical basis for§ 71.63, to revise§ 71.63 (other than for vitnfied HLW in canisters), or to eliminate the rule, are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. The NRG staff recently reviewed the technical bases for§ 71.63, as directed in the SRM to SECY-96-215. The NRG staff concluded, in SECY-97-2-iS, dated September 29, 1997, that the technical bases remain valid, and that the provisions provide adequate flexibility for current and future technologies. Except for the changes made in this rulemaking for vitrified HLW in canisters, the NRG staff concluded that the provisions in § 71.63 should remain unchanged. The NRG staff will further consider potential modifications to § 71.63 in its response to a petition for rulemaking, dated September 25, 1997, (Docket No. PRM-71-12). The NRG published a notice of receipt for the petition in the FEDERAL REGISTER (63 FR 8362, dated February 19, 1998).

Comment. One commenter suggested that the proposed rule be changed to require that HLW canister desigr,, fabrication, test, and fill be conducted under a quality assu.-ance program that meets, to the satisfaction of the NRC, the requirements of Part 71, Subpart H.

This commenter also suggested that the proposed rule be changed to require that the exemption will only apply to canisters of HLW in shipping packages which have been demonstrated by analysis or test to adequately contain the HLW canisters without allowing canister failure under the hypothetical accident cond1t1ons of Part 71, S* 1bpart F, when considered as a transportation system.

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Response. The technical basis given In the DOE petition for an exemption Is that a separate inner container Is unnecessary because of the high degree of confinement provided by the stainless steel waste canister and the non-resp1rabihty of the solid, plutonium-bearing waste form In support of its petition, poE submitted a Technical Justification which included a description of a representative HLW canister together with the results of 7-meter and 9-meter drop testing of the canisters and a description of the standards used for canister fabrication and filling.

. The technical review performed by the NRC staff to certify a HLW package would include the sealed canister as well as th~ radioactive contents in the form of vitnfif:'d HLW It Is expected that an application for approval of a HLW package design would include a canister design and vitrified HLW contents with charactenstics and integrity comparable to those*

described in the DOE petition. The DOE HLW canisters will be subject to an NRC approved quality assurance plan.

The final rule has been revised to specify tha~ the vitrified high-level waste be contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport. These standards would apply to all canisters containing vitrified HLW transported under this provision and will provide reasonable assurance that the package design adequately protects pub:*... health and safety.

Comment. One commenter suggested that the proposed rule be changed to require that the exemption will only apply to vitrified HLW from which plutonium has been removed pnor to transfer to HLW storage tanks. The commenter suggested the vitnfied HLW be restncted to no more thar 3 7 TBq (100 Ci) of plutonium.

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Response. The Statement of Considerat1ors for the original rule (39 FR 20960) did not discuss actIvIty limits (quantity limits), nor did the CommIssIon adopt activity limits on the other forms of plutonium that are exempt from § 71 63(b) Rather, any limitations on the quantity of plutonium that can be shipped in a transportation package-for any exempt form of plutonium-are due to the inherent design features of the specific transportation package being used These design features are reviewed by the NRC as part of the package certification process The commenter has not provided any technical basis for requiring activity limits on this form of plutonium. The final rule does not specify a quantity limit for this exemption.

Regulatory Action The NRC Is amending 10 CFR 71.63 based on its evaluation of the petition submitted by DOE; the attachment to the petition, "Technical Justif1cat1on to Support the PRM by the DOE to Exempt HLW Canisters from 10 CFR 71.63(b)," the ti1ree comments received on the petition; and the seven comments received on the proposed rule. Section 71.63(b) specifies special provisions for shipping plutonium in excess of 0. 7 4 TBq (20 curies) per pac~age, including a separate inner containment system, except when plutonium is in solid form of reactor fuel elements, metal, or meta, dlloys. 1:-i amending§ 71.63(b), the NRC is granting, with modification, the petition submitted by DOE to eliminate these special provisions when transporting vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport. The final rule completes NRC action on PRM-71-11 In the proposed rule, the NRG would have required that the HLW canister meet design criteria contained in§ 60 135(b) and (c). The final rule, instead, incorporates these requirements into Part 71 16

In addition, the NRC has corrected the usage of units 1n § 71 63 The metric units are used first with the English units in parenthesis.

Criminal Penalties For the purposes of Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act {AEA), the Commission is issuing the final rule under one or more of sections 161 b, 161 i, or 161 o of the AEA Willful violations of the rule will be subject to criminal enforcement.

'compatibility of Agreement State Regulations Under the "Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of Agreement State Programs" approved by the Commission on June 30, 1997 (62 FR 46517), this rule is classified as compatibility category "NRC." This regulation addresses areas of exclusive NRC authority.

However, a State may adopt these provisions for the purposes of clarity and communication, as long as the State does not adopt regulations or program elements that would cause the State to regulate these areas.

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule will not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, and therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required. The final rule change 17

exempts shipments of vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport The purpose of the double containment rule is to ensure safety by requiring plutonium to be shipped as a solrd, under double containment. thereby minimizing the likelihood of leakage dunng transport as a result of

, possible packaging errors. The Commission believes that the plutonium within vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister is essentially nonrespirable and this form of plutonium provides a level of protection comparable to irradiated reactor fuel elements-which are exempt from the double-containment requirement. Therefore, double containment is unnecessary for vitrified H:..'JV contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste con!o:nment during handlir:J activities associated with transport.

The final environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmental assessment and the finding of no significant impact are available from Mark Haisfield, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-:-

0001, telephone (301) 415--6196.

Pape, work Reduction Act Statement This final rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0008.

• 18

Public Protection Notification

, If an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a final regulatory analysis, *Jn this final regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Commission.

The analysis is available for inspection in the NRG Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW.

(Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Mark Haisfield, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6196.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b}), the rommission certifies that this rule does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. DOE is the only transporter of vitrified HLW. No other entities are involved.

DOE is not a small entity as defined in 10 CFR 2.810 19

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action Is not a major rule and has venfied this determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget.

Backfit Analysis the NRC has determined tha~ u1e backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not aoply to this rule, and therefore, a backfit analysis is not required because these amendments do not involve any provisions that would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a}(1}.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 71 Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Incorporation by reference, Nuclear materials, Packaging and containers, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

For the reasons ~.;t out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C.

552 and 553; the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 71.

20

PART 71-PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

1. The authority citation for Part 71 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 930,932,933,935, 948, 953, 954, as amended, sec. 1701, 106 Stat 2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2297f); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846).

Section 71 97 also issued under sec. 301, Pub L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789-790.

2. Section 71.63 is revised to read as follows:

§ 71.63 Special requirements for plutonium shipments.

(a} Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) per package must be shipped as a solid.

(b) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) per package must be packaged in a separate inner container placed w1th1n outer packaging that meets the requirements of Subparts E and F of this part for packaging of material in normal form. If the entire package is subjected to the tests specified in§ 71.71 ("Normal conditions of transport"), the separate inner container must not release plutonium as demonstrated to a ser:,sitivity of 1 o-s A)h. If the entire package is subjected to the tests specified in§ 71.73 ("Hypothetical accident conditions"), the separate inner container must restrict the loss of plutonium to not more than A 2 in 1 week.

Solrd plutonium in the following forms is exempt from the requirements of ~his paragraph:

(1) Reactor fuel elements; (2) Metal or metal alloy; 21

(3) Vitrified high-level waste contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport. As one method of meeting these design requirements, the NRC will consider acceptable a canister which is designed in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, editions through the 1995 Edition. However, this canister need not be designed in accordance with the requirements of Section VIII, Parts UG-46, UG-115 through UG-120, UG-125 through UG-136, UW-60, UW-65, UHA-60, and UHA-65 and the canister's final closure weld need not be designed in accordance with the requirements of Section VIII, Parts UG-99 and UW-11. The Director of the Federal Register :;:proves this incorporation by reference in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, editions through the 1995 Edition, may be purchased from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, United Engineering Center, 345 East 47th St, New York, NY 10017. It is also available for inspection at the NRC Library, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738 or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC.; and 22

(4) Other plutonium bearing solids that the Comm1ss1on determines should be exempt from the requirements of this section

'?*II..

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this,..,:.(_.,,, day of May, 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Comm1ss1on John ~. Hoyle,

_3~tary of tre Commission.

23

Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585

- October 31, 1997 DOCKETED USNRC

°97 NOV -6 AlO :2 8 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn. Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff Washington, DC 20555-0001 D "'~ET ' u ~BER R '

Dear Mr. Secretary:

s::u LE-=-..::..:....,.-J (b J._ F ~ 'J-S LI-/ 6 The enclosed additional comments are submitted by the Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management to supplement our July 17, 1997, response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Requirements for Shipping Packages Used to Transport Vitrified High-Level Waste, Docket Number 71-11, issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in May 1997.

The enclosed comments were prepared to provide clarification and information related to the comments and recommendations in Mr. Sidney Crawford's July 22, 1997, letter on the proposed rule. Having submitted the petition for rulemaking, PRM-71-11, which is the basis for the Commission's proposed rule, we are interested in the outcome of this action and believe our additional comments are appropriate.

We appreciate the opportunity to provide additional information to assist you in addressing comments on the proposed rule to modify 10 CFR 71.63. Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. William Lake at 202/586-2840.

Enclosure Sincerely,

~-A-~

Christopher A. Kouts, Director Storage and Engineering Technology Division Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management edby 2

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Enclosure Comments on the seven issues identified and addressed in Mr. Crawford's letter:

1.

"No transportation cask has been proposed, even as a conceptual design. "

The Department of Energy (DOE) began design, development, and certification of a truck cask for transport of canisters containing vitrified high level waste (Ill, W) in the 1980's. That effort was deferred, in part, by the need to resolve the double containment issue. Once this issue is resolved, DOE may continue the truck cask project, or pursue other transport options for HLW.

In an effort to resolve the issue of double containment for canistered HL W prior to producing waste canisters, and prior to continuing design, development, and certification efforts for HL W casks, DOE submitted a petition for rulemaking to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1993. Resolving the containment issue before embarking on major efforts ofHLW canister production and cask design is simply good management practice.

2.

"Unlike Nuclear Fuel, HLW canister design, fabrication, test, and fill is not directly subject to NRC quality assurance requirements of 10 CFR 71 Subpart H (although essentially the same requirements are conveyed for compliance with DOWIRW-0351P, Waste Acceptance Systems Requirements Document WASRD) and DOEIRW-0333P, Quality assurance Requirements and Description (QARD)) nor does NRC directly evaluate HL W canister design, fabrication, or test "

Similar to nuclear fuel, DOE's HLW canisters will be subject to NRC approved quality assurance (QA) from production to eventual disposal. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), as amended, requires DOE to perform all activities for the NWP A, including transportation, under NRC's regulatory authority. In accordance with NWPA, DOE performs its NRC licensed activities which include production and transport ofHLW canisters under its QA plan described in Publication DOE/RW-0333P. The DOE's original QA plan was submitted to NRC, and approved. As the program was implemented, the plan needed revision and further approval by the NRC. NRC's most recent acceptance of the QA plan was based on Revision 7 of DOE/RW-0333P, dated July 8, 1997.

3.

"DOE/EM has considered different configurations for immobilization, storage, and transportation of vitrified HL Wand spent nuclear fuel (SF.), none of which has been subject to safety analysis or public review and comment These concepts include co-packaging DOE SF. (not subject to NRC design and licensing oversight) with canistered HL Win a single transportation cask and disposal of plutonium solutions (in an immobilized form) within HLW canisters (DOE's "can in canister" concept)."

1

DOE, like others engaged in engineering development activities, considers a number of different options to accomplish needed tasks. The DOE evaluates these candidate options, choosing those which best meet requirements set for safety, performance, and efficiency. It is not necessary for NRC to review all of these early concepts to evaluate the safety of the option selected by the DOE and submitted to the NRC for review. The canistered filW system under consideration is one approach that has been selected by DOE, and submitted to NRC for review. The selection of vitrified filW canisters by DOE as a method of plutonium immobilization, and submission of the petition for rulemaking on double containment, allows public involvement at the appropriate time.

As other concepts are selected and submitted to the NRC for certification, they too will be available for public consideration.

4.

"The DOEIRW WASRD provides dimensional envelope parameters for repository handling and disposal conditions, but does not establish canister minimum wall thickness criteria or other structural criteria other than a 7 meter drop without breaching" and the implied need to withstand canister weight stress, including safety margins during handling. The canisters have not been designed to undergo accident conditions of 10 CFR 71, and, in fact, the WASRD glossary indicates the purpose of the HL W canisters is to act as a pour mold for the vitrified HL W. Furthermore, the Savannah River and West Valley canisters are of substantially different thicknesses:

Savannah River- 0.375" nominal; West Valley - 0.1345" nominal (10 gauge)."

The NRC uses performance-based standards for certification of package designs used for radioactive material transportation. This approach assures public health and safety while allowing a high degree of flexibility for cask design activities. The approach is considered to be preferable to the use of prescriptive engineering standards which significantly limit design flexibility that is essential for efficient! accomplishing the numerous and varied transportation activities covered by the NRC's regulations. These filW canisters are not, by themselves, intended to be transport packages. They will be shipped, as contents, in packages designed and certified to meet all the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 71. An applicant for NRC certification, such as DOE, must demonstrate that the package (i.e., the cask and its contents) satisfies all radiological safety requirements of 10 CFR 71 which include containment. The 7 meter drop test with an acceptance criterion of no breaching has the form of a performance standard, but is not intended to meet any existing NRC requirement. It is offered, along with several other independent demonstrations, to support the DOE' s petition for rulemaking. Finally, the canisters are designed for several functions, and any number of factors could result in canisters of different wall thickness.

5.

"The 9 m drop tests represented by DOEIRW were performed on a very small number of canisters early in the Savannah River development program, were not conducted under a quality assurance program meeting DOEIRW-0333P (or the precursor, DOEIRW-0214). All 9 meter drop tests are believed to h0:ve been conducted prior to 2

1990. It is not clear that such data is "qualified in accordance with NUREG-1298.

Furthermore, it is not clear that results can be extended to the much thinner West Valley canisters."

The canister drop tests were not conducted under the QA program described in DOE/RW-0333P, but were conducted at DOE contractor facilities using engineering and QA procedures applicable at the time at the facilities where the tests were performed. The tests were conducted for elements of DOE not subject to the requirements ofNWP A. Tests performed by these DOE contractors (Laboratories) have generally been considered adequate and appropriate for NRC licensing and certification activities. When necessary, such previously performed tests are accepted for use in design and safety demonstration activities through QA procedures such as a peer review process which are established to handle these situations.

6.

"The WASRD "leak tightness" provision/or filled HLW canisters is specified as "less than lxl o-4 atm-cc/sec, three orders of magnitude greater than provided by ANSI N14.5-1977. The value was selected as consistent with DOEIRW-0199, Site Characterization Plan (SCP), although HLW canisters are not intended, of themselves, to meet repository post-closure containment requirements. (WASRD Requirements Backup Sheets)."

The W ASRD document specifies an operational test of 10-4 atm-cc/sec to verify that the package has been assembled and sealed (welded) properly. The leak testing standard, ANSI N-14.5, provides a method of demonstrating the adequacy of a containment system, and specifies a leakage rate of 10*7 cm 3/sec as a demonstration ofleaktightness for a containment vessel. DOE's Petition for Rulemaking assumes and argues that double containment is not needed for canistered HLW containing plutonium bearing solids. In accordance with DOE's position, the HLW canister is not a containment boundary, and the leakage test standard, ANSI N-14.5 does not apply. The canisters with its HL W will be the contents of a transport cask, and the leakage standard would be used to demonstrate the containment adequacy of the transport cask.

1.

"DOE HLW, as cu"ently qualified, has, to the most economic extent practical, had plutonium removed from process streams prior to being transfe"ed to HL W tanks, this may not be the case if some methods of DO E's proposed disposal of surplus plutonium are adopted or if some non-HL W, high plutonium-bearing waste streams are introduced. "

The DOE's petition and NRC's proposed rule address the issue of exempting casks containing HLW canisters from the double containment requirements of 10 CFR 71. Neither DOE's petition nor NRC's proposed rule suggests exempting casks containing HLW canisters from other provisions of 10 CFR 71. These other provisions include specifying the cask and the contents which may be shipped in the cask, and satisfying containment criteria. Certificates of compliance issued by the NRC for HL W transport casks, like certificates for all packages, will specify and limit the contents. Under the NRC's procedures, an applicant for cask design certification must 3

specify the cask and its radioactive contents, and demonstrate that the package (i.e., the cask and its contents) satisfies all radiological safety requirements of 10 CFR 71 which include containment. Specific shipments of radioactive material must comply with all conditions of approval in the certificate before a shipment can be made. Certificates of compliance for these shipments will specify the isotopes that can be included as contents and their maximum quantities.

Deviations from approved contents will preclude shipment until appropriate corrective actions are taken.

Comments on the three recommendations provided in Mr. Crawford's letter:

I.

"HL W canister design, fabrication, test, and fill will be conducted under a QA program that meets, to the satisfaction of the NRC, the requirements of 10 CFR Subpart H."

The recommended requirement is unnecessary. All aspects of production and transportation of HL W canisters by DOE that are covered by the NWP A will be performed under DOE' s NRC approved QA program which is described in DOE/RW-0333P.

2.

"The exemption will apply only to canisteredHLWfrom which plutonium has been removed prior to transfer to HL W storage tanks. A suggested value could be 100 curies maximum plutonium content (2500 gmlnr x 0. 6 nr x 0. 062 Ci/gm = 93 curies) (W ASRD limit, nominal canister volume, Pu-239 specific activity)"

The recommended requirement is unnecessary. Any certificate of compliance issued by the NRC for HLW transport casks will specify and limit the contents. Under the NRC's procedures, DOE will specify the radioactive contents, and demonstrate that the package (i.e., the cask and its contents) satisfies all radiological safety requirements of 10 CFR 71. Shipments of radioactive material must satisfy all conditions of approval which include specific limits on contents. Under these procedures, deviations from approved contents will preclude shipment until appropriate corrective actions are taken.

3.

"The exemption will apply only to canisteredHLWin shipping casks which have been demonstrated by analysis or test to adequately contain the canisters without allowing canister failure under the hypothetical accident conditions in 10 CFR 71 Subpart F when considered as a transportation system. "

To begin, consider the general method of containment assessment and how it applies for the proposed rule. The discussion will address the package which consists of a cask and its contents, and the cask's ability to contain the radioactive contents. The cask component of interest here is the containment boundary. The contents are of interest because they produce a containment source term. For design approval, the package is subjected to the normal and hypothetical accident conditions of 10 CFR 71, and its response determined. The response of the contents leads to a quantification of the containment source term, while the response of the cask along with the source term leads to a determination of the containment system's performance. The containment system's performance is then compared to the containment acceptance criteria, both 4

of which are expressed as an activity releases. Under the proposed rule, filW canisters are treated as the radioactive contents of a transportation package having a single containment boundary which is the general approach used for most contents.

The recommendation suggests a requirement to show that the canister does not fail under test conditions of 10 CFR 71. However, there is no definition offered for canister failure.

Furthermore, if the HL W canister is treated as the contents of a package, the containment source term produced by it under normal or hypothetical accident condition is simply a quantity that must be determined and used to demonstrate the adequacy of the containment system. The concept of failure can be applied to the containment boundary which has acceptance criteria specified in 10 CFR 71, but not to the source term.

5

DOCKETED US RC "97 JUL 24 A11 :01 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff July 22, 1997 Sidney Crawford 6 Spinning Wheel Court Germantown, MD 20874 DOCKET NlJABEA p PROPOSED RULE 11

( '1:IP~ ~5 Jllt,)

Subject:

Petition for Rulemaking PRM-71-11 (RIN 3150-AF59)

Gentlemen:

The following comments are provided in response to Federal Register Notice of Proposed Rulemaking PRM-71-11, published May 8, 1997 at 62FR25146. When originally requested by the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (DOE/RW) in 1993, the request seemed appropriate and consistent with the anticipated waste form (vitrified borosilicate glass). Since that time, actual glass melt of HL W tank sludge has been initiated at Savannah River and West Valley. However, the final waste form(s) at Hanford and Idaho have not been established. The Idaho HL W is currently a dry calcine form and may be processed as a ceramic or other form for disposal; the Hanford HL W is currently being developed under two privatized procurements which are closely controlled as proprietary processes and are not subject to DOE/EM (Headquarters) oversight for process control and waste acceptance criteria.

The NRC correctly notes that the specific HLW acceptance criteria ofDOE/RW technical baseline documents are not under NRC control and could be changed in the future as long as repository performance is not adversely impacted. It should be noted that some of the quantities presented by DOE/RW, and included in the NRC Federal Register notice, draft Environmental Assessment, and Regulatory Analysis are no longer correct. In particular, the quantity of Hanford HL W canisters is grossly understated. In terms of shipments, this is compensated, in part, by shipping 4 to 7 HL W canisters per shipping cask rather than 2 canisters per cask identified in the EA and RA. Also, HLW will eventually be shipped from Idaho (INEEL) to a geologic repository, although the waste form may not be vitrified (borosilicate glass). Although the EA notes the Idaho waste was not considered in the rulemaking, it is not clear that the proposed amendment to 10CFR71.63 excludes (or includes) Idaho HLW. Finally, drop test results quoted by DOE/RW may not meet NRC standards for data quality.

The following issues should be considered prior to amending 1 0CFR 71.63:

JUL 2 4 1997 4cknowledged by card....................... ::.

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1. No transportation cask has been proposed, even as a conceptual design.

2. Unlike nuclear fuel, HL W canister design, fabrication, test, and fill is not directly subject to NRC quality assurance requirements of 10CFR71 Subpart H (although essentially the same requirements are conveyed for compliance with DOE/RW-035 1P, Waste Acceptance System Requirements Document (WASRD) and DOE/RW-0333P, Quality Assurance Requirements and Description (QARD)) nor does NRC directly evaluate HL W canister design, fabrication, or test.

3. DOE/EM has considered different configurations for immobilization, storage, and transportation of vitrified HL W and spent nuclear fuel (SNF), none of which have been subject to safety analysis or public review and comment. These concepts include co-packaging DOE SNF (not subject to NRC design and license oversight) with canistered HL W in a single transportation cask and disposal of plutonium solutions (in an immobilized form) within HL W canisters (DOE's "can in canister" concept).

4. The DOE/RW WASRD provides dimensional envelope parameters for repository handling and disposal conditions, but does not establish canister minimum wall thickness criteria or structural criteria other than 7 meter drop "without breaching" and the implied need to withstand canister weight stress, including safety margins, during handling. The canisters have not been designed to undergo accident conditions of 1 0CFR 71, and, in fact, the W ASRD glossary indicates the purpose of the HL W canisters is to act as a pour mold for the vitrified HL W. Furthermore, the Savannah River and West Valley canisters are of substantially different thicknesses: Savannah River - 0.375" nominal; West Valley - 0.1345" nominal (10 gauge).

5. The 9 meter drop tests represented by DOE/RW were performed on a very small number of canisters early in the Savannah River development program, were not conducted under a quality assurance program meeting DOE/RW-0333P (or the precursor, DOE/RW-0214).

All 9 meter drop tests are believed to have been conducted prior to 1990. It is not clear that such data is "qualified" in accordance with NUREG-1298. Furthermore, it is not clear that results can be extended to the much thinner West Valley canisters.

6. The W ASRD "leak tightness" provision for filled HL W canisters is specified as "less than 1 xl04 atm-cc/sec", three orders of magnitude greater than provided by ANSI Nl4.5-1977.

The value was selected as consistent with DOE/RW-0199, Site Characterization Plan (SCP),

although HL W canisters are not intended, of themselves, to meet repository post-closure containment requirements. (W ASRD Requirements Backup Sheets)

7. DOE HL W, as currently qualified, has, to the most economic extent practical, had plutonium removed from process streams prior to being transferred to HL W tanks; this may not be the case if some methods of DO E's proposed disposal of surplus plutonium are adopted or if some non-HL W, high plutonium-bearing waste streams are introduced.

Based on the above considerations, the following conditions should be included with any final rule to amend 10CFR71.63.

A. HL W canister design, fabrication, test, and fill will be conducted under a QA program that meets, to the satisfaction of the NRC, the requirements of 10CFR71 Subpart H.

B. The exemption will apply only to vitrified HL W from which plutonium has been removed prior to transfer to HL W storage tanks. A suggested value could be 100 curies maximum plutonium content. (2500 gm/m3 x 0.6 m3 x 0.062 Ci/gm= 93 curies) (WASRD limit, nominal canister volume, Pu239 specific activity)

C. The exemption will apply only to canistered HL W in shipping casks which have been demonstrated by analysis or test to adequately contain the canisters without allowing canister failure under the hypothetical accident conditions of 10CFR71 Subpart F when considered as a transportation system.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the proposed change to 10CFR71.63. My contact information will be provided with the forwarding e-mail message.

• Sincerely, Sidney Crawford

• This letter was received on NRC's interactive rulemaking website on July 22, 1997 -- ATB

Operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by Exceptional Service in the National Interest Sandia Corporation DOCKETED US RC "97 JUL 24 A11 :o 1 James K. Rice P.O. Box 5800 Director Albuquerque. NM 87185-0726 Environmental Programs Center Phone: (505) 845-7301 Fax: (505) 844-7437 Internet: jkrice@sandia.gov Secretary July 21. 1997 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington. DC 20555-0001 OFFICE OF S CRET y

DOCHE Tn-'G & *;rRVIL.E BR.,. 't..H DOCKET NUMBERPR PROPOSED RULE

. 11

( l,~~l<:l5l'ft)

Re:

Comments on Proposed Rulemaking RIN 3150-AF59 (Federal Register. pages 25146-25147). "Requirements for Shipping Packages Used to Transport Vitrified High-Level Waste" Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has requested. in a notice of proposed rule making (NPRM. Federal Register. pages 21546-21547). comments on whether it should "amend its regulations to remove canisters containing vitrified high-level waste (HLW) containing plutonium from the packaging requirement for double containment." The current requirement in 10 CFR Part 71.63 requires double containment. in a separate inner container. of plutonium in excess of 20 curies (0.74 Tbq) per package. and then lists two specific forms of solid plutonium -- 1) reactor fuel elements and 2) metal or metal alloys -- which are excluded from this requirement and indicates that other plutonium-bearing solids may be determined by the Commission to be excluded from this requirement.

Historically, the double containment requirement for plutonium was instituted during the era when spent nuclear fuel recycle was anticipated and was motivated primarily by the prospect of shipping plutonium in liquid form.

plutonium nitrate. This expectation led to the general requirement that any package containing more than 20 curies of plutonium be designed ~ith a "separate inner container" (or "double containment") and that the plutonium must be in solid form.

This requirement is excessive for many forms of plutonium in packages containing more than the 20 curies of plutonium.

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example. vitrified HLW in sealed canisters is one of the forms for which the "double containment" requirement is excessive. Therefore. we endorse the proposed change dealing with in VHLW canisters.

Beyond this. the Commission is urged to reconsider the double containment requirement in general. This longer term prospect for addressing the technical basis for 10CFR71.63 (requiring "double containment") is contemplated in the NRC staff memorandum (dated October 31. 1996. from John C.

Hoyle to James M. Taylor. Staff Requirements - Secy 96-215 - Requirements for Shipping Packages Used to Transport Vitrifi ed Wastes Containing Plutonium).

This memorandum suggests that"... eliminati on of portions of 10CFR71.63 is needed... " We strongly endorse this action as contemplated in the NRC staff memo and we would be pleased to assist in the development of a technical basis for such change.

We recommend that:

(a) the Commission assess whether the double containment requirement is technically justified with a view toward its elimination as suggested by the NRC memo. and (b) in the event the Commission determines that it will not fully eliminate 10CFR71.63. then specify that only "highly dispersible materials" which are "readily respirable" be required to be "doubly contained" and provide a basis for clearly defining highly dispersible and readily respirable.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule. Please contact Richard Yoshimura at (505) 845-8181 if you have any questions.

Sincerely, (original signed by James K. Rice and mai led 7/22/97) *

• This letter was received on NRC's interactive rulemaking website on July 22, 1997 -- ATB

Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 July 17, 1997 DOCKETED USNRC Secretary "97 JUL 24 Al 1 :38 OFFlCE OF SECRE. TARY OOCKETiNG & SERVICE BRANCH U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn. Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff Washington, DC 20555-0001 DOCKET NLMBER PR 11 PROPOSED RULE............ __

Dear Mr. Secretary:

( ~a Fte ~5/t/,}

The following comments are submitted in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Requirements for Shipping Packages Used to Transport Vitrified High-Level Waste, Docket Number 71-11, Issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in May 1997. These comments were prepared by the Storage and Engineering Technology Division in the Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. Other Offices within the Department may also respond to the Commission's request for comments. These comments are intended to provide clarification of some of the Department's activities that may be affected by the rule, and to address the broader issue of transport rules for plutonium and plutonium bearing materials.

General Comments:

1.

The proposed rule is appropriate, effective, and expeditious for the well-defined canisters containing plutonium bearing vitrified wastes.

2.

The proposed rule which ties canistered waste approved for transport under 10 CFR 71.63 to the rules for disposal of high-level radioactive wastes (HL W) under 10 CFR 60. 13 5 (b) and ( c ), assumes that shipments will not take place until a repository or interim storage facility becomes available. The Commission should be aware that certification approval for transport packages under the proposed rule, if it becomes effective, may be pursued prior to the submission of a license application for a repository or interim storage facility.

We are concerned that such a situation could complicate and impede progress on the HL W cask certification process.

3.

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking referred to an NRC staff requirements memorandum (SRM), dated October 31, 1996. That SRM directed the staff to initiate and expedite the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which has been accomplished. The SRM also stated, "In the longer term, the staff should also address whether the technical basis for 10 CFR 71. 63 remain valid, or whether a revision or elimination of portions of 10 CFR 71. 63 is needed -

to provide flexibility for current and future technologies." According to the SRM, this broader look at 10 CFR 71.63 is scheduled to be completed by September 26, 1997.

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2 It should be noted the Department of Energy possesses various forms and quantities of plutonium, and therefore, is interested in any Commission action on 10 CFR 71.63. The Department is currently developing plans for disposition of its plutonium inventory. In order to facilitate an exchange of information between the Department and the Commission, we suggest that the broader look at 10 CFR 71.63 take the form of an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. With such a process form, the Department and other interested parties would have the opportunity to fully participate in the planned broader look at 10 CFR 71. 63.

4.

For the longer term consideration of disposition of plutonium bearing materials that exist in a variety of forms, we recommend a less prescriptive approach than contained in the proposed rule. Consistent with the Commission's general approach to rules pertaining to containment of radioactive materials for transport, performance-based criteria are suggested. Performance-based criteria for exemption of plutonium bearing material from the double containment requirements of 10 CFR 71.63 should be based on dispersibility and respirability of the radioactive contents.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule. We would also be pleased to provide any additional information to assist you in addressing the need for modification to 10 CFR 71. 63 to deal with future requirements for transport and disposition of plutonium bearing materials.

Sincerely, Christopher A. Kouts, Director Storage and Engineering Technology Division Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY CONSULTANTS, INC.

8905 COPENHAVER DRIVE POTOMAC, MARYLAND 20854 (301) 340-1047 (301) 340-2229 FAX DOCKETED U NRC "97 JUL 22 P 1 :26 OFFISf.._Or SEC~ETARY OOCKc. 1 ING

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• l RVICE na. NCH July 22, 1997 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff Washington, DC 20555-0001 Re: NRC Rulemaking on Requirements for Shipping Packages Used to Transport Vitrified High Level Waste, Docket Number 71-11

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As a former U.S. DOE official whose duties included the management of the DOE Transport Technology Program for several years, and who has significant background knowledge about this rulemaking, I wish to extend my endorsement of the proposed regulatory changes, stated in the referenced rulemaking, as a commendable start to needed revisions of 10 CFR 71.63.

Although these changes are expeditious to achieve the desired effect, and should be invoked, these changes could be better configured to serve the interests of the nation.

With this interest in mind, I offer the following comments:

1.

Tieing the certification of a transport package which is subject to the prov1s1ons of 10 CFR 71.63, to the provisions of 10 CFR 60.135 (b) and (c) (relating to "Criteria for the waste package and its components"), establishes a specious relationship between two separate sections of the regulations which were not intended in their original formulation.

This may lead to unforeseen and unnecessary entanglements in the certification and licensing process for transport on the one hand, and waste disposal in geologic repositories on the other.

2.

NRC should pursue the removal of the tie-in between 10 CFR 71.63 and 10 CFR 60.135 (b) and (c).

Adequacy of the VHLW canisters should be based on performance criteria which relate to transport loadings alone for exemption of plutonium-bearing packages from the provisions of 10 CFR 71.63. This would t\\cknowledged by card..... ~.:":._:~,..,-

~- JUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI~

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eliminate the need for making a connection between two sets of arguments about particle generation, one relating to radioactive waste in geologic repositories and one to radioactive material in transport. While in both cases there is a clear safety incentive to reducing particulate generation, the two arguments are not precisely analogous.

3.

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking referred to a NRC Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) dated October 31, 1996. This SRM directed the staff to initiate and expedite the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and this has been accomplished. The SRM also stated, "In the longer term, the staff should also address whether the technical basis for 10 CFR 71.63 remain valid, or whether a revision or elimination of portions of 10 CFR 71.63 is needed to provide flexibility for current and future technologies." This broader look at 10 CFR 71.63 is to be completed by September 26, 1997. I recommend that pursuit of the total elimination of 10 CFR 71.63 be undertaken forthwith.

4.

In the event that NRC does not eliminate 10 CFR 71.63, it is quite clear that the performance criteria for exemption of plutonium-bearing materials from double containment requirements should be based on dispersibility and respirability of the radioactive contents.

FPF/aw Frank P. Falci President

OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY MANAGED BY LOCKHEED MARTIN ENERGY RESEARCH CORP.

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY POST OFFICE BOX 20()8.8485 OAK R10Ge. TN 37831-8485 July 21, 1997 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20555-8520 Attn:

Rulemaking and Adjudications E. Easton (301) 415-8520 M. Haisfield (301) 415-6196 Gentlemen:

DOCKETED US RC "97 JUL 22 P 4 :48 OFFICE OF SE. ET.t., Y DOCKET! G S~R' ICE iiANCH PHONE: (423) 974-11163 FAX: (423) 974-1975 INTERNET: POPERBQ0RNL.GOV I

DOCKET NLMBER PROPOSED RULE PR 7 i

( ft>~ fR :lS/t/to)

Transmittal of Comments on Proposed Rule "Requirements for Shipping Packages Used to Transport Vitrified High-Level Waste (RIN 31SO-AFS9)

Attached are comments relating to the subject the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) rroposcd rule

[RIN (31S0)-AFS9].

R. B. Pope Senior R&D Program Manager, and Leader of the Transportation Tedmologies Group Oak Ridge National Laboratory P.O. Box 2008, MS-6495 Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6495 phonc(423)974-1963 fax (423) 974-1975 E-mail poperb@ornl.gov RBP:mmd cc:

J. M. Begovich J.M. Cash P. T. Dickman, DOFJAL P. B. Lester. DOFJOR R. D. Michclhaugh L. B. Shappert File: 2.1 - EM Transportation Management JUL 2 4 1997 J\\cknowleaged by card..... --.......... --6' or1ll -23rinrinr dcience lo Eife

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Comments on Proposed Rulemaking RIN 3150-AF59 (Federal Register, pages 25146-25147)

Prepared by R. B. Pope Oak Ridge National Laboratory P. 0. Box 2008, MS-6495 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831-6495 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has requested, in a notice of proposed rule making (NRPM, Federal Register, pages 21546-21547), comments on whether it st.ould "amend its regulations to remove canisters containing vitrified high-level waste (HL W) containing rt~um from the packaging requirement for double containment" The cum:nt requirement in l 0 CFR Pmt. H.63 requires double containment, in a separate inner container, of plutonium in excess of 31 Ci (0. 74 TBA) per package, and then lists two specific fonns of solid plutonium which are excluded from this rcquire~nen\\ and indicates that other plutonium-bearing solids may be determined by the commission to be excludrd frotn this requirement.

Historically, the double containment requirement tor plll\\(>nium was instituted during the era when spent nuclear fuel recycle was anticipated. and resulted from a.-concem about the packaging and transport oflargc quantities of highly dispcrsable plutonium (e.g., plutonium nitrate liquids). However, rather than imposing a requirement that highly dispersable fonns of plutonium be doubly-contained, the regulators chose to require all forms..>f plutonium to be doubly-contained except for specific forms which were clearly non-dispersablc.

The Commission is strongly urged to add vitrified HL W in canisters to the list of those materials excluded from the double-containment requirement Beyond this, the Commission is urged to reconsider the double containment requiremen* :."1. general. It is recommended that the Commission:

(a) assess whether the double containment requirement is technically justified in view of the fact that the current International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (ST-I, 1996) does not impose such a requirement; and (b) if determined that the double containment requirement is technically justified, then specify that only

.. highly dispersablc materials" be required to be double-contained, and provide a basis for clearly defining "highly dispersable materials" consistent with the manner in which the IAEA has now defined.. low dispersable materials" for the type C packages in ST-I. Thus, the Commission would be specifying what needs to be doubly-contained, rather than what does not need to be doubly-contained.

This approach would result in the U.S. regulations being more consistent with the current and future IAEA Regulations. This approach would also be consistent with that taken by the Commission in adopting the IAEA-specific unshielded radiation level requirement for low specific activity materials and surface contaminated objects in its regulations adopted effective April 1, 1996.

+

GENERAL ATOMICS NWM:AZ:201:97 File 6.11.31.5.1 July 21, 1997 Secretar)I", U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rulemak\\ngs and Adjudications Staff Washington, DC 20555-0001 DOCKETED USNRC "97 JUL 22 P 2 :Q7 OFF Cf OF SECRETARY DOCKE TiNG & 3EqVICE F.11</.JLH

Subject:

Proposed Rule, "Requirements for Shipping Packages Used to Transport Vitrified High-Level Waste"

Dear Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff:

General Atomics believes that the proposed rule to allow vitrified high-level radioactive waste (HL W) containing plutonium to be transported without a double containment inside its shipping cask should be implemented.

The proposed rule will allow the transport of vitrified HLW cost effectively, thus saving the taxpayers money while still maintaining protection of the public health and safety. The requirement that the waste forms meet the design criteria in 10 CFR 60.135 (b) and (c), e.g. waste in solid form, in sealed containers and that particulate waste forms be consolidated to limit the availability and generation of particulates, combined with using a Type B shipping cask for transport, ensures that there is 9

essentially no risk to the public health and safety.

Sincerely, II.

AIZ~

cc:

R. M. Grenier

(!)

JUL: 2 4 1997 1\\cknowledged by card... "... -

...... ~:-::;,,.

3550 GENERAL ATOMICS COURT, SAN DIEGO, CA 92121-1194 PO BOX 85608, SAN DIEGO, CA 92186-5608 (619) 455-3000

.lS. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM1S:::i10n DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics PoS!mark Date 1 ~'

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY Cot+1ISSION 10 CFR Part 71 RIN 3150-AF59 "97 MAY 12 AlO :32 Requirements for Shipping Packages Used to Transport Vitrified High-Level Waste AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION : Proposed rule: request for comments.

DOCKET NUMBER PR PROPOSED RULE 1 I

( (oP.. F~ ~5lt!")

SUt+tARY : The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its regulations to remove canisters containing vitrified high-level waste (HLW) containing plutonium from the packaging requirement for double containment. This amendment is being proposed in response to a petition for rulemaking (PRM-71-11) submitted by the Department of Energy (DOE). This proposed rule would also make a minor correction to the usage of metric and English units to be consistent with existing NRC policy.

~

1~1 l9CJ1 DATE: The comment period expires (75 days afteP ~~elieatiaA). Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so. but the Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Send comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.

Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike. Rockville. Maryland.

between 7:45 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.

For information on submitting convnents electronically, see the discussion under Electronic Access in the Supplementary Information Section.

Certain documents related to this rulemaking, including comments received and the environmental assessment :~d f;nding of no significant impact. may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room. 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level).

Washington, DC.

These same documents may also be viewed and downloaded electronically via the Electronic Bulletin Board established by NRC for this rulemaking JS discussed under Electronic Access in the Supplementary Information Sectioo.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Earl Easton. Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington. DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-8520. e-mail EXE@nrc.gov or Mark Haisfield. Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, DC 20555-0001. telephone (301) 415-6196, e-mail MFH@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

In 10 CFR 71.63, the NRC imposed special requirements on licensees who ship plutonium in excess of 0.74 terabecquerels (20 curies). These 2

requirements specify that plutonium must be in solid form and that packages used to ship plutonium must provide a separate inner containment (the "double containment" requirement). In adopting these requirements. the NRC specifically excluded plutonium in the form of reactor fuel elements. metal or metal alloys,

and. on a case-by-case basis. other plutonium-bearing solids that the NRC determines do not require double containment.

On November 30. 1993. the DOE petitioned the NRC to amend§ 71.63 to add a provision that would specifically remove canisters containing plutonium-bearing vitrifie1 waste from the packaging requirement for double containment. The NRC published a notice of receipt for the petition. docketed as PRM-71-11. in the Federal Register on February 18. 1994 (59 FR 8143). requesting public comment by May 4. 1994. On May 23. 1994 (59 FR 26608). the public comment period was extended to June 3. 1994. at the request of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) Oversight Program of the State of Idaho.

Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. as amended. the DOE is the Federal age~cy responsible for developing and administering a geologic repository for the deep disposal of HLW and spent nuclear fuel. In the petition.

the DOE proposes to ship the HLW from each of its three storage locations at Aiken. South Carolina: Hanford.. Washington: and West Valley, New York : directly to the geologic repository in casks certified by the NRC. Currently, this HLW exists mostly in the form of liquid and sludge resulting from the reprocessing of defense reactor fuels.

The DOE proposes to solidify this material into a borosilicate glass form in which the HLW is dispersed and immobilized. The glass would then be placed into stainless steel canisters for storage and eventual transport to the geologic repository. DOE's purpose in requesting an amendment to the rule is to allow the transportation and disposal of HLW in a more cost-3

effective and efficient manner without adversely affecting public health and safety.

The containers used to transport canisters of vitrified HLW will be Type B packages certified by the NRC.

These packages are required to meet accident resistant standards. The HLW will also be subject to the special transport controls for a "Highway Route Controlled Quantity" pursuant to U.S. Department of Transportation regulations.

In addition. the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.

as amended. requir~s the DOE to provide technical assistance and funds to train emergency responders along the planned route.-

The DOE asserts that shipment of vitrified HLW without double containment will not adversely affect safety. This is because the canistered. vitrified HLW provides a comparable level of protection to the packaging of reactor fuel elements. which does nbt require double containment.

The DOE also noted that the plutontum concentrations in the vitrified HLW will be considerably lower than the concentration in spent nuclear fuel and that vitrified HLW is in an essentially nonrespirable form.

Comments on the petition were received from three parties: the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): Nye County. Nevada (the site for the proposed spent fuel and HLW repository at Yucca Mountain): and the INEL Oversight Program of the State of Idaho.

EPA reviewed the petition in accordance with its responsibilities under Section 309 of the Clean Air Act and had no specific comments.

Nye County agreed with the rationale and arguments advanced by the DOE. and had no objection to DOE's petition. The State of Idaho commented that the petition was ~remature bec9use it did not specify the parameters or pe~formance standards that HLW must meet.

On June 1. 1995. the NRC staff met with the DOE in a public meeting to discuss the petitioner's request and the possible alternative of requesting an 4

NRC determination under§ 71.63(b)(3) to exempt vitrified HLW from the double containment requirement. The DOE informed the NRC in a letter dated January 25.

1996. of its intent to seek this exemption and the NRC received DOE's request on July 16. 1996. The DOE requested that the original petition for rulemaking be held in abeyance until a decision was reached on the exemption request.

In response to DOE 's request. the NRC staff prepared a Commission paper (SECY-96-215. dated October 8. 1996) outlining and requesting Commission approval of the NRC staff's proposed approach for making a determination under

§ 71.63(b)(3). The determination would have been the first made after the promulgation of the original rule. "Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transport and Transportat1on of Radioactive Materials Under Certain Conditions."

published on June 17. 1974 (39 FR 20960). In a staff requirements memorandum dated October 31. 1996. the Commission disapproved the NRC staff's plan and directed that this policy issue be addressed by rulemaking.

In response. the NRC staff has developed this proposed rule in response to the DOE petition.

Discussion In the final 1974 rule. the NRC anticipated that a large number of shipments of plutonium nitrate liquids could result from spent nuclear fuel repro~essing and revised its regulations to require that plutonium in excess of 0.74 terabequerels (20 curies) be shipped in solid form. The NRC did so because shipment of plutonium liquids is susceptible to leakage, particularly if a shipping package is improperly or not tightly sealed. The value of 0. 74 terabequerels (20 curies) was chosen because it was equal to a large quantity of plutonium as defined in 10 CFR Part 71 in effect in 1974. Although this definition no longer appears in 10 CFR Part 71. the value as applied to double 5

containment of plutonium has been retained. The concern about leakage of liquids arose because of the potential for a large number of packages (probably of more complex desi gn ) to be shipped due to reprocessing and the increased possibility of human error resulting from handling this expanded shipping load.

The NRC treats dispersible plutonium oxide powder in the same way because it also is susceptible to leakage if packages are improperly sealed. Plutonium oxide powder was of particular concern because it was the most likely alternative form (as opposed to plutonium nitrate liquids) for shipment in a fuel reprocessing economy.

To address the concern~with dispersible powder. the NRC required that plutonium not only must be in solid form. but also that solid plutonium be shipped in packages requiring double containment.

In the accompanying statement of considerations to the final 1974 rule. the NRC stated that the additional inner containment requirements are intended to take iQto account that the plutonium may be in a respirable form and that solid forms that are essentially nonrespirable. such as reactor fuel elements. are suitable for exemption from the double containment requirement. The Commission further stated that:

Since the double containment provision compensates for the fact that the plutonium may not be in a "nonrespirable" form. solid forms of plutonium that are essentially nonrespirable should be exempted from the double containment requirement. Therefore. it appears appropriate to exempt from the double containment requirements reactor fuel elements. metal or metal alloy, and other plutonium bearing solids that the Commission determines suitable for such exemption. The latter category provides a means for the Commission to evaluate. on a case-by-case basis. requests for exemption of 6

other solid material where the quantity and form of the material permits a determination that double containment is unnecessary.

DOE's petition to amend§ 71.63. by adding a provision that exempts canisters containing vitrified HLW from the packaging requirement for a separate inner containment is partly based on the rationale that the vitrified HLW meets the intent of the rule because the plutonium will be in an essentially nonrespirable form. The DOE petition contends that the vitrified HLW contained in stainless steel canisters provides a comparable level of safety protection to that provided by spent fuel elements.

Specifically, in the technical information supporting the petition1

• the DOE sought 'to demonstrate that the waste acceptance specifications and process controls in the vitrification process and the waste and canister characteristics compar~ favorably to spent nuclear fuel in terms of the dispersability and respirability of the contents during normal conditions of transport and after an accident. The DOE maintained that impact and leak tests on the canisters.

chemical anaiysis of spent fuel and simulated HLW borosilicate glass. design of the HLW canister. and other studies of the levels of plutonium and other radioactive elements present in the borosilicate glass demonstrate that vitrified HLW canisters are more robust and contain less plutonium than spent reactor fuel elements. During actual transport conditions. the HLW canister will be enclosed within an NRC-certified shipping cask. further reducing the potential for canister damage and for release of respirable particles of HLW glass.

The DOE petition refers to plutonium in the form of borosilicate glass as being essentially nonrespirable. This is because a minute quantity of respirable 1 Technical Justification to Support the PRM by the DOE to Exempt HLW Canisters from 10 CFR 71.63(b). dated September 30. 1993.

7

particles could result if the glass fractures such as during cooldown processes after being poured into the HLW canisters. normal handling and transport conditions. and accident conditions.

In the technical information supporting the petition. the DOE compared the physical and chemical characteristics of the vitrified HLW glass mixture to spent nuclear fuel pellets. Because impact studies of simulated waste glass from the DOE Savannah River site (Ai'ken. South Carolina) have shown comparable levels of fracture resistance and similar fractions of respirable particles when compared to unirradiated uranium fuel pellets and otheP potential waste form materials.

the fracture resistance of HLW glass is expected to be comparable to that of uranium fuel pellets.

The DOE also compared the concentration of plutonium present in a HLW canister from the Savannah River site to that contained in a typical spent reactor fuel element and concluded that the spent reactor fuel element contains at least 100 times the concentration of plutonium expected in a HLW canister.

The DOE stated that the maximum concentration of plutonium projected for the Hanford and West Valley HLW canisters is much less than that of the Savannah River canisters.

The DOE also compared the integrity of the HLW canister to the cladding of a reactor fuel element.

The wall thickness of proposed HLW canisters designs are substantially thicker than the cladding thickness of a reactor fuel element.

Additionally, the DOE noted that reactor fuel elements have been exposed to high levels of radiation which effects the cladding's material properties.

Consequently. the DOE concluded that the protection provided by the HLW canister would be at least comparable to that provided by spent reactor fuel cladding.

Based on DOE documents. it is estimated that there will be 3.500 shipments of vitrified HLW by 2030.

These shipments would not start until a HLW repository 8

or an interim storage facility becomes available. However. the DOE's statement of 3,500 shipments is based on loading two HLW canisters in each reusable shipping cask.

If a separate inner containment is required. the weight of the canister would be increased. This would cause a corresponding decrease in the vitrified glass payload to remain within allowable conveyance weight and/or size limitations. potentially to the point that only one canister could be transported per shipping cask. Consequently, the number of shipments required to transport the existing quantity of waste would increase. Therefore. the proposed rule would have the following benefits:

(1) reductng the occupational dose associated with loading, unloading, decontaminating. and handling the shipping casks: (2) reducing the dose to the public during normal transport by decreasing the total number of shipments: (3) decreasing total loading and unloading time (and resultant expense): and (4) reducing the cost of the containment system.

Proposed Regulatory Action The NRC is proposing to amend 10 CFR 71.63 based on our evaluation of the petition submitted by the DOE. its attachment. "Technical Justification to Support the PRM by the DOE to Exempt HLW Canisters from 10 CFR 71.63(b)." and the three public comments received on the petition after its publication in the Federal Register. 10 CFR 71.63 specifies special provisions when shipping plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 curies) per package, including a separate inner containment system. except when plutonium is in solid form in reactor fuel elements. metal. or metal alloys. In proposing to amend§ 71.63. the NRC is accepting. with modifications. the petition submitted by DOE. for the reasons set forth in the following paragraphs.

9

In an accompanying statement of considerations to the 1974 rule on shipping plutonium. the Commission stated that the additional inner containment requirements are intended to take into account the fact that the plutonium may be in a respirable form.

The safety goal achieved in§ 71.63 is the prevention of releases of respirable forms of plutonium (when shipping over 0.74 TBq) during both normal conditions of transportation and during accidents. The 1974 rule considered both increased numbers of shipments of potentially respirable forms of plutonium. as a result of commercial reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. and an increased potential for a human p~:kag;ng error associated with the larger shipping load.

However. these large numbers of plutonium shipments have not occurred. due in part to policy, technical. and economic decisions to abandon commercial reprocessing in the late 1970s.

Becau~e of the material proper~ies of the vitrified HLW. the sealed canisters. and the approved quality assurance programs as described in the petition. canisters of vitrified HLW packaged in accordance with 10 CFR Part 71 are highly unlikely to result in releases of dispersible or respirable forms of plutonium under normal transportation conditions. as identified under 10 CFR Part

71. Therefore. for normal transportation. the vitrified HLW canisters meet the intent of the§ 71.63(b) requirement without the need for double containment.

As for accident conditions. transportation packages for vitrified HLW will be required to be certified by the NRC pursuant to Section 180 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. as amended (42 USC 10175). and 10 CFR Part 71.

Every package for vitrified HLW will be required to meet the standards for accident resistant (i.e.. Type B) packages as set forth in 10 CFR Part 71.

The shipping casks for vitrified HLW are anticipated to be similar in design and robustness.

and provide a comparable level of protection to shipping casks for spent nuclear fuel.

Because spent nuclear fuel is excluded from the double containment 10

requirement, a favorable comparison of the canisters of vitrified HLW to spent nuclear fuel would support removal of the vitrified HLW forms from double containment.

The tests described in the technical justification demonstrate that the canisters containing the vitrified HLW compare favorably to the cladding surrounding spent fuel pellets in reactor assemblies. The comparison is in terms of physical integrity and containment. based upon the material properties.

dimensions. and the effects of radiation damage to materials.

Th~ DOE analysis demonstrates much lower concentrations of plutonium in the HLW canisters than in spent reactor fuel elements.

However, the DOE has not established an upper limit on plutonium concentration for these vitrified HLW canisters. and the NRC is not basing its decision to remove these canisters from the double containment requirement based on the plutonium 's concenttation.

Jn the technical justification. the DOE described the physical characteristics and acceptance standards of the canisters of vitrified HLW.

including that the canistered waste form be capable of withstanding a 7-meter drop onto a flat. essentially unyielding surface. without breaching or dispersing radionuclides. This requirement is imposed by the DOE's "Waste Acceptance System Requirements Document (WASRD)." Rev. 0. which is referenced in the technical justification supporting the petition. This test should not be confused with the 9-meter drop test onto an essentially unyielding surface. as required by the hypothetical accident conditions in 10 CFR 71.73.

The 9-meter drop test is performed on the entire package under 10 CFR Part 71 certification review by the NRC.

The 7-meter drop applies to the canistered HLW.

which is the content of the NRC-certified Type B package.

The NRC agrees that the 7-meter drop test requirement is relevant to the demonstration that the canistered HLW represents an essentially nonrespirable 11

form for shipping plutonium. It is reasonable to expect that the ?-meter drop test on the canister would be a more severe test than the 9-meter drop test on an NRC-approved Type B package, due to the energy absorption by the packaging and impact limiters. The WASRD acceptance criterion of no "breaching or dispersing radionuclides" could be used to demonstrate that the waste is essentially nonrespirable under accident conditions.

In some of thes~ tests. the HLW canisters were dropped from 9 meters. 2 meters above the DOE ?-meter design standard. and portions of the testing included deliberately introducing flaws (0.95-cm holes) in the canisters* walls.

In these drop tests. all the HLW canisters remained intact. For those HLW canisters tested with the 0.95 cm holes. the quantity of respirable plutonium released through these holes was less than 20 curies. This review has provided the NRC staff confidence that DOE's petition is supportable and that vitrified HLW is.essentially non-respirable in the forms likely to be shipped.

However. the NRC does not control the requirements in. or changes to. the DOE 's WASRD. Many requirements in the WASRD are apparently derived from. or are DOE 's interpretations of. the NRC or other applicable regulations. There are no NRC regulations or other requirements specifying a ?-meter drop test onto an essentially unyielding surface for canistered HLW. Accordingly, the NRC does not have assurance that this test will be retained in future revisions to the WASRD.

Therefore. this test itself does not represent a sufficient basis for removing the regulatory requirement in 10 CFR 71.63 for a separate inner containment.

To address this concern. the proposed rulemaking provides additional requirements beyond those presented in the petition for rulemaking that requested exemption of "Canisters containing vitrified high-level waste." The NRC is proposing to amend 10 CFR 71.63(b) by excluding sealed canisters containing vi trified HLW from the double containment requirement if these canisters meet the 12

specific waste package design criteria in 10 CFR Part 60. The additional requirement to meet 10 CFR Part 60 is responsive to the public comment received on the DOE petition from the State of Idaho by establishing criteria relevant to the intent of the double containment rule.

The design criteria for HLW forms in 10 CFR 60.135(b) and Cc) require that the waste be in solid form, in sealed containers, and that particulate waste forms be consolidated to limit the availability and generation of particulate.

The basis for these technical requirements under 10 CFR Part 60 is to limit particulates for reduced leaching versus limi t ing particulate for respirability.

Nevertheless. the bases are generally consistent. The DOE WASRD, and its associated quality assurance programs. are primarily based upon compliance with 10 CFR Part 60 requirements.

In addition. the NRC is proposing to make a minor formatting change in the languaQe of the regulation and a minor correction to the usage of units in this section to be consistent with existing NRC policy. Metric units are reported first ~ith English units in parenthesis.

Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations The proposed compatibility level for this rulemaking is Division 4 because the change only affects the DOE plutonium shipments. Division 4 rules pertain to those regulatory functions that are reserved solely to the authority of the NRC pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended, and 10 CFR Part 150.

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Electronic Access Comments may be submitted electronically. in either ASCII text or WordPerfect format (version 5.1 or later). by calling the NRC Electronic Bulletin Board (BBS) on FedWorld.

The bulletin board may be accessed using a personal computer. a modem. and one of the commonly available communications software packages. or directly via Internet. Background documents on the rulemaking are also available. as practical. for downloading and viewing on the bulletin board.

If using a personal computer and modem.~the NRC rulemaking subsystem on FedWorld can be accessed directly by dialing the toll free number (800) 303-9672.

Communication software parameters should be set as follows:

parity to none. data bits to 8. and stop bits to 1 (N.8.1).

Using ANSI or VT-100 terminal emulation.

the NRC rulemaking subsystem can then be accessed by selecting the "Rules Menu" option.from the NRC Main Menu." Users will find the "FedWorld Online User's Guides" particularly helpful.

Many NRC subsystems and data bases also have a Help/Information Center" option that is tailored to the particular subsystem.

The NRC subsystem on FedWorld also can be accessed by a direct dial phone number for the main FedWorld BBS. (703) 321-3339. or by using Telnet via Internet: fedworld.gov.

If using (703) 321-3339 to contact FedWorld, the NRC subsystem will be accessed from the main FedWorld menu by selecting the "Regulatory, Government Administration and State Systems." then selecting "Regulatory Information Mall." At that point. a menu will be displayed that has an option "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission" that will take you to the NRC Online main menu.

The NRC Online area also can be accessed directly by typing

"/go nrc" at a FedWorl d command line. If you access NRC from FedWorl d

• s main menu. you may return to FedWorld by selecting the "Return to FedWorld",option 14

from the NRC Online Main Menu.

However. if you access NRC at FedWorld by using NRC's toll-free number. you will have full access to all NRC systems. but you will not have access to the main FedWorld system.

If you contact FedWorld using Telnet. you will see the NRC area and menus.

including the Rules Menu.

Although you will be able to download documents and leave messages. you will not be able to write comments or upload files (comments). If you contact FedWorld using FTP. all files can be accessed and downloaded but uploads are not allowed; all you will see is a list of files without descriptions (normal Gopher look).

An index file listing all files within a subdirectory, with descriptions. is available. There is a 15-minute time limit for FTP access.

Although FedWorld also can be accessed through the World Wide Web. like FTP. that mode only provides access for downloading files and does not display the NRC Rules Menu.

You may also access the NRC's interactive rulemaking web site through the NRC home page (http://www.nrc.gov). This site provides the same access as the FedWorld bulletin board. including the facility to upload comments as files (any format). if your web browser supports that function.

For more information on the NRC bulletin boards call Mr. Arthur Davis.

Systems Integration and Development Branch. NRC. Washington. DC 20555-0001.

telephone (301) 415-5780: e-mail AXD3@nrc.gov.

For information about the interactive rulemaking site. contact Ms. Carol Gallagher. (301) 415-6215; e-mail CAG@nrc.gov.

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Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. as amended. and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part

51. that this rule. if adopted. would not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. and therefore. an environmental impact statement is not required.

The proposed rule change removes shipments of sealed canisters containing vitrified HLW that meet the design criteria in 10 CFR 60.135(b) and (c) from the double containment~packaging requirement.

The additional design requirement supports consistency with the intent of the origina*1 1974 rule.

The primary purpose for double containment is to ensure that any respirable plutonium will not leak into the atmosphere. Vitrified HLW is essentially nonrespirable. and therefore. the packaging requirement for double contaiQment is unnecessary.

The NRC has sent a copy of the environmental assessment and this proposed rule to every State Liaison Officer and requested their comments on the environmental assessment.

The environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room. 2120 L Street NW. (L0wer Level).

Washington. DC.

Single copies of the environmental assessment and the finding of no significant impact are available from Mark Haisfield. Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington. DC 20555-0001. telephone (301) 415-6196.

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Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This proposed rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget. approval number 3150-0008.

Public Protection Notification The NRC may not conduct or sponsor. and a person is not required to respond to. a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid 0MB control number.

Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this proposed regulation.

The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Commission.

The draft analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room. 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level). Washington. DC.

Single copies of the draft analysis may be obtained from Mark Haisfield. Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington.

DC 20555-0001. telephone (301) 415-6196.

The Commission requests public comment on the draft regulatory analysis.

Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.

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Regulatory Flexibility Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)).

the Commission certifies that this rule. if adopted. will not have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities. The rulemaking only affects the DOE shipments of vitrified HLW.

No other entities are involved.

Backfit Analysis The NRC has determined that the backfit rule. 10 CFR 50.109. does not apply to this proposed rule. and therefore. a backfit analysis is not required because these amendments do not involve any provisions that would impose backfits as defined in :o CFR 50.109(a)(l).

List of Subjects 10 CFR Part 71 Criminal penalties. Hazardous materials transportqtion. Nuclear materials.

4t Packaging and containers. Reporting and recordkeeping requirements:

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended: the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. as amended: and 5 U.S.C. 553: the NRC is proposing to adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 71.

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PART 71--PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

1.

The authority citation for Part 71 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 53. 57, 62. 63, 81, 161. 182. 183. 68 Stat. 930. 932.

933, 935, 948, 953. 954, as amended, sec. 1701. 106 Stat. 2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 2073. 2077. 2092. 2093, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233. 2297f); secs. 201. as amended. 202. 206, 88 Stat. 1242. as amended. 1244. 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841. 5842.

5846). Section 71.97 also issued under sec. 301. Pub. L.96-295.

94 Stat. 789-790.

2. Section 71.63 is revised to read as follows :

§ 71.63 Special requirements for plutonium shipments.

(a) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) per package must be shipped as a solid.

(b) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) per package must be packaged in a separate i~ner container placed within outer packaging that meets the requirements of subparts E and F of this part for packaging of material in normal form. If the entire package is subjected to the tests specified in§ 71.71

("Normal conditions of transport"), the separate inner container must not release plutonium as demonstrated to a sensitivity of 10-5 A2/h. If the entire package is subjected to the tests specified in§ 71.73 ("Hypothetical accident conditions").

the separate inner container must restrict the loss of plutonium to not more than A2 in 1 week. The requirements of this paragraph do not apply to solid plutonium in the following forms :

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(1) Reactor fuel elements:

(2) Metal or metal alloy; (3) Sealed canisters containing vitrifi ed high-level waste that meet the design criteria in 10 CFR 60.135(b) and (c): and (4) Other plutonium bearing solids that the Commission determines should be exempt from the requirements of this section.

Dated at Rockville. Maryland. this L~ay of ¥ 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John, Hoyle.

Seer ary of the Commission.

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